REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y.
2021-2022 1
Why does the Constitution devotes an entire Article for
the Bill of Rights? And why was it placed in Article III
in the Constitution?
A: It is purposely placed there to set limitations and to
ensure that the State will not be committing abuses in its
exercise of its inherent powers — police power, power of
imminent domain, and power of taxation.
The 1987 Constitution is considered as a 3-in-1
Constitution. Primarily divided into 3, the provisions are:
1. CONSTITUTION OF SOVEREIGNTY (supreme power
to govern) – Government of the people, for the people and
by the people.
Article I (Philippine Territory) – this is the first indicia that
the Constitution is making known its desire to exercise
sovereignty over the metes and bounds of its territories
over the Philippine archipelago (even extend up to 12-nm
from the baseline stretch which we call the territorial sea).
Simply put, sovereignty means the State has the power to
ordain and enforce laws over the entirety of the
Philippines.
Article II (Declaration of Principles and Policies) –
Section 1. “The Philippines is a democratic and republican
state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government
authority emanates from them.”
The people own the sovereignty thus we adhere to the
principle of democracy (our freedom) and republicanism
(which impose certain limits on freedom). The rights of
other persons are the limitations of our own right. ‘sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas’ (use your own right, but do not
violate the right of others). A right seizes to be one if in the
exercise of it, you are trampling upon the rights of others.
BUT, the Constitution is also regarded as a social contract
where people who wield or possess sovereignty under the
1987 Constitution surrender their sovereignty in favor of
the government so that the Government now will be the
one to exercise the sovereign powers to avoid chaos from
people exercising each of their own sovereignty.
2. CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT
Art. VI – Power of the legislature to make/repeal laws.
Art. VII - Executive Department executive these laws
Art. VIII – Judiciary merely interprets the law
Art. IX – Constitutional Commissions
Art. X – Local Government (autonomy of all LGUs)
Art. XI – Ombudsman, SB and Tanodbayan
Art. XIII – Commission on Human Rights
3. CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (Article III BOR)
BILL OF RIGHTS
Declaration and enumeration of a person’s rights and
privileges which the Constitution is designed to
protect against violation by the government, or by
individuals or by groups of individuals.
Basis: According to Marcelo H. Del Pilar, perfection of
humanity is not possible without freedom for the individual.
Thus, the existence of social institutions and all political
organizations and relationships are justified insofar as they
have for their primary aim the defense and protection of
freedom.
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
CLASSES OF RIGHTS
1. Natural Rights – those possessed by every citizen
without being granted by the State for they are given to
man by God as human beings created in His image that he
may live a happy life. (inherent and inalienable). In PIL,
every child has the right to be born.
2. Constitutional Rights – conferred and protected by the
Constitution.
3. Statutory Rights – provided by law, promulgated by the
law-making body and consequently may be abolished by
the same body.
CLASSIFICATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
1. Political Rights – the power to participate directly or
indirectly in the establishment or administration of the
government. – Ex. Right to citizenship, right to suffrage,
right to information, right to form political parties, etc.
2. Civil Rights – a law which secures private individuals
for the purpose of securing enjoyment of their means of
Happiness. – Ex. Rights against involuntary servitude, right
not to be imprisoned because of debts, property rights,
right to a healthful and balance ecology, right to education
3. Social and Economic Rights – (ICESCR) – intended to
insure the well – being and economic security of an
individual.
4. Rights of the Accused (Section 14, Art. XIII) – intended
for the protection of a person accused of any crime.
GENERATIONS OF THE STUDY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
1st generation – Civil and Political Law (ICCPR)
2nd generation – Social & Economic Rights (ICESCR)
3rd generation – Right to (Collective) Development
The relationship between human rights and civil and
political rights: Human rights are broader in scope as a
matter of fact civil and political rights are just two slices of
the cake known as human rights law.
POLICE POWER – "that inherent and plenary power in
the State which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful
to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society.” In other
words, police power is vested upon any civilized
government for purposes of promoting the general welfare
or common good. This is actually one of the essences of
democracy and of course republicanism as espoused by
Section 1, Article II.
SCOPE OF THE POLICE POWER – insofar as the present
Constitution is concerned, the exercise of Police Power will
justify the enactment of legal measures that would cover
three very important areas:
1. Public Health; 2. Public Safety, 3. Public Morals
SECTION I, ARTICLE III
(Due process and Equal Protection Clause)
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, nor shall any person
be denied the equal protection of the laws.
1. Life – is the most important form of human rights. A
person who is breathing but is not accorded with all his
human rights is good as dead.
2. Liberty – everyone’s liberty cannot be taken away from
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
him without due process.
3. Property – one of the very important components of
comfortable living. Labor Rights – also partakes of a
property right. An employee cannot be just terminated from
his employment without due process.
DUE PROCESS – implies the right of the person affected
thereby to be present before the tribunal which pronounces
judgment upon the question of life, liberty and property in
its most comprehensive cases to be heard by testimony or
otherwise and to have the right of controverting by proof of
any material fact. [Medenilla vs. Civil Service Commission].
Due process of law is a proceeding which hears before it
condemns, the punishment of the guilty only proceeds after
inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. [Dartmouth
College vs Woodward & Daniel Webster]
Simply put, before the State condemns it has to give the
person a chance to be heard first; before it could proceed
to punish the guilty, it has to conduct an inquiry, and it
cannot render judgment if trial has not been conducted.
TWO ASPECTS OF DUE PROCESS — According to US
vs. Ling Su Fan (1908), due process of law is a process
according to the law of the land. Due process of law" is not
that the law shall be according to the wishes of all the
inhabitants of the state, but simply First, that there shall be
a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the
legislative department of the Government; Second, that
this law shall be reasonable in its operation; Third, that it
shall be enforced according to the regular methods of
procedure prescribed; and Fourth, that it shall be
applicable alike to all the citizens of the state or to all of a
class.
The first and second principles are known as the
Substantive Due Process; and The third and fourth
principles are known as Procedural Due Process.
TWO COMPONENTS/ASPECTS OF DUE PROCESS
In the case of Alliance for The Family Foundation, vs.
Janette Garin, due process of law has two aspects:
substantive and procedural. Substantive due process
refers to the intrinsic validity of a law that interferes with the
rights of a person to his life, liberty, or property. Procedural
due process, on the other hand, means compliance with
the procedures or steps, even periods, prescribed by the
statute, in conformity with the standard of fair play and
without arbitrariness on the part of those who are called
upon to administer it. Stated otherwise in the case of
Secretary Of Justice vs. Lantion, it consists of the two
basic rights of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee
of being heard by an impartial and competent tribunal.
Simply put, in substantive due process the law must be
valid, a person cannot be convicted of a crime based on an
invalid law otherwise, the elementary maxim of nullum
crimen nulla poena sine lege applies. Procedural due
process is procedural fairness.
Ex. Under the ROC, the trial cannot proceed without the
arraignment of the accused. An accused tried and convicted in
absentia prior to his arraignment must be acquitted even if he
was guilty as hell because there is a blatant violation of the
rules on criminal procedure.
Due Process is not always judicial due process. There are
other legal controversies that may have to be decided not
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
2
by the courts but by the administrative bodies which are
not always bound by the finer points of the judicial due
process as mandated by the Constitution. As explained in
these two doctrines:
Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies –
The mandate of the rules of procedures, there are certain
cases which though may be cognizable by the trial court
but one cannot immediately file charges without going
through the administrative process.
Ex: If an LGU enacts a tax ordinance (questionable). The
Local Government Code says that before you can question
the validity of a Local Tax ordinance before the court, you
have to bring it first to the attention of the SOJ → O.P. → CA
(if judgment is unfavorable).
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction – there are issues that
need not be brought to the attention of the judicial courts
first because those issues might be dependent upon the
expertise of the appropriate administrative agency.
Ex: For valid monetary claims against the government, you
need not go to court first, you have to first bring it to the
attention of the COA (Constitutional Law 1)
The observance of fairness in the conduct of any
investigation or inquiry is at the very heart of the due
process. The essence of due process is to be heard
and as applied to administrative proceedings, this
means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of action or ruling of complaint.
Administrative due process cannot be fully equated with
due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a
formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and
technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied. [Peter
Vivo vs. PAGCOR]
*RRACS – Revised Rules of Administrative Cases in the
Civil Service.
Due process requirement entails the opportunity to be
heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.
This is satisfied if the parties are given the opportunity to
explain their respective sides through position papers or
pleadings. Or when a person is notified of the charge
against him and given the opportunity to explain or defend
himself.
ANG TIBAY DOCTRINE (1940s) [Ang Tibay vs. CIR]
CARDINAL RIGHTS in administrative proceedings:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the
party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(the right to hearing and the right to present of a party
would be rendered meaningless if the tribunal will not give
any strain of consideration with regards these pieces of
evidence.
(3) The decision must have something to support itself.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a
finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be
"substantial." – quantum of proof required.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence
presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
(6) The tribunal or body or any of these judges must act on
its or his own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of
a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court should, in all controversial questions, render
its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decision rendered.
Two-Fold purpose of Administrative Due Process
1. Contributes to the accuracy and thus minimizes errors;
2. More intrinsically to the person with the subject of
deprivation, it gives him a sense of rational participation
and a decision that can affect his destiny and thus,
enhances his dignity. (Fr. Bernas)
Part of the due process clause is publication.
Publication cannot be dispensed with, without affecting the
validity of the law. The 15-day period can be increased or
shortened, but in no case shall publication be dispensed
with. Therefore, there is no such thing as immediate
effectivity of the law (if the period is silent, follow the 15-D
period (Tanada vs. Tuvera). Reason being that due
process which is a rule of fairness requires those who must
obey a command must first know what to obey. Else, the
maxim ignorantia legis non excusat. (Art. 3, NCC) is N/A
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL V CITY MAYOR OF MANILA,
G.R. No. L-24693, July 31, 1967
• Manila City Ordinance No. 4760 questioned for being
violative of the due process clause as it imposes too
many restrictions and regulations on hotels/motels
particularly Section 1: fees, filling out of form, inspection.
HELD: NO, the petition is not covered by the mantle of
protection associated with the due process guarantee.
Police power measures being specifically aimed to
safeguard public morals are immune from such
imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance. Petitioner’s
claim must bow down to police power. To hold otherwise
would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of
police power which has been properly characterized as
the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers, extending as it does "to all the great public
needs.” It would destroy the very purpose of the state if it
could be or allowed itself to be deprived of its
competence to promote public health, public morals,
public safety and the general welfare.
Velasco v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-24153, 2/14/1983
• Manila City Ordinance No. 4964 prohibits barbershops
to conduct massage business and in separate rooms.
Petitioners contend that it amounts to a deprivation of
property, of their means of livelihood without due process
of law.
HELD: It was NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The court
explained that it was a police power measure. The
objectives behind its enactment are:
(1) To impose payment of the license fee for engaging in
massage clinic business;
(2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might
grow out of the construction of separate rooms for
massage of customers." The Court has been most liberal
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
3
in sustaining ordinances based on the general
welfare clause.
GR: Potestas non potest delegari
XPN: When congress delegates police power to LGUs.
Congress enacted RA 7160 in 1991. It is a valid
delegation of police power.
LIMITATION: it cannot go against a statute/national law.
Ynot v. IAC, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987
• 6 carabaos were transported in a pump boat from
Masbate to Iloilo and were confiscated by the police for
violation of EO 626-A. Petitioner Ynot brought an action
for replevin and challenged the constitutionality of the
EO. Trial court sustained the confiscation and did not rule
on the constitutionality of the law on the ground that it
lacked authority to do so. Decision is affirmed by the IAC.
HELD: EO No. 626-A was declared unconstitutional. The
measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner
without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying
him the centuries old guarantee of elementary fair play –
due process.
Bautista v. Juinio, G.R. No. L-50908, 1/31/1984
• Pres. Marcos signed an LOI that banned the use of
vehicles under the "H" and "EH" classifications of the
LTC on certain days. Exempted are vehicles classified as
Service, Truck, DiPLomatic, Consular Corps, Tourist
Cars. MC No. 39, issued by respondent Minister of
PWTC and respondent LTC, imposing the penalties "of
fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of license”.
Petitioners claim that the LOI is discriminatory and a
denial of due process.
HELD: The laws operate equally and uniformly on all
persons under similar circumstances or that all persons
must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not
being different, both in the privileges conferred and the
liabilities imposed. The government is not required by the
Constitution to adhere to the policy of all or none. The
LOI cannot be declared void on its face as behind it is the
presumption of validity. The necessity for evidence to
rebut such presumption is unavoidable as underlying
questions of facts may condition the constitutionality of
legislation. Absence of some factual foundation of record
for overthrowing the statute, The presumption of validity
must prevail.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE – refers to the
constitutional guarantee of the equality of a person before
the law. The equal protection clause confers upon a person
the same rights and obligation under the law under the
same circumstances. There is more truism in legal equality
rather than total equality. The equal protection clause does
not prohibit classification, for the government is not
required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of all or
none, it does not prevent the legislature from establishing
classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules
shall operate, so long as the classification is not
unreasonable.
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
EQUAL PROTECTION CONCEPTS:
• Legal equality. We have the equal number of rights as
well as the number of obligations under the law under the
same circumstances.
• Does not prohibit classification. At times, the law may
impose classification insofar as those who are to be
benefited by law because it is required by circumstances.
Ex. Law on Senior Citizen
Classification – is the grouping of things in speculation or
practice because they agree with one another in certain
particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality.
The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so it goes
without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner
determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required
of a valid classification is that it be reasonable.
PEOPLE V. CAYAT, G.R. No. L-45987, May 5, 1939
• Mr. Cayat, a Non-Christian, native of Baguio and was
sentenced by the Justice of the Peace (MTC) to pay a
fine of ₱5 or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency for possessing a bottle of A-1-1 gin, an
intoxicating liquor contrary to Act No. 1639 which only
allows native wines and liquors made by the tribes. Cayat
invoked his constitutional protection on the equal
protection clause. He claimed that there was an invalid
classification. Argues that the law appeared problematic
and must be declared unconstitutional.
HELD: It is an established principle of constitutional law
that the guarantee of the equal protection of the law is
not violated by legislation based on reasonable
classification.
REQUISITES FOR VALID CLASSIFICATION
1. It must rest on substantial distinction which make real
differences;
2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4. Apply equally to all members of the same class
Act 1639 satisfies these requirements. The distinction is
unquestionably reasonable (history has it that their use of
intoxicating liquors resulted in lawlessness and crimes).
The Act is designed to promote peace and order in the
non-Christian tribes. Its ultimate purpose can be no other
than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater
Philippines. Judgment AFFIRMED.
CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION V.
BANGKO SENTRAL G.R. No. 148208 12/15/2004
• Unionism is encouraged by no less than the
Constitution. The management and the union must
engage in CBA (may contain a union security clause): (1)
Close shop agreement – management undertakes to
accept applicants who are not union members;
(2) Union shop agreement – management may accept
applicants who are not union members but within a
specific time as written in the CBA must become a union
member (terminated if not).
Cited the landmark case of Victoria v. Elizarde (1974),
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
4
one employee is a member of INC and they are not
allowed to join unions. There came a law which
exempted them from joining unions, likewise protected
them from being terminated because of either a close
shop/union shop agreement. Religious freedom always
prevails over some contractual obligation. Sometimes,
the law may make some exemptions. According to
INC’s ecclesiastical doctrine, this is not allowed and we
have to respect that. “Guarantee of the equal protection
clause is not a guarantee of equality in the application of
the laws upon all the citizens of the State.”
Villegas v. Hiu Chiung Tsai Pao Ho G.R. L-29646
• A City of Manila ordinance prohibits the employment of
aliens unless they first secure a permit from the Mayor
and pay the fee of ₱500. Violation of which incurs
imprisonment and a fine. The alien respondent who is
employed in Manila brought suit and obtained judgment
from the CFI, layering the ordinance null and void.
HELD: The ordinance involved is a tax measure and in
imposing a flat fee of ₱500, it fails to consider substantial
differences in situation among aliens and for that reason
violates the rule on uniformity of taxation. It also lays
down no guide for the granting or denial of permit and
therefore, permits the arbitrary exercise of discretion by
the City Mayor. The ordinance denies aliens’ due process
and the equal protection clause. Requiring a permit
before a person can be employed is tantamount to
denying him the basic right to earn a livelihood, the due
process clause and the equal protection clause over
citizens and aliens.
VERA V. CUEVAS, G.R. NO. L-33693-94 5/31/1979
• Section 169 of the Tax Code required that all
condensed skimmed milk in whatever form sold in the
Philippines shall be clearly and legibly marked on its
immediate containers with the words, "This milk is not
suitable for nourishment for infants less than one year of
age” or words of similar import. Private respondents
(engaged in the manufacture and sale of filled milk
products) brought an action before the CFI of Manila for
a declaration of their rights. The CFI restrained the CIR
and its agents from enforcing this requirement.
HELD: It was held that Section 169 of the Tax Code has
been repealed by RA 344. At any rate, Section 169
applies only to skimmed milk and not to filled milk;
enforced only against manufacturers of filled milk but not
against manufacturers of skimmed milk. Thus, denying
them the equal protection of the law.
DUMLAO V. COMELEC, G.R. L-52245 1//22/1980
• Section 4 of BP 52 provides (in part): “any retired
elective provincial city or municipal official … to which he
seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the
same elective local office from which he has retired.”
Dumlao (former governor of Nueva Vizcaya) and a
candidate for 1980 elections sued for prohibition to enjoin
enforcement of the law on the ground that it is contrary to
the equal protection and due process guarantee of the
Constitution.
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
HELD: No. The purpose of the law is to allow the
emergence of younger blood in local governments. The
classification in question being pursuant to that purpose,
it cannot be considered invalid. The tiredness of the
retiree for government work is present, and what is
emphatically significant is that the retired employee has
already declared himself tired and unavailable for the
same government work.
IGOT V. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245 1/22/1980
• Romeo Igot filed a petition for Prohibition to enjoin
enforcement of Sec. 4(2), BP 52: “any person convicted
of subversion, insurrection, rebellion or others of similar
offenses and the filing of charges for such crimes before
a civil or military tribunal after preliminary investigation
shall be a prima facie evidence of such fact.”
HELD: With respect to the presumption arising from the
filing in a court or military tribunal to such crimes after
preliminary investigation, this provides a contravention of
the constitutional presumption of innocence as the
candidate is disqualified for public office on the ground
alone that charges have been filed against him before
civil or military tribunal. Such a person is virtually placed
in the same category as a person already convicted of a
crime. Although the presumption is rebuttable, time
constraints may prevent from offering contrary proof, it is
best that evidence of disloyalty be passed upon by courts
rather than by an administrative body. – NULL and VOID.
NOTE: In both cases, Igot and Dumlao were not directly
injured. Dumlao’s petitions are mere requests for an
advisory opinion from the court – theory of judicial review
and in Igot, he has no locus standi (not been convicted or
charged with acts of disloyalty nor disqualified from being
candidates for local elective positions; can’t sue as taxpayer
since the issue is not about disbursement of public funds).
But because of the paramount public interest in the
question of the proximity in the election, the Court resolved
the issue on special disqualification.
Q: Are aliens entitled to the equal protection clause?
GR: It applies to all persons, both citizens and aliens. The
Constitution places the civil rights of aliens on equal footing
with those of the citizens.
XPN: Statutes may validly limit exclusively to citizens the
enjoyment of rights or privileges connected with public
domain, the public works, or the natural resources of the
State.
NOTE: The rights and interests of the State in these things
are not simply political but also proprietary in nature and so
citizens may lawfully be given preference over aliens in
their use or enjoyment.
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE V.
QUISUMBING, G.R. No. 128845, 6/1/2000
• International School, Inc. established primarily for
dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other
temporary residents. The School pursuant to Sec. 2(c) of
PD 732 hires teachers, classifying them into two: (1)
foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School grants
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
5
foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded to local-hires
i.e. housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and
home leave travel allowance and they are paid 25%
more. The School justifies the difference on two
"significant economic disadvantages": (a) the "dislocation
factor" and (b) limited tenure. International School
Alliance of Educators contested, claiming that the
point-of-hire classification employed by the School is
discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher
salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
HELD: The point-of-hire classification employed by
respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary
rates of foreign-hires and local hires is an invalid
classification and is violative of the equal protection
clause. There is no reasonable distinction between the
services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The
practice of the School of according higher salaries to
foreign-hires contravenes public policy and violates the
principle of equal work for equal pay. While the School
needs to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be
used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The
local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires
and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter.
The "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited
tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction
in salary rates and those ‘economic disadvantage” are
adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded to
them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, i.e. housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, etc.
DYCAICO V. SSS, G.R. No. 161357. 11/30/2005
• Bonifacio and Petitioner Elena Dycaico lived together
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. In
1989, Bonifacio retired and began receiving his monthly
SSS pension until he passed away in 1997. A few
months prior to his death, after retirement, Bonifacio
married Elena. Elena filed with the SSS an application for
survivor's pension. Her application was denied on the
ground that under Section 12- B(d) of RA 8282 or the
Social Security Law, she could not be considered a
primary beneficiary.
HELD: The Court held that the denial was invalid and
declared the proviso on Section 12-B(d) of RA 8282 as
violative of the equal protection clause. The proviso
which qualifies the term 'primary beneficiaries' results in
the classification of dependent spouses into two groups:
(1) spouses married to SSS members before retirement;
and (2) spouses married to SSS members AFTER
retirement. The petitioner belongs to the second group as
such, she and those similarly situated do not qualify as
'primary beneficiaries' and are not entitled to the pension.
The Congressional concern of the possibility of
relationships entered after retirement for the purpose of
obtaining benefits and Section 12-B(d) was apparently
intended to prevent such ‘sham marriages’ is concededly
valid. However, classifying dependent spouses and
determining their entitlement to survivor's pension based
on whether the marriage was contracted before or after
the retirement of the other spouse, regardless of the
duration of the said marriage, bears no relation to the
achievement of the policy objective of the law, i.e.,
provide meaningful protection to members and their
beneficiaries against the hazard of disability, sickness,
maternity, old age, death and other contingencies
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
resulting in loss of income or financial burden." The
proviso infringes the equal protection clause. Both are
still legal spouses.
GSIS V. MONTESCLAROS, G.R. No. 146494
Same situation with Dycaico vs. SSS, only difference in
law involved (GSIS Law). Both Social Security Laws
contain constitutional infirmities.
HIMAGAN VS PEOPLE GR No. 113811
• Himagan, a PNP in Davao, was implicated in the killing
of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of
Bernabe Machitar. After the information was filed with the
RTC, it issued an Order suspending petitioner until the
termination of the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A.
6975, otherwise known as DILG Act of 1990.
Himagan filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension
(11 months already), relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807 of
the Civil Service Decree. According to him, his
suspension should be lifted because it was supposedly
limited to 90 days. Motion was denied, thus he went to
the SC claiming that an imposition of preventive
suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the CSC Law
and would be a violation of his constitutional right to
equal protection of laws.
HELD: It was not a violation of the equal protection
clause. Section 47 of RA 6975 is not unconstitutional.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated
differently from the other classes of persons charged
criminally or administratively insofar as the application of
the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that
policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which
can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against
them. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a
serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is
pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are
obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily
cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in
uniform and armed. The equal protection clause exists to
prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to
eliminate discrimination and oppression based on
inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences
among men, the equal protection clause does not
demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all
persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. Equal Protection does not absolutely
forbid classifications so long as it meets the valid
requisites (as laid down in PP vs. Cayat).
SECTION II, ARTICLE III
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
6
seized.
GR: A person or his house including papers can neither be
searched nor seized without a valid search warrant or
warrant of arrest as the case may be.
REQUISITES FOR A VALID SEARCH WARRANT
1. There must be an existence of probable cause;
2. This probable cause must be personally determined by
the Judge by examination under oath or by affirmation of
the complainant and his witnesses; and
3. The so-called particularity of description of the place to
be search or the things to be seized.
Purpose of this provision: “The inviolability of the home
is one of the most fundamental of all the individual rights
declared and recognized in the political codes of civilized
nations.” – Fr. Bernas
“A man’s home is his castle.” No one can enter into the
home of another without the consent of its owner.
A privacy of a home, the place of abode, the place where
a man with his family may dwell in peace and enjoy the
companionship of his wife and children unmolested by
anyone even by the king, has always been regarded by
civilized nation as one of the most sacred personal right to
whom men are entitled.
PROBABLE CAUSE – defined generally as “such
reasons, supported by facts and circumstances, as will
warrant a cautious man in the belief that his action, and
the means taken in prosecuting it, are legally just and
proper. It is “such facts and circumstances antecedent to
the issuance of a warrant, that are in themselves sufficient
to induce a cautious man to rely upon them and act in
pursuance thereof.”
FOR PURPOSES OF THE ISSUANCE OF WOA – such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed by the person sought to be arrested.
FOR PURPOSES OF THE ISSUANCE OF SW – such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and the objects sought in connection with
the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
HOW PROBABLE CAUSE IS ESTABLISHED – Sec. 2
(last part: to be personally determined by the Judge…)
“The establishment of the existence of probable cause
presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the
party against whom they sought performed particular acts
or committed specific omissions violating a given provision
of our criminal law.” – Stonehill v. Diokno
Bache & Co. Vs. Hon. Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz, et al.
• Respondent Judge issued search warrant No. 2-M-70
relying only on the stenographic notes that were read to
him.
HELD: The warrant is invalid and the things seized were
declared to be the fruit of the poisonous tree and were
ordered to be returned to its owner. Personal
examination by the judge of the complainant and his
witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the
existence or non-existence of a probable cause, pursuant
to Art. III, Sec. 2 (last part) of the Constitution, and Sec.
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
3, Rule 126 of the RROC, both of which prohibit the
issuance of warrants except "upon probable cause." The
determination of whether or not a probable cause exists
calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal
of facts and should not be allowed to be delegated in the
absence of any rule to the contrary. The participation of
respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to the
issuance of Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 was limited to
listening to the stenographer’s readings of her notes, to a
few words of warning against the commission of perjury,
and to administering the oath to the complainant and his
witness – this cannot be considered a personal
examination. If there was an examination at all, it was the
one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court.
“Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are not
sufficient. The Judge has to take depositions in writing of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach
them to the record. Deposition is necessary in order that the
Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or
non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury
the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations
are false.” [Mata vs. Bayona]
Q: Is it necessary that a Judge should personally
determine P.C. before issuance of a valid WOA?
Soliven vs. Makasiar G.R. No. 82585 11/14/1988
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required
to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure,
he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting
documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the
existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he
may disregard the fiscal's report and require the
submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid
him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.
The judge may rely on the finding of the probable cause
by the investigating prosecutor.
SEARCH WARRANT WARRANT OF ARREST
Personal determination Judge may not personally
by the judge. determine and may rely
upon the finding of the
probable cause by the
investigating prosecutor
PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION
Section 2 of Article III requires that the things, the place or
person to be searched or the things to be seized must be
specifically or particularly described in the warrant.
Intent of the requirement [Uy Kheytin vs. Villareal]
• to limit the things to be seized to those, and only those,
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
7
particularly described in the search warrant
• to leave the officers of the law with no discretion
regarding what articles they shall seize, to the end that
"unreasonable searches and seizures" may not be made,
• that abuses may not be committed.
People v. Veloso, G.R. No. L-23051, 10/20/1925
(Validity of John Doe Warrants)
• A John Doe warrant was issued by the Judge and
Veloso was arrested. Velos questioned the legality of the
warrant as it violates the constitutional requirement of
particularity of description.
HELD: The warrant is valid. General rule, a warrant for
the apprehension of an unnamed party is void, "except in
those cases where it contains a description personae
such as will enable the officer to identify the accused."
The description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the
proper person upon whom the warrant is to be served.
As the search warrant stated that John Doe had
gambling apparatus in his possession in the building
occupied by him at No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of
Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose Ma. Veloso, the
manager of the club, the police could identify John Doe
as Jose Ma. Veloso without difficulty. A John Doe warrant
can be valid provided that it contains a description
personae.
Pangandaman Vs. Casar, G.R. No. 71782, 4/14/1988
(Limitation of John Doe Warrants)
• The issuance of John Doe Warrants is not unlimited.
Insofar, as warrants issued against 50 "John Does" and
not one of whom the witnesses to the complaint could or
would identify, it is of the nature of a general warrant, one
of a class of writs long proscribed as unconstitutional and
once anathematized as "totally subversive of the liberty
of the subject." Clearly violative of the constitutional
injunction that warrants of arrest should particularly
describe the person or persons to be seized, the warrant
must, as regards its unidentified subjects, be voided.
Specific description of property to be seized – the
description is required to be specific only insofar as the
circumstances will ordinarily allow. It is not required that
technical precision of description be given, particularly,
where by the nature of the goods to be seized, their
description must be rather general, since the requirement
of a technical description would mean that no warrant
could be issued.
Stonehill vs. Diokno, G.R. No. L-19550, June 19, 1967
(Particularity of description)
• 42 assailed warrants to seize and take possession of
personal property to wit: books of accounts, financial
records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other
documents and/or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursements receipts, balance
sheets and P&L statements and Bobbins (cigarette
wrappers) for an alleged “violation of Central Bank,
tariffs and custom laws, the internal revenue code
and the RPC.”
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022 8

being arrested who might be armed with a concealed

HELD: The Court in this case said that two points must
weapon and (2) to prevent the person from destroying
be stressed in connection with this constitutional
evidence within his reach.
mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but
upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in
Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court:
the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the
Person lawfully arrested may be searched for a dangerous
warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
weapon or anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of a crime without a search warrant.
None of these requirements has been complied with in
the contested warrants. Moreso, no specific offense had
been alleged in said applications. The averments with Nolasco v. Cruz-Paño, G.R. No. L-69803, 10/8/1985
respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a (Search incidental to lawful arrest)
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who
issued the warrants to have found the existence of • Mila Aguilar-Roque was one of the accused in a
probable cause, for the same presupposes the rebellion case. She was, at the time, at large but had a
introduction of competent proof that the party against standing warrant (fugitive of justice). Around 9 AM of
whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or August 6, the police applied for a search warrant from the
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision respondent to be served particularly in the leased
of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications residence of Roque which was described as a suspected
involved in this case do not allege any specific acts underground house of CPP/NPA. The search warrant
performed by petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of was then issued by the respondent judge under the
the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of pending criminal case for rebellion. It did not, however,
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal appear in the records that an application in writing was
Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code," without submitted by the Chief of CDG (Lt. Col Saldajeno), only
reference to any determinate provision of said laws. the deposition of Secret Agent Lapuz was submitted to
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure the court stating that to his knowledge, there were kept in
of records pertaining to all business transactions of the premises sought to be searched, some records,
petitioners, regardless of whether the transactions were documents and other papers of the CPP/NPA and the
legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all National Democratic Front including support money from
records of the petitioners and the aforementioned foreign and local sources intended for rebellion. At
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly around 11:30 Roque and Nolasco were arrested by the
contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights — Constabulary Security Group. At 12 noon, the CSG
that the things to be seized be particularly described — searched the premises and seized 428 documents and
as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the written materials, and additionally a portable typewriter,
elimination of general warrants. and 2 wooden boxes, making 431 items in all.

ISSUES: (1) WON the search is valid; (2) WON the

WARRANTLESS SEARCHES AND SEIZURES
seized documents and other property be returned to the
petitioner; (3) WON petitioners must be released.
GR: No person can be searched nor be arrested without a
valid warrant, either for search of his person, house,
HELD: (1) The search was NOT VALID. It is at once
dwelling, papers or effects or even the seizure of his
evident that the foregoing Search Warrant authorizes the
person or those objects named in the warrant after the
seizure of personal properties vaguely described and not
determination of the probable cause personally determined
particularized. It is an all embracing description which
by the judge and with the other constitutional requirement
includes everything conceivable regarding the
that the warrant must be specifically described objects and
Communist Party of the Philippines and the National
things to be seized.
Democratic Front. It does not specify what the subversive
books and instructions are; what the manuals not
XPN:
otherwise available to the public contain to make them
1. warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest;
subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of
2. search of a moving vehicle; Carroll Doctrine
rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the
3. seizure of evidence in “plain view”;
searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized
4. custom searches;
thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding
5. where there is waiver of rights; consented search
what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also
6. exigent and emergency circumstances.
were a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. It is thus
in the nature of a general warrant and infringes on the
1. SEARCHES INCIDENTAL TO A VALID ARREST
constitutional mandate requiring particular description of
– an official making an arrest may take from the person
the things to be seized. Search warrants of similar
arrested any money or property found upon his possession
description were considered null and void for being too
which was used in the commission of the crime or could be
general.
the fruit of the crime or which might be furnished by the
prisoners with the means of committing violence or
(2) No. Notwithstanding the irregular issuance of the
escaping or which may be used in evidence in the trial of
Search Warrant and although, ordinarily, the articles
the accused. These exceptions are applicable to instances
seized under an invalid search warrant should be
where there was a warrant for the arrest of a person
returned, they cannot be ordered returned. Some
sought to be taken into custody issued by the court. When
searches may be made without a warrant. Thus, Section
this warrant is served upon the person, the arresting officer
12, Rule 126, Rules of Court: A person charged with an
may search him even without a search warrant.
offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission
Two-Fold Purpose of this principle: (1) To protect the
of the offense.
arresting officer against physical harm from the person

From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan

University of Mindanao College of Law
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022 9

(3) NO. Considering that ROQUE has been charged with NOTE: Mere suspicion is never enough. But the conduct
Rebellion, which is a crime against public order; that the of the officers turned the mere suspicion into a probable
warrant for her arrest has not been served for a cause.
considerable period of time; that she was arrested within
the general vicinity of her dwelling; and that the search of
2.1. SEARCH OF A MOVING VEHICLE
her dwelling was made within a half hour of her arrest,
the search at her place not need a search warrant; this,
for possible effective results in the interest of public order. Valmonte vs. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988, 9/29/1989
Such being the case, the personalities seized may be
retained by CSG, for possible introduction as evidence in • NCRDC with the mission of conducting security
the Rebellion case, leaving it to ROQUE to object to their operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral
relevance and to ask the Special Military Commission to areas installed checkpoints in various parts of
return to her any and all irrelevant documents and Valenzuela, Metro Manila as part of its duty to maintain
articles. peace and order in the NCR. Petitioners alleged that
because of the installation of said checkpoints, the
residents of Valenzuela are worried of being harassed
2. SEARCHES FOR MOVING VEHICLES
and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical disposition and blanket
Papa v. Mago, G.R. No. L-27360, February 28, 1968 authority of the military manning the checkpoints,
considering that their cars and vehicles are being
• The counterintelligence unit of the Manila Police subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially
Department, received reliable information that a certain at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search
shipment of personal effects, allegedly misdeclared and warrant and/or court order in violation of the Constitution.
undervalued, would be released from the customs zone
of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks. Petitioner HELD: General allegation without stating the details of
Ricardo Papa, Chief of Police and a duly deputized agent the incidents which amount to a violation of right against
of the BOC, conducted surveillance at gate No. 1. unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable
When the trucks left, elements of the counter-intelligence the Court to determine whether there was a violation. Not
unit went after the trucks and intercepted them. The load all searches and seizures are prohibited; those which are
of the two trucks consisting of nine bales of goods, and reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not
the two trucks, were seized. Upon investigation, a person to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the resolved according to the facts of each case. True, the
policemen a "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of
in Informal Entry No. 147-5501", issued by the BOC in abuse by the men in uniform, in the same manner that all
the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit. Claiming to governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the
have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even
two trucks and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these
B. Lanopa filed with the CFI a petition "for mandamus abnormal times, when conducted within reasonable
with RO/PI” alleging, among others, that the goods limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly and a
seized by members of the Manila Police Department was peaceful society.
without a search warrant issued by a competent court.
Q: Does the law require prior announcement to the
HELD: The search and seizure was VALID. Section 2203
public before installing checkpoints?
of the Tariff and Customs Code authorizes persons
A: No, there is no need for checkpoints to be announced.
having police authority to enter, pass through or search
Not only would it be impractical, it would also forewarn
any land, inclosure, warehouse, store or building, not
those who intend to violate the ban. Even so, badges of
being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and
legitimacy of checkpoints may still be inferred from their
examine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, or
fixed location and the regularized manner in which they are
envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search
operated. SC ruled that not all checkpoints are illegal.
and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of
Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public
holding or conveying any dutiable or prohibited article
order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to
introduced into the Philippines contrary to law, without
motorists are allowed. For, admittedly, routine checkpoints
mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases.
do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists’ right to "free
Simply put, there is an express statutory provision under
passage without interruption," but it cannot be denied that,
the law. To require the law enforcer to apply for a search
as a rule, it involves only a brief detention of travelers
warrant prior to the conduct of the search would be
during which the vehicle’s occupants are required to
impractical because of mobility and the vehicle can be
answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle
quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body
the warrant must be sought. However, as emphasized by
search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a
the SC in Almeida Sanchez v. US (1973), automobile or
visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as
not, there must be probable cause for the search.
violative of an individual’s right against unreasonable
search. In fact, these routine checks, when conducted in a
In this case, the law enforcement had actually received
fixed area, are even less intrusive. [People V. Escaño]
a tip from an informant that triggered their suspicion and
conducted a surveillance wherein they gathered
LIMITS IN THE CONDUCT OF CHECKPOINTS
additional information that strengthened their belief that
indeed, some crimes were actually committed.
(a) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a

From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan

University of Mindanao College of Law
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fairgrounds;
(b) simply looks into a vehicle;
(c) flashes a light therein without opening the car’s doors;
[a,b,c – Valmonte vs. De Villa]
(d) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or
body search;
(e) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a
visual search or visual inspection; and
(f) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.
If the conduct of checkpoints is merely limited to above
allowable acts, such searches are less intrusive and
cannot as yet be considered as violative of Section 2,
Article III, 1987 Constitution. Never could a vehicle be
legally subjected to extensive search unless there is
probable cause to believe that the vehicle is being used in
the commission of a crime. Anything illegal obtained during
the search will be considered admissible.
The existence of probable cause justifying the warrantless
search is determined by the facts of each case such as:
the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned
by the driver, or where the accused was acting
suspiciously, and attempted to flee. The mere mobility of
those vehicles does not give the police authorities
unlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches
without warrant.” – [Aniag vs COMELEC]
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE – an illicit object may be seized
in plain view. Objects falling in plain view of an officer, who
has the right to be in the position to have that view, are
subject to seizure and may be introduced in the case. The
search must be inadvertent — “Kumbaga di ka
naghahanap pero kusa mo na lang nakikita”.
If an officer encountered prohibited objects only after
poking around, the discovery would not be considered
inadvertent. In the case of People vs. Tabar the SC said
where Marijuana sticks fall before the eyes of a police
officer, the seizure of those sticks would not of course
require a warrant.
PEOPLE V. MUSA, (G.R. No. 96177 1/27/1993
(Evidence in plain view doctrine)
• Citing Ker vs. US (marijuana was visible) in this case, it
was not; they had no clue of its contents. If inadvertently
they came across the plastic bag because it was within
their "plain view," what may be said to be the object in
their "plain view" was just the plastic bag and not the
marijuana.
The U.S. SC stated the following limitations on the
application of the doctrine:
What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the
police officer in each of them had a 1prior justification for
an intrusion in the course of which he 2inadvertently
came across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior
justification — whether it be a warrant for another object,
hot pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some
other legitimate reason for being present unconnected
with a search directed against the accused — and
permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension
of the original justification is legitimate only where it is
immediately apparent to the police that they have
evidence before them; The "plain view" doctrine may not,
however, be used to launch unbridled searches and
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
10
indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general
exploratory search made solely to find evidence of
defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually
applied where a police officer is not searching for
evidence against the accused, but nonetheless
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
People vs. Valdez G.R. No. 129296, 9/25/2000
• Valdez was charged for violating Sec. 9 of R.A. No.
6425 as amended by R.A. No. 7659 for allegedly caught
in flagrante delicto and without authority of law, planted,
cultivated and cultured (7) fully grown Indian Hemp. He
was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The witnesses (5
policemen) testified that Valdez admitted that the
marijuanas was his. They uprooted, took photos of
Valdez standing beside the cannabis, and arrested him
(WITHOUT A WARRANT). Valdez claimed that he was
weeding his vegetable farm when he was called by an
unidentified person and was asked to go with the latter to
see something and 5 armed policemen were present and
they made him stand in front of the hemp plants. He was
then asked if he knew anything about the marijuana
growing there. When he denied SPO2 Libunao poked a
fist at him and told him to admit ownership of the plants.
Valdez contends that there was unlawful search.
HELD: 1There was no S.W. issued by a judge after
personal determination of the existence of P.C. given the
fact that police had ample time to obtain S.W. The
confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an
illegal search and seizure. Thus, they cannot be used as
evidence against appellant for being the proverbial fruit of
the poisonous tree. The mantle of protection extended
by the B.O.R. covers both innocent and guilty alike
against any form of high-handedness of law enforcers,
regardless of the praise-worthiness of their intentions.
2
Before an accused may be convicted of a crime, the
prosecution must establish by proof beyond reasonable
doubt that a crime was committed and that the accused
is the author thereof (fundamental). The evidence must
not only stand the test of reason, it must also be credible
and competent – “generally admissible” evidence — .
“of such a character that the court or judge is bound to
receive it, that is, allow it to be introduced at trial”. 3The
Constitution decrees that, “In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved.” To justify the conviction, the
prosecution must adduce that quantum of evidence
sufficient to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence. The prosecution must stand or fall on its
evidence and cannot draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the accused. Absent the required
degree of proof of guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal.
People of the Philippines vs. Idel Aminnudin
• Aminnudin was arrested shortly after embarking from
M/V Wilcon 9 at around 8:30 PM in Iloilo City on June 25,
1984 by the Officers who acted on a “tip” received 2 days
prior. He was accosted, inspected his bag and found
articles which look like marijuana leaves, and took him to
their HQ for investigation. The articles were confiscated
and later taken to the NBI lab for examination. When they
were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
him. Eventually he was convicted. In his defense,
Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, contending that all
he had in his bag was his clothing. He insisted he did not
even know what marijuana looked like and that his
business was selling watches and sometimes cigarettes.
He also contended that his bag was confiscated without
a search warrant.
HELD: The search and the arrest conducted is
UNLAWFUL and in violation of Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution. There was no warrant of arrest or search
warrant issued by a judge after personal determination
by him of the existence of probable cause. The officers
had at least two days within which they could have
obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin. His
name was known, the vehicle was identified, the date of
its arrival was certain, and from the information they had
received, they could have persuaded a judge that there
was probable cause to justify the issuance of the warrant,
yet they did nothing. No effort was made to comply with
the law. Amminudin was not, at the moment of his arrest,
committing a crime nor was it shown that he was about to
do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing
was descending the gangplank of the vessel and there
was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers
innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only
when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that
triggered his arrest. The Identification by the informer
was the probable cause as determined by the officers
(and not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon
Aminnudin and immediately arrest him. The marijuana
leaves here were excluded as evidence.
