G.R. No.

118910 November 16, 1995

KILOSBAYAN, INCORPORATED, et. Al., petitioners vs. Manuel L. MORATO, in his capacity as Chairman
of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office, and the PHILIPPINE GAMING MANAGEMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners seek reconsideration of the court’s decision in this case. The petitioner filed Petition
for Prohibition, Review and/or Injunction seeking to declare the Equipment Lease Agreement between
the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office and the Philippine Gaming Management Corp. invalid. The
petition was dismissed hence, the Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners made two objections against
the ruling: (1) that the constitutional policies and principles invoked by petitioners, while not supplying
the basis for affirmative relief from the courts, may nonetheless be resorted to for striking down laws or
official actions which are inconsistent with them and (2) that the Constitution, by guaranteeing to
independent people's organizations "effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social, political
and economic decision-making" (Art. XIII, §16), grants them standing to sue on constitutional grounds.

ISSUE: Whether or not Article II, Sections 5, 12, 13 and 17 of the 1987 Philippine Constitution are self-
executing provisions.

RULING:

No. The court ruled that the above-mentioned provisions are not self-executing. They do not
confer rights which can be enforced in the courts but only provide guidelines for legislative or executive
action. By authorizing the holding of lottery for charity, Congress has in effect determined that
consistently with these policies and principles of the Constitution, the PCSO may be given this authority.
 G.R. No. 142362 May 3, 2006

PHILIPPINE AGILA SATELLITE INC. and MICHAELC. U. DE GUZMAN, Complainants, vs. JOSEFINA
TRINIDAD-LICHAUCO Undersecretary for Communications, Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC), Respondents.

Facts:

In 1994, Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. (PASI), a duly organized a corporation, had
entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Department of Trade and
Communication (DOTC), concerning the launch of a Philippine-owned satellite into outer space. The
government, thru PASI, obtain two (2) orbital slots for the Philippine satellites after seeking for official
confirmation to then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr.

Sometime in December 1997, however, the respondent Lichauco, then DOTC Undersecretary for
Communications, allegedly maligning the name of complainant [Michael de Guzman] which are contrary
to law, morals and basic norms of good faith and interfering in the business of PASI by offering and
awarding one of the orbital slot to another unknown party despite its prior assignment to PASI.

Petitioner filed a civil complaint against the respondent before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Mandaluyong City. Respondent on the other hand, prayed for its dismissal primarily on the grounds that
the suit is a suit against the State which may not be sued without its consent. The motion to dismiss the
case was denied by the RTC. Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the
Court of Appeals, which subsequently nullified the lower court’s decision. Complainants filed this
Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the CA’s decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent’s defense of state immunity from suit is applicable in this case.

Ruling:

No.The Court rules that the defense of state immunity from suit does not apply since it has
been settled that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State
department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal
and property rights or the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an assumption of authority
which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State
may not be sued without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity
cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
 G.R. No. L-41299 February 21, 1983

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DAVID B. CRUZ, SOCORRO CONCIO CRUZ, and
LORNA C. CRUZ, respondents.

FACTS:

Sometime in March, 1963 respondents Spouses David B. Cruz and Socorro Concio Cruz had a
real estate loan thru SSS. The respondents paid their monthly payments although there were delays
were incurred in their monthly payments which were due every first five (5) days of the month. On July
9, 1968, petitioner SSS filed an application with the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal for the foreclosure of the
real estate mortgage on the ground that the respondent failed to pay the installments due and payable
on the principal debt and the interest thereon. Thereafter, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal successfully
published the notice of foreclosure pursuant to this application for foreclosure.

The respondents filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal an action for damages and
attorney's fees against the SSS and the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal. The trial court rendered judgment
directing the petitioner to pay respondents P2,500.00 as actual damages, P35,000.00 as moral damages,
P10,000.00 as exemplary or corrective damages and P5,000.00 as attorney's fees.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court judgment and modified the judgment
by the elimination of the P5,000.00 moral damages.

Issue: Whether or not SSS as a government entity can be held liable for damages.

RULING:

Yes. SSS is a juridical entity with a personality of its own. It has corporate powers separate and
distinct from the Government. Its own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued in
Court. What is of paramount importance in this controversy is that an injustice is not perpetrated and
that when damage is caused a citizen, the latter should have a right of redress particularly when it arises
from a purely private and contractual relationship between said individual and the System.

The court however find the SSS cannot be held liable for the damages as awarded by the Trial
Court and the Appellate Tribunal.
 G.R. No. 158589 June 27, 2006

PHILIP MORRIS, INC., BENSON & HEDGES (CANADA), INC., and FABRIQUES DE TABAC REUNIES, S.A.,
(now known as PHILIP MORRIS PRODUCTS S.A.), Petitioners,
vs.
FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, Respondent.

FACTS:

Petitioners, registered owners of the cigarette trademarks "MARK VII", "MARK TEN" and “LARK”,
respectively filed a complaint against the respondent, a Philippine registered company using the
trademark "MARK” for cigarettes for Infringement of Trademark and Damages. The petitioners invoked
the provisions of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property to which
the Philippines is a signatory. Petitioners pointed out that upon the request of an interested party, a
country of the Union may prohibit the use of a trademark which constitutes a reproduction, imitation, or
translation of a mark already belonging to a person entitled to the benefits of the said Convention, even
in the absence of actual use of the product in our country.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Paris Convention, an international law is superior over a municipal law.

HELD: No.

Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any
means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the
doctrine of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of International Law are given a standing
equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments.