Case No.

Tañada vs Tuvera

GR No. L-63915, April 24, 1985

Facts

Petitioners invoking the people’s right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right
recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution as well as the principle
that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the official gazette or otherwise
defectively promulgated.

Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondents public officials to publish, and/or
cause the publication in the official gazette the various, Presidential Decrees, Letter of
Instructions, general orders, Proclamations, Executive Orders, letters of implementation, and
administrative orders.

Issue:

Whether or not publication to the Official Gezatte is required to all presidential issuances.

Ruling:

Yes. It is required. All unpublished issuances which are of general application and of public
nature, and unless published, shall have no binding force nor effect.

In Pesigan vs. Angeles, the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is
necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. "

Therefore, it is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially
and specifically informed of its contents
 Case No. 2

LEAL vs. I.A.C

G.R. 137110 AUGUST 1, 2000

FACTS:

A document entitled “Compraventa”, involving sale of three parcels of land was executed
by the respondents’ predecessor, Vicente Santiago, and Cirio Leal the deceased father of some
of the petitioners. At the back of the document was an annotation prohibiting the sale of the land
to third person or strangers to the contract other than the Vicente Santiago or his heirs or
successors.

25 years after, Vicente Santiago approached the petitioners and offered repurchased of
the subject properties. Petitioners refused the offer. Respondent then filed a complaint which
was dismissed by the Court of First Instance and Court of Appeals. Upon filing for motion for
reconsideration, the Court of Appeals promulgated a resolution reversing the previous decision
and granting the right to repurchase in favor of the respondent.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the annotation at the back of the “Compraventa” is a valid right to
repurchase

RULING:

No. Article 1306 states that, “That contracting parties may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. The condition at the back of the TCT,
prohibiting the sell to third party is contrary to public policy, since it amounts to a perpetual
restriction to the right of ownership, specifically the owner's right to freely dispose of his
properties. Further, under 2nd paragraph of Article 1606, should there be agreement as to time,
although it is indefinite, therefore, the right should be exercised within ten years. Based on the
fact presented, the respondent attempted to exercised his right of repurchase 25 years from the
date of the contract, the said right is undoubtedly expired.

Hence, the court reinstated the decision promulgated on June 28, 1978 dismissing the
complaint and order cancellation of the prohibition to sell at the back of the TCTs.
 Case No. 3

CIR vs AICHI FORGING COMPANY

G.R. No. 184823 October 06, 2010

FACTS:

Aichi Forging Company of Asia, taxpayer, filed a VAT refund case on September 30,
2004,covered period is from July 01 to September 30, 2002, with CIR through DOF One Stop Shop
Inter-Agency Tax Credit. On the same date, the taxpayer filed a petition for review with the CTAdocketed
as CTA Case No. 7065, and the result was favored to the taxpayer, granting partial claim for refund.
However, CIR, maintains that the taxpayer’s administrative and judicial claims were filed in violation of
Sections 112(a) and 229 of the NIRC. CIR further argues that CTA En Banc erred in applying Sec. 114
(a) of the NIRC in determining the star of the two-year period as the provision pertains to the compliance
requirements in the payment of VAT and insisting that such procedural requirement is based on the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and the fact that the CTA is an appellate body
exercising judicial review over administrative actions of the BIR.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the computation of legal periods for prescription should be pursuant to Section 31
of Administrative Code.

RULING:

Yes, the claim for refund was filed within the prescribed period pursuant to Section 31 of the
Administrative Code under Executive Order (EO) No. 292 which superseded Article 13 of the Civil Code
under EO No. 200 based on the legal maxim, Lex posteriori derogate priori. Though both deal with the
same subject matter in computing legal periods, however, under Administrative Code the year is
composed of 12 calendar months while Civil Code is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year
or leap year. On the other hand, with respect to the granting of the claim, SC reversed and dismiss the
CTA Case No. 7065 for having been prematurely filed.

In view of the above-mentioned, the prescriptive period for the claiming of VAT refund shall be
based on Section 31 of the Administrative Code regardless if it is a regular or leap year.
 Case No. 4

G. R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985

Dorn vsRomillo

Facts:

Ms. Alice Reyes Van Dorn, the petitioner, is a citizen of the Philippines while Mr.
Richard Upton, the private respondent is a citizen of the United States. They were married in
Hongkong in 1972 and established residence in the Philippines after marriage. In 1982, the
parties were divorced in Nevada, U.S.A. Ms. Dorn then remarried also in Nevada to Theodore
Van Dorn.

On June 8, 1983, the private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil case No.
1075-P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, Pasay City, primarily seeking right to manage
the petitioner’s business (Galleon Shop) in Ermita, Manila citing that the said business is a
conjugal property.

The petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred
by previous judgement in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent
had acknowledges that he and the petitioner had “no community property” as of June 11, 1982.
The RTC denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that the property involved was located in
the Philippines and that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case.

The denial is now the subject of the certiorari filed to the Supreme Court.

Issue:

Whether or not the Nevada divorce is valid and binding in the Philippines.

Ruling:

Yes. The Nevada divorce is valid and binding in the Philippines especially so that the
respondent is a citizen of the U.S.A.

The divorce in Nevada released the private respondent from the marriage from the
standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court,
which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is
estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged
conjugal property.
 Case No. 5

Bellis vs Bellis

20 SCRA 358

Facts:

Amog Bellis was a citizen of the States of Texas and of the US. By his 1st wife, whom he
divorced, he had 5 legitimate children (one pre deceased in infancy), by his 2nd wife, he had 3
legitimate children and finally he had 3 illegitimate children, Amos Bellis Jr., Maria Cristina, and
Miriam Palma.

On August 5, 1952, he executed a will wherein after all taxes are paid, his estates should
be divided as follows: a) $240,000 to his 1st wife, b) P120,000 to his 3 illegitimate children, and
c) all remaining will be distributed to his 7 legitimate children. When he died on July 8, 1958, his
will was admitted to probate in the Court of First instance of Manila.

The Peoples Bank and Trust Company (executor of the will) paid all bequests includingthe
amount reserved for the 1st wife and his 3 illegitimate children. The residual estate was divided
into 7 for the legitimate children in the "Project of Partition", however, 2 of the illegitimate
children (Maria and Miriam) filed their oppositions on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children and therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.

Issue:

W/N the validity of Amog Bellis' will and tge succesional rights of the illegitimate children
are governed by the Texas Laws and not the Philippines Laws.

Ruling:

Yes. Amog Bellis' will and the succession rights of his illegitimate children are under Texas
Laws.

Amog Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and the US and died a resident of Texas.
Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decendent, the Texas
law, which does not provide for legitimes.

The order of the probate court was affirmed because under the Texas law, there are no
forced heirs or legitimes and since the will and successional rights are to be determined by the
said law, the Philippines law cannot be applied to the testacy of Amog Bellis.
 Case No. 6

G.R. No. 205487 November 12, 2014

ORION SAVINGS BANK, Petitioner,
vs.
SHIGEKANE SUZUKI, Respondent.

Facts:

Shigekane Suzuki (Suzuki), a Japanese national, met with Ms. Helen Soneja
(Soneja) to inquire about a condominium unit and a parking slot at Cityland Pioneer,
Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang (Kang), a Korean national and
a Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder.

Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536 [covered by Condominium Certificate of Title
(CCT) No. 18186] and Parking Slot No. 42 [covered by CCT No. 9118] were for sale for
₱3,000,000.00. After a brief negotiation, the parties agreed to reduce the price to
₱2,800,000.00.Suzuki and Kang then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 26, 2003
covering Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42. Soon after, Suzuki took possession of the
condominium unit and parking lot, and commenced the renovation of the interior of the
condominium unit.

Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the titles to the
properties, which were then allegedly in possession of Alexander Perez (Perez, Orion’s
Loans Officer) .Despite several verbal demands, Kang failed to deliver the documents.
Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to verify the
status of the properties with the Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds.

Before long, Suzuki learned that CCT No. 9118 representing the title to the Parking Slot
No. 42 contained no annotations although it remained under the name of Cityland
Pioneer. This notwithstanding, Cityland Pioneer, through Assistant Vice President
Rosario D. Perez, certified that Kang had fully paid the purchase price of Unit. The title
to the condominium unit had no existing encumbrance, except for anannotation under
Entry No. 73321/C-10186 which provided that any conveyance or encumbrance of CCT
No. 18186 shall be subject to approval by the Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA).
Although CCT No. 18186 contained Entry No. 66432/C-10186 dated February 2, 1999
representing a mortgage in favor of Orion for a ₱1,000,000.00 loan, that annotation was
subsequently cancelled on June 16, 2000 by Entry No. 73232/T. No. 10186. Despite the
cancellation of the mortgage to Orion, the titles to the properties remained in possession of
Perez.

Suzuki then executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim dated September 8, 2003, withthe
Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City, annotated as Entry No. 3292/C-No. 18186 in
CCT No. 18186. Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the titles.Orion, (through Perez),
however, refused to surrender the titles, and cited the need to consult Orion’s legal
counsel as its reason.

On October 14, 2003, Suzuki received a letter from Orion’s counsel dated October 9,
2003, stating that Kang obtained another loan in the amount of ₱1,800,000.00. When Kang
failed to pay, he executed a Dacion en Pago dated February 2, 2003, in favorof Orion covering
Unit No. 536. Orion, however, did not register the Dacion en Pago, until October 15, 2003.

On October 28, 2003, Suzuki executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over Parking Slot
No. 42 (covered by CCT No. 9118) and this was annotated as Entry No. 4712/C-No.
9118 in the parking lot’s title.

On January 27, 2004, Suzuki filed a complaint for specific performance and damages
against Kang and Orion.

In its decision dated June 29, 2009, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213,
Mandaluyong City ruled infavor of Suzuki and ordered Orion to deliver the CCT Nos.
18186 and 9118 to Suzuki.
The RTC further ordered Orion and Kang to jointly and severally pay Suzuki moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, appearance fees, expenses for litigation
and cost of suit. Orion timely appealed the RTC decision with the CA.

On August 23, 2012, the CA partially granted Orion’s appeal and sustained the RTC
insofar as it upheld Suzuki’s right over the properties.Orion sought a reconsideration of
the CA decision but the CA denied the motion in its January 25, 2013 resolution. Orion
then filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 with this Court.
The Petition and Comment
Orion’s petition is based on the following grounds/arguments:
1. The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and void. Under
Korean law, any conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with the
consent of both spouses;
2. Suzuki is not a buyer in good faith for he failed to check the owner’s duplicate
copies of the CCTs;
3. Knowledge of the PRA restriction under Entry No. 73321/C-10186, which
prohibits any conveyance or encumbrance of the property investment, defeats
the alleged claim of good faith by Suzuki; and
4. Orion should not be faulted for exercising due diligence.
Issue:
Wether or Not the Petition for Cerotiorari should be Granted.

Ruling:
Denied, due to lack of merit.
 Orion failed to prove the authenticity of the Dacion en Pago, we see no reason
for the application of the rules on double sale under Article 1544 of the New Civil Code.
Suzuki, moreover, successfully adduced sufficient evidence to establish the validity of
conveyance in his favor.
Orion should not be allowed to successfully assail the good faith of Suzuki on the basis
of the PRA restriction.
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is
merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang. In other words, the import from the
certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in
his name alone, and that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung.
 Case No. 7:

University of the East vs. Romeo A. Jader G.R. 132344

February 17, 2000

FACTS:

Romeo Jader was enrolled in the University of the East, College of Law from 1984 up to 1988.
In the first semester of his last school year which was SY: 1987-1988, he failed to take the final
examination in his Practice Court I and was given an incomplete grade. On February 1, 1988,
where Jader was already enrolled in the second semester as a fourth year law student, he filed
an application for the removal of his incomplete grade given by his Professor which was
Professor Carlos Ortega. The application of removal was approved by Dean Tiongson. Jader
received a failing grade of five (5). Surprisingly, on April 15, 1988, Jader’s name appeared as
one of the tentative candidates for the 35th Commencement Exercises. Jader attended the said
graduation ceremony and even prepared himself for the bar examination. Jader failed to take
the bar examination because of his deficiency.

Jader sued the said university for damages claiming that he suffered moral shock, anguish,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, & sleepless nights.

The judgement of the lower court favored Jader ordering the university to pay a sum of 35, 470
pesos and the amount of 5,000 pesos for the cost of suit. The Court of Appeals affirmed this
judgement with modification and ordered the university to pay 50,000 pesos for moral damages.

ISSUE: Whether or not the University of the East has liability to Romeo Jader

HELD:

Yes. The university belatedly informed the student of his deficiency, particularly at a time when
he was already preparing for the bar examinations. This act shows that the university failed to
act in good faith which is an abuse of the right under Art.19 of the Civil Code. Furthermore, the
university is engaged in a legal education which means that it should practice the principle of
good dealings stated in Art. 19 & Art. 20 of the Civil Code.

