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Mc Naughtan’s Rule and Its Relevance in IPC

Submitted by
Baasim Mir
201810631, 4th Semester
SELF-FINANCE

Faculty of Law
JamiaMilliaIslamia
23rd of April, 2021

Under the guidance of


Dr Saadiya
Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law,
Jamia Millia Islamia, New Delhi, 110025.

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CERTIFICATE

The project entitled “MC Naughtan’s Rule And Its Relevance In IPC“submitted to the Faculty
of Law, Jamia Millia Islamia for Law Of Crimes IIas part of Internal Assessment is based on
my original work carried out under the guidance of Dr (Prof) Saadiya from 12th of March to 28th
of April. The Research work has not been submitted elsewhere for award of any degree.
The material borrowed from other sources and incorporated in the research paper has been duly
acknowledged. I understand that I, myself would be held responsible and accountable for
plagiarism, if any, detected later on.

Signature of the candidate


Date 28th April, 2021

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Table of Contents

1. Abstract 4
2. Introduction 4-5
3. Historic development of Insanity Defense in India 5-6
4. The Insanity Defense produces “WRONG” Verdict 6-7
5. Burden Of Proof 7-9

6. CONCLUSION 10 )
7. BIBLOGRAPHY
………………………………………………………………………………………11….

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McNaughton’s rule

The aim of this research paper is to reveal the substance and procedure of insanity as a defence,
as well as the most popular call for its abolition or change. Insanity defence has existed for
many decades, but only in the last three centuries has it been a legal position. We believe that
insanity as a defence should be preserved for the simple reason that it is fundamentally just, and
that rational and sensible changes will alleviate the majority of the problems associated with it.
As a culture, we must decide if “the insanity defence is morally essential.”If we stress the moral
importance of it, we must also ensure that insanity defence hearings are conducted rationally,
that erroneous verdicts are avoided, and that the disposition of those acquitted due to insanity
results in the safety of society and the proper care of those acquitted.

The origins of the defence are discussed, as well as a statistical overview of the defence across
the world. It considers a variety of critiques that are often levelled but are unfounded. It cites a
few defence watershed moments before concluding with an appropriate conclusion.1

INTRODUCTION
R v M’Naghten (1843) 8 E.R. 718; (1843) 10 Cl. & F. 200
Facts

In January 1843, at the parish of Saint Martin, Middlesex,Daniel M'Naghten took a revolver and
shot Edward Drummond, whom he mistook for British Prime Minister Robert Pell, fatally
wounding him in the parish of Saint Martin, Middlesex, in January 1843. M'Naghten was
charged with Drummond's murder after he died five days later. Due to his insanity, he pled not
guilty.
Proof of the shooting of Drummond was presented at trial, and witnesses were called on behalf
of the defendant, M'Naghten, to testify that he was not in a stable state of mind at the time of the
1
Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, Deontological Ethics, in STANFORD ENCYLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
(2007), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/#DeoFoiCon .

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crime. Some of the witnesses who testified had already studied M'Naghten, while others had
never seen him before the trial and formed their opinions based on what they heard from other
witnesses.
According to the medical evidence presented, people of otherwise sound mind may be afflicted
by morbid delusions, and M'Naghten was one of them. A individual suffering from such a
delusion would normally have a moral sense of right and wrong, but actions related to their
delusion may be carried out outside their control, leaving them without such a sense.
As a result, M'Naghten was unable to exercise control over his actions when under the influence
of his illusion. Because of M'Naghten's illness, the delusions progressed gradually until they
reached a climax, culminating in Drummond's death. Evidence presented to the Court regarding
M'Naghten's condition indicated that a man could go years without acting out while under the
influence of the illusion, but that he had the capacity to act out in extravagant and violent
paroxysms.
Lord Chief Justice Tindal said in relation to M'Naghten's charge, "the question to be resolved is
whether the prisoner had or did not have the use of his understanding at the time the crime in
question was committed, so as to realise that he was doing a wrong or wicked act." If the jury
believe that the prisoner was not rational at the moment he committed the crime, that he was
breaking both God's and man's rules, therefore he will be entitled to a favourable verdict; if, on
the other hand, they believe that he was in a stable state of mind at the time he committed the act,
then their verdict would be against him.”
M’Naghten was found not guilty.

Following that, a jury of Judges was summoned to the House of Lords to answer a series of
hypothetical questions about insanity.

Issue

The hypothetical questions about insanity the judges had to address were as follows:

What is the law about alleged crimes committed by persons suffering from insane delusions in
relation to one or more specific subjects or persons: for example, when the accused knew he was

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breaking the law at the time of the alleged crime, but committed the alleged crime with the
intention of redressing or vengeance when under the influence of insane delusions.
When a person accused of being afflicted with psychotic delusions about one or more specific
subjects or individuals is charged with a crime (murder, for example) and insanity is used as a
defence, what are the proper questions to ask the jury?
On what terms could the jury be asked to determine the prisoner's mental condition at the time
the crime was committed?
Is a person who commits an offence as a result of an irrational delusion about existing facts
automatically excused?
Can a medical expert familiar with the disease of insanity, who had never seen the prisoner prior
to the trial but was present during the trial and the cross-examination of all witnesses, be asked
his opinion as to the state of the prisoner's mind at the time of the alleged crime, or whether the
prisoner was conscious at the time of doing the act, that he was sane at the time of doing the act,
that he was sane at the time of doing the act
Held: The Judges formulated the M'Naghten Rules (1843) 4 St.Tr.(N.S.) 847 in answer to these
questions. The legal definition of insanity can be found here. They state that if a defendant wants
to use insanity as a defence, he or she must prove that:

They suffered from a deficiency of rationality brought on by a mental illness; as a result, either
he was unaware of the meaning and quality of his behaviour, or he was unaware that what he
was doing was wrong.2

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF
INSANITY DEFENSE IN INDIA

As a result, the ancient Indian legal literature is unclear as to whether or not the insane person is
entirely absolved of his criminal liability. It seems that the principle of sin, as well as the doctrine
of each individual's total responsibility for actions committed by him, did not allow for such an
2
Joachim Herrmann, The Rule of Compulsory Prosecution and the Scope of Prosecutorial Discretion in Germany,
41 U. CHI. L. REv. 468 (1974) (describing the traditional rule of compulsory prosecution, departures from it, and
means to enforce it including court supervision of charging and dismissal decisions)

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exception. However, it is clear from ancient literature that great thought is given to the allocation
of danda (punishment) or prayaschitta (penance) to an insane violator of social or moral order.

In Muhammadan law, there tends to be no duty applied to insane or imbecilic people. Except for
actions performed in lucid intervals, their legal ability is affected in the same way as that of an
infant without determination under Muhammadan Law. The law considers those people to be
unable to comprehend and therefore exempts them from liability. Insanity should be pleaded on
the same day as minorities; otherwise, there would be no favourable presumption. This is subject
to the conditions that the defendant take an oath and that his true mental state is not incompatible
with his well-known insanity.Taking such a lack of understanding into account, Abu Yusuf said
that "the had cannot be put on the accused after his confession unless it is made clear that he is
not psychotic or mentally disturbed.".. If he is free from such deficiency, he should then be
submitted to the legal punishment.”3 It was himself of the sanity of the criminal before
pronouncing judgment.

The Law Commission of India attempted to review Section 84 in their 42nd report in 1971, but
no amendments were made. The “act of a person of unsound mind” is dealt with in Section 84 of
the IPC. “Nothing is a crime committed by a person who, at the time of doing it, is incapable of
understanding the meaning of the act, or that he is doing something that is either wrong or
against the law, because of insanity.” The following basic ingredients may be identified based on
an examination of Section 84 of the IPC.that For the sake of easy understanding, the Section 84
IPC can be divided into two broad categories of, major criteria (medical requirement of mental
illness) and minor criteria (loss of reasoning requirement). Major criteria (mental illness
requirement) mean the person must be suffering from mental illness during the commission of
act. Minor criteria (loss of reasoning requirement) mean the person is: Incapable of knowing the
nature of the act or Incapable of knowing his act is wrong or Incapable of knowing it is contrary
to law. Both major (mental illness) and minor (loss of reasoning) criteria constitute legal
insanity. Section 84 IPC, clearly embodies a fundamental maxim of criminal jurisprudence is, (a)
“Actus nonfacit reum nisi mens sit rea” (an act does not constitute guilt unless done with a guilty
intention) and (b) “Furiosi nulla voluntas est” (a person with mental illness has no free

3
Abu Yusuf, Al-igrar; quoted in Qadri, Islamic
Jurisprudence in the Modern World 270 (1963)

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will).4

This implies that an act does not constitute a crime unless it is done with a guilty intention i.e.
“mens rea.”

