"That on or about February 28, 1996, in the City of Zamboanga,
1 G.R. No. 139179 April 3, 2002
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
WILFREDO TOLENTINO Y ESPERAT and JONATHAN FABROS Y
CASTRO, accused,
JONATHAN FABROS Y CASTRO, appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire records to review. The
appellate court may pass upon every circumstance favorable to the accused.
In the present case, the prosecution failed to prove the existence of
conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt. Neither was it able to show that
appellant was an accomplice or accessory. Hence, he must be acquitted on
reasonable ground.
The Case
Jonathan Fabros y Castro appeals the May 27, 1999 Decision1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 17) in Criminal Case
No. 13698, finding him guilty of murder and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, finding the accused Wilfredo Tolentino and
Jonathan Fabros guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
murder, and taking into consideration the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling (morada) without any mitigating
circumstance to offset the same, the Court hereby sentences the
above-named accused separately to suffer the penalty of
[r]eclusion [p]erpetua, to pay separately the heirs of the victim the
sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages, the sum of P50,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and to indemnify the said heirs [in] the sum of
P15,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs."2
The Information, dated March 2, 1996, charged appellant as follows:
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a piece of wood and knife,
conspiring and confederating together, mutually aiding and
assisting with one another, by means of treachery and evident
premeditation and with intent to kill, did then and there without
any warning, assault, attack and stab with the use of said weapons
that they were armed with, at the person of HERNAN SAGARIO y
CUESTA, thereby inflicting mortal wounds on the different parts of
the latter's body which directly caused his death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of said victim.
"That the commission of the above-stated offense has been
attended by the following aggravating circumstances, to wit:
1. Abuse of superior strength; and
2. Dwelling."3
With the assistance of counsel,4 appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned
on June 7, 1996.5 After due trial, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution's version of the facts is summarized by the Office of the
Solicitor General as follows:6
"On February 28, 1996 around 7:30 in the evening, appellant and
his cousins, Sheila Guilayan and Merwin Ledesma, were at their
house in Luyahan, Pasonanca, Zamboanga City when their neighbor
Wilfredo Tolentino called them. When asked what was it all about,
Wilfredo simply motioned to them to come to his house located
just across the road. Once they were inside the house, Wilfredo
immediately revealed his plan to kill Hernan Sagario, Sheila's
stepfather. Wilfredo explained that it was the only way to free
 Sheila's mother - appellant's aunt - of the sufferings being caused
by Hernan. Wilfredo then instructed Merwin to go back to the
house and get the bolo of Hernan. Merwin obliged, got the bolo,
and gave it to Wilfredo. Thereafter, they were told by Wilfredo to
go home and wait for Hernan.1âwphi1.nêt
"Around 8:30 in the evening, Hernan arrived. He went directly to
the kitchen and fixed the bag of rice he was carrying. Meanwhile,
appellant, together with Sheila and Merwin, just stayed quiet in the
living room. Moments later, Wilfredo with a 2"x2" piece of wood in
his hand entered the house. He then followed Hernan towards the
kitchen. When about an armslength away from Hernan, Wilfredo,
without saying a word, immediately walloped Hernan on the right
side of the neck sending the latter unconscious and falling face
down to the ground. Wilfredo immediately instructed appellant
and Merwin to help him bring Hernan out of the house. Lifting
Hernan out of the house, Wilfredo held him by the neck while both
appellant and Merwin grasped his feet. They then carried Hernan
towards the creek about seven meters away from the house.
"Upon reaching the creekside, the three stopped and moved closer
to the water. At this juncture, Wilfredo successively stabbed
Hernan on different parts of the body causing the latter's instant
death. After throwing the victim's lifeless body in the creek, the
three immediately left.
"The post-mortem examination on the victim's cadaver disclosed
that the cause of his death was cardio-respiratory arrest due to
shock and hemorrhage secondary to [a] stab wound penetrating
the chest." (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant, on the other hand, presented the following version of the facts: 7
"Accused Jonathan Fabros and Wilfredo Tolentino both denied
killing the victim. Instead, they pointed to each other as the one
who killed Hernan Sagario. Fabros pointed to Tolentino as the
assailant and the latter also fingered the former as the killer of
Sagario.
"Relying on his lone testimony and corroborating the testimony of
prosecution witness Sheila Guilayan, accused Fabros narrated that
he is a resident of Luyuhan, Pasonanca, particularly in the house of
his auntie Amparo Guilayan (the common-law wife of Hernan
Sagario), together with his cousins Merwin Ledesma and Sheila
Guilayan.
"On 28 February 1996, at around 7:00 p.m., he returned home to
Luyahan after his work at Astoria Hotel as a waiter. Sheila was at
home when he arrived. Shortly thereafter, their neighbor, accused
Tolentino, came over and called for Sheila. Sh[ei]la stood up and
went to the house of Tolentino, leaving behind Fabros and Merwin
Ledesma. After a while, he and Ledesma heard Sheila crying and
the two went to the house of Tolentino. At the house of Tolentino,
Fabros and Ledesma asked Sheila why she cried. [She] disclosed
Tolentino's plan to kill her stepfather Hernan Sagario. When asked
for his motive to kill Hernan Sagario, Tolentino merely reasoned
that he just wanted to help their auntie Amparo get rid of her
problems. When they expressed apprehension [about] being
implicated and tried to prevent Tolentino from pursuing his plan,
the latter told them not to worry; for he will take care.
"When Tolentino saw their uncle Hernan coming towards the
house, he ordered them to go home and they obeyed. As he
arrived, Hernan ordered Fabros to boil water. Afterwards, Hernan
went out of the house to buy Ovaltine. When Hernan returned,
Tolentino approached him and they talked for about two minutes.
Afterwards, Tolentino went to his house while their uncle Hernan
told him (Fabros) to check if the water was already boiling.
Jonathan went to the kitchen while their uncle placed the rice he
brought in a container. At that instance, Jonathan heard the sound
'pok', and saw Tolentino holding a piece of wood (2" x 2"). Then, he
saw his uncle f[a]ll down slowly, his chest hitting the corner edge
of a table. Tolentino approached his uncle and kicked him. Then he
ordered Fabros to come near him and carry Hernan by his feet.
Afraid that Tolentino will hit him with the piece of wood, Fabros
held his uncle by the feet while Tolentino pulled Hernan by the shirt
and he just followed Tolentino. Tolentino brought Hernan near the
river. When Jonathan noticed that his uncle regained
consciousness, he ran away towards a banana plantation and from
there he saw Tolentino [stab] Sagario on the chest. After stabbing
the victim, Tolentino pushed and waded him into the water.
Scared, Jonathan ran home. About twenty minutes later, Tolentino
arrived and with thumbs up sign, he said, 'Okey na!'. Jonathan also
observed that there was blood on the shoulder of Tolentino. The
latter then called the three (3) and warned them that if they will
tell other people, he will kill them. Out of fear, they just followed
whatever Tolentino told them.
"By reason of fear of Tolentino's threat, Jonathan told the police
that he did not know what happened. On 01 March 1996, however,
he was arrested for the death of Hernan Sagario on account of an
information received by the police identifying him as the assailant.
He was brought to the Sta. Maria Police Station and thereat he was
told by the police that if he will not admit, they will show him the
witness, which the police later did by showing to him his co-accused
Tolentino. On seeing Tolentino, he declared that he (Tolentino) was
the one who killed the victim.
"However, on 14 July 2000, long after the trial court's decision had
become final and executory on his part, Wilfredo Tolentino,
apparently conscience-stricken, executed an affidavit admitting
sole responsibility for the death of Hernan Sagario and retracted
his testimony implicating accused-appellant Jonathan Fabros. His
affidavit is herein reproduced as follows:
'I, WILFREDO TOLENTINO y ESPERAT, 65 years old,
widower, Filipino, a convicted prisoner with the San
Ramon Prison and Penal Farm in Zamboanga City, after
having been duly sworn to in accordance with law hereby
depose and state:
'That I was convicted for the crime of Murder in Criminal
Case No. 13698 entitled 'The People of the Philippines,
Plaintiff, versus, Wilfredo Tolentino y Esperat and
Jonathan Fabros y Castro, accused,' which Decision was
promulgated on May 30, 1999 and ha[s] become final;
'That of the four years I have been in prison, I have
contemplated on the consequences of my acts and have
been conscience stricken causing me sleepless nights and
deep pity [for] my co-accused Jonathan Fabros whom I
have wrongfully imputed to be the killer of the victim
Hernan Sagario y Cuesta. As he appealed the Decision,
[maybe] I still have the chance to rectify the wrong I have
done to him and tell the Honorable Court what actually
happened [o]n the night of February 28, 1996, as
hereunder narrated;
'That I had known Hernan Sagario earlier in 1994 when he
was still a security guard and he attempted to shoot me
with his service firearm and although we had amicably
settled the matter between us, when he came to be my
neighbor, I would remember that incident and my old
grudge against him would be rekindled;
'That earlier that night of February 28, 1996, I came home
quite drunk [after] my drinking spree with my relatives
across the river and one of the topics we discussed was
about the incident when Hernan Sagario attempted to
shoot me. As I recalled that incident, my old grudge
against him resurfaced and I resolved right then and there
to take my revenge on Hernan. So when he came home
and he was in the kitchen, I took hold of a piece of wood
and hit him with it and when he fell down unconscious, I
dragged his body outside of the house, ordering Jonathan
Fabros who was then in the kitchen to help me carry the
body of Hernan outside or else he would also become my
victim. Jonathan unwillingly assisted me carry the body of
Hernan outside and upon my direction, we dragged the
body of Hernan towards the river where to finish him off,
I stabbed [him] in the chest and pushed him down into the
water to hide his body. For his part, Jonathan left me when
the body reached the river;
'That after [the] killing, I threatened Jonathan Fabros,
Neneng (the daughter of Hernan's live-in-partner) and
Weng-weng, a cousin of Neneng and Jonathan[,] never to
report the incident to any one or else they could become
my next victim;
The trial court held that the prosecution's evidence positively identified
Wilfredo Tolentino as the person who had hit the victim with a piece of
wood and later stabbed him with a bolo. It also ruled that the killing was
qualified by treachery and attended by the aggravating circumstance of
dwelling.
The court a quo observed that overt and positive acts of appellant
manifested his approval of the killing and the concurrence of his acts with
those of the other accused.8 Thus, the RTC concluded that Fabros was a co-
conspirator and should be held equally responsible for the murder.
Hence, this appeal.9
The Issue

'That during the investigation of the killing, I pointed to In his Brief, appellant assigns the following alleged errors for our
Jonathan as the killer of Hernan, thinking that I would not consideration:
be implicated. Even when I was also charged for the killing,
I was confident that I would be acquitted if I would point
I
to Jonathan as the killer. During the trial of the case, I
bribed Jonathan and even gave P20,000.00 to a middle
"The Court a quo gravely erred in convicting herein Accused-
man to effect the pay off but Jonathan returned the
appellant Jonathan Fabros of the crime charged notwithstanding
money to me saying he could not admit what he did not
the categorical statement of Prosecution Witness Sheila Guilayan
commit;
that it was Accused Wilfredo Tolentino who actually killed the
victim, Hernan Sagario.
'That my conscience ha[d] been greatly troubled by
denying Jonathan his future by [my] own evil acts and by
II
this affidavit hopes to correct the wrongs I had done to
Jonathan Fabros;
"The Court a quo gravely erred in convicting accused-appellant
notwithstanding Wilfredo Tolentino's categorical admission of guilt
'That I am executing this affidavit [to] attest to the truth of
[of] the crime charged."10
the foregoing narration of facts and to appeal to the Court
authorities to rectify the wrongs I had done to Jonathan
Fabros and I am willing to testify in court o[n] these The errors boil down to the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence.
statements narrated.'"
This Court's Ruling
Ruling of the Trial Court
The appeal is meritorious; appellant should be acquitted.
Main Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
The RTC held that the assistance of appellant in bringing the body of the
victim from the house to the river bank where the latter was allegedly
stabbed to death positively showed that the former had conspired in the
commission of the crime.11 In its abbreviated nine-page Brief, the Office of
the Solicitor General agrees that conspiracy has been duly proven. On the
other hand, appellant argues that his "fleeting participation" in helping carry
the victim's body to the river bank did not indicate unity of purpose or
design. We agree with him.
An appeal in a criminal action opens the whole case to review. This implies
that the Court may pass upon every circumstance favorable to the accused.
In People v. Manambit,12 the Court explained thus:
"Indeed, the Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to
review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if it finds that
their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just disposition of
the case. It is a matter of justice that the two other appellants be
exonerated of the charges. This we do because an appeal in a
criminal action opens the whole case for review and this includes
the review of the penalty and indemnity. Every circumstance in
favor of the accused shall be considered."13
No Conspiracy
Even the Office of the Solicitor General admits that appellant did not directly
kill the victim. It, however, urges us to convict him on the basis of conspiracy.
In theory, conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it.14 To prove conspiracy, the prosecution must establish the following three
requisites: (1) two or more persons came to an agreement, (2) the
agreement concerned the commission of a crime, and (3) the execution of
the felony was decided upon.15 Once conspiracy is established, the act of
one becomes the act of all.16
Well-settled is the rule that the existence of conspiracy cannot be
presumed.17 Quite the contrary, the evidence for it must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt.18 As this Court has repeatedly stated, criminal conspiracy
must be founded on facts, not on mere surmises or conjectures. 19 Prior
agreement or assent is usually inferred from the acts of the accused showing
concerted action, common design and objective, actual cooperation, and
concurrence of sentiments or community of interests.20 Mere presence at
the scene of the crime or even knowledge of the plan or acquiescence
thereto are not sufficient grounds to hold a person liable as a
conspirator.21 Therefore, the task in every case is to determine whether the
particular acts established by the requisite quantum of proof reasonably
yield that inference.22
In the case before us, we agree that the culpability of Tolentino was clearly
established, but we are also convinced that the evidence fails to show the
culpability of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. 23 Because,
unquestionably, the latter did not personally inflict any of the fatal flows, he
can be held liable as a principal, only if conspiracy is proven. 24 To recall,
Sheila Guilayan, the prosecution eyewitness, narrated the circumstances
surrounding the killing of Hernan Sagario as follows:
"Q On February 28, this year, 1996, at around 7:30 o'clock in the
evening, can you still remember where were you?
A Yes, I could still remember, I was in our house.
Q You were in your house, are you referring to your house in
Pasonanca, Luyahan?
A Yes.
Q Can you also remember who were with you in that evening
of February 28, 1996 in your house at Pasonanca, Luyahan?
A Yes, I can still remember, my companions were Jonathan Q What did you do after you were called by this Tolentino?
Fabros and Melwin Ledesma.
A So I went with him to their house.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Where is his house?
Q And you said while you were in the sala sitting down, writing,
there was an incident that transpired, will you please tell us what A Just beside our house or near our house.
transpired?
COURT:
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
Q Where was Tolentino when he called you to go with him?
That will ask for narration, what transpired?
A He was by the door of our house although he was still outside
COURT: but he was at the door of our house when he called me.

Be more specific on that. COURT:

PROSECUTOR ORILLO: Continue.

Q What happened? PROSECUTOR ORILLO:

A I was called by Tolentino and he requested me to go to their Q And you said you went with him to his house, now what
house. happened there in his house?

Q You are referring to Wilfredo Tolentino? A There in their house he told me just to keep quiet because he
[was] going to kill my step-father.
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
Q And what did you do next after he told you about that?
Leading, Your Honor.
A After he told me that I cried and I told him not to do that
COURT: because we will be implicated.

Sustained. Q What else did you do aside from crying and telling him not to
do it because we will be implicated, what else did you do?
PROSECUTOR ORILLO:
A Well, I just cried until my two cousins heard me and they, the
two, also went to the house of Tolentino.
Q While your two cousins were already in the house of
Tolentino, what happened next?
A My cousins asked me why I was crying.
Q And then?
A They asked Tolentino why I was crying.
Q What did you do next?
A I just cried and kept on telling him not to do it because we will
be implicated and also my mother [was] not [t]here.
Q And how about Tolentino, what did he do?
A Well, he again told me just not to tell it to anybody because if
I [was] going to tell it to anybody, he will also kill us.
Q How about your two cousins, what did they do?
A My cousins also told him not to do it because they said they
[were] the only persons [t]here and for sure we will be implicated.
Q And thereafter, what happened next?
A Tolentino said he will just take care.
Q So what happened next after that?
A And then Tolentino asked Melwin Ledesma to get the bolo of
my stepfather in our house.
Q And what did your cousin Melwin Ledesma do after he was
ordered by Tolentino to get the bolo?
A Then Melwin Ledesma went to the house and got the bolo
and brought the same to the house of Tolentino.
Q And after bringing the bolo to the house of Tolentino, what
happened next?
A Then when my step-father was on his way to our house,
Tolentino told us to go home."25
"Q What happened next after you said your step-father went
out to buy ovaltine?
A Then several minutes thereafter my stepfather again arrived
in our house then he got inside the house and he went directly to
the kitchen.
Q And what did your step-father do?
A After that he transferred the rice he brought which was placed
on a plastic cellophane to another plastic container.
Q And what else happened?
A And then after that Tolentino entered our house and went
directly to the kitchen and there he hit my step-father.
Q And what instrument did Tolentino use in hitting your step-
father?
A A piece of wood.
Q Will you please describe this piece of wood?
A A round piece of wood.
Q How about the length of this piece of wood?
A (Witness extended her both hands to demonstrate the length
which when measured gave us twenty inches in length).
Q You said it was a round piece of wood, can you more or less
tell us the diameter of this piece of wood?
A (Witness again made a circle to demonstrate the diameter
which [was] three and a half inches x x x).
PROSECUTOR ORILLO:
Q And where was your step-father hit by that piece of wood
used by Tolentino?
A He was hit on the right side of his neck x x x extending to his
right jaw.
Q Will you please tell this Honorable Court your particular
position when you saw Tolentino hit with the piece of wood your
step-father?
A I was in a sitting position in the sala but you know in our house
even if you are seated in the sala you can see the kitchen from
there.
Q Before you saw that, where did Tolentino come from?
ATTY. JIMENEZ: Witness is incompetent, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR ORILLO: If she knows, Your Honor.
ATTY. JIMENEZ: She was seated in the sala, how can [she] know?
COURT: According to her she went home and she was in the sala. If
she went to the sala, probably she will know. If she knows she may
answer.
A: I did not know where he came from but I just saw him getting
inside our house and [going] directly to the kitchen.
PROSECUTOR ORILLO:
Q: When you saw Tolentino hit your step-father, where was
your step-father facing?
A: He was facing forward while Tolentino came from behind
him.
Q: And what happened next after your step-father was hit by
that piece of wood used by Tolentino?
A: After he was hit he fell [face] down x x x, he fell down first on
the table and after that to the ground. From the table he continued
to fall to the ground.
Q : And while your step-father was already on the ground, what
if any did Tolentino do?
A Then when my step-father was already at the cemented
pavement Tolentino stepped on his head several times.
Q And then what happened next?
A After that I cried but he told me to keep quiet because if I
[was] not going to keep quiet he will also kill us.
Q After that, what happened?
A And then he asked my cousins to help him to bring the body
of my step-father outside of the house.
Q And then?
A Then they brought my step-father outside of the house and
Tolentino held him on the collar of his shirt and my cousins held
him on his feet.
Q And while already outside the house, towards what direction
did they bring your step-father?
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
Witness is incompetent, we object, Your Honor.
COURT: Sustained.
PROSECUTOR ORILLO:
Q What else happened after you saw your cousins Jonathan
Fabros and Tolentino carrying your step-father?
ATTY. FABIAN: Objection, Your Honor, there was no mention of any
Jonathan Fabros in her testimony.
COURT: Cousin only.
ATTY. FABIAN: mention of Jonathan Fabros.
COURT: I do not know if it was cousin or cousins.
ATTY. JIMENEZ: I heard cousins, Your Honor.
COURT: Cousins, with 'S'. She may answer. Yes, according to her it
was only her cousins who were with her.
ATTY. FABIAN:
I heard the name Jonathan Fabros being mentioned by the
prosecution, Your Honor.
COURT:
That is why I told the prosecutor to change it to cousins.
ATTY. FABIAN:
Yes, Your Honor.
A It was only Jonathan and Tolentino who carried him.
Q So what happened next after you saw them carrying your
step-father?
A They brought my step-father to the creek.
Q How far is this 'sapa' or creek from your house?
A Maybe from here (witness again by the use of the witness
stand as reference point, pointed to the fourth bench from the
front,) about 6.5 meters, because from the witness stand to the
main door is measured 7.5 meters, so if it is from here, it is only 6.5
meters.
ATTY. JIMENEZ: That is about 7 to 8 meters.
COURT: That is about 7 meters already from the witness stand to
the fourth bench, more or less 7 meters.
PROSECUTOR ORILLO:
Q This 'sapa' or creek that you are referring to, please describe
to this Honorable Court this creek which according to you is only 7
meters more or less away from your house?
A This is a wide creek.
Q And what else did you see?
A Well, since it was clear from our house although I stayed
inside our house and since the walling of our house, the portion of
this is made of screen, I saw Tolentino when they were carrying my
step-father in the act of stabbing my step-father (witness
demonstrated as if she was holding something and thrust[ing it]
forward).
Q What else did you see?
A And then after that, I only saw Tolentino [place] the body of
my step-father on the water and there I did not see my cousin
anymore.
Q And then what transpired next?
A Then a few minutes thereafter my cousin returned to the
house.
Q And what did you do when your cousin returned to the
house?
A And then when he arrived home I just cried and I told him,
because his nickname is Nonong, so I said: 'Nonong, we will be
really implicated and he said nothing and instead he just went to
his previous position and sat down.
Q How about the other cousin of yours Melwin Ledesma, where
was he?
A He was also beside me and he was embracing me from
behind.
Q What happened next?
A Then another few minutes after, Tolentino arrived in our
house.
Q And when he arrived at your house, what did he do?
A And then there inside our house he flashed a thumb's up and
he said it is already okey.
Q What else did he do?
A Then he approached me and told me not to report [t]his
incident because if I [was] going to report [it] he [was] going to kill
me.
Q And that particular time when he arrived at your house, what
if any did you notice from his person, this Tolentino?
ATTY. JIMENEZ:
Leading, Your Honor.
COURT: Sustained.
PROSECUTOR ORILLO: What if any have you noticed from
Tolentino?
COURT: Will you please be more specific with your question.
PROSECUTOR ORILLO: At the time when Tolentino arrived at your
house and told you 'okey na', with thumb's up, that particular time,
what if any have you noticed on his person?
 ATTY. JIMENEZ:
It is [a] very general question, Your Honor.
COURT:
Anything she noticed, she may answer.
A I noticed that his shortpants was wet and there [were]
bloodstains on his shirt."26
The above testimony shows that Tolentino attacked Hernan Sagario. The
assault was carried out without the participation of appellant,27 who did not
personally hit or stab the victim, but only subsequently helped carry the
latter from the house to the nearby creek.28 Nothing in the testimony
conveyed a coordinated action, concerted purpose or community of design
to commit the criminal act.29 It must be emphasized that Tolentino's plan to
kill the victim was concocted in the absence of appellant. 30 The latter's
participation, as shown by the foregoing testimony, was made when the
decision to kill was already a fait accompli.31
Further, conspiracy cannot be inferred from the overt acts of appellant.32 He
did nothing to assist Tolentino in the actual commission of the
murder.33 Neither did the former bear any weapon, much less use one to
inflict injury on the victim.34 In fact, appellant, showing clearly his lack of
support for the criminal intent of Tolentino, even tried to prevent the latter
from hacking the victim, according to the eyewitness. 35
Indeed, the trial court based its finding of conspiracy on mere presumptions,
not on solid facts indubitably indicating a common design to commit
murder.36 Such suppositions do not constitute proof beyond reasonable
doubt.37
Because of the lack of a united purpose, appellant cannot be considered a
principal by indispensable cooperation.38 Absent a conspiracy, his
responsibility, as well as that of his co-accused, is individual -- not collective
-- and each is to be punished only for his own separate acts. 39
Not an Accomplice
Neither can appellant be convicted as an accomplice. Article 18 of the
Revised Penal Code defines accomplices as "those persons who, not being
included in Article 17,40 cooperate in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts." To be convicted as an accomplice, it is
necessary that the accused be aware of the criminal intent of the principal
and then cooperate knowingly or intentionally by supplying material or
moral aid for the efficacious execution of the crime.41
To consider a person an accomplice in the commission of the offense, the
following must concur: (1) community of design -- knowing the criminal
design of the principal by direct participation, one concurs therein; (b)
cooperation in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts, with the intention of supplying material and moral aid in the execution
of the crime in an efficacious way; and (c) a relation between the acts done
by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as accomplice.42
To be deemed an accomplice, one needs to have had both knowledge of and
participation in the criminal act.43 In other words, the principal and the
accomplice must have acted in conjunction and directed their efforts to the
same end.44 Thus, it is essential that both were united in their criminal
design.45
In the case before us, appellant did not concur in or lend support to the
nefarious intent of Tolentino.46 The mere fact that the former had prior
knowledge of the latter's criminal design did not automatically make him an
accomplice.47 This circumstance, by itself, did not show his concurrence in
the principal's criminal intent.48
That appellant helped Tolentino carry the victim from the house to the creek
did not necessarily demonstrate concurrence of wills or unity of purpose or
action.49 Quite the contrary, the former's attempt to dissuade the latter
from killing Sagario was attested to by the prosecution witness. 50 With the
nominal role appellant played in the drama that had been thrust upon him,
we cannot declare that he was an accomplice in the crime charged.51
Not an Accessory Either
Appellant cannot be convicted as an accessory either. Article 19 of the
Revised Penal Code defines an accessory as one who had knowledge of the
commission of the crime and did not participate in its commission as
principal or accomplice, yet took part subsequent to its commission by any
of three modes: (1) profiting oneself or assisting the offender to profit by
the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or destroying the body of the crime,
or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; and
(3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the
crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or
when the offender is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to
take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of
some other crime. To convict an accused as an accessory, the following
elements must be proven: (1) knowledge of the commission of the crime
and (2) subsequent participation in it by any of the three above-cited
modes.52
duress, simply assisting Verzola in bringing the body down the
house to the foot of the stairs and leaving said body for anyone to
see, cannot be classified as an attempt to conceal or destroy the
body of the crime, the effects or instruments thereof, must be done
to prevent the discovery of the crime."60
The presumption of innocence in favor of appellant has not been overcome
by proof beyond reasonable doubt.61 Thus, he must be acquitted.62
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED and the assailed Decision SET ASIDE.
Appellant is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt. He is
ordered RELEASED from custody immediately, unless legally held for
another cause. In this regard, the director of the Bureau of Corrections is
directed to report to this Court his compliance with this Decision within five
(5) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.

Under paragraph 2 of said codal provision, the concealment or the

destruction of the body of the crime or of the effects or the instruments
thereof must have been done in order to prevent the discovery of the
crime.53 That, precisely, is wanting in the present case.54

In his testimony,55 appellant stated that because he was afraid his co-
accused would hurt him if he refused, he agreed to assist the latter in
carrying the victim towards the river. The fact that appellant left thereafter
likewise indicated his innocence of the charge. 56 Verily, he adequately
explained his conduct prior to the stabbing incident as one born of fear for
his own life.57 It is not incredible for an eyewitness to a crime, especially if
unarmed, to desist from assisting the victim if to do so would put the
former's life in peril.58

Thus, in People v. Verzola,59 we explained as follows:

"x x x. It must be noted that Josefina testified that she helped her
co-appellant bring the body of the deceased down the stairs
because of fear. Even if she assisted her co-appellant without
 a. P50,000.00, as indemnity for the death of Arnulfo B. Tuadles;
2 G.R. No. 128900 July 14, 2000

b. P226,298.36, as actual damages;

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
c. P7,200,000.00, representing compensable earnings lost by
ALBERTO S. ANTONIO, SPO4 JUANITO N. NIETO and SPO1 HONORIO
reason of Arnulfo B. Tuadles’ death;
CARTALLA, JR., accused-appellants.

d. P3,000,000.00 or the stipulated P1,000,000.00 each for the three

DECISION
(3) children of Arnulfo B. Tuadles, and another P500,000.00 for the
widow, Ma. Odyssa "Suzette" Tecarro-Tuadles, as moral damages;
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
e. P50,000.00, as exemplary damages;
This is an appeal from the Decision dated April 30, 1997, rendered by the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 156 in Criminal Case No. 111232-
f. Costs.
H, for Murder, the dispositive portion of which is quoted hereunder, to wit:

In case of insolvency of accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ "Ambet", accused

WHEREFORE, finding accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ "Ambet", GUILTY
JUANITO NIETO y NEMER and HONORIO C. CARTALLA, JR., shall be liable to
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery as
pay, jointly and severally, one-third (1/3) of the above-adjudicated sums or
charged in the Information, and there being no mitigating or any aggravating
the amount of P3,675,432.78 unto the said heirs of Arnulfo B. Tuadles.
circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, pursuant to Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 7659 entitled "An Act to
Impose The Death Penalty On Certain Heinous Crimes" and Art. 63, In any event, the foregoing civil liabilities shall all be without subsidiary
paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. imprisonment in case of insolvency.

In the service of his sentence, accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ "Ambet"
shall be credited in full with the period of his preventive imprisonment.
The guilt of both accused JUANITO NIETO y NEMER and HONORIO C.
CARTALLA, JR., as accessories, having also been established beyond any
reasonable doubt, each of them is hereby sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correcional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as maximum.
Being instruments of the crime, let the caliber .9mm Beretta Mode 92F with
Serial Number BER-041965-Z, including its black magazine and five (5) live
bullets, which are presently under the custody of the Court, be confiscated
and forfeited in favor of the Government and turned over to the Firearms
and Explosives Office, Camp Crame, Quezon City.
Let a Commitment Order be issued for the transfer of accused ALBERTO S.
ANTONIO @ "Ambet" from the San Juan Municipal Jail to the Bureau of
Corrections, Muntinlupa City.

Accused ALBERTO S. ANTONIO @ "Ambet" is likewise hereby ordered to pay, SO ORDERED.1

unto the heirs of Arnulfo B. Tuadles, the following sums:
On that fateful morning of November 2, 1996, what should have been an
amiable game of cards between two erstwhile friends turned into a deadly
confrontation resulting in the fatal shooting of one by the hand of the other.
The victim, Arnulfo "Arnie" Tuadles, a former professional basketball player,
succumbed instantaneously to a single gunshot wound right between the
eyes, inflicted with deadly precision by the bullet of a .9mm caliber Beretta
pistol.
Convicted of murder by the trial court as the killer is Alberto "Ambet" S.
Antonio, a one-time chairman of the Games and Amusement Board (GAB).
It was during his stint as such that he and Tuadles became socially
acquainted. They somehow lost touch, but later became reacquainted when
they both started frequenting the International Business Club (IBC), located
along Wilson Street in San Juan, Metro Manila, which houses amenities such
as a dining room, music bar and gameroom. Often, the two would meet with
other members and friends to play cards in the gameroom at the second
floor of the club. Their preferred games were poker or "pusoy dos", ordinary
poker or Russian poker. Their bets always ran into the tens of thousands of
pesos.
The tragic events began to unravel in the final hours of November 1, 1996.
Antonio, Tuadles, and a certain Danny Debdani, then president of the IBC,
had agreed to meet at the club for another poker session, their third night
in a row. Antonio arrived at the club first, followed by Tuadles at around
midnight. Debdani, however, failed to appear, so after waiting for
sometime, Antonio and Tuadles decided to play "pusoy dos", a game for two
(2) players only. They continued playing until morning, pausing only when
either of them had to visit the restroom. They stopped playing at around
9:00 o’clock in the morning of November 2, 1996, to eat breakfast.
When it came time to tally their scores and collect the winnings from the
loser, an argument arose. It is at this point where the prosecution and the
defense presented two very different scenarios. The prosecution alleged
and sought to prove that in the course of an argument, without warning or
cause, Antonio pulled his gun from behind his back and shot Tuadles at very
close range, thus employing treacherous means to accomplish the nefarious
deed. The pivotal evidence presented by the prosecution was the testimony
of one Jose Jimmy T. Bobis, a security guard who testified as to how the
shooting of Tuadles occurred.
On the other hand, the defense hinged its opposing arguments on the
testimony of accused Antonio himself, who testified that their argument
was caused by Tuadles’ refusal to pay Antonio’s winnings. In the middle of a
heated altercation where they traded expletives, Tuadles suddenly grabbed
Antonio’s gun from atop a sidetable. Fearing for his life, Antonio claimed
that he reached for Tuadles’ hand and they grappled for possession of the
gun. As they wrestled, a single shot roared, Tuadles fell face down to the
floor, and Antonio was left too stunned to recall who had actually pulled the
trigger. In fine, Antonio alleged that the shooting was accidental, and his
only motivation was to defend himself. He also refuted the testimony of the
prosecution’s eyewitness, averring that SG Bobis could not have seen the
actual shooting since he (Bobis) and co-accused SPO4 Juanito Nieto, who
were alerted by Antonio’s yells, reached the scene when Tuadles had
already been shot and was lying on the floor.
While Tuadles lay bloodied and still, no one remembered to call an
ambulance or check if he was still alive. Instead, and there is no dispute in
these succeeding events, Antonio convinced the two (2) security guards,
prosecution eyewitness SG Bobis included, to accompany him to his home
in Greenmeadows Subdivision, Quezon City, after which they proceeded to
the San Juan Police Station. With them was SPO4 Nieto, a member of the
San Juan Police Force. They remained at Antonio’s residence for several
hours, during which time Antonio made phone calls and summoned his
lawyer. At around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Antonio, accompanied by
SPO4 Nieto, placed himself and his gun in the custody of San Juan Mayor
Jinggoy Estrada and the police authorities. Later, the two security guards
and SPO4 Nieto were driven back to the club where they waited for the
police investigators. Sometime thereafter, SG Bobis narrated the events and
executed his statement at the police station, a statement which he would
repudiate three (3) days later.
On November 18, 1996, an Information was filed against Antonio for the
crime of murder. Also charged as accessories were SPO4 Nieto and SPO1
Honorio Cartalla, Jr. The Information alleged that:
On or about November 2, 1996, in San Juan, Metro Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Antonio, armed with a gun,
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and
with treachery, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of
Arnulfo "Arnie" Tuadles, by then and there suddenly, unexpectedly,
deliberately and without provocation, shooting Arnulfo "Arnie" Tuadles on
his forehead, right between the eyes, thereby inflicting upon the latter
mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his death;
The accused Nieto, without having participated in said crime of murder,
either as principal or accomplice, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take part subsequent to its commission, with abuse of his public
functions and position as a public officer, by harboring or assisting the
accused Antonio, by then and there failing to arrest and surrender
immediately the said accused Antonio to the authorities and by giving false
information which tended to deceive the investigating authorities; and
The accused Cartalla, Jr., without having participated in said crime of murder
either as principal or accomplice, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take part subsequent to its commission, with abuse of his public
functions and position as a public officer, by concealing or destroying the
effects or instruments of the body of the crime, in order to prevent its
discovery, by then and there removing the laser sight of the gun used in
shooting Tuadles, deliberately omitting to take steps to preserve the
evidence at the scene of the crime, and purposely failing to call on the crime
laboratory service of the proper agencies for appropriate action.
2
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment, co-accused SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. entered a plea of "Not
Guilty." Accused Antonio and SPO4 Nieto both refused to enter a plea, and
the trial court entered a plea of "not guilty" for both of them.
After trial on the merits, all three accused were found guilty as charged,
imposing on them the appropriate penalties and ordering them to pay to
the heirs of Tuadles various amounts as and for indemnity and damages, set
forth in the dispositive portion quoted above. All three accused filed
separate appeals assailing the trial court’s findings and disposition.
Appellant Antonio assails the trial court’s judgment on the following
assigned errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF JOSE "JIMMY" BOBIS WHICH CONFLICTS
DRASTICALLY NOT ONLY WITH HIS INITIAL DECLARATIONS BUT
ALSO WITH HIS PREVIOUSLY EXECUTED STATEMENT, AND WHICH
TESTIMONY IS TAINTED WITH SERIOUS INCONSISTENCIES,
INCREDIBILITIES, AND OMISSIONS ON SUBSTANTIAL MATTERS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT TREACHERY
ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
VERSION OF APPELLANT ALBERTO "AMBET" ANTONIO.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
V
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT SUFFICIENT
PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF THE VICTIM ARNULFO "ARNIE"
TUADLES IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE COMMISION OF THE
 IMPUTED ACT, AND IN NOT APPRECIATING THIS MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE.
VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING THE SUM OF
P7,200,000.00 AS COMPENSABLE EARNINGS LOST BY REASON OF
ARNIE TUADLES’ DEATH, DESPITE INADEQUATE EVIDENCE TO
SUPPORT SUCH AWARD.
VII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PALPABLY EXCESSIVE
MORAL DAMAGES TO THE HEIRS OF ARNIE TUADLES.
VIII
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT ALBERTO
"AMBET" ANTONIO GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER.3
Appellant SPO4 Nieto likewise questions the trial court’s decision, arguing
that:
I DISREGARDING THE SIXTEEN (16) YEARS OF ACTIVE POLICE
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING NIETO AS AN
ACCESSORY
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME
COMMITTED BY THE PRINCIPAL ACCUSED ANTONIO WAS
MURDER4
Appellant Cartalla, Jr. also challenged the said decision on the following
grounds:
I
THE COURT OF ORIGIN HAS COMMITTED A BLATANT ERROR IN
CONVICTING SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA, JR. AS ACCESSORY TO
THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE RECORD IS SO
REPLETE WITH EVIDENCES THAT THERE ARE REASONABLE
DOUBTS TO HOLD HIM AS SUCH.
II
THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR AND HAS NOT
SHOWN FAIRNESS IN NOT CONSIDERING FULLY THE GOOD FAITH,
DILIGENCE AND HARD WORK EXERTED BY SPO1 HONORIO
CARTALLA, JR. WHEN HE INVESTIGATED THE CASE ON HAND TILL
THE TIME HE DELIVERED THE SPECIMEN OR PIECES OF PHYSICAL
EVIDENCE OF THE CRIME TO THE PNP-CLS, CAMP CRAME,
QUEZON CITY.
III
THE LOWER COURT HAS COMMITTED A SERIOUS MISTAKE IN
SERVICE OF SPO1 HONORIO CARTALLA, JR. SHOWN WITH
DEDICATION AND LOYALTY THERETO SUSTAINING MORE HIS
INNOCENCE OF THE CRIME CHARGED HEREIN.5
Considering that appellant Antonio is the principal accused, we shall deal
first with the issues raised in his appeal, foremost of which is the credibility
of the prosecution’s sole eyewitness, SG Jose Jimmy Bobis. Appellant
Antonio challenges SG Bobis’ worth and credibility as an eyewitness on two
(2) grounds.
First, SG Bobis, in his first sworn statement before the San Juan authorities
averred that he did not see the actual shooting since he was still ascending
the stairs leading to the second floor where the crime took place when he
heard the gunshot. Days later, in a second statement taken at the Eastern
Police District (EPD) and in his testimony before the trial court, SG Bobis
negated his earlier statement, this time averring that he had indeed seen
appellant Antonio pull his gun from behind, and with neither warning nor
provocation, aim the gun at the head of Tuadles and shoot the latter
pointblank. This complete turnabout in SG Bobis’ testimony, according to
appellant Antonio, is a sure sign of the said witness’ unreliability,
incredibility, and unworthiness. He also points out the contradictions and
inconsistencies between SG Bobis’ first and second statements and court
testimony.
Second, appellant Antonio belittles SG Bobis’ reasons for giving the San Juan
Police investigators false information in his first statement, saying that
nobody threatened SG Bobis if he testified against appellant Antonio. On the
other hand, appellant Antonio suggests that it was Colonel Lucas
Managuelod of the EPD who coerced SG Bobis to change his statement and
testimony so that the murder charge against appellant Antonio would be
strengthened.
There is no question that SG Bobis’ second statement and court testimony,
on the one hand, contradicted what he previously narrated in his first
statement, on the other hand. The question therefore is: Which is more
credible and of more value to the courts in ascertaining the guilt or
innocence of the accused?
It is a matter of judicial experience that affidavits or statements taken ex
parte are generally considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature,
they are inferior to testimony given in court, and whenever there is
inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness in court,
the testimony commands greater weight.6 Moreover, inconsistencies
between the declaration of the affiant in his sworn statements and those in
open court do not necessarily discredit said witness. 7 Thus, the trial court
followed precedents in giving more credence to SG Bobis’ testimony given
in open court despite his having executed an earlier statement which was
inconsistent with his testimony.
Besides, when confronted with his first contradictory statement, SG Bobis
explained the reasons why he was moved to give false information in his first
statement. He had testified that moments after he saw appellant Antonio
shoot Tuadles, the appellant warned him: "Ikaw, ‘wag kang tumistigo,
ha."8 Later, he and the other security guard, SG Olac, were allegedly coerced
to go to the appellant’s house in Quezon City. He also testified that while
they were there, appellant Antonio and his lawyer instructed him (Bobis),
should the police investigator ask him who shot Tuadles, to say that what
happened was only an accident.9
At the police station, appellant SPO4 Nieto allegedly told SG Bobis to say
that they were both outside the club when the trouble started, saying:
"kailangan ipalabas natin na nasa labas tayo ng club."10 Bobis stated that he
was confused and afraid, and, therefore, told the police investigator,
appellant Cartalla, Jr., on November 2, 1996, that he did not see appellant
Antonio shoot Tuadles because he was still ascending the stairs when the
gun went off.
Apparently, it was not only fear that ruled his thoughts and actions at that
time, but also remorse and confusion. As found by the trial court:
He admits that he had acted contrary to the ethical standards and code of
conduct of private security guards when he did not make a formal report to
his superior about the shooting incident of November 2, 1996 at the Club
but countered that this was because accused Antonio had taken him to the
latter’s house. This being so, neither was he able to put said accused Antonio
under arrest.
Added to this was the fact that even accused Nieto, a policeman in active
service who was with them at the time and who should have done so, had
also failed to arrest accused Antonio, more so with him and SG Olac who are
just ordinary security guards. ("Dahil po ma’am, si SPO4 Nieto, pulis na po
ang kasama namin, hindi niya po nagawa na arestuhin si Mr. Ambet Antonio
mas lalo po kami na ordinary guard lang po.")
True, he had his service .38 caliber in his possession at the time.
Nevertheless, because accused Antonio looked: "parang galit pa sila sa
amin" he can not, as in fact he did not, insist that instead of going to the
house of accused Antonio, he will effect the arrest.11
Nevertheless, Bobis stated that his conscience bothered him, and seeing
Tuadles’ widow crying on television, he gathered enough resolve and
courage to finally tell the truth to the police authorities at the EPD. When he
testified in open court, SG Bobis did not waver in his declaration that he
witnessed appellant Antonio suddenly pull his gun from behind and shoot
Tuadles three (3) feet away.
Rule 132, Section 13 of the Rules of Court provides that:
Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has made at other
times statements inconsistent with his present testimony, the statements
must be related to him, with the circumstances of the times and places and
the persons present, and he must be asked whether he made such
statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the statements be in
writing they must be shown to the witness before any question is put to him
concerning them. (Underscoring ours).
Thus, this Court has uniformly held that:
Previous statements cannot serve as bases for impeaching the credibility of
a witness unless his attention was first directed to the discrepancies and he
was then given an opportunity to explain them. It is only when no
reasonable explanation is given by a witness in reconciling his conflicting
declarations that he should be deemed impeached.12
We find no reason to discredit the trial court’s finding that the reasons given
by SG Bobis sufficiently explained the conflicting declarations he made in his
two (2) sworn statements and in his court testimony. Therefore, he cannot
be impeached as an eyewitness. This Court also recognizes that the initial
reticence of witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal case and
their aversion to be involved in criminal investigations due to fear of reprisal
is not uncommon, and this fact has been judicially declared not to adversely
affect the credibility of witnesses.13
Apart from the issue of SG Bobis’ having given an earlier contradictory
statement, his direct testimony and answers under cross-examination
appear clear and convincing. We agree with the trial court when it held:
But it is SG Bobis whom the Court finds credible.
Why he had executed a first, then a second statement, totally in conflict with
each other, SG Bobis had fully explained to the satisfaction of the Court. His
lowly station in life had been taken advantage of by accused Antonio and
Nieto. These two (2) had thought that they had succeeded in completely
prevailing upon SG Bobis. For did not SG Bobis tell their lies?
Still, the conscience of a good man had won over.
SG Bobis had redeemed himself. He gave spontaneous and straightforward
answers to the gruelling questions propounded on him and had stuck to his
truth.
The Court had painstakingly, taken note of each of the witnesses’ demeanor
on the stand. While SG Bobis was steadfast with his words, accused Antonio
and Nieto were evidently recalling from a script. The other prosecution
witnesses, SG Olac and Romeo M. Solano were, like SG Bobis, untainted in
their testimonies.14
Finding nothing that would compel us to conclude otherwise, we respect the
findings of the trial court on the issue of the credibility of SG Bobis as an
eyewitness, especially considering that the trial court was in a better
position to decide the question, having heard the witness himself and
observed his deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. 15
In the recent case of People v. Pili, this Court had occasion to rule that:
It is doctrinally settled that the assessments of the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, because
of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note
their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling examination. These are
the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and in
unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies.
Through its observations during the entire proceedings, the trial court can
be expected to determine, with reasonable discretion, whose testimony to
accept and which witness to believe. Verily, findings of the trial court on such
matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances
of weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as
to materially affect the disposition of the case. 16
And in People v. Deleverio, this Court ruled that:
It is axiomatic to point out, furthermore, that in an appeal, where the
culpability or innocence of an accused would hinge on the issue of credibility
of witnesses and the veracity of their testimonies, findings of the trial court
are entitled to and given the highest degree of respect.17
Moreover, in People v. Reynaldo, we reiterated the principle that:
The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best
and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate
magistrates, can weigh the testimony of a witness in the light of his
demeanor, conduct and attitude as he testified, and is thereby placed in a
more competent position to discriminate between the true and the false. 18
There are other reasons why the eyewitness testimony of SG Bobis was
given full faith and credit. SG Bobis, a mere security guard, realized he was
no match to appellants Antonio and SPO4 Nieto. The former, a wealthy
businessman, is known as an intimate friend of people in power. Appellant
Antonio admitted in court that he surrendered himself and his gun to Mayor
Jinggoy Estrada, who was his good friend. Hours later, he went to see then
Vice President Joseph Estrada in Tagaytay City so he (Antonio) could tell his
friend, the Vice President, what happened in his own words. 19
Appellant SPO4 Nieto was a member in active duty of the San Juan Police
Force who was close to appellant Antonio. Considering SG Bobis’ lowly
station in life, as compared to that of the said appellants, it is
understandable that his initial reaction to the shocking events would be one
of intimidation, if not fear. SG Bobis believed then, and no one can fault him
for thinking so, that going against the instructions and dictates of appellant
Antonio and SPO4 Nieto would make life very difficult for him, knowing they
were well-connected to the powers that be. This perceived threat, whether
real or imagined, compelled him to take the easy way out and just repeat
what appellants told him to say.
There is an oft-quoted adage that a person may be able to avoid his enemies,
but he can never run away from himself. SG Bobis may have momentarily
avoided incurring the wrath of the appellants by acceding to their dictates,
but he could not escape the proddings of his conscience. He realized he had
to right a wrong, and this he did with selflessness and at great risk to himself.
Furthermore, appellants could not impute any ill motive on the part of SG
Bobis except the statement that it was Colonel Lucas Managuelod of the EPD
who told him how to testify. Thus, his positive and categorical declarations
on the witness stand under solemn oath without convincing evidence to the
contrary deserve full faith and credence.20
Appellant Antonio, however, would seek to completely avoid culpability by
claiming that the shooting of Tuadles was caused by mere accident without
his fault or intention of causing it, or that he acted in self-defense.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that where an accused
admits having killed the victim but invokes self-defense to escape criminal
liability, he assumes the burden of proof to establish his plea of self-defense
by clear, credible and convincing evidence.21 To successfully interpose self-
defense, appellant Antonio must clearly and convincingly prove: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) the reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) the person
defending himself must not have provoked the victim into committing the
act of aggression.22
Without granting that his testimony is an accurate narration of the events
that took place, we shall discuss the points raised by appellant Antonio only
for the purpose of determining whether the requisites of self-defense were
attendant as claimed. In his testimony appellant Antonio alleged that
Tuadles committed an act of aggression when he (Tuadles) grabbed the gun
which was on top of a sidetable. Appellant Antonio then concluded that
Tuadles had the sole intention of using the gun against him (Antonio), so he
grappled with Tuadles to prevent the latter from shooting him. His bare
testimony, uncorroborated as it is, does not convince us that Tuadles would,
so to speak, beat him to the draw. The testimony of Bobis shows that
Tuadles was calm in answering Appellant Antonio’s loud invectives, and it
would be hard to imagine Tuadles as the aggressor under such a situation.
And even if Tuadles had grabbed the gun, it could very well have been that
Tuadles intended to keep the gun away from appellant Antonio to prevent
the latter from using it against him considering the state of mind and the
foul mood appellant Antonio was in. This would be a more believable
scenario since even appellant Antonio admitted that he was suffused with
anger, his temper short due to three (3) consecutive sleepless nights.
Appellant Antonio never said that Tuadles aimed or pointed the gun at him.
There is no evidence, apart from appellant Antonio’s uncorroborated
testimony, that Tuadles made an attempt to shoot him. Hence, there is no
convincing proof that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Tuadles.
For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual, sudden,
unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, and not merely a
threatening or intimidating attitude.23 The burden of proving unlawful
aggression lay on appellant Antonio, but he has not presented
incontrovertible proof that would stand careful scrutiny before any court.
Lacking this requirement, appellant Antonio’s claim of self-defense cannot
be appreciated. He cannot even claim it as an extenuating circumstance. 24
Besides, it cannot be said that appellant Antonio did not provoke Tuadles, if
indeed the latter had grabbed the gun from the table. Antonio himself
admitted that he was shouting and cursing Tuadles while in a furious rage.
Such a threatening stance could be interpreted as a provocation which could
have prompted Tuadles to get the gun so that appellant Antonio, in his
anger, would not be able to use it against Tuadles. If ever there was
provocation, it was certainly coming from appellant Antonio, not from
Tuadles.
In the alternative, appellant Antonio claims that the shooting of Tuadles was
an accident. He further argues that Tuadles was killed while he, Antonio, was
performing a lawful act with due care, and without fault or intention of
causing it. Having ruled that appellant Antonio failed to prove his claim of
self-defense, (i.e., there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Tuadles
and provocation coming from Antonio himself), there is no basis for us to
argue with appellant Antonio that he was performing a lawful act when he
shot Tuadles.25
We note that appellant Antonio’s version of how the shooting took place
leaves much room for conjecture. It is true that there is no fixed dictum on
the reaction of a person under the circumstances of a sudden death he may
have caused. He could react in a variety of ways, some of them even
irrational. However, we respect the trial court’s findings. The trial court
upheld the prosecution’s version thus sustaining the theory that if Antonio
indeed shot Tuadles by accident, the natural reaction expected of him would
be to immediately see to it that Tuadles be brought to a hospital or get
medical attention at the quickest time possible. Instead, appellant Antonio
left Tuadles, who was supposed to be his good friend, lying dead on the floor
for several hours. If indeed he and Tuadles both had their hands on the gun
and there was no telling who actually pulled the trigger, we agree that
appellant Antonio should have seen to it that no one else would touch the
gun barehanded to preserve the fingerprints on it. Instead, he gave the gun
to SPO4 Nieto who had no concern for preserving the fingerprints on the
gun. Not only that, appellant Antonio also handed the gun to Mayor Jinggoy
Estrada. Thus, one tangible piece of evidence that could have proven his
claim of self-defense or accident was unfortunately lost due to his lack of
presence and due care.
Appellant Antonio’s ambivalence in his choice of defenses is clear from the
records. First, he denies that he pulled the trigger because it was Tuadles
who was holding the gun. Then he says that he cannot recall who fired the
gun so it could have very well been either him or Tuadles who did it. Next,
he admits firing the gun, but he did it in self-defense. Only, he could not
indubitably prove that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Tuadles.
Failing there, he again admitted shooting Tuadles, but that it was an
accident. Again, he failed to prove that he was in the process of performing
a lawful act when he shot Tuadles.
When an accused invokes self-defense or claims that it was an accident to
escape criminal liability, he admits having caused the death of the victim.
And when he fails to prove by clear and convincing evidence the positiveness
of that justifying circumstance, having admitted the killing, conviction of the
accused is inescapable.26 Appellant Antonio had to rely on the strength of
his evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence for,
even if the latter were weak, his invoking self-defense is already an open
admission of responsibility for the killing.27 As it was, appellant Antonio’s
testimony is not only uncorroborated by independent and competent
evidence, but also doubtful by itself28 for being ambivalent and self-
serving.29
Having admitted responsibility for the killing of Tuadles, appellant Antonio
claims the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. On this score, we
find merit in his claim considering that all the elements in order that
voluntary surrender may be appreciated were attendant in his case. First, he
had not been actually arrested; Second, he surrendered himself to a person
in authority; and Third, his surrender was voluntary. It is of no moment that
appellant Antonio did not immediately surrender to the authorities, but did
so only after the lapse of about six (6) hours. In the case of People v.
Bautista,30 the voluntary surrender of the accused to a police authority four
(4) days after the commission of the crime was considered attenuating.
There is no dispute that appellant Antonio voluntarily surrendered to the
mayor, a person in authority, before he was arrested, hence the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender should be considered in appellant
Antonio’s favor.31
Appellant Antonio also claims the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation on the part of Tuadles. To avail of this mitigating circumstance,
it must be shown that the provocation originated from the offended
party.32 However, apart from his own testimony, appellant Antonio has not
proven by convincing evidence that he was provoked by Tuadles. He claimed
that Tuadles provoked him when the latter refused or could not pay his
winning. Refusal to pay cannot be a mitigating provocation for appellant
Antonio to kill Tuadles. An unpaid debt cannot, and never will, be a reason
to shoot the debtor dead. Besides, appellant Antonio had no other proof
that he won and that the argument arose from Tuadles’ refusal to pay. His
bare testimony is, at best, self-serving. Accordingly, appellant Antonio is not
entitled to the benefit of the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation.33
There is, however, a significant and consequential aspect of the case which
the trial court overlooked and disregarded.
As earlier stated, we find no sufficient reason to disagree with the trial court
when it relied on the testimony of SG Bobis. However, we have carefully
examined said testimony, the records of this petition, and the justifications
of the trial court upon which it based its decision.
There is no basis for the trial court’s conclusion "that accused Antonio
consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the
accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself."34 It ruled that
treachery qualified the killing to murder. The trial court did not explain the
basis for the qualification except for a terse citation that there was a sudden
attack and the victim had no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate.
As stated by counsel for appellant, out of the 71-page decision, typed single
space, the trial court devoted only a few sentences to the issue of treachery.
There was no treachery in this case.
It is not only the sudden attack that qualifies a killing into murder. There
must be a conscious and deliberate adoption of the mode of attack for a
specific purpose.
All the evidence shows that the incident was an impulse killing. It was a spur
of the moment crime.
The precedents are many. They are consistent. Among them:
"Mere suddenness of attack is not enough to constitute treachery where
accused made no preparation or employed no means, method and form of
execution tending directly and specially to insure the commission of a crime
and to eliminate or diminish risk from defense which the victim may take."35
"A sudden and unexpected attack would not constitute alevosia where the
aggressor did not consciously adopt a mode of attack intended to perpetrate
the homicide without risk to himself."36
"A sudden and unexpected attack constitutes the absence of alevosia where
it did not appear that the aggressor had consciously adopted a mode of
attack intended to facilitate the perpetration of the homicide without risk to
himself, as where the appellant followed the victims when the latter refused
appellant's invitation to have some more alcoholic drinks." 37
"The mere suddenness of attack does not, of itself suffice for a finding of
alevosia if the mode adopted by the accused does not positively tend to
prove that they thereby knowingly intended to insure the accomplishment
of their criminal purpose without any risk to themselves arising from the
defense that might be offered."38
"The aggravating circumstance of treachery is not present when decision to
attack was arrived at on the spur of the moment."39
The annotations are similarly consistent. It is not enough that the means,
methods, or form of execution of the offense was without danger to the
offender arising from the defense or retaliation that might be made by the
offended party. It is further required, for treachery to be appreciable, that
such means, method or form was deliberated upon or consciously adopted
by the offender.40 Such deliberate or conscious choice was held non-existent
where the attack was the product of an impulse of the moment. 41
The trial court's ruling that the mere suddenness of an attack makes the
killing a murder because of treachery is not consistent with the decisions of
this Court.42 Conscious deliberation or conscious adoption of the mode of
attack has to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. For it is likewise an
established principle that the quantum of evidence to prove a person's being
guilty of a crime is also required to prove treachery. The same degree of
proof to dispel any reasonable doubt is required before any conclusion may
also be reached respecting the attendance of treachery, whether as
qualifying or aggravating, in a criminal case.43 There is no such proof in this
case.
There is no dispute that prior to the shooting, appellant Antonio and Tuadles
spent several hours having fun playing "pusoy dos." The situation turned
ugly, however, when Tuadles could not pay to appellant Antonio his alleged
winnings. An argument arose, with appellant Antonio and Tuadles standing
face to face three (3) feet away from each other, a fact attested to by the
defense and even by the prosecution eyewitness himself.
Accordingly to SG Bobis, Tuadles and Antonio were arguing. Antonio even
called out: "Sarge! Sarge! Sarge!" Just before the shooting, Bobis heard
Antonio saying: "Putang ina ka kasi." The argument precluded the presence
of treachery. If Antonio had consciously adopted means and methods to kill
Tuadles, there was no reason to call for a Sergeant or any eyewitness for
that matter.
To the point is our ruling in the case of People v. Alacar,44 where we held
that there was no treachery where the attempt to kill resulted from a verbal
altercation. More recently, in People v. Salvador, we pronounced that:
"There would be no treachery when the victim was placed on guard, such as
when a heated argument preceded the attack, or when the victim was
standing face to face with his assailants and the initial assault could not have
been unforseen."45 (Underscoring Ours)
Even if it could be said that the attack was sudden, there would still be no
treachery.1âwphi1 In People v. Chua,46 we reiterated our consistent view
that:
"While the killing itself appears to have occurred on sudden impulse, it was
preceded by acts of appellant showing hostility and a heated temper that
indicated an imminent attack and should have put the deceased on guard."
Thus, treachery could not be appreciated where the victim was forewarned
and could have anticipated the aggression of the accused. Since the sudden
shooting of Tuadles was preceded by a heated verbal altercation between
Tuadles and appellant Antonio, as admitted by both prosecution and
defense, then it cannot be concluded that the shooting was committed with
treachery.
It is also clear that appellant Antonio did not set out or plan to kill Tuadles
in the first place. His criminal act was an offshoot of their argument which
neither of them had foreseen. Hence, there was no treachery because
treachery requires that the mode of attack must have been thought of by
the offender and must have sprung from an unforeseen occurrence. 47
In People v. Nitcha,48 we held that:
"To establish treachery, the evidence must show that the accused made
some preparation to kill the victim in such a manner as to ensure the
execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the person
attacked to defend himself. A killing done at the spur of the moment is not
treacherous." (Underscoring ours)
It was Antonio's sudden anger and heated passion which drove him to pull
his gun and shoot Tuadles. Said passion, however, cannot co-exist with
treachery. In passion, the offender loses his reason and control. In treachery,
on the other hand, the means employed is adopted consciously and
deliberately. One who, in the heat of passion, loses his reason and self-
control, cannot consciously employ a particular means, method or form of
attack in the execution of the crime. 49 Thus, the killing of Tuadles by
appellant Antonio was not attended by treachery.
That the treachery, which was alleged in the information and favorably
considered by the trial court to elevate the killing to murder, was not proven
by convincing evidence50 is advocated by the Solicitor General in the
Appellee's Brief. He agreed with Appellant Antonio's contention on the
matter:
On the basis of the evidence at hand, appellee is constrained to agree with
this particular submission of Antonio. Antonio and Tuadles engaged in
"pusoy dos". In the beginning, they were heard laughing and kidding each
other (nagtatawanan at nagkakantiyawan). Later, the banter turned into
verbal altercation.
Under the circumstances, Tuadles became aware of the incipient violence.
Hence, Tuadles could have braced himself with the aggression of Antonio.
There is no treachery when the killing results from a verbal altercation or
spat between the victim and the assailant such that the victim must have
been forewarned of the impending danger. In this case, Bobis testified that
he saw Antonio and Tuadles facing each other before Antonio raised his
hand and shot Tuadles on the forehead. The proximate distance of three
feet between Tuadles and Antonio immediately before the fatal shooting
allowed and gave Tuadles opportunity to defend himself.51
Consequently, Antonio can only be convicted of the lesser crime of homicide
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal code.
Having been found guilty of the crime of homicide, the penalty that should
be imposed on appellant Antonio should be reduced to reclusion
temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being one (1)
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the penalty to be imposed
shall be the minimum period of reclusion temporal, that is, from twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the penalty to be imposed
shall be the penalty next lower which is prision mayor in any of its
periods.52 Therefore, appellant Alberto Antonio is hereby sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal,
as maximum.
Appellant Antonio challenges the award of compensatory and moral
damages to the heirs of Tuadles, arguing that said award was unsupported
by adequate evidence. In arriving at the amount of P7,200,000.00 as
compensatory damages, the trial court relied completely on the testimony
of the victim's widow, Suzette Tuadles, who stated that at the time of his
death, Tuadles was earning P50,000.00 a month from his construction
business. Applying the formula laid down by this Court in the cases of Villa
Rey Transit v. CA,53 and People v. Quilaton,54 the trial court arrived at the
amount of P7,200,000.00 as compensatory damages for loss of earning
capacity. Appellant Antonio argues that the trial court cannot just rely on
the sole testimony of Suzette Tuadles, otherwise, it would be basing its
computation on mere speculation, conjecture, or guess work.
In People v. Silvestre55 and People v. Verde,56 we held that the absence of
documentary evidence to support the prosecution's claim for damages for
loss of earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude recovery of said
damages. There, we awarded damages for loss of earning capacity
computed on the basis of the testimonies of the victim's wives. This was
reiterated in People v. Dizon,57 where we held that:
"As a rule, documentary evidence should be presented to substantiate the
claim for damages for loss of earning capacity. In People vs. Verde (G. R. No.
119077, February 10, 1999), the non-presentation of documentary evidence
to support the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity did not prevent
this Court from awarding said damages. The testimony of the victim's wife
as to the earning capacity of her murdered husband, who was then 48 years
old and was earning P200.00 a day as a tricycle driver, sufficed to establish
the basis for such an award. x x x As in People vs. Verde, the Court is inclined
to grant the claim for damages for loss of earning capacity despite the
absence of documentary evidence." (Underscoring ours)
In the case at bar, however, the award for compensatory damages should
be calculated as follows:
Net earning = life expectancy x gross annual income -
capacity (x) living expenses
(50% of gross annual
income)
2(80-40)
[P600,000.00 -
x = x
300,000.00]
3
26.67 x
= offender to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) concealing or destroying
P300,000.00
= P8,001,000.00
Considering that moral damages may be awarded without proof of
pecuniary loss, the Court shall take into account the circumstances obtaining
in the case and assess damages according to its discretion.58 We agree with
appellant Antonio that the trial court's award of moral damages was
excessive. While there is no hard and fast rule in the determination of what
would be a fair amount of moral damages, each case must be governed by
its own peculiar circumstances.59 And though moral damages are incapable
of pecuniary estimation to compensate the claimants for actual injury, they
are not designed to enrich the complainants at the expense of the
accused.60
Applied to this case, we recognize that Tuadles was the sole support of his
family and they will also be deprived of his love and companionship. No
amount of money could ever compensate for their loss. While the award of
moral damages may help ease the emotional and psychological trauma that
they continue to suffer, this Court has not granted so large an amount as
moral damages. Accordingly, we find that the amount of P3,000,000.00
granted by the trial court in this case is excessive, and the same is therefore
reduced to P500,000.00. Moreover, there being no aggravating
circumstances attendant in this case, the award of exemplary damages
should also be deleted.61
We now come to the errors assigned by appellant SPO4 Juanito M. Nieto.
He argues that the trial court erred in convicting him as an accessory. The
trial court's grounds for finding him guilty are: (1) he failed to arrest
appellant Antonio; and (2) he gave false information tending to deceive the
investigating authorities.62
The Revised Penal Code in Article 19 defines an accessory as one who has
knowledge of the commission of the crime, yet did not take part in its
commission as principal or accomplice, but took part in it subsequent to its
commission by any of three modes: (1) profiting himself or assisting the
the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof in order to
prevent its discovery; and (3) harboring, concealing, or assisting in the
escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse
of his public functions or when the offender is guilty of treason, parricide,
murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to
be habitually guilty of some other crime.63
Under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code, there are two (2)
classes of accessories, one of which is a public officer who harbors, conceals
or assists in the escape of the principal. Such public officer must have acted
with abuse of his public functions, and the crime committed by the principal
is any crime, provided it is not a light felony. Appellant SPO4 Nieto is one
such public officer, and he abused his public function when he failed to
effect the immediate arrest of accused Antonio and to conduct a speedy
investigation of the crime committed.
The evidence in the case at bar, insofar as appellant Nieto's culpability is
concerned, shows that in the middle of the argument between appellant
Antonio and the deceased, Antonio called Nieto by shouting, "Sarge! Sarge!"
Hearing this, SG Bobis woke Nieto up and the latter went upstairs.
Immediately thereafter, appellant Antonio shot Tuadles, and then ordered
Nieto to get the scoresheet and the cards from the table, which Nieto did.
Antonio, Nieto and Bobis went downstairs. Antonio told guards Bobis and
Ernesto Olac to go with them, and they all boarded Antonio's Mercedes Benz
van, including Nieto. They arrived at Antonio's residence in Greenmeadows
Subdivision at around 11:30 o'clock in the morning. There, they had coffee
while Antonio made some telephone calls. Soon after, a certain Atty. Abaya
arrived and talked to the two security guards, while Nieto was present. Nieto
then told Bobis that in his statement, he should say that the two of
them, i.e., Bobis and Nieto, were seated outside the entrance of the Club
when the incident took place. At 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Nieto, Bobis
and Olac returned to the Club. They waited outside until members of the
San Juan police, together with Mayor Jinggoy Estrada and Vice Mayor Philip
Cezar, arrived at 6:00 o'clock in the evening. After the police investigated
the scene, they proceeded to the police station. There, Nieto reiterated his
instruction to Bobis to say that the two of them were outside the club. While
Bobis gave his statement to the police, Nieto remained in front of him and
dictated to him what he should answer to the questions of the police
investigator.64
The foregoing facts were culled from the testimony of SG Bobis. Appellant
Nieto's actuations immediately after the commission of the crime
demonstrate his liability as an accessory. Being a police officer in the active
service, he had the duty to arrest appellant Antonio after the latter
committed a crime in his presence, and which he himself witnessed.
Unfortunately, he failed to do what was incumbent upon him to do. Instead,
he rode with the offender to the latter's house where they stayed for more
than five (5) hours. In the early case of U. S. v. Yacat, et al., it was held:65
It is, however, unquestionable that Pedro Ureta, who was the local president
of the town of Cabiao at the time the crime was committed, has incurred
criminal liability. Abusing his public office, he refused to prosecute the crime
of homicide and those guilty thereof, and thus made it possible for them to
escape, as the defendant Pedro Lising did in fact. This fact is sufficiently
demonstrated in the records, and he has been unable to explain his conduct
in refusing to make an investigation of this serious occurrence, of which
complaint was made to him, and consequently he should suffer a penalty
two degrees inferior to that designated by paragraph 2 of article 405 of the
Code, by virtue of article 68 thereof.
Appellant Nieto knew of the commission of the crime. Right before the
shooting, appellant Antonio called him and he immediately went upstairs.
He saw that appellant shot Tuadles. Despite this knowledge, he failed to
arrest appellant and, instead, left the crime scene together with the latter.
To this extent, he assisted appellant Antonio in his escape.66
Furthermore, as correctly found by the trial court, appellant Nieto provided
false information to deceive the investigating authorities. He instructed
Bobis to answer falsely to the questions of the investigating officer, in order
to make it appear that there were no eyewitnesses to the incident and thus
make it more difficult for the police to solve the crime.
Accordingly, the court a quo was correct in convicting appellant as an
accessory to the crime, and he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty
prescribed by law. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, we impose on
appellant Nieto the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years of prison correccional, as maximum.
Finally, we come to appellant SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr.'s appeal. After
carefully reviewing the facts and issues raised therein, we find that the trial
court erred in finding said appellant guilty as an accessory.
The trial court's sole reason for convicting appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. was
his failure to produce the laser sight of the gun as evidence during the trial.
However, such omission does not amount to concealing or destroying the
body of the crime or effects or instruments thereof to prevent its discovery.
The laser sight had been surrendered to the police authorities so there was
no more need for discovery. Its loss thereafter does not make appellant
SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. an accessory. At most, as custodian thereof, he may be
made answerable administratively.
In his testimony, he made clear that the loss was not intentional. He further
stated:
Q Finally, Mr. Cartalla, what can you say about the charge against you as
alleged in the information that you tried to conceal or destroy the effects or
body of the crime to prevent its discovery?
A It's not true, sir.
Q Why?
A Because I did not conceal anything, I did not destroy anything on the body
of the crime and as far as I know, I did all my job as investigator and I worked
for it up to the wee hours of the morning up to the next morning, I still did
it and I gathered evidence and I submitted it to the Crime Laboratory and
even when at the time, I have been hearing that I will not be the one who
will investigate, they got it from me without proper notice, that they will
take over the investigation, I still did my job, and on the fifth, I was asked by
Prosecutor Llorente to retrieve the slug and what I did was even the
investigation is not with me, I still did it, I still went to the IBC and I still
worked hard, I even remember…
Atty. Flaminiano
We want to make of record that the witness is now in tears at this moment.
COURT
Continue.
A The companion of Inspector de Leon and PO2 Rojas even said that this
policeman is very hardworking, even the investigation is not with him
anymore, but still, he's working and I answered him, whatever, whatever
they will charge to me, maybe it's just their job and so, I will also do my job.
Because as far as I know, I will not be implicated because I have not done
anything, I have not done the charges that they filed against me, I was
surprised when I was given a confirmation that I was an accessory that is
why my youngest child even told me "kala ko Papa, Mabait ka?" and I told
him that it's not true. For me, I have not done anything like that.
Atty. Fernandez
That's all for the witness, your Honor.
COURT
The way I look at your case, you are indicted here as an accessory because
according to one of the witnesses, the gun together with the laser sight was
handled to you and when that gun reached Crame, the laser sight was no
longer there, answer me, what happened?
A The truth, your Honor, is, when the gun was submitted to me by Inspector
Cabrera, the laser sight was there, I immediately made the transmittal for
the laboratory and I described what is there, together with the laser and
after that, I placed it in a brown envelope, I placed it in my drawer. On the
second day, I was really busy on that day because I was the only one. I was
asking for assistance because I would go out, I will investigate and then I just
found out when I was about to submit the laser to the laboratory, I gave the
envelope together with the transmittal and when it was being received, he
checked it and he said "Sgt. Where is the laser sight?" and I said "it's there,
attached." And he said "please look at it."
COURT
Who told you that?
A The person who received, your Honor.
COURT
But in your transmittal, you wrote there that there was a laser?
A Yes, your Honor. When I saw the envelope, there was no laser, I was
planning to go back right away but I just said, "okay, I will just cross it" out
and I did not erase because I want that I will not hide anything. It has
happened because maybe somebody is interested or I might have left in my
drawer. Because I will not hide it. That's why I did not sno-pake it and I just
crossed it out so it can be read together with my initial and when I came
back, I asked them who touched my things.
COURT
What answer did you get?
A There was no answer. Nobody was answering me, nobody was talking. 67
From the foregoing, it is clear that appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. did not
intentionally conceal or destroy the laser sight, and the prosecution failed
to prove that he did so with intent to derail the prosecution of the principal
accused. On the other hand, while the laser sight was an accessory device
attached to the gun, it was not essential to the commission, investigation
and prosecution of the crime. The gun itself, which was the instrument of
the crime, was surrendered to the authorities and presented as evidence in
court. The failure of appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. to present the laser sight as
part of the evidence did not in any way affect the outcome of the trial, much
less prevent the discovery of the crime. Furthermore, there is no showing
that appellant SPO1 Cartalla, Jr. profited by the non-presentation of the
laser sight.
Thus, under the definition of an accessory under the Revised Penal Code and
jurisprudence, appellant Cartalla, Jr.'s omission does not make him liable as
an accessory to the crime committed by appellant Antonio. Even the
Solicitor General submits that there are no grounds to convict appellant
Cartalla, to wit:
At the time the laser sight was turned over to Cartalla, the crime or its corpus
delicti had been discovered. Hence, the loss of the laser sight could not have
prevented the discovery of the crime. The essential instrument of the crime,
namely, a caliber .9 mm Beretta Model 92F with serial number BER-041965-
7 and black magazine had been preserved and presented as evidence.
Neither could Cartalla be said to have profited with the non-presentation of
the laser sight as this was not proved by the prosecution. Either way,
concealing or profiting, there is no convicting motive for Cartalla to have so
committed. More so, as Cartalla was the investigating officer on the case.
It is submitted that the non-production of the laser sight by Cartalla did not
make him an accessory to the crime committed by Antonio, although he may
be administratively liable for the loss of a part of the evidence for the
prosecution in this case.68
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed Decision in Criminal
Case No. 111232-H is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Alberto
"Ambet" Antonio is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
HOMICIDE and is correspondingly sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum to
fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. Accused-appellant Juanito Nieto y Nemer is likewise found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the crime of HOMICIDE,
and is correspondingly sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years of prision
correccional, as maximum.
Accused-appellant Antonio is likewise ordered to pay to the heirs of Arnulfo
B. Tuadles the following sums:
(1) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Arnulfo B. Tuadles;
(2) P226,298.36 as actual damages;
 (3) P8,001,000.00 as compensatory damages for loss of earning
capacity;

(4) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and

(5) Costs.

For failure to prove accused-appellant SPO1 Honorio Cartalla, Jr.'s guilt

beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the crime, he is ACQUITTED and
absolved of all liability, both criminal or civil.

In case of insolvency of appellant Alberto S. Antonio @ "Ambet", appellant

Juanito Nieto y Nemer shall be liable to pay one-half (1/2) of the above-
adjudicated sums or the amount of P4,388,649.18 unto the said heirs of
Arnulfo B. Tuadles.

In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

3 G.R. No.134847 December 6, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff- appellee,
vs.
RUBY MARIANO y LARA and RUTH MARIANO y LARA, accused-appellants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Heinous crimes are grievous, odious and hateful offenses which, by reason
of their inherent wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity, are
repugnant to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in
a just, civilized and ordered society.1 To this genre belong the acts charged
in the instant case - a bizarre and nauseating tale of outrageous cruelty and
brutality. The Court is now called upon to determine whether the accused
are responsible therefor.
Driven by grinding poverty in her home province and lured by the prospect
of a lucrative employment in the big city, Michelle Priol, then only sixteen
(16), left home for Manila in January 1996 to work as a domestic help. Soon
enough Michelle found herself hired at the household of the sisters Ruth
Mariano and Ruby Mariano in Bambang, Pasig City.
Jenny Priol, Michelle's older sister, testified that she often visited Michelle
at the Mariano.residence. However, whenever she would visit Michelle, she
and her sister could not freely talk as Ruth and Ruby were always hovering
about.2 Apparently unhappy with the manner she was allowed to visit
Michelle - they being constantly watched by the Mariano sisters and denied
their privacy - Jenny never went to her sister again after her last visit in
November 1996.3 Sometime afterwards, Ruth and Ruby brought Michelle to
her sister Jenny to complain to her that their rice cooker no longer
functioned and heaped the blame on Michelle. On that occasion Jenny
noticed that Michelle's hair was unevenly cut to the scalp. When asked what
happened, Michelle told her that it was Ruby who gave her the ugly
haircut.4 Concerned with the condition of her sister, Jenny confronted Ruby.
But the latter angrily replied: "Why are you so bold to ask me that question;
why don't you ask your sister!"5 Jenny then told Ruby that she was going to
take her sister back from them but the furious Ruby hurriedly left with Ruth,
taking Michelle with them. That was the last time Jenny saw her younger
sister alive.
On 17 August 1997 at around 6:00 o'clock in the evening, SPO2 Edgardo
Hernandez of the Pasig Police Station received an anonymous call reporting
that a woman was seen in Bambang, Pasig City, carrying a rectangular box
with a human leg protruding. The caller further informed SPO2 Hernandez
that the woman then placed the box inside the compartment of a car
bearing plate number UPR-561.6 On the basis of this information SPO2
Hernandez together with SPO1 Ruben Fidelino immediately conducted a
"stake-out and surveillance operation" in the vicinity of Bambang as
reported. After a couple of minutes, the police officers spotted two (2)
women boarding a car with the reported plate number. They turned out to
be accused-appellants Ruth Mariano y Lara and Ruby Mariano y Lara. 7 The
vehicle was owned and driven by Ruby. The law enforcers, riding in their
patrol car with SPO1 Fidelino on the wheels, followed the vehicle. But the
women, perhaps sensing that they were being trailed, drove fast. Alarmed
by the suspects' reaction to their presence, the policemen sounded their
siren. After a brief chase, the officers overtook the suspects' vehicle and
blocked its path. SPO2 Hernandez and SPO1 Fidelino alighted, from their
patrol car and introduced themselves as police officers. They ordered Ruth
and Ruby to alight from their vehicle.8
The lawmen then announced that they would be conducting a visual search
of the luggage compartment of the vehicle. Initially, Ruby refused saying
that only dirty clothes were in the compartment but later relented the police
officers insisted.9 Upon opening the compartment, SPO2 Hernandez was
greeted by a putrid odor emanating from a decomposing body inside the
box. Ruth and Ruby identified the body as that of their maid Michelle
Priol.10 Ruth and Ruby were then arrested and taken to the Pasig Police
Station. Their vehicle was driven to the station by SPO2 Hernandez.
Senior Police Inspector Emmanuel L. Aranas, Medico-legal Officer of the PNP
Crime laboratory, conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Michelle. The
result was appalling and beyond belief. The body was found to be poorly
nourished and already in a state of decomposition. The skin and underlying
soft tissues on the chest appeared to have been gnawed by rats apparently
attracted to the exposed scalded flesh resulting from the repeated splashing
of boiling water, and that the victim had died two (2) to three (3) days prior
to the autopsy. The autopsy findings were: (a) healed and healing lacerated
wounds on the upper lip caused by hard blunt object or fist blows healed
lacerated wound on the lower lip; (c) multiple lacerated swelling wounds on
the right and left ear; (d) two (2) healing wounds on the left illiac region;
and, (e) the cause of death was multiple traumatic wounds, and first and
second degree scalding burns on the head, trunk, upper and lower
extremeties comprising about 72% of the body surface, caused by hot liquid
within the range of boiling point inflicted at various times prior to the death
of the victim.11
With the foregoing findings, Ruth and Ruby were charged with murder. Ruth
denied the charge claiming that the victim "died because she got sick, and
not because I mauled her."12 Nevertheless, by her own narration and
admission during the trial, Ruth described in lurid details what really
happened to Michelle. According to Ruth, Michelle was kind, industrious and
respectful at first. However, sometime November 1996 she and her sister
Ruby caught Michelle stealing money and jewelry from their bedroom. Thus,
they brought her to the police but later desisted from prosecuting Michelle
when she pleaded for a second chance and promised that she would not do
it again.13 After that incident, Michelle's attitude changed completely. Ruth
claimed that she often caught her stealing money from them and destroying
the appliances whenever she cleaned the house, and that whenever she
scolded Michelle she would answer back, triggering a fight between them. 14
Ruth confessed in her testimony that she doused boiling water on Michelle
several times whenever she was angry. 15 In those occasions, according to
her, they were quarrelling and Michelle would fight back. 16 Ruth further said
that only by pouring boiling water on Michelle could she (Ruth) "pacify her
(and stop her) from fighting back."17
Ruth likewise admitted having pulled Michelle's hair and banged her
head (inuumpog ang ulo),18 and that in the month of July 1997 alone they
fought at least six (6) times. She added that she was remorseful afterwards
for what she had done and treated Michelle's seared flesh with antibiotics
and washed her wounds with guava leaves. As if explaining the fresh-looking
wounds on the body of Michelle, Ruth said that Michelle sometimes
scratched her wounds thereby removing the scabs and exposing the fresh
wounds. But by August 1997 Michelle lost her appetite and her condition
started to deteriorate. Not long thereafter, she died. Ruth further testified,
that when she was about to wake Michelle up in the morning of 17 August
1997 she discovered Michelle's body already bent and flexed
forward (nakabaluktot) lying in bed, lifeless.19 So she panicked and hurriedly
placed the body in a box, which she then loaded inside the luggage
compartment of Ruby's car. According to Ruth, she was afraid that her 74-
year old mother who was suffering from a heart ailment would see the body,
thus she concealed the corpse in the trunk of the vehicle.20 When Ruby
arrived that evening, Ruth met her at the gate of their house and told her
that she had a problem. Ruth then asked Ruby to drive and promised to tell
her about it on the way. It was then that they were apprehended by
elements of the Pasig Police force.
On 22 June 1998 Ruth arid Ruby were convicted of murder by the trial court.
Accordingly, Ruth was sentenced to death while Ruby was found guilty as an
accomplice and sentenced to reclusion temporal. The trial court explained
its Decision -
With such evidence on record, there is no doubt that Ruth was responsible
for the death of Michelle Priol and the killing was aggravated with (sic)
cruelty making it a crime of murder. Splashing boiling water six (6) times a
month, even when the previous injuries were not yet healed, is cruelty of
the highest order. Splashing boiling water while the previous scalding burns
were not yet healed was deliberately done. Such act was inhumanly
augmenting the suffering of the victim. Ruth Mariano admitted this in her
oral testimony and in her counter-affidavit x x x x therefore, Ruth Mariano
should be held to answer for the crime of murder as defined and penalized
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code x x x x
As to the liability of Ruby Mariano, the evidence appears to be
circumstantial. [She] knew of the death of Michelle Priol prior to the time
her body was put in a box and loaded in the car x x x x she [was] living with
Ruth in the same apartment and as such, that place is not too big not to see
or know that a member of the household is (sic) dead.
Moreover, as admitted by Ruth Mariano in her testimony in Court that she
poured boiling water on Michelle Priol six (6) times a month. That alone
must have been known to Ruby Mariano. For her failure to prevent Ruth
from pouring boiling water on Michelle Priol, which according to Dr. Aranas
was the cause of Priol's death, that constitute cooperation on her part in
killing Michelle Priol.
All the foregoing circumstances taken together constitute violation of Article
18 of the Revised Penal Code, hence, Ruby Mariano is liable as an
accomplice.
Considering that the act of putting the cadaver of victim Michelle Priol in a
box and loading it in the baggage compartment of a car is an outraging act,
or, an act of scoffing at her person or corpse which is an aggravating
circumstance coupled with evident premeditation and taking advantage of
superior strength, the fact that the accused Ruth Mariano is a big buxom
matured woman while the victim Priol was a slim teenager, such aggravating
circumstances, and there being no mitigating circumstance, the imposition
of the death penalty would be proper as against accused Ruth Mariano y
Lara.21
Hence, this automatic review of the death penalty imposed by the trial
court.
The errors assigned by accused-appellants in their brief may be subsumed
under the basic contention that the trial court erred in convicting them as
principal and accomplice to the crime of murder notwithstanding the fact
that the prosecution evidence was grossly insufficient to prove their guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Aware that the life of a human being is here at stake, we have carefully
examined every piece of evidence on record as well as the arguments raised
by accused-appellants in their pleadings no matter how specious and
ridiculous they may appear to be, but we fail to find any compelling reason
to overturn the findings of fact and conclusions of the court a quo, except as
may be stated hereunder.
First, on the criminal liability of Ruth Mariano. The defense at once crumbles
in the face of accused-appellant's own admission in open court that she
employed violence on Michelle, dousing her with boiling water and
battering her into insensibility in the course of their supposed quarrels. She
virtually painted in her testimony a harrowing portrait of the barbaric
episode culminating in the death of the victim, thus -
A: Whenever I scolded her, she became angry and told me that I'm (sic) not
the one who is (sic) paying her salary and I am (sic) "masungit."
Q: And what else transpired, if any?
A: We have (sic) exchanges of word and that started our quarrel.
Q: When you said quarrel, what do you mean quarrel, just by exchanging
words or what? You have any physical contact?
A: We were engaged in physical fight.
Q: What else happened, if any?
A: If she fought back and I'm (sic) being hurt and if I'm (sic) already angry,
I splashed (nasasabuyan) her with boiling water x x x x22
Q: When for the first time did you have any occasion of splashing hot water
on the person of Priol?
A: July 1997.
Q: When was the second time?
A: I cannot remember.
Q: Also in the month of July? A: Yes, your honor.

A: Every time she fought against me. Q: And when she tried to pull your hair, what do you do?

Q: When was the third time? A: I pulled her hair also and sometimes banged (inuumpog) her head.25

A: I cannot remember anymore. Accused-appellant's brutality was confirmed by Dr. Emmanuel L. Aranas
who concluded in his autopsy report that the cause of death of the victim
Q: More or less, how many times did you splash her with hot water? was "multiple traumatic wounds, and first and second degree scalding burns
covering 72% of the body surface," which were the very same injuries
COURT: Hot or boiling water? accused-appellant admitted she had inflicted on the victim. Dr. Aranas
testified -
PROSECUTOR LEONARDO: Boiling water.
Q: And after conducting the examination, what was the cause of death that
you found?
A: Twice (2x) x x x x23

A: Well, the cause of death Ma'am, is the multiple traumatic injuries, as well
Q: You splashed her frontally?
as the scalding burns, first to second degree recovering 72% of the surface
area.
A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q: Combined together?
Q: Facing each other?
A: Yes, your honor. All these are contributory to the death of the deceased. 26
A: Yes, Ma'am xxxx
These medical findings when combined with accused-appellant's judicial
Q: She does not run away when you saw her holding the airpot?
admission, certainly wove a tight web of evidence as to accused-appellant's
culpability. They clearly established her guilt to a moral certainty, for which
A: When I splashed her she told me, that is (sic) enough, I will (sic) not fight she could not escape punishment.
anymore.24
Accused-appellant however, by way of avoidance, maintains that she did not
Q: Just answer my question. kill the victim, insisting that the latter "died because she got sick, and not
because I mauled her."
A: No, your honor.
The Court is not persuaded. It is evident that the death of the victim was the
Q: She waits (sic) until you poured the boiling water on her? direct, natural and logical consequence of the injuries she sustained in the
hands of accused-appellant Ruth Mariano. The wounds inflicted on the
victim were of extremely dangerous nature, i.e., calculated to destroy life,
although they did not immediately result in the victim's death. A person is
to be held to contemplate and be responsible for the natural consequences
of her own acts. If she inflicts wounds of such gravity as to put the life of the
victim in jeopardy, and death follows as a consequence of her felonious and
wicked acts, it does not alter the nature nor diminish the criminality of the
acts to prove that other causes cooperated in producing the fatal
result. Es que es causa de la causa es causa del mal causado. He who is the
cause of the cause is the cause of the evil caused.
Accused-appellant further asserts that (a) her acts of'pouring boiling water
on Michelle were accidental; (b) she was unaware of the effects or danger
of pouring boiling water on a human being; and, (c) she treated the wounds
and burns of the victim with antibiotics (Bactrim Forte) and washed it with
guava leaves until she got well.
The artificiality of these assertions is self-evident. They are but fabrications
to explain away the numerous mortal wounds of the victim. As to the alleged
accidental pouring of boiling water, the physical evidence shows that the
victim suffered first and second degree scalding burns covering 72% of the
body surface, caused by accused-appellant's repeated acts of pouring
boiling water on the victim while they were allegedly embroiled in a quarrel.
Clearly, the sheer number, and severe nature and extent of the wounds
suffered by the victim attest to their deliberate infliction.
As regards her claim that she was unaware of the effects or danger of
pouring boiling water on a human being, accused-appellant must have seen
how the boiling water she poured the first time on Michelle seered the flesh
of the victim, permanently disfiguring her body even as she agonized in pain.
Accused-appellant, who was thirty-four (34) years old then, was not shown
to be a person of diminutive intelligence as not to realize the lethal effects
of repeatedly dousing boiling water on a human being. Neither can we
attach any importance to her pretension that she administered antibiotics
and herbal medicine on the burns of Michelle until she recuperated, for it is
contrary to the findings of Dr. Aranas who observed that there was no
evidence of medical intervention notwithstanding the character and
number of the victim's injuries.27
To compound accused-appellant Ruth Mariano's woes, her confessed act of
putting the lifeless body of Michelle in a box and loading it in the luggage
compartment of a car is obviously inconsistent with her profession of
innocence. As observed by the Solicitor General, to which we agree, "an
innocent person would have lost no time in reporting to the police her
discovery, right in her own house, of the death of a household member
instead of taking pains in concealing it."28
Quite obviously, accused appellant exceeded the limits of her credibility, as
she was plainly incredible. Her attempts to lessen the impression of sadism
and viciousness of her crime only assault the intelligence of this Court. We
are not that naive and gullible as the defense perhaps thought.
Second, on the complicity of accused-appellant Ruby Mariano. There is no
solid evidence on record effectively linking accused-appellant Ruby Mariano
to the gruesome killing of Michelle Priol. There is no showing that she ever
laid hands on the deceased nor was she ever seen helping her sister Ruth on
those occasions when Ruth reportedly manhandled Michelle, nor was there
any positive act of assent or cooperation on her part with Ruth ever
satisfactorily established or proved by the prosecution. All that can be
gathered from evidence are: (a) Ruth and Ruby were staying with Michelle
in the same apartment, together with their 74-year old mother and Ruby's
children; (b) the victim had been dead for two (2) to three (3) days when
placed in the car; and, (c) Ruby owns the vehicle where the body of the
victim was concealed and was in fact driving the vehicle when the police
intercepted them and found the body of Michelle in the trunk of their
vehicle. While these circumstances strongly indicate that Ruby had
knowledge of what her sister Ruth did to Michelle, they are too insufficient
to support a finding that Ruby had something to do with the crime so that
she should likewise be answerable. With her nominal role, we cannot
conscientiously declare that Ruby was a principal or even an accomplice in
the crime. The presumption of innocence in her favor has not been
overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
We cannot agree with the Solicitor General that Ruby should have been
convicted as an accessory after the fact -
x x x x since her act of driving the car where the corpse of Michelle was
hidden, her resistance to stop the car when chased by the police and to
immediately open the luggage compartment as requested by the police, her
act of lying to the police by claiming that the box in the compartment
contained only dirty clothes, and her refusal to open said box sufficiently
indicate knowledge of the crime and assistance to Ruth Mariano in
concealing the corpus delicti to prevent its discovery.
Accused-appellant Ruby Mariano is the sister of accused-appellant Ruth
Mariano. As such, their relationship exempts appellant Ruby Mariano from
criminal liability under Art. 20 of The Revised Penal Code -
Art. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. - The penalties
prescribed for accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such
with respect to their spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural
and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same
degrees, with the single exception of accessories falling within the
provisions of paragraph 1 of the preceding article (underscoring supplied).
The reason for exemption is obvious; it is based on ties of blood and the
preservation of the cleanliness of one's name, which compels one to conceal
crimes committed by relatives so near as those mentioned in the above-
quoted article. This Court is thus mandated by law to acquit accused-
appellant Ruby Mariano.
Third, the crime committed by accused-appellant Ruth Mariano was
evidently murder, the killing of the victim being qualified by cruelty. The
autopsy report of Dr. Aranas abundantly shows irrefutable evidence of
cruelty -
FINDINGS: Poorly nourished, fairly developed female cadaver, in the
beginning stage of decomposition. Embalmed. The skin and underlying soft
tissues on the chest gnawed by small animals. HEAD, TRUNK AND
EXTREMITIES: Healed lacerated wound, upper lip, measuring 1 by 0.7 cm.,
1.5 cm., right of the anterior midline; Healing lacerated wound, upper lip,
measuring .07 by .3 cm., left of the anterior midline; Healed lacerated
wound, non-coaptated, lower lip, measuring 1 by 1 cm., just left of the
anterior midline; Multiple lacerated wounds, right ear, with multiple
contusions and swelling; Multiple lacerated wounds, left ear, with multiple
contusions and swelling.
CONCLUSION: Cause of death is multiple traumatic injuries and scalding
burns, 1st and 2nd degrees, 72% of the body surface area.
The wounds and scalding burns listed in the autopsy report were inflicted at
different times but did not immediately result in death, as some of the
wounds were still in the process of healing at the time of the autopsy. This
clearly suggests that the victim was still alive even after those injuries were
sadistically and inhumanly inflicted on her. The nature and extent of those
injuries undoubtedly caused terrible sufferings on the victim for a long
period of time resulting in a slow, painful death. Explaining his medical
findings on the cadaver of the victim, Dr. Aranas testified -
Q: In such a situation where there are several injuries, would you tell the
Court how long after the infliction of those injuries will the victim die?
A: Well, your Honor, there is evidence of a slow regression of the physical
condition of the deceased, so, the moment that injuries were inflicted on
her a few days or may be a week prior to death, there is already a regression
of the body of the deceased considering the presence or the observation of
a collapsed lung and the presence of yellowish fluid on the lungs. This only
means that there was already a slow regression on the physical condition.
COURT: In a layman's language, what do you mean by slow regression?
A: Well, your Honor, there is an evidence of the process of weakening of the
system of the body and slowing down the function of the vital organs of the
deceased.
Q: In other words, you would like to tell the Court that the victim has
suffered for a long time before she actually died?
A: Precisely, your Honor.
Q: Can you tell the Court, with the injuries that you have found in the body
of the victim, how long did that victim suffer before she died?
A: Well, your Honor, there are healed wounds and these would have been
inflicted a week or more prior to the death; and there are healing wounds
and these were inflicted within a week prior to the death; there were fresh
wounds which were inflicted may be a few hours or day prior to the death.
So, she has been suffering for quite a long time prior to the death. 29
Indeed, to the trained eye of medico-legal specialists, the inanimate remains
of the dead give an eloquent testimony of their own, and that is true even
of the young victim, Michelle, who in life could not have been as articulate.
The test in appreciating cruelty, as a qualifying circumstance is whether the
accused deliberately augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not
necessary for its commission, or inhumanly increased the victim's sufferings
or outrage, or scoffed at his person or corpse. 30 The prosecution evidence
surmounted this test beyond any peradventure of doubt.
We also find that the circumstance of abuse of superior strength aggravated
the killing of the victim.1âwphi1 There was gross physical disparity between
the age, built and strength of accused-appellant Ruth Mariano viz-a-viz the
victim Michelle. The former is a big and burly matured woman in her thirties,
several inches taller than the victim, and "who could subdue her [victim]
even without a weapon."31 While the latter was merely a teenager, five (5)
feet tall, slim and poorly nourished and weighed less than 100 pounds
according to Dr. Aranas.32 The records also show that accused-appellant
Ruth Mariano pulled the victim's hair, banged her head, and repeatedly
doused boiling water on her. On those occasions, the victim was not shown
to be equipped with reasonable means of defense. Abuse of superior
strength depends upon the age, size and strength of the parties. To take
advantage of superior strength is to purposely use excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. 33
Abuse of superior strength is a generic aggravating circumstance which is
capable of being proved and taken into consideration in imposing the
sentence, even if it was not alleged in the information. The evidence of its
existence merely forms part of the proof of the actual commission of the
offense and does not violate the constitutional right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
We are not in accord with the trial court, however, in appreciating evident
premeditation as an aggravating circumstance. The essential elements of
evident premeditation are: (a) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung
to his determination; and, (c) a sufficient interval of time between the
determination and execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.34 These requisites must be established with equal
certainty and clarity as the criminal act itself before it can be appreciated as
an aggravating circumstance.35 In the instant case, the records are bereft of
any evidence to show the nature of accused-appellant Ruth Mariano's
planning and preparation to slay her victim, or how much time had elapsed
before it was carried out. Evident premeditation must be based on external
facts which are evident, not merely suspected, and which indicate deliberate
planning. Mere presumptions and inferences, no matter how logical or
probable they might be, would not be enough to sustain a finding of this
aggravating circumstance.36
Article 248 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Sec. 6, RA 7659,
punishes murder with reclusion perpetua to death. The presence of the
aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength warrants the
imposition of the higher penalty of death on accused-appellant Ruth
Mariano in accordance with Art. 63 of The Revised Penal Code.37 In addition,
the same accused-appellant should be made to pay the heirs of the victim
₱50,000.00 for civil indemnity, comformably with prevailing
jurisprudence,38 P35,000.00 for actual damages, and P300,000.00 for moral
damages. Moreover, since there is present an aggravating circumstance,
and considering the peculiar circumstances of this case, an award of
P50,000.00 for exemplary damages is proper.
Finally, we cannot write finis to this case without expressing our abhorrence
to the manner by which the crime was perpetrated. Accused-appellant Ruth
Mariano's atrocious character, which transfixes the soul with such horror
and revulsion, truly merits the severest condemnation of this Court. By her
savagery and ruthlessness - by a woman to another woman - she forfeits her
rightful place in civilized society. Michelle, even in death, is entitled no less
to the full measure of justice as any other victim of a gruesome and
senseless killing.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the court a quo of 22 June 1998

is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Ruth Mariano is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER qualified by extreme cruelty and
is sentenced to DEATH. She is further ORDERED to pay the heirs of victim
Michelle Priol y Beronio the following amounts: P50,000.00 for civil
indemnity, P35,000.00 for actual damages, P300,000.00 for moral damages,
another P50,000.00 for exemplary damages, and to pay the costs.

As for accused-appellant Ruby Mariano, the Court finds the evidence

insufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt her guilt as an accomplice
in the commission of the said crime. Neither can she be held liable as an
accessory after the fact, as she is exempt from criminal liability by reason of
her relationship with her co-accused pursuant to Art. 20 of The Revised
Penal Code. Consequently, she is ACQUITTED of the crime charged and her
immediate release from custody is ordered unless she is being detained for
some other lawful cause. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to report to
this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof.

Four (4) members of the Court, although maintaining their adherence to the
view that RA 7659, insofar as it prescribes the death penalty, is
unconstitutional, nevertheless, bow to the ruling of the Court, by a majority
vote, that the law is constitutional and that the death penalty should
accordingly be imposed. In accordance with Sec. 25 of RA 7659, amending
Art. 83 of The Revised Penal Code, upon the finality of this Decision, let the
records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President
for the possible exercise of his pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.

4 G.R. No. 169060 February 6, 2007
[Formerly G.R. No. 154915]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
JOEY CONCEPCION y PEREZ, Appellant.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
For review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals affirming with
modification the Judgment2 dated 24 June 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court3 (RTC) Branch 12 of Malolos, Bulacan, finding appellant Joey
Concepcion y Perez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder,
and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
In an Amended Information4 filed by Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Salvador R. Santos, Jr. on 1 December 1998, appellant was charged with
murder, thus:
Criminal Case No. 423-M-98
That on or about the 26th day of December 1997, in the municipality of
Bustos, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a knife, with intent
to kill one Rolando F. Nicolas, with treachery, did then and there wilfully
(sic), unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said knife
said [sic] Rolando F. Nicolas, hitting him on his abdomen, thereby inflicting
upon him serious physical injuries which directly caused the death of the
said Rolando F. Nicolas.
Contrary to law.
Salaysay,6 eyewitness Carmencita Baliña (Baliña),7 common-law wife of
victim Rolando F. Nicolas (Nicolas), filed a motion for reinvestigation8 before
the RTC, Branch 77. This motion was granted9 and after the completion of
reinvestigation, the Amended Information for murder was filed. The case
was thus re-raffled and assigned to RTC, Branch 12.
When arraigned, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge. 10 Subsequently,
the defense manifested at pre-trial that while appellant indeed stabbed
Nicolas in the stomach once, he did so however in self-defense. For this
reason, the trial court, upon agreement of the parties, ordered the conduct
of reverse proceedings with the defense first to present its evidence on the
alleged self-defense.11
The pre-trial order12 issued by Judge Crisanto C. Concepcion embodied the
stipulations agreed upon by the parties as follows: (1) the identities of the
accused and the victim; (2) the date, time and place of the commission of
the charged offense, that is, 26 December 1997, 12:10 in the morning, in
Barangay Tanawan, Bustos, Bulacan; (3) that the cause of death of the victim
was the single stab wound to the stomach; and (4) that prosecution
witnesses Baliña, Jeffrey Lopez (Lopez) and Precy Baldazo (Baldazo) gave
their respective statements to the police authorities, and this being so, the
testimonies of the police officer who took the statements and the medico-
legal officer may already be dispensed with.13
Trial promptly ensued thereafter. To substantiate his theory, the defense
presented as witnesses the appellant, appellant’s father, appellant’s
mother, and SPO4 Eduardo Cuison, the arresting officer. The defense’s
version of the incident runs, thus:
At about 11 o’clock in the evening of 25th of December 1997, appellant and
his friend Lopez joined Nicolas, Baliña, and their companions Gilbert de
Guzman and Lenin Baldazo at the drinking session and holiday festivities
then going on in the house of appellant’s aunt Precy Baldoza. 14

On 19 March 1998, appellant was originally charged with homicide in an The trouble that night allegedly began when appellant attempted to flirt
Information5 filed before the RTC, Branch 77 of Malolos, Bulacan. However, with Baliña by touching her hand when she passed the videoke microphone
following the execution of her Karagdagang Sinumpaang to him. According to appellant, what he did angered the victim, causing the
latter to utter in a loud voice, "Putang ina mo, multo ka."15 Immediately house. He was followed by his mother, Nicolas, Baliña and the rest. As Baliña
thereafter, Baliña purportedly asked appellant to leave to avoid further and Nicolas were going out of the house and into the veranda, the latter
problems. Thus, appellant claims to have gone, but that he was prompted paused and stooped slightly to light a cigarette.20
to return to retrieve his mother, who had been left there in the course of
their heated argument.16 Baliña saw appellant suddenly stand up, rush toward Nicolas and stab him.
Thereafter, appellant fled. Nicolas was stunned, managing to utter only the
As he returned to fetch his mother, while situated about two (2) meters from words, "Why, Joey?" before collapsing. He was rushed to a nearby hospital
his aunt’s house, so appellant narrates, Nicolas suddenly appeared and where he expired.21
pulled out a knife. Appellant approached Nicolas and asked, "Ano ba ang
problema?" In the course of their argument, appellant allegedly attempted The Autopsy Report22 on the victim shows that the cause of his death was
to wrestle the knife away from the victim. Consequently, in their struggle to the stab wound in his abdomen. It describes the stab wound as follows:
gain possession of the knife, appellant and Nicolas fell on the ground, with
the latter landing on top of appellant. According to appellant, he was xxxx
surprised to see that the knife had pierced the stomach of Nicolas. Confused,
as he was himself bloodied, appellant explains, he ran away and left the
STAB WOUND –
victim without helping him.17
gaping, 2.5 cms. located on the abdomen, along the anterior median line,
Appellant went straight to his home where he told his wife and father about
102 cms. from the right heel, one end is sharp, the other is contused,
what had transpired. His father then went to the police station and came
directed backwards and upwards involving the skin and underlying soft
back with two (2) police officers.18
tissues, severing the omentum and intestines and hitting the liver with a
depth of 8-9 cms.
To counter the defense’s account of the incident, the prosecution presented
Baliña who claimed to have witnessed the killing of the victim. Her testimony
xxxx
attested to the following facts:
The prosecution asserts that appellant harbored ill-feelings toward Nicolas
In the evening of 25 December 1997, appellant and Lopez joined a get-
as a result of a disagreement some three (3) years back. Nicolas had
together at the house of Baldazo where, among others, Nicolas and Baliña
purportedly reprimanded appellant for extorting money from those
were present. Throughout the night, the group drank beer and sang in
engaged in quarrying operations in their area. The victim had then allegedly
celebration of the holidays. Sometime during the drinking spree, however,
poked a gun at appellant in one of their encounters.23
Baliña noticed that appellant had surreptitiously left in a hurry without
explanation and thereafter disappeared for a considerable amount of time.
To prove actual damages, Baliña presented receipts in the amount of
Baliña believes that at that point, appellant went home to get the murder
₱50,000.00 representing the expenses incurred during the wake and the
weapon as his mother appeared at the venue of the festivities thereafter
service for the victim’s funeral.24
and inquired whether her son had a fight with anyone.19

Finding the prosecution’s version to be more credible than appellant’s

At around 11:45 that evening, the festivities ended uneventfully. Appellant,
allegation of self-defense, the trial court found appellant guilty of murder
who was first to leave the group, seated himself in the veranda outside the
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify
the heirs of the victim in the amount of ₱75,000.00, in addition to
₱50,000.00 for funeral expenses as actual damages, and ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages.25
Conformably with this Court’s decision in People v. Mateo,26 appellant’s
appeal was remanded to the Court of Appeals. On 9 May 2005, the appellate
court rendered its decision affirming the appellant’s conviction, with
modification as to appellant’s civil indemnity. The dispositive portion of the
decision states:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan (Branch 12), dated June 24, 2002, in Criminal Case No. 423-M-98,
finding appellant Joey Concepcion y Perez guilty of murder and sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and awarding actual and
moral damages in favor of the legal heirs of the victim Rolando F. Nicolas is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil indemnity awarded by the trial
court also in favor of the said heirs is reduced to Fifty Thousand Pesos
(₱50,000.00). No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.27
Appellant maintains that the court a quo gravely erred: (1) in giving full faith
and credence to the testimony of Baliña instead of the self-defense
interposed by appellant; (2) in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of
treachery; and (3) in finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of murder.28
Appellant argues that all the essential elements of self-defense were
sufficiently established to exculpate him from liability. He contends that no
evidence on record shows that he intended to kill the victim; if at all, the
death of the victim was purely accidental and only triggered by the
provocation committed by the victim when he attacked appellant with a
knife.29
We are convinced of the appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
however, the downgrading of the offense involved and the reduction of the
penalty are in order.
Case law has established that in invoking self-defense, whether complete or
incomplete, the onus probandi is shifted to the accused to prove by clear
and convincing evidence all the elements of justifying circumstance, namely:
(a) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (b) the reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 30
We find that appellant has miserably failed to demonstrate that the death
of Nicolas had occurred on the occasion of a legitimate self-defense on his
part. The accused, in cases of self-defense, must rely on the strength of his
own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution’s evidence since
he admits the commission of the alleged criminal act.31 One who admits the
infliction of injuries which caused the death of another has the burden of
proving self-defense with sufficient and convincing evidence, for even if the
evidence of the prosecution were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the
accused himself had admitted the killing.32 Self-defense, like alibi, is a
defense which can easily be concocted. If the accused’s evidence is of
doubtful veracity, and it is not clear and convincing, the defense must
necessarily fail.33
Accordingly, there can be no self-defense unless there was unlawful
aggression on the accused. It thus follows that the accused has the burden
of proof to show that he was the victim of an unlawful aggression in order
to be entitled to his claim of self-defense.34 This is so, because it is a
fundamental principle that one who exculpates himself with an allegation of
justification has the burden of fully showing the concurrence of all the
elements constituting the defense invoked.35
Unlawful aggression presupposes not merely a threatening or an
intimidating attitude, but an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or an
imminent danger thereof, which imperils one’s life or limb. 36 It is the first
and primordial element of self-defense. Without it, the justifying
circumstance cannot be invoked.37
Hence, it is crucial to determine whether or not the victim Nicolas was
indeed the unlawful aggressor. He was not. Aggression to be unlawful must
be actual and imminent, such that there is a real threat of bodily harm to
the person resorting to self-defense or to others whom that person is
seeking to defend. As adequately established by the prosecution, there was
no incident to speak of which would amount to aggression, much less
unlawful aggression, on the part of the victim. Correspondingly, appellant
failed to present any corroborative evidence to buttress his bare allegations,
despite the presence of many persons during the incident who could have
been called to testify. His lone testimony in support of his claim of self-
defense under the circumstances is simply not enough to establish his
defense.
Appellant is not even sure of his real defense. He asserts that his acts were
made in self-defense, but he suggests at the same time that the victim’s
death was accidental. The incongruent claims make his overall theory
implausible.
While appellant’s slaying of Nicolas is a proven fact, the prosecution
however failed to prove the presence of treachery to qualify the killing to
murder.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from the defense which the offended party might make. 38
In the case at bar, the Courts below should not have appreciated the
presence of treachery to qualify the killing to murder. The only prosecution
evidence on the matter is the bare testimony of Baliña, the victim’s
common-law wife, that his head was bent while lighting a cigarette when
appellant launched his attack. Baliña made the claim for the first time in her
Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay,39 as she failed to mention it in her first
Sinumpaang Salaysay.40 The amendment appears to be a mere afterthought
made precisely to upgrade the charge to murder.
Significantly, two of the companions of Nicolas during the festivities gave
statements to the police authorities.41However, the prosecution did not
present them as witnesses. Hence, their statements cannot be considered
as evidence.42
In the absence of conclusive proof on the manner in which the aggression
against Nicolas was commenced, treachery cannot be appreciated as a
modifying circumstance.43 It bears stressing that treachery cannot be
presumed. It must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the
crime itself.44
The barefaced fact that the victim might have been unaware or helpless
when he was stabbed does not constitute proof of treachery.45 The
prosecution has the burden to prove that at the time of the attack, the victim
was not in a position to defend himself, and that the offender consciously
and deliberately adopted the particular means, method and forms of attack
employed by him.46 When the prosecution fails to prove treachery, as in this
case, the accused may be held liable only for homicide not murder.47
As a final matter, we address the issue of appellant’s claimed mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender. For voluntary surrender to be
considered, the following requisites must concur: (a)
the offender was not actually arrested; (b) he surrendered to a person in
authority or to an agent of a person in authority; and (c) his surrender was
voluntary.48 There must be showing of spontaneity and an intent to
surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because the accused
acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to spare them the trouble and expense
concomitant to his capture.49 The records show that appellant did not
surrender but was arrested in his residence by SPO4 Cuison. This arresting
officer even had to go twice to appellant’s home to effect the arrest,
because during the first attempt, appellant would not come out of his house
and his mother refused to turn him over to the arresting officer. 50
Based on the foregoing, we modify the finding of guilt and the consequent
penalty imposed as pronounced by the Court of Appeals. Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, prescribes the penalty of reclusion
temporal for the crime of homicide. There being neither mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances in the commission of the deed in the instant case,
the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period is imposed, in
accordance with Article 64, paragraph 1 of the RPC. Further, applying
Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court imposes the penalty
of imprisonment ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of
reclusion temporal, as maximum.1awphi1.net

We affirm, however, the award of damages. Consequently, the court finds

appellant liable to the heirs of Rolando F. Nicolas in the amount of
₱50,000.00 as actual damages for funeral expenses, ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages and ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity. 51

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 00519,

is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION. As modified, appellant JOEY
CONCEPCION y PEREZ is convicted of the crime of homicide and sentenced
to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years
and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Appellant is further
ordered to pay the heirs of Rolando F. Nicolas the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as
actual damages, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

5 G.R. No. 153875 August 16, 2006
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ROLANDO DAGANI y REYES and OTELLO SANTIANO Y LEONIDA, Accused-
Appellants.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
For review before the Court is the Decision dated June 20, 20021 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of the City of Manila, Branch 12 (RTC), dated February 18, 1993, in
Criminal Case No. 89-77467, finding the accused-appellants Otello Santiano
y Leonida (Santiano) and Rolando Dagani y Reyes (Dagani) guilty of the
crime of Murder.
The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about September 11, 1989, in the City of Manila, Philippines,
the said accused conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping each other did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery, attack, assault and
use of personal violence upon one ERNESTO JAVIER Y FELIX by then and
there shooting him with a .38 caliber revolver, thereby inflicting upon the
said ERNESTO JAVIER Y FELIX mortal gunshot wounds which were the
direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
Upon arraignment, the appellants pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued where
the prosecution adduced evidence to establish the following:
At about 4:45 in the afternoon of September 11, 1989, a group composed
of Ernesto Javier (Javier), Lincoln Miran (Miran), and two other individuals
had been drinking at the canteen located inside the compound of the
Philippine National Railways (PNR) along C.M. Recto Avenue, Tondo,
Manila. All of a sudden, appellants, who were security officers of the PNR
and covered by the Civil Service Rules and Regulations, entered the
canteen and approached the group. Appellant Dagani shoved Miran,
causing the latter to fall from his chair. Dagani then held Javier while
Santiano shot Javier twice at his left side, killing the latter.
The defense proceeded to prove their version of the facts:
Appellants testified that they were ordered by their desk officer to
investigate a commotion at the canteen. Upon reaching the place, Santiano
ordered his co-accused, Dagani, to enter, while the former waited outside.
Dagani approached Javier who had been striking a bottle of beer on the
table. Javier then pulled out a .22 caliber revolver and attempted to fire at
Dagani, but the gun failed to go off. Then suddenly, while outside the
canteen, Santiano heard gunfire and, from his vantage point, he saw Javier
and Dagani grappling for a .22 caliber gun which belonged to Javier. During
the course of the struggle, the gun went off, forcing Santiano to fire a
warning shot. He heard Javier’s gun fire again, so he decided to rush into
the canteen. Santiano then shot Javier from a distance of less than four
meters.
Appellants invoked the justifying circumstances of self-defense and lawful
performance of official duty as PNR security officers. They also argued that
the prosecution failed to establish treachery and conspiracy.
The RTC rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding both accused Otello Santiano y Leonida and Rolando
Dagani y Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder
defined and punished under Art. 248, RPC, with the presence of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender and granting them the
benefit of [the] Indeterminate Sentence Law, both accused are hereby
sentenced to each suffer an Indeterminate prison term of TEN (10) YEARS
and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum, to EIGHTEEN (18) YEARS I
and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal x x x.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT APPRECIATING SELF DEFENSE
Both accused are hereby ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim the ON THE PART OF THE ACCUSED.
sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, the sum of P31,845.00 as funeral
and burial expenses, the sum of II

P30,000.00 as and for [sic] attorney’s fees and the further sum THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE FACT THAT
of P1,000.00 per appearance of counsel. THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE IN LAWFUL PERFORMANCE OF AN
OFFICIAL DUTY.
Both accused shall be credited with the full extent of their preventive
imprisonment. Both accused are hereby committed to the Director, III
National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila for service of Sentence.
THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING THAT
SO ORDERED.3 THERE WAS CONSPIRACY.

In brief, the RTC held that appellants failed to prove that Javier attempted IV
to squeeze the trigger of the .22 caliber gun when he pointed it at Dagani;
that during the course of the struggle for the possession of the .22 caliber THE LOWER COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION
gun, the danger to the life of the accused ceased to be imminent; that in WAS ABLE TO ESTABLISH BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE
grappling for the weapon, Dagani "controlled" the hands of Javier and ACCUSED ARE GUILTY OF MURDER.4
pushed them away from his body; that the appellants failed to produce the
two empty shells as physical evidence of the gunfire allegedly caused by
The CA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
Javier; that no points of entry or bullet markings on the walls of the
canteen were shown; that, in light of these findings, no unlawful
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of conviction is MODIFIED.
aggression was present on the part of the victim; that the appellants failed
Appellants are hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua. The award for
to prove that they were on official duty at the time of the incidence; that,
attorney’s fees and appearance fees for counsel are hereby deleted. In all
since it was not established that Javier actually fired his gun, the injury
the other aspects, the appealed decision is maintained.
inflicted upon him cannot be regarded as a necessary consequence of the
due performance of an official duty; that the appellants were acting in
conspiracy; that the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the Let the entire records of the case be elevated to the Supreme Court for the
killing, considering that Javier had been shot while his hands were being mandated review.
held by Dagani and as his body was out of balance and about to fall; and
that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be SO ORDERED.5
appreciated in favor of the appellants.

The appellants appealed to the CA and assigned the following errors:

The CA affirmed the findings of fact as well as the salient portions of the
RTC Decision, but deleted the award of attorney’s fees and the per
appearance fees of counsel since, the
CA reasoned, the instant case is criminal in nature which is under the
control of the public prosecutor, and, additionally, the RTC failed to justify
this award in the body of its Decision. And last, the CA found that the RTC
erroneously applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law since the penalty for
Murder, at the time of the incident, was reclusion perpetua which is an
indivisible penalty to be imposed in its entirety, regardless of the attending
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
Appellants are now before this Court submitting for resolution the same
matters argued before the CA. Through their Manifestation dated February
11, 2003,6 appellants prayed to dispense with the filing of additional briefs.
As of date, the records show that despite the efforts exerted by the surety
and the responsible law officers to locate the appellants, the latter could
not be found and have jumped bail.7
The appeal is partly meritorious.
Appellants argue that the courts a quo misappreciated the facts and erred
in finding that there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim.
They insist that the victim, Javier, had been armed with a revolver at the
time he was struggling with appellant Dagani; that the former "could have
easily killed the latter;" that, given the fact that Javier had been drinking,
"it is quite probable for Javier to act harshly and aggressively towards
8
peace officers such as the accused;" and that Javier actually fired three
shots from his .22 caliber gun.9
We are not convinced.
When self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused
to show that the killing was legally justified. Having owned the killing of the
victim, the accused should be able to prove to the satisfaction of the Court
the elements of self-defense in order to avail of this extenuating
circumstance. He must discharge this burden by clear and convincing
evidence. When successful, an otherwise felonious deed would be
excused, mainly predicated on the lack of criminal intent of the accused.
Self-defense requires that there be (1) an unlawful aggression by the
person injured or killed by the offender, (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel that unlawful aggression, and (3) lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. All
these conditions must concur.10
Unlawful aggression, a primordial element of self-defense, would
presuppose an actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger
on the life and limb of a person – not a mere threatening or intimidating
attitude11 – but most importantly, at the time the defensive action was
taken against the aggressor.12 To invoke self-defense successfully, there
must have been an
unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused,
who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by
employing reasonable means to resist the attack.13
In the instant case, the assertions that it was "quite probable" that Javier,
during the course of the struggle for the firearm, "could have easily killed"
the appellants are uncertain and speculative. There is aggression in
contemplation of the law only when the one attacked faces real and
immediate threat to one’s life. The peril sought to be avoided must be
imminent and actual, not just speculative. 14
To sum up the matter, we quote the findings of the CA:
The defense was unable to prove that there was unlawful aggression on
the part of Javier. They were unable to present evidence that the victim
actually fired his gun. No spent shells from the .22 caliber pistol were
found and no bullets were recovered from the scene of the incident. Javier
also tested negative for gunpowder residue. Moreover, the trial court
found appellant Dagani’s account of the incident to be incredible and self-
serving. In sum, the defense presented a bare claim of self-defense without
any proof of the existence of its requisites. 15
Even if it were established that Javier fired his gun as the appellants so
insist, the imminence of the danger to their lives had already ceased the
moment Dagani held down the victim and grappled for the gun with the
latter. After the victim had been thrown off-balance, there was no longer
any unlawful aggression
that would have necessitated the act of killing.16 When an unlawful
aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-
defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former aggressor. 17 When
Javier had been caught in the struggle for the possession of the gun with
appellant Dagani, the grave peril envisaged by appellant Santiano, which
impelled him to fire at the victim, had then ceased to a reasonable
extent,18 and undoubtedly, Santiano went beyond the call of self-
preservation when he proceeded to inflict the excessive and fatal injuries
on Javier, even when the alleged unlawful aggression had already ceased. 19
The second element of self-defense demands that the means employed to
neutralize the unlawful aggression are reasonable and necessary. It is
settled that reasonable necessity of the means employed does not imply
material commensurability between the means of attack and defense.
What the law requires is rational equivalence.20 The circumstances in their
entirety which surround the grappling of the firearm by Dagani and Javier,
such as the nature and number of gunshot wounds sustained by the
victim21 which amounted to two fatal wounds,22 that Dagani was able to
restrain the hands of Javier and push
them away from his body,23 that Dagani was larger than Javier and had
finished Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) hand-to-
24
hand combat training, and Javier, as admitted by the appellants, was
inebriated at the time of the incident,25 do not justify appellant Santiano’s
act of fatally shooting the victim twice.26
All things considered, the appellants’ plea of self-defense is not
corroborated by competent evidence. The plea of self-defense cannot be
justifiably entertained where it is not only uncorroborated by any separate
competent evidence but is in itself extremely doubtful.27 Whether the
accused acted in self-defense is a question of fact. Like alibi, the affirmative
defense of self-defense is inherently weak because, as experience has
demonstrated, it is easy to fabricate and difficult to disprove. 28 This Court,
therefore, finds no reversible error on the part of the courts a quo in
rejecting the claim of self-defense.
Appellants set up the defense that they were in the lawful performance of
their official duties. They specifically aver that they had been ordered by
their desk officer to proceed to the canteen in response to a telephone call
stating that there was a group "creating trouble;" that they were in the call
of duty and exercising their functions and responsibilities as members of
the PNR Civil Security Office to preserve peace and order and
protect the lives and property in the PNR Compound;29 and that, invoking
jurisprudence, as security officers in the performance of duty, like the
police, they must stand their ground and overcome the opponent, and the
force that may be exerted must differ from that which ordinarily may be
offered in self-defense.30
Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person who acts in the
fulfillment of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right or office does not
incur any criminal liability. Two requisites must concur before this defense
can prosper: 1) the accused must have acted in the performance of a duty
or in the lawful exercise of a right or office; and 2) the injury caused or the
offense committed should have been the necessary consequence of such
lawful exercise.31 These requisites are absent in the instant case.
As found by the CA:
The defense failed to prove that the security officers were in fact on duty
at the time they were at the canteen. The trial court gave weight to the
fact that the appellants were unable to submit their daily time records to
show that they were on duty at the time. Appellants’ assertion that they
were ordered to go on 24-hour duty was belied by PNR Security
Investigator Rolando Marinay’s testimony that PNR security officers work
in two 12-hour shifts, from 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. and from 7:00 p.m. to
7:00 a.m.
Moreover, since it was not established that Javier fired his gun, the injury
inflicted upon him cannot be regarded as a necessary consequence of
appellants’ due performance of an official duty.32
As stated, considering that the imminent or actual danger to the life of the
appellants had been neutralized when Dagani grappled with Javier and
restrained his hands; that Javier had been thrown off-balance; that Dagani
had been specially trained for these purposes; and that Javier had been
drinking immediately prior to the scuffle, this Court holds that the fatal
injuries that appellant Santiano inflicted on the victim cannot be deemed
to be necessary consequences of the performance of his duty as a PNR
security officer.33 While it is recognized that police officers – if indeed the
appellants can be likened to them – must stand their ground and
overwhelm their opponents, in People v. Ulep,34 this Court counseled:
The right to kill an offender is not absolute, and may be used only as a last
resort, and under circumstances indicating that the offender cannot
otherwise be taken without bloodshed. The law does not clothe police
officers with authority to arbitrarily judge the necessity to kill. It may be
true that police officers sometimes find themselves in a dilemma when
pressured by a situation where an immediate and decisive, but legal,
action is needed. However, it must be stressed that the judgment and
discretion of police officers in the performance of their duties must be
exercised neither capriciously nor oppressively, but within reasonable
limits. In the absence of a clear and legal provision to the contrary, they
must act in conformity with the dictates of a sound discretion, and within
the spirit and purpose of the law. We cannot countenance trigger-happy
law enforcement officers who indiscriminately employ force and violence
upon the persons they are apprehending. They must always bear in mind
that although they are dealing with criminal elements against whom
society must be protected, these criminals are also human beings with
human rights.35
But this Court cannot agree with the findings of the courts a quo that the
appellants were in conspiracy.
The RTC simply held:
The Information cited conspiracy of the accused. Since it can also be
committed thru simultaneous/concerted action and considering that Javier
was shot by Santiano while being held by Dagani, under jurisprudence,
conspiracy is present.36
The tenor of the factual findings of the CA is equally unsatisfactory:
Moreover, the facts show that Javier was shot by appellant Santiano as he
was being subdued by appellant Dagani. The trial court held that the
manner of the attack was indicative of a joint purpose and design by the
appellants.37
Courts must judge the guilt or innocence of the accused based on facts and
not on mere conjectures, presumptions, or suspicions.38 Other than the
plain fact that the victim had been shot by one of the accused while being
held by a co-accused, there is no other evidence that the appellants were
animated by the same purpose or were moved by a previous common
accord. It follows that the liability of the accused must be determined on
an individual basis. While no formal agreement is necessary to establish
conspiracy because conspiracy may be inferred from the circumstances
attending the commission of the crime, yet, conspiracy must be
established by clear and convincing evidence.39
This Court has held that even if all the malefactors joined in the killing,
such circumstance alone does not satisfy the requirement of conspiracy
because the rule is that
neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof of
conspiracy. Conspiracy must be shown to exist
as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself.40 Thus,
even assuming that Javier was simultaneously attacked, this does not
prove conspiracy. No evidence was presented to show that the appellants
planned to kill Javier or that Dagani’s overt acts facilitated that alleged
plan. The prosecution did not establish that the act of Dagani in trying to
wrestle the gun from Javier and in the process, held the latter’s hands, was
for the purpose of enabling Santiano to shoot at Javier. The prosecution
had the burden to show Dagani’s intentional participation to the
furtherance of a common design and purpose41 or that his action was all
part of a scheme to kill Javier. That Dagani did not expect Santiano to shoot
the victim is established when Santiano testified that Dagani "seem[ed] to
be shocked, he was standing and looking at the victim" as Javier gradually
fell to the ground.42 And since Dagani’s conviction can only be sustained if
the crime had been carried out through a conspiracy duly proven, in view
of the failure of the prosecution to discharge that burden, this Court is
constrained to acquit him.
And this Court cannot say that treachery attended the attack. The RTC
declared:
[T]he Court believes that Javier was shot while his body was out-balanced
and about to fall to the right side and while his hands were being held by
Dagani. Javier, therefore, was shot at when he has no means to defend
himself, hence, the killing was attended by the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.43
which the CA affirmed as follows:
The findings of the court a quo clearly showed that Javier was being held
down and could not effectively use his weapon. As such, the trial court
held that Javier could not be considered to be an armed man as he was
being held down and was virtually helpless.
It has been held that when an assault is made with a deadly weapon upon
an unarmed and unsuspecting victim who [was] given no immediate
provocation for the attack and under conditions which made it impossible
for him to evade the attack, flee or make [a] defense, the act is properly
qualified as treachery, and the homicide resulting therefrom is classified as
murder.44 x x x
Treachery under par.16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code is defined
as the deliberate employment of means, methods or forms in the
execution of a crime against persons which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense
which the intended victim might raise. Treachery is present when two
conditions concur, namely: (1) that the means, methods and forms of
execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate; and (2) that such means, methods and forms of
execution were deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused
without danger to his person.45
This Court has held that the suddenness of the attack, the infliction of the
wound from behind the victim, the vulnerable position of the victim at the
time the attack was made, or the fact that the victim was unarmed, do not
by themselves render the
attack as treacherous.46 This is of particular significance in a case of an
instantaneous attack made by the accused whereby he gained an
advantageous position over the victim when the latter accidentally fell and
was rendered defenseless.47 The means employed for the commission of
the crime or the mode of attack must be shown to have been consciously
or deliberately adopted by the accused to insure the consummation of the
crime and at the same time eliminate or reduce the risk of retaliation from
the intended victim.48 For the rules on treachery to apply, the sudden
attack must have been preconceived by the accused, unexpected by the
victim, and without provocation on the part of the latter. 49 Treachery is
never presumed. Like the rules on conspiracy, it is required that the
manner of attack must be shown to have been attended by treachery as
conclusively as the crime itself.50
The prosecution failed to convincingly prove that the assault by the
appellants had been deliberately adopted as a mode of attack intended to
insure the killing of Javier and without the latter having the opportunity to
defend himself. Other than the bare fact that Santiano shot Javier while
the latter had been struggling with Dagani over the possession of the .22
caliber gun, no other fact had been adduced to show that the appellants
consciously planned or predetermined the methods to insure the
commission of the crime, nor had the risk of the victim to
retaliate been eliminated during the course of the struggle over the
weapon, as the latter, though struggling, had not been
completely subdued. As already stated, this Court must emphasize that the
mere suddenness of the attack, or the vulnerable position of the victim at
the time of the attack, or yet even the fact that the victim was unarmed,
do not by themselves make the attack treacherous. 51 It must be shown
beyond reasonable doubt that the means employed gave the victim no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate, and that such means had been
deliberately or consciously adopted without danger to the life of the
accused.52
For these reasons, the Court is inclined to look upon the helpless position
of Javier as merely incidental to the attack, and that the decision to shoot
Javier was made in an instant.53
Considering the rule that treachery cannot be inferred but must be proved
as fully and convincingly as the crime itself, any doubt as to its existence
must be resolved in favor of Santiano. Accordingly, for failure of the
prosecution to prove treachery to qualify the killing to Murder, appellant
Santiano may only be convicted of Homicide.54 The penalty, therefore,
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is reclusion
temporal.
The Office of the Solicitor General is correct in that the courts a quo failed
to consider the aggravating circumstance of
taking advantage of official position under Article 14 (1) of the Revised
Penal Code, since the accused, a PNR security officer
covered by the Civil Service, committed the crime with the aid of a gun he
had been authorized to carry as such.55Considering that the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender, as duly appreciated by the courts a
quo, shall be offset against the aggravating circumstance of taking
advantage of official position, the penalty should be imposed in its medium
period, pursuant to Article 64 (4) of the aforesaid Code.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the sentence of appellant
Santiano will consist of a minimum that is anywhere within the full range
of prision mayor, and a maximum which is anywhere within reclusion
temporal in its medium period. This Court hereby fixes it to be from eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum.
As to the award of damages, prevailing jurisprudence entitles the heirs of
the deceased to the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death
of the victim without need of any evidence or proof of damages.56
The CA erred in deleting the attorney’s fees and per appearance fees for
lack of factual basis. Although the CA is correct in noting that the RTC failed
to justify these awards in the body of its Decision, this appeal opens the
entire case for review and, accordingly, the records show that the
foregoing
amounts had been stipulated by the parties,57 thereby dispensing with the
need to prove the same.58
As to moral damages, however, the widow of the victim, Erlinda Javier, is
not entitled to the same. She did not testify on any mental anguish or
emotional distress which she suffered as a result of her husband’s death.
No other heirs of Javier testified in the same manner.59
Inasmuch as the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of official
position attended the killing, the Court awards exemplary damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 in accordance with Articles 2230 and 2234 of the
Civil Code and prevailing jurisprudence.60
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15304
dated June 20, 2002 is MODIFIED. Appellant Otello Santiano y Leonida is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Homicide and is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of an indeterminate sentence from eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Appellant
Santiano is further ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amounts
of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P31,845.00 as funeral and burial
expenses, P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, P30,000.00 as attorney’s
fees and P1,000.00

per appearance of counsel. Appellant Santiano shall be credited with the

full extent of his preventive imprisonment.

Appellant Rolando Dagani y Reyes is hereby ACQUITTED.

SO ORDERED.

6 G.R. No. 168051 September 27, 2006
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HONORATO C. BELTRAN, JR., accused-appellant.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Murder is one of the instances when man descends to a level lower than
that of the beast, for it is non-instinctive killing, a deliberate destruction of
a member of the same species for reasons other than survival.1
This is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
No. 00755, dated 31 March 2005,2affirming with modifications the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pallocan, Batangas City,
Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 10525, dated 9 October 2001,3 convicting
the accused-appellant Honorato C. Beltran, Jr., alias Jun-Jun and Junior, of
the crime of murder, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of deceased Norman H.
Concepcion, the amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, and P18,252.00 as actual damages.
On 3 November 1999, appellant was indicted in an Information 4 for
Murder allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about October 25, 1999 at around 10:00 o'clock in the
evening at Velasquez Road, Brgy. Sta. Rita, Batangas City,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, while armed with a bolo, a deadly
weapon, with intent to kill and with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and hack with the said bolo, suddenly and without
warning one Norman Concepcion y Habla while the latter was
unarmed and completely defenseless, thereby hitting him on the
different parts of his body, which directly caused the victim's
death.
When arraigned on 9 November 1999, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to
the charge therein.5 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution established its case through the testimonies of its
witnesses, namely: Ever D. Sales, Rolando G. Dalisay, Dr. Dinah R. Lucero,
SPO1 Julian M. de Castro and Normita H. Concepcion. Their testimonies are
summarized as follows:
Ever D. Sales (Ever) was a resident of Velasquez Subdivision, Barangay Sta.
Rita, Batangas City. He worked as a gasoline boy in Caltex Gasoline Station
at San Pascual, Batangas City.
Ever testified that on 25 October 1999, at about 10:00 in the evening, he
left his workplace and proceeded home using his bicycle. While traversing
the Velasquez Road, he saw appellant holding a bolo and standing in front
of his house situated at the side of Velasquez Road. On the opposite side of
the same road, he saw Norman H. Concepcion (Norman) standing in front
of an automobile repair shop. Exhausted by the travel, Ever decided to
stop by and rest momentarily at a nipa hut near the same road. Minutes
later, he saw appellant, from a distance of six meters, stalking Norman who
was then walking near the automobile shop. Appellant approached
Norman, and, without a warning, hacked him with a bolo. Norman tried to
avoid the blow by moving backwards and shielding his face with his left
arm. However, Norman's left hand was hit and wounded by the bolo.
When Norman turned around and ran, appellant hacked him at the back
causing him to fall down on a grassy area. Appellant repeatedly hacked
Norman with a bolo.
Fearing for his own safety, Ever immediately left the nipa hut and sought
help in a nearby sari-sari store. Later, he went to the crime scene and
found no trace of appellant. He also discovered the bloodied and lifeless
body of Norman sprawled on the ground. Afterwards, he proceeded home
and narrated to a relative named Renato Sales (Renato) what he just
witnessed. Later, Renato informed a certain Carmina Baliwag of the
incident, who in turn, relayed the same to Normita Concepcion (Normita),
the sister of Norman. Ever also declared that he did not know of any
reason why appellant hacked Norman to death.6
Rolando G. Dalisay (Rolando) is a resident of Velasquez Subdivision,
Barangay Sta. Rita, Batangas City, where he is engaged in a carpentry
business.
Rolando supported the testimony of Ever by stating that on 25 October
1999, at around 10:00 in the evening, he was walking along Velasquez
Road to buy some medicines when, at a distance of about 15 meters, he
saw appellant hacking Norman with a bolo. He noticed that when Norman
fell on the ground, appellant continued his onslaught by relentlessly
hacking the former. Afraid that he might be seen by the appellant, he
immediately went home and informed his wife about the incident. When
the barangay tanod and policemen arrived at the crime scene, he
proceeded thereto and told them what he had witnessed. Further, he
stated that he personally knows appellant as the latter was a former
employee in his carpentry business. He also personally knew Norman since
the latter was a relative of his wife. Lastly, he testified that appellant and
Norman had a previous quarrel which, however, was subsequently settled
in their barangay office.7
SP01 Julian D. Mendoza was the investigating officer of the instant case.
On 26 October 1999, at about 12:00 midnight, his station received an
information regarding the hacking incident. He and a certain SPO3 Mario
Panaligan rushed to the crime scene. Upon arriving thereat, he inquired
from the people present the identity of the dead person and of the killer.
Rolando approached him and narrated that the dead person was Norman
and the killer was appellant. Normita also arrived at the crime scene and
told him relevant information. With this lead, they proceeded to
appellant's house but the latter was not there.
On 27 October 1999, a certain Tomas Dimacuha surrendered the appellant.
Later, the brother of appellant, Sherman Beltran, brought before him the
bolo, about three palms in length, used by appellant in hacking Norman to
death.8
Dr. Dinah R. Lucero, Medical Officer IV of the Batangas City Health Office,
testified that she conducted the post mortem examination on the cadaver
of Norman on 26 October 1999 at the Eternal Memorial Chapel. She
declared that, aside from the fact that Norman's body was almost
decapitated, the latter suffered seven stab wounds and his cause of death
was "massive blood loss secondary to multiple hacking wound."9 The death
certificate issued by Lucero shows that Norman was twenty-two (22) years
of age at the time of his demise.10
Lastly, Normita, sister of Norman, testified that on the evening of 25
October 1999, Carmina Baliwag called her on the telephone and instructed
her to proceed to Velasquez Road. Upon arriving thereat, she was shocked
to discover the dead body of Norman lying on the ground. She claimed that
appellant had a motive to kill Norman since an altercation occurred
between the two on 22 October 1999, which, however, was settled later
on 25 October 1999. In establishing her claim for damages, she stated that
she spent an amount of P61,000.00 in connection with Norman's death,
and that the latter worked as an assistant to the electrician at First Gas
Company with a monthly income of P6,000.00. She also claimed that she
was "shocked" at the sudden and gruesome death of Norman, and that she
felt "pity" for him.11
On the other hand, the defense argued its case by presenting the
testimony of the appellant himself and a certain Dr. Luisito Briones.
Appellant admitted that he hacked Norman with a bolo but insisted that he
did the same in self-defense. He narrated that on 25 October 1999, at
about 10:00 in the evening, he and his mother were resting inside their
house when suddenly, he heard Norman shouting and insulting him
outside their house and challenging him to a fight. When he came out of
the house, he noticed that Norman was accompanied by several
unidentified persons. Thereafter, he tried to pacify Norman but the latter
slapped the back of his head and pulled out an ice pick from his pocket. He
retreated and looked for something to defend himself. He found a bolo
near a tamarind tree in front of their house and took the same. When
Norman was about to enter appellant's house, the latter hacked him with
the bolo. Norman tried to avoid the blow but the same hit his left arm.
Appellant lost grip of the bolo and the same fell on the ground. While
appellant was reaching for the bolo, Norman grabbed his head and tried to
stab him with the ice-pick. Appellant, however, eluded the counter-attack
but he sustained a minor wound on the forehead. Upon gaining control of
the scuffle, appellant took the bolo and hacked Norman four consecutive
times, most of them landed on the head. When appellant noticed that
Norman was no longer moving, he fled therein and went to his brother,
Sherman Beltran, in Bauan, Batangas, where he stayed that same night and
hid therein the bolo. The next day, he went to his sister's house in Lipa
City. Later that day, he went to the Granja Hospital, also in Lipa City, for
treatment of his wound on the forehead.
Appellant also claimed that on 22 October 1999, he was mauled by
Norman near a sari-sari store; that Norman is taller than him since he is
only 5'4 in height; that he was forced to kill Norman because the latter
insulted him and his mother; and that he was on his way to Bauan City to
surrender to police when he was apprehended by the barangay officers in
Lipa City.12 Appellant was twenty-nine years (29) of age at the time of his
arrest.13
Dr. Luisito D. Briones testified that he treated appellant on the morning of
26 October 1999 at Granja Hospital in Lipa City for a lacerated wound on
the forehead. He also claimed that the wound was possibly caused by a
knife and that it was already on the healing stage. He also issued a medical
certificate attesting to the same.14
On 9 October 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision15 finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. It reasoned that
appellant's claim of self-defense cannot be sustained in view of the
positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. In closing,
the trial court ruled:
In the light of all the foregoing consideration and upon the
evidence, accused Honorato Beltran, Jr. y Casia alias "Jun-Jun" is
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder charged in the information. Consequently, the accused is
hereby sentenced to Reclusion perpetua together with all the
accessory penalties inherent therewith and to pay the costs. He is
further directed to indemnify the heirs of Norman Concepcion in
the sum of P61,000.00 as actual damages and the sum
of P75,000.00 as moral damages.16
Aggrieved, appellant filed a notice of appeal therein on 22 October
2001.17 Subsequently, on 3 January 2003, appellant filed his Appellant's
Brief with this Court assailing the Decision of the RTC dated 9 October
2001.18Pursuant to our ruling in the case of People v. Mateo,19 we issued a
Resolution dated 8 November 2004, transferring the instant case to the
Court of Appeals for disposition.20 On 31 March 2005, the Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision affirming with modifications the assailed RTC
Decision. Aside from reducing the amount of actual damages awarded by
the RTC, it also ordered appellant to pay the heirs of Norman an amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Aside from moral damages in the amount
of P75,000.00, appellant is ordered to pay the heirs of the
deceased, Norman Concepcion, the following amounts: (a) Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity; and (b) Eighteen
Thousand Five Hundred Twenty-Five (P18,525.00) as actual
damages.21
Dismayed, appellant appealed the afore-quoted Decision before this Court
by adopting and invoking the same arguments stated in his Appellant's
Brief dated 3 January 2003, to wit:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF EVER SALES DESPITE OF ITS BEING UNBELIEVABLE
AND BIASED, INSTEAD OF THE SELF-DEFENSE INTERPOSED BY THE
APPELLANT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY DESPITE THE
 PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THE SAME BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
III.
ASSUMING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE
JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-DEFENSE, THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING IN HIS FAVOR THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES OF SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION ON THE PART OF
THE OFFENDED PARTY WHICH IMMEDIATELY PRECEDED THE ACT
AND VOLUNTARY SURRENDER.
IV.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AWARDING EXCESSIVE
ACTUAL DAMAGES.22
Anent the first issue, appellant argued that the testimony of prosecution
witness, Ever, is biased, unbelievable and confusing; that the trial court
should not have considered them; that his acquittal is proper on the
ground of self-defense; and that the elements of self-defense are present
in the instant case.
The contention is without merit.
Prosecution eyewitness, Ever, testified that on 25 October 1999, at about
10:00 in the evening, he left his workplace and proceeded home using his
bicycle. While traversing Velasquez Road, he saw appellant holding a bolo
and standing in front of his house situated at the side of Velasquez Road.
On the opposite side of the same road, he saw Norman standing in front of
an automobile repair shop. Exhausted by the travel, he decided to stop by
and rest momentarily at a nipa hut near the same road. Minutes later, he
saw appellant, from a distance of six meters, stalking Norman who was
walking then near the automobile repair shop. Appellant approached
Norman, and without a warning, repeatedly hacked him with a bolo.
Although it occurred late in the evening, the light coming from the moon
and the electric post therein provided him with good visibility to identify
appellant and Norman, and to witness how the heinous act was
executed.23 This testimony was corroborated by another prosecution
eyewitness, Rolando. Thus, the positive identification and categorical
declarations of Ever on the witness stand under solemn oath deserves full
faith and credence.
Appellant, however, posited that there were inconsistencies between the
testimony of Ever in open court and his sworn statements before the
investigators. According to appellant, Ever testified during his direct
examination that he was at a distance of about six meters, more or less,
from appellant and Norman when the hacking occurred; that the place
where the killing occurred was "lighted" by the moon; and that during his
cross-examination, he stated that there was no other person within the
area when he witnessed the hacking. On the other hand, appellant claimed
that Ever declared in his sworn statements before the investigators that he
was more or less 20 meters from the place where the hacking took place;
that there was light coming from the electric post and the moon; and that
during his cross-examination, he also stated that the mother of appellant
was outside the house when the hacking took place.24
This Court had consistently ruled that the alleged inconsistencies between
the testimony of a witness in open court and his sworn statement before
the investigators are not fatal defects to justify a reversal of judgment of
conviction. Such discrepancies do not necessarily discredit the witness
since ex-parte affidavits are almost always incomplete. It bears emphasis
that a sworn statement or an affidavit does not purport to contain a
complete compendium of the details of the event narrated by the affiant.
Sworn statements taken ex-parte are generally considered to be inferior to
the testimony given in open court.25
Moreover, as aptly stated by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
when Ever testified in court that "there was light coming from the moon,
sir" he was not denying what he stated in his sworn statement that "there
was a light from the lamp (electric) post and the moon."26 The appellant
also testified that the place where the hacking incident occurred was
lighted by an electric post. As the foregoing circumstances clearly
established that the place where the hacking occurred was lighted by the
moon and an electric post, the testimony of Ever as to the identity of the Article 11, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code provides for the
killer and the victim, and how the killing was executed, must stand. elements and/or requisites in order that a plea of self-defense may be
validly considered in absolving a person from criminal liability, viz:
Further, the alleged inconsistencies with respect to the presence of
appellant's mother in the place where the hacking took place, and the ART. 11. Justifying circumstances. – The following do not incur any
distance between the nipa hut where Ever rested and the area where the criminal liability:
hacking took place, are minor inconsistencies and trivial matters that serve
to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of Ever for they erase the Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that
suspicion of rehearsed testimony. Also, they are not material in the instant the following circumstances concur;
case since none of them is an essential element of murder. 27
First. Unlawful aggression;
More importantly, the RTC had observed that Ever was candid,
straightforward and credible in giving his testimony on the witness stand. It Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent
found Ever to be unbiased since he was neither a friend nor an enemy of or repel it;
appellant and Norman but just a mere neighbor. It also found that there
was no ulterior motive for him to testify against appellant. 28
Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person
defending himself.
It is a well-settled doctrine in our jurisprudence that when the credibility of
a witness is in issue, the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of
As an element of self-defense, unlawful aggression refers to an assault or
the testimonies of the witnesses and its assessment of the probative
attack, or a threat thereof in an imminent and immediate manner, which
weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings are
places the defendant's life in actual peril.32 It is an act positively strong
accorded high respect if not conclusive effect.29 This is because the trial
showing the intent of the aggressor and not merely a threatening or
court has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of a witness
intimidating attitude.33 It is also described as a sudden and unprovoked
and is in the best position to discern whether they are telling the truth. 30 It
attack of immediate and imminent kind to the life, safety or rights of the
is worth stressing at this point that the Court of Appeals affirmed such
person attacked.34
findings of the RTC. In this regard, it is settled that when the trial court's
findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are
There is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts in
generally conclusive and binding upon this Court.31 We find no compelling
actual or imminent peril the life, limb, or right of the person invoking self-
reason to deviate from such findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals.
defense. There must be actual physical force or actual use of weapon.35 In
order to constitute unlawful aggression, the person attacked must be
On another point, appellant contended that he merely acted in self-
confronted by a real threat on his life and limb; and the peril sought to be
defense when he hacked Norman to death.
avoided is imminent and actual, not merely imaginary.36

We disagree.
In the instant case, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of
Norman that justified the act of appellant in hacking him to death. There
was no actual or imminent danger on the life of appellant when he came
face to face with Norman. As narrated by Ever, Norman was just walking
on the road and was not provoking appellant into a fight. It was the
appellant who approached and suddenly hacked Norman repeatedly even
when the latter was already fallen on the ground. In short, appellant was
the unlawful aggressor.
Even if this Court were to adopt the version of facts of appellant, the result
or conclusion would be the same.
Appellant alleged that he was resting inside his house when he heard
Norman shouting invectives against him and challenging him to a fight.
When he went outside the house to pacify Norman, the latter slapped the
back of his head and brought out an ice-pick. Appellant retreated and
when Norman tried to follow him inside the house, he took a bolo and
repeatedly hacked Norman. The foregoing circumstances does not justify
the act of appellant in hacking Norman. Obviously, mere shouting of
invectives and challenging one to a fight does not put one's life in actual or
imminent danger. In the same vein, mere slapping of one's head does not
place a person's life in serious danger such that it compels him to use a
bolo and hack the offender.
As regards the brandishing of an ice-pick, appellant had several less
harmful means of avoiding the same as he was not cornered or trapped.
He could have run inside his house and locked the door, or, called the
neighbors or authorities for help. Unfortunately, appellant did not avail
himself of any of those options and instead chose to hack Norman. Quite
conspicuously, no convincing evidence was presented to show that
Norman was, indeed, armed with an ice-pick at the time of the incident. In
fact, no ice-pick was found in the crime scene nor in the body of Norman.
There was also no proof adduced showing that Norman attempted to stab
appellant or tried to barge into the latter's house.37
The fact that appellant sustained an injury on his head, allegedly caused by
Norman's ice-pick, does not signify that he was a victim of unlawful
aggression or that he acted in self-defense.38 The physician who treated
appellant testified that the latter was diagnosed on 26 October 1999, the
day after the hacking incident; that appellant was discharged on the same
day he was treated in the hospital since he was only an out-patient; and
that at the time he examined the head injury of appellant, it was already
on its healing stage.39 It is clear from the foregoing that appellant's head
injury was not serious or severe. The cause of the same is likewise
doubtful. Thus, the superficiality of the injury sustained by appellant is no
indication that his life and limb were in actual peril. 40
In stark contrast, Norman was almost decapitated and sustained fatal
injuries on the head and neck. All in all, Norman sustained seven fatal
wounds, most of them located at the head and neck. Based on the
foregoing, it is difficult to believe that Norman was the unlawful aggressor.
The gravity, location, and number of wounds sustained by Norman are
eloquent physical evidence showing a determined effort on the part of
appellant to kill Norman, and not just to defend himself.41
Time and again, we held that unlawful aggression is a sine qua non for
upholding the justifying circumstance of self-defense.42 It is an essential
and indispensable requisite, for without unlawful aggression on the part of
the victim, there can be, in a jural sense, no complete or incomplete self-
defense.43 Without unlawful aggression, self-defense will not have a leg to
stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be
appreciated even if the other elements are present.44 To our mind,
unlawful aggression is clearly absent in the case at bar.
The second element of self-defense requires that the means employed by
the person defending himself must be reasonably necessary to prevent or
repel the unlawful aggression of the victim. The reasonableness of the
means employed may take into account the weapons, the physical
condition of the parties and other circumstances showing that there is a
rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense.45
The act of appellant in repeatedly hacking Norman on his head and neck
was not a reasonable and necessary means of repelling the aggression
allegedly initiated by the latter. As stated earlier, no convincing evidence
was presented to show that Norman was armed with an ice-pick at the
time of the incident. In fact, no ice-pick was found in the crime scene or in
the body of the victim. There was also no proof showing that Norman
attempted to stab appellant or tried to barge into the latter's house.
Granting arguendo that Norman was armed with an ice-pick, the repeated circumstance that qualifies the killing of a person to murder. Article 14,
hackings were not necessary since he can overpower or disable Norman by paragraph (16) of the Revised Penal Code states the concept and essential
a single blow on non-vital portion/s of his body. elements of treachery as an aggravating circumstance, thus:

Again, as correctly observed by the OSG, had the appellant merely wanted ART. 14. Aggravating circumstances. - The following are
to protect himself from what he perceived as an unlawful aggression of aggravating circumstances:
Norman, he could have just disabled Norman.46 When Norman fell on the
ground, appellant should have ceased hacking the former since the alleged xxxx
aggression or danger no longer exists. By appellant's own testimony,
however, he hacked Norman with his bolo even when the latter was 16. That the act be committed with treachery (alevosia).
already lying on the ground. It appears, therefore, that the means used by
appellant, which were simultaneous and repeated hackings, were adopted
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
by him not only to repel the aggression of Norman but to ensure the
against the person employing means, methods, or forms in the
latter's death. In sum, such act failed to pass the test of reasonableness of
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
the means employed in preventing or repelling an unlawful aggression.
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which
the offended party might make.
Like an alibi, self-defense is inherently weak for it is easy to
fabricate.47 Thus, this Court had consistently ruled that where an accused
As can be gleaned from the foregoing, two essential elements/conditions
admits killing the victim but invokes self-defense, it is incumbent upon the
are required in order that treachery may be appreciated: (1) The
accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in self-
employment of means, methods or manner of execution that would insure
defense.48 As the burden of evidence is shifted on the accused to prove all
the offender's safety from any retaliatory act on the part of the offended
the elements of self-defense, he must rely on the strength of his own
party, who has, thus no opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2)
evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution.49 In the instant case,
deliberate or conscious choice of such means, methods or manner of
appellant failed to discharge such burden with clear and convincing
execution. Further, it must always be alleged in the information and
evidence. Therefore, his plea of lawful self-defense must fall.
proved in trial in order that it may be validly considered.51

With regard to the second issue, appellant contended that there was no
treachery that qualified his act to murder in the absence of direct evidence
showing that his attack on Norman was sudden; that Norman was not
deprived of an opportunity to defend himself; and that appellant did not
employ treachery to insure the execution of the crime.
Appellant's contention is bereft of merit.
Treachery is a sudden and unexpected attack under circumstances that
render the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself by reason of
the suddenness and severity of the attack.50 It is as an aggravating
In the case at bar, treachery was alleged in the Information against
appellant. Moreover, all the essential elements/conditions of treachery
were established and proven during the trial.
Appellant, while holding a bolo, had waited for the dark to set in before
making his move so that nobody, especially Norman, would notice his
impending attack. When he saw Norman, alone and unarmed, casually
walking near an auto repair shop, he followed him surreptitiously. Later,
appellant came out and approached the unsuspecting Norman, who, in
turn, faced the former. Appellant took advantage of the stunned and
hapless Norman by swiftly hacking him with a bolo. As the assault was
sudden and unexpected, Norman was forced to move backwards and raise
his left arm to shield his face but it was too late. Norman's left arm was
immediately hit by the bolo. When Norman turned his back on appellant
and tried desperately to run, appellant hacked him again at the back
causing him to fall on the ground. As the bloodied and moaning Norman
was lying on the ground, appellant unleashed his full wrath by repeatedly
hacking him on the neck and head. Upon noticing that Norman was no
longer moving and was, in fact, almost decapitated, he stopped the
hacking and fled the scene.
As viewed from the foregoing, the suddenness and unexpectedness of the
appellant's attack rendered Norman defenseless, vulnerable and without
means of escape. Appellant's use of nighttime and a deadly bolo, as well as
the sudden attack and repeated hackings on the vital portions of Norman's
body, were especially adopted by him to immediately cripple Norman and
prevent him from retaliating or escaping. Appellant deliberately adopted
them in order to overpower the much younger, taller, and larger Norman.
Considering that Norman was alone and unarmed, there was absolutely no
way for him to defend himself or escape. Further, the fact that Norman
sustained several fatal wounds while appellant allegedly sustained a single
superficial wound on his forehead shows that Norman was not able to
retaliate or defend himself. Given the foregoing, there is no doubt in our
minds that appellant intended and was determined to kill Norman.
Appellant, however, asseverated that there was no treachery since the
attack was frontal or face to face, such that Norman had been forewarned
of the attack and, thus, placed him in a position where he can defend
himself. Appellant also claimed that there was a quarrel between him and
Norman prior to the hacking incident which, in effect, negate treachery
since it disproved the fact that the attack was sudden and unexpected. We
are not persuaded.
There is no dispute that Norman was facing appellant at the time of the
first blow. Subsequently, however, Norman turned his back and tried to
run but he was hacked at the back, and when he fell on the ground, he was
hacked again repeatedly. It is settled that treachery is to be appreciated
when the victim was initially attacked frontally, but was attacked again
after being rendered helpless and had no means to defend himself or to
retaliate.52 As long as the attack was sudden and unexpected, and the
unarmed victim was not in a position to repel the attack, there is
treachery.53
The quarrel between Norman and appellant prior to the hacking incident
does not negate treachery. It is true that there is no treachery if the killing
was preceded by an altercation or dispute. The same, however, does not
apply in the instant case. The misunderstanding between the two occurred
on 22 October 1999. This was settled before their barangay officials on the
morning of 25 October 1999. Cooler heads then had already set in. In fact,
the two shook hands before the same barangay officials. Thus, there was
no reason for Norman to suspect that appellant still held a grudge against
him and to prepare or anticipate appellant's retaliation. It must also be
noted that no conversation or struggle occurred between them shortly
before the hacking incident.
Appellant argued that if his plea of self-defense cannot be considered, he is
still entitled to the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation on
the part of the offended party and voluntary surrender under Article 13
paragraphs (4) and (7) of the Revised Penal Code, respectively.
We reject these contentions.
Article 13 paragraph (4) of the Revised Penal Code provides that a person's
criminal liability may be mitigated if there was a sufficient provocation or
threat on the part of the offended party which immediately preceded the
crime. Before the same can be appreciated, the following elements must
concur: (1) That the provocation or threat must be sufficient or
proportionate to the crime committed and adequate to arouse one to its
commission; (2) That the provocation or threat must originate from the
offended party; and (3) That the provocation must be immediate to the
commission of the crime by the person provoked.
Norman did not in any way provoke appellant into a fight on that fateful
night. There was no argument or physical struggle that ensued between
them shortly before appellant hacked Norman with a bolo. Norman was
innocently walking along the road when, all of a sudden, appellant
surfaced and hacked him in rapid succession. The alleged altercation
between the two occurred much earlier (22 October 1999) as to
reasonably and sufficiently incite the appellant to act the way he did. In the
absence of sufficient provocation on the part of the offended party,
appellant's assertion of mitigating circumstance cannot be sustained.
Moreover, and more importantly, this ordinary mitigating circumstance
cannot offset the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery which
is present in the instant case.
Likewise, appellant is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. Article 13, paragraph (7) of the Revised Penal Code
states that the offender's criminal liability may be mitigated if he
voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority or his agents. Accordingly,
the essential elements of voluntary surrender are: (1) that the offender
had not been actually arrested or apprehended; (2) that the surrender was
voluntary and spontaneous; and (3) that the offender surrendered himself
to a person in authority or his agent.
Appellant was already apprehended for the hacking incident by the
barangay officials of Lipa City just before he was turned over to the police
by a certain Tomas Dimacuha.54 Assuming that appellant had indeed
surrendered to the authorities, the same was not made
spontaneously.55 Immediately after the hacking incident, appellant, instead
of proceeding to the barangay or police, went to his brother, Sherman
Beltran, in Bauan, Batangas, and the next day, to his sister in Lipa City. It
took him three long days to surrender to the police
authorities.56 Moreover, the flight of appellant and his act of hiding until he
was apprehended by the barangay officials are circumstances highly
inconsistent with the spontaneity that characterizes the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender.57
As to the last issue, appellant insisted that the trial court has awarded
excessive damages in favor of Norman's heirs. He argued that there was no
proof or justification for the same.
When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be
awarded: (1) a civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of the victim; (2)
actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary
damages; and (5) temperate damages.58 Thus, we agree with the Court of
Appeals that the award of P50,000.00 for civil indemnity ex delicto to
Norman's heirs is proper without need of proof other than appellant's
commission of murder that resulted in Norman's death. 59 Likewise, we
agree with the Court of Appeals that moral damages should be awarded
since Normita testified during the trial that she suffered moral shock and
wounded feelings because of the brutal and sudden death of Norman.
However, we deem it necessary to reduce the amount of the same
from P75,0000.00 to P50,000.00.
Normita claimed that she spent a total amount of P61,080 for the burial
and funeral expenses of Norman. However, the receipts on record shows
that only an amount of P18,420.82 was spent therein.60 Normita's claim of
expenses for the food, drinks, flowers, chairs and tables during the funeral
and burial of Norman, as well as the traditional 40 days prayer thereafter,
were not supported by any receipts. These expenses are merely written,
listed, and signed by Normita in one sheet of yellow paper, and submitted
as evidence in the trial court. Thus, as general rule, Normita is entitled only
to an amount of P18,420.82 since actual damages may be awarded only if
there are receipts to support the same. However, in the case of People v.
Dela Cruz,61 this Court declared that when actual damages proven by
receipts during the trial amount to less than P25,000.00, such as in the
present case, the award of temperate damages for P25,000.00, is justified
in lieu of actual damages for a lesser amount. This Court ratiocinated
therein that it was anomalous and unfair that the heirs of the victim who
tried but succeeded in proving actual damages to less P25,000.00 only
would be in a worse situation than those who might have presented no
receipts at all but would be entitled to P25,000.00 temperate damages.
Thus, instead of P18,420.82, an amount of P25,000.00 as temperate
damages should be awarded to the heirs of Norman. Actual damages for
loss of earning capacity cannot be awarded in this case since there was no
documentary evidence to substantiate the same.62Although there are
exceptions to this rule, none is availing in the present case. 63
Moreover, exemplary damages in the amount of P25,000.00 should be
awarded in this case since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was
firmly established.64

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 March 2005 is

hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS: We award Norman's heirs civil
indemnity of P50,000.00 for Norman's death; moral damages, in the
amount of P50,000.00; temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages, in
the amount of P25,000.00; and lastly, exemplary damages in the amount
of P25,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

7 G.R. No. 148912 September 10, 2003
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
TIMOTEO ESCARLOS, alias "Tomy," appellant.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
By interposing self-defense, herein appellant admits authorship of the
killing. Thus, shifted to him is the burden of proof showing that the killing
was justified. Despite his failure to prove self-defense, he may be convicted
only of homicide, not murder, because of the inability of the prosecution
to establish any qualifying circumstance. Here, treachery is negated by the
victim's awareness of the impending attack.
The Case
For automatic review before the Court is the May 29, 2001 Decision 1 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta, Pangasinan (Branch 46) in Criminal
Case No. U-10792, finding appellant guilty of murder beyond reasonable
doubt and sentencing him to death. The dispositive portion of the Decision
reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered CONVICTING
beyond reasonable doubt accused Timoteo Escarlos of the crime
of Murder and the Court sentences him to suffer the penalty of
DEATH; he is likewise ordered to indemnify the heirs of Antonio
Balisacan the sum of P28,650.00 as actual damages, the sum of
P50,000.00 as moral damages and the further sum of P50,000.00
as exemplary damages.
"The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to prepare the mittimus.
"The Jail Warden, Bureau of Jail Management and Penology
(BJMP) Urdaneta District Jail, Urdaneta City, is hereby ordered to
deliver the living body of Timoteo Escarlos to the National Bilibid
Prisons, Muntinlupa City, immediately upon receipt of this
Decision."2
The Information3 dated August 29, 2000, charged appellant as follows:
"That on or about July 1, 2000, in the evening, at Barangay
Dumanpot, Asingan, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a sharp
pointed bladed weapon, with deliberate intent to kill, treachery
and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, hold and stab from behind Brgy.
Kgd. Antonio Balisacan, inflicting upon him the following injuries:
External Findings:
(1) Stab wound located below right clavicle measuring 3
inches length and 8 inches depth.
(2) Stab wound located at left armpit measuring 4
[inches] length and 6 inches depth.
(3) Stab wound located at mid lumbar area measuring 3
inches length and 4 inches depth
(4) Stab wound located between right first and second
finger measuring 3 inches length.
Internal Findings:
(1) Cutting of the upper and lower lobe of the right lung.
(2) Cutting of the lower lobe of the left lung.
which injuries directly caused the death of said Brgy. Kgd. Antonio
Balisacan, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
 "Contrary to Art. 248, Revised Penal Code in relation to Republic
Act No. 7659."4
During his arraignment on November 8, 2000, appellant, with the
assistance of his counsel,5 pleaded not guilty to the charge.[6] After trial in
due course, he was found guilty by the lower court.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) narrates the factual version of the
prosecution as follows:
"Around 9 o'clock in the evening of July 1, 2000, Antonio Balisacan
went to the residence of Jaime Ulep in Domampot, Asingan,
Pangasinan to attend a benefit dance which was near the place. In
the benefit dance was his son Crisanto Balisacan, who attended
the dance with his friends. Crisanto stood beside the emcee,
Ceasario Escarlos, appellant's brother. While Ceasario was calling
the victim, Antonio Balisacan, to come to the the stage as he was
a kagawad, Crisanto heard the people at his back shout 'Ay!'. Five
(5) to six (6) meters at his back, with the place [illuminated] by a
50 to 100 watts bulb, he saw appellant stab his father, Antonio,
several times. Crisanto was momentarily shocked that he was not
able to react. When appellant fled, Crisanto came to his senses
and ran to Antonio. Antonio was still alive so he brought him to
Urdaneta Sacred Heart Hospital where he expired a few minutes
after arrival.
"Jesus Dismaya was also beside Ceasario when Antonio
Balisacan's name was called. When he heard people shout, he
turned around and saw from a distance of four (4) meters
appellant stabbing Antonio four (4) times with a ten (10) inch-long
knife. He then called Antonio's brother, [Marcelo] Balisacan.
"Within the vicinity was Antonio's brother, Marcelo Balisacan. He
was in the Asingan-Urdaneta road, which was about fifteen (15)
meters outside Ulep's yard when he heard people shout and run
from the benefit dance. Wanting to know what was happening, he
went to the benefit dance and saw that Antonio was stabbed. He
went near Antonio, hugged him, and asked who stabbed him. He
replied, 'Tomy Escarlos.'
"Meanwhile around 9:30 of the same evening of July 1, 2000.
SPO1 Patricio Badua was on duty. He received a phone call about
a stabbing incident in a benefit dance in Domampot, Asingan,
Pangasinan. When he went to the scene of the crime, the victim,
Antonio Balisacan was already in the hospital and appellant had
already fled. He later learn[ed] that Antonio died.
"Dr. Noemi Taganas conducted an autopsy on Antonio's body and
found:
External Findings:
(1) Stab wound located below the right clavicle
measuring 3 inches length (in) and 8 inches (in) depth.
(2) Stab wound located at left armpit measuring 4 inches
length and 6 inches depth.
(3) Stab wound located at mid lumbar area measuring 3
inches length and 4 inches depth
(4) Stab wound located between right first and second
finger measuring 3 inches length.
Internal Findings:
(1) Cutting of the upper and lower lobe of the right lung.
 (2) Cutting of the lower lobe of the left lung.
"She later issued a death certificate. She stated in court that out
of the four (4) stab wounds, Antonio's second stab wound was
fatal because the lungs were penetrated.
"Dr. Ronald Bandonil, an NBI medico-legal officer confirmed
Taganas' autopsy report. He also conducted an autopsy on the
exhumed body of Antonio. In his autopsy he found that Antonio's
first and second wounds were fatal as these caused his death due
to hypovalmic shock or massive blood loss."7 (Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant, on the other hand, relates his version of the facts in this
manner:
"On the night of July 1, 2000, accused TIMOTEO ESCARLOS
together with Rexie Yabes, Fredo Ramos, Erwin Ramos, Rowena
Alamigo and others were at the yard of Jaime Ulep, in Purok
Inanama, Domanpot Asingan, Pangasinan watching a benefit
dance sponsored by Mr. & Mrs. Organization. He was invited to
buy lechon during the benefit dance.
"While thereat, Kgd. Antonio Balisacan who was then drunk,
passed in front of accused and told him, 'You are here again to
create trouble.' Accused was offended so he answered back
saying 'Why do you say that to me when I am not doing any
trouble here.' Antonio Balisacan told him, 'OKINNAM KETDI' (vulva
of your Mother) and without warning boxed him. Timoteo was hit
on the forehead, which left a scar on his forehead about an inch
above the right eyebrow. He intended to box back but he noticed
that the victim was pulling out a kitchen knife, so for fear of his
life, he grabbed the weapon from Antonio Balisacan and used the
knife in stabbing the latter who was hit at the side below the left
armpit. He stabbed him twice and when the victim was about to
fall down, he was able to hit him for the third time.
"The weapon that Timoteo was able to get from Antonio was a
kitchen knife about 10 to 12 inches. Antonio drew the knife from
his left side. Timoteo was able to get hold of the handle of the
knife when he grappled for the same from the victim, by taking
hold of the knife with his right hand and stabbed Antonio who
was intending to stab him. Antonio was one (1) inch taller than
accused.
"Timoteo's testimony was corroborated by an eyewitness,
CESARIO ESCARLOS, the brother of Timoteo and president of the
Mr. & Mrs. Association which sponsored the benefit dance on July
1, 2000.
"On the night of July 1, 2000, Cesario Escarlos was at the yard of
Jaime Ulep. At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of the said date,
he saw his brother Timoteo Escarlos together with Dexie Yabis
standing in a corner watching the dance. Several minutes later
Kgd. Antonio Balisacan arrived and later on, while Cesario was on
his way to urinate. He heard Antonio uttered to Timoteo 'ADDA
CAYO MANEN NGA AGARAMED TI NILOLOCON.' While relieving
himself, he heard both Timoteo and Antonio arguing and before
he could get near and pacify them, he saw them wrestling with
each other. Many people were around but nobody pacified them.
Next minute he saw Antonio bloodied and lying on the ground.
There were at least 100 people then and might have seen the
incident. He noticed that Jesus Dismaya was there but the latter
did not do anything. Cesario, after the incident only stayed there
for 3 minutes because he was looking for his three year-old
daughter. In the meantime, nobody touched the body of the
victim."8
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court believed that the prosecution's evidence was sufficient to
convict appellant of murder qualified by treachery. It rejected his plea of
self-defense, because there had been no unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim.
 "x x x. The established facts revealed that the victim was one of
the persons who filed a case of malicious mischief against
[appellant]. Said case was filed five (5) months before the instant
case happened. To the mind of the Court, the accused only found
a way of avenging what he felt towards the victim. He took
advantage of that x x x particular time and place to let out his
feelings in the presence of his barangay mates. Such hidden
grudge by the accused against the victim, established the motive
of the former.
xxx xxx xxx
"The second element of self-defense is also lacking. The nature,
location and the number of wounds inflicted on the victim belie
and negate the accused['s] claim of self-defense. The post mortem
findings of the autopsy report showed that the victim sustained
four stab wounds.
"If there is any truth to the accused'[s] claim of self-defense, he
would not have stabbed him several times. [Worse,] the location
of the wounds suggested that the accused was at the back of the
victim when the wounds were inflicted. It is therefore evident
from the conduct of the accused that he was determined to kill
the victim and did not just act to defend himself. In view of the
foregoing, it is no longer necessary to discuss the third element."9
Hence, this automatic review.10
The Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors for our consideration:
"1. The honorable trial court erred in appreciating treachery as a
qualifying circumstance despite failure of the prosecution to
prove its attendance.
"2. The honorable trial court erred in not finding that the
testimony of the supposed eyewitnesses for the prosecution as to
the attendance of treachery is flawed and unworthy of belief.
"3. The honorable trial court erred in not giving exculpatory
weight to the theory of self-defense interpose[d] by the accused-
appellant.
"4. The honorable trial court committed a grave and serious error
in not finding that the victim [was] the first to assault accused.
"5. The honorable trial court erred in considering motive to
establish the guilt of the accused.
"6. The honorable court erred in convicting the accused-appellant
of murder instead of acquitting him or at most convicting him of
homicide."11
These issues boil down to four: (1) sufficiency of the prosecution's
evidence, (2) viability of self-defense, (3) appreciation of treachery as a
qualifying circumstance, and (4) propriety of the penalty and the damages
imposed by the trial court.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Sufficiency of the Prosecution's Evidence
Although appellant did not directly raise the sufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence as an issue, this Court nonetheless deliberated on it
motu proprio, because an automatic appeal in a criminal action opens the
whole case for review. Indeed, the strength of the prosecution's evidence
must be passed upon, especially in cases in which the death penalty has
been imposed by the trial court.12 We have carefully examined the A: Mr. Timoteo 'Tomy' Escarlos, the accused in this case, your
evidence for the prosecution and found that the fact of killing and the Honor.
identity of the killer were duly established beyond reasonable doubt.
Q: Will you please focus your eyes within this Honorable
Prosecution Witness Crisanto Balisacan, son of the victim, testified on the Court and tell us whether the person you said who stabbed your
stabbing incident, which had occurred during a benefit dance on that father by the name of Timoteo Escarlos is in the premises of this
fateful night of July 1, 2000. The witness' testimony is as follows: Honorable Court?

"COURT: A: Yes, sir.

You go to the main point. Q: Will you please stand up and point to him?

ATTY. VELASCO: A: The first one, your Honor (Witness is pointing unto a
person seated on the bench inside the courtroom, who, when his
While there, did you observe or did you see if there was name was asked, he answered Timoteo Escarlos).
any unusual incident that took place?
Q: How long have you been acquainted with the accused
A: Yes, your Honor. Timoteo Escarlos?

Q: What was that unusual incident you have seen and A: About ten years, your Honor.
observed?
Q: He is also from Domampot?
A: Stabbing incident, your Honor.
A: Yes, your Honor.
COURT:
Q: Considering that it is already about 9:20-9:30 o'clock in the
Who was stabbed? evening when this stabbing incident took place, how can you be
sure that it was Timoteo Escarlos who stabbed your father?
ATTY. VELASCO:
A: There was x x x light, your Honor.
Who was the victim of that stabbing?
Q: What kind of light are you trying to say?
A: My father.
A: 50–100 watts bulb.
Q: Who stabbed him?
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. VELASCO: Did you see the spot where your father was ATTY. VELASCO: When you heard shoutin[g], what did you do, if
actually stabbed? any?

A: Yes, sir. A: I turned my head to my back.

Q: How far is this place where your father was stabbed in Q: When you focused your attention and sight at your back,
relation to the entrance of the dance arena. what happened next?

A: About 5 to 6 meters at my back, your Honor. A: I saw stabbing. I saw my father stabbed by Timoteo
Escarlos, your Honor."13 (Italics supplied)
Q: And at that distance, what happened next while you were
watching? Undoubtedly, the factual premises with regard to the killing and its
commission by appellant are clear and undisputed. He did not at all deny
A: I heard shouting. the allegations against him and openly admitted that he had killed the
victim. However, he interposes self-defense to seek his exoneration from
Q: These shouting that you heard, where did they come from? criminal liability.

A: From my back. Second Issue:

xxx xxx xxx Plea of Self-Defense

COURT: What is that shouting about? In pleading self-defense, appellant asserts that it was the victim who
initially approached and assaulted him. Allegedly, the former had no choice
but to defend himself under the circumstances. In his testimony before the
ATTY. VELASCO: You heard shoutin[g], according to you, what did
trial court, he described the confrontation that had led to the fatal killing
you hear, if you know?
as follows:
A: About the incident.
"Q: And while you were there at the yard of Jaime Ulep on
that night of July 1, 2000 do you remember having seen the
COURT: Tell [us] exactly what you heard[.]
person of one Kgd. Antonio Balisacan?

A: I heard shouting, 'Ay!'

A: Yes, sir.

Q: How many people shouted, 'Ay'?

Q: And did he see you also?

A: Many, your Honor, because that was a benefit dance.

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And did you happen to see him? A: None, sir.

A: When he passed in front of me he uttered in a loud voice – Q: What happened later on when you answered Brgy. Kgd.
'you are here again to create trouble' (ADDA KA MANEN DITOY Antonio Balisacan?
NGA AGARAMID TI NILILOKO).
A: He said: 'OKINNAM KETDI' (vulva of your mother) and then
Q: To whom did Antonio Balisacan utter these words? he boxed me, sir.

A: I, sir. Q: Were you hit?

Q: And you said it was uttered in a loud manner, how far A: Yes, sir.
were you when he uttered these words?
Q: What part of your body was hit?
A: More or less 3 to 4 meters, sir.
A: This one on my forehead, sir. (Witness is pointing on his
Q: What did you say? forehead).

A: I was offended, sir. Q: Were you injured?

Q: And do you know the physical appearance of Antonio A: Yes, sir.

Balisacan when he mentioned those words to you?
Q: What injury did you suffer?
A: As if he was drunk, sir.
A: My forehead was injured (Witness is pointing a [to] a scar
Q: What made you say that as if he was drunk? on his forehead about an inch at the right above the right
eyecrow).
A: I smell his breath, sir.
Q: And what did you do after you were boxed by Antonio
Q: How did you react later when Antonio Balisacan uttered Balisacan?
those words to you?
A: When I intend to box him I noticed that he withdrew a
A: I said: 'Why do you say that to me when I am not doing any balisong and I tried to grab and used the balisong in stabbing, sir.
trouble here.'
xxx xxx xxx
Q: By the way, when Antonio Balisacan said those words to
you, were you doing anything that time? COURT:
 How many times did you stab him? The implications of pleading self-defense insofar as the burden of proof is
concerned was explained by the Court in Macalino v. People,17 from which
A: Two times but when he was about to fall down I was able we quote:
to hit him once for the third time, sir.
"In pleading self-defense, petitioner in effect admitted that he
Q: You said that he drew a knife, where did he draw the stabbed the victim. It was then incumbent upon him to prove that
knife? justifying circumstance to the satisfaction of the court, relying on
the strength of his evidence and not on the weakness of the
A: At his left side, sir. prosecution. The reason is that even if the prosecution evidence
were weak, such could not be disbelieved after petitioner
admitted the fact of stabbing the victim."18
Q: What kind of weapon did he draw?

A: I sized it to be a kitchen knife, sir.
Q: Could you tell the Honorable Court the length of that knife
to include the handle?
A: 10 to 12 inches, sir.
Q: And how did you grapple for the possession of that knife?
A: I was able to hold the handle of the kitchen knife, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q: What prompted you to stab him considering that you
already got hold [of] the knife from him?
A: Yes, sir, because he intend[ed] to stab me, so, when I had
possession of the knife I stabbed him, sir."14 (Italics supplied)
We stress that when the accused invokes self-defense, the burden of proof
is shifted from the prosecution to the defense. Thus, the latter assumes
the responsibility of establishing this plea by clear and convincing
evidence.15Upon its shoulders rests the duty of proving, to the satisfaction
of the trial court, the justifying circumstance of self-defense.16
The accused who avers that the killing arose from an impulse of self-
defense has the onus probandi of proving the elements thereof. 19 The
essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense.20 Verily, to
invoke self-defense successfully, there must have been an unlawful and
unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then
forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing
reasonable means to resist the attack.21
Unlawful Aggression on the Part of the Victim
In the present case, appellant claims that there was unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim when the latter unceremoniously boxed him on the
forehead in the heat of their argument. Appellant adds that he had initially
thought of hitting back when he noticed that the victim was pulling out a
kitchen knife. Hence, to save his life, the former grabbed the weapon and
used it to stab the latter. Appellant insists that under the circumstances, he
was legally justified in using the knife to ward off the unlawful aggression.
For him to wait for the knife to be raised and to fall on him before acting to
defend himself would be asking too much, he argues.
The contentions of appellant are untenable. While the victim may be said
to have initiated the confrontation, we do not subscribe to the view that
the former was subjected to an unlawful aggression within the legal
meaning of the phrase.
The alleged assault did not come as a surprise, as it was preceded by a
heated exchange of words between the two parties who had a history of
animosity. Moreover, the alleged drawing of a knife by the victim could not
have placed the life of appellant in imminent danger. The former might
have done it only to threaten or intimidate the latter.
Unlawful aggression presupposes actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent
danger -- not merely threatening and intimidating action.22 Uncertain,
premature and speculative was the assertion of appellant that the victim
was about to stab him, when the latter had merely drawn out his knife.
There is aggression, only when the one attacked faces real and immediate
threat to one's life. The peril sought to be avoided must be imminent and
actual, not just speculative.23
Even assuming arguendo that there was an altercation before the stabbing
incident and that some danger did in fact exist, the imminence of that
danger had already ceased the moment appellant disarmed the victim by
wresting the knife from the latter. After the former had successfully seized
it, there was no longer any unlawful aggression to speak of that would
have necessitated the need to kill the latter. Hence, appellant became the
unlawful aggressor when he stabbed the victim. 24
When an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who
resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even to wound the former
aggressor.25 To be sure, when the present victim no longer persisted in his
purpose or action to the extent that the object of his attack was no longer
in peril, there was no more unlawful aggression that would warrant legal
self-defense on the part of appellant.26 Undoubtedly, the latter went
beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict excessive,
atrocious and fatal injuries on the latter, even when the allegedly unlawful
aggression had already ceased.
Reasonable Necessity of the Means Employed to Prevent or Repel the
Attack
Appellant argues that in the heat of the encounter, he was not in a position
to calculate or determine the effects of his blows, and that it was
nevertheless necessary for him to inflict them in order to save his own life.
As correctly held by the trial court, the nature, the number and the
location of the wounds inflicted upon the victim were important indicia
disproving self-defense.27 The claim of appellant that only two of the four
stab wounds were fatal is of no moment, inasmuch as the means he
employed was glaringly disproportionate to the perceived unlawful
aggression. He admitted in his testimony that he had stabbed the victim
for the third time, even when the latter was about to fall.
The means employed by a person invoking self-defense must be
reasonably commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack
sought to be averted, as held by the Court in People v. Obordo:28
"Even assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim, accused-appellant likewise failed to prove
that the means he employed to repel Homer's punch was
reasonable. The means employed by the person invoking self-
defense contemplates a rational equivalence between the means
of attack and the defense. Accused-appellant claimed that the
victim punched him and was trying to get something from his
waist, so he (accused-appellant) stabbed the victim with his
hunting knife. His act of immediately stabbing Homer and
inflicting a wound on a vital part of the victim's body was
unreasonable and unnecessary considering that, as alleged by
accused-appellant himself, the victim used his bare fist in
throwing a punch at him."29
Indeed, the means employed by a person resorting to self-defense must be
rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. 30
Unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua non for upholding the justifying
circumstance of self-defense.31 Unless the victim has committed unlawful
aggression against the other, there can be no self-defense, complete or
incomplete, on the part of the latter. If there is nothing to prevent or repel, circumstance of treachery had not been clearly established. Thus, the
the other two requisites of self-defense will have no basis.32 Court declared:

Third Issue: "However, we agree with the OSG's recommendation that

appellant be held liable only for homicide, not murder. In this
Appreciation of Qualifying Circumstances case, the qualifying circumstance of treachery was not
conclusively established. For treachery to exist, the following
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an requisites must be met: (1) that at the time of the attack, the
aggressor without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, thus victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) that the
depriving the latter of any real chance to put up a defense, and thereby offender consciously adopted the particular means, method or
ensuring the commission of the attack without risk to the form of attack employed by him. The facts show that Edmundo
aggressor.33 Treachery requires the concurrence of two conditions: (1) the was placed on guard concerning a possible assault by Pedro. First,
employment of a means of execution that gives the person attacked no there was a heated argument between them at the place of the
opportunity for self-defense or retaliation; and (2) the deliberate and wake. Second, Edmundo was not unaware that he and Rolando
conscious adoption of the means of execution.34 were followed outside by appellant, who did not adopt any means
to conceal himself or hide his intention of confronting Edmundo.
Third, the abrasions and contusions on Edmundo's face show that
There is no treachery when the assault is preceded by a heated exchange
Edmundo was able to put up a fight before he was fatally stabbed.
of words between the accused and the victim; or when the victim is aware
These circumstances negate the existence of treachery in the
of the hostility of the assailant towards the former.35
commission of the offense."41
In the instant case, the verbal and physical squabble prior to the attack
As in People v. Cariño, the Office of the Solicitor General recommended in
proves that there was no treachery, and that the victim was aware of the
this case that appellant be convicted of homicide only, inasmuch as the
imminent danger to his life.36 Moreover, the prosecution failed to establish
qualifying circumstance of treachery had not been sufficiently
that appellant had deliberately adopted a treacherous mode of attack for
established.42
the purpose of depriving the victim of a chance to fight or retreat. 37

The trial court correctly ruled that the qualifying circumstance of evident
Certainly, the victim knew that his scuffle with appellant could eventually
premeditation was not present in the killing. Essentially, there is evident
turn into a violent physical clash. The existence of a struggle before the
premeditation when the execution of a criminal act is preceded by cool
fatal blows were inflicted on the victim clearly shows that he was
thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out a criminal intent
forewarned of the impending attack, and that he was afforded the
within a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.43 Obviously,
opportunity to put up a defense. 38 Indeed, a killing done at the spur of the
the acts of appellant in the present case can hardly be described as a
moment is not treacherous. Moreover, any doubt as to the existence of
product of reflective thought or deliberate planning towards a decisive
treachery must be resolved in favor of the accused.39
resolve to kill the victim. On the contrary, the confrontation that escalated
to a violent brawl was quite spontaneous, casual and incidental. Verily, the
In People v. Cariño,40 we modified the trial court's decision and ruled that
brutal killing was not the result of a previous plot or sinister design to end
the crime committed was only homicide, because the qualifying
the life of the victim.
The elements of evident premeditation are as follows: (a) the time when
the accused decided to commit the crime; (b) an overt act manifestly
indicating that the accused clung to the determination to commit the
crime; and (c) the lapse of a period of time, between the determination
and the subsequent execution of the crime, sufficient to allow the accused
an opportunity to reflect upon the consequences of the act. 44 As found by
the trial court, the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to
establish any of the foregoing requisites. To be sure, when there is no
showing how and when the plan to kill was decided or how much time had
elapsed before the crime was carried out, there is no evident
premeditation.45
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is MODIFIED. Appellant is held guilty of
homicide and sentenced to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prison mayor
medium, as minimum; to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and (1) day
of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum. He shall also pay the heirs of
the victim the amounts of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P28,650 as actual
damages, consistent with prevailing jurisprudence.[49] The grant of moral
and exemplary damages is DELETED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

In a criminal prosecution -- especially in cases involving the extreme

penalty of death -- nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt of every
fact necessary to constitute the crime with which the accused is charged
must be established.46

Fourth Issue:

Proper Penalty and Award of Damages

Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for homicide is
reclusion temporal. There being neither mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance, the appropriate penalty should be reclusion temporal in its
medium period. Appellant is likewise entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law.

The trial court awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000, but
failed to award P50,000 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim.
Moral damages cannot be granted in the absence of proof
therefor.47 Unlike in rape cases, this type of award is not automatically
given in murder or homicide. The prosecution was, however, able to prove
actual damages in the sum of P28,650. The award of exemplary damages
should be omitted considering that no aggravating circumstance was duly
proven.48