However, the Supreme Court strongly stated that Jader should not have been awarded of moral
damages because as a senior law student, he should be responsible enough to ensure that all
his affairs particularly his academic achievement, are in order.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed with modification. The University
of the East is ordered to pay the sum of 35,470 pesos and 5,000 pesos for the cost of suit. The
award of moral damage is deleied.
 Case No. 8

ST. LUKE’S COLLEGE OF MEDICINE- WILLIAM H. QUASHA MEMORIAL

FOUNDATION V. SPOUSES MANUEL AND ESMERALDA PEREZ & SPOUSES ERIC
AND JURISITA QUINTOS +
G.R. NO. 222770
SEPTEMBER 28, 2016
PEREZ, J.
Facts:

The petionioner entered into a Memorandum of Intent with the Municipality of Cabiao,
Nueva Ecija for a construction of a community clinic. The said facility consisted of six-bed
medical facility in the ground floor and a residential space for medical staff in the second floor.
St. Luke’s sent four of its medical students including the daughters of the respondents to
complete a four- week clerkship rotation at the clinic, and like the previous batches, they were
housed on the second floor of the clinic.
On February 9, 2010, a fire broke out on the second floor resulting to the death of the
female medical students, including the daughters of the plaintiff- appellants, due to smoke
inhalation resulting “to asphyxia”. The Bureau of Fire Protection (BFP) conducted an
investigation on the incident and certified that the fire was accidental in nature due to unattended
cooking.
Respondents had their doubts and sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) and the latter declared that the construction of the Cabiao Community Clinic building was
a violation of the provisions of the Revised Fire Code of the Philippines.
Respondents then filed a complaint for damages against petitioner claiming that their
negligence caused the deaths of respondents’ daughters.
The Regional Trial Court(RTC) dismissed the complaint for lack of merit but upon
appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC decision and remanded the case to the RTC
for reception of evidence on the amount of damages to be awarded.

Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for the deaths of medical students for being
negligent.

Ruling:
Yes. The petitioners and the victims are bound by the enrolment contracts. Institutions of
learning have the “built-in” obligation of providing a conducive atmosphere for learning where
there are no constant threats to life and limb, and where peace and order are maintained. The law,
recognizing the obligatory force of contracts, will not permit a party to be set free from liability
of any kind of misperformance of the contractual undertaking or a contravention of the tenor
thereof.
 In the case at bar, the Cabiao Community Clinic is to be considered as part of the campus
premises of St. Luke’s. As such, it was mandatory upon petitioners to ensure that the said clinic
was conducive for learning, that it has no constant threats to life and limb and that peace and
order was maintained thereat. Petitioner failed to comply with this obligation. It failed to take the
necessary precautions to guard their students against foreseeable harm, it remiss in inspecting the
premises of the Cabiao Community Clinic and in ensuring that the necessary permits were in
order. These precautions could have minimized the risk to the safety of the victims. Hence,
petitioner is liable for being negligent.
 Case No. 9
G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984
ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY
BEDENIA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

FACTS:

On February 8, 1964,the petitioners, together with John Doe alias ‘Tato’, and Fourteen
Richard Does, Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermundo, Christopher Villanoac,
GodofredoVillania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales, Ricardo Celestino and Jose Ortega,
wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, threatened and violently prevented Antonio Vergara and his
family to close their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Municipality of Jose
Panganiban, Province of CamarinesNorte, at around 9:00 AM that day. Using their axes and
other instruments, the group destroyed the furnitures inside, taking with them the goods,
merchandise and wares that the family owns. The actual and moral damages amounted to PhP
30,000.00 while the exemplary damages were valued at PhP 20,000.00.

It was found out that Roy Padilla, who was at the time the seating mayor of the said
Municipality, and all others who were then serving as policemen aside from the lone civilian,
Ricardo Celestino, all used their public positions in the commission of the crime and, did so with
evident premeditation.

The Court of First Instance of CamarinesNorte found the abovementioned petitioners

guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and imposed to imprison them
for 5 months and 1 day and to pay the necessary fines as provided by law. The other persons
with them at the crime scene were found not guilty due to the insufficiency of evidence proving
their involvement.

The petitioners appealed their case to the Court of Appeals and argued that Padilla,
being the Mayor, has the power to clear the market premises, pursuant to the existing municipal
ordinances vis-à-vis the market stalls that allegedly become a nuisance in the area, which
included that which was owned by Antonio Vergara and his family. The petitioners further
questioned the ruling of the lower court regarding their case, arguing that their decision is not
supported by evidence. The Court of Appeals decided to acquit them on the ground of
reasonable doubt, yet still ordered the petitioners to pay a total of PhP 9,600.00 to the
complainants for the actual damages.

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration stating that since they were already
acquitted for their criminal liability, logically then, they also should be free from paying their
alleged civil liabilities. The Court of Appeals did not allow the said motion and pointed out that
since the acquittal of the appellant was based on reasonable doubt, and not on facts that they
indeed took the law in their own hands and that damages were inflicted to the complainants,
their decision to demand them to pay fines was justified.

The petitioners, then, argued that the Court of Appeals committed “a legal inconsistency,
if not plain judicial error”, in the special civil action that they filed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioners are civilly liable to pay the fine amounting to PhP 9,600.00
to the complainants if they were already acquitted by the court for their criminal liability?

RESULTS:

Since the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based not on
facts but only on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286), and that although the
petitioners were acquitted for their criminal liabilities, it is merely based on reasonable doubt
because it is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complainants and
carted away its contents, which even the petitioners themselves did not deny. Therefore, the
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals and dismissed the petition for lack
of merit.
 Case No. 10

DONATO vs LUNA

G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988

FACTS:

Mr. Donato, petitioner, is charged for bigamy by a complaint of private respondent, Donato’s
second wife,Ms. Abayan. Prior to the action for bigamy, Ms. Abayan filed a case with Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Manila, to void or nullify her marriage with the petitioner based on the ground
that she had no previous knowledge that Mr. Donato was already married. However, Mr. Donato
response was his marriage with Ms. Abayan is void, because it has no marriage license and force were
employed by Ms. Abayan. Before the celebration of the marriage, Mr. Donato and Ms. Abayan, had lived
together for 5 years as husband and wife ratified by their marriage license pursuant to Article 76 of the
Civil Code. Not until Ms. Abayan found out that Mr. Donato had a previous married.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the criminal case for bigamy required to be postpone with respect to the civil case
for annulment on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question.

RULING:

Yes, the criminal case for bigamy should be postponed with respect to the civil case for
annulment on the ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question. Under the principle on the
decision of “Landicho vs Relova”, cannot apply the rule on prejudicial questions since a case for
annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to bigamy case against the petitioner
only, if it is proved that the petitioner’s consent to such marriage was obtained by means of duress,
violence, intimidation and undue influence.

Therefore, the civil case for annulment filed was not constitutes a prejudicial question to the
criminal case for bigamy, and should be sustained.
 Case No. 11

ZAPANTA vs MONTESA

G.R. No. L-14534 February 28, 1962

FACTS:

Co, respondent, filed a bigamy case against Zapanta, petitioner, charging that was previously
married to Estrella Guarin, and without having the said marriage dissolved contracted a second marriage
with the complainant. On June 16, 1958, Zapanta filed a case against Co for the annulment of their
marriage on the ground of duress, force and intimidation. At a later date, Co filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint upon the ground that it stated no cause of action but the same was denied by the court. On
September 2, 1958Zapanta filed a motion to suspend proceedings on the ground that the civil case was a
prejudicial question. Respondent judge denied the motion as well as petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration and ordered his arraignment. After entering a plea of not guilty, petitioner field the present
action.

ISSUES:

Whether or not, the case is prejudicial question

RULING:

Yes, the civil action for annulment must first be decided before the action for bigamy can proceed.
A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal.Thus,
the issue involved in the action for the annulment of the second marriage is determinative of petitioner’s
guilt or innocence of the crime of bigamy.

Therefore, the petition was granted without any costs.

 Case No. 12

MERCADO vs. TAN

G.R. 137110 AUGUST 1, 2000

FACTS:

The accused Dr. Vincent Mercado, while still being married to Ma. Thelma Olivia,
entered into a contract of marriage to the complainant Ma. Consuelo Tan on June 27, 1991. No
dispute was made at the time of the celebration of the wedding. Accused has two children in his
first marriage and one child with the complainant.

A year or so into the marriage, a letter of complaint for bigamy was filed against the
accused. More than a month after the bigamy case was filed, the accused filed an action for the
declaration of nullity of marriage against his first wife, and on May 6, 1993 the marriage between
Mercado and Olivia was declared null and void.

