Consti2 Case Digests - Midterm

Constitutional Law 2
Midterm Reviewer
Case Digests – Doctrines / Rulings Only
Stephanie Rose S. Marcelino, CPA
I. Police Power
Goldenway v Equitable PCI
The purpose of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution is to safeguard the integrity of contracts
against unwarranted interference by the State. As a rule, contracts should not be tampered with by
subsequent laws that would change or modify the rights and obligations of the parties. Impairment is
anything that diminishes the efficacy of the contract. There is impairment if a subsequent law changes the
terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or
withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties.
The freedom to contract is not absolute; all contracts and all rights are subject to the police power of
the State and not only may regulations which affect them be established by the State, but all such
regulations must be subject to change from time to time, as the general well-being of the community may
require, or as the circumstances may change, or as experience may demonstrate the necessity. Settled is
the rule that the non-impairment clause of the Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes targeted by the
Government. The right granted by this provision must submit to the demands and necessities of the
State's power of regulation. Such authority to regulate businesses extends to the banking industry
which, as this Court has time and again emphasized, is undeniably imbued with public interest.
MMDA v Viron
Under the provision of E.O. No. 125 as amended, it is the DOTC and not the MMDA which is authorized
to establish and implement the project. Thus the President must exercise the authority through the
instrumentality of the DOTC which is the PRIMARY implementing and administrative entity in the promotion,
development, and regulation of the networks of transportation and the one so authorizes to establish and
implement the project.
Even assuming arguendo that Police Power was delegated to the MMDA, its exercise of such power does
not satisfy the Two Sets of Police Power Measure:
1. the interest of the public welfare, and

2. he means employed.
Stated differently, the police power legislation must be firmly grounded on PUBLIC INTEREST / WELFARE
and a reasonable relation between the purpose and the means.
ES v Forerunner
There is no doubt that the issuance of the ban to protect the domestic industry is a reasonable exercise
of police power. The deterioration of the local motor manufacturing firms due to the influx of imported used
motor vehicles is an urgent national concern that needs to be swiftly addressed by the President. In the
exercise of delegated police power, the Executive can therefore validly proscribe the importation of these
vehicles.
OSG v Ayala Land
OSG is actually invoking police power to justify the regulation by the State. The Court finds, however, that
in totally prohibiting respondents from collecting parking fees, the State would be acting beyond the
bounds of police power.
Police power is the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty
and property. It is usually exerted in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of the property
of the owner. The power to regulate, however, does not include the power to prohibit and confiscate
except in the cases of illegally possessed articles which should be destroyed to protect peace and
order.
Midterm Reviewer
When there is a taking or confiscation of private property for public use, the State is no longer
exercising police power, but another of its inherent powers, namely, eminent domain. Eminent domain
enables the State to forcibly acquire private lands intended for public use upon payment of just
compensation to the owner.
The total prohibition against the collection by respondents of parking fees from persons who use the mall
parking facilities has no basis in the National Building Code or its IRR. The State also cannot impose the
same prohibition by generally invoking police power, since said prohibition amounts to a taking of
respondents’ property without payment of just compensation.
Fernando v St. Scholastica’s College
Police Power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and ordinances to promote
health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people.
The test of a valid ordinance must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact and pass
according to the procedure prescribed by law, but it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements:
1. Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

2. Must not be unfair or oppressive;
3. Must not be partial or discriminatory;
4. Must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5. Must be general and consistent with public policy;
6. Must not be unreasonable;
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police power
only if the following requisites are met:
1. Lawful Subject: The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular
class, require its exercise
2. Lawful Method: The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals
The court is of the view that the implementation of the setback requirement would be tantamount to
taking of respondents private property for public use without just compensation in contravention to the
Constitution.
United BF Homewoners v City Mayor
The constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of contracts is limited by the exercise of the police
power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare.
Invariably described as "the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers" and "in a sense, the
greatest and most powerful attribute of government," the exercise of the power may be judicially
inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having
been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee.
Surneco v ERC
The contract between NEA and ADB must yield to the greater authority of the State’s exercise of
police power. As a legislative power, police power is adopted by a State to promote the health, morals,
peace, education, good order, safety, and general welfare of the people. This must prevail not only over
future contracts but even over those already in existence.
Midterm Reviewer
PBOAP v DOLE
DO 118-12 and MC 2012-001 are in the nature of social legislations to enhance the economic status
of bus drivers and conductors, and to promote the general welfare of the riding public. Therefore, they are
reasonable and are not violative of due process, equal protection, and non-impairment of obligation of
contracts.
Due process (not violative)
Notice and hearing are not required when an administrative agency exercises its quasi-legislative
power. The reason is that in the exercise of quasi-legislative power, the administrative agency makes no
determination of past events or facts. Essentially, substantive due process is satisfied if the
deprivation is done in the exercise of the police power of the State.
Non-impairment of obligation of contracts (no violation)
A statute passed to protect labor is a legitimate exercise of police power although it incidentally destroys
existing contract rights. Laws regulating public utilities are valid police power legislations. Not only does
DO 118-12 aim to uplift the economic status of bus drivers and conductors; it also promotes road and traffic
safety. Further, certificates of public convenience granted to bus operators are subject to
amendment.
Zabal v Duterte
"Expansive and extensive as its reach may be, police power is not a force without limits. "It has to be
exercised within bounds - lawful ends through lawful means, i.e., that the interests of the public generally,
as distinguished from that of a particular class, require its exercise, and that the means employed are
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose while not being unduly oppressive upon
individuals."
Certainly, the closure of Boracay, albeit temporarily, gave the island its much needed breather, and likewise
afforded the government the necessary leeway in its rehabilitation program. It was the most practical and
realistic means of ensuring that rehabilitation works in the island are started and carried out in the most
efficacious and expeditious way. Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion,
unreasonableness, arbitrariness or oppressiveness, the Court will not disturb the executive
determination that the closure of Boracay was necessitated by the foregoing circumstances. As
earlier noted, petitioners totally failed to counter the factual bases of, and justification for the challenged
executive action.
JSMI v SSS
Equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or
things without distinction. It simply requires equality among equals as determined according to a
valid classification. Such classification must pass the test of reasonableness. Gutierrez v DBM
enumerated the following requirements:
1. It must rest of substantial distinctions

2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law
3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only
4. It must apply equally to all members of the same class
Substantial distinction:
There is substantial distinction between the sea-based and land-based OFWs. Seafarers constitute a
unique classification of OFWs. All seafarers have only one standard contract, which provides for the rights
and obligations of the foreign ship owner, the seafarer and the manning agencies. It outlines all the duties
and responsibilities of the foreign ship owners, manning agencies, and seafarers. Standardized contractual
arrangement is possible because they all have similarity of circumstances relating to work. They face the
same perils and predicaments and enjoy the same benefits.
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Contrary thereto, the land-based OFWs do not have singular or uniform employment contract because of
the variety of work they perform. Their contract depends on the nature of their employment and their place
of work.
Reasonableness of classification; germane to the purpose of law:
Sec 9-B simply reiterates the provision in other existing laws and regulations. Sec 1 of the 2010 POEA-
SEC provides that the principal foreign ship owner has the primary duty to extend SSS coverage to
seafarers. Nevertheless, the 2016 POEA Rules, which governs the recruitment and employment of
seafarers, state that manning agencies assume joint and several liability with the employer/ship
owner/principal for all claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with the implementation of the
contract. Necessarily, this includes claims arising out of the SSS coverage and contributions in favor of
seafarers. If the principal foreign ship owner fails to pay the SSS contributions, then the joint and several
liability of the manning agencies can be invoked.
This joint and several liability provisions only echoes the provision under Sec 10 of RA 8042 “Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act”. This was not created out of thin air.
The law does not violate the right against infringement of contract:
The constitutional right to inviolability of contract is not absolute. It is subject to the proper exercise of the
police power. Under the Civil Code, labor contacts are impressed with public interest and must yield to the
common good. The State reasonably exercise its police power. The new rate increases are imposed
gradually and are rationally shouldered by both the employer and seafarer. The petitioners failed to show
that such increases are unreasonable and would cause significant economic damages and liabilities to the
stakeholders and the entire maritime industry.
The increased rate is in line with the State’s objective to establish, develop, promote and perfect a sound a
viable tax-exempt social security system suitable to the needs of the Filipino citizens which shall promote
social justice through savings and ensure meaningful social security protection to members and their
beneficiaries against hazards of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies
resulting in loss of income or financial burden.
Masanglay v People
Section 68 or even Section 77 covers any type of land so long as timber or other forest products were
taken therefrom, regardless of an accused's property interests in the land, when the taking was done
without any authority granted by the State.
Verily, State regulation of the utilization of forest lands cuts above ownership rights. This is in line with
the police power of the State and its obligation to the entire nation to promote, protect, and defend its right
to a healthy and clean environment and ecology as a third-generation collective right. It can cover both
public and private lands as well as ancestral domains which are sui generis or unique.
Parens Patriae
Hand-in-hand with police power in the promotion of general welfare is the doctrine of parens patriae. It
focuses on the role of the state as a "sovereign" and expresses the inherent power and authority of the
state to provide protection of the person and property of a person non sui juris.
Under the doctrine, the state has the sovereign power of guardianship over persons of disability, and
in the execution of the doctrine the legislature is possessed of inherent power to provide protection to
persons non sui juris and to make and enforce rules and regulations as it deems proper for the management
of their property.
Doctrine of Public Trust
While the Regalian doctrine is state ownership over natural resources, police power is state regulation
through legislation, and parens patriae is the default state responsibility to look after the defenseless, there
remains a limbo on a flexible state policy bringing these doctrines into a cohesive whole, enshrining the
Midterm Reviewer
objects of public interest, and backing the security of the people, rights, and resources from general neglect,
private greed, and even from the own excesses of the State. We fill this void through the Public Trust
Doctrine.
In this framework, a relationship is formed — "the state is the trustee, which manages specific natural
resources for the trust principal for the benefit of the current and future generations — the beneficiaries."
“The State has an affirmative duty to take the public trust into account in the planning and allocation of
water resources, and to protect public trust uses whenever feasible." But with the birth of privatization of
many basic utilities, including the supply of water, this has proved to be quite challenging. The State is in a
continuing battle against lurking evils that has afflicted even itself, such as the excessive pursuit of profit
rather than purely the public's interest.
II. Eminent Domain
Republic v Samson
Petitioners may be allowed to present evidence to assert its ownership over the subject property, but
for the sole purpose of determining who is entitled to just compensation.
Expropriation, or the exercise of the State's right to eminent domain, is proscribed by the restraints of
public use and just compensation.
It has been held that, the existence of doubt or obscurity in the title of the person or persons claiming
ownership of the properties to be expropriated would not preclude the commencement of the action
nor prevent the court from assuming jurisdiction thereof. The Rules merely require, in such eventuality,
that the entity exercising the right of eminent domain should state in the complaint that the true ownership
of the property cannot be ascertained or specified with accuracy.
The attempt of the petitioner to present evidence cannot be characterized as an "attack." It must be
emphasized that the objective of the case is to appropriate private property, and the contest on private
respondents' title arose only as an incident to the issue of whom should be rightly compensated.
EPZA v Pulido
Compensation cannot be just to the owner in the case of property that is immediately taken unless
there is prompt payment, considering that the owner thereby immediately suffers not only the loss of his
property but also the loss of its fruits or income. Thus, in addition, the owner is entitled to legal interest
from the time of the taking of the property until the actual payment in order to place the owner in a
position as good as, but not better than, the position he was in before the taking occurred.
It is arbitrary and capricious for a government agency to initiate expropriation proceedings, seize a person’s
property, allow a judgment of the court to become final and executory and then refuse to pay on the ground
that there are no appropriations for the property earlier taken and profitably used.
Yusay v CA
A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely
a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses
a general and permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are
enacted differently -- a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution.
Section 19. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting
pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare
for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of... just compensation, pursuant to the provisions
of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be
exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer
was not accepted:
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Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take possession of the property
upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court
of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on... the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided, finally, That, the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time
of the taking of the property." (Emphasis... supplied)
Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an LGU can exercise the power of
eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief executive, on
behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation proceedings
over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of
the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9 Article III of the Constitution
and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought to be
expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
Republic v Rural Bank
In expropriation proceedings, just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property
taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's gain, but the owner's loss. The
word "just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey thereby the
idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and
ample.
The constitutional limitation of "just compensation" is considered to be a sum equivalent to the market
value of the property, broadly defined as the price fixed by the seller in open market in the usual and
ordinary course of legal action and competition; or the fair value of the property; as between one who
receives and one who desires to sell it, fixed at the time of the actual taking by the government.
There is no legal basis to separate the value of the excavated soil from that of the expropriated
properties, contrary to what the trial court did. In the context of expropriation proceedings, the soil has no
value separate from that of the expropriated land. Just compensation ordinarily refers to the value of
the land to compensate for what the owner actually loses. Such value could only be that which prevailed at
the time of the taking.
LBP v Libioco
For purposes of just compensation, the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its
character and its price at the time of taking. There are three important concepts in this definition—the
character of the property, its price, and the time of actual taking.
The potential use of a property should not be the principal criterion for determining just compensation
for this will be contrary to the well-settled doctrine that the fair market value of an expropriated property is
determined by its character and its price at the time of taking, not its potential uses.
The “time of taking” is the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property.
Sec. 17 of RA 6657: — In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current
value of the like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered.
LBP v Escandor
The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. The DAR’s valuation is only preliminary
and not final and conclusive. The court has the final say.
Midterm Reviewer
The CARP vested to the RTC, sitting as SAC, original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for
determination of just compensation. RTC do not exercise mere appellate jurisdiction over just compensation
disputes.
Since the lands were placed under land reform after effectivity of RA 6657, said law governs the awarding
of just compensation. DAR issued AO No. 06 series of 1992, as amended by DAR AO No. 11, series of
1994 and further amended by AO No. 05 series of 1998, in recognition of its rule-making power to carry out
RA 6657. In the case at bar, the SAC based its valuation upon a different formula and not the formula
outline in the AO. The formula should be:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)

LV = Land Value
CNI – Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
NTC v Oroville
The landmark case of Republic v. Vda. De Castello provides an enlightening discourse on the requisites
of taking.
1. First, The expropriator must enter a private property;

2. Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period;
3. Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority;
4. Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected; and
5. Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
"Inverse condemnation is a cause of action against a governmental defendant to recover the value of
property which has been taken in fact by the governmental defendant, even though no formal exercise of
the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. While the typical taking occurs
when the government acts to condemn property in the exercise of its power of eminent domain, the entire
doctrine of inverse condemnation is predicated on the proposition that a taking may occur without such
formal proceedings. The phrase "inverse condemnation," as a common understanding of that phrase would
suggest, simply describes an action that is the "inverse" or "reverse" of a condemnation proceeding."
We rule that the reckoning value is the value at the time of the filing of the complaint, as the RTC
provided in its decision. Compensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either
when NPC entered or when it completed the tunnel, as NPC submits, would not be just, for it would
compound the gross unfairness already caused to the owners by NPC’s entering without the intention of
formally expropriating the land, and without the prior knowledge and consent of the Heirs of Macabangkit.
NPC’s entry denied elementary due process of law to the owners since then until the owners commenced
the inverse condemnation proceedings. The Court is more concerned with the necessity to prevent NPC
from unjustly profiting from its deliberate acts of denying due process of law to the owners. As a measure
of simple justice and ordinary fairness to them, therefore, reckoning just compensation on the value at the
time the owners commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is entirely warranted.
Republic v JGCDHAI
Eminent domain is the inherent power of a nation or a sovereign state to take, or sanction the taking of,
private property for a public use without the owner's consent, conditioned upon payment of just
compensation. In other words, eminent domain is a coercive measure on the part of the state whereby
private interests are impaired for the general welfare.
While eminent domain is an inherent power, it is not absolute such that it is subject to limitations imposed
under the 1987 Constitution. Section 1, Article III provides that no person shall be deprived of property
without due process of law, while Section 9 thereof states that private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation. These constitutionally enshrined restrictions ensure that private individuals
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are not unduly prejudiced by the capricious or oppressive exercise of the State's powers. Thus, in order for
the State to exercise its power of eminent domain, the following requirements must be present:
1. that it is for a particular purpose; and
2. that just compensation is paid to the property owner.
Essentially, expropriation is an involuntary sale where the landowner is practically an unwilling seller.
Provided all the requisites for its exercise are present, a private individual cannot resist the state's exercise
of its inherent power of eminent domain. Nevertheless, there is nothing that precludes the government from
entering into a negotiated sale with a private landowner to acquire a property to be devoted for a public
purpose. In fact, expropriation proceedings or court intervention would be unnecessary should a deed of
sale be executed where the parties come to an agreement as to the price of the property to be sold.
Republic v Goloyuco
In Capitol Steel Corporation v. PHIVIDEC Industrial Authority, the Court clarified that the payment of the
provisional value as a condition for the issuance of a writ of possession is different from the payment
of just compensation for the expropriated property. While the provisional value is based on the current
relevant zonal valuation, just compensation is based on the prevailing fair market value of the property.
In that case, the Court agreed with the CA's explanation that:
The first refers to the preliminary or provisional determination of the value of the property. It serves a
double-purpose of pre-payment if the property is fully expropriated, and of an indemnity for damages if
the proceedings are dismissed. It is not a final determination of just compensation and may not
necessarily be equivalent to the prevailing fair market value of the property. Of course, it may be a factor
to be considered in the determination of just compensation.
City of Manila v Prieto
The LGU’s exercise of the power of eminent domain is only a delegated authority. It has no inherent
power of eminent domain. Such power is essentially lodged in the legislature. LGU’s power of eminent
domain is not eminent but inferior since it must conform with the limits imposed by the principal.
The LGC provides for the requisites which must concur before an LGU may exercise this power:
1. An ordinance is enacted authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the
power of eminent domain.
2. It must be exercised for public purpose or welfare.
3. There must be a payment of just compensation.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner but the latter did not accept.
Furthermore, being a delegated power, the exercise should be pursuant to the Constitution and pertinent
laws. In the case at bar, the pertinent law is RA 7279 or the law that governs that local expropriation of
properties for purposes of urban land reform and housing. Under Section 9 of the said law, it is stated that
lands for socialized housing shall be acquired in the following order:
1. Those owned by government and any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, etc.

2. Alienable lands of public domain
3. Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands
4. Those within the declared areas or priority development, zonal improvement program sites, slum
improvement and resettlement program not yet acquired
5. Bagong Lipunan Improvement Sites and Services not yet acquired
6. Privately-owned lands
Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous, the above order shall not apply.
Under Section 10, it states that expropriation shall be resorted to only when other modes of
acquisition have been exhausted.
Midterm Reviewer
MORE v PECO
The power of eminent domain is exercised by the Legislature. However, it may be delegated by
congress to the President, administrative bodies, local government units, and even to private
enterprises performing public services.
Requisites for a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain are present:
1. The property taken must be private property;

2. There must be genuine necessity to take private property;
3. The taking must be for public use;
4. There must be payment of just compensation; and
5. The taking must comply with due process of law.
It is settled that a property already devoted to public use can still be subject to expropriation, provided
this is done directly by the national legislature or under a specific grant of authority to a delegate.
The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of
a public character.
As a rule, the determination of whether there is genuine necessity for the exercise is a justiciable question.
However, when the power is exercised by the Legislature, the question of necessity is essentially a matter
that the legislature can decide and determine.
Public use is now synonymous with public interest. “Whatever is beneficially employed for the general
welfare satisfies the requirement of public use”
III. Taxation
Planters v Fertiphil
The imposition of the levy provided under LOI 1465 is an exercise by the State of its power of taxation
because the primary purpose of the levy is revenue generation. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if
revenue is, at least, one of the real and substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax.
Taxes are exacted only for a public purpose. It would be robbery for the State to tax its citizens and
use such funds generated for private purpose.
Public purpose is the heart of a tax law. When a tax law is only a mask to exact funds from the public when
its true intent is to give undue benefit and advantage to a private enterprise, that law will not satisfy the
requirement of “public purpose.”
Jurisprudence states the test as follows:

1. the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of particular class, requires its
exercise; and
2. the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Cojuangco v Republic
Based on its definition, a tax has three elements, namely:
a. it is an enforced proportional contribution from persons and properties;

b. it is imposed by the State by virtue of its sovereignty; and
c. it is levied for the support of the government. The coconut levy funds fall squarely into these
elements
Midterm Reviewer
The Court has also recently declared that the coco-levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only be
used for public purpose. The levy itself is constitutional. However, what was done to the funds was
unconstitutional.
It is at once apparent that any property acquired by means of the coconut levy funds, such as the subject
UCPB shares, should be treated as public funds or public property, subject to the burdens and restrictions
attached by law to such property. The government cannot also give back the shares to the farmers. It
must only belong to the government for public use.
MIAA v City of Pasay
“MIAA is neither a stock nor a non-stock corporation, MIAA does not qualify as a government-owned or
controlled corporation. MIAA is a government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform
efficiently its governmental functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality, the only difference
is that MIAA is vested with corporate powers. . . .”
“When the law vests in a government instrumentality corporate powers, the instrumentality does
not become a corporation. Unless the government instrumentality is organized as a stock or non-
stock corporation, it remains a government instrumentality.
Thus, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but a government instrumentality which
is exempt from any kind of tax from the local governments. Indeed, the exercise of the taxing power of
local government units is subject to the limitations enumerated in Section 133 of the Local Government
Code. Under Section 133 (o) of the Local Government Code, local government units have no power to tax
instrumentalities of the national government like the MIAA. Hence, MIAA is not liable to pay real property
tax for the NAIA Pasay properties.
Furthermore, the airport lands and buildings of MIAA are properties of public dominion intended for
public use, and as such are exempt from real property tax under Section 234 (a) of the Local
Government Code. However, under the same provision, if MIAA leases its real property to a taxable
person, the specific property leased becomes subject to real property tax. In this case, only those
portions of the NAIA Pasay properties which are leased to taxable persons like private parties are subject
to real property tax by the City of Pasay.
CIR v TPI
The tax amnesty is a general pardon by the State to impose penalties on persons otherwise guilty
of evasion or violation of a revenue or tax law. It is an absolute forgiveness or waiver by the government
of its right to collect what is due it and to give tax evaders who wish to relent a chance to start with a clean
slate. Much like a tax exemption, an amnesty must be construed strictly against the taxpayer and
liberally in favor of the taxing authority.
There is no express provision in RA 9480 which states that taxpayers with delinquent accounts shall be
excluded from the enjoyment of the tax amnesty program.
Expressio unius est exclusion alterius. In implementing the amnesty, the CIR cannot insert an exception
that is not provided by the law. The rule-making power of administrative agencies cannot be extended to
amend or expand statutory requirements or to embrace matters not originally encompassed by the law.
The assessments have already been extinguished by TPI’s compliance with the requirements for tax
amnesty under RA 9480. It is absurd and unjust that BIR still issues a WDAL despite that the taxpayer
already availed of the amnesty.
Midterm Reviewer
IV. Due Process of Law
City of Manila v Laguio
Constitutional safeguard of due process furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should
conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.
The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and
property of individuals; to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the powers of the
government, unrestrained by the established principles of private rights and distributive justice; to protect
property from confiscation by legislative enactments, from seizure, forfeiture, and destruction without a trial
and conviction by the ordinary mode of judicial procedure; and to secure to all persons equal and impartial
justice and the benefit of the general law.
Two separate limits on the government:
1. Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it
deprives a person of life, liberty, or property. Classic procedural due process issues are concerned
with what kind of notice and what form of hearing the government must provide when it takes a
particular action.
2. Substantive due process asks whether the government has an adequate reason for taking away
a person's life, liberty, or property. It looks whether there is a sufficient justification for the
government's action.
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of
the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law.
Police power must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive
of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police
measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting
the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to
be arbitrarily invaded.
Ylaya v Gacott
The most basic tenet of due process is the right to be heard. Denial of due process means the total
lack of opportunity to be heard or to have one's day in court. As a rule, no denial of due process takes place
where a party has been given an opportunity to be heard and to present his case; what is prohibited is
the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard.
In Samalio v. Court of Appeals, due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type
proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where the opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or through pleadings, is accorded, no denial of procedural due process takes place. The
requirements of due process are satisfied where the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain their side of the controversy at hand.
Moreover, "any seeming defect in the observance of due process is cured by the filing of a motion for
reconsideration. Denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who has had the
opportunity to be heard on his motion for reconsideration.
Arroyo v DOJ
Preliminary investigation can be considered as a kind of judicial proceeding wherein the prosecutor, by
nature, acts as quasi-judicial officer.
In recent cases, fact-finding requires the presence of substantive and procedural due process.
In the case at bar, there are two separate teams – the fact finding team and the preliminary investigator.
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Publication is not required because DOJ and COMELEC are both governed by their own rules which has
long been published.
The procedure in conducting the preliminary investigation is governed by Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure. Under both Rules, the respondent
shall submit his counter-affidavit and that of his witnesses and other supporting documents relied upon for
his defense, within ten (10) days from receipt of the subpoena, with the complaint and supporting affidavits
and documents. Also in both Rules, respondent is given the right to examine evidence, but such right
of examination is limited only to the documents or evidence submitted by complainants which she
may not have been furnished and to copy them at her expense.
Mortel v Kerr
As a rule, a client is bound by his counsel’s conduct, negligence and mistake in handling a case.
But this rule admits of exception. In many cases decided by the Court in the past, it held that a case may
be reopened after finding that negligence of the counsel had deprived the client of his day in court, thereby
also depriving him of his property without due process of law. This is the case when counsel’s negligence
was so gross and palpable.
The negligence and mistakes of his counsels were so gross and palpable that they denied due process to
Mortel and could have cost him his property. They prevented him from presenting his side which was highly
unfair and unjust. He stated that he already paid the principal loan and interest and this could be confirmed
in court through testimony of bank representative.
The counsels are thereby held guilty of gross ignorance, negligence and dereliction in a damage suit. The
lower court was ordered to re-open the civil case.
UP v Dizon
Unlike in pleadings where ultimate facts alone need to be stated, the Constitution and the Rules of Court
require not only that a decision should state the ultimate facts but also that it should specify the
supporting evidentiary facts, for they are what are called the findings of fact.
The importance of the findings of fact and of law cannot be overstated. The reason and purpose of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court in that regard are obviously to inform the parties why they win or
lose, and what their rights and obligations are. Only thereby is the demand of due process met as to the
parties. As Justice Isagani A. Cruz explained in Nicos Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals:
It is a requirement of due process that the parties to a litigation be informed of how it was decided, with an
explanation of the factual and legal reasons that led to the conclusions of the court. The court cannot simply
say that judgment is rendered in favor of X and against Y and just leave it at that without any justification
whatsoever for its action. The losing party is entitled to know why he lost, so he may appeal to a higher
court, if permitted, should he believe that the decision should be reversed. A decision that does not clearly
and distinctly state the facts and the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to how it was
reached and is especially prejudicial to the losing party, who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the
court for review by a higher tribunal
Perez v Spouses Madrona
For injunction to issue, two requisites must concur:

1. There must be a right to be protected and
2. The acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right.
Respondents’ fence is not a nuisance per se. By its nature, it is not injurious to the health or comfort of the
community. It was built primarily to secure the property of respondents and prevent intruders from entering
it. And as correctly pointed out by respondents, the sidewalk still exists. If petitioner believes that
respondents’ fence indeed encroaches on the sidewalk, it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that
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purpose. Not being a nuisance per se, but at most a nuisance per accidens, its summary abatement
without judicial intervention is unwarranted.
People v Sandiganbayan
No, the state is not denied its right to due process
In People v. Leviste, we stressed that the State, like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court; in
criminal proceedings, the public prosecutor acts for and represents the State, and carries the burden
of diligently pursuing the criminal prosecution in a manner consistent with public interest, The State’s right
to be heard in court rests to a large extent on whether the public prosecutor properly undertook his duties
in pursuing the criminal action for the punishment of the guilty.
When can a State be said to have been denied due process?
1. the public prosecutor rested the case knowing fully well that the evidence adduced was insufficient;
2. the refusal of the public prosecutor to present other witnesses available to take the stand;
3. the knowledge of the trial court of the insufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence when the demurrer
to evidence was filed before it; and
4. the trial court’s failure to require the presentation of additional evidence before it acted on the
demurrer to evidence.
OCA v Indar
It is settled that technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative
proceedings. Thus, administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial
sense. It is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided.
Otherwise stated, in the application of the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is
not lack of previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.
White Light v City of Manila
Due process has limited the seemingly limitless scope of police power. Based on substantive due
process grounds, the general test of validity of an ordinance is best tested.
Two standards of judicial review evolved in US jurisdiction, where ours was patterned:
1. Strict scrutiny test: Presence of a compelling rather than substantial government interest and
absence of less restrictive means.
2. Rational basis test: If the law rationally furthers a legitimate agenda
In the Philippines, the rational basis test is often applied in analysis of equal protection challenges. Using
this, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Strict scrutiny
test, on the other hand, refers to the standard for determining the quality and amount of governmental
interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. It is used today to test the validity of laws
dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights.
If the Court would use the rational basis test and take a myopic view of the Ordinance, it can only analyze
strictly as to the law’s effect to the petitioners at bar. Yet, the Court recognized the capacity of the petitioners
to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their patrons, those who would be deprived of availing the short
time access or wash-up rates to lodging establishments in question.
One might say that the infringed rights of these customers are trivial but those trivial yet fundamental
freedoms are the ones that accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty as
incorporated in our Constitution cannot be defined with exactness, it must be broad to include not only
freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any common
occupations of life, to acquired useful knowledge, to marry, to establish home and bring up children, to
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worship God, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized as essential to the orderly pursuit of
happiness.
The purpose of the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior that leads to prostitution, adultery and
fornications but it cannot be denied that sexual behavior among consenting married or consenting single
adults which is constitutionally protected will be curtailed as well.
Reasonable relation must exist between the purpose and the means employed to accomplish it.
Lacking concurrence, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
A plain reading of the ordinance shows it makes no classification of places of lodging and thus deems them
all as susceptible to illicit patronage. There are other solutions to achieve the purpose of the ordinance,
such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work and struct
enforcement of the existing laws and regulations. These measures are more judicious and less drastic
means to promote morality.
Quiao v Quiao
A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent do not depend upon events foreign to the will
of the holder, or to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself
and not dependent upon a contingency. The term “vested right” expresses the concept of present fixed
interest which, in right reason and natural justice, should be protected against arbitrary State action, or an
innately just and imperative right which enlightened free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable
individual rights, cannot deny.
To be vested, a right must have become a title legal or equitable to the present or future enjoyment of
property.
No violation of vested right as long as due process is followed.
Du v Jayoma
License to operate a cockpit is a mere privilege.
“A license authorizing the operation and exploitation of a cockpit is not property of which the holder may
not be deprived without due process of law, but a mere privilege that may be revoked when public interests
so require."
Without any legal right to operate a cockpit in the municipality, the petitioner is not entitled to damages.
"In order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, there must be damnum et injuria – that
act must be not only hurtful, but wrongful."
In the absence of a legal right in favor of the plaintiff, there can be no cause of action.
Exception: If there is monetary consideration, then it is already in a form of a contract. It cannot be

revoked without due process.
Go v Letran
Since disciplinary proceedings may be summary, the insistence that a "formal inquiry" on the accusation
against Kim should have been conducted lacks legal basis. It has no factual basis as well.
"Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he
cannot thereafter complain of deprivation of due process."
Jurisprudence has clarified that administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due process in the
strict judicial sense. The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures
universally applicable to every imaginable situation. Thus, we are hard pressed to believe that Kim’s denial
of his fraternity membership before formal notice was given worked against his interest in the disciplinary
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case. What matters for due process purpose is notice of what is to be explained, not the form in
which the notice is given.
Minimum standard of due process in an educational institution:
1. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them;
2. they shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the assistance of counsel, if desired;
3. they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
5. the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the
school authorities to hear and decide the case.
Cudia v PMA
As PMA is the primary training and educational institution of the AFP, it certainly has the right to invoke
academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules and regulations, which are the Honor Code and
the Honor System in particular.
Academic freedom includes the right to determine:

1. Who may teach
2. What may be taught
3. How to teach
4. Who may be admitted to study
The minimum standards of due process required in the dismissal of a cadet as per jurisprudence
are:
1. a fair hearing at which he is apprised of the charges against him and permitted a defense. x x x For
the guidance of the parties x x x the rudiments of a fair hearing in broad outline are plain.
2. The Cadet must be apprised of the specific charges against him.
3. He must be given an adequate opportunity to present his defense both from the point of view of
time and the use of witnesses and other evidence. It does not suggest, however, that the Cadet
must be given this opportunity both when demerits are awarded and when dismissal is considered.
4. The hearing may be procedurally informal and need not be adversarial.
The power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even after graduation for any act
done by the student prior thereto. The school may withdraw or cancel the diploma.
The Court held that “a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent’s capacity to represent himself, and
no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel.” Hence, the
administrative body is under no duty to provide the person with counsel because assistance of counsel is
not an absolute requirement.
Philcontrust v Santiago
In administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one’s side suffices to meet the
requirements of due process. The proceeding is not bound by technical rules as long as there’s
adequate notice and meaningful opportunity to be heard.
Right to appeal is not a component of due process. The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor is
it a component of due process. It is a mere statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner
and in accordance with the provisions of law.
Maynilad v Secretary of DENR
In terms of due process, the petitioners were notified of the charges against them and were given an
opportunity to be heard during the technical conference. They wrote letters formalizing their position.
Service of justice, not technical subservience, is the end pursued by the rules of procedure. In administrative
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proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity constitutes the minimum requirements
of due process. Clarificatory hearing is not required.
Legaspi v City of Cebu
Test of a valid ordinance:
Formal:
1. Within the corporate powers of LGU
2. In accordance with procedure prescribed by law
Substantive:
3. Should not contravene other laws
4. Must pass different test of due process
5. Consistent with public policy
Prior intervention of a court of law was not indispensable to ensure a compliance with the guaranty
of due process.
There are instances under our laws in which the absence of the requirements of notice and hearing under
procedural due process is not necessarily a denial or deprivation of due process.
NTC v Brancomm
Proceedings related to permit applications are non-adversarial in nature for there are virtually no
contending parties. Although an administrative agency may entertain oppositors to an application, such
undertaking does not automatically convert the proceeding to a quasi-judicial one for a couple of reasons:
a. the subject of application proceedings pertain only to an applicant's privilege to engage in a

regulated activity-it does not vest or deprive a party to such proceedings of any right or legally
protected interest; and
b. oppositions to applications merely aid an administrative agency's function in regulating or
assessing an applicant's legal fitness to hold a franchise.
However, NTC proceedings can be converted into quasi-judicial proceedings when:
1. prospective entrants intend to use the franchise without compensation

2. newcomer will detrimentally displace existing facilities of existing operators
There must be oppositors who will be affected and their legislative rights need to be protected.
V. Equal Protection of the Law
Garcia v Executive Secretary
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its
improper execution through the state's duly-constituted authorities.
In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it
may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective.
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It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification.
Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites:
1. the classification rests on substantial distinctions;
2. it is germane to the purpose of the law;
3. it is not limited to existing conditions only; and
4. it applies equally to all members of the same class.
"Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification." In the present case, petitioner belongs
to the class of those who have been convicted by any court, thus, he is entitled to the rights accorded to
them. Clearly, there is no substantial distinction between those who are convicted of offenses which are
criminal in nature under military courts and the civil courts.
Quinto v COMELEC
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. The Court has explained the nature of the
equal protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well
as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which
is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not
demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former
occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite
term and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials
hold their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials
hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve at the
pleasure of the appointing authority.
Central Bank Employees v BSP
Relative constitutionality
As a general rule, the Legislature is not prevented from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon
which different rules shall operate, as long as the classification is reasonable and germane to the purpose
of the law. In the case at bar, it is clear that the original intent of the legislature in passing the law was to
address the BSP’s lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting competent officers and executives. It was
not intended to discriminate against the rank and file. The resulting discrimination or distinction has a
rational basis and is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense. Being a product of
amendment during the deliberations does not retract the law from its validity.
However, the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all other rank and file employees of other GFIs
from SSL renders the continued application of the proviso a violation of the equal protection clause. A
statute may be constitutionally valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid to another because of altered
circumstances. It is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of the changed conditions.
The proviso of RA 7653 passed the rational basis test upon its first enactment, but in second level or strict
scrutiny test, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertions that each exemption
rests on a policy determination by the legislature. Policy determination argument may support the inequality
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of treatment between rank and file and officers of BSP but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment
between BSP rank and file and other GFI’s rank and file who are similarly situated. If a law has the effect
of denying the equal protection of the law or permits such denial, it is unconstitutional.
Salumbides v Office of the Ombudsman
In Civil Service Commission v Sojor, the Court found no basis to broaden the scope of the doctrine of
condonation. The same condonation applied to reelected officials cannot be applied to a reappointed
officials since there is no sovereign will of the people to speak of for the latter. This non application
does not violate the equal protection clause. Quinto v Comelec applied the four-fold test in an equal
protection challenge to discuss the material and substantive distinction between an elective and an
appointive official:
• The elective official occupies his office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate
• The appointive official holds his office by virtue of his designation thereto by an appointing authority.
An election is an embodiment of a popular will and the purest expression of sovereignty. Elected officials
are expected by the people who voted for them to serve until the end of their term. There are no such
expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.
Moreover, the unwarranted expansion of the Pascual doctrine would set a dangerous precedent as it would
provide civil servants with blanket immunity from administrative liability.
Garcia v Drilon
RA 9262 is not discriminatory, unjust, and violative of the equal protection clause.
The equal protection clause in our Constitution does not guarantee an absolute prohibition against
classification. The non-identical treatment of women and men under RA 9262 is justified to put them
on equal footing and to give substance to the policy and aim of the state to ensure the equality of
women and men in light of the biological, historical, social, and culturally endowed differences
between men and women.
RA 9262, by affording special and exclusive protection to women and children, who are vulnerable victims
of domestic violence, undoubtedly serves the important governmental objectives of protecting human rights,
insuring gender equality, and empowering women. The gender-based classification and the special
remedies prescribed by said law in favor of women and children are substantially related, in fact essentially
necessary, to achieve such objectives. Hence, said Act survives the intermediate review or middle-tier
judicial scrutiny. The gender-based classification therein is therefore not violative of the equal protection
clause embodied in the 1987 Constitution.
Imbong v Ochoa (Executive Secretary)
Private educational v public educational institution: not unconstitutional
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health
education program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who are
less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction sufficient to
annul the assailed provision.
Substantial distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational institutions,
particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions
especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of
reproductive health education.
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Priority given to poor people: not unconstitutional
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is
not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by
providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering
from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH
Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number.
Punishment to health care provider: unconstitutional
The Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private,
should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with
the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction,
it would be violative of “the principle of non-coercion” enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise
of religion.
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated
by a religious group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes
such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section
23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion.
The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the
dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the performance of reproductive
health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers should be respected. The
punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who
declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a
clear inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
Ysaruegui v PAL
The Bill of Rights is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals. Indeed, the United
States Supreme Court, in interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment, which is the source of our equal
protection guarantee, is consistent in saying that the equal protection erects no shield against private
conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful. Private actions, no matter how egregious, cannot violate the
equal protection guarantee.
Republic v Manalo
Divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and void, a divorce decree
obtained by an alien against his or her Filipino spouse is recognized if made in accordance with the national
law of the foreigner.
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceedings and a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her
alien spouse. In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the
same rights and obligations in an alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their
wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference of
whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives undue
favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
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JSMGI v SSS
Substantial distinction:
There is substantial distinction between the sea-based and land-based OFWs. Seafarers constitute a
unique classification of OFWs. All seafarers have only one standard contract, which provides for the rights
and obligations of the foreign ship owner, the seafarer and the manning agencies. It outlines all the duties
and responsibilities of the foreign ship owners, manning agencies, and seafarers. Standardized contractual
arrangement is possible because they all have similarity of circumstances relating to work. They face the
same perils and predicaments and enjoy the same benefits.
Contrary thereto, the land-based OFWs do not have singular or uniform employment contract because of
the variety of work they perform. Their contract depends on the nature of their employment and their place
of work.
Reasonableness of classification; germane to the purpose of law:
Sec 9-B simply reiterates the provision in other existing laws and regulations. Sec 1 of the 2010 POEA-
SEC provides that the principal foreign ship owner has the primary duty to extend SSS coverage to
seafarers. Nevertheless, the 2016 POEA Rules, which governs the recruitment and employment of
seafarers, state that manning agencies assume joint and several liability with the employer/ship
owner/principal for all claims and liabilities which may arise in connection with the implementation of the
contract. Necessarily, this includes claims arising out of the SSS coverage and contributions in favor of
seafarers. If the principal foreign ship owner fails to pay the SSS contributions, then the joint and several
liability of the manning agencies can be invoked.
This joint and several liability provisions only echoes the provision under Sec 10 of RA 8042 “Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act”. This was not created out of thin air.
VI. Search and Seizures
United Laboratories v Isip
A search warrant is a legal process which has been likened to a writ of discovery employed by the State
to procure relevant evidence of crime. It is in the nature of a criminal process, restricted to cases of public
prosecutions. A search warrant is a police weapon, issued under the police power. A search warrant
must issue in the name of the State, namely, the People of the Philippines.
A search warrant has no relation to a civil process. It is not a process for adjudicating civil rights or
maintaining mere private rights.It concerns the public at large as distinguished from the ordinary civil action
involving the rights of private persons. It may only be applied for in the furtherance of public prosecution.
However, a private individual or a private corporation complaining to the NBI or to a government

