Cases in Criminal Procedure

1. People and AAA v. CA; GR No. 183652; Feb. 25, 2015

2. People v. Jugueta; GR No. 202124; April 5, 2016
3. Teehankee Jr. v. Madayag; GR No. 103102; March 6, 1992
4. People v. Casey; GR No. L-30146; Feb. 24, 1981
5. Renato S.D. Domingo, et. al. v. Sps. Singson, G.R. No. 203287, April 5, 2017;
6. Joselito R. Pimentel v. Ma. Chrysantine L. Pimentel and People of the Philippines, G.R.
172060, Sept. 13, 2010.
7. Fortich-Celdran, et. al. v. Celdran. et. al. G.R. No. L-22677, February 28, 1967
8. Sec. Leila de Lima, et. al. v. Mario Joel T. Reyes, G. R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016.
9. Mario Veridiano y Sapi v. People GR No. 200370, June 7, 2017;
10. Jeffrey Miguel y Remigio v. People;G.R. No. 227038, July 31, 2017;
11. Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales v. People G. R. No. 205926, July 22, 2015;
12. People v. Rose Edward Ocampo y Ebesa G.R. No. 232300, August 1, 2018.
People and AAA v. CA
GR No. 183652; Feb. 25, 2015

Facts:
Accused-appellants Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola were charged with the crime of
rape of a 16-year old girl. The RTC convicted Carampatana and Oporto guilty as principals and
Alquizola as an accomplice while the CA acquitted them of the crime charged, hence, this
present appeal.

After attending a graduation dinner party, AAA, together with her friends, went to Alson’s
Palace for a drinking session to celebrate their graduation. During such session, they shared their
problems with each other. AAA became emotional and started crying, prompting her to take her
first shot of Emperador Brandy. After consuming more or less five glasses of drinks, she felt
dizzy so she laid her head down on Oporto’s lap. Oporto then started kissing her head and they
would remove her baseball cap. This angered her so she told them to stop, and simply tried to
hide her face with the cap. The group just laughed at her and still made her drink more. She fell
asleep but was woken up so that she could drink the remaining liquor inside the Brandy bottle.
She refused but they insisted so she drank. Again, AAA fell asleep.

When she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the Alquizola Lodging House.
She recognized that place because she had been there before. She would thereafter fall back
asleep and wake up again. And during one of the times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto
on top of her, kissing her on different parts of her body, and having intercourse with her. At one
point, AAA woke up while Carampatana was inserting his penis into her private organ.
Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her. For the last time, she fell unconscious.

Issues:
Whether or not the Information filed is duplicitous?
Held:
The Supreme Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single Information, it,
however, actually charged the accused of several rapes. As a general rule, a complaint or
information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective. Non-compliance
with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule117 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before
he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived.

People v. Jugueta
GR No. 202124; April 5, 2016
Facts:
Ireneo Jugueta y Flores (appellant) was accused, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger
San Miguel, of using firearms to shoot on the house occupied by the family of Norberto Divina.
Two of the children of Norberto, namely, Mary Grace (13 years old) and Claudine (3 1/2 years
old), died from gunshot wounds. Norberto Divina, his wife Maricel Divina and children
Elizabeth and Judy Ann Divina, both minors, were not hit.
Appellant Jugueta was charged with the Double Murder of Mary Grace Divina and
Claudine Divina, both minors. The crime was alleged to have been committed with treachery,
evident premeditation, in the dwelling of the offended party, and the accused taking advantage of
nighttime to facilitate the commission of the offense. He was also charged, together with Gilbert
Estores and Roger San Miguel, with Multiple Attempted Murder, for the shooting attack on the
other family members of Norberto Divina, who fortunately, were not hit.

Issues:
Whether or not the Information filed is duplicitous?
Held:
Yes, the Supreme Court held that the Informations in this case failed to comply with
the requirement in Section 13, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court that an information
must charge only one offense. However, since appellant entered a plea of not guilty during
arraignment and failed to move for the quashal of the Informations, he is deemed to have
waived his right to question the same. It is also well-settled that when two or more offenses
are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it before
trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose
upon him the proper penalty for each offense.

Teehankee Jr. v. Madayag

GR No. 103102; March 6, 1992

Facts:
On July 19, 1991 an information for the crime of frustrated murder was filed against
Claudio Teehankee Jr. allegedly committed to Maureen Navarro Hultman.

After the prosecution had rested its case, the petitioner moved for leave to file a demurrer
to evidence, but before the motion was filed, the victim died. So, the private prosecutor filed an
omnibus motion for leave of court to file the amended information. The amended information
filed on October 31, 1991 charges Teehankee of murder.
 The trial court admitted the amended information. During the arraignment, the petitioner
refused to be arraigned on the amended information contending the lack of a preliminary
investigation thereon. The judge, then, ordered the plea of "not guilty" be entered for petitioner.
The prosecution was ordered to present its evidence. The petitioner's counsel manifested that he
did not want to take part in the proceedings because of the legal issue raised. So, the trial court
appointed a counsel de officio to represent the petitioner.

The petitioner now seeks, among other things, for the SC to nullify the respondent judge's
admittance of the amended information, and to compel the judge to order preliminary
investigation of the crime charged in the amended information.

Issues:
 Whether or not an amended information involving a substantial amendment, without
preliminary investigation, after the prosecution has rested on the original information, may
legally and validly be admitted.
Held:

The Court held that an objective appraisal of the amended information for murder filed
against herein petitioner will readily show that the nature of the offense originally charged was
not actually changed. Instead, an additional allegation, that is, the supervening fact of the death
of the victim was merely supplied to aid the trial court in determining the proper penalty for the
crime. That the accused committed a felonious act with intent to kill the victim continues to be
the prosecution's theory. There is no question that whatever defense herein petitioner may adduce
under the original information for frustrated murder equally applies to the amended information
for murder. Under the circumstances thus obtaining, it is irremissible that the amended
information for murder is, at most, an amendment as to form which is allowed even during the
trial of the case.

It consequently follows that since only a formal amendment was involved and introduced in the
second information, a preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the
accused. The filing of the amended information without the requisite preliminary investigation
does not violate petitioner's right to be secured against hasty, malicious and oppressive
prosecutions, and to be protected from an open and public accusation of a crime, as well as from
the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial.

People v. Casey
GR No. L-30146; Feb. 24, 1981
Facts:
An Information for Murder was filed against accused-appellant Joseph Casey alias
"Burl", alleging that on or about the 31st day of March, 1968, in the municipality of San Juan,
province of Rizal, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named
accused, being then armed with a knife, together with one Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad"
who is then armed with a firearm and who was (sic) still at large, and the two of them conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill,
evident premeditation and treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did, then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot and stab with the said firearm
and knife one Alfredo Valdez, thereby inflicting upon the latter fatal wounds which directly
caused his death. upon arraignment, said accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the
said complaint. Then, sometime in September, 1968, accused ' appellant Ricardo Felix alias
"Carding Tuwad" was arrested. Accordingly, an Amended Information was filed by the same
fiscal to include Ricardo Felix as an accused. accused Ricardo Felix entered the plea of not guilty
upon being arraigned and trial was accordingly had.
Issues:
WON the Court a quo erred in illegally trying appellant Casey on the amended
information without arraignment, and in finding him guilty after such illegal trial.
Held:
We do not find merit in the first assignment of error. The lack of arraignment under the
amended information is objected to by accused-appellant Joseph Casey allegedly on the ground
that there is a violation of his constitutional right to be informed of the charge against him. There
can be a violation of such right, however, only when the amendment pertains to matters of
substance. In the case at bar, the alterations introduced in the information refer to the inclusion of
accused appellant Ricardo Felix to the same charge of murder. They do not change the nature of
the crime against accused-appellant Casey. Conspiracy, evident premeditation, treachery and
taking advantage of superior strength are similarly alleged in both informations. No extenuating
circumstance is likewise alleged in both. Thus the amendment of the information as far as
accused-appellant Casey is concerned is one of form and not of substance as it is not prejudicial
to his rights.
Renato S.D. Domingo, et. al. v. Sps. Singson,
G.R. No. 203287, April 5, 2017
Facts:
The spouses Macario C. Domingo (Macario) and Felicidad S..D. Domingo (Felicidad)
(Spouses Domingo) ate the parents of respondent Engracia D. Singson (Engracia) and petitioners
Renato S.D. Domingo (Renato) and his co-heirs whom he represents herein, namely:
Consolacion D. Romero (Consolacion), Josefina D. Borja, and Rafael, Ramon, and Rosario, all
surnamed Domingo (collectively, the petitioners).
During their lifetime, the Spouses Domingo owned a parcel of landand the house built thereon
(subject property). Macario died on February 22, 1981, while Felicidad died on September 14,
1997.
Engracia filed a complaint8 for ejectment/unlawful detainer against co-heirs of petitioner
Renato. She claimed that she is the absolute owner of the subject property, having bought the
same from the Spouses Domingo as evidenced by an Absolute Deed of Sale. The old TCT was
cancelled and a new TCT was issued under her name. The petitioners only learned of the
supposed sale of the subject property when they received the summons and a copy of Engracia's
complaint in Civil Case. he petitioners filed a complaint which sought the nullity of the sale.
They alleged that the Absolute Deed of Sale dated June 6, 2006, upon which Engracia bases her
ownership of the subject property, was a nullity since the signatures of their parents appearing
thereon as the supposed vendors were forged. Petitioners filed a Joint Affidavit Complaint13 with
the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Pasig City, claiming that Engracia falsified the
signatures of their parents in the Absolute Deed of Sale and, thus, charging her with the crimes
of falsification of public document, estafa, and use of falsified documents. the Spouses Singson
filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings Due to Prejudicial Question. They alleged that the
validity and genuineness of the Absolute Deed of Sale, which is the subject of Civil then still
pending are determinative of their guilt of the crime charged. The RTC granted the motion to
suspend the proceedings filed by the Spouses Singson.
Issues:
Whether or not the criminal case was properly suspended on the ground of prejudicial
question.
Held:
Yes, there is indeed a presidential question. The Supreme Court held the allegations to
the civil case was based on the very same facts, which would be determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case because if the signatures of the spouses Domingo
are genuine , then there would be no falsification and therefore spouses sing song would be
innocent.

Joselito R. Pimentel v. Ma. Chrysantine L. Pimentel and People of the Philippines,

G.R. 172060, Sept. 13, 2010.
Facts:
Private respondent Maria Pimentel filed an action for frustrated murder against petitioner
Joselito Pimentel. Petitioner received summon to appear in a civil case for a nullity of marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the
proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on the ground of the existence of a prejudicial
question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the offender and the victim is a
key element in parricide, the outcome of the civil case would have a bearing in the criminal case
filed against him The RTC issued order holding that the pendency of the case is not a prejudicial
question that warrants suspension.
Issues:
 Whether or not annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question that warrant suspension of
the criminal case.
Held:
The Supreme Court held that there is no prejudicial question. The issue in the annulment
of marriage is not similar or intimately related to the issue in the criminal case of parricide. Their
relationship is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

Fortich-Celdran, et. al. v. Celdran. et. al.

G.R. No. L-22677, February 28, 1967

Facts:
This is a suit for annulment of an extra-judicial partition of properties and for accounting
filed with the CFI of Cebu, on Febru-ary 3, 1954.Plaintiffs were the children of the deceased,
Pedro Celdran, Sr. from the first marriage. Defendants were Josefa Celdran, spouse ofthe
deceased by the second marriage, and the seven children. When the defendants answered on May
28, 1954, Ignacio Celdran with-drew as one of the plaintiffs, alleging that it was falsified. On
March 6, 1959, the parties had an amicable settlement, except Ignacio Celdran, recognizing as
valid the above extrajudicial partition. The court held that the extrajudicial partition is valid for
being satisfied by Ignacio, upon receipt of P10,000.00 plus two (2)residential lots. Ignacio
appealed to the CA.On March 22, 1963, at the instance of Ignacio, an informationfor falsification
of public documents was filed by the City Fiscal of Ozamis in the CFI, Ozamis. Accused were the
children of Pedro, Sr.by the first marriage.
Issues:
May the proceedings in the criminal case on the ground of prejudicial question be suspended,
for the reason that the alleged falsification of document of withdrawal (of Ignacio) is at issue in
the Civil case pending in the Court of Appeals?
Held:
The High Court held that the action poses a prejudicial question to the criminal
prosecution for alleged falsification. The authenticity of the document (motion to withdraw) was
assailed in the same civil action. The resolution in the civil case will, in a sense, be determinative
of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal suit pending in another tribunal. As such, it is a
prejudicial question which should be first decided before the prosecution can proceed in the
criminal case.
Sec. Leila de Lima, et. al. v. Mario Joel T. Reyes,
G. R. No. 209330, January 11, 2016.
Facts:

Dr. Gerardo Ortega, a veterinarian and anchor of several shows in Palawan, was shot
dead by Marlon Recamata. Recamato also implicated Rodolfo “Bumar” O. Edrad, Dennis C.
Arans, and Armando “Salbakotah” R. Noel, Jr. Edrad alleged that it was former Palawan
Governor Mario Joel T. Reyes who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega.

On February 7, 2011, Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima created a special panel of prosecutors to
conduct preliminary investigation. On June 8, 2011, the First Panel concluded its preliminary
investigation and dismissed the complaint.

On June 28, 2011, Dr. Patricia Gloria Inocencio-Ortega, Dr. Ortega’s wife, filed a Motion to Re-
Open Preliminary Investigation, which, among others, sought the admission of mobile phone
communications between former Gov. Reyes and Edrad but it was denied by the First Panel.

In the interest of service and due process, the Secretary of Justice created a new panel of
investigators to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. The Second Panel issued a Resolution
finding probable cause and recommending the filing of information on all accused.

Reyes filed before the Court for Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Writ of
Preliminary Injuction and/or Temporary Restraining Order impleading the RTC of Palawan.

Respondent argues that the Secretary of Justice had no authority to order motu propio the
reinvestigation of the case since Dr. Inocencio-Ortega was able to submit her alleged new
evidence to the First Panel when she filed her Motion for Partial Reconsideration. He argues that
all parties had already been given the opportunity to present their evidence before the First Panel
so it was not necessary to conduct a reinvestigation.

On the other hand, petitioners argue that the Secretary of Justice acted within her authority and
argued that her creation of the second panel was a purely executive function and not a quasi-
judicial function. They point out that under Republic Act No. 10071 and the 2000 NPS Rule on
Appeal, the Secretary of Justice has the power to create a new panel of prosecutors to
reinvestigate a case to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

Petitioners’ position was that the First Panel “appeared to have ignored the rules of preliminary
investigation” when it refused to receive additional evidence that would have been crucial for the
determination of the existence of probable cause. They assert that respondent was not deprived
of due process when the reinvestigation was ordered since he was not prevented from presenting
controverting evidence to Dr. Inocencio-Ortega’s additional evidence. Petitioners argue that
since the Information had been filed, the disposition of the case was already within the discretion
of the trial court.
Respondent argues that the Secretary of Justice’s discretion to create a new panel of prosecutors
was not “unbridled” since the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires that there be compelling
circumstances for her to be able to designate another prosecutor to conduct the reinvestigation.
He argues that the Second Panel’s Resolution was void since the Panel was created by a
department order that was beyond the Secretary of Justice’s authority to issue. He further argues
that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since the Information filed by the
Second Panel was void.

Issues:

Whether the creation of the Second Panel was an executive function

Whether the Secretary of Justice is authorized to create motu propio another panel of prosecutor
in order to conduct a reinvestigation of the case

Whether the Petition for Certiorari has already been rendered moot by the filing of the
information in court

Held:

The determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable cause is not
a quasi-judicial proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of Justice in affirming or
reversing the findings of prosecutors may still be subject to judicial review if it is tainted with
grave abuse of discretion.

A quasi-judicial function is “the action, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or

bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,
and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise discretion of a
judicial nature.” Otherwise stated, an administrative agency performs quasi-judicial functions if
it renders awards, determines the rights of opposing parties, or if their decisions have the same
effect as the judgment of a court.

In a preliminary investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an
accused. The prosecutor only determines “whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably guilty thereof,
and should be held for trial.” As such, the prosecutor does not perform quasi-judicial functions.

In Santos v. Go:
The prosecutor in a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary investigation
is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information.
It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a
crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is
guilty thereof. While the fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a
quasi-court, for it is the courts, ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.

Though some cases describe the public prosecutors power to conduct a preliminary investigation
as quasi-judicial in nature, this is true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the
prosecutor is an officer of the executive department exercising powers akin to those of a court,
and the similarity ends at this point.

The fact that the DOJ is the primary prosecution arm of the Government does not make it a
quasi-judicial office or agency. Its preliminary investigation of cases is not a quasi-judicial
proceeding. Nor does the DOJ exercise a quasi-judicial function when it reviews the findings of a
public prosecutor on the finding of probable cause in any case.

An act is considered ministerial if “an officer or tribunal performs in the context of a given set of
facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his or its own judgment,
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.” In contrast, an act is considered discretionary
“if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right to decide how or when
the duty shall be performed.”63 Considering that “full discretionary authority has been delegated
to the executive branch in the determination of probable cause during a preliminary
investigation,” the functions of the prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice are not ministerial.

A criminal prosecution is initiated by the filing of a complaint to a prosecutor who shall then
conduct a preliminary investigation in order to determine whether there is probable cause to hold
the accused for trial in court. The recommendation of the investigating prosecutor on whether to
dismiss the complaint or to file the corresponding information in court is still subject to the
approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor. However, a party is not
precluded from appealing the resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state
prosecutor to the Secretary of Justice.

The 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires the filing of a petition for review before the Secretary of
Justice can reverse, affirm, or modify the appealed resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor
or chief state prosecutor. The Secretary of Justice may also order the conduct of a reinvestigation
in order to resolve the petition for review.
Under Rule 112, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, however, the Secretary of Justice may motu
propio reverse or modify resolutions of the provincial or city prosecutor or the chief state
prosecutor even without a pending petition for review. The Secretary of Justice exercises control
and supervision over prosecutors and it is within her authority to affirm, nullify, reverse, or
modify the resolutions of her prosecutors.

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 10071 also gives the Secretary of Justice the authority to directly
act on any “probable miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of the prosecution staff,
regional prosecution office, and the provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor.” Accordingly,
the Secretary of Justice may step in and order a reinvestigation even without a prior motion or
petition from a party in order to prevent any probable miscarriage of justice.

It is settled that executive determination of probable cause is different from the judicial
determination of probable cause. The executive determination of probable cause is one made
during preliminary investigation. It is a function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor
who is given a broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those
whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and thus should be held for
trial. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a
criminal case must be filed in court. Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged
by the public prosecutor, i.e., whether or not he has made a correct ascertainment of the existence
of probable cause in a case, is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be
compelled to pass upon.

The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. The judge must satisfy
himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is necessity for placing the accused under
custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. If the judge finds no probable cause, the
judge cannot be forced to issue the arrest warrant.

Mario Veridiano y Sapi v. People

GR No. 200370, June 7, 2017;
Facts:
Mario Veridiano y Sapi  was charged with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs after a concerned citizen called a certain PO3 Esteves, police radio operator of the
Nagcarlan Police Station, informing him that a certain alias "Baho," who was later identified as
Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs. PO3 Esteves informed his
two co-police officers. The Chief of Police instructed to set up a checkpoint. During the
checkpoint, the two police officers chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger jeepney. They
flagged down the jeepney and asked the passengers to disembark. The police officers instructed
the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for possible concealed weapons and to remove the
contents of their pockets. The police officers recovered from Veridiano "a tea bag containing
what appeared to be marijuana. Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights.
He was then brought to the police station.
The RTC convicted Vedriano of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Vedriano
appealed to the CA contending that he was illegally arrested and that the tea bag containing
marijuana is "inadmissible in evidence [for] being the 'fruit of a poisonous tree.'" However, the
CA affirmed the RTC. Veridiano filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Issues:
1. Whether there was a valid warrantless arrest;
2. Whether there was a valid warrantless search against petitioner;
3. Whether there is enough evidence to sustain petitioner's conviction for illegal
possession of dangerous drugs.
Held:
In the first issue, the petitioners arrest is not valid. The Court held that the arrest could
not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the Rules of
Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who
did not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that would incite
suspicion. In effecting the warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they
received. Reliable information alone is insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any
overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was
being committed, or is about to be committed.
A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have
personal knowledge of facts, based on their observation, that the person sought to be
arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives rise to probable cause that would
justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
In the second issue, The Court held that the petitioner's warrantless arrest was unlawful. A search
incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a search is
made. Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search; "the process cannot be
reversed." Petitioner in this case was a mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any act
that would give police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his
possession. There was no evidence to show that the police had basis or personal knowledge that
would reasonably allow them to infer anything suspicious.
In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded the allowable
limits of warrantless searches. They had no probable cause to believe that the accused violated
any law except for the tip they received. They did not observe any peculiar activity from the
accused that may either arouse their suspicion or verify the tip. Moreover, the search was flawed
at its inception. The checkpoint was set up to target the arrest of the accused.
Lastly, the warrantless search conducted by the police officers is invalid. Consequently, the tea
bag containing marijuana seized from petitioner is rendered inadmissible under the exclusionary
principle in Article III, Section 3(2) of the Constitution. There being no evidence to support his
conviction, petitioner must be acquitted.

Jeffrey Miguel y Remigio v. People;

G.R. No. 227038, July 31, 2017;
Facts:
Petitioner Jeffrey Miguel y Remigio was charged with the crime of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs after a Bantay Bayan operative of Barangay San Antonio Village, Makati City
was doing his rounds when he purportedly received a report of a man showing off his private
parts at Kaong Street. Two barangay operatives went to the said street and saw a visibly
intoxicated person, which they later identified as herein petitioner, urinating and displaying his
private parts while standing in front of a gate enclosing an empty lot. They approached petitioner
and asked him where he lived, and the latter answered Kaong Street. One of them also lived in
the same street but petitioner looked unfamiliar to him, so he asked for an identification card, but
petitioner failed to produce one. They repeated the request for an identification card, but instead,
petitioner emptied his pockets, revealing a pack of cigarettes containing one (1) stick of cigarette
and two (2) pieces of rolled paper containing dried marijuana leaves, among others. This
prompted them to seize the foregoing items, take petitioner to the police station, and turn him, as
well as the seized items, over to the police officers and undergo drug testing. After examination,
it was confirmed that the aforesaid rolled paper contained marijuana and that petitioner was
positive for the presence of methamphetamine but negative for THC-metabolites, both dangerous
drugs.
The petitioner however, presented a different version of the facts. According to him, he was just
urinating in front of his workplace when two (2) Bantay Bayan operatives approached and asked
him where he lived. Upon responding that he lived in Kaong Street they then frisked him, took
away his belongings, and thereafter, handcuffed and brought him to the barangay hall.
Thereafter, he was taken back to the barangay hall where they showed him two (2) sticks of
marijuana joints allegedly recovered from him.
The RTC convicted the petitioner. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the search and arrest made on petitioner were illegal and, thus, the
marijuana purportedly seized from him is inadmissible in evidence.
Held:
The Court held in the affirmative. The law requires that there first be a lawful arrest
before a search can be made- the process cannot be reversed. The Court simply finds highly
implausible the prosecution's claim that a valid warrantless arrest was made on petitioner on
account of the alleged public display of his private parts because there was no records showing
that such charge was filed aside from the instant criminal charge for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs. In the instant case, the Bantay Bayan operatives conducted an illegal search on
the person of petitioner notwithstanding the absence of lawful arrest. Hence, the search made
was not incidental to lawful arrest. Consequently, the marijuana purportedly seized from him on
account of such search is rendered inadmissible in evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule
under Section 3 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Since the confiscated marijuana is the
very corpus delicti of the crime charged, petitioner must necessarily be acquitted and exonerated
from criminal liability.

Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales v. People

G. R. No. 205926, July 22, 2015;
Facts:
Petitioner Commerciante was charged with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous
drugs after Agent Eduardo Radan of the NARCOTICS group and PO3 Bienvy Calag II (were
aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend at Private Road,
Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City, at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour along Private Road,
spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2) men - later identified as Comerciante and a
certain Erick Dasilla - standing and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of
them handing plastic sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they
immediately stopped and approached Comerciante and Dasilla. At a distance of around five (5)
meters, PO3 Calag introduced himself as a police officer, arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and
confiscated two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from them. A
laboratory examination later confirmed that said sachets contained methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu.
Comerciante averred that PO3 Calag was looking for a certain "Barok", who was a notorious
drug pusher in the area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were just standing in front of a
jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and taken to a police station. There, the police officers
claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked money in exchange for their
release. When they failed to accede to the demand, they were brought to another police station to
undergo inquest proceedings, and thereafter, were charged with illegal possession of dangerous
drugs.
The RTC convicted Commerciante. The CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the arrest and search made on petitioner were illegal and, thus, the shabu
purportedly seized from him is inadmissible in evidence.
Held:
 The Court held in the affirmative. In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante's acts
of standing around with a companion and handing over something to the latter do not constitute
criminal acts. These circumstances are not enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal
activity which would constitute a "genuine reason" for PO3 Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk"
search on the former. In this light, the "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante should be
deemed unlawful. In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid "stop and frisk"
search made on Comerciante. As such, the shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the
confiscated shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Comerciante must necessarily
be acquitted and exonerated from all criminal liability.

People v. Rose Edward Ocampo y Ebesa

G.R. No. 232300, August 1, 2018.
Facts:

Police Chief Inspector Allan Rabusa Ruba of the Valenzuela Police Station formed a team to
validate the reports and complaints of the residents of Barangay Pinalagad and to conduct a
surveillance in the said barangay.The team interviewed a confidential informant, a known
resident in the area and learned that a certain "alias ER," herein appellant, is engaged in the
illegal trade of marijuana and is usually doing business inside a billiard hall situated near the
Pinalagad Elementary School. The team then proceeded near the front part of the said school and
conducted a surveillance on the appellant. In the evening of the same day, the team reported the
result of their investigation to Chief Ruba and upon receiving the report, Chief Ruba organized a
team to conduct a buy-bust operation against appellant. After planning the operation, the team
coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and submitted to the latter
their Pre-Operation Report and the PDEA received from the Valenzuela Police Station. The team
then proceeded to the target area in Barangay Pinalagad. The confidential informant met with the
team and informed PO1 Llacuna, the designated poseur-buyer, that appellant was inside the
billiard hall repacking marijuana leaves. Afterwards, the confidential informant brought PO1
Llacuna inside the billiard hall and introduced him to appellant as a buyer. Appellant then asked
PO1 Llacuna how much he was going to buy and the latter replied "five pesos" which really
meant "five hundred pesos." PO1 Llacuna handed the marked money to appellant, thereafter, the
latter pulled out five (5) pieces of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing suspected
marijuana leaves from a Zesto juice box. PO1 Llacuna immediately motioned the confidential
informant to rush out of the billiard hall which was the pre-arranged signal for the other team
members. PO1 Llacuna then grabbed the appellant and introduced himself as a police officer and
informed him of his constitutional rights and searched the appellant and recovered the marked
money from the latter's pocket. The team also recovered fifty-eight (58) small plastic sachets
containing marijuana leaves with fruiting tops, one (1) glass tube, eighteen (18) transparent
plastic sachets, one (1) newspaper wrapper containing suspected marijuana leaves with fruiting
tops and one (1) partially burned cigarette. After that, the team conducted an inventory at the
place of arrest in the presence of the appellant, and a barangay official. The inventory report was
executed and signed by PO1 Llacuna as the arresting officer, SPO1 Garcia as the investigating
officer, and Kagawad Sherwin De Guzman as the witness. The conduct of the inventory was also
photographed. Immediately after, SPO1 Garcia turned over the seized items which were sealed
and labeled to the Crime Laboratory Office of Valenzuela City. The items were received by PO1
Pataueg and turned over the same to Forensic Chemist PCI Cejes who personally received the
same evidence and as a result of her examination, the same items tested positive for marijuana, a
dangerous drug.
The RTC found appellant guilty. The CA affirmed the RTC’s decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the arrest and search were valid, and the evidences obtained were
admissible.
Held:
The Court held in the affirmative. Buy-bust operations are legally sanctioned procedures
for apprehending drug-peddlers and distributors. These operations are often utilized by law
enforcers for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their
nefarious activities.
In the present case, the body of evidence adduced by the prosecution supports the conclusion that
the identity, integrity and evidentiary value of the subject marijuana leaves with fruiting tops
were successfully and properly preserved and safeguarded through an unbroken chain of
custody.