The lower court charged the accused with bigamy and the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision. Hence, the accused filed a petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused committed the crime of bigamy given the fact that his first
marriage is ab initio.

RULING:

Yes, accused is guilty of the crime of bigamy. Under Article 40 of the family code, the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposed of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such marriage void.

The accused contracted a second marriage although there was no judicial declaration of
the nullity of his first marriage. In fact, he instituted the nullity of marriage only after a complaint
was filed against him.

Henceforth, by contracting a marriage while the first one was still existent, the accused is
guilty of the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
 Case No. 13:

Te vs. Court of Appeals G.R. 126746

November 29, 2000

FACTS:

Arthur Te (petitioner) and Liliana Choa (private respondent) were married in a civil rites on
September 14, 1988. They did not live together after the marriage although they would meet
each other regularly. Not until when private respondent gave birth to a girl on April 21, 1989,
petitioner stopped visiting her. On May 20, 1989, while the petitioner is still married to the
private respondent, he contracted a second marriage with Julia Santella. When Liliana learned
about the petitioner’s marriage to Santella, she filed a case against the petitioner charging him
with bigamy on August 9, 1990. Also on November 8, 1990, Liliana filed with the PRC for the
revocation of the engineering license against the petitioner & Santella on the ground of
committing immoral acts.

Meanwhile, on July 20, 1990, Te filed an action for annulment of his marriage on a ground that
he was forced to marry her, that Liliana concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of
their marriage, & was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital obligations.

The RTC rendered its judgement although the petition for annulment was still pending

The petitioner appealed to this stating that the nullity of his marriage has to be resolved first in
the civil case before the criminal proceedings could continue.

ISSUE: Whether or not the civil case should be resolved first before the criminal case

HELD:

No. The Court of Appeals stated that pendency of the civil case for annulment of marriage did
not pose a prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy be
suspended until the civil case is terminated. The outcome of the civil case had no bearing upon
the determination of petitioner’s guilt or innocence in the criminal case for bigamy. That the
petitioner already committed bigamy the moment his first marriage subsisted at the time of his
second marriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied.

 Case No. 14

Quiambao vs. Osario

G.R. no. L-48157, March 16, 1988

Facts:

A complaint for forcible entry was filed bu private respondents Zenaida Gaza, Buensucero,
Justina Gaza Bernardo and Felipe Gaza against petitioner Ricardo Quiambao before the
Municipal Court of Malabon, Rizal. Private respondents were allegedly the legitimate
possessors of a 30,853 sq m lot by virtue of the Agreement Sell no. 3482 executed by DAR.
Petitioner entered into the 400sq m portion and placed bamboo posts over it.

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there is a pending
administrative case involving said parties and said lot, hence, a prejudicial question which bars
a judicial action until after its termination.

When the Municipal Court denied the motion to dismiss, the petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari with injunction before the court of first instance of Rizal against Judge Osorio and the
private respondents.

The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss petition maintaining that the administrative
case did not constitute a prejudicial question as it involved the question of ownership. The CFI
dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order issued. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the dismissal order was also denied for lack of merit, hence, this appeal by
petitioner Quiambao.

Issue:

W/N the administrative case between the parties involving the lot subject matter of the
ejectment case constitutes a prejudicial question which would operate as a bar to said
ejectment case.

Ruling:

No. The administrative case does not constitute a prejudicial question.

A prejudicial question is understood in law to be that which arises in a case the resolution of
which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. 1 The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play generally in a
situation where civil and criminal actions are pending and the issues involved in both cases are
similar or so closely related that an issue must be pre-emptively resolved in the civil case before
the criminal action can proceed. Thus, the existence of a prejudicial question in a civil case is
alleged in the criminal case to cause the suspension of the latter pending final determination of
the former.
The essential elements of a prejudicial question as provided under Section 5, Rule 111 of the
Revised Rules of Court are: [a] the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to
the issue in the criminal action; and [b] the resolution of such issue determines whether or not
the criminal action may proceed.

The actions involved in the case at bar being civil and administrative in character, it is obvious
that technically, there is no prejudicial question involved. However, the petition was granted and
the Civil Case was dismissed because there is a correlation between the 2 proceedings
stemming from the fact that the right of the private respondents to eject petitioner from the
disputed portion depends primarily on the resolution of the pending administrative case.