agency charged with the enforcement of special penal laws, such as the BFAD, may appear,
participate and file pleadings in the search warrant proceedings to maintain, inter alia, the validity of
the search warrant issued by the court and the admissibility of the properties seized in anticipation of a
criminal case to be filed; such private party may do so in collaboration with the NBI or such government
agency. The party may file an opposition to a motion to quash the search warrant issued by the court, or a
motion for the reconsideration of the court order granting such motion to quash.
It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view doctrine. However,
seized things not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view.
The State must adduce evidence to prove that the elements for the plain-view doctrine to apply are
present, namely:
1. the executing law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise
properly in a position from which he can view a particular order;
2. the officer must discover incriminating evidence inadvertently; and
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3. it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a
crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure.
Republic v Eugenio
Is the application for an order authorizing bank inquiry under AMLA valid even without a pre-
existing case? YES
Section 10 of AMLA authorizes freeze order while Section 11 thereof authorizes inquiry order.
Section 11 bank inquiry may be availed of without the need of a pre-existing case under the AMLA.
Generally, Section 11 allows the AMLC to inquire into the bank accounts without having to obtain a judicial
order in cases where there is probable cause that the deposits or investments are related to kidnapping for
ranson, certain violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Acts of 2002, hijacking and other
violations under RA No. 6325, destructive arson and murder. Such special circumstances does not apply
in the case at bar. Therefore, a court order is required.
Is the application for an order authorizing bank inquiry under AMLA valid even without notice of
hearing (ex-parte)? YES
Nothing in Section 11 specifically authorizes that such court order be ex-parte, unlike in Section 10
where the freeze order specifically authorizes an ex-parte.
A freeze order is aimed at preserving monetary instruments or property in any way deemed related to
unlawful activities under Section 3(i). The owner would thus be inhibited from utilizing the account for the
duration of the freeze order. To make such order anteceded by judicial proceeding with notice to account
holder would allow for or lead to the dissipation of such funds even before the order could issued.
On the other hand, a bank inquiry does not necessitate any form of physical seizure of the property of
account holder. The account is only examined on particular details such as records of deposits and
withdrawals. Said records are in the possession of the bank and cannot be destroyed at the instance of the
account holder alone as it would require the extraordinary cooperation and devotion of the bank. Despite
prior notice, the account holder will still be unable to conceal or cleanse his bank account records of
suspicious or anomalous transactions, at least not without the cooperation of the bank, which inherently
has no vested interest to aid him.
Is the existence of probable cause required before the issuance of an order authorizing bank inquiry
under AMLA? NO
A constitutional warrant requires that the judge to personally examines the witnesses under oath to decide
on the existence of probable cause. This imposition was not specifically required by the legislature when
they enacted the AMLA. A bank inquiry order is not a search warrant or warrant of arrest as it contemplates
a direct order but not the seizure of persons or property.
Is the right to privacy infringed by AMLA in authorizing a bank inquiry order? YES
Section 2 of the RA 1405 or the Bank Secrecy Act of 1955 states that:
“All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the Philippines including investments
in bonds issued by the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are
hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked
into by any person, government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of the depositor,
or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of
public officials, or in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.”
The confidentiality of bank deposits remains a basic state policy in the Philippines.
Section 2 of RA 1405 allows for exception to the secrecy rule:
1. upon written permission of the depositor

2. in cases of impeachment
3. upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials
4. in cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation
Section 8 of RA 3019 the AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act is also another exception.
Midterm Reviewer
The AMLA may have added exceptions to this in Section 11 bank inquiry order but it does not mean that it
has dispensed with the general principle established by the Bank Secrecy Act. Thus, Lilia Cheng has the
standing to vindicate her rights to privacy and has the right to challenge whether the requirements of issuing
the bank inquiry order has been complied with.
HPS Software v PLDT
Probable cause for issuance of a search warrant – judge must rely on facts and circumstances that would
lead a reasonable man to believe in the existence of the crime.
The warrant is not a general one because the items to be seized were sufficiently identified physically
and were also specifically identified by stating their relation to the offenses charged
Del Castillo v People
Warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or things to be
seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or description that points out the place to be searched to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional
requirement of definiteness.
It is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the person against
whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under appellant's
control or possession.
The barangay tanod who found the shabu is an agent of a person in authority. He is acting on behalf of
the police officers who requested for his aid.
Valleno v People
Old Law: If there’s irregularity with the chain of custody, the evidence can still be admissible if the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved.
New Law: There should be a justifiable reason why procedure was not followed.
People v Mariano
The signature of the accused in the "Receipt of Property Seized" is inadmissible in evidence if it
was obtained without the assistance of counsel. The signature of the accused on such a receipt is a
declaration against his interest and a tacit admission of the crime charged. However, while it is true that
appellants signed receipt of the property seized unassisted by counsel, this only renders
inadmissible the receipt itself.
The evidentiary value of the Receipt of Property Seized is irrelevant in light of the ample evidence
proving appellants’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution was able to prove that a valid buy-
bust operation was conducted to entrap appellants. The testimony of the poseur-buyer clearly established
that the sale of shabu by appellant was consummated. The corpus delicti, which is the shabu, was
presented in court and confirmed by the other members of the buy-bust team. They acknowledged that
they were the same drugs placed in 4 plastic sachets seized from appellants.
People v Martinez
Although this Court has ruled in several dangerous drugs cases that tipped information is sufficient probable
cause to effect a warrantless search, such rulings cannot be applied in the case at bench because said
cases involve either a buy-bust operation or drugs in transit, basically, circumstances other than the
sole tip of an informer as basis for the arrest. None of these drug cases involve police officers entering a
house without warrant to effect arrest and seizure based solely on an informer’s tip.
Midterm Reviewer
It has been held that personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be based upon
probable cause, which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when the suspicion, that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing an offense, is based on actual facts, that is, supported by circumstances sufficiently strong
in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.
The apprehending officers should have first conducted a surveillance considering that the identity
and address of one of the accused were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and
determining the existence of probable cause, then a search warrant should have been secured prior to
effecting arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal, the ensuing search as a result thereof is likewise
illegal. Evidence procured on the occasion of an unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for
being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be excluded.
The subject items seized during the illegal arrest are thus inadmissible. The drug, being the very corpus
delicti of the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, its inadmissibility thus precludes
conviction, and calls for the acquittal of the accused.
Sy v People
In lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed.
Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the
police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search. Although probable cause
eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
People v Racho
Appellant never objected to his arrest before arraignment. Considering this lapse, coupled with his
active participation in the trial of the case, the Court must abide with jurisprudence which dictates that
appellant is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest.
The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his person and cannot be the
basis of his acquittal.
The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial
warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
Exceptions to unlawful search:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
2. Search of evidence in "plain view"
3. Search of a moving vehicle
4. Consented warrantless search
5. Customs search
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances
People v Uyboco
Hot pursuit:
The second instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by paragraph (b) necessitates two stringent
requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected:
1. an offense has just been committed; and
2. the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it.
Midterm Reviewer
Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause, which means an actual belief or
reasonable grounds of suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of
actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense is based on actual facts.
A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on
the part of the peace officers making the arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure does not require the arresting officers to personally witness the commission of the
offense with their own eyes.
It is sufficient for the arresting team that they were monitoring the pay-off for a number of hours long enough
for them to be informed that it was indeed appellant, who was the kidnapper. This is equivalent to personal
knowledge based on probable cause.
Sales v People
Routine frisk at the airport:

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property
to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is
prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures.
We find no irregularity in the search conducted on petitioner who was asked to empty the contents of his
pockets upon the friskers reasonable belief that what he felt in his hand while frisking petitioners short pants
was a prohibited or illegal substance.
Irregularity in following procedure under Section 21 of RA 10640:
In case of non-compliance, there must be justifiable grounds and as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized item is preserved.
No need for all the persons who hold the drugs to testify in court. The law enforcer who seized the drug
and the laboratory examiner’s testimony is however, important.
People v Mariacos
Suspicion alone is not sufficient to effect a warrantless search and seizure. The must be reasonable
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently sound in themselves to give probable cause.
Warrantless search of a moving vehicle is valid. It is highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's
inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes
a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity.
It is impracticable to obtain a warrant when the search is conducted on a mobile ship, on an aircraft, or in
other motor vehicles since they can quickly be moved out of the locality or jurisdiction where the warrant
must be sought.
The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make
a quick decision and act fast. It would be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before
conducting the search under the circumstances. Time was of the essence in this case. The searching officer
had no time to obtain a warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board the vehicle before the same left
for its destination.
Luz v People
What is an arrest? It is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer
for the commission of the crime.
There was no valid arrest of petitioner. When he was flagged down for committing a traffic violation, he was
not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Midterm Reviewer
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure for dealing
with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver’s license of
the latter.
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be
said to have been "under arrest." There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza to arrest him, deprive
him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which
petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time.
It also appears that, according to City Ordinance No. 98-012, which was violated by Luz, the failure to wear
a crash helmet while riding a motorcycle is penalized by a fine only. Under the Rules of Court, a warrant of
arrest need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It
may be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
People v Lagman
The finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a house or building owned or occupied by a
particular person raises the presumption of knowledge and possession thereof which, standing
alone, is sufficient to convict. Denial of knowledge of the seized evidence does not suffice to rebut the
presumption of constructive knowledge and possession of the regulated substances due to the fact that
she is a tenant of the house and that she had full access to, full control of, and dominion over the rooms.
Pollo v Constantino
Petitioner does not have expectation of privacy in his office and computer files. Petitioner failed to prove
that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his office or government-issued
computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a separate enclosed office
which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open to other employees
or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent other employees
from accessing his computer files.
Even assuming arguendo, in the absence of allegation or proof of the aforementioned factual
circumstances, that petitioner had at least a subjective expectation of privacy in his computer as he claims,
such is negated by the presence of policy regulating the use of office computers.
A search by a government employer of an employee’s office is justified at inception when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-
related misconduct.
Miclat v People
The seizure made by PO3 Antonio of the four plastic sachets from the petitioner was not only incidental
to a lawful arrest, but it also falls within the purview of the "plain view" doctrine.
In flagrante delicto: An arrest made during the commission of a crime does not require a previously issued
warrant.
Elements of in flagrante delicto:

1. The person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime;
2. Such an overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer
Requisites of the plain view doctrine:

1. the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is
in a position from which he can view a particular area;
2. the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent;
3. it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure
Midterm Reviewer
People v Bajo
Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order
to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of such ways and means for the
purpose of trapping or capturing a lawbreaker. Thus, in instigation, officers of the law or their agents incite,
induce, instigate or lure an accused into committing an offense which he or she would otherwise not commit
and has no intention of committing. But in entrapment, the criminal intent or design to commit the offense
charged originates in the mind of the accused, and law enforcement officials merely facilitate the
apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses and schemes; thus, the accused cannot justify his or her
conduct. In instigation, where law enforcers act as co-principals, the accused will have to be acquitted. But
entrapment cannot bar prosecution and conviction. As has been said, instigation is a "trap for the unwary
innocent," while entrapment is a "trap for the unwary criminal.
As a general rule, a buy-bust operation, considered as a form of entrapment, is a valid means of arresting
violators of Republic Act No. 9165. It is an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of
committing a crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without
anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense.
A police officers act of soliciting drugs from the accused during a buy-bust operation, or what is known as
a "decoy solicitation," is not prohibited by law and does not render invalid the buy-bust operations. The
sale of contraband is a kind of offense habitually committed, and the solicitation simply furnishes evidence
of the criminals course of conduct. As here, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the informant utilized
by the police merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. The police received an intelligence report
that appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs. They duly acted on it by utilizing an informant to
effect a drug transaction with appellant. There was no showing that the informant induced the appellant to
sell illegal drugs to him.
Applying the foregoing, we declare that the accused was not arrested following an instigation for him to
commit the crime. Instead, he was caught in flagrante delicto during an entrapment through buy-bust.
In a buy-bust operation, the pusher sells the contraband to another posing as a buyer; once the transaction
is consummated, the pusher is validly arrested because he is committing or has just committed a crime in
the presence of the buyer.
The buy-bust is not invalid in the absence of prior surveillance. The argument of the accused lacks merit.
We have held that prior surveillance is not necessary to render a buy-bust operation legitimate, especially
when the buy-bust team is accompanied to the target area by the informant. That was what precisely
happened here.
It is not indispensable to present the informant as a witness because his security can be
endangered. Unless it is absolutely essential, an informant is not required to testify in court (e.g. allegations
that police has ill-motive).
People v Abedin
While it is true that Section 86 of R.A. No. 9165 requires the National Bureau of Investigation, PNP and the
Bureau of Customs to maintain "close coordination with the PDEA on all drug-related matters," the provision
does not, by so saying, make PDEA’s participation a condition sine qua non for every buy-bust operation.
After all, a buy-bust is just a form of an in flagrante arrest sanctioned by Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of the Court which police authorities may rightfully resort to in apprehending violators of R.A. No.
9165 in support of the PDEA. A buy-bust operation is not invalidated by mere non-coordination with
the PDEA.
People v Octavio
Under Sec 21 R.A 9165 it does not require the presence of any elected public official during the buy
bust operation. Relevant to accused-appellants’ case is the procedure to be followed in the custody and
handling of the seized dangerous drugs as outlined in Section 21, paragraph 1, Article II, R.A. No. 9165,
which reads:
Midterm Reviewer
1. The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof.
Clearly, there is nothing in the aforesaid law or its implementing rules which require the presence of the
elected public official during the buy-bust operation. It is enough that he is present during the physical
inventory immediately conducted after the seizure and confiscation of the drugs and he signs the
copies of the inventory and is given a copy thereof.
Furthermore, this Court has consistently ruled that even if the arresting officers failed to take a
photograph of the seized drugs as required under Section 21 of R.A. No.9165, such procedural lapse is
not fatal and will not render the items seized inadmissible in evidence. What is of utmost importance
is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be
utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Chain of custody rule:

To be admissible in evidence, the prosecution must be able to present through records or testimony, the
whereabouts of the dangerous drugs from the:
1. time these were seized from the accused by the arresting officers;
2. turned-over to the investigating officer;
3. forwarded to the laboratory for determination of their composition; and
4. up to the time these are offered in evidence.
For as long as the chain of custody remains unbroken, as in this case, even though the procedural
requirements provided for in Sec. 21 of R.A. No.9165 was not faithfully observed, the guilt of the accused
will not be affected.
Presumption of regularity: The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless there
is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with.
People v Manlangit
Informant must accompany the police in a buy-bust if there is no prior surveillance.
Search warrant is not required in a buy-bust operation because it is a way of apprehending the
accused in flagrante delicto.
Settled is the rule that prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility of the police
officers who conducted the buy-bust operation. Defense of denial, without substantial evidence to support
it, cannot overcome the presumption of regularity of the police officers’ performance of official functions.
People v Que
Fidelity to the chain of custody requirements is necessary because, by nature, narcotics may easily
be mistaken for everyday objects. Chemical analysis and detection through methods that exceed human
sensory perception, such as specially trained canine units and screening devices, are often needed to
ascertain the presence of dangerous drugs. The physical similarity of narcotics with everyday objects
facilitates their adulteration and substitution. It also makes planting of evidence conducive.
What is critical in drug cases is not the bare conduct of inventory, marking, and photographing.
Instead, it is the certainty that the items allegedly taken from the accused retain their integrity, even
as they make their way from the accused to an officer effecting the seizure, to an investigating
officer, to a forensic chemist, and ultimately, to courts where they are introduced as evidence.
Midterm Reviewer
The prosecution here failed to account for the intervening period between the supposed handover of the
sachet from accused-appellant to P03 Lim, to the marking of the sachets by SPO4 Tubo. Likewise, it
absolutely failed to identify measures taken during transit from the target area to the police station to ensure
the integrity of the sachets allegedly obtained and to negate any possibility of adulteration or substitution.
In complete disregard of Section 21’s unequivocal requirements, no one but police officers witnessed the
supposed marking of the sachets obtained from accused-appellant.
Photograph and inventory must be conducted at the place where the warrant was served, otherwise
if there is no warrant, at the nearest police station or the office of the officer who seized the items.
It must be done immediately after seizure. Presence of elected official is indispensable. Any one of
the representative from the National Prosecution Service or the media may be present.
Saluday v People
The warrantless search conducted through bus inspection constitutes a reasonable search and is
therefore, valid.
Reasonable search – arises from a reduced expectation of privacy. (examples: searches done at airports,
seaports, bus terminals, malls, and similar public places)
Warrantless search – PRESUMABLY “unreasonable search” but for reasons of practicality, a search
warrant can be dispensed with. (examples: search incidental to a lawful arrest, search of evidence in plain
view, consented search, and extensive search of a private moving vehicle)
The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures is not a blanket prohibition. It
operates against “unreasonable” searches and seizures only but when a search is “reasonable”, Sec. 2 Art
III of Consti does not apply. The reasonableness of a person’s expectation of privacy must be determined
on a case-to-case basis since it depends on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.
Accordingly, a person’s expectation of privacy is diminished whenever he or she enters private

premises that are accessible to the public.
The search of persons in a public place is VALID because the safety of others may be put at risk. Public
transport buses and their terminals are in that category. Aside from public transport buses, any moving
vehicle that similarly accepts passengers at the terminal and along its route is likewise covered by these
guidelines, a routine inspection at the terminal or of the vehicle itself while in transit constitutes a reasonable
search.
In conduct of bus searches, the Court laid down the ff. guidelines:
o Prior to entry, passengers and their bags and lug gages can be subjected to a routine inspection akin
to airport and seaport security protocol. Passengers can also be frisked. Should the passenger object,
he or she can validly be refused entry into the terminal.
o While in transit, a bus can still be searched by government agents or the security personnel of the bus
owner if: 1) upon receipt of information that a passenger carries contraband or illegal articles, the bus
where the passenger is aboard can be stopped en route to allow for an inspection of a person and
his/her effects; 2) whenever a bus picks passengers en route, the prospective passenger can be frisked
and his/her luggage be subjected to the same routine inspection by government agents or private
security personnel as though the person boarded the bus at the terminal; and 3) a bus can be flagged
down at designated military or police checkpoints where State agents can board the vehicle for a routine
inspection of the passengers and their bags or luggage.
Conditions to qualify as a valid reasonable search:

