Professional Documents
Culture Documents
3/14
C. Reproductive Autonomy, pp. 977-988 (Skinner v. Oklahoma; Griswold v.
Connecticut; Eisenstadt v. Baird);
Skinner v. Oklahoma
Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, Skinner (Petitioner), was sentenced to
involuntary sterilization under Oklahoma’s Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act
(the Act) and now alleges that the Act deprives him of equal protection under the
laws
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The right to have offspring is a fundamental right,
requiring a compelling state interest to interfere with it.
Facts. Oklahoma defined a “habitual criminal” as a person who, “having been
convicted two or more times for crimes ‘amounting to felonies involving moral
turpitude’ either in Oklahoma or another State, is thereafter convicted of such a
felony in Oklahoma and is sentenced to a term of imprisonment in a Oklahoma
penal institution.” Such habitual criminals could be subject to forced sterilization.
The Petitioner had been twice arrested for theft offenses before being arrested and
confined for armed robbery. During his third incarceration, the Act was passed
and proceedings were instituted against him.
Issue. May the State sterilize an individual against his will for being convicted of
three felonies involving moral turpitude?
Held. No. Supreme Court of Oklahoma ruling reversed.
Justice William Douglas (J. Douglas) notes that sterilization of habitual offenders
in no way guarantees that new offenders will not be born. Furthermore, there is no
guarantee that habitual offenders would spawn offenders themselves.
J. Douglas cannot justify the distinction between larceny (involving moral
turpitude) and embezzlement (not involving moral turpitude) in the eyes of the
statute. This is clear discrimination in J. Douglas’s view. In terms of fines and
imprisonment the crimes are identical to the State. Only when it comes to
sterilization do the crimes differ. As such, equal protection is violated.
Concurrence. Chief Justice Harlan Stone (J. Stone) concurs in the judgment, but
rests his decision on due process grounds, arguing that the invasion of personal
liberty is too great.
Discussion. Skinner represents the Supreme Court of the United States’ growing
awareness of the right to reproductive autonomy. Unlike later cases that focus on
due process and a right to privacy, the majority in Skinner holds that sterilization
in the present situation violates equal protection principles.
Griswold v. Connecticut
Brief Fact Summary. The Appellants, Griswold and others (Appellants), was
arrested for providing information, instructions, and medical advice to married
persons as a means to prevent conception.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Intimate marital relations lie within a zone of privacy
into which the government may not intrude.
Facts. Connecticut law criminalized the use of chemical and mechanical
contraception, as well as the counseling and aiding the use of such contraception.
The Petitioner was the Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of
Connecticut. The Petitioner was arrested after providing information and
instructions on birth control methods to married people.
Issue. May the government ban all use of contraceptives?
Held. No. Appeals Court ruling reversed.
Justice William Douglas (J. Douglas) describes the “penumbras[] formed by
emanations from specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights.” In particular, he
describes the fact that the State cannot “contract the spectrum of available
knowledge” consistent with the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution (Constitution). He also describes the rights to “privacy and repose”
suggested by many of the Amendments in the Bill of Rights.
J. Douglas suggests that the marital relationship lies at the center of such a zone of
privacy. As the law prohibits the use of contraceptives, rather than their
manufacture or sale, the law is aimed at the core of the marital relationship. He
argues that this is too broad a sweep to be a constitutional exercise of state
authority.
Dissent. Justices Hugo Black (J. Black) and Potter Stewart (J. Stewart) dissented.
They admit they find the Connecticut statute offensive, but believe that unless
there is a specific constitutional provision otherwise, the remedy for such
legislation is through the political branches, not the judiciary.
Concurrence.
Justice John Marshall Harlan (J. Marshall) argues that the statute should be
overturned on Due Process grounds, as the enactment violates “basic values
‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’”
Justice Byron White (J. White) concurs on due process grounds, believing that the
purpose of the statute is to enforce policies disfavoring illicit sexual contact. He
notes that denying married couples the right to contraception in no way
strengthens that policy.
Justice Arthur Goldberg (J. Goldberg) believes that the Ninth Amendment of the
United States Constitution (Constitution) guarantees that the marital relation is a
right retained by the people, and as such, Connecticut does not have the
constitutional authority to abridge that relationship.
Discussion. The opinion of the Court in Griswold is unusual in that it relies on
inferred rights in the Constitution. Furthermore, it is difficult to distinguish how
the Supreme Court’s opinion is any more “correct” than the concurring opinions
offered.
Eisenstadt v. Baird
Brief Fact Summary. The Appellee, Baird (Appellee), was arrested for lecturing
on contraception to a group of University students and distributing contraceptive
foam to a student after the lecture.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The State may not discriminate between married and
unmarried individuals in prohibiting the distribution of contraception.
Facts. Massachusetts law created three classes of people receiving contraceptive
devices and drugs: (1) married persons could receive contraceptives to prevent
pregnancy, but only from doctors or druggists on prescription; (2) single people
may not receive contraceptives from anyone to prevent pregnancy and (3) anyone
may receive contraceptives from anyone to prevent the spread of disease.
Issue. May the state discriminate between married and unmarried couples in
prohibiting birth control methods?
Held. No. Appeals Court ruling affirmed.
Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) notes that “if the right to privacy means
anything, it means the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”
Dissent. Chief Justice William Burger (J. Berger) argues that there is nothing in
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) that
suggests birth control must be made available on the open market.
Discussion. A right to privacy is again recognized in Eisenstadt. Here, the right to
contraception is extended to unmarried individuals, as well.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------
3/16
pp. 988-1010; 1031-1036 (Roe v. Wade; Planned Parenthood v. Casey)
Roe v. Wade
Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, Jane Roe (Petitioner), was pregnant and
challenged the Texas statute prohibiting her from acquiring an abortion.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The State has a limited ability to affect a woman’s
ability to procure an abortion.
Facts. The Petitioner was pregnant with an unwanted pregnancy and brought suit
against the State of Texas for prohibiting medically licensed professionals from
performing abortions.
Issue. To what extent may the State regulate a woman’s ability to procure an
abortion?
Held. It varies, depending on the trimester during which the operation occurred
and whether or not the woman’s life and health is taken into account.
Justice William Brennan (J. Brennan) produced a continuum. He begins by noting
that a statute, which only excepts from criminality those abortions designed to
save the mother’s life is unconstitutional.
Prior to the end of the first trimester, only the pregnant woman and her physician
may make decisions regarding the termination of a pregnancy.
During the second trimester, the state may regulate abortion in manners
reasonably related to maternal health.
During the third trimester, the state may even prohibit all abortion procedures,
except where the life or health of the mother is at risk.
Dissent. Justice William Rehnquist (J. Rehnquist) dissents, largely arguing that
the three-trimester approach offered by the majority speaks more of judicial
legislation than constitutional analysis.
Discussion. The right to privacy is extended further again. Roe is the central case
involving a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy. Roe’s three-trimester
approach is no longer used by federal courts in analyzing abortion legislation, but
rather a more fluid approach outlined in
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------
3/21
pp. 1010-1026 (Gonzales v. Carhart);
Gonzales v. Carhart
Facts of the Case: In 2003, Congress passed and the President signed the Partial-
Birth Abortion Ban Act. The controversial concept of partial-birth abortion is
defined in the Act as any abortion in which the death of the fetus occurs when
"the entire fetal head [...] or [...] any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside
the body of the mother." Dr. Leroy Carhart and other physicians who perform
late-term abortions sued to stop the Act from going into effect. The plaintiffs
argued that the Act could apply to a more common abortion procedure known as
"D&E;" ("dilation and evacuation"), as well as to the less common "intact D&E;,"
sometimes called D&X; ("dilation and extraction"). With this application the Act
would ban most late-term abortions and thus be an unconstitutional "undue
burden" on the right to an abortion, as defined by the Supreme Court in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey. The plaintiffs also argued that the Act's lack of an exception
for abortions necessary to protect the health of the mother rendered it
unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's decision in Stenberg v. Carhart,
regardless of Congress's finding in the Act that partial-birth abortions are never
medically necessary.
A federal District Court agreed and ruled the Act unconstitutional on both
grounds. The government appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
The government argued that the Act only bans a narrow category of abortion
procedures, and that a health exception is not required when Congress determines
that a banned abortion procedure is never necessary for the health of the mother.
The Eighth Circuit disagreed and upheld the District Court, ruling that a health
exception is required for all bans on abortion procedures when "substantial
medical authority" supports the necessity of the procedure. The Circuit Court
ruled that the ongoing disagreement among medical experts over the necessity of
intact D&E; abortions was sufficient to establish that the Act was unconstitutional
without a health exception. The Circuit Court did not reach the question of
whether the Act was so broad as to qualify as an unconstitutional "undue burden."
Question: Is the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 an unconstitutional
violation of personal liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment because the Act
lacks an exception for partial-birth abortions necessary to protect the health of the
mother?
Conclusion: No. The Court ruled by a 5-4 vote that Congress's ban on partial-
birth abortion was not unconstitutionally vague and did not impose an undue
burden on the right to an abortion. Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote the opinion for
the majority. The Court held that, under the most reasonable interpretation, the
Act applies only to the intact D&E; method (also known as "partial-birth
abortion") and not to the more common D&E; procedure. The Act's application
was limited by provisions that restrict enforcement to cases where the physician
intends to perform an intact D&E; and delivers the still-living fetus past specific
"anatomical landmarks." Because the majority found that the Act applies only to a
specific method of abortion, it held that the ban was not unconstitutionally vague,
overbroad, or an undue burden on the decision to obtain an abortion. The Court
also held that Congress, after finding intact D&E; never to be medically
necessary, could validly omit a health exception from the ban, even when "some
part of the medical community" considers the procedure necessary. To require the
exception whenever "medical uncertainty" exists would be "too exacting a
standard to impose on the legislative power [...] to regulate the medical
profession." The Court left open the possibility that an as-applied challenge could
be brought against the Act if it were ever applied in a situation in which an intact
D&E; was necessary to preserve a woman's health. Justice Ginsburg's dissent
disputed the majority's claim that the opinion was consistent with the Casey and
Stenberg precedents and said "The Court's hostility to the right Roe and Casey
secured is not concealed."
Decision: 5 votes for Gonzales, 4 vote(s) against
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------
3/23
D. Medical Care Decisions, pp. 1040-1048
3/28
G. Sexual Orientation and Sexual Activity, pp. 1056-1069 (Lawrence v. Texas)
Lawrence v. Texas
Facts of the Case: Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private
residence, Houston police entered John Lawrence's apartment and saw him and
another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act.
Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in
violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in
certain intimate sexual conduct. In affirming, the State Court of Appeals held that
the statute was not unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, with Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986),
controlling.
Question: Do the criminal convictions of John Lawrence and Tyron Garner under
the Texas "Homosexual Conduct" law, which criminalizes sexual intimacy by
same-sex couples, but not identical behavior by different-sex couples, violate the
Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection of laws? Do their criminal
convictions for adult consensual sexual intimacy in the home violate their vital
interests in liberty and privacy protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment? Should Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), be
overruled?
Conclusion: No, yes, and yes. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy, the Court held that the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons
of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due
Process Clause. After explaining what it deemed the doubtful and overstated
premises of Bowers, the Court reasoned that the case turned on whether Lawrence
and Garner were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of
their liberty under the Due Process Clause. "Their right to liberty under the Due
Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without
intervention of the government," wrote Justice Kennedy. "The Texas statute
furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal
and private life of the individual," continued Justice Kennedy. Accordingly, the
Court overruled Bowers. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor filed an opinion
concurring in the judgment. Justices Clarence Thomas and Antonin Scalia, with
whom Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Thomas joined, filed
dissents.
Decisions
Decision: 6 votes for Lawrence and Garner, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Due Process