Andrew D.

Echavez

CRISANTA ALCARAZ MIGUEL v. JERRY D. MONTANEZ

GR No. 191336, 2012-01-25

Facts: The respondent Jerry Montanez (Montanez) secured a loan o P143, 864.00 payable in
one (1) year, or until February 1, 2002, from the petitioner. The respondent gave as collateral
therefor his house and lot. Due to the respondent's failure to pay the loan, the petitioner filed a
complaint against the respondent before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay San Jose,
Rodriguez, and Rizal. The parties entered into a Kasunduang Pagaayos wherein the respondent
agreed to pay his loan in installments in the amount of P2, 000.00/per month, and in the event
the house and lot given as collateral is sold, the respondent would settle the balance of the loan
in full. However, the respondent still failed to pay, and on December 13, 2004, the Lupong
Tagapamayapa issued a certification to file action in court in favor of the petitioner. The petitioner
filed a complaint for Collection of Sum of Money. The respondent raised the defense of improper
venue considering that the petitioner was a resident of Bagumbong, Caloocan City while he lived
in San Mateo, Rizal.
Issues: WHETHER OR NOT a complaint for sum of money is the proper remedy for the petitioner
considering the existing Kasunduang Pagaayos
Ruling:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that because the respondent failed to comply with the terms of the
Kasunduang Pagaayos, said agreement is deemed rescinded pursuant to Article 2041 of the New
Civil Code and the petitioner can insist on his original demand. Perforce, the complaint for
collection of sum of money is the proper remedy. It is true that an amicable settlement reached at
the barangay conciliation proceedings, like the Kasunduang Pagaayos in this case, is binding
between the contracting parties and, upon its perfection, is immediately executory insofar as it is
not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public order and public policy.
 Submitted by: Jing R. Reyes
Swagman vs. CA [GR NO. 161135, April 8, 2005]

FACTS: Sometime in 1996 and 1997, Swagman through Atty. Infante and Hegerty, its president
and vice-president, respectively, obtained from Christian loans evidenced by three promissory
notes dated 7 August 1996, 14 March 1997, and 14 July 1997. Each of the promissory notes is
in the amount of US$50,000 payable after three years from its date with an interest of 15% per
annum payable every three months. In a letter dated 16 December 1998, Christian informed the
petitioner corporation that he was terminating the loans and demanded from the latter payment
of said loans.
On 2 February 1999, Christian filed with the RTC a complaint for a sum of money and damages
against the petitioner corporation, Hegerty, and Atty. Infante.
The petitioner corporation, together with its president and vice-president, filed an Answer raising
as defenses lack of cause of action. According to them, Christian had no cause of action because
the three promissory notes were not yet due and demandable.
The trial court ruled that under Section 5 of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a
complaint which states no cause of action may be cured by evidence presented without objection.
Thus, even if the plaintiff had no cause of action at the time he filed the instant complaint, as
defendants’ obligation are not yet due and demandable then, he may nevertheless recover on the
first two promissory notes in view of the introduction of evidence showing that the obligations
covered by the two promissory notes are now due and demandable. When the instant case was
filed on February 2, 1999, none of the promissory notes was due and demandable, but , the first
and the second promissory notes have already matured during the course of the proceeding.
Hence, payment is already due. This finding was affirmed in toto by the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not a complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was filed be cured
by the accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of the case.

HELD: No. Cause of action, as defined in Section 2, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
is the act or omission by which a party violates the right of another. Its essential elements are as
follows:
1. A right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created;
2. An obligation on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
3. Act or omission on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may
maintain an action for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of the last element that a cause of action arises, giving the
plaintiff the right to maintain an action in court for recovery of damages or other appropriate relief.
Such interpretation by the trial court and CA of Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure is erroneous. The curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action
in fact exists at the time the complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for failure to allege
the essential facts. Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure in order that the actual merits of a case may be determined in the most expeditious
and inexpensive manner without regard to technicalities and that all other matters included in the
case may be determined in a single proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity of suits.
 NATHANIEL JR. GOLLA
Barrido vs. Nonato
Facts:
A Petition for Review was filed by petitioner Barrido questioning the decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) and its resolution which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Bacolod City, Branch 53, which ordered the partition of the subject property.
In the course of the marriage of respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta
N. Barrido, they were able to acquire a property consisting of a house and lot. Nonato asked
Barrido for partition, but the latter refused.
Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod
City, Branch 3. Barrido moved for the dismissal of the complaint because the MTCC lacked
jurisdiction, the partition case being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
MTCC rendered a Decision ordering the conjugal property to be adjudicated to the
defendant Marietta Nonato, the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose
to remain.
Nonato appealed the MTCC Decision before the RTC which reversed the ruling of the
MTCC. It ordered the parties to equitably partition the house and lot; to reimburse Joseph
Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato of the amount advanced by them in payment of the debts and
obligation with Philippine National Bank; and to deliver the presumptive legitimes of Joseph
Raymund and Joseph Leo Nonato pursuant to Article 51 of the Family Code.
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. It held that since the property's assessed
value was only P8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCC's jurisdiction. Barrido filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which was, however, denied for lack of merit. Hence, Barrido brought the case
to the Court via a Petition for Review.
Issue:
Whether or not CA erred in holding that the MTCC had jurisdiction to try the present case.
Ruling:
CA did not err in holding that the MTCC had jurisdiction to try the present case. Contrary
to Barrido's contention, the MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or those
affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property. Section 33 of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 129 provides:

Section 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does
not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of
such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by
R.A. No. 7691)

Here, the subject property's assessed value was merely P8,080.00, an amount which certainly
does not exceed the required limit of P20,000.00 for civil actions outside Metro Manila to fall within
the jurisdiction of the MTCC. Therefore, the lower court correctly took cognizance of the instant
case.
 SAYCO, MAUREEN AVA L.
G.R. No. 173915 February 22, 2010
RENE SANTE AND REYNALDO SANTE, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 60,
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, and VITA N. KALASHIAN, Respondents.Topic:
Jurisdiction
Facts:
On April 5, 2004, Respondent Vita N. Kalashian filed before the RTC of Baguio City a complaint
for damages against petitioners. In her complaint, respondent alleged that while she was inside
the Police Station of Natividad, Pangasinan, and in the presence of other persons and police
officers, petitioner Irene Sante uttered words, which when translated in English are as follows,
"How many rounds of sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert? You fuckin’ bitch!" Bert
refers to Albert Gacusan, respondent’s friend and one (1) of her hired personal security guards
detained at the said station and who is a suspect in the killing of petitioners’ close relative.
Petitioners also allegedly went around Natividad, Pangasinan telling people that she is protecting
and cuddling the suspects in the aforesaid killing. Thus, respondent prayed that petitioners be
held liable to pay moral damages in the amount of ₱300,000.00; ₱50,000.00 as exemplary
damages; ₱50,000.00 attorney’s fees; ₱20,000.00 litigation expenses; and costs of
suit.Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that it was the Municipal Trial Court in
Cities (MTCC) and not the RTC of Baguio, that had jurisdiction over the case. They argued that
the amount of the claim for moral damages was not more than the jurisdictional amount of
₱300,000.00, because the claim for exemplary damages should be excluded in computing the
total claim.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of Jurisdiction. The trial court held that
the total claim of respondent amounted to ₱420,000.00 which was above the jurisdictional amount
for MTCCs outside Metro Manila. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the
CA raising that RTC Baguio committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment of
the complaint. The CA ruled in favor of the petitioner, hence this petition for certiorari.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
2. Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment
of the complaint.
Ruling:
1. Yes, the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.
2. No, the RTC did not committed grave abuse of discretion in allowing the amendment of
the complaint since the nature of the complaint is for recovery of damages for the alleged
malicious acts of petitioners. The complaint principally sought an award of moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, for the alleged
shame and injury suffered by respondent by reason of petitioners’ utterance while they
were at a police station in Pangasinan. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law
based on the facts alleged in the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement
of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff’s causes of action. It is clear, based on the
allegations of the complaint, that respondent’s main action is for damages. Hence, the
other forms of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of
the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint.
 QUIBOT, REEHNA GERALYN I

G.R. No. 158401 January 28, 2008

PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY vs WILLIAM GOTHONG & ABOITIZ (WG&A), INC

FACTS: After the expiration of the lease contract of Veterans Shipping Corporation over the
Marine Slip Way in the North Harbor, petitioner WG&A requested respondent PPA for it to be
allowed to lease and operate the said facility. Thereafter, President Estrada issued a
memorandum addressed to the DOTC and PPA, stating that it has approved the request of WG&A
to lease the Marine Slip Way from January 1 to June 30, 2001 or until such time that respondent
PPA turns over its operations to the winning bidder for the North Harbor Modernization Project.
The said contract was eventually conformed to and signed by the petitioner company. And in
accordance the PPA surrendered possession of the Marine Slip Way in favor of the petitioner.
However, believing that the said lease already expired on June 30, 2001, respondent PPA
subsequently sent a letter to WG&A directing the latter to vacate the contested premises and to
turn over the improvements made.

In response, WG&A wrote to PPA urging the latter to reconsider its decision to eject the former.
But the PPA denied such. Thus petitioner WG&A commenced an Injunction suit before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila. Petitioner claims that the PPA unjustly, illegally and prematurely
terminated the lease contract.

Petitioner amended its complaint for the first time. The complaint was still denominated as one
for Injunction with prayer for TRO. In the said amended pleading, the WG&A incorporated
statement to the effect that PPA is already estopped from denying that the correct period of lease
is "until such time that the North Harbor Modernization Project has been bidded out to and
operations turned over to the winning bidder”. The TRO sought was denied by the trial court.
While the CA granted respondent's petition, thereby setting aside the RTC orders and directing
the RTC to admit respondent's second amended

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RTC COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED THE ADMISSION OF THE SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT.

HELD: NO, The CA did not err in finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the Order dated March 22, 2002 denying the admission of respondent's second
amended complaint.

The RTC applied the old Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court instead of the provisions of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, amending Section 3, Rule 10 to wit:

SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next preceding section,
substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused
if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay.

The application of the old Rules by the RTC almost five years after its amendment by the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure patently constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
 RODRIGUEZ, Joyce Camille B
LARENA v. VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. L-29155 November 5, 1928
FACTS:
The present action was brought on April 13, 1925, but the last amended complaint, setting forth
three causes of action, was not filed until June 17, 1927. As her first cause of action the plaintiff,
after a preliminary statement of the origin of the controversy, alleges that while case G. R. No.
21706 was on appeal to the Supreme Court, the defendant knew positively that the aforesaid
lease was declared rescinded by the Court of First Instance and that he, the defendant, also knew
that he thereafter was not entitled to the possession of the aforesaid hacienda; that he,
nevertheless, in bad faith continued in such possession during the agricultural year 1922-1924
and appropriated to himself the cane harvest for that year, and that the defendant refuses to pay.
The plaintiff, therefore, asks judgment for the sum of P21,827 .26 upon the first cause of action.
For the second cause of action, the plaintiff alleges that under the contract of lease of the
Tacgajan Hacienda, one of the obligations assumed by the defendant was that he would use the
care of a good father of the family in conserving the tools, agricultural implements, draft animals,
and other effects enumerated in an inventory made at the time the defendant entered in
possession under the lease; that he was further obligated to return said property to the plaintiff,
but that he return said property to the plaintiff, but that he returned only a part that he returned
only a part thereof and failed to returned only a part thereof and failed to return 4 carabaos, 4
vacunos, 1 corn mill, 4 wagons, 106 steel rails, 14 plows, 1 table, 1 scale, an 1 telephone, the
total value of the property enumerated being P3,596 for which amount, plus P500 in damages,
the plaintiff asks judgment under her second cause of action.
As a third cause of action the plaintiff alleges that the harvest of sugar cane illegally made by
the defendant in 1924 left ratoon sugar cane in the fields of the hacienda, which sugar cane was
the property of the plaintiff, and that during the year 1925, the defendant illegally harvested said
ratoon cane together with some recently planted cane, which harvested after deducting the share
of the sugar central, produced 1,613.25 piculs of sugar, which the defendant sold for his own
benefit at the price of P13 per picul, the total amount received by him being P20,962.25 for which
the plaintiff demands judgment.
In his answer to the first and third causes of action, the defendants alleges that according to the
pleadings in case G. R. No. 21706, the two causes of action were included in that case and,
therefore, must be considered res judicata. In regard to the second cause of action the defendant
pleads the general issue and sets up as a special defense that assuming that the property referred
to in said cause of action was missing, it loss was due to its total extinction by ordinary use, for
which the defendant could not be held responsible. For all three causes of action, the defendant
sets up as a special defense the document executed by the plaintiff on September 30, 1924,
acknowledging the satisfaction of the judgment in case G. R. No. 21706.
Upon trial the Court of First Instance sustained the defendant's special defense and absolved him
from the complaint with the cost against the plaintiff, whereupon the latter appealed to this court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the two causes of action is considered as res judicata.
RULING:
NO. Properly speaking, this argument does not involve the doctrine of res judicata but
rests on the well-known and, in American law, firmly established principle that a party will
not be permitted to split up a single cause of action an make it the basis for several suits.
But that is not this case. The rule is well established that when a lease provides for the payment
of the rent in separate installments, each installment is an independent cause of action, though it
has been held and is good law, that in an action upon such a lease for the recovery of rent, the
installments due at the time the action brought must be included in the complaint and that failure
to do so will constitute a bar to a subsequent action for the payment of that rent.
 JEROME J. PRECIA
GONZALES V. GJH LAND, INC.

FACTS: Gonzales filed a Complaint for "Injunction with prayer for Issuance of Status Quo Order,
Three (3) and Twenty (20)-Day Temporary Restraining Orders, and Writ of Preliminary Injunction
with Damages" against respondents GJH Land, Inc., et al. before the RTC of Muntinlupa City
seeking to enjoin the sale of S.J. Land, Inc.'s shares which they purportedly bought from S.J.
Global, Inc. on February 1, 2010. In the complaint, Gonzales alleged that the subscriptions for
the said shares were already paid in full in the books of S.J. Land, Inc., yet these same shares
were again offered for sale.

The case was raffled to RTC Branch 276, which is not a Special Commercial Court. Herein
respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction because according to
them, the case involves an intra-corporate controversy and therefore, it should be heard by the
designated Special Commercial Court of Muntinlupa City which is Branch 256 and not in Branch
276.

RTC Branch 276 granted the motion to dismiss reasoning that it had no jurisdiction over the case
since RTC Branch 256 was the branch specifically designated by the Supreme Court as the
Special Commercial Court. Gonzales file a review on certiorari directly to supreme court.

ISSUE: Whether or not RTC erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter?

RULING: Yes, although the Court finds Branch 276 to have correctly categorized the case as a
commercial case, more particularly, an intra-corporate dispute, the Court nonetheless deems that
the erroneous raffling to a regular branch instead of to a Special Commercial Court is only a
matter of procedure that is an incident related to the exercise of jurisdiction and, thus, should not
negate the jurisdiction which the RTC of Muntinlupa City had already acquired. In such a scenario,
the proper course of action was not for the commercial case to be dismissed; instead, Branch 276
should have first referred the case to the Executive Judge for re-docketing as a commercial
case and thereafter, the Executive Judge should then assign said case to the only
designated Special Commercial Court in the station, i.e., Branch 256 and not to dismiss the
case outright.
 JEREMIAH OLIVER ARCIAGA
G.R. No. 182435 August 13, 2012
Lilia Ada et al. vs. Florante Baylon

Facts:
-The estate of spouses Florentino and Maximina Baylon was left to their heirs, Rita, Victoria,
Dolores, Panfila, Ramon and Lilia. Dolores and Ramon both died intestate.
-Victoria passed away leaving an heir while Ramon left children from his first and second
marriages.
-The family, excluding Florante, Rita and Panfila, filed a petition for partition of the estate
comprising of 43 parcels of land alleging that the three, on their own, occupied and took
possession of select parcels of the property.
-Rita, during the pendency of the case, donated her share of the co-owned property to Florante
which prompted the petitioners to file for a supplemental pleading praying for the rescission of
such donation. She later died while the case is still pending.
-The trial court later on decided that there exists a co-ownership with regards to most of the
parcels of property. It invalidated the donation inter vivos of Rita’s share of the co-owned estate
which Florante moved for reconsideration but was denied.
-Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the decision of the lower court with
regards to the validity of the donation.
-The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was disapproved. Hence, this petition.
Issue:

-Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the validity of the donation of Rita to Florante.

Ruling:
-The case involves two distinct and separate actions that where posed as a misjoinder, the petition
for partition and the rescission of the donation. As these two are of different factors, each must
be treated separately.
-However, each disposition may not affect the entirety of the case as It is still capable of
adjudication so as long as the new cause of action in the supplemental pleading is related to the
first.
-The Supreme Court partially grants the petition and modifying the ruling of the CA by reinstating
the rescission of the donation and orders to remand the case to the trial court for determination
of the co-ownership of the property in question.
 PRINCESS MAGPANTAY
G.R. No. L-2352 July 26, 1910
ELADIO ALONSO vs. TOMAS VILLAMOR, ET AL.,
FACTS:
The plaintiff, Eladio Alonso as priest of the church and the person in charge of a Roman Catholic
Church located in the municipality of Placer brought an action to recover against the defendants,
who were members of the municipal board of the municipality of Placer the rental value of the
church and its appurtenances, including the church cemetery, from the 11th day of December,
1901, until the month of April, 1904.
The defendants wrote a letter to the plaintiff stating that there was an order from the provincial
fiscal saying that cemeteries, convents and other buildings erected on land belonging to town,
must turned into the treasury of the municipality all the revenues and products therefrom. As such,
the defendants notify the plaintiff that all the revenues and products of the church must be turned
over to them, including all the alms given by the churchgoers and devotees to the image of St.
Vicente lodge in the church should also be turned into the municipal treasury.
On the 13th of December, 1901, the defendants took possession of the church and its
appurtenances, and also of all of the personal property contained therein. The plaintiff, as priest
of the church and the person in charge thereof, protested against the occupation thereof by the
defendants, but his protests received no consideration, and he was summarily removed from
possession of the church, its appurtenances and contents.
The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant assert that the plaintiff was not the
real party in interest and that the court erred in permitting the action to be brought under the name
of the plaintiff instead of the name of the bishop of the diocese within which the church was located
or under the name of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the issue raised by the defendant constitutes enough ground to reverse the
decision of the court.
RULLING:
NO, the Plaintiff as the priest and the person in charge of the Church, seeks only the welfare of
the great church whose servant he is. The substitution, then, of the name of the bishop of the
diocese, or the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, for that of Padre Alonso, as party plaintiff, is
not in reality the substitution of one identity for another, of one party for another, but is simply to
make the form express the substance, it is purely technical.
In this case, the Supreme Court ordered and decreed that the process, pleadings, proceedings
and decision in this action be, and the same are hereby, amended by substituting the Roman
Catholic Apostolic Church in the place and stead of Eladio Alonso as party plaintiff, that the
complaint be considered as though originally filed by the Catholic Church, the answer thereto
made, the decision rendered and all proceedings in this case had, as if the said institution which
Father Eladio Alonso undertook to represent were the party plaintiff, and that said decision of the
court below, so amended, is affirmed, without special finding as to the costs.
 MARICEL PAJANUSTAN
IRENE & REYNALDO SANTE vs. HON. EDILBERTO CLARAVALL & VITA KALASHIAN
G.R. No. 173915 February 22, 2010
FACTS:
On April 5, 2004, Villarama filed before the RTC of Baguio City a complaint for damages against
petitioners and praying that they be held liable to pay moral damages, ₱300,000.00; ₱50,000.00
as exemplary damages; ₱50,000.00 attorney’s fees; ₱20,000.00 litigation expenses; and costs of
suit for the words uttered by Sante.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that it is the MTCC which had the jurisdiction
and not the RTC as the amount total claim must be P300k only, excluding claim for exemplary
damages. RTC denied the motion. Hence, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with CA.
On the other hand, respondent and her husband filed an amended complaint to increase the claim
for moral damages to P1M. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss with Answer Ad Cautelam and
Counterclaim which was denied by the trial court. Aggrieved by the decision, they filed a Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with CA.
CA granted the petition for certiorari, holding that exemplary damages should not be included in
the total claim in determining jurisdiction as it is merely incidental to the cause of action. However,
in its subsequent decision on the other petition for certiorari, CA affirmed the RTC and did not find
merit in petitioners’ posture that the claims for exemplary damages and attorney’s fees are merely
incidental. It also ruled that respondent can amend her complaint. Hence, this petition for certiorari
before the SC was filed.

ISSUE:
1) Whether or not the RTC acquires jurisdiction over the case?
2) Whether or not the amount of claim be amended in this case?
HELD:
(1) YES. RTC has jurisdiction.
Sec. 19(8) of BP 129, as amended by RA 7691 provides:
“XXX (8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversy exceeds
One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) or, in such other cases in Metro Manila, where the
demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundred thousand pesos
(₱200,000.00).”
Pursuant to RA 7691, the abovementioned amount is adjusted [Supreme Court Circular No. 21-
99 (200k- effective Mar 20, 1999); OCA Circular No. 65-2004 (300k – effective Feb 22, 2004)].
Undoubtedly, MTCC has jurisdiction if the amount to be considered is P300k of moral damages
alone. However, applying Administrative Circular No. 09-94:
“2. The exclusion of the term "damages of whatever kind" in determining the jurisdictional amount
under Section 19 (8) and Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, applies
to cases where the damages are merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of
action. However, in cases where the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the
causes of action, the amount of such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of
the court.”
the other forms of damages being claimed by respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, attorney’s
fees and litigation expenses, are not merely incidental to or consequences of the main action but
constitute the primary relief prayed for in the complaint. Thus, must be included in the total claim
in determining jurisdiction.
(2) YES. While it is a basic jurisprudential principle that an amendment cannot be allowed
when the court has no jurisdiction over the original complaint and the purpose of the
amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court, here, the RTC clearly had jurisdiction
over the original complaint and amendment of the complaint was then still a matter of right.
 SALVADOR TEMPLO
Swangman vs CA
Facts:
Petitioner Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc., obtained from private respondent Neal B. Christian
loans evidenced by three promissory notes. Each of the promissory notes is in the amount of
US$50,000 payable after three years from its date with an interest of 15% per annum payable
every three months.
In February 1999, private respondent Christian filed with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City,
a complaint for a sum of money and damages against the petitioner corporation. The complaint
alleged that starting January 1998 until December 1998, they paid him only an interest of 6% per
annum, instead of 15% per annum, in violation of the terms of the three promissory notes.
The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the private respondent and averred that although
the first 2 promissory notes were not due when the initial complaint was filed, it became
demandable during the pendency of the case curing its defect for lack of cause of action.
Issue:
May a complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was filed be cured by the accrual of a
cause of action during the pendency of the case?
Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court held that CA erred in affirming the RTC’s interpretation of sec 5 rule 10
of the Rules on Civil Procedure that even if the private respondent had no cause of action when
he filed the complaint for a sum of money and damages because none of the three promissory
notes was due yet, he could nevertheless recover on the first two promissory notes which became
due during the pendency of the case in view of the introduction of evidence of their maturity during
the trial.
It is a rule of law to which there is, perhaps, no exception, either at law or in equity, that to recover
at all there must be some cause of action at the commencement of the suit. That unless the
plaintiff has a valid and subsisting cause of action at the time his action is commenced, the defect
cannot be cured or remedied by the acquisition or accrual of one while the action is pending, and
a supplemental complaint or an amendment setting up such after-accrued cause of action is not
permissible.
 SAQUILAYAN, FATIMA J.

Navarro vs. Escobido, GR.153788

Facts:
Karen Go is the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, a business involved in buying and selling
motor vehicles, including hauling trucks and other heavy equipment. Her husband, Glenn Go,
later on entered into a lease agreement with option to purchase with Roger Navarro involving two
motor vehicles. Later on, the checks issued by Navarro where dishonored due to insufficient funds
which led Karen Go to send a demand to Navarro to either pay the balance or return the vehicles
leased. A complaint was later on filed by Karen Go against Navarro for replevin and/or sum of
money with damages. Navarro, on his defense, argued that the complaints filed against him stated
no cause of action since Karen Go was not a party to the lease agreement.
The RTC then dismissed the case but upon motion for reconsideration by Karen Go, issued
another order setting aside the dismissal. The RTC held that Karen Go had sufficient interest and
should include her husband in the complaint based on Section 4, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
and ordered her to file a motion for the inclusion of her husband as co-plaintiff.
Navarro posits that the RTC erred when it ordered the amendment of the complaint to include
Glenn Go as a co-plaintiff, instead of dismissing the complaint outright because a complaint which
does not state a cause of action cannot be converted into one with a cause of action by a mere
amendment or a supplemental pleading. In effect, the lower court created a cause of action for
Karen Go when there was none at the time she filed the complaints.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Karen Go is a real party in interest;
2. Whether or not the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the inclusion
of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff.
Ruling:
1. Yes, Karen Go is a real party in interest. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules states that:
SEC. 2. Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest.
As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will directly benefit from
or be injured by a judgment in this case. Thus, contrary to Navarro’s contention, Karen Go is the
real party-in-interest, and it is legally incorrect to say that her Complaint does not state a cause
of action because her name did not appear in the Lease Agreement that her husband signed in
behalf of Kargo Enterprises.

2. No. Glenn Go is not strictly an indispensable party in the action to recover possession of
the leased vehicles, he only needs to be impleaded as a pro-forma party to the suit, based
 on Section 4, Rule 4 of the Rules, which states: Section 4. Spouses as parties. – Husband
and wife shall sue or be sued jointly, except as provided by law.
Furthermore, non-joinder of indispensable parties not ground to dismiss action. Even assuming
that Glenn Go is an indispensable party to the action, the Supreme Court have held in a number
of cases that the misjoinder or non-joinder of indispensable parties in a complaint is not a ground
for dismissal of action.
Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that neither misjoinder nor nonjoinder of parties
is a ground for the dismissal of an action, thus: Sec. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties.
Neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be
dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage
of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a misjoined party may be severed
and proceeded with separately.
 LILYBETH A. JUINIO

MARIETTA N. BARRIDO, Petitioner, vs. LEONARDO V. NONATO, Respondent.

G.R. No. 176492, October 20, 2014
Facts of the Case:
The respondent Leonardo V. Nonato and petitioner Marietta N. Barrido were able to acquire a
property situated in Bacolod City, consisting of a house and lot, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title. Their marriage was declared void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Since there
was no more reason to maintain their co-ownership over the property, Nonato asked Barrido for
partition, but the latter refused. Nonato filed a Complaint for partition before the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC) of Bacolod City.
Barrido claimed that the subject property had already been sold to their children. She likewise
moved for the dismissal of the complaint because the MTCC lacked jurisdiction, the partition case
being an action incapable of pecuniary estimation.
The Bacolod MTCC rendered a Decision which is to adjudicate to the defendant Marietta Nonato,
the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain.
Nonato appealed the MTCC Decision before the RTC. The Bacolod RTC reversed the ruling of
the MTCC which ordered the partition of the property. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC
Decision. It held that since the property’s assessed value was only ₱8,080.00, it clearly fell within
the MTCC’s jurisdiction. Barrido filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was, however, denied
for lack of merit. Hence, Barrido brought the case to the Court via a Petition for Review.
Issue:
Whether or not the MTCC had no jurisdiction to try the case.
Held:
No. The petition lacks merit. The MTCC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of real actions or
those affecting title to real property, or for the recovery of possession, or for the partition or
condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on real property. It held that since the property’s
assessed value was only ₱8,080.00, it clearly fell within the MTCC’s jurisdiction.
Section 33 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 provides that Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in civil cases. Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:
xxxx
(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real
property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does
not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such
assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest,
damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs: Provided, That value of
such property shall be determined by the assessed value of the adjacent lots. (as amended by
R.A. No. 7691).
 JEE ANN P. RAFAEL
Banda v. Erineta
G.R. No. 166620 : April 20, 2010
FACTS
The petitioners filed a class suit on their own behalf and on behalf of all their co-employees at the
National Printing Office (NPO) challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 378 issued by President
Arroyo. It amended Section 6 of EO No. 286 by removing the exclusive jurisdiction of the NPO
over the printing services requirements of government agencies and instrumentalities.
Petitioners perceived that EO No. 378 will be a threat to their security of tenure as employees of
the NPO. They contended that it is beyond the executive powers of President Arroyo to amend
or repeal Executive Order No. 285 issued by former President Aquino when the latter still
exercised legislative powers; and Executive Order No. 378 violates petitioners' security of tenure,
because it paves the way for the gradual abolition of the NPO.