People vs Tangliben G.R. NO. 63630, April 06, 1990
• At around 9:30 in the evening the Patrolmen noticed a
person carrying a red traveling bag who was acting
suspiciously and they confronted him; that the person
was requested by Patrolman Quevedo and Punzalan to
open the red traveling bag but the person refused, only to
accede later on when the patrolmen identified
themselves; that found inside the bag were marijuana
leaves wrapped in plastic wrapper and weighing one kilo,
more or less. The counsel for the accused stated that the
marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was a
product of an unlawful search without a warrant and is
therefore inadmissible in evidence.
HELD: The contention is devoid of merit. This case falls
squarely on the exceptions under Section 12 of Rule 126
of the ROC and Rule 113, Sec. 5(a). In contrast to the
case of Aminnudin, here presents urgency. There was an
informer who pointed to Tangliben. Faced with such
on-the-spot information, the police officers had to act
quickly. There was not enough time to secure a search
warrant. To require search warrants during on-the-spot
apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal possessors of
firearms, jueteng collectors, smugglers of contraband
goods, robbers, etc. would make it extremely difficult, if
not impossible to contain the crimes with which these
persons are associated.
People v. Burgos GR No. L-68955 9/4/1986
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
11
• Cesar Masamlok surrendered to the authorities and
pointed Ruben Burgos (accused) as a member of the
NPA who threatened to kill him and his family if he
refused to join. The police then formed a task force to
arrest Burgos. They went to Burgos’ residence where
they saw him plowing his field. They arrested him and
recovered from his house a caliber .38 revolver buried
under the ground. The arrest was made without any
warrant or at least a search warrant. He was also not
reminded of his constitutional rights. According to
Burgos, he was not a member of the NPA. The gun was
actually buried by Masamlok himself a few days before
the arrest without the former’s knowledge since he was
not in his house then. It was only his wife who was
present and she was threatened by Masamlok not to
report the gun to the authorities. After his warrantless
arrest, he disclosed that he was tortured for days to
admit the ownership of the recovered revolver.
HELD: The warrantless arrest of Burgos is not justified.
The exceptions in Sec. 6, Rule 113 of ROC must be
strictly construed. There is no compelling reason for the
haste and the failure to first go through the process of
obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had
reasonable grounds to believe that the accused had
committed a crime. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the
officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have
personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also
be committed in his presence or within his view. There is
no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever
knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it
came in its entirety from the information furnished by
Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given
by the appellant’s wife. At the time of the appellant’s
arrest, Burgos was not in actual possession of any
firearm or subversive document. Neither was he
committing any act which could be described as
subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time
of the arrest. They were still fishing for evidence of a
crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of
the subject firearm on the basis of information from the
lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful
and the firearm is inadmissible for being the proverbial
fruit of the poisonous tree.
PEOPLE VS. MARIACOS
• Mariacos was arrested after she was carrying a bag
alleged to have prohibited drugs inside. The bag, before
it came into her possession, was found inside a
passenger jeepney with no owner so the policeman
looked inside it only to find packs of marijuana. The
policeman was acting on a report made about the bag by
an agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network. Mariacos
invoked Sec. 2, Art. 3.
HELD: The Court opines that the invocation of Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution is misplaced. At the time,
when PO2 Pallayoc looked into the contents of the
suspicious bags, there was no identified owner. He asked
the other passengers atop the jeepney but no one knew
who owned the bags. Thus, there could be no violation of
the right when no one was entitled thereto at that time.
The search was conducted in a moving vehicle. Time and
again, a search of a moving vehicle has been justified on
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
the ground that the mobility of vehicles makes it possible
to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought. Thus, under the facts, PO2
Pallayoc could not be expected to secure a search
warrant in order to check the contents of the bags which
were loaded on top of the moving jeepney. Otherwise, a
search warrant would have been of no use because the
motor vehicle had already left the locality. The search in
this case is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband
or prohibited drugs was about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc
had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would be
unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before
conducting the search under the circumstances. Time
was of the essence in this case.
NB: Always consider if there is urgency.
PP vs. Jack Racho y Raquero G.R. No. 186529
• Racho was charged with violation of RA 9165. He was
arrested alighting from Genesis bus info he relayed to the
confidential agent whom he transacted with for the
purchase of shabu. RTC’s verdict is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and CA affirmed.
HELD: Racho can no longer question the validity of his
arrest, but the subsequent warrantless search is not
valid. He is deemed to have waived his right to question
the validity of his arrest when he never objected to the
irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. It is his
first time to raise the issue. He actively participated in the
trial of the case and voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the court. The sachet of shabu seized from
him during the warrantless search is inadmissible in
evidence against him. It was confiscated during a
warrantless search incidental to an unlawful arrest. There
was no sufficient probable cause to effect a valid
warrantless arrest because appellant herein did not
perform some overt act that would indicate that he has
committed, was actually committing, or was attempting to
commit an offense. The tip or “reliable information” alone
is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest.
NOTES: A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does
not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence
seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. The 1987
Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure
must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it
becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained
therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding. Said proscription, however, admits certain
exceptions. Officers had time to secure the warrant. Also
the information was only coming from a “confidential
agent” not from the officers themselves, they had no
personal knowledge.
This circumstance gives rise to another question:
whether that information, by itself, is sufficient probable
cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest. The long
standing rule in this jurisdiction is that “reliable
information” alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless
arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused
perform some overt act that would indicate that he has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense.
PEOPLE V. COMPACION G.R. 124442, 7 /20/2001
(WAIVER OF RIGHTS)
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
12
• Officers conducted a surveillance on Compacion’s
residence (on a confidential tip supplied by an informant
that accused was growing and cultivating marijuana
plants). During the surveillance, they saw 2 tall plants in
the backyard of the accused which they suspected as
marijuana plants. The team proceeded to the house
despite failure to obtain a warrant. The prosecution
contends that the accused opened the gate and
permitted them to come in. He was immediately asked
about the suspected marijuana plants and he admitted
that he planted and cultivated the same for the use of his
wife who was suffering from migraine. However,
Compacion’s version stated that while he and his family
were sleeping, he heard somebody knocking outside his
house. After he opened the gate, 4 persons whom he
thought were members of the military went inside his
house. One of them told him to sit in the living room.
Some went upstairs while the others went around the
house. None of them asked for his permission to search
his house.
HELD: The search and seizure conducted was not
authorized by a search warrant. Neither does it fall within
the exceptions. The accused’ right against unreasonable
search was clearly violated. It is extant from the records
that he’ did not consent to the warrantless search and
seizure conducted. While such rights may be waived,
either expressly or impliedly, such waiver must constitute
a valid waiver made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently. The act of the accused in allowing the
members of the military to enter his premises and his
consequent silence during the unreasonable search and
seizure could not be construed as voluntary submission
or an implied acquiescence especially so when members
of the raiding team were intimidatingly numerous and
heavily armed. His implied acquiescence, if any, could
not have been more than mere passive conformity given
under coercive or intimidating circumstances and is, thus,
considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee. Consequently, herein
accused-appellants lack of objection to the search and
seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional
right or a voluntary submission to the warrantless search
and seizure.
PP V. DE GRACIA, G.R. No. 102009-10 7/6/1994
DOCTRINE OF EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES
• There were intelligent reports that a building was being
used as headquarters by RAM — former rebel soldiers
during the time of Col. Gringo Honasan (1989 coup
d’etat) A surveillance team was coming out of the
building but the occupants refused to open the door
despite repeated requests. Indications were there that
there were large quantities of explosives and ammunition
inside the building. At the time, nearby courts were
closed and there was general chaos and disorder in the
area. The raiding team forcibly entered the building and
conducted the search. In the search, there were
recovered several illegal items (firearms used by former
rebels and subversive documents). The soldiers were
criminally charged before the court. In defense, the
members of the RAM captured interposed the argument
that the evidence against them (firearms and
ammunition, etc.) can never be used as evidence
because they are inadmissible.
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
HELD: Under the foregoing circumstances, the instant
case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition
against a warrantless search. In the first place, the
military operatives, taking into account the facts obtained
in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a
crime was being committed. There was consequently
more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their
action. Furthermore, under the situation then prevailing,
the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and
secure a search warrant from the courts because the
courts were closed at that time. Under such urgency of
the moment, the search warrant should lawfully be
dispensed with it. This is known as warrantless search
due to an exigent circumstance.
STOP AND FRISK RULE – TERRY SEARCH
CASE NO. 1 POSADAS VS. CA
FIRST CITED THE TERRY VS. OHIO CASE (1968): In this
case, two men repeatedly walked past a store window and
returned to a spot where they apparently conferred with a
third man. This aroused the suspicion of a police officer. To
the experienced officer, the behavior of the men indicated
that they were sizing up the store for an armed robbery.
When the police officer approached the men and asked
them for their names, they mumbled a reply. Whereupon,
the officer grabbed one of them, spun him around and
frisked him. Finding a concealed weapon in one, he did the
same to the other two and found another weapon. In the
prosecution for the offense of carrying a concealed weapon,
the defense of illegal search and seizure was put up. The
United States Supreme Court explained that "where a
police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him to
reasonably conclude in the light of his experience that a
criminal activity may be afoot that a person with whom he
may be dealing with is armed and dangerous. Wherein the
course of the investigation of this behavior he identifies
himself as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries
and when nothing in the initial stages of encounter serves
to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others safety, he
is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the
area, a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
person in an attempt to discover weapons which must be
used to assault him, such a search is reasonable."
• Two policemen on foot patrol along Magallanes St. in
DC noticed a person who was walking so fast and was
holding a buri bag. When the duo tried to approach him,
he hurriedly sped up by running as fast as he could.
When he was captured, a .38 caliber unlicensed revolver
was found and he was charged with PD1866
(possession of unlicensed firearm). During trial, the
prosecution offered the revolver as evidence; the
accused questioned the admissibility of the revolver
invoking Section 2 article 3, saying that it can’t be used
as evidence for being the fruit of the poisonous tree.
HELD: The revolver is admissible as evidence. While it
is true that the apprehending policemen cannot yet
validly interpose probable cause when they tried to the
accused. Nevertheless, when the law tried to catch the
attention of the accused, and he subsequently ran
apparently out of fear as he was aware that he
possessed something illicit, then the situation was
sufficient enough for probable cause to apply. Thus, the
policemen were justified when they searched him
without a warrant and that the unlicensed firearm may
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
13
be introduced as evidence as the accused was in the act
of committing a crime when apprehended.
CASE NO. 2: PEOPLE VS. SOLAYAO — Accused with
his companions fled upon seeing the government
agents. Under the circumstances, the government
agents could not possibly have procured a search
warrant first. This case constitutes an instance where a
search and seizure may be effected without first making
an arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop and
frisk". The SC underscored probable cause as the basis
for the conduct of the Stop and frisk.
CASE NO. 3: MALACAT VS. CA — The Supreme Court
discussed the justification for an allowable scope of a
"stop-and-frisk" as a "limited protective search of outer
clothing for weapons. While probable cause is not
required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless
holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a
"stop and frisk."
A "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest:
(1) effective crime prevention and detection.
(2) safety and self-preservation which permit the police
officer to take steps to assure himself that the person
with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the
police officer.
COMPARE THIS DOCTRINE W/ PP VS. MENGOTE
Policemen saw two men "looking from side to side," one
of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached
the duo and identified themselves as policemen,
whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to
escape because the other lawmen had surrounded
them. The suspects were then searched. One of them,
who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found
with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six
live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later
identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife recovered
from their possession. The weapons were taken from
them and used as evidence in a prosecution for the
possession of unlicensed firearms.
HELD: There is no question that evidence obtained as a
result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in
any proceeding for any purpose. The police officers
cannot lean on probable cause when proceeding with
the search there was no offense involved from
looking side to side and the other one is holding the
abdomen. The essential requisites of probable cause
must still be satisfied before the warrantless search and
seizure can be had. Probable cause in this case must
only be based on reasonable grounds of suspicion or
belief that a crime has been committed or is about to be
committed. It is not however decided by the Judge in this
case as required by Section 2, Article 3 but by the
searching police officers.
INSTANCES WHERE AN ARREST MAY BE VALIDLY
MADE WITHOUT A WARRANT OF ARREST
GR: No one can be illegally arrested without warrant.
XPNs: Section 5 Rule 113 Rules of Court
Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense; – IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO
*Crime must be witnessed by the arresting officer. [People vs
Posadas – he was arrested for commiting the crime of PD
1866]
(b) When an offense has just been committed, and he has
probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and – HOT PURSUIT
*Arresting officer must have personal knowledge by way of the
information obtained from the eye witness. [People vs Jayson
– the arresting policemen had personal knowledge from the
eye witnesses who pointed at the bouncer minutes after he
tried to flee the scene.]
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has
escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another. ESCAPEE
In cases falling under paragraph (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with Sec. 7, Rule 112.
NOTE: • A warrantless arrest effected 3 months after the
commission of the crime is already invalid. It must be a
regular filing as opposed to inquest proceedings.
• For continuing crimes a warrantless arrest may still be
applied invoking Section 5(1), Rule 113. Even if the one
who is in the possession of the stolen item is not the one
who stole it, nonetheless he can still be filed with a criminal
case in violation of the anti-fencing law.
BUY BUST OPERATION – is a form of entrapment. This
is different from instigation because it is the means by
which the accused is lured into the commission of the
offense charged in order to prosecute him. On the other
hand, entrapment is the employment of such ways and
means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a
lawbreaker.
ILLUSTRATIVE CASES:
*PEOPLE VS. MARTINEZ G.R. No. 198694
• Officers of Station Anti-Illegal Drugs of the Malate
Police arrested Ramon for purportedly violating Section
844 of Manila City Ordinance which punishes breaches
of the peace when he shouted "Putanginamo! Limang
daan na ba ito?" He was asked to empty his pockets
and there recovered from him a small transparent plastic
sachet containing shabu. It was confiscated and Ramon
was brought to the police station.
HELD: The act of shouting in a thickly-populated place,
with many people conversing with each other on the
street, would constitute any of the acts punishable under
Section 844 of the Ordinance. Ramon was not making or
assisting in any riot, affray, disorder, disturbance, or
breach of the peace; he was not assaulting, beating or
using personal violence upon another; and, the words
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
14
he allegedly shouted are not slanderous, threatening or
abusive, and thus, could not have tended to disturb the
peace or excite a riot. All told, no P.C. exists to justify
Ramon’s warrantless arrest. Arrest should not be
exercised in a whimsical manner, else a person’s liberty
be subjected to ubiquitous abuse. As Law enforcers, it is
largely expected of them to conduct a more circumspect
assessment of the situation.
Q: Does prior surveillance or “Test Buy” is necessary
for the validity of a buy bust operation in drug cases?
A: No, SC said that it was not required. The court
categorically stated in the case of Ermico vs. People that
the prior surveillance or Test buy is not required for a valid
buy bust operation, for as long as the authority is
accompanied by their informant. Thus, the court said in
People vs Francisco Manlangit that simple as the rule
that the absence of prior surveillance of test buy does not
affect the legality of the buy bust operation there is no
textbook method of conducting buy bust operation, the
court has left to the discretion to the police authorities for
the selection of defective means to apprehend drug
dealers. The prior surveillance was less lengthy one is not
necessary especially where the police operatives are
accompanied by their informant during the entrapment,
flexibility is a trade of good police work that when time is of
the essence the police may dispense with need for prior
surveillance.
Atty Bonocan: Proper conduct of buy bust operation
would require that the poseur buyer must be an organic
member of the law enforcement organization. It would be
enough that an informant comes to the police and then the
police immediately thereafter will conduct a buy bust
operation by making use of one its operatives to act as a
poseur buyer with the drugs marked money and will
perform the orchestrated purchase. In that case when the
person is arrested by the drug dealer upon handing over
the illicit merchandise, the poseur buyer along with the
other operatives may now effect the necessary arrest and
there would be no constitutional violation in that situation.
FAJARDO VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 190889
“The object must be open to the eye and hand its
discovery must be INADVERTENT”
• Members of PISO were instructed to respond to the
complaint of some concerned citizens, that there were
accordingly armed men drinking liquor at the residence of
Elenita Fajardo, and who were indiscriminately firing.
Upon the officers arrival they notice that several persons
run in different direction, the responding team saw one
Valerio, who was holding two .45 caliber pistols, he fired
shots to the policeman before entering the house of
Fajardo, then Fajardo was seen tucking a .45 between
her waist and the waistband of her shorts. After which
she entered the house and locked the main door. The
officers cordoned the perimeter of the house as they
waited for further instructions, this time SP02 Nava who
was posted at back portion of the house of Fajardo saw
Valerio emerged twice on top of the house and throw
something, SP02 Nava and others who acted as a
witness recovered the said object which turn out to be
two (2) receivers of a .45 caliber pistol. Thus, they were
convicted of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition under the plain view doctrine. On appeal,
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Fajardo insisted on acquittal; she claimed that the
discovery of two receivers does not come in the purview
of the plain view doctrine.
HELD: The seizure of the 2 .45 pistols outside the
petitioner’s house falls within the purview of the plain
view doctrine. The presence of SPO2 Nava at the back
of the house and of the other law enforcers around the
premises was justified by the fact that Fajardo and
Valerio were earlier seen holding .45 caliber pistols
before they ran inside the house and sought refuge. The
attendant circumstances and their evasive actions when
the law enforcers arrived engendered a reasonable
ground for the latter to believe that a crime was being
committed. There was thus sufficient probable cause for
the policemen to cordon off the house as they waited for
daybreak to apply for a search warrant. SP02 Nava
clearly saw on two different instances that Valerio
emerged on top of the subject dwelling and threw
suspicious objects. Thus, he had reasonable grounds to
believe that the things thrown might be contraband items,
or evidence of the offense they were suspected of
committing.
The ensuing recovery of the receivers was inadvertent, it
is not crucial that the initial citing that the seized
contraband may be identified and known; all that is
merely required that the law enforcer observes that the
seized item may be evidence of a crime or a contraband
subject of seizure.
NOTE: The constitutional protection found in Section 2,
article 3 of the constitution can only be invoked against the
However, the liability for their possession of the receivers
state NOT AGAINST PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS. If we talk
should fall only for Valerio and not for Fajardo. Fajardo
about unreasonable searches and seizures.
was neither in physical nor constructive possession of
the subject receivers. The testimony of SPO2 Nava
clearly bared that he only saw Valerio on top of the house
when the receivers were thrown. None of the witnesses
saw the petitioner holding the receivers, before or during
their disposal. At the very least, Fajardo’s possession
of the receivers was merely incidental because
Valerio, the one in actual physical possession, was seen
at the rooftop of petitioner’s house. Absent any
evidence pointing to petitioner’s participation,
knowledge or consent in Valerio’s actions, she
cannot be held liable for illegal possession of the
receivers.
Requirements to legally hold firearm:
1. LTOP – License to own and possess firearm;
2. License of the firearms;
3. Permit to carry firearms outside residence.
*SESBREÑO V. CA G.R. No. 160689, 3/26/2014
• Meter inspectors of an electric company who after
obtaining permission from the housemaid of a particular
residence were allowed entry to the premises of the
house to inspect the electric meter registered in the
account of Sesbreno who was not around at the time, the
inspectors noticed that the electric meter is turned upside
down handing and its disc not rotating. Pursuant to the
Electric Service Commission Contract, the meter was
replaced with a new one and subject to a laboratory test.
Then the Electric company then sent Sesbreno a bill on
the unrecorded consumption. (most likely what Sesbreno
did was use a jumper that will enable him to consume
amounts of electricity without being recorded in the
meter) Sesbreno filed a complaint for damages against
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
15
the electric company and the inspectors in accordance
with Art 32 of the new civil code, among other grounds
he claimed that the inspectors entry into his residence is
not justified and was in violation of Section 2, Article 3 of
the 1987 constitution because the meter inspectors were
not armed with a search warrant.
HELD: The constitutional guarantee against unlawful
searches and seizures is intended as a restraint against
the Government and its agents tasked with law
enforcement. It is to be invoked only to ensure freedom
from arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of State power.
The Court has made this clear in its pronouncements,
including that made in People v. Marti. If the search is
made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must
generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of
constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the
behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private
establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the
case at bar, and without the intervention of police
authorities, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government
*People vs Cogaed GR NO. 200334, July 30, 2014
• Cogaed and Dayao were intercepted in a checkpoint
initiated by PSI Bayan who "received a text message
from an unidentified civilian informer" that one Marvin
Buya (a.k.a. Marvin Bugat) "would be transporting
marijuana" from Brgy. Lun-oy to Poblacion. When asked
about the contents of their bags, both replied that they
did not know since they were transporting the bags as a
favor for their barriomate named Marvin. Both were
arrested and in the police station they were requested to
empty their bags. Inside Cogaed’s sack was "4 rolled
pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting tops," and inside
Dayao’s yellow bag was a brick of suspected marijuana.
Both were criminally charged but Dayao was dismissed
for being a 14-year-old minor and Cogaed was convicted.
HELD: The Court held that the marijuana bricks and
fruiting tops are INADMISSIBLE as evidence. The search
involved in this case was initially a "stop and frisk"
search, but it did not comply with all the requirements of
reasonability. It is the police officer who should observe
facts that would lead to a reasonable degree of suspicion
of a person but in this case it was the driver. The police
officer should not adopt the suspicion initiated by another
person. This is necessary to justify that the person
suspected be stopped and reasonably searched.
Anything less than this would be an infringement upon
one’s basic right to security of one’s person and effects.
There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this
case, and there was no approximation for the probable
cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person
searched was not even the person mentioned by the
informant. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya,
this still remained only as one circumstance. This is not
enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings
without a valid search warrant. None of the other
exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the
evidence to be admissible. The facts of this case do not
qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest. There
can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights
even if he did not object when the police asked him to
open his bags. Cogaed’s silence or lack of aggressive
objection was a natural reaction to a coercive
environment brought about by the police officer’s
excessive intrusion into his private space. The
prosecution and the police carry the burden of showing
that the waiver of a constitutional right is one which is
knowing, intelligent, and free from any coercion. In all
cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.
SECTION III, ARTICLE III
(Privacy of Communication and Correspondence)
SECTION 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful
order of the court, or when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the
preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in
any proceeding. — EXCLUSIONARY RULE.
NOTE: This constitutional right can only be invoked
against the state, not against a private individual.
”Invasion of communication and correspondence is a kind
of search” – Fr. Bernas.
Ex: The use of postal mail – under this constitutional rule,
nobody can intrude in the privacy of the letter by forcibly
opening the sealed envelope. Even Verbal Communication
(Telephone, Landline) – Note that the traditional telephone
(only the person holding the hand held telephone can hear
what is on the other line) Under the law, it is regarded as
private communication. IIn the same manner of a Smartphone
— (tayo lang nakakarinig to secure the conversation) Even
the text messages – they are intended for one receiver only.
Unless you are using a loudspeaker, You cannot legally blame
anyone around who was able to overhear the conversation.
Do not use the speaker mode, because you have the
reasonable expectation that the communication is private.
Under RA 4200, Anti Wiretapping Act, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication done in
among others via telephone is criminally punishable
GR: The constitution protects our communication, even
correspondence, to be an inviolable right. So that the state
cannot just intrude into these matters without the lawful
court order, or an express provision of the law.
EFFECT OF THE NON-OBSERVANCE OF THIS RULE:
Any evidence obtained in violation of this rule shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Stated
otherwise, the evidence obtained in violation of this
principle will be considered as the fruit of the poisonous
tree.
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
16
COMERCIANTE vs PEOPLE GR NO. 205926
HELD: Section 2, Article III mandates that a search and
seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of
a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of
probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such
search and seizure becomes, as a general rule,
"unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional
provision.
To protect people from unreasonable searches and
seizures, Section 3 (2), Article III of the Constitution
provides for an exclusionary rule which instructs that
evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of
such unreasonable searches and seizures are deemed
tainted and should be excluded for being the proverbial
fruit of a poisonous tree.
Concept of the right to privacy: in general meaning is
the right to be alone, the right to be let alone.
HING VS CHOACHUY GR NO 179736
“The right to privacy is the right to be let alone”
The supreme court in this case explained that the right
to privacy is enshrined in our Constitution and in our
laws. It is defined as “the right to be free from
unwarranted exploitation of one’s person or from
intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way
as to cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary
sensibilities.” It is the right of an individual “to be
free from unwarranted publicity, or to live without
unwarranted interference by the public in matters in
which the public is not necessarily concerned.”
Simply put, the right to privacy is “the right to be let
alone.”
The Bill of Rights guarantees the people’s right to
privacy and protects them against the State’s abuse of
power. In this regard, the State recognizes the right of
the people to be secure in their houses. No one, not
even the State, except “in case of overriding social need
and then only under the stringent procedural
safeguards,” can disturb them in the privacy of their
homes
As a matter of fact, Article 26 (1) of the NCC states:
Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons. The
following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for
damages, prevention and other relief:
(1) Prying into the privacy of another's residence;
∙ This part of the civil code seeks to protect an individual's
right to privacy, and provides legal remedy against abuses
that may be committed by other individuals.
∙ This does not mean that only the residence is entitled to
privacy, because the law also covers similar acts – in
other words, a business establishment and an office is
likewise entitled to the same privacy when the public is
excluded therefrom, and only such individuals allowed
may come in.
Thus, an individual’s right to privacy under Article 26(1) of
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
the Civil Code should not be confined to his house or
residence as it may extend to places where he has the
right to exclude the public or deny them access. The
phrase “prying into the privacy of another’s residence,”
therefore, covers places, locations, or even situations
which an individual considers private. And as long as his
right is recognized by society, other individuals may not
infringe on his right to privacy. - [Hing vs Choachuy]
∙ Our right to privacy is one of the highest forms of human
rights.
∙ The concept of privacy also involves another relative
concept of Zones of Privacy
DISINI V. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE GR No.203335
(Discussion on Zones of Privacy)
HELD: Only those persons who have deliberately
broadcasted in public libelous remarks through the use
of the internet are criminally liable. The Zones of
privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within
these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible
unless excused by law and in accordance with
customary legal process. The meticulous regard we
accord to these zones arises not only from our
conviction that the right to privacy is a "constitutional
right" and "the right most valued by civilized men," but
also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and
"everyone has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks."
In assessing the challenge that the State has
impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a
court must determine whether a person has exhibited a
reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether
that expectation has been violated by unreasonable
government intrusion.
The concept of liberty would be emasculated if it does
not likewise compel respect for his personality as a
unique individual whose claim to privacy and interference
demands respect. In other words, our laws, especially
the constitution, will always seek to protect our human
right to privacy, especially on communication. [Morfe vs
Mutuc (1968)]
Constitutional guarantees that create zones of privacy:
(a) the right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
which is the basis of the right to be let alone (the beginning
of all freedom); and [Section 2, Article 3 & Section 3(1)]
(b) right to privacy of communication and correspondence.
Father Bernas in his book added that the right to privacy is
but an aspect of the right to be secured in one’s person.
Q: How is Privacy Classified? In the case of Whalen vs
Roe, decided by the US Supreme Court in 1997, The court
classified privacy into two categories:
1. Decisional Privacy – involves the right to independence
in making certain important decisions
2. Informational Privacy – refers to the interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters. — has two aspects: [Disini]
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
17
(1) the right not to have private information disclosed, and
(2) the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.
Two-fold Test in determining whether or not a matter is
entitled to the right to privacy:
1. subjective test – where one claiming the right must
have an actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a
certain matter.
2. objective test – where his or her expectation of privacy
must be one society is prepared to accept as objectively
reasonable.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 4200 : AN ACT TO PROHIBIT
AND PENALIZE WIRE TAPPING AND OTHER
RELATED VIOLATIONS OF THE PRIVACY OF
COMMUNICATION, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being
authorized by all the parties to any private communication
or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or dictaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder,
or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant
or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding
sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire
record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies
thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured
either before or after the effective date of this Act in the
manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for
any other person or persons; or to communicate the
contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any
other person: Provided, that the use of such record or any
copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation
or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not
be covered by this prohibition.
Q: Is RA 4200 redundant with Section 3 Article III?
A: No. Section 3 (Article III) of the constitution provides for
the general rule and the for the exclusionary rule. In RA
4200, not only does it prohibit and exclude evidence
illegally obtained but it also imposes criminal liability. This is
another safeguard to enforce our constitutional right.
Gaanan v. IAC G.R. No. L-69809, 16 October 1986
• Gaanan listened to the conversation on the extension
line (as instructed by Laconico) with Atty. Pintor, who
proposed a condition that they would withdraw the
complaint for direct assault if they would pay 8,000 to
which he agreed. When he brought the money as
instructed by Pintor, he was arrested. The following day,
Gaanan executed an affidavit stating that he heard
Pintor demand 8,000 for the withdrawal of the case.
Laconico attached the affidavit and charged them for
robbery and extortion. Atty. Pintor also charged Gaanan
of violation of the Anti-wiretapping law. On appeal, they
argued that the telephone extension is not covered by
the term device under RA 4200.
HELD: While the conversations were indeed private, the
law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a
"device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
overhearing, intercepting, or recording the
communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate
installation of a device or arrangement in order to
overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. An
extension telephone cannot be placed in the same
category as a dictaphone, dictograph or the other
devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the
use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire
or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in
this case was not installed for that purpose. It just
happened to be there for ordinary office use. The
purpose there was for convenience and not to violate the
anti wire-tapping law.
Additional Cases on Privacy of Communication and
Correspondence:
Salcedo–Ortañez v. CA G.R. No. 100662, 08/04/1994
• Rafael Ortanez filed with the RTC for annulment of
marriage with damages against his wife on the grounds
of lack of marriage license and physical capacity of
Teresita. On trial, Rafael presented 3 cassette tapes
containing alleged recordings of conversation with
Teresita and an unidentified person. Teresita interposed
an objection but the trial court denied it as well as her
motion for reconsideration. She appealed to the CA via a
petition via certiorari but affirmed the decision of the
RTC. Thus, she elevated the case to SC.
HELD: The tapes could not be admissible as evidence.
In fact, Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit
and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations
of the Privacy of Communication, and for other
purposes" expressly makes such tape recordings
inadmissible in evidence. Apart from the fact of course
that said act considered it a crime. Clearly, respondents,
the Trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the
afore-quoted provisions of the law in admitting in
evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a clear
showing that both parties to the telephone conversations
allowed the recording of the same, the inadmissibility of
the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833
• Socorro Ramirez filed with the RTC a civil case alleging
that one Ester Garcia in a confrontation in the latter's
office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a
"hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to
petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy. In support of her claim,
petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event
culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by
Ramirez as a result of Ramirez’s recording of the event in
secret, Garcia filed a criminal case before the RTC of
Pasay for violation of RA 4200. Ramirez argued that the
provision of RA 4200 does not apply to the taping of a
private conversation by one of the parties in the
conversation.
HELD: RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it
illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to
any private communication to secretly record such
communication by means of a tape recorder. The law
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
18
makes no distinction. The statute's intent to penalize all
persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier "any" “even a
person privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the
latter will qualify as a violator" under RA 4200.
Zulueta v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107383
• Cecilia Zulueta suspected her husband Dr. Alfredo
Martin-Zulueta to have an affair. At some point, Cecilia
entered the clinic of her husband and in the presence of
her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary,
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's
clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged
paramours, greetings cards, canceled checks, diaries,
Dr. Martin's passport, and photographs. The documents
and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for
legal separation and for disqualification from the practice
of medicine which she had filed against her husband.
HELD: The documents and papers in question are
inadmissible in evidence. Spouses are not exempted
from the constitutional injunction declaring "the privacy of
communication and correspondence to be inviolable".
The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is
if there is a "lawful order from a court or when public
safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law."
Any violation of this provision renders the evidence
obtained inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding."
The intimacies between spouses do not justify any one of
them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other
and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of
marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does
not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an
individual and the constitutional protection is ever
available to him or her.
People v. Andre Marti, G.R. No. 81561, 1/18/1991
• Andre Marti was charged for violation of Dangerous
Drugs RA 9262 when his package was delivered by his
common-law wife, Shirley to the booth of the "Manila
Packing and Export Forwarders" was withheld by the
owners when they inspected it following and SOP and
suspected from a peculiar odor emitted that the
packaged contained a contraband to which they called
the NBI to assist. Marti contends that he was illegally
searched and seized by the NBI.
HELD: The evidence was obtained by a private person,
acting in a private capacity and without the intervention
and participation of State authorities. In the absence of
governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by
the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State
since the contraband having come into possession of the
Government without the latter transgressing appellant's
rights against unreasonable search and seizure.
The Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not
meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches
and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
against the government and its agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked
against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
NOTE: The contraband is not a “communication”.
Waterous Drugs v. NLRC, G.R. 113271, 10/16/1997
• Antonia Catolico, a pharmacist employed by Waterous
Drugs, was involved in various irregularities. She was
being investigated for overpricing of the medicines of
Waterous Drugs. After confirmation from one of the
company’s clients it was found that she accepted a check
under her name in the amount of P640 (as a investigatory, work-related purposes, as well as for
refund/kickback). The cheque was discovered by Ms.
Saldana (employee) of the company. Catolico questioned
the act of Saldana in opening the envelope. Later
Catolico was dismissed and she questioned the
admissibility of the check for having been searched and
seized without warrant.
HELD: The arguments tendered by Catolico and NLRC
were both wrong. The Court found no reason to revise
the doctrine laid down in People v. Marti that the Bill of
Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable
searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals.
It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the
citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the
contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion
gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in
the 1935 Charter Sec 1(3), Article. This was in turn derived
almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to the
pronouncements of the US Supreme Court and Appellate
Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
In the 1967 case of Katz v. United States, SC held that the
act of FBI agents in electronically recording a conversation
made by petitioner in an enclosed public telephone booth
violated his right to privacy and constituted a "search and
seizure". Because the petitioner had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in using the enclosed booth to make
a personal telephone call, the protection of the Fourth
Amendment extends to such an area. In the concurring
opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, it was further noted that the
existence of privacy right under prior decisions involved a
two-fold requirement: first, that a person has exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy; and second, that
the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable (objective).
In Mancusi v. DeForte, which addressed the reasonable
expectations of private employees in the workplace, the US
Supreme Court held that a union employee had Fourth
Amendment rights with regard to an office at union
headquarters that he shared with other union officials, even
as the latter or their guests could enter the office. The Court
thus "recognized that employees may have a reasonable
expectation of privacy against intrusions by police."
The Fourth Amendment equally applies to a government
workplace was addressed in the 1987 case of O’Connor v.
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
19
Ortega where a physician, Dr. Ortega, investigated for
mismanagement of the psychiatric residency program,
sexual harassment of female hospital employees and other
irregularities searched his office and seized personal items
from his desk and filing cabinets. The Court categorically
declared that "individuals do not lose Fourth Amendment
rights merely because they work for the government instead
of a private employer." A plurality of four Justices concurred
that the correct analysis has two steps: first, because "some
government offices may be so open to fellow employees or
the public that no expectation of privacy is reasonable", a
court must consider "the operational realities of the
workplace" in order to determine whether an employee’s
Fourth Amendment rights are implicated; and next, where
an employee has a legitimate privacy expectation, an
employer’s intrusion on that expectation "for non
investigations of work-related misconduct, should be judged
by the standard of reasonableness under all the
circumstances."
In US v. Mark L. Simons, Simons, an employee of CIA,
was convicted of receiving and possessing materials
containing child pornography despite the search and
seizure done in his office. Because he already knew that
The policy also stated that users shall understand that the
agency will periodically audit, inspect, and/or monitor the
user’s Internet access as deemed appropriate.
The preceeding US jurisprudence were discussed in
the case below.
Briccio A. Pollo v. Karina Constantino-David
FACTS: Pollo is a former Supervising Personnel
Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the
Officer-in-Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison
Division (PALD) under the "Mamamayan Muna Hindi
Mamaya Na" program of the CSC.
On January 3, 2007 at around 2:30 p.m., an unsigned
letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC
Chairperson Karina Constantino-David which was
marked "Confidential" and sent through a courier service
(LBC) from a certain "Alan San Pascual" of Bagong
Silang, Caloocan City, was received by the Integrated
Records Management Office (IRMO) at the CSC Central
Office. Following office practice in which documents
marked "Confidential" are left unopened and instead sent
to the addressee, the aforesaid letter was given directly
to Chairperson David.
The letter contained and questioned if Pollo is allowed to
be “a lawyer of an accused gov’t employee having a
pending case in the CSC”.
David conducted an investigation and a few days later,
the computers of Pollo was secured and the 17 diskettes
contained by 42 documents were drafts, pleadings, in
connections with
Based on that, Pollo was administratively charged and
later dismissed from the service. Pollo appealed the
dismissal to the SC invoking the O’Connor doctrine.
ISSUE: Was there a violation of his right to privacy?
HELD: No, there was none. failed to prove that he had
an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy either in his
office or government-issued computer which contained
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022 20

Q: What are the four basic rights under the free speech
his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that he had a
clause?
separate enclosed office which he did not share with
anyone, or that his office was always locked and not
open to other employees or visitors. Neither did he allege Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the 1freedom
that he used passwords or adopted any means to of speech, of 2expression, or 3of the press, or the 4right of
prevent other employees from accessing his computer the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the public government for redress of grievances.
assistance office of the CSC-ROIV, he normally would
have visitors in his office like friends, associates and FRANCISCO CHAVES VS. RAUL GONZALES, G.R.
even unknown people, whom he even allowed to use his NO. 168338, 15 February 2008
computer which to him seemed a trivial request. He
described his office as "full of people, his friends, Q: Explain the nature of the free speech clause.
unknown people" and that in the past 22 years he had
been discharging his functions at the PALD, he is
Freedom of expression has gained recognition as a
"personally assisting incoming clients, receiving
fundamental principle of every democratic government
documents, drafting cases on appeals, in charge of
and it has been given a status of a preferred right that
accomplishment report, Mamamayan Muna Program.
stands on a higher level than substantive economic
freedom or the other liberties. In one case the SC said
Petitioner’s claim of violation of his constitutional right to
that the cogent rights codified by Article 3, Section 4 of
privacy must necessarily fail. His other argument
the Constitution copied almost verbatim from the First
invoking the privacy of communication and
Amendment of the US Bill of Right where considered the
correspondence under Section 3(1), Article III of the 1987
necessary consequence of Republican institution and the
Constitution is also untenable considering the recognition
complement of free speech. This preferred status of free
accorded to certain legitimate intrusions into the privacy
speech has also been codified at the international level,
of employees in the government workplace under the
its recognition now enshrined in international law as a
aforecited authorities. We likewise find no merit in his
customary norm that binds all nations. In this jurisdiction
contention that O’Connor and Simons are not relevant
(PH) the primacy and highest (esteem?) accorded
because the present case does not involve a criminal
freedom of expression is a fundamental postulate of our
offense like child pornography. As already mentioned, the
Constitutional system. This right is elevated to
search of petitioner’s computer was justified there being
Constitutional status in the 1935, 1973, and 1987
reasonable ground for suspecting that the files stored
Constitution reflecting our own lesson of history both
therein would yield incriminating evidence relevant to the
political and legal that freedom of speech is an
investigation being conducted by CSC as government
indispensable condition for nearly every other form of
employer of such misconduct subject of the anonymous
freedom.
complaint. This situation clearly falls under the exception
to the warrantless requirement in administrative searches
For it is only when the people have unbridled access to
defined in O’Connor.
information and the press that they will be capable of
rendering enlightened judgments. In the oft-quoted words
of Thomas Jefferson, we cannot both be free and
ignorant.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, ET AL V. ROSARIO
GOPEZ LIM, G.R. NO. 184769, 10/05/2010 Q: What kind of ideas may be expressed under the
free speech clause?
Rules on Habeas Data
The ideas that may be expressed under this freedom are
May an employee invoke the remedies available under
confined not only to those that are conventional or
such writ where an employer decides to transfer her
acceptable to the majority. To be truly meaningful,
workplace on the basis of copies of an anonymous letter
freedom of speech and of the press should allow and
posted therein ─ imputing to her disloyalty to the
even encourage the articulation of the unorthodox view,
company and calling for her to leave, which imputation it
though it be hostile to or derided by others; or though
investigated but fails to inform her of the details thereof?
such view "induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs
Rosario G. Lim (respondent), also known as Cherry Lim,
people to anger." To paraphrase Justice Holmes, it is
is an administrative clerk at the Manila Electric Company
freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for the
(MERALCO).
thought that agrees with us.
On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was posted at the
door of the Metering Office of the Administration building Freedom of speech and of the press means something
of MERALCO Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, at which more than the right to approve existing political beliefs or
respondent is assigned, denouncing respondent. The economic arrangements, to lend support to official
letter reads: measures, and to take refuge in the existing climate of
opinion on any matter of public consequence. When
atrophied, the right becomes meaningless. The right
Read Republic Act 10173: Data Privacy Act of 2012 belongs as well -- if not more – to those who question,
who do not conform, who differ.
(Section 4, Article III)
Q: What is the scope of the free speech clause?
“The Free Speech Clause”

From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan

University of Mindanao College of Law
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it
extends protection to nearly all forms of communication.
It protects speech, print and assembly regarding secular
as well as political causes, and is not confined to any
particular field of human interest. The protection covers
myriad matters of public interest or concern embracing all
issues, about which information is needed or appropriate,
so as to enable members of society to cope with the
exigencies of their period. The constitutional protection
assures the broadest possible exercise of free speech
and free press for religious, political, economic, scientific,
news, or informational ends, inasmuch as the
Constitution's basic guarantee of freedom to advocate
ideas is not confined to the expression of ideas that are
conventional or shared by a majority.
The constitutional protection is not limited to the
exposition of ideas. The protection afforded free speech
extends to speech or publications that are entertaining as
well as instructive or informative.
Q: What are the limits and restraints of free speech?
The freedom of expression is not absolute nor is it an
unbridled license. Therefore, all speech are not treated
the same.
For freedom of expression is not an absolute, nor is it an
"unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible
use of language and prevents the punishment of those
who abuse this freedom."
Thus, all speech are not treated the same. Some types of
speech may be subjected to some regulation by the
State under its pervasive police power, in order that it
may not be injurious to the equal right of others or those
of the community or society. The difference in treatment
is expected because the relevant interests of one type of
speech, e.g., political speech, may vary from those of
another, e.g., obscene speech. Distinctions have
therefore been made in the treatment, analysis, and
evaluation of the permissible scope of restrictions on
various categories of speech. We have ruled, for
example, that in our jurisdiction slander or libel, lewd and
obscene speech, as well as "fighting words" are not
entitled to constitutional protection and may be
penalized.
Q: Cite the four aspects of the freedom of the press.
Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period
under the 1935 Constitution, has recognized four aspects
of freedom of the press. These are:
(1) freedom from prior restraint;
(2) freedom from punishment subsequent to publication;
(3) freedom of access to information; and
(4) freedom of circulation.
Q: Discuss the relationship between freedom of
expression (Section 4), prior restraint and subsequent
punishment.
Jurisprudence teaches that FOE is the foundation of a free,
open, and democratic society. FOE is an indispensable
condition to the exercise of almost all other civic and
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
21
political rights. In fact, it was always held that no society
can remain free, open, and democratic without FOE. FOE
guarantees full, spirited and even contentious discussion of
all social, economic, and political issues and to survive, a
free and democratic society must zealously safeguard FOE.
FOE even allows the citizens to expose and check abuses
of public officials, to make informed choices of candidates
for a public office,allows the competition of ideas, the clash
of claims and counterclaims from which the truth will likely
emerge, allows the erring of social grievances, mitigating
sudden eruptions of violence from marginal groups who
otherwise would not be heard by the government, provides
civilized way of engagement among political, ideological,
religious or ethnic opponents. If one cannot use his tongue
to argue, he might use his fist instead. FOE is the freedom
to disseminate ideas and beliefs whether competing,
informing or otherwise. It is the freedom to express to
others what one likes or dislikes as it is the freedom of
others to express to one and all what they favor or disfavor;
it's the free expression for the ideas we love or hate.
Indeed, the function of FOE is to stir disputes.
It may indeed best serve its high purpose when the
exercise of FOE induces a condition of unrest, creates
dissatisfaction with conditions as they are or even stirs
people to anger because speech is often provocative and
challenging, it may strike at prejudices and preconceptions
and have profound and unsettling effects as it presses for
acceptance of an idea. Prohibits for enactment of any law
that curtails the FOE. [Dissenting Opinion of J. Carpio]
Q: What is prior restraint?
A: According to Fr. Bernas, means the official governmental
restrictions on the press or other forms of expressions IN
ADVANCE (BEFORE) of actual publication or
dissemination. Its most blatant form is the system of
licensing administered by the Executive department. Ex.
movie censorship (must be reviewed by MTRCB). Another
form is the Judicial prior restraint (that may come in a form
of injunctive writ - oppositors of the film filed an injunction
case); license taxes measured by gross receipts for the
privilege of engaging in the business of advertising in any
news paper (1936 case of C American Press: according to
the oppositors, the requirement of the Government of
license is a form of an invalid prior restraint but the US SC
held that its valid because they are not talking about the
contents of the newspapers but for the advertisements
where they can gain profit)
Flat licenses for the privilege of selling religious goods –
where the SC invalidated the Manila ordinance imposing
license charges and taxes upon the ABS the rate of which
was based on the gross sales of their religious goods. It is a
clear violation of ABS constitutional freedom of the press
[American Bible Society v City of Manila]
Prior restraint is generally understood as an imposition in
advance of a limit upon speech or other forms of
expression. In determining whether a restriction is a prior
restraint, one of the key factors considered is whether the
restraint prevents the expression of a message. In
Nebraska Press Association v Stuart (1976), prior restraint
by definition has an immediate and irreversible sanction if it
can be said that a threat of criminal or civil sanction after
publication 'chills' speech, prior restraint 'freezes' it at least
for the time.
The term prior restraint is used to describe administrative
and judicial orders forbidding certain communications when
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
issued in advance of the time that such communication is to
occur. Prior restraint can be both valid (RPC punishing
slander, oral defamation, libel, cyber libel, inciting to
sedition) or invalid (like in the case of American Bible
Society).
Q: What is subsequent punishment?
A: The act of punishing the purveyor of illegal speech
AFTER it is published. The exceptions to this rule are
pornography, false or misleading advertisement, advocacy
of imminent lawless action, and danger to national security.
The imposition of liability to the individual exercising his
freedom may be in any form such as penal, civil, or
administrative penalty. Those Penal penalties (mentioned
above) are valid subsequent punishment, but other than
that, the government cannot impose a subsequent
punishment for the exercise of the person’s freedom of
expression.
BURGOS V. CHIEF OF STAFF G.R. No. L-64261, 26
December 1984
FACTS: Two [2] search warrants issued on December 7,
1982 by respondent Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano.
ISSUE: Was there a prior restraint in this case.
HELD: The premises searched were the business and
printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We
Forum newspapers. As a consequence of the search and
seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with
the further result that the printing and publication of said
newspapers were discontinued.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or
censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press
guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes
a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express
themselves in print. This state of being is patently
anathematic to a democratic framework where a free,
alert and even militant press is essential for the political
enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.
BABST V. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BOARD, G.R.
No. L-62992, 28 September 1984
FACTS: Petitioners are columnists, feature article writers
and reporters of various local publications. At different
dates since July, 1980, some of them have allegedly
been summoned by military authorities who have
subjected them to sustained interrogation on various
aspects of their works, feelings, sentiments, beliefs,
associations and even their private lives. Typical of the
letters received by the petitioners from respondent NIB is
that addressed to petitioner Arlene Babst.
Petitioners maintain that the respondents have no
jurisdiction over the proceedings which are violative of
the constitutional guarantee on free expression since
they have the effect of imposing restrictive guidelines and
norms on mass media; that they are a punitive ordeal or
subsequent punishment of petitioners for lawful
publications; that they amount to a system of censorship,
curtailing the "free flow of information and petition and
opinion," indispensable to the right of the people to know
matters of public concern guaranteed in Section 6 of
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
22
Article IV of the Constitution;
ISSUE: Was the NIB exercising prior restraint upon the
press freedom of the petitioners?
HELD: SC rendered this moot and academic but still
answered in the affirmative. It is not Idle to note that
ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and answer
some questions, which the person invited may heed or
refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally
objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however,
such an invitation can easily assume a different
appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from a
powerful group composed predominantly of ranking
military officers issued at a time when the country has
just emerged from martial rule and when the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not
entirely been lifted and the designated interrogation site
is a military camp, the same can easily be taken, not as a
strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as
an authoritative command which one can only defy at his
peril, especially where, as in the instant case, the
invitation carries the ominous seaming that "failure to
appear . . . shall be considered as a waiver . . . and this
Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance
with law."
GERONIMO SANTIAGO V. FAR EASTERN
BROADCASTING, G.R. No. L-48683, 11/04/1941
FACTS: The petitioner argues that the broadcasting of
the speeches of the candidates of the Sumulong Popular
Front Party in the evening of September 23, 1941, could
not by any means offer any danger to public safety or
public morality, and that the respondent was not justified
"to previously censor and approve the complete texts of
the speeches of said candidates allowing the same to be
broadcasted in its station."
ISSUE: May the Executive Department through the
Secretary of Interior may issue a regulation requiring
radio stations to submit the speeches 24 hours before it
can be broadcasted (another form of prior restraint)?
HELD: Yes, because it is an exercise of the police power.
The SC failed to perceive the cogency of such an
argument. It does not bolster up the case for the
petitioner. It impliedly admits — and correctly, we think —
that a speech that may endanger public safety may be
censored and disapproved for broadcasting. How could
the censor verify the petitioner's claim that the speeches
he intended to broadcast offered no danger to public
safety or public morality, if the petitioner refused to
submit the manuscript or even the gist thereof? If the
petitioner had complied with respondent's requirement
and the respondent had arbitrarily and unreasonably
refused to permit said speeches to be broadcasted, he
might have reason to complain. It is not the duty of the
respondent as a public service corporation to broadcast
speeches without requiring the submission of the
manuscript thereof in advance, but that, on the contrary,
the laws and regulations expressly authorize the
respondent to make such a requirement.
Q: Explain the following tests on government
suppression of free speech:
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
A. Dangerous tendency rule – means that the evil
consequences of the comment or the utterance must be
extremely serious and the degree of imminence must be
high before it is punished. The danger to be guarded
against it is the substantive evil sought to be prevented –
the primarily disorderly and unfair administration of justice.
This test establishes a definite rule in the Constitutional law,
it provides the criterion as to what words may be published.
Under this rule, the advocacy of ideas cannot
constitutionally be abridged unless there is a clear and
present danger that such advocacy will harm the
administration of justice.
B. Clear and present danger rule – has been adopted in
cases where extreme difficulty is confronted determining
where the freedom of expression ends and the right of
courts to protect their independence begins. There must be
a remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this
rule lies in that the freedom of speech and of the press, as
well as the right to petition for redress of grievance, while
guaranteed by the constitution, are not absolute. They are
subject to restrictions and limitations, one of them being the
protection of the courts against contempt. If the words
uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a
right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not
necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force,
violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that
such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it
necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated
to incite persons to acts of force, violence or unlawfulness.
It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of
the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil the
utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the
legislative body seeks to prevent. [G.R. No. L-8974]
C. Balancing of interest test – even if there is clear and
present danger but to the mind of the court halos
magkapareho ang point or reasons of the opposing parties
(Government vs. the Speaker) the Court will have to
balance whose reasons is much more beneficial to all.
Under this rule, it rests on the theory that it is the court’s
function in a case before it when it finds public interests
served by legislation, on the one hand, and the free
expression clause affected by it, on the other, to balance
one against the other and arrive at a judgment where the
greater weight shall be placed. If, on balance, it appears
that the public interest served by restrictive legislation is of
such nature that it outweighs the abridgment of freedom,
then the court will find the legislation valid. In short, the
balance-of-interests theory rests on the basis that
constitutional freedoms are not absolute, not even those
stated in the free speech and expression clause, and that
they may be abridged to some extent to serve appropriate
and important interests. [Soriano v Laguardia, GR No.
164785]
Q: Distinguish between content-neutral and
content-based regulation of the free speech clause.
A: Jurisprudence distinguishes between a content-neutral
regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the
speech, or one that merely controls the time, place or
manner, and under well defined standards; and a
content-based restraint or censorship, i.e. the restriction
is based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech.
Content-based laws are generally treated as more suspect
than content-neutral laws because of judicial concern with
discrimination in the regulation of expression.
Content-neutral regulations of speech or of conduct that
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
23
may amount to speech, are subject to lesser but still
heightened scrutiny. [NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING V.
CESAR DY, ET AL]
*Content-based restraint is the invalid one.
NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING V. CESAR DY, ET AL,
G.R. No. 170270 & 179411, 02 April 2009
FACTS: In 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of
its broadcasting stations, management office and
transmitters on property located in Minante, Cauayan
City, Isabela. The property is owned by CBS
Development Corporation (CDC), an affiliate corporation
under the Bombo Radyo network which holds title over
the properties used by Bombo Radyo stations throughout
the country. On 28 June 1996, CDC was issued by the
then municipal government of Cauayan a building permit
authorizing the construction of a commercial
establishment on the property. The (HLURB) issued a
Zoning Decision certifying the property as commercial.
That same day, the Office of the Municipal Planning and
Development Coordinator (OMPDC) of Cauayan affirmed
that the commercial structure to be constructed by CDC
conformed to local zoning regulations, noting as well that
the location "is classified as a Commercial area." Similar
certifications would be issued by OMPDC from 1997 to
2001.
A building was consequently erected on the property, and
therefrom, DZNC and Star FM operated as radio
stations. Both stations successfully secured all necessary
operating documents, including mayor’s permits from
1997 to 2001. During that period, CDC paid real property
taxes on the property based on the classification of the
land as commercial.
All that changed beginning in 2002. On 15 January of
that year, petitioners applied for the renewal of the
mayor’s permit. petitioners formally requested then City
Zoning Administrator-Designate Bagnos Maximo
(Maximo) to issue a zoning clearance for the property.
Maximo, however, required petitioners to submit "either
an approved land conversion papers from the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) showing that the
property was converted from prime agricultural land to
commercial land, or an approved resolution from the
Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod
authorizing the reclassification of the property from
agricultural to commercial land." Petitioners had never
been required to submit such papers before, and from
1996 to 2001, the OMPDC had consistently certified that
the property had been classified as commercial.
Due to this refusal by Maximo to issue the zoning
clearance, petitioners were unable to secure a mayor’s
permit. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus17 with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cauayan City to
compel the issuance of the 2002 mayor’s permit. RTC of
Cauayan denied petitioners’ accompanying application
for injunctive relief, they filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but this would be
dismissed by the appellate court due to the availability of
other speedy remedies with the trial court. In February of
2003, the RTC dismissed the mandamus action for being
moot and academic.19
In the meantime, petitioners sought to obtain from the
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
DAR Region II Office a formal recognition of the
conversion of the CDC property from agricultural to
commercial. The matter was docketed as Adm. Case No.
A-0200A-07B-002. Then DAR Region II Director Abrino
L. Aydinan (Director Aydinan) granted the application and
issued an Order that stated that "there remains no doubt
on the part of this Office of the non-agricultural
classification of subject land before the effectivity of
Republic Act No. 6657 otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. On 16
January 2003, petitioners filed their applications for
renewal of mayor’s permit for the year 2003, attaching
therein the DAR Order. Their application was approved.
However, on 4 March 2003, respondent Felicisimo Meer,
Acting City Administrator of Cauayan City, wrote to
petitioners claiming that the DAR Order was spurious or
void.
The controversy continued into 2004. In January of that
year, petitioners filed their respective applications for
their 2004 mayor’s permit, again with the DAR Order
attached to the same. A zonal clearance was issued in
favor of petitioners. Yet in a letter dated 13 January 2004,
respondent Meer claimed that no record existed of DAR
Adm. Case No. A-0200A-07B-002 with the Office of the
Regional Director of the DAR or with the RCLUPPI.23 As
a result, petitioners were informed that there was no
basis for the issuance in their favor of the requisite
zoning clearance needed for the issuance of the mayor’s
permit.
The deadline for application for the mayor’s permit
lapsed on 15 February 2004, despite petitioners’ plea for
another extension. On 17 February 2004, respondents
Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia, City Legal Officer of
Cauayan City, arrived at the property and closed the
radio stations.
ISSUE: Was the closure valid?
HELD: No, the closure was not valid. That the acts
imputed against respondents constitute a prior restraint
on the freedom of expression of respondents who
happen to be members of the press is clear enough.
There is a long-standing tradition of special judicial
solicitude for free speech, meaning that governmental
action directed at expression must satisfy a greater
burden of justification than governmental action directed
at most other forms of behavior. We had said in SWS v.
COMELEC: "Because of the preferred status of the
constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the
press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty
presumption of invalidity. Indeed, ‘any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. . . .
The Government 'thus carries a heavy burden of showing
justification for the enforcement of such restraint.’ There
is thus a reversal of the normal presumption of validity
that inheres in every legislation."
The Supreme Court here distinguished content-neutral
restraint and content-based restraint or censorship.
Ostensibly, the act of an LGU requiring a business of
proof that the property from which it operates has been
zoned for commercial use can be argued, when applied
to a radio station, as content-neutral since such a
regulation would presumably apply to any other radio
station or business enterprise within the LGU.
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
24
However, the circumstances of this case dictate that we
view the action of the respondents as a content-based
restraint.
WHY? Prior to 2002, petitioners had not been frustrated
in securing the various local government requirements
for the operation of their stations. It was only in the
beginning of 2002, after the election of respondent
Ceasar Dy as mayor of Cauayan, that the local
government started to impose these new requirements
substantiating the conversion of CDC’s property for
commercial use. Petitioners admit that during the 2001
elections, Bombo Radyo "was aggressive in exposing the
widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear
to have favored Respondent Dy and other members of
the Dy political dynasty."52 Respondents’ efforts to close
petitioners’ radio station clearly intensified immediately
before the May 2004 elections, where a former employee
of DZNC Bombo Radyo, Grace Padaca, was mounting a
credible and ultimately successful challenge against the
incumbent Isabela governor, who happened to be the
brother of respondent Dy. It also bears notice that the
requirements required of petitioners by the Cauayan City
government are frankly beyond the pale and not
conventionally adopted by local governments throughout
the Philippines.
All those circumstances lead us to believe that the steps
employed by respondents to ultimately shut down
petitioner’s radio station were ultimately content-based.
Being content-based, it is invalid and unconstitutional
under Section 4.
Q: Distinguish between “void for vagueness” and
“overbreadth doctrine”.
A: The law itself is invalid because it is vague to the extent
that the people must guess its meaning. It's invalid.
Overbreadth doctrine - there is a law that prohibits
something which gives a chilling effect. SC will not hesitate
to strike these laws invalid.
To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of
overbreadth do not operate on the same plane.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when
it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution
in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to
accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair
notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law
enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle. The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that
a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and
thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the
overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will
understand what a statute prohibits and will accordingly
refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is
protected (chilling effect). [Southern Hemisphere vs.
Anti-Terrorism Council]
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
Q: What is meant by the doctrine of strict scrutiny?
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict
scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality
and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify
the regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is
used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the
regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other
fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier
applications to equal protection. The United States
Supreme Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to
protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial access
and interstate travel. [White Light Corp vs City of Manila]
Note: The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have
special application only to free speech cases. They are
inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes
As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an
'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment."
In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of
facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken
words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained
at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary
criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial
challenge to a legislative act is the most difficult challenge
to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish
that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act
would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said
that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is
vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who
engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the
conduct of others."
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on
their faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are
called in American law, First Amendment cases. They
cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a
criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that "one to whom application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the
statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken
as applying to other persons or other situations in which its
application might be unconstitutional." As has been pointed
out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment
context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial
invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a
particular defendant."
Q: Distinguish between “facial challenge” and “as
applied challenge” concerning laws regulating the free
speech clause.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute
and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling
effect" upon protected speech.
In Loida Nicolas-Lewis vs Comelec, the SC said that It
may not be amiss to point out, at this juncture, that a facial
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
25
invalidation of the questioned statute is warranted to
counter the "chilling effect" on protected speech that comes
from its overbreadth as any person may simply restrain
himself from speaking or engaging in any partisan political
activity anywhere in order to avoid being charged of an
electoral offense. Indeed, an overbroad law that "chills one
into silence" should be invalidated on its face.
As applied challenge - na violate mo na and you were
criminally charged. That is the time that you will challenge
the said law.
Simply put, facial challenge – questioning the validity of the
law on its face (vague or overbreadth); you have the right to
question it before the Court (Rule 64 – declaratory relief
prior to breach of a law or a contract).
In both cases, it can’t be used when the law which you seek
to get annulled by the Court are those ordinary penal laws –
do not regulate in any way the exercise of free speech.
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute
and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling
effect" upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen
statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily
apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for
rehabilitating the statutes in a single prosecution, the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks
on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the
person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct
could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity." The possible harm to society in permitting some
unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the
possibility that the protected speech of others may be
deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal
statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their
very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this
reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area
of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area
of free speech.
SANTIAGO DIVINAGRACIA V. CBS & PBS, G.R. No.
162272, 07 April 2009
Congress unquestionably has the power to grant and
deny licenses and to eliminate existing stations. No one
has a First Amendment right to a license or to
monopolize a radio frequency; to deny a station license
because "the public interest" requires it "is not a denial of
free speech."
The absence of government regulation in that market had
led to the emergence of hundreds of radio broadcasting
stations, each using frequencies of their choice and
changing frequencies at will, leading to literal chaos on
the airwaves. It was the Radio Act of 1927 which
introduced a licensing requirement for American
broadcast stations, to be overseen eventually by the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC).
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This pre-regulation history of radio broadcast stations
illustrates the continuing necessity of a government role
in overseeing the broadcast media industry, as opposed
to other industries such as print media and the Internet.
Without regulation, the result would be a free-for-all
market with rival broadcasters able with impunity to
sabotage the use by others of the airwaves.
Other rationales may have emerged as well validating
state regulation of broadcast media, but the reality of
scarce airwaves remains the primary, indisputable and
indispensable justification for the government regulatory
role. The integration of the scarcity doctrine into the
jurisprudence on broadcast media illustrates how the
libertarian ideal of the free expression clause may be
tempered and balanced by actualities in the real world
while preserving the core essence of the constitutional
guarantee. Indeed, without government regulation of the
broadcast spectrum, the ability of broadcasters to clearly
express their views would be inhibited by the anarchy of
competition. Since the airwaves themselves are not
susceptible to physical appropriation and private
ownership, it is but indispensable that the government
step in as the guardian of the spectrum.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO V. CA, G.R. No. 119673, 7/26/96
FACTS: Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo has a television
program entitled "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" aired on Channel
2. The program presents and propagates petitioner's
religious beliefs, doctrines and practices often times in
comparative studies with other religions.
Sometime in the months of September, October and
November 1992 petitioner submitted to the respondent
Board of Review for Moving Pictures and Television the
VTR tapes of its TV program Series Nos. 116, 119, 121
and 128. The Board classified the series as "X" or not for
public viewing on the ground that they "offend and
constitute an attack against other religions which is
expressly prohibited by law."
INC pursued 2 courses of action against the respondent
Board and it appealed to the Office of the President the
classification of its TV Series No. 128. It succeeded in its
appeal and the Office of the President reversed the
decision of the respondent Board. Forthwith, the Board
allowed Series No. 128 to be publicly telecast.
December 14, 1992, INC also filed against the
respondent Board a civil case in the RTC. Petitioner
alleged that the respondent Board acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in requiring
petitioner to submit the VTR tapes of its TV program and
in x-rating them. It cited its TV Program Series Nos. 115,
119, 121 and 128. In their Answer, respondent Board
invoked its power under PD No. 1986 in relation to Article
201 of the Revised Penal Code.
After trial, the RTC rendered a judgment which
dispositive portion of it reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering
respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and
Television (BRMPT) to grant petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo
the necessary permit for all the series of "Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo" program.
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
26
Petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo, however, is directed to refrain
from offending and attacking other existing religions in
showing "Ang Iglesia ni Cristo" program.
INC moved for reconsideration of the said judgment
praying: (a) for the deletion of the second paragraph of
the dispositive portion of the Decision, and (b) for the
Board to be perpetually enjoined from requiring petitioner
to submit for review the tapes of its program which was
granted by the trial court. The board appealed to the CA
which reversed the decision of the trial court. INC went to
the SC crying invalid prior restraint.
ISSUE: Was the reversal of the trial court’s decision by
the Court of Appeals correct?
HELD: No. The SC reversed the ruling of the Appellate
Court. First. Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is
its hostility against all prior restraints on speech,
including religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains
speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and
should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden
of the respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If
it fails to discharge this burden, its act of censorship will
be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
Second. The evidence shows that the respondent Board
x-rated petitioners TV series for "attacking" either
religions, especially the Catholic church. An examination
of the evidence, especially Exhibits "A," "A-1," "B," "C,"
and "D" will show that the so-called "attacks" are mere
criticisms of some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets
of other religions. The videotapes were not viewed by the
respondent court as they were not presented as
evidence. Yet they were considered by the respondent
court as indecent, contrary to law and good customs,
hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under
section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses
petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right
to free exercise of religion. It misappreciates the essence
of freedom to differ.
The word attack is not synonymous with the word
"offend." Moreover, Article 201 (2) (b) (3) of the Revised
Penal Code should be invoked to justify the subsequent
punishment of a show which offends any religion. It
cannot be utilized to justify prior censorship of speech. It
must be emphasized that E.O. 876, the law prior to PD
1986, included "attack against any religion" as a ground
for censorship. The ground was not, however, carried
over by PD 1986. Its deletion is a decree to disuse it.
MTRCB V. ABS-CBN, G.R. No. 155282, 1/17/2005
FACTS: On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening,
respondent ABS-CBN aired "Prosti-tuition," an episode of
the television (TV) program "The Inside Story" produced
and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female
students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to
pay for their tuition fees. In the course of the program,
student prostitutes, pimps, customers, and some faculty
members were interviewed. The Philippine Women’s
University (PWU) was named as the school of some of
the students involved and the facade of PWU Building at
Taft Avenue, Manila conspicuously served as the
background of the episode.
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The showing of "The Inside Story" caused uproar in the
PWU community. Its officials, the PWU Parents and
Teachers Association filed letter-complaints3 with
petitioner MTRCB. Both complainants alleged that the
episode besmirched the name of the PWU and resulted
in the harassment of some of its female students.
In their answer, respondents explained that the "The
Inside Story" is a "public affairs program, news
documentary and socio-political editorial," the airing of
which is protected by the constitutional provision on
freedom of expression and of the press. Accordingly,
petitioner has no power, authority and jurisdiction to
impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents.
The Board (MTRCB) after hearing fined ABS CBN and
required it to submit further and all other programs for the
board’s review before showing. ABS CBN then filed a
civil action before the RTC questioning the board’s
judgment. The RTC annulled the decision of the board.
Hence, the MTRCB went to the SC.
ISSUE: Was the RTC’s ruling correct?
HELD: No. "The Inside Story" is a television program,
hence, it is within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB over
which it has power of review. Here, respondents sought
exemption from the coverage of the term "television
programs" on the ground that the "The Inside Story" is a
"public affairs program, news documentary and
socio-political editorial" protected under Section 4, Article
III of the Constitution. Albeit, respondent’s basis is not
freedom of religion, as in Iglesia ni Cristo, but freedom of
expression and of the press, the ruling in Iglesia ni Cristo
applies squarely to the instant issue. It is significant to
note that in Iglesia ni Cristo, this Court declared that
freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status
by the framers of our fundamental laws, past and
present, "designed to protect the broadest possible
liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs x x x." Yet despite the fact that
freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred
status, still this Court, did not exempt the Iglesia ni
Cristo’s religious program from petitioner’s review power.
The Court further said that Respondents claim that the
showing of "The Inside Story" is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of speech and of the
press. However, there has been no declaration at all by
the framers of the Constitution that freedom of
expression and of the press has a preferred status.
If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious
programs from the jurisdiction and review power of
petitioner MTRCB, with more reason, there is no
justification to exempt therefrom "The Inside Story"
which, according to respondents, is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of
the press, a freedom bearing no preferred status.
The only exceptions from the MTRCB’s power of review
are those expressly mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No.
1986, such as (1) television programs imprinted or
exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its
departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels (actual
happening is reported i.e. vehicular accident; unlike
“Inside Story” that is scripted).
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
27
Apparently, newsreels are straight presentation of events.
They are depiction of "actualities." Correspondingly, the
MTRCB Rules and Regulations implementing P. D. No.
1986 defines newsreels as "straight news reporting, as
distinguished from news analyses, commentaries and
opinions. Talk shows on a given issue are not considered
newsreels." Clearly, the "The Inside Story" cannot be
considered a newsreel. It is more of a public affairs
program which is described as a variety of news
treatment; a cross between pure television news and
news-related commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of
opinions. Certainly, such kind of program is within
petitioner’s review powers of the MTRCB.
IN RE VICENTE SOTTO
FACTS: Vicente Sotto, who was required by their Court
on December 7, 1948, to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt to court for having issued a
written statement in connection with the decision of this
Court in In re Angel Parazo for contempt of court, which
statement, as published in the Manila Times and other
daily newspapers of the locality, reads as follows:
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No.
53.) interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of
Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to
suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his refusal to divulge the
source of a news published in his paper, I regret to say
that our High Tribunal has not only erroneously
interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in
evidence the incompetency of narrow mindedness o the
majority of its members, In the wake of so many
mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during
these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an
end to so much evil, is to change the members of the
Supreme Court. To his effect, I announce that one of the
first measures, which as its objects the complete
reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now
constituted, a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It
need be said loudly, very loudly, so that even the deaf
may hear: the Supreme Court very of today is a far cry
from the impregnable bulwark of Justice of those
memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa,
Manuel Araullo and other learned jurists who were the
honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary.
Due to this The Supreme Court cited Sotto in contempt of
Court.
In his defense, Sotto justified himself by invoking the free
speech clause. Is he correct?
The Supreme Court said in the negative. It is true that the
constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and the
press must be protected to its fullest extent, but license
or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should
not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As
important as the maintenance of an unmuzzled press
and the free exercise of the right of the citizen, is the
maintenance of the independence of the judiciary. As
Judge Holmes very appropriately said: "The
administration of justice and the freedom of the press,
though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and
neither should be violated by the other. The press and
the courts have correlative rights and duties and should
cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
laws, from which the former receives its prerogatives and
the latter its jurisdiction. The right of legitimate publicity
must be scrupulously recognized and care taken at all
times to avoid impinging upon it. In a clear case where it
is necessary, in order to dispose of judicial business
unhampered by publications which reasonably tend to
impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct
the administration of justice, this court will not hesitate to
exercise its undoubted power to punish for contempt.
This Court must be permitted to proceed with the
disposition if its business in an orderly manner free from
outside interference obstructive of its constitutional
functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an
impartial court, and, as a last resort, as a individual
exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve
its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal. . . ."
ESPUELAS VS. PEOPLE GR No. L-2990
FACTS: Oscar Espuelas had his picture taken, making it
to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a
piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when
in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel.
After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent
copies of same to several newspapers and weeklies of
general circulation for their publication with a suicide note
or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by
a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to
the latter's supposed wife translation of which letter
reads:
Dearest wife and children, bury me five meters deep. Over my
grave don't plant a cross or put floral wreaths, for I don't need
them. Please don't bury me in the lonely place. Bury me in the
Catholic cemetery. Although I have committed suicide, I still
have the right to burried among Christians. But don't pray for
me. Don't remember me, and don't feel sorry. Wipe me out of
your lives. My dear wife, if someone asks to you why I
committed suicide, tell them I did it because I was not pleased
with the administration of Roxas. Tell the whole world about
this. And if they ask why I did not like the administration of
Roxas, point out to them the situation in Central Luzon, the
Leyte.
Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them
that here in the Philippines our government is infested with
many Hitlers and Mussolinis. Teach our children to burn
pictures of Roxas if and when they come across one. I
committed suicide because I am ashamed of our government
under Roxas. I cannot hold high my brows to the world with
this dirty government. I committed suicide because I have no
power to put under Juez de Cuchillo all the Roxas people now
in power. So, I sacrificed my own self.
Later it was found out that he was just faking his death.
For that, he was criminally charged for scurrilous libels
against the Government. In his defense, Espuelas
invoked the free speech clause of the Constitution.
ISSUE: Should he be acquitted?
HELD: No. The freedom of speech secured by the
Constitution "does not confer an absolute right to speak
or publish without responsibility whatever one may
choose." It is not "unbridled license that gives immunity
for every possible use of language and prevents the
punishment of those who abuse this freedom." When the
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
28
use irritating language centers not on persuading the
readers but on creating disturbances, the rationable of
free speech cannot apply and the speaker or writer is
removed from the protection of the constitutional
guaranty. In this instance, the attack on the President
passes the furthest bounds of free speech and common
decency. More than a figure of speech was intended.
There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which
could easily produce disaffection among the people and
a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to
remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws
PEOPLE VS ISAAC PEREZ GR No. L-21049
FACTS: Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar,
Sorsogon and one a citizen of the same municipality
happened to meet at the presidencia of Pilar, they
became engaged in a discussion regarding the
administration of Governor-General Wood, which
resulted in Perez shouting a number of times: "The
Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off
Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for
the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence."
Charged in the CFI of Sorsogon with a violation of article
256 of the Penal Code having to do with contempt of
ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority, and
convicted thereof, Perez has appealed the case to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Must the conviction be reversed on the ground of
free speech.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court said that criticism is
permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of
Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the
Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the
range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect
be seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act
is seditious, the constitutional guarantees of freedom of
speech and press and of assembly and petition must
yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the
prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the
constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State.
Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief
Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official position,
like the Presidency of the United States and other high
offices, under a democratic form of government, instead,
of affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems
rather to invite abusive attacks. But in this instance, the
attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest
bounds of free speech was intended. There is a seditious
tendency in the words used, which could easily produce
disaffection among the people and a state of feeling
incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the
Government and obedient to the laws.
PEOPLE VS JUAN FELEO GR No. L-36429
FACTS: Juan Feleo was a leader of the communists at
the time delivered a speech to the effect:
“You must imitate the French soldiers who in a battle at . . .
instead of pointing the arms at the enemies, instead of pointing
the arms at them, what they did was to shoot at their chiefs.
What we want to say is for you to use them (the guns) not
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against the communists but against the American government.
We do hope that when the time comes the Constabulary man
and the scouts would be deserters in order to side with the reds
to defend the Philippines. . . . I Likewise hope the Constabulary
men do not have bad conscience possessed by the American
imperialist as they (the Constabulary) are under military
discipline, not to suppress the sucker, the American
government, because we consider them oppressed. Imagine the
salary of a constabulary private, P15, only, and see what the
captains do, General Nathorst, Colonel Bowers and others,
how big are their salaries? They receive hundreds and
thousands. But their chiefs are the ones far away from the
scene of the battle, they are in their offices, and whenever there
is promotion they are the captains and the lieutenants. Those
who scratch their bellies are the ones who receive big pay. The
soldiers starve to death. . . . My companions, if we all unite
there will be no more trust (?) Belo, there will be no oppressive
American government and they will go away if we all have a
rebellious heart. If we all be united, that captain (referring to
the Provincial Commanders S. F. Cacdac) will fall, and we
shall be the owners of those haciendas, the railroad company
and others.”
He was charged, tried, and convicted for seditious libel.
His defense during the appeal, he only said it in the
exercise of the constitutionally protected freedom of
speech.
ISSUE: Was the conviction valid?
HELD: It is a well established doctrine that the
constitutional guarantee of the freedom of speech and of
the press does not give a person an unqualified right to
speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever he may
choose. That a state in the exercise of its police power
may punish those who abuse the freedom conferred by
the constitutional provision, and whose language tends to
disturb the public peace, is not open to question. The
words spoken by the appellant on the occasion
mentioned incited the hearers to imitate French soldiers
in battle who, instead of pointing arms at their enemies,
directed their weapons towards their own chiefs. As an
end to be accomplished by this course of action it was
said that the provincial commander of the Constabulary
would fall and the communists would become owners of
the haciendas as well as of the railroad company and
other companies. In the same speech the hope was
expressed that the Constabulary force and the scouts
would desert in order to side with the reds. Words of this
kind are properly considered seditious because they tend
to incite the people to take up arms against the
constituted authorities and to rise against the established
government.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: During the criminal trial involving the former
President Joseph Estrada for his plunder cases at the
SandiganBayan. The media requested if they can cover
for purposes of ensuring transparency and the
constitutional guarantee of public trial.
ISSUE: Should the request be granted?
HELD: No. The courts recognize the constitutionally
embodied freedom of the press and the right to public
information. It also approves of media's exalted power to
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
29
provide the most accurate and comprehensive means of
conveying the proceedings to the public and in
acquainting the public with the judicial process in action;
nevertheless, within the courthouse, the overriding
consideration is still the paramount right of the accused
to due process which must never be allowed to suffer
diminution in its constitutional proportions. Justice Clark
thusly pronounced, "while a maximum freedom must be
allowed the press in carrying out the important function of
informing the public in a democratic society, its exercise
must necessarily be subject to the maintenance of
absolute fairness in the judicial process.
Atty. Bonocan Comment: There seems to be a clash of
two (2) constitutional rights i.e. the freedom of the press
vs. Erap’s right to due process. The Supreme Court has
given more weight to the constitutional right of Erap in
refusing allowance to televise the trial conducted by the
SandiganBayan.
AYER PRODUCTIONS V. CAPULONG G.R. 82380
FACTS: Right after EDSA Revolution, there was a
project movie entitled “The Four Day Revolution” where
one of the characters is Juan Ponce Enrile (JPE) who
was the former Minister of National Defense. JPE tried to
block the filming of the movie invoking his right to privacy.
ISSUE: Was JPE correct?
HELD: Whether the "balancing of interests test" or the
clear and present danger test" be applied in respect of
the instant Petitions, the Court believes that a different
conclusion must here be reached: The production and
filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture "The
Four Day Revolution" does not, in the circumstances of
this case, constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private
respondent's "right of privacy."
The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution" relates
to the non-bloody change of government that took place
at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in February 1986, and
the trian of events which led up to that denouement.
Clearly, such subject matter is one of public interest and
concern. The subject thus relates to a highly critical stage
in the history of this countryand as such, must be
regarded as having passed into the public domain and as
an appropriate subject for speech and expression and
coverage by any form of mass media. The subject mater,
as set out in the synopsis provided by the petitioners and
quoted above, does not relate to the individual life and
certainly not to the private life of private respondent
Ponce Enrile. "The Four Day Revolution" is not
principally about, nor is it focused upon, the man Juan
Ponce Enrile' but it is compelled, if it is to be historical, to
refer to the role played by Juan Ponce Enrile in the
precipitating and the constituent events of the change of
government in February 1986.
Similarly the SC likewise emphasized that JPE cannot
effectively invoke his right to privacy because he was a
public figure and more importantly the film does not talk
about his private life.
SWS VS. COMELEC GR No. 147571
FACTS: RA No.9006 (Fair Election Act) Section 5.4
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
states:
Surveys affecting national candidates shall not be
published fifteen (15) days before an election and
surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published
seven (7) days before an election.
It created a chilling effect. Thus. SWS questioned the
provision as violative of the free speech clause.
ISSUE: Was SWS correct in assailing the constitutionality
of Section 5.4 of RA 9006.
HELD: The Court held that that §5.4 of R.A. No. 9006
constitutes an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of
speech, expression, and the press.
To be sure, §5.4 Iays a prior restraint on freedom of
speech, expression, and the press prohibiting the
publication of election survey results affecting candidates
within the prescribed periods of fifteen (15) days
immediately preceding a national election seven (7) days
before a local election. Because of tile preferred status of
tile constitutional rights of speech, expression, and he
press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty
presumption of invalidity. Indeed, any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a
heavy Presumption against its constitutional validity.
...The Government thus carries a heavy burden of
showing justification for in enforcement of such restraint.
"' There, thus a reversal of the normal presumption of
validity that inheres in every legislation.
CASES relative to the right to peacefully assemble
governed by BP 880 also known as the “Public
Assembly Act of 1985”.
Primicias vs. Fugoso from the cases of Fuguso these are
cases that are relative to the right to peaceably assemble
(BP 880, Peaceable Assembly Act). In fact, this is where
they based that everytime there is a rally, they cannot just
do so if there is no permit coming from Under this law and
based on case laws, the Mayor or Chief Executive of the
LGU concerned does not have discretionary powers
whether to issue the permit to rally or not; it's only
ministerial. Except during the conduct of the rally, there is
violence. In Fuguso, the denial of the permit is based on an
ordinance that prohibits the conduct of rally on the ground
that it might cause chaos — the Supreme Court invalidated
that ordinance because the law merely confers upon the
municipal council the right to regulate not to altogether
prohibit and more importantly, it goes into the constitutional
right of the people and the group applying for the rally
permit to peacefully assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances.
Randolph vs. Arroyo the act involved here is Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017 (PP 1017) and General Order No. 5
(G.O. No. 5). PGMA revoked all the rally permits. That is
why it was assailed because the rest did not know it was
revoked and the rest still continued the rally despite the
revocation. Thus, they were arrested and criminally
charged. The Supreme Court invalidated the action of the
government as held that PP 1017 was unconstitutional.
Bayan vs Ermita — what’s involved here was PGMA’s
Preemptive Calibrated Response policy. There was a rally
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
30
in mendiola and there was a dispersal by the government
through the PNP and used water cannons teofisto
guingonia was hit. The government said they are
implementing the PCRP and the provisions under BP 880.
The Supreme Court did not agree with the argument
tendered by the Government. The BP 880 is not an
absolute ban for public assemblies but a restriction that
simply regulates the time, place, and manner of the
assembly (content-neutral vs content-based regulations). In
this case, the petition was partly granted and the PCRP
was nullified and the SC ordered for the immediate
designation of Freedom parks according to BP 880 (no
need to apply for a permit).
Nicolas Lewis vs Comelec — what’s involved here was
Section 36.08 of RA 9189 (Overseas Absentee Voting Act).
Lewis assailed the prohibition of campaigning during
absentee voting period at any place abroad; it violates her
constitutional right of free speech. SC nullified Sec. 36.08 of
RA 9189 as an impermissible content-neutral regulation for
being overbroad violating the free speech clause under
Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution. In this case, the
challenged provision's sweeping and absolute prohibition
against all forms of expression considered as partisan
political activities without any qualification is more than what
is essential to the furtherance of the contemplated
governmental interest. On its face, the challenged law
provides for an absolute and substantial suppression of
speech as it leaves no ample alternative means for one to
freely exercise his or her fundamental right to participate in
partisan political activities. By banning partisan political
activities or campaigning even during the campaign period
within embassies, consulates, and other foreign service
establishments, regardless of whether it applies only to
candidates or whether the prohibition extends to private
persons, it goes beyond the objective of maintaining order
during the voting period and ensuring a credible election. To
be sure, there can be no legally acceptable justification,
whether measured against the strictest scrutiny or the most
lenient review, to absolutely or unqualifiedly disallow one to
campaign within our jurisdiction during the campaign
period. For the foregoing reasons, SC declared Section
36.8 of RA 9189 as amended by RA 10590 unconstitutional
for violating Sec. 4, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.
—- END OF PRELIMS COVERAGE —--
Section 5, Article III: Freedom of Religion Clause
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free
exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed.
No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights.
Historical Background: Spanish Constitution, the church and
the state are one entity (church is part of the State). In fact,
Spanish laws at that time had provided a lot of measures to
protect the church. However, when American sovereignty took
over, there was already the separation of the church and the
state. The Philippine Constitution has always been patterned
before the American Constitution. – (Fr. Bernas)
This provision contains two aspects:
(1) Non-establishment clause (xxx no law shall be made xxx)
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
– the law is very clear that Congress cannot pass a statute
that seeks to establish any religion. It is not allowed for any
religion to have a legal charter. Nor can Congress pass a law
through an RA officially recognizing a certain religion as the
official religion of the state or create a new religion.
(2) Free exercise clause (or prohibiting the exercise thereof) –
Congress cannot pass a law that prohibits the exercise of
religion.
In interpreting this free exercise clause embodied in the
Constitution, the Court has consistently adhered to the doctrine
that: The right to religious profession and worship has a
two-fold aspect (sub-aspect) of Free exercise clause:
(1) freedom to believe – absolute as long as the belief is
confined within the realm of thought.
Ex: “I believe that Satan is my God”. Will you be criminally
charged? No. (The Government cannot even prevent you)
(2) freedom to act on one’s beliefs – subject to regulation
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the
public welfare.
Ex: If you perform overt acts that would disrupt the public
peace and welfare, such as killing a virgin for sacrifice/rituals.
Q: Can you still invoke your constitutional right of
freedom to act on one’s belief? No, it’s already a murder or
homicide as the case may be (unless the victim consents).
As a matter of fact, J. Isagani Cruz in his opinion in the case of
REQUEST OF MUSLIM EMPLOYEES IN THE DIFFERENT
COURTS IN ILIGAN CITY said:
The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases
concerning the hereafter. He may indulge his own theories
about life and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at
all; embrace or reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of
God or of any being that appeals to his reverence; recognize or
deny the immortality of his soul – in fact, cherish any religious
conviction as he and he alone sees fit. However absurd his
beliefs may be to others, even if they be hostile and heretical to
the majority, he has full freedom to believe as he pleases. He
may not be required to prove his beliefs. He may not be
punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter
of faith. "Men may believe what they cannot prove." Everyone
has a right to his beliefs and he may not be called to account
because he cannot prove what he believes . . . . BUT . . .
Where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or
omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes
subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty
may be, religious freedom, like all other rights guaranteed in
the Constitution, can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for
the rights of others. It is an error to think that the mere
invocation of religious freedom will stalemate the State and
render it impotent in protecting the general welfare. The
inherent police power can be exercised to prevent religious
practices inimical to society. And this is true even if such
practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and
not merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable
requirements or prohibitions of the law.
Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: The constitutional
provision on religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not
create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil
immunity. Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious
dogma, not freedom from conformity to law because of
religious dogma.
NON-ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: It prohibits the state from
passing laws which aid one religion or prefer one religion over
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
31
the other.
GR: Congress cannot include in the GAA the appropriation to
fund religious projects or similar purposes. Because it violates
the separation of church and state no matter how noble the
intention is.
XPNs: (See cases below)
AGLIPAY V. RUIZ, G.R. No. L-45459, 13 March 1937
FACTS: 33rd International Eucharistic Congress was held in
the Philippines. The Director of Post printed postage stamps
that highlighted that event under the provisions of Act No.
4052 of the Philippine Legislature which appropriated funds.
The sale of the postage stamps was questioned.
Q: Was there a violation of the non-establishment clause?
HELD: No. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by
our Constitution is religious liberty, not mere religious
toleration. Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional
mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for religion
and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. In the
preamble of the Constitution, it manifested reliance upon
Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is
recognized here as elsewhere.
While the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may
be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a religious
character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the
Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and main purpose
of the Government. The Government should not be
embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental
results, more or less religious in character, if the purpose
had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by
appropriate legislation. The main purpose should not be
frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not
contemplated.
AUSTRIA V. NLRC, G.R. No. 124382, 16 August 1999
Pastor Austria worked with the 7th Day Adventist with 12
churches under him. In 1991, he was transferred to Bacolod.
Failure to account for the church tites. Because of this, he
was terminated. That is why he filed an illegal termination
case with the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter ruled against
him which he appealed before the NLRC which upheld his
termination. He now questions the jurisdiction of the NLRC
over the case because the matter involved is ecclesiastical.
ISSUE: Has the NLRC has jurisdiction over the case.
HELD: Yes. The case does not concern an ecclesiastical or
purely religious affair as to bar the State from taking
cognizance of the same. An ecclesiastical affair involves the
relationship between the church and its members and
relates to matters of faith, religious doctrines, worship and
governance of the congregation i.e. proceedings for
excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers,
administration of sacraments and other activities with
attached religious significance which the State cannot
meddle. The case does not even remotely concern any of
the above cited examples. He was not ex-communicated or
expelled from the membership of the SDA but was
terminated from employment. What is involved here is the
relationship of the church as an employer and the minister
as an employee; it is purely secular.
UCCP V. BRADFORD UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST, INC
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G.R. No. 171905, 20 June 2012
FACTS: Petitioner United Church of Christ in the
Philippines, Inc. (UCCP) is a religious corporation duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines. It is
a national confederation of incorporated and unincorporated
self-governing Evangelical churches of different
denominations, devised for fellowship, mutual counsel and
cooperation. It is the ecclesiastical successor of the
Evangelical Church of the Philippines, the Philippine
Methodist Church and the United Evangelical Church of the
Philippines.
Respondent BUCCI, used to be part of UCCP but in 1979, it
formed its own incorporation under SEC. UCCP opposed
this and requested the SEC for its annulment alleging that it
is not allowed under UCCP’s by-laws.
ISSUE: WON the disaffiliation of BUCCI is valid and is
purely an ecclesiastical affair outside the jurisdiction of SEC.
HELD: No. UCCP and BUCCI, being corporate entities and
grantees of primary franchises, are subject to the jurisdiction
of the SEC. Section 3 of PD No. 902-A provides that SEC
shall have absolute jurisdiction, supervision and control over
all corporations. Even with their religious nature, SEC may
exercise jurisdiction over them in matters that are legal and
corporate. BUCCI, as a juridical entity separate and distinct
from UCCP, possesses the freedom to determine its steps.
The Court owes but recognition to BUCCI’s decision as it
concerns its legal right as a religious corporation to
disaffiliate from another religious corporation via legitimate
means –a secular matter well within the civil courts’ purview.
TARUC . DE LA CRUZ, G.R. No. 144801, 10 March 2005
FACTS: Taruc and other petitioners were lay members of
the Philippine Independent Church (PIC). Taruc tried to
organize an open mass to be celebrated by Fr. Ambong
during the town fiesta of Socorro. When Taruc informed
Bishop Dela Cruz of the plan, the Bishop tried to dissuade
him because Fr. Ambong was not a member of the clergy of
the diocese of Surigao and his credentials were in doubt.
When the Bishop failed to stop Taruc, he declared
petitioners in 1993 as expelled/excommunicated from the
PIC. Because of this, Taruc et al filed a complaint for
damages with a preliminary injunction against Bishop De la
Cruz before the RTC. They contend that their expulsion was
illegal because there was no due process of law. Bishop
questioned the jurisdiction of the court invoking the
separation of church and the state and that the matters
involved here is ecclessiastical.
ISSUE: Has the court jurisdiction over the case?
HELD: No. In our jurisdiction, we hold the Church and the
State to be separate and distinct from each other. "Give to
Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God’s."
SC agreed with the CA that the expulsion/excommunication
of members of a religious institution/organization is a matter
best left to the discretion of the church officials, and the laws
and canons of said institution/organization. It is not for the
courts to exercise control over church authorities in the
performance of their discretionary and official functions.
Rather, it is for the members of religious institutions or
organizations to conform to church regulations.
SPOUSES IMBONG V. OCHOA, ET AL
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
32
G.R. No. 204819, etc., 08 April 2014 (BAR Q - RH BILL)
Q: Does the duty to “refer” make them criminally liable?
A: The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer
imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and
conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical
practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking
information on modem reproductive health products,
services, procedures and methods, his conscience is
immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform
an act against his beliefs.
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out
clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes
pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an
act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They
cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do
directly. One may not be the principal, but he is equally guilty
if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to
utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is
not in his mind. While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom
of choice through informed consent, freedom of choice
guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and
prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether
direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.
**CASES ON FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE**
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY V CITY OF MANILA,
G.R. No. L-9637, 30 April 1957
FACTS: ABS has been distributing and selling bibles and/or
gospel throughout the Philippines and translating the same
into several Philippine dialects. In 1953, the acting City
Treasurer of the City of Manila informed ABS that it was
conducting the business of general merchandise since
November, 1945, without providing itself with the necessary
Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation of
Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos.
2529, 3028 and 3364, and required ABS to secure, within 3
days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together
with compromise covering the period from the Q4 of 1945 to
Q2 of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45. ABS questioned
the directive as violative of the free exercise clause.
HELD: Yes, such an It may be true that in the case at bar
the price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets
was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost
of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was
engaged in the business or occupation of selling said
"merchandise" for profit. For this reason We believe that the
provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as
amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it
would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious
profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination
of religious beliefs.
COMPARE WITH THE CASE OF TOLENTINO
TOLENTINO V. SEC. OF FINANCE
G.R. No. 115455, 25 August 1994
FACTS: This entity invoking the case of ABS, questioned
BIR in making the products/reading materials subject to VAT
law. They were asked to add-on 10% VAT and remit it to the
BIR. Philippine Bible Society assailed this. They were
likewise exempt for being subjected to the VAT law.
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HELD: What was involved in the ABS case was local
business taxes. In this case, PBS was subjected to the VAT
law imposed upon the buyer of the goods and not the seller.
GERONA V BOARD OF EDUCATION
G.R. No. L-13954, 12 August 1959
FACTS: Petitioners were members of Jehovah’s Witnesses.
Their children were expelled from the school for their refusal
to join the flag ceremony because it is against their religious
belief. Thus, they wrote to the Secretary of Education
invoking the free exercise clause but denied the petition.
Thus, they elevated the case to the SC.
ISSUE: Was the denial of DEPED as regards to their
request for the exemption and for the reinstatement of their
expelled children, valid?
HELD: Yes. The flag is not an image but a symbol of the
Republic of the Philippines, an emblem of national
sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom
and liberty which it and the Constitution guarantee and
protect. Considering the complete separation of church and
state in our system of governments, the flag is utterly devoid
of any religious significance. Saluting the flag consequently
does not involve any religious ceremony.
In requiring school pupils to participate in the flag salute, the
State thru the Secretary of Education was not imposing a
religion or religious belief or test on said students. It was
merely enforcing a non-discriminatory school regulation
applicable to all alike whether Christian, Muslim, Protestant
or Jehovah's Witness. The State was merely carrying out
the duty imposed upon it by the Constitution which charged
it with supervision over and regulation of all educational
institutions, to establish and maintain a complete and
adequate system of public education, and to see to it that all
schools aim to develop among other things, civic conscience
and teach the duties of citizenship [Sec. 5, Art. XIV]. It does
nothing more than try to inculcate in the minds of the school
population during the formative period of their life. Whatever
is taught to the youth during this period, such as love of
country and love of the flag, all of which make for united and
patriotic citizenry.
EBRALINAG V. DIVISION SUPERINTENDENT OF
SCHOOLS OF CEBU, G.R. No. 95770, 03/01/1993
(stare de cisis - abandoned the Gerona ruling)
FACTS: Same as the Gerona case. RA 1265 (Flag Law)
and Dept. Order 8 making the flag ceremony compulsory.
HELD: SC abandoned the Gerona ruling. Religious freedom
is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority
and the amplest protection among human rights, for it
involves the relationship of man to his Creator. What the
petitioners seek only is exemption from the flag ceremony,
not exclusion from the public schools where they may study
and learn the Constitution as part of the curricula and
acquire knowledge and skills from these educational
institutions pursuant to the mandate in Sec. 3(2), Art. XIV of
the Constitution. The exemption may be accorded to them
however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others.
Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the flag
ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such patriotic
exercises. While the highest regard must be afforded their
right to the free exercise of their religion, "this should not be
taken to mean that school authorities are powerless to
discipline them" if they should commit breaches of the peace
by actions that offend the sensibilities, both religious and
patriotic, of other persons. If they quietly stand at attention
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
33
during the flag ceremony while their classmates and
teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite
the patriotic pledge, such conduct will NOT possibly disturb
the peace, or pose "a grave and present danger of a serious
evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest that the State has a right and duty
to prevent.
ANOTHER CASE WHERE SC MADE THE RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM PREVAIL OVER A STATUTORY OBLIGATION
ALEJANDRO ESTRADA v. SOLEDAD S. ESCRITOR
FACTS: An admin case against Escritor, a court employee
for disgraceful and immoral conduct was filed. Escritor,
already a widow when she entered the judiciary in 1999 and
admitted that she has been living with Quilapio (who still has
legal impediment) without the benefit of marriage for 20
years and that they have a son. But their conjugal
arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs. In
fact, after 10 years of living together, she executed in July
1991 a "Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness," – it makes
the union moral and binding within the congregation all over
the world except in countries where divorce is allowed. Only
couples who have been baptized and in good standing may
execute that declaration which requires the approval of the
elders of the Congregation. As a matter of practice, the
marital status of the declarant and their respective spouses'
commission of adultery are even investigated before the
declarations are allowed to be executed. In sum, therefore,
insofar as the congregation is concerned, there is nothing
immoral about the conjugal arrangement between Escritor
and Quilapio and they remain members in good standing in
the congregation. Escritor invoked the religious belief
practice and she should not be held administratively liable.
ISSUE: Is she administratively liable for disgraceful and
immoral conduct?
HELD: No. The present case involves purely conduct arising
from religious belief. Not any interest of the state would
suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is
a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the
hierarchy of rights – the most inalienable and sacred of all
human rights. This right is sacred for an invocation of the
Free Exercise Clause. In this particular case and under the
distinct circumstances, respondent’s conjugal arrangement
cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for
exemption from the law based on the fundamental right of
freedom of religion. Escritor must enjoy her religious
freedom. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred
freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority
higher than the State and so the state interest sought to be
upheld must be so compelling that its violation will erode the
very fabric of the State that will also protect that freedom. In
the absence of showing that such state interest exists,
man must be allowed to subscribe to the infinite.
Q: What is meant by the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality
or Accommodation?
In the case of Estrada vs. Escritor, the Benevolent Neutrality
Theory believes that with respect to these governmental
actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed not to
promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a
burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or
institution's religion. What is sought under the theory of
accommodation is not a declaration of unconstitutionality of a
facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
burdensome effect whether by the legislature or the courts.
BENJAMIN VICTORIANO VS. ELIZALDE ROPE
FACTORY (ERF) , G.R. NO. L-25246, 12 September 1974
FACTS: Victoriano, a member of INC and employed in ERF,
was compelled (against his will because INC does not allow
them) to join the Union because of an existing collective
bargaining agreement that contains a closed shop provision
– where it says that if you are not a member, you may be
validly terminated from employment. Congress then enacted
RA 3350 (legally exempts members of religious sects that
prohibits members to join Unions). Victoriano presented his
resignation from his Union which later wrote to the
management for his termination on account of their Union
security clause.
ISSUE: May the management validly terminate Victoriano
based on the violation of the CBA?
HELD: NO. The free exercise of religious profession or
belief is superior to contractual rights. In case of conflict, the
latter must, therefore, yield to the former. Religious freedom,
although not unlimited, is a fundamental personal right and
liberty, and has a preferred position in the hierarchy of
values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom
of religion. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent
an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare
of the community that infringement of religious freedom may
be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to
avoid the danger. To compel persons to join and remain
members of a union to keep their jobs in violation of their
religious scruples, would hurt, rather than help, labor unions.
Congress has seen it fit to exempt religious objectors lest
their resistance spread to other workers, for religious
objections have contagious potentialities more than political
and philosophic objections.
Q: In the ruling of Elizalde does it mean that the members
of INC are already precluded from joining unions? NO
KAPATIRAN SA MEAT AND CANNING DIVISION VS.
CALLEJA, G.R. NO. 82914, 20 June 1988
FACTS: From 1984 to 1987 TUPAS was the sole and
exclusive CBA Rep of the workers in the Meat and Canning
Division of the Universal Robina Corporation (URC), with a
3-year collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Within the
freedom period of 60 days prior to the expiration of its CBA,
TUPAS filed an amended notice of strike on September 28,
1987 as a means of pressuring the company to extend,
renew, or negotiate a new CBA with it. URC obtained an
injunction against the strike, resulting in an agreement to
return to work and for the parties to negotiate a new CBA.
On October 8, 1987, the NEW ULO, composed mostly of
workers belonging to the INC sect, registered as a labor
union, claiming that it has "the majority of the daily wage
rank and file employees numbering 191," and filed a petition
for a certification election — legal process to select a
legitimate CBA Rep will be chosen from among 2 or more
existing CBU — at the Bureau of Labor Relations. TUPAS
moved for the dismissal for the petition of the certification
election for being defective in form and averring that the
NEW ULO is composed mostly of members of INC which
refused to affiliate with other Labor Unions and accused
URC in using NEW ULO to defeat the bargaining rights of
TUPAS.
ISSUE: IS the NEW ULO a legitimate labor union?
HELD: Yes. Because they were registered and their
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
34
application was accepted. This Court's decision in Victoriano
vs. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, upholding the right of
members of the INC sect not to join a labor union for being
contrary to their religious beliefs, does not bar the members
of that sect from forming their own union. The public
respondent correctly observed that the "recognition of the
tenets of the sect should not infringe on the basic right of
self-organization granted by the constitution to workers,
regardless of religious affiliation."
ISLAMIC DA’WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILS (IDCP) V.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. No. 153888, 09 July 2003
IDCP has always been the official corporation to issue Jalal
Certificate on food products. In 2001, the Office of the
Executive Secretary issued EO 465 creating the Philippine
Halal Certification Scheme and designating co-respondent
OMA to oversee its implementation. Under the EO, OMA
has the exclusive authority to issue halal certificates and
perform other related regulatory activities. IDCP questioned
this.
ISSUE: Does EO 46 violate the separation of state and the
church clause of the Constitution?
HELD: Yes.OMA deals with the societal, legal, political and
economic concerns of the Muslim community as a "national
cultural community" and not as a religious group. Thus,
bearing in mind the constitutional barrier between the
Church and State, the latter must make sure that OMA does
not intrude into purely religious matters lest it violate the
non-establishment clause and the "free exercise of religion"
provision found in Sec. 5, Art. III of the 1987 Constitution.
Without doubt, classifying a food product as halal is a
religious function because the standards used are drawn
from the Qur'an and Islamic beliefs. By giving OMA the
exclusive power to classify food products as halal, EO 46
encroached on the religious freedom of Muslim
organizations like IDCP to interpret for Filipino Muslims what
food products are fit for Muslim consumption. Also, by
arrogating to itself the task of issuing halal certifications, the
State has in effect forced Muslims to accept its own
interpretation of the Qur'an and Sunnah on halal food. EO
46 was invalidated.
RE: REQUEST OF MUSLIM EMPLOYEES IN THE
DIFFERENT COURTS IN ILIGAN CITY,
A.M. No. 02-2-10-SC, 14 December 2005
FACTS: Muslim Court employees requested to be exempted
from observing office hours on two occassions: (1) to hold
office hours from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without lunch or
coffee breaks during the month of Ramadan; (2) to be
excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every
Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year.
ISSUE: Should the requests be granted based on the
exercise clause?
HELD: The Court recognizes that the observance of
Ramadan and the Friday Muslim Prayer Day is integral to
the Islamic faith. Thus it partly granted the request but only
during the Ramadan finding support in Section 3 (a) of P.D.
No. 291, as amended by P.D. No. 322. However, the Court
did not grant the second request because this will now be
inconsistent with the CSC laws and for lack of statutory
basis. To allow the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to be
excused from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every
Friday (Muslim Prayer Day) during the entire calendar year
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
would mean a diminution of the prescribed government
working hours. For then, they would be rendering service 12
hours less than that required by the CSC rules for each
month. Further, this would encourage other religious
denominations to request for similar treatment.
The performance of religious practices, whether by the
Muslim employees or those belonging to other religious
denominations, should not prejudice the courts and the
public. Indeed, the exercise of religious freedom does not
exempt anyone from compliance with reasonable
requirements of the law, including civil service laws.
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY V. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 190582, 08 April 2010
FACTS: ANG LADLAD was denied application for their
accreditation as a Party List. COMELEC cited provisions in
the scripture: Romans 1:26, 27 and the Koran verses.
ISSUE: Was the denial by the COMELEC valid?
HELD: No. Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5
that "no law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At bottom,
what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government
neutrality in religious matters." Clearly, "governmental
reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with
this policy of neutrality." It was a grave violation of the
non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the
Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of ANG
LADLAD. Rather than relying on religious belief, the
legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions should depend,
instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some
justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to
religious doctrine. Otherwise stated, the government must
act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily
secular effects.
Section 6, Article III – Liberty of Abode & Travel
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same
within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except
upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel
be impaired except in the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
Q: What is the concept of the liberty of abode?
A: Here, no one can be compelled to change his/her home
except in accordance with law. According to Fr. Bernas, Liberty
can be impaired only upon lawful order of the court and upon
the issuance of that lawful order, the Court is to be guided by
the limits prescribed by law.
Ex: The civilians found in a rebel-infested locality, the military
commanders usually ask them in one area or would require
them to spend a night in a safe area. This HAMLETING could
have come under this provision but unfortunately, this issue did
not reach the SC.
“LIMITS PRESCRIBED BY LAW” – examples are the final
and executory orders issued by the Court in ejectment cases
or Order of Demolition.
VILLAVICENCIO V. LUKBAN, G.R. No. L-14639, 3/25/1919
The Mayor of Lukban and the city authorities deported 170
ill-reputed women (who were kept confined to their houses
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
35
in the district by the police after closing the district where
they work) to Davao as laborers. Without their knowledge,
consent, and was given no opportunity to collect their
belongings. The Counsel for the relatives and the friends of
deportees filed an application for habeas corpus alleging
that those women were illegally refrained from their liberty.
ISSUE: By authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief
of Police presume to act in deporting by duress these
persons from Manila to another distant locality within the
Philippine Islands?
RULING: NOTHING. The act of the respondents was illegal.
Under the American constitutional system, liberty of abode
is a principle so deeply embedded in jurisprudence and
considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a
constitutional sanction. Even the Gov-Gen or the President
of the US, who has often been said to exercise more power
than any king or potentate, has no such arbitrary
prerogative, either inherent or express. Much less, therefore,
has the executive of a municipality, who acts within a sphere
of delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police
could, at their mere behest, render the liberty of the citizen
so insecure, then any other official can do the same. And if a
prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no
law from one locality to another within the country, then it
can hold the same club over the head of any citizen. The
forcible taking of these women, deprived them of freedom of
locomotion just as effectively as if they had been
imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or
personal belongings, they were prevented from exercising
the liberty of going when and where they pleased.
RICARDO SILVERIO VS CA GR 94284 (COURT ORDER)
FACTS: Silverio was charged with violation of Sec. 20 (4) of
the Revised Securities Act. He posted bail but an Order was
issued directing the DFA to cancel Petitioner's passport or to
deny his application therefor, and the Commission on
Immigration to prevent him from leaving the country on the
grounds that he had gone abroad several times without the
necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the
arraignment and hearings. He contends that the scheduled
arraignments can’t be had because there was a pending
MTQ and (2) the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful
order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest
of national security, public safety or public health."
RULING: Silverio is NOT CORRECT. Sec. 6, Art. III should
by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power
of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their
orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them in
order to attain finality and avoid undue delay. All auxiliary
writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into
effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135,
Sec. 6, ROC). Silverio is facing a criminal charge. He has
posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by failing
to appear before the Court when required. Warrants for his
arrest have been issued. Those orders and processes would
be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to
leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial
confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal
case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his
departure from the Philippines must be considered as a
valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt
with in accordance with law.
EFRAIM GENUINO, ET AL V. DE LIMA, G.R. No. 197930
FACTS: Criminal complaints were filed against former
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
President GMA before the DOJ. Thus, De Lima issued DOJ
WLO (Watch List Order) pursuant to her authority under
DOJ Circular No. 41 against GMA. She also ordered for the
inclusion of GMA's name in the Bureau of Immigration
watchlist. GMA filed the present Petition to annul and set
aside DOJ Circular No. 41 and WLOs issued against her for
allegedly being unconstitutional.
ISSUE: May the DOJ validly Issue HDO, WLO or allow DO?
RULING: NO. The right to travel is part of the "liberty" of
which a citizen cannot be deprived without due process of
law. It is part and parcel of the guarantee of freedom of
movement that the Constitution affords its citizens. Under
Sec. 6, Article III of the Constitution, there are only three
considerations that may permit a restriction on the right to
travel: national security, public safety or public health. As a
further requirement, there must be an explicit provision of
statutory law or the ROC providing for the impairment.
It is clear from the foregoing that the liberty of abode may
only be impaired by a lawful order of the court. There is no
law particularly providing for the authority of the SOJ to
curtail the exercise of the right to travel, in the interest of
national security, public safety or public health. DOJ Circular
No. 41 is not a law. It is not a legislative enactment which
underwent the scrutiny and concurrence of lawmakers, and
submitted to the President for approval. Without a law to
justify its action, the issuance of DOJ Circular No. 41 is an
unauthorized act of the DOJ of empowering itself under the
pretext of dire exigency or urgent necessity. This action runs
afoul the separation of powers between the three branches
of the government and cannot be upheld.
MARCOS V. MANGLAPUS, G.R. 88211, 9/15/1989
(President’s Residual Power in re: right to travel)
FACTS: The government of Corazon Aquino imposed a ban
on Former Pres. Marcos regarding his return to the
Philippines. This was assailed by the Marcoses as violative
of their right to travel and abode averring that there is
nothing in the Constitution written to ban a person to return
to his home. In fact, Sec. 6 says that freedom to travel is a
constitutional right that can be limited by a law.
ISSUE: May the President in the exercise of the powers
granted by Constitution prohibit the Marcos’ from returning
to the Philippines.
RULING: YES. It is the President’s residual power. The right
involved here is the right to return to one's country, a totally
distinct right under international law, independent from,
although related to, the right to travel. Thus, the UDHR and
the ICCPR treat both rights as separate and distinct
from each other. The Declaration speaks of the "right to
freedom of movement and residence within the borders of
each state" separately from the "right to leave any country,
including his own, and to return to his country." On the other
hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of
movement and freedom to choose his residence" and the
right to "be free to leave any country, including his own."
which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are
necessary to protect national security, public order, public
health or morals or enter one's own country" of which one
cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." It would therefore be
inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to
return to one's country in the same context as those
pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The right to return to one's country is not among the rights
specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only
of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
36
well-considered view that the right to return may be
considered, as a generally accepted principle of
international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the
law of the land. However, it is distinct and separate from the
right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the
ICCPR i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof.
Q: What are the known statutory limits to the exercise of
the right to travel?
Explained in the case of Leave Division, OAS-OCA v.
Heusdens, the exercise of one’s right to travel or the freedom
to move from one place to another, as assured by the
Constitution, is not absolute. There are constitutional, statutory
and inherent limitations regulating the right to travel. Section 6
itself provides that "neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety or public
health, as may be provided by law." Some of these statutory
limitations are the following:
1] The Human Security Act of 2010 or Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9372. The law restricts the right to travel of an individual
charged with the crime of terrorism even though such person is
out on bail.
2] The Philippine Passport Act of 1996 or R.A. No. 8239.
Pursuant to said law, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs or his
authorized consular officer may refuse the issuance of, restrict
the use of, or withdraw, a passport of a Filipino citizen.
3] The "Anti- Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" or R.A.
No. 9208. Pursuant to the provisions thereof, the Bureau of
Immigration, in order to manage migration and curb trafficking
in persons, issued Memorandum Order Radjr No. 2011-011,12
allowing its Travel Control and Enforcement Unit to "offload
passengers with fraudulent travel documents, doubtful purpose
of travel, including possible victims of human trafficking" from
our ports.
4] The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995
or R. A. No. 8042, as amended by R.A. No. 10022. In
enforcement of said law, the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) may refuse to issue deployment permit
to a specific country that effectively prevents our migrant
workers to enter such country.
5] The Act on Violence against Women and Children or
R.A. No. 9262. The law restricts movement of an individual
against whom the protection order is intended.
6] Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995 or R.A. No. 8043.
Pursuant thereto, the Inter-Country Adoption Board may issue
rules restrictive of an adoptee’s right to travel "to protect the
Filipino child from abuse, exploitation, trafficking and/or sale or
any other practice in connection with adoption which is
harmful, detrimental, or prejudicial to the child."
Inherent limitations on the right to travel are those that naturally
emanate from the source. These are very basic and are built-in
with the power. An example of such inherent limitation is the
power of the trial courts to prohibit persons charged with a
crime to leave the country. In such a case, permission of the
court is necessary. Another is the inherent power of the
legislative department to conduct a congressional inquiry in aid
of legislation. In the exercise of legislative inquiry, Congress
has the power to issue a subpoena and subpoena duces
tecum to a witness in any part of the country, signed by the
chairperson or acting chairperson and the Speaker or acting
Speaker of the House; or in the case of the Senate, signed by
its Chairman or in his absence by the Acting Chairman, and
approved by the Senate President.
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
Section 7, Article III – Right to Information
SECTION 7. The right of the people to information on matters
of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government
research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
NOTE: that this Right to information is intertwined with the
government’s constitutional duty to full public disclosure of all
transactions involving public interest. Section 28, Article II — it
is a policy of the State to adhere to full transparency in all
transactions involving public interest. Subject to reasonable
conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts a policy of full
public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Section 7, Art. III is the individual right and Section 28, Art. 2 is
the correlative duty of the government to observe full public
disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
Now, what do you think is the purpose of this provision?
In the case of Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority and
Amari Coastal Bay Development Corporation, these twin
provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in
policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well
as provide the people sufficient information to exercise
effectively other constitutional rights.
These twin provisions are essential to the exercise of freedom
of expression. If the government does not disclose its official
acts, transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever citizens
say, even if expressed without any restraint, will be speculative
and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are also
essential to hold public officials "at all times x x x accountable
to the people," for unless citizens have the proper information,
they cannot hold public officials accountable for anything.
Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in
public discussions leading to the formulation of government
policies and their effective implementation. An informed
citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of
any democracy. Now, this right to information however is not
without limitation. According to Fr. Bernas, the two sentences
of Section 7 guarantee only one general right, that is, the right
to information on matters of public concern. The right of access
to official records is given as an implementation of the right to
information. Thus, the right to information on matters of public
concern is both the purpose and the limit of the right of access
to public documents. Thus, too, regulatory discretion must
include both authority to determine what matters are of public
concern and authority to determine the manner of access to
them.
LIMITS TO THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION: In the case of
IDEAL v. PSALM, SC distinguished the duty to disclose
information from the duty to permit access to information on
matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the
Constitution. Unlike the disclosure of information which is
mandatory under the Constitution, the other aspect of the
people’s right to know requires a demand or request for one to
gain access to documents and paper of the particular agency.
Moreover, the duty to disclose covers only transactions
involving public interest, while the duty to allow access has a
broader scope of information which embraces not only
transactions involving public interest, but any matter contained
in official communications and public documents of the
government agency. Such relief must be granted to the party
requesting access to official records, documents and papers
relating to official acts, transactions, and decisions that are
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
37
relevant to a government contract.In Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority thus laid down the rule that the constitutional right to
information includes official information on on-going
negotiations before a final contract. The information, however,
must constitute definite propositions by the government and
should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged
information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters
affecting national security and public order. In addition,
Congress has prescribed other limitations on the right to
information in several legislations.
TO SUM IT UP, according to the case of Chavez vs PCGG,
these are the limitations to the right to information under
Section 7, Article III: [BINT-COC-6713]
1] Banking Transactions – under the Bank Secrecy law; XPN:
RA 670 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Law)
2] Intelligence Information;
3] National Security matter;
4] Trade Secrets – patented inventions in the possession of the
IPO can’t be disclosed;
5] Criminal Matters – on going investigations as regards the
commission of a crime
6] Other Confidential Information – classified info; Executive
Privilege; Deliberative Process Privilege [Akbayan vs. Tomas
Aquino]
7] Sec 3 Rule 4 of RA 6713 or the Code of Ethical Standards
for Public Officers and Employees.
Pursuant to the mandate of this law, the CSC promulgated the
implementing rules. Sec. 3 Rule 4 provides that every
department, office or agency shall provide official information,
records or documents to any requesting public, EXCEPT if:
(a) such information, record or document must be kept secret
in the interest of national defense or security or the conduct of
foreign affairs; (restatement of the ruling in the cases of
Chavez v PEA and Chavez v PCGG)
(b) such disclosure would put the life and safety of an
individual in imminent danger;
Ex: Philippine witness protection program.
(c) the information, record or document sought falls within the
concepts of established privilege or recognized exceptions as
may be provided by law or settled policy or jurisprudence;
Ex: Presidential communications privilege (in general, an
executive privilege)
(d) such information, record or document comprises drafts of
decisions, orders, rulings, policy decisions, memoranda, etc.;
Ex: Drafts of judicial decisions (can’t access that), EXCEPT
the final copies of these documents. As a matter of fact, the
concerned government agency may destroy these documents.
(e) it would disclose information of a personal nature where
disclosure would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy;
Ex: Data Privacy Act and information covered by this law are
likewise mentioned in this particular IRR.
(f) it would disclose investigatory records compiled for law
enforcement purposes or information which if written would be
contained in such records, but only to the extent that the
production of such records or information would:
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
(i) interfere with enforcement proceedings;
(ii) deprive a person of a right to a fair trial or an impartial
adjudication;
(iii) disclose the identity of a confidential source and in the case
of a record compiled by a criminal law enforcement authority in
the course of a criminal investigation, or by an agency
conducting a lawful national security intelligence investigation,
confidential information furnished only by the confidential
source; or
(iv) unjustifiably disclose investigative techniques and
procedures; Ex: those records under the custody of the police
in the conduct of fact-finding investigation in relation to the
commission of a particular crime.
(g) it would disclose information the premature disclosure of
which would:
(i) in the case of a department, office or agency which agency
regulates currencies, securities, commodities, or financial
institutions, be likely to lead to significant financial speculation
in currencies, securities, or commodities, or significantly
endanger the stability of any financial institution; or
(ii) in the case of any department, office or agency be likely or
significantly to frustrate implementation of a proposed official
action, except that subparagraph (f)
(iii) shall not apply in any instance where the department, office
or agency has already disclosed to the public the content or
nature of its proposed action, or where the department, office
or agency is required by law to make such disclosure on its
own initiative prior to taking final official action on such
proposal.
REMEMBER: As a member of the public, you cannot just come
to the concerned agency and ask them to show you and even
allow you to copy these documents at any time that suits your
convenience. That could only be possible if of course you do it
during official working hours.
IMPORTANT CASE LAW DOCTRINE:
IDEAL vs. PSALM – explanation on the relationship between
these constitutional rights of the people to information and the
duty of the government to disclose.
Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority and Chavez v PCGG –
exceptions provided for by case law as regards to this
particular constitution of right. In both cases, the SC
ratiocinated that like all constitutional guarantees, the right to
information with its right of access to its official records is not
absolute. While providing guarantee for this particular right, the
Constitution also provides that the people’s right to know is
limited to matters of public concern further subject to such
limitation as may be provided for by law.
AKBAYAN vs. Thomas Aquino – this case involved the
JPEPA while negotiation were still on going between the
representatives of the Philippine and Japanese government,
there were people, among others, members of AKBAYAN who
would want to have access to records particularly those offers
and counteroffers made by both parties prior to the conclusion
of JEPEPA. One of the issues raised by the government in that
case is that the requesting public cannot yet gain access to
those documents because they were not matters of public
concern but the SC held that JPEPA is a public concern
covered by the right to information here sought to meet the
requirement that must be a matter of public concern. From the
nature of the JPEPA as an international trade agreement, it is
evident that the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted
during the negotiations towards its execution are matters of
public concern. Thus, respondents do not dispute. They only
claim that diplomatic negotiations are covered by the doctrine
of executive privilege, thus constituting an exception to the
right to information and the policy of full public disclosure.
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
38
Q: May the public request for the copies of SALNs,
Personal Data Sheet (PDS) and CV of the SC Justices?
RE: Request for the copies of the 2008 SALN, PDS OR
CV of The Justices of the Supreme Court and Officers
and Employees of the Judiciary
RE: Request of Philippine Center for Investigative
Journalism [PICJ] for the 2008 SALN and PDS of the
Court of Appeals Justices
The SC answered in the affirmative, the court finds no
reason to deny the public access to the SALNs, PDS and
CVs of the justices of the court and other magistrates of the
judiciary subject of course to the limitations provided under
RA 6713. The court notes the valid concerns of the other
magistrates regarding the possible illicit motives of some
individuals in their request for access to such personal
information and their publication. However, custodians of
public documents must not concern themselves with the
motives, reasons and objects of the persons seeking access
to these records. Rather, the moral or material injury which
their misuse might inflict on others is the requestor’s
responsibility and lookout. Any publication is made subject
to the consequences of the law. While public officers in the
custody or control of public records have the discretion to
regulate the manner in which records may be inspected,
examined or copied by interested persons, such discretion
does not carry with it the authority to prohibit access,
inspection, examination, or copying of the records. After all,
public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees
must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives – (Dogma
found in Sec 1, Article 11).
Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment through
Alternative Legal Services, Inc. (IDEAL, Inc.) v Power
Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Corp.
(PSALM) G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012.
FACTS: PSALM is a GOCC mandated by RA 9136 (Electric
Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 or the EPIRA Law) to
manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of the
assets of the NPC over a 25-year period. PSALM held a
public bidding for the sale of AHEPP, a 246-MW
hydroelectric power plant and awarded the sale to K-Water,
But even before K-Water was given the Notice of Award,
IDEALS had been sending letters to PSALM to request for
copies of documents pertaining to the sale. The first letter
requests for copies of the Terms of Reference and proposed
bids submitted by the bidders. There was no response
because at the time no bids had been submitted yet
(updates about the ongoing bidding were posted on the
PSALM website). The second letter requested information
regarding the winning bidder, such as company profile,
contact person, office address, and Philippine registration.
Despite press releases announcing K-Water as the winning
bidder, PSALM failed to sufficiently provide the petitioners
with the information they were asking for, almost as if
PSALM officials were trying to hide something.
ISSUES: Was there compliance on the rule of transparency
on the part of PSALM?
HELD: NO. Aside from its duty to disclose material
information regarding the sale of AHEPP, PSALM further
has the duty to allow access to information on matters of
public concern. This burden requires a demand or request
from a member of the public, to which the right properly
belongs. "The gateway to information opens to the public the
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
following: (1) official records; (2) documents and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions; and (3)
government research data used as a basis for policy
development.
PSALM veritably violated the petitioners’ right to information.
It should have permitted access to the specific documents
containing the desired information, in light of the disclosure
of the same information thus made in its website. The
documents referred to are neither confidential nor privileged
in nature, as the gist thereof had already been published in
the news bulletins in the website of PSALM, and as such,
access thereto must be granted to the petitioner. On the
contrary, the documents requested partake of the nature of
official information.
Section 8, Article III
RIGHT TO FORM ASSOCIATIONS
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in
the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.
This provision is in relation to Sec. 2(5) of Art. IX-B of the CSC.
And the enumeration of the constitutional powers of the CSC.
Sec. 2(5) of Art. IX-B: “The right to self-organization shall not
be denied to government employees.” Section 8, Art. III is like
a restatement strengthening the right of all people to
self-organization. [in-depth discussion in Labor Relations Law.]
In a certain CBU, when the management does not receive from
the workers a proposal to bargain, the law says that it is
incumbent upon the employer or management to initiate talks
for purposes of collective bargaining.
Q: May government workers also be allowed to unionize?
A: YES but with limitations.
Also, in relation to Sec. 2(5) of Art. IX-B, government workers
are entitled to unionize, just like the workers in the private
sector. As a matter of fact, when EO 180 was issued, it
contained rules that should be observed when it comes to
unionization in the public sector. However, the number of rights
is not the same in the private and public sectors; the latter is
limited. According to EO 180, these government workers
unions must be registered in the CSC and the Department of
Labor through the BLR. Also, although the workers in the
public sector are entitled to unionization, they cannot stage
strikes because the terms and conditions of their employment
are fixed by law and cannot be subject to stipulation or
bargaining. [MPSTA and SSSDA cases]
Strike – under the Labor Code, strike is the temporary
cessation of work because of a labor dispute.
Two (2) grounds for the workers to validly conduct a strike:
1. bargaining deadlock; 2. unfair labor practice (ULP).
GESITE v COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS: Petitioners (public school teachers) admitted that
they participated in concerted mass actions in Metro
Manila from September to October 1990 which temporarily
disrupted classes. They went on a sit-down strike — they go
to school but they will just sit down and not do anything.
Petitioners claim that they were merely exercising their
constitutional right to peaceably assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances. Thus, they may not
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
39
be penalized administratively.
ISSUE: Were the Petitioners correct?
HELD: NO. Those public-school teachers who went on a
sit-down strike were actually staging a strike. Such an act
was invalid. The question of whether the concerted mass
actions launched by the public school teachers has long
been settled. In the case of Manila Public School Teachers
Association, et al. v. Laguio, Jr., it was held that, these 'mass
actions' were to all intents and purposes a strike; they
constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or
absence from work which it was the teachers' duty to
perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons. It is
an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that
petitioners' purpose was to realize their demands by
withholding their services. The fact that the conventional
term 'strike' was not used by the striking employees to
describe their common course of action is inconsequential,
since the substance of the situation, and not its appearance,
will be deemed to be controlling. It is a well-settled rule in
this jurisdiction that employees in the public service may not
engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts, and other forms of
mass action that will lead to the temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service. The right of government
employees to organize is limited to the formation of unions
or associations only, without including the right to strike.
Moreover, the general proposition is that a public official is
not entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered any
service. As he works, he shall earn. Since petitioners did
not work during the period for which they are now claiming
salaries, there can be no legal or equitable basis to order
the payment of such salaries."
NOTE: Sec. 8 does not only cover unionism; it also includes all
other things which involves association.
Examples: Drivers of PUJs or tricycle drivers (TODA), they
have associations. The very catch all of this is the purpose of
organization, it must not be contrary to law.
Q: Do you commit a crime by merely being a member of
the CPP-NPA knowing that it is an aggrupation of
criminals not just because they are rebels but they are
now considered as terrorists?
A: BEFORE, in the case of People v Hernandez, the SC held
that mere membership in the Communist Party or in the
CLO renders the member liable, either of rebellion or of
conspiracy to commit rebellion, because mere
membership and nothing more merely implies advocacy of
abstract theory or principle without any action being
induced thereby; and that such advocacy becomes criminal
only if it is coupled with action namely, actual rebellion or
conspiracy to commit rebellion, or acts conducive thereto or
evincing the same. SUBSEQUENTLY, then President Marcos
signed the Anti-Subversion Act. It is explicit under Sec. 4, RA
1700, that whoever knowingly, willfully and by overt acts
affiliates himself with, becomes or remains a member of the
Communist Party of the Philippines and/or its successor or of
any subversive association as defined in section two hereof
shall be punished by the penalty of arresto mayor and shall be
disqualified permanently from holding any public office,
appointive and elective, and from exercising the right to vote.
SECTION 9 ART. III EMINENT DOMAIN
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
Three (3) inherent powers of the State:
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
(1 Police power; (2) Power to tax; and
(3) Power of eminent domain (power to expropriate) — the
power of the state to take private property for public use and
with just compensation.
The constitution requires particularly under Sec. 9 of Art. 3 that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
Ex: Project of the national government i.e. the Mindanao
Railways, road expansions or new roads. The just
compensation must be the fair market value (zonal value) of
the property involved. The issue of just compensation is always
judicial, if the negotiation on the compensation is not met the
government can file an expropriation case or proceeding
against the private person but only to settle the just
compensation which will be determined by the Court.
The ultimate right of sovereign power to expropriate not only
public but private property owned by all citizens within the
territorial sovereignty for public purpose may be taken. This is
an inherent power and cannot be taken away from the
Government.
Q: May the LGUs exercise the power of eminent domain?
Yes, by virtue of this well-acclaimed constitutional principle of
valid delegation power.
Fr. Bernas: the power to expropriate pertaining to local
government units, in a strict sense, is actually called the power
of inferior domain. If it’s the national government that
exercises this power, it’s called the power of eminent domain or
the power of expropriation. But when it comes to local
government units, it is properly termed as the power of inferior
domain. It was said that in the hands of government agencies,
local governments and public utilities is merely a delegated
power.
Q: What are the constitutional requisites of the exercise of
the power of eminent domain?
A: There are two (2) Constitutional Limitations here:
1. The purpose of the taking which must be for public use; and
2. Just compensation must be given to the private owners.
Q: What is the extent of the term “public use” as a
requisite in the exercise of the power to expropriate?
A: There