Hence, Section 84 IPC fastens no culpability on persons with mental illness because they can
have no rational thinking or the necessary guilty intent.5

THE INSANITY DEFENSE PRODUCES "WRONG" VERDICTS

The insanity defence examinations, unlike many other grounds for criminal guilt, do not pose
purely factual issues. Rather, the legal, moral, and social judgments made regarding the
defendant's mental state at the time of the crime are the primary considerations. For instance,
whether the defendant shot the fatal bullet with the intent to kill the victim, fulfilling the
elements of murder, are factual questions with definitive, but sometimes difficult to ascertain,
responses. Insanity defence evaluations, on the other hand, ask unanswerable questions like how
much lack of understanding of right and wrong, or how much inability to adapt one's behaviour
to the law, a defendant must have in order to be acquitted. The legal decision must, of course, be
based on evidence, but the legal test is not factual in and of itself. The applicable behavioural
spectrum is prescribed by the insanity defence tests, but the fact finder, as the moral
representative of the group, must draw the line between guilt and innocence. There are few
definitive answers to moral questions, even at extremes.
Many insanity verdicts are presumptively reasonable if there is no significant flaw in the
interpretation of the evidence or the jury instructions. The issue is how to apply community
norms in light of legal precedents, and there are few straightforward, scientifically correct cases
that make it to the jury. In the occasional obvious event, the fact finder may be motivated by bias
or wilfully fail to apply the test properly, but this is true of all indeterminate, morally-based
criteria, and there is no reason to think it occurs disproportionately in insanity defence
proceedings. Furthermore, even though an insanity verdict is incorrect in any final, objective
sense, "wrong" verdicts will occur in any field of law, but they do not necessarily result in rash

4
Bapu @ Gajraj Singh vs State of Rajasthan. Appeal (crl.) 1313 of 2006. Date of Judgement on 4 June, 2007.
5
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4676

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attempts to alter inherently just laws. For example, juries must sometimes acquit defendants who
assert the indefinite justification of self-defence because jurors incorrectly consider the
defendants' false arguments that they sincerely and legitimately believed their lives were in
danger, but no one calls for the defence to be abolished. The idea of a wrong or unpopular
verdict is far too weak, and it proves much too much to be a valid justification for eliminating the
insanity defence.

Some critics argue that the insanity defence is merely a historical accident that does not merit the
reverence it gets. While historical precedent favours the defense's preservation, it is meaningless
in deciding whether the defence is morally appropriate and technically feasible: only ethical and
reasonable counterarguments can be used to refute the defense's existence. The location of
insanity and the way in which it was adjudicated in the previous judicial procedure has no
bearing on where it should be today or whether it can be implemented. There are many common
objections to the defence of insanity: (1) it results in "wrong" verdicts; (2) defendants use it to
"beat the rap"; (3) it diverts attention and resources away from the treatment needs of disordered
people in jail and prison who did not raise or fail the defence; (4) it is a historical accident; (5) it
is a "rich person's defence"; and (6) it is used to "beat the rap." These criticisms, however, are
insignificant.That is, they are either based on erroneous scientific assumptions and reasoning, or
they show too much and therefore fail to include clear objections to the insanity defence.

BURDEN OF PROOF

Devidas Loka Rathod v. State of Maharashtra,


In this esoteric case, the Supreme Court of India discussed the law relating to the plea of insanity
under section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, as well as some important precedents. The appellant
challenged his conviction under sections 302 and 324 of the Indian Penal Code, claiming that the
trial court dismissed his defence that he was of unsound mind, relying on the testimony of Dr.
Sagar Srikant

Chiddalwar, that the appellant wasn’t mentally sick and fit to face trial. The two judge bench of

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“An act will not be an offence, if done by a person, who at the time of doing the same, by reason
of unsoundness of mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act, or what he is doing is
either wrong or contrary to law.”Carves out as an exception under section 84 of the Indian Penal
Code. the supreme court, in notion of the facts and circumstances of the case, ruled that the
appellant was enfranchised to the benefit of the exception under section 84 of the Indian Penal
Code in view of the fact of the preponderance of his medical his acts, though in specified
circumstances it may be rebuttable. While elaborating on the doctrine of burden of proof in the
context of the plea of insanity, the Apex Court made reference to the case of Dahyabhai
Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat61964 AIR 1563 7
, in which the court observed that there is a rebuttable presumption that the accused was not of
unsound mind , when he committed the crime, in the sense laid down by Section 84 of the IPC:
the accused may rebut it by placing before the court all the relevant evidence oral, documentary
or circumstantial, but the burden of proof upon him is no higher than that rests upon a party to
civil proceedings8. That the onus of proof is on the accused, under Section 105 of the Evidence
Act and it is not as stringent as on the prosecution to be established beyond all reasonable doubts.
The accused has only to establish his defense on a preponderance of probability, after which the
onus shall shift on the prosecution to establish the inapplicability of the exception.9
Doctrine of burden of proof in the context ofthe plea of insanity– That the law undoubtedly
presumes that every person committing an offence is sane and liable for his acts, though in
specified circumstances it may be rebuttable. While elaborating on the doctrine of burden of
proof in the context of the plea of insanity, the Apex Court made reference to the case of
Dahyabhai Chhaganbhai Thakkar v. State of Gujarat11 , in which the court observed that there is
a rebuttable presumption that the accused was not of unsound mind , when he committed the
crime, in the sense laid down by Section 84 of the IPC: the accused may rebut it by placing
before the court all the relevant evidence oral, documentary or circumstantial, but the burden of
proof upon him is no higher than that rests upon a party to civil proceedings12 . That the onus of
proof is on the accused, under Section 105 of the Evidence Act and it is not as stringent as on the
prosecution to be established beyond all reasonable doubts. The accused has only to establish his

6
7
1964 AIR 1563
8
9
www.criminallawreview.in

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defense on a preponderance of probability, after which the onus shall shift on the prosecution to
establish the inapplicability of the exception.

Insanity– Legal insanity equips a good ground of defence from criminal liability while medical
insanity does not. In order to establish legal insanity, the necessary elements as provided by
section 84 of the Indian Penal Code must be proved. If there are sufficient medical grounds to
hold that a person is suffering from insanity, it is a case of medical insanity. Legal insanity
(unsoundness of mind) for the purposes of section 84, Indian Penal Code means that the defence
must prove that at the time of Commission of crime with which the accused is charged, because
of unsoundness of mind, he did not know the nature of his act or that he was doing what was
either wrong or contrary to law. The incapacity of the accused must be caused by some disease
of mind and must exist at the time of commission of crime. Medically a person may be certified
sane or insane as the case may be, but legally he will be held insane (of unsound mind) only if he
successfully proves the requirements of the law under section 84, Indian Penal Code which will
entitle him to be acquitted of the charge. If he fails to prove that, the law presumes him sane at
the time of commission of the crime by him, even though medically he may have been insane at
that time.13 The irresistible impulse test is used to establish whether, as an outcome of a mental
disease or defect, the defendant was unable to control or resist his or her own impulses, thus
leading to a criminal act. If so, the defendant is not guilty because of insanity. Criminal Law only
punishes a man for his fault not for his misfortunes.

Many judgments from Indian courts have clarified the scope of section 84's concept of
unsoundness of mind. There have been numerous debates about the scope of the defence of
insanity, and courts have attempted to understand it from time to time..
 Baswantrao Bajirao vs Emperor on 1April, 19471410

“As a result, all of this evidence is only valid (if it is relevant at all) to prove a moderate case of
medical insanity, but the law distinguishes between medical and legal insanity. In Section 84,
10 14
1949 CriLJ 181

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which summarises Indian law on the subject, "nothing is an offence" if it is committed by a
person who is "incapable of understanding" the meaning of the act or that he is doing anything
that is "wrong or contrary to law" at the time of doing it "due to unsoundness of mind."The
accused has to prove this fact underSection 108,Evidence Act, and the burden is on him of
proving that he did not know the nature of his act or that the action which he did was wrong or
contrary to law. According to Mayne by the. first is meant the prisoner's consciousness of the
bearing of his act on those affected by it and by the second the prisoner's consciousness, in
relation to himself. It is an admirable summary of the tests to be applied in cases of insanity. In
connection with cases of homicide the special relevance of these two tests are brought out by
Mayne thus: In dealing with cases involving a defense of this kind distinction must be made
between cases in which insanity is more or less proved and the question is only as to the degree
of irresponsibility and cases in which insanity is sought to be proved in respect of a person who
for all intents and purposes appears sane. In all cases where previous insanity is proved or
admitted certain considerations have to be borne in mind. Maine summarizes them as follows:
Whether there was deliberation and preparation for the act; whether it was done in a manner
which showed a desire to concealment; whether, after the crime, the offender showed
consciousness of guilt, and made efforts to avoid detection; whether, after his arrest, he offered
false excuses and made false statements. All facts of this sort are material, as bearing on the test
which Bramwell, B. submitted to a jury in such a case: "would the prisoner have committed the
act if there had been a policeman at his elbow? It is to be remembered that these tests are good
for cases in which previous insanity is more or less established.”

 Kamala Singh v State on December,195411


"The case of 'M'Naughton stands on its own. It is the well-known legal pronouncement on the
issue of insanity in cases of murder. It's a one-of-a-kind situation that has nothing to do with the
current situation.
In 'M'Naughton's case, the onus is definitely and exceptionally placed upon the accused to
establish such a defense. where it is stated the only general rule that can be laid down as to the
evidence in such a case is that insanity, if relied upon as a defense, must be established by the

11
AIR 1955 Pat 209, 1955 CriLJ 825

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defendant. But it was added that all the Judges had met and resolved that it was not proper for the
Crown to call evidence of insanity, but that any evidence in the possession of the Crown should
be placed at the disposal of the prisoner's counsel to be used by him if bethought fit".

 Hari Singh Gond v. State of MadhyaPradesh12


According to the Supreme Court, Section 84 establishes the legal standard for determining
liability in cases of presumed mental insanity. In the IPC, the term "mind soundness" is not
specified. The courts, on the other hand, have largely equated this term with insanity. However,
there is no clear meaning for the word "insanity." It's a word that's used to describe different
levels of mental illness. As a result, no one who is mentally ill is ipso facto immune from
criminal liability. There must be a distinction made between legal and medical insanity. Legal
insanity, not medical insanity, is the focus of a judge.

 Shrikant Anandrao Bhosale v. Stateof Maharashtra18


The Supreme Court held that "it is the entirety of the circumstances shown in the light of the
recorded facts" that will show that the crime was committed while deciding the offence under
section 84 of the Indian Penal Code. Also added was the observation that "unsoundness of mind
before and after the incident is a valid fact." Unsoundness of mind must have existed at the time
of the crime. The court should take into account the fact that the accused was of unsound mind at
the time the crime was committed, and it is the accused's responsibility to prove it. The word
"insanity" is not included in Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code.

Rattan Lal v. State of M. P19The court ruled that the critical point in time for determining
unsound mind is when the crime is actually committed, and that whether the accused was in such
a state of mind as to be entitled to Section 84 benefits can only be determined from the
circumstances that preceded, attended, and followed the crime. In other words, actions
preceding, accompanying, and following the incident may be important in deciding the accused's
mental state at the time of the crime, but not behaviour that occurred later.

12
AIR 2009 SC 31

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CONCLUSION

On a concluding note Section 84 IPC embodies McNaughton rules as follows: "Nothing is an


offence which is done by a person who, at the time of doing it, by reason of unsoundness of
mind, is incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that he is doing what is either wrong or
contrary to the law."
the plea of insanity has always been a part of the criminal justice system. It is rarely used, but
when it is, it is rarely effective, and when it is, it usually comes with obtrusive costs to the
pleader, both in terms of stigma and duration of institutional stay. The insanity defence is now a
captive of both mental and scientific theories, despite the fact that these myths bear no relation to
facts. These myths exemplify the public's view of the defence and the plea. It's debatable whether
any other field of criminal law is more poorly known right now.

We should not eradicate the insanity defence until we sincerely believe that any criminal suspect,
no matter how insane, needs to be punished. If we don't believe it and don't see how we can,
we'll have to keep the defence.

BIBLOGRAPHY

 Boland, F. (1996). "Insanity, the Irish Constitution and the European Convention on
Human Rights". 47 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 260.
 Bucknill, J. C. (1881). "The Late Lord Chief Justice of England on Lunacy". Brain. 4: 1–
26.

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 Butler Committee. (1975). The Butler Committee on Mentally Abnormal Offenders,
London: HMSO, Cmnd 6244
 Dalby, J.T. (2006). "The Case of Daniel McNaughton: Let's get the story
straight".  American Journal of Forensic Psychiatry. 27: 17–32.
 Ellis, J. W. (1986). "The Consequences of the Insanity Defense: Proposals to reform
post-acquittal commitment laws". Catholic University Law Review.  35: 961.
 Gostin, L. (1982). "Human Rights, Judicial Review and the Mentally Disordered
Offender". (1982) Crim. LR 779.
 The Law Reform Commission of Western Australia. The Criminal Process and Persons
Suffering from Mental Disorder, Project No. 69, August 1991. [2]
 Elliott, Catherine; Quinn, Frances (2000). Criminal Law (Third ed.). Harlow, Essex:
Pearson Education Ltd. pp. 241–248..

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