Issue:
Whether or not the case can be considered as class suit
Ruling:
No. The requisites of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter of controversy is one of common or
general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are so numerous that it is impracticable
to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class suit are sufficiently numerous or
representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of all concerned.
Here, the petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who would be affected by the
assailed Executive Order and who were allegedly represented by petitioners. It was the Solicitor
General, as counsel for respondents, who pointed out that there were about 549 employees in
the NPO. The 67 petitioners undeniably comprised a small fraction of the NPO employees whom
they claimed to represent. Subsequently, 32 of the original petitioners executed an Affidavit of
Desistance, while one signed a letter denying ever signing the petition, ostensibly reducing the
number of petitioners to 34. We note that counsel for the petitioners challenged the validity of the
desistance or withdrawal of some of the petitioners and insinuated that such desistance was due
to pressure from people "close to the seat of power.” Still, even if we were to disregard the
affidavit of desistance filed by some of the petitioners, it is highly doubtful that a sufficient,
representative number of NPO employees have instituted
 ROZELYN R. CAMIQUE
ROGER V. NAVARRO, Petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE L. ESCOBIDO, Presiding Judge, RTC
Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro City, and KAREN T. GO, doing business under the name
KARGO ENTERPRISES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 153788 ; November 27, 2009
FACTS:
 Petition for review on certiorari that seeks to set aside the CA decision denying petitioner
Roger V. Navarro’s motion to dismiss
 Karen T. Go, married to Glenn Go, was the owner of Kargo Enterprises, an entity duly
registered and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines in
Cagayan de Oro
 Karen T. Go filed two complaints before the RTC for replevin and /sum of money with damages
against Navarro; and prayed that the RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure of two motor
vehicles in Navarro’s possession
 First Complaint: Last two checks for the six-check installments of the leased motor vehicle
with option to purchase were dishonored. Go was asking for immediate delivery of the said
motor vehicle after several demands both written and oral were made of defendant
Navarro. Glenn Go, the manager of Kargo Enterprises, was the party to the lease agreement
 Second Complaint: Same as the first complaint but this one, there were three postdated
checks issued by Navarro and the last check was dishonored.
 Sheriff seized the two vehicles and delivered them to Go.
 In his Answers, Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the two complaints
stated no cause of action since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements with
Option to Purchase where the actionable documents on which the complaints were based.
 Navarro’s motion for both cases were duly consolidated.
 Later on, the RTC dismissed the case on the ground that the complaints did not state a cause
of action but set aside and held that Karen Go had sufficient interest in the leasing business.
Karen Go then ordered by the court to file a motion for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff
 When the RTC denied Navarro’s motion for reconsideration, Navarro filed a petition for
certiorari with the CA, essentially contending that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion when it reconsidered the dismissal of the case and directed Karen Go to amend
her complaints by including her husband Glenn Go as co-plaintiff. According to Navarro, a
complaint which failed to state a cause of action could not be converted into one with a cause
of action by mere amendment or supplemental pleading.
 the CA denied Navarro’s petition and affirmed the RTC’s order
 Navarro alleges that even if the lease agreements were in the name of Kargo Enterprises,
since it did not have the requisite juridical personality to sue, the actual parties to the
 agreement are himself and Glenn Go. Since it wasKaren Go who filed the complaints and not
Glenn Go, she was not a real party-in-interest and the complaints failed to state a cause of
action.
 according to Navarro, the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff drastically changed the theory
of the complaints, to his great prejudice. Navarro claims that the lower court gravely abused
its discretion when it assumed that the leased vehicles are part of the conjugal property of
Glenn and Karen Go. Since Karen Go is the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, the
vehicles subject of the complaint are her paraphernal properties and the RTCgravely erred
when it ordered the inclusion of Glenn Go as a co-plaintiff.
 Navarro likewise faults the lower court for setting the trial of the case in the same order that
required Karen Go to amend her complaints, claiming that by issuing this order, the trial court
violated Rule 10 of the Rules.
 Even assuming the complaints stated a cause of action against him, Navarro maintains that
the complaints were premature because no prior demand was made on him to comply with
the provisions of the lease agreements before the complaints for replevin were filed.
 Lastly, Navarro posits that since the two writs of replevin were issued based on flawed
complaints, the vehicles were illegally seized from his possession and should be returned to
him immediately.
 Karen Go, on the other hand, claims that it is misleading for Navarro to state that she has no
real interest in the subject of the complaint, even if the lease agreements were signed only by
her husband, Glenn Go; she is the owner of Kargo Enterprises and Glenn Go signed the lease
agreements merely as the manager of Kargo Enterprises. Moreover, Karen Go maintains that
Navarro’s insistence that Kargo Enterprises is Karen Go’sparaphernal property is without
basis. Based on the law and jurisprudence on the matter, all property acquired during the
marriage is presumed to be conjugal property. Finally, Karen Go insists that her complaints
sufficiently established a cause of action against Navarro. Thus, when the RTC ordered her
to include her husband as co-plaintiff, this was merely to comply with the rule that spouses
should sue jointly, and was not meant to cure the complaints’ lack of cause of action.
ISSUE: Whether or not Karen Go is the real party-in-interest
HELD: Yes. Karen Go is the real party-in-interest. The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires
that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest, i.e.,
the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to
the avails of the suit.
The central factor in appreciating the issues presented in this case is the business name Kargo
Enterprises. The name appears in the title of the Complaint where the plaintiff was identified as
"KAREN T. GO doing business under the name KARGO ENTERPRISES," and this identification
was repeated in the first paragraph of the Complaint.Paragraph 2 defined the business KARGO
ENTERPRISES undertakes. Paragraph 3 continued with the allegation that the defendant "leased
from plaintiff a certain motor vehicle" that was thereafter described. Significantly, theComplaint
specifies and attaches as its integral part the Lease Agreement that underlies the transaction
between the plaintiff and the defendant.
G.R. No. 164205 September 3, 2009
 DASCO, ALLYSSA MAE

OLDARICO S. TRAVEÑO vs. BOBONGON BANANA GROWERS MULTI-PURPOSE

COOPERATIVE, TIMOG AGRICULTURAL CORPORATION, DIAMOND FARMS, INC., and
DOLE ASIA PHILIPPINES

FACTS:
Respondent Timog Agricultural Corporation (TACOR) and respondent Diamond Farms, Inc. (DFI)
hired Oldarico Traveño and his 16 co-petitioners top work at a banana plantation at Bobongon
Santo Tomas, Davao del Norte.
Petitioners contended that while they worked under the direct control of supervisors assigned by
TACOR and DFI, these companies used different schemes to make it appear that they were hired
through independent contractors, including individuals, unregistered associations, and
cooperatives. Subsequently, nominal individual contractors were required to join a cooperative
and thus became members of respondent Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-purpose Cooperative
(the Cooperative).
The respondents began utilizing harassment tactics to ease them out of their jobs, they changed
they compensation package from daily basis to pakyawan rate and, eventually, the respondent
stopped paying their salaries making them to stop from working.
Three separate complaints for illegal dismissal were filed before the National Labor Relations
Commission for unpaid salaries, overtime pay, 13th month pay, service incentive leave pay,
damages, and attorney’s fees. As the Cooperative failed to file its position paper, the Labor Arbiter
found respondent Cooperative guilty of illegal dismissal and dropped all other respondent as
party-respondent for lack of merit.
On partial appeal to the NLRC, petitioners questioned the Labor Arbiter’s denial of their money
claims and the dropping of their complaints against TACOR, DFI, and Dole Asia Philippines.
NLRC sustained the Labor Arbiter’s ruling that the employer of petitioners is the Cooperative.
Motion for Reconsideration was denied thus, petitioners appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Appellate court dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari on the ground that the accompanying
verification and certification against forum shopping was defective, it having been signed by only
19 of the 22 therein named petitioners.
ISSUE: WON appellate court erred in dismissing their petition on a mere technicality as it should
have, at most, dismissed the petition only with respect to the non-signing petitioners.
RULING:
YES. As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein,
unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof,
unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial compliance" or presence of
"special circumstances or compelling reasons."
The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a
case; otherwise, those who did not sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable
or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or petitioners share a common
interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in
the certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.
The certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his
counsel. If, however, for reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he
must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
The foregoing restated pronouncements were lost in the challenged Resolutions of the appellate
court. Petitioners’ contention that the appellate court should have dismissed the petition only as
to the non-signing petitioners or merely dropped them as parties to the case is thus in order.
 ALINARTE, DENISE ANDREA B.
BACALSO VS PADIGOS
FACTS
The case at bar involves a parcel of land in Cebu covered by an original certificate of title in the
name of 13 co-owners. Respondents filed a complaint against petitioners for quieting of title,
declaration of nullity of documents, recovery of possession, and damages.
Respondents filed an amended complaint with leave of court impleading as additional defendants
Alipio, Sr.'s other heirs. Later, they again filed a Second Amended Complaint with leave of court
impleading as additional plaintiffs the other heirs of the registered co-owners.
In their Answer to the Second Amended Complaint, petitioners contended that the Second
Amended Complaint should be dismissed in view of the failure to implead other heirs of the other
registered owners of the lot who are indispensable parties; which resulted to a third amended
complaint filed by respondents impleading the heirs of other registered owners.
The Regional Trial Court then rendered decision in favor of Padigos which was also affirmed by
the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE
W/N the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Second Amended Complaint is valid and legal,
even if not all indispensable parties are impleaded or joined.
DECISION
YES. As provided under Section 7, Rule 3 of Rules of Court, the absence then of an indispensable
party renders all subsequent actions of a court null and void for want of authority to act, not only
as to the absent party but even as to those present.
 JOHN PAUL AURELLANO
BLOSSOM AND COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. MANILA GAS CORPORATION,
defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-32958, November 8, 1930
Johns J:
FACTS
Blossom, plaintiff, had a contract with Manila gas, defendant, for Four years and they agreed that
the defendant will deliver month per month the orders of the plaintiff, and they agreed that the
price of the should be relative to the price of crude and coal and in an event of increase and
decrease, there should be decrease or increase of the same. Their contract was extended for
another 10 years with the same stipulation. After some time, the petitioner filed an action to
against the defendant for him to do specific action regarding the delivery of the tar. The Court of
First Instance then rendered judgement to the case in favor of the plaintiff awarding the plaintiff
with the sum of P2,219.60 only. The plaintiff filed another case for performance herein this case
at bar.
Issues
Whether or not the second action will suffice
Ruling
No since the contract is considered continuous only single action can be filed. The plaintiff-
appellant’s action will not suffice since the judgement of the lower court is meritorious and no
further actions can be filed.
 MACASAET, NANCY
Eladio Alonso vs Tomas Villamor et al.,
July 26, 1910
FACTS:
Defendants were members of the municipal board of the municipality of Placer. Defendants wrote
a letter addressed to the priest in charge of the church, stating that Defendants received an order
from the Provincial Fiscal that cemeteries, convents, and other buildings erected on land
belonging to the town belong to the town. Therefore all revenues and products of the church must
be turned over to the treasury of the municipality. The alms which are given it by the devotees
thereof must be also turned into the municipal treasury.
Thereafter, the defendants took possession of the church and all of the personal properties
contained therein.
Plaintiff asserts that he is just engaged in the prosecution of this case, not for himself, but for
the bishop of the diocese, not by his own right, but by right of another. He seeks merely to do
for the bishop what the bishop might do for himself. He was not involved personally. His own
rights are not presented. He has no interest whatever in the litigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the lower court erred in permitting the action to be brought and continued in the
name of the plaintiff instead of in the name of the bishop of the diocese within which the church
was located, or in the name of the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church, as the real party in interest.
RULING:
The plaintiff personally has no interest in the cause of action. it is undoubted that the bishop of
the diocese or the Roman Catholic Apostolic Church itself is the real party in interest. The plaintiff
asserted the same in the complaint, and maintained that assertion all through the record. He
claimed no interest whatsoever in the litigation. The substitution, then, of the name of the bishop
of the diocese as party plaintiff, is in reality not a substation of the identity of another but is simply
to make the form express the substance that is already there.
Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest. The plaintiff is not such party.
Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure, however, provides:
The court shall... if any, as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding
and at any stage of the action, in either... the Court of First Instance or the Supreme Court, by
adding or striking out the name of any party, either plaintiff or defendant, or by correcting a
mistake in the name of a party,... without regard to technicalities, and in the most expeditious and
inexpensive manner.
Section 503 of the same code provides:
No judgment shall be reversed on formal or technical grounds, or for such error as
has not prejudiced the real rights of the excepting... party... under these provisions that this
court has full power, apart from that power and authority which is inherent, to amend the
process, pleadings, proceedings, and decision in this case by substituting, as party plaintiff, the
real party in interest. Such an amendment does not constitute a change in the identity of the
parties.
There is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings, their forms or contents. Their sole purpose
is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. They were created,
not to hinder and delay, but to facilitate and promote, the administration of justice.
Therefore, the ordered and decreed that the process, pleadings, proceedings and decision in
this action be, and the same are hereby, amended by substituting the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Church in the place and stead of Eladio.
Alonso as party plaintiff, that the complaint be considered as though originally filed
by the Catholic Church, the answer thereto made, the decision rendered and all proceedings in
this case had, as if the said institution which Father Eladio Alonso undertook to represent were
the party plaintiff, and that said decision of the court below, so amended, is affirmed.
 LIEZL GALVE
ATTY. SYLVIA BANDA, ET. AL. vs. EDUARDO R. ERMITA G.R. No. 166620 : April 20, 2010
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS: The petitioners are employees of the National Printing Office (NPO) who filed a Petition
for Certiorari and prohibition, characterized as a class suit, assailing the constitutionality of E.O.
No. 378. The said executive order altered the exclusive printing jurisdiction of NPO under E.O.
No. 285 and allowed government agencies and instrumentalities to source their printing services
from the private sector through competitive bidding, subject to the condition that it be of superior
quality and lower in cost. It also limited NPO's appropriation in the General Appropriations Act to
its income. The petition failed to state the number of NPO employees who were allegedly
represented in the class suit and it was the Solicitor General who pointed out that there were
about 549 employees in the NPO, 67 of which are the petitioners. 32 of the original petitioners
later on executed an Affidavit of Desistance, while one denied ever signing the petition. Hence,
the petitioners’ number is down to 34. More so, only 20 of the 67 petitioners signed the
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping has duly subscribed the petition before the
notary public.
ISSUE: WON the case qualifies as class suit.
HELD: NO. The case does not qualify as a class suit under the Rules of Court. As provided in
Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the requisites of a class suit are: 1) the subject matter
of controversy is one of common or general interest to many persons; 2) the parties affected are
so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all to court; and 3) the parties bringing the class
suit are sufficiently numerous or representative of the class and can fully protect the interests of
all concerned. Also, in Mathay v. The Consolidated Bank and Trust Company the Court held that:
“x x x Whether the suit is or is not a class suit depends upon the attending facts, and the complaint
or other pleading initiating the class action should allege the existence of the necessary facts x x
x”. The Court also reiterated its ruling in MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da'wah Council of the
Philippines, Inc., that in determining the question of fair and adequate representation of members
of a class, the court must consider (a) whether the interest of the named party is coextensive with
the interest of the other members of the class; (b) the proportion of those made a party, as it so
bears, to the total membership of the class; and (c) any other factor bearing on the ability of the
named party to speak for the rest of the class. In the case at bar, the number of NPO employees
who were allegedly represented in the class suit was not alleged but it was the Solicitor General
who pointed out such information. More so, the number of employees represented was originally
67 out of 549 and went further down to only 34 employees. Hence, it is highly doubtful that a
sufficient, representative number of NPO employees have instituted this purported class suit.
More so, the Manifestation of Desistance, to which the previously mentioned Affidavit of
Desistance was attached, was filed by the President of the National Printing Office Workers
Association (NAPOWA), expressing NAPOWA's opposition to the filing of the instant petition in
any court. Hence, there is an apparent conflict between petitioners' interests and those of the
persons whom they claim to represent. Since it cannot be said that petitioners sufficiently
represent the interests of the entire class, the present case cannot be properly treated as a class
suit.
 SERVIDA, RICARDO
G.R. No. L-29155 November 5, 1928
JOSEFINA RUBIO DE LARENA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
HERMENEGILDO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
G. R. No. 21706 was a case decided in 1924 .In the said case, the Supreme court affirmed a
decision of the Court of First Instance ordering the rescission of a lease of the Tacgajan Sugar
Plantation and the payment by the defendant-lessee of the unpaid balance of the rent for the
agricultural year 1920-1922 in the sum of P5,949.28 with interest from August 26, 1922, an for
P8,000 in rent for the agricultural year 1921-1923. The decision also provided that the possession
of the leased land be delivered to the plaintiff.
A writ of execution was issued, but before levy was made the parties came to an agreement,
under which the money judgment was to be settle by cash and transfer of a house.
In the meantime, the defendant had harvested the sugarcane crop produced in the agricultural
year 1922-1924, and after having satisfied the aforesaid money judgment, he also continued in
possession of the plantation long enough to appropriate to himself the following ratoon cane crop.
The present action was brought on April 13, 1925, but the last amended complaint, setting forth
three causes of action, was not filed until June 17, 1927.
In the first cause of action, it is alleged that while case G. R. No. 21706 was on appeal to the
Supreme Court, the defendant was in bad faith in continuing possession of the hacienda during
the agricultural year 1922-1924 and appropriated to himself the cane harvest for that year
following the decision of the CFI of rescinding the lease.
For the second cause of action the plaintiff alleges that under the contract of lease of the hacienda,
the defendant is obligated to take care of the tools, agricultural implements, draft animals, and
other effects and return them to the plaintiff but the defendant returned only a part thereof.
As a third cause of action the plaintiff alleges that the harvest of sugar cane illegally made by the
defendant in 1924 left ratoon sugar cane in the fields of the hacienda, which sugar can was the
property of the plaintiff, and that during the year 1925, the defendant illegally harvested said
ratoon cane together with some recently planted cane
In his answer, the defendants alleges that first and third causes of action were included in and,
therefore, must be considered res adjudicata. In regard to the second cause of action the
defendant pleads the general issue and sets up as a special defense that assuming that the
property referred to in said cause of action was missing, it loss was due to its total extinction by
ordinary use, for which the defendant could not be held responsible.
The CFI ruled in favor of the defendant. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
 1. Whether the case involves the doctrine of res judicata, thus absolving the defendant from
liability?
2. Whether the court below erred in absolving the defendant from liability upon the second
cause of action?
RULING:
1. No. He should be liable in relation to the first and third cause of action.
The argument of the defendant that the plaintiff having had an opportunity to ventilate the matter
in the former case, she cannot now enforce the same cause of action in the present case does
not involve the doctrine of res judicata. It instead rests on the established principle that a party
will not be permitted to split up a single cause of action an make it the basis for several suits. The
said rule is well established that when a lease provides for the payment of the rent in separate
installments, each installment is an independent cause of action, though it has been held and is
good law, that in an action upon such a lease for the recovery of rent, the installments due at the
time the action brought must be included in the complaint and that failure to do so will constitute
a bar to a subsequent action for the payment of that rent.
Also, the lease did not provide for payment of rent in advance or at any definite time. The rent for
an agricultural year was not considered due until the end of the corresponding year. It follows that
the rent for the agricultural year 1922-1924 ha not become sue time of the trial of the case and
that consequently the trial court could not render judgment therefore. The action referred to is,
therefore, no bar to the first cause of action in the present litigation.
For the first cause of action, the defendant held possession under the contract of lease until said
contract was rescinded. The contract contained no special provision for the procedure in effecting
the rescission, and it follows that it could only be accompanied by a final judgment of the
court. The judgment in case G. R. No. L-210706 did not become final until March 27, 192, when
our decision on appeal was rendered.
For the third cause of action, following termination of the lease by final judicial order the defendant
had then no right whatever to the possession of the land or to the fruits thereof, and in removing
the fruits, he acted in bad faith. This being the case, he must pay for the fruits received by him,
less the necessary expenses of production.
2. No.
The court below found that the weight of the evidence showed that the missing draft animals died
from rinderpest and that the other personal property was turned over to the provincial sheriff for
delivery to the plaintiff before the writ of execution was returned to the court. If so, the action would
lie against the sheriff rather than against the defendant.
 JUINIO, JAY
Tallorin vs Heirs of Tarona
GR177429 November 24, 2009
Facts:
On February 9, 1998 respondents Carlos, Rogelio, and Lourdes Tarona (the Taronas) filed an
action before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Balanga, Bataan,1 against petitioner Anicia
Valdez-Tallorin (Tallorin) for the cancellation of her and two other women’s tax declaration over a
parcel of land.
The Taronas alleged in their complaint that, unknown to them, in 1981, the Assessor’s Office of
Morong in Bataan cancelled Tax Declaration 463 in the name of their father, Juanito Tarona
(Juanito), covering 6,186 square meters of land in Morong, Bataan. The cancellation was said to
be based on an unsigned though notarized affidavit that Juanito allegedly executed in favor of
petitioner Tallorin and two others, namely, Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores
Valdez, who were not impleaded in the action. In place of the cancelled one, the Assessor’s Office
issued Tax Declaration 6164 in the names of the latter three persons.
The Taronas asked the RTC to annul Tax Declaration 6164, reinstate Tax Declaration 463, and
issue a new one in the name of Juanito’s heirs.
The Taronas claimed that Tallorin was in default to file her answer which the RTC denied. The
Taronas hen filed for a special civil action for certiorari before the CA. The CA then remanded the
case to the RTC again to grant the Taronas’ claim that Tallorin was in default. The RTC then
rendered judgment against Tallorin and was declared in default, thus, annulling the tax declaration
in the names of Tallorin, Pastelero and Valdez and reinstating it back to Juanito Tarona.
Tallorin filed an appeal to the CA pointing out that the land was titled to her, Pastelero and Valdez.
She claimed that the trial court erred in not dismissing the complaint for the failure to implead
Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez who were indispensable parties in the
action.
The CA rejected Tallorin’s arguments and affirmed the RTC’s judgement.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC erred in not dismissing the case for the failure of the complainant to
implead the other two individuals, Pastelero and Valdez.

Held:
Yes. The RTC erred in not failure to implead Margarita Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores
Valdez who were indispensable parties in the action.
The rules mandate the joinder of indispensable parties. Thus:
Sec. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. – Parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs and defendants.
The Court cannot discount the importance of tax declarations to the persons in whose names
they are issued. Their cancellation adversely affects the rights and interests of such persons over
the properties that the documents cover. The reason is simple: a tax declaration is a primary
evidence, if not the source, of the right to claim title of ownership over real property, a right
enforceable against another person.
But the Taronas’ action cannot be dismissed outright. As the Court held in Plasabas v. Court of
Appeals, the non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal. Section 11, Rule
3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure prohibits the dismissal of a suit on the ground of non-
joinder or misjoinder of parties and allows the amendment of the complaint at any stage of the
proceedings, through motion or on order of the court on its own initiative. Only if plaintiff refuses
to implead an indispensable party, despite the order of the court, may it dismiss the action.
There is a need, therefore, to remand the case to the RTC with an order to implead Margarita
Pastelero Vda. de Valdez and Dolores Valdez as defendants so they may, if they so desire, be
heard.
 GAMAZAN, TERESALYN
LILIA B. ADA vs. FLORANTE BAYLON G.R. No. 182435, August 13, 2012, 678 SCRA 293
FACTS: Spouces Florentino Baylon and Maximina Elnas Baylon (Spouses Baylon)who died on
November 7, 1961 and May 5, 1974, respectively. At the time of their death, Spouses Baylon
were survived by their legitimate children, namely, Rita Baylon (Rita), Victoria Baylon(Victoria),
Dolores Baylon (Dolores), Panfila Gomez (Panfila), Ramon Baylon (Ramon) and herein petitioner
Lilia B. Ada (Lilia).Dolores died intestate and without issue on August 4, 1976. Victoria died on
November 11, 1981 and was survived by her daughter, herein petitioner Luz B. Adanza. Ramon
died intestate on July 8, 1989 and was survived by herein respondent Florante Baylon (Florante),
his child from his first marriage, as well as by petitioner Flora Baylon, his second wife, and their
legitimate children, namely, Ramon, Jr. and herein petitioners Remo, Jose, Eric, Florentino and
Ma. Ruby, all surnamed Baylon During the pendency of an action for partition, there was a
donation made by Rita to Florante without the consent of the other parties or the Court. When the
other parties learned of the donation, they filed a Supplemental Pleading seeking the rescission
of the donation.
ISSUE: Can there be a joinder of these two (2) causes of action?
HELD: NO. There was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for partition could not be joined
with action for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in favor of Florante. Lest it be
overlooked, an action for partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court while an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the ordinary rules of
civil procedure. The variance in the procedure in the special civil action of partition and in the
ordinary civil action precludes their joinder in one complaint or their being tried in a single
proceeding to avoid confusion in determining what rules shall govern the conduct of the
proceedings as well as in the determination of the presence of requisite elements of each
particular cause of action. Nevertheless, misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for
dismissal. A misjoined cause of action, if not severed upon motion of a party or by the Court sua
sponte, may be adjudicated by the court together with the other cause of action
 RICHIE H. SALUBRE

BLOSSOM AND COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
MANILA GAS CORPORATION, defendant-appellee.
G.R. No. L-32958; November 8, 1930

FACTS:
The plaintiff Blossom and Co. entered into a contract with the defendant Manila Gas
Corporation. It was stipulated that defendant shall deliver to the plaintiff from month to month of
specified amount of water gas tar. The contract provided for the value of 1 ton of gas tar at Php
65.00. The contract stipulated that the price would prevail only as long as the raw materials used
by the defendant in the production of gas should cost the same price as that prevailing while the
contract subsists. In case of increase or decrease in the cost of raw materials, a corresponding
increase or decrease in the price of tar shall be applied.
Later, the contract was amended extending its period to ten years. After four years from
the execution of the contract, plaintiff instituted an action against the defendant for specific
performance and for claim of damages based on its allegation that the defendant breached the
contract by ceasing to deliver any coal and gas tar solely because of the increase in price of tar
products and its desire to secure better than what the plaintiff paid.
The Court of First Instance of Manila ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Thus, the claim of
recovery of damages was granted but it refused to order the defendants to resume delivery but
left it with its remedy for damages against the defendants for any subsequent breach of the
contract. Later, another action for damages was instituted by the plaintiff against the defendant
on the ground that it breached the contract once more to perform its obligation under the same
contract.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the plaintiff is barred from instituting the second action for claim of
damages.
RULING:
Yes, the Supreme Court ruled that the plaintiff is barred from filing the second action for
damages. It was held that when the contract is indivisible as in this case and the breach is total,
there can only be one action in which the plaintiff must recover all damages. Hence, the recovery
of judgement for damages by reason of a breach is a bar to another action on the same contract
and on account of the continuous breach.