• As to the manner of search, it must be the least intrusive and must uphold the dignity of the person/s
being search, minimizing any cause for public embarrassment, humiliation, or ridicule.
• Neither can the search result from any discriminatory motive (such as insidious profiling, stereotyping,
and other similar motives)
• As to purposes of the search, it must be confined in ensuring public safety.
• As to the evidence seized from the reasonable search, courts must be convinced that precautionary
measures were in place to ensure that no evidence was planted against the accused.
People v Comprado
Midterm Reviewer
A stop-and-frisk search is often confused with a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. However,
in a jurisprudence, the Court settled the distinctions between the two: the law requires that there first be
a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process cannot be reversed.
“Stop and frisk” serves a two-fold interest:
1. the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that
a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and
2. the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
Macad v People
A search of a moving vehicle may either be a mere routine inspection or an extensive search. The
search in a routine inspection is limited to the following instances:
1. where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public
fair grounds;
2. simply looks into a vehicle;
3. flashes a light therein without opening the car’s doors;
4. where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search;
5. where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and
6. where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.
On the other hand, an extensive search of a moving vehicle is only permissible when there is probable
cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search has
been held to be valid only as long as the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause
to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the
vehicle to be searched.
Lapi v People
In People v. Alunday, any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure for the acquisition
by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. We have also ruled that an accused may be estopped from
assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing of the information against him before
his arraignment. And since the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person
of the accused, any defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submits
to the jurisdiction of the trial court. We have also held in a number of cases that the illegal arrest of an
accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint
after a trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.
As with certain constitutional rights, the right to question the validity of a warrantless arrest can be
waived. This waiver, however, does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of the evidence
seized during the illegal arrest.
Manibog v People
Reasonable warrantless searches and seizures:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules
of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence;
2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view,";
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly
reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances
Midterm Reviewer
Vaporoso v People
The element of personal knowledge must be coupled with the element of immediacy. Upon gaining such
personal knowledge, not only did PO2 Torculas chase petitioners until they entered a dark, secluded area,
he also called for back-up and conducted a "stake-out" right then and there until they were able to arrest
petitioners about six (6) hours later. These circumstances indubitably show that the twin requisites of
personal knowledge and immediacy in order to effectuate a valid "hot pursuit" warrantless arrest are
present, considering that PO2 Torculas obtained personal knowledge that a crime had just been committed
and that he did not waver in his continuous and unbroken pursuit of petitioners until they were arrested.
The phrase "within the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which he might
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.
This requires strict application that is "to absolutely limit a warrantless search of a person who is lawfully
arrested to his or her person at the time of and incident to his or her arrest and to 'dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of the offense.' Such warrantless search
obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest."
Purpose of allowing search and seizures incident to a lawful arrest is to protect:

1. Law enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on them by a person they have lawfully arrested;
and
2. Evidence from being destroyed by the arrestee.
People v Policarpio
A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in
the community. Any designation or description known to the locality that points out the place to the
exclusion of all others, and on inquiry leads the officers unerringly to it, satisfies the constitutional
requirement.
A search warrant may be said to particularly describe the things to be seized when the description
therein is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow; or when the description expresses
a conclusion of fact — not of law — by which the warrant officer may be guided in making the search
and seizure; or when the things described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the
offense for which the warrant is being issued.
Quiap v Quiap
Leonides should have raised the issue of validity of the arrest before the arraignment, therefore the
supposed defect in the arrest was deemed waived. Even assuming that he can still impugn the legality of
his arrest, the circumstances is akin to a “stop and frisk” situation. His unusual and suspicious conduct and
the fact that the police were on an intelligent mission, created a sufficient probable cause where search and
seizure may be affected without fist making an arrest. The initial suspicion of the police was fortified when
he attempted to throw out the seized item.
The dangerous drug itself is the very corpus delicti the offense, and the fact of its existence is vital
to a judgment of conviction. The prosecution must satisfactorily establish the chain of custody of
the seized item.
Notably, the crime happened before RA 10640 amended RA 9165. The original law requires that the
physical inventory and photograph of the seized item be conducted at the place where the search warrant
is served. However, in earlier cases the Court ruled that deviation from the standard procedure dismally
compromises the evidence, unless such non-compliance was under justifiable grounds and the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending team. In later cases,
the Court emphasized the importance of the presence of the three insulating witnesses during the physical
inventory and photograph. In People v Caray, the Court ruled that the corpus delicti cannot be deemed
preserved absent any acceptable explanation for the deviation from the procedural requirements of the
chain of custody. In Matabilas v People, the Court held that sheer statements of unavailability of the
insulating witnesses, without actual serious attempt to contact them, cannot justify non-compliance.
In the case at bar, the absence of the required insulating witnesses puts serious doubt as to the integrity of
the chain of custody. There was no representative from the media and the DOJ and any elected public
official. Worse, there was no attempt on the part of the buy-bust team to comply with the law and its
implementing rules.
Midterm Reviewer
Moreover, the link between the investigating officer and the forensic chemist was not established with
certainty. The police did not describe the precautions taken.
While the police enjoy presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this cannot prevail over
the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent, and cannot by itself constitute proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Evardo v People
A warrantless, intrusive search of a moving vehicle cannot be premised solely on an initial tip.
A warrantless search must be founded on probable cause where there must be a confluence of several
suspicious circumstances.
When the law enforcers are predisposed to perceive guilt – as when specific persons are the targets of
checkpoints, patrols, and similar operations – their subjective perception cannot anchor probable cause.

Consti2 Case Digests - Midterm

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Consti2 Case Digests - Midterm

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Constitutional Law 2

Goldenway v Equitable PCI

1. the interest of the public welfare, and

OSG v Ayala Land

Fernando v St. Scholastica’s College

1. Must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

United BF Homewoners v City Mayor

Due process (not violative)

Non-impairment of obligation of contracts (no violation)

1. It must rest of substantial distinctions

Reasonableness of classification; germane to the purpose of law:

Doctrine of Public Trust

II. Eminent Domain

Republic v Rural Bank

LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)

1. First, The expropriator must enter a private property;

City of Manila v Prieto

1. Those owned by government and any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, etc.

1. The property taken must be private property;

Jurisprudence states the test as follows:

Based on its definition, a tax has three elements, namely:

a. it is an enforced proportional contribution from persons and properties;

MIAA v City of Pasay

IV. Due Process of Law

City of Manila v Laguio

Two separate limits on the government:

Perez v Spouses Madrona

For injunction to issue, two requisites must concur:

No, the state is not denied its right to due process

When can a State be said to have been denied due process?

White Light v City of Manila

2. Rational basis test: If the law rationally furthers a legitimate agenda

No violation of vested right as long as due process is followed.

License to operate a cockpit is a mere privilege.

Exception: If there is monetary consideration, then it is already in a form of a contract. It cannot be

Minimum standard of due process in an educational institution:

Academic freedom includes the right to determine:

Maynilad v Secretary of DENR

Legaspi v City of Cebu

Test of a valid ordinance:

a. the subject of application proceedings pertain only to an applicant's privilege to engage in a

However, NTC proceedings can be converted into quasi-judicial proceedings when:

1. prospective entrants intend to use the franchise without compensation

V. Equal Protection of the Law

Garcia v Executive Secretary

Central Bank Employees v BSP

Salumbides v Office of the Ombudsman

Imbong v Ochoa (Executive Secretary)

Private educational v public educational institution: not unconstitutional

Priority given to poor people: not unconstitutional

Punishment to health care provider: unconstitutional

Reasonableness of classification; germane to the purpose of law:

VI. Search and Seizures

United Laboratories v Isip

However, a private individual or a private corporation complaining to the NBI or to a government

Section 2 of RA 1405 allows for exception to the secrecy rule:

1. upon written permission of the depositor

HPS Software v PLDT

Del Castillo v People

Exceptions to unlawful search:

Routine frisk at the airport:

Irregularity in following procedure under Section 21 of RA 10640:

Elements of in flagrante delicto:

Requisites of the plain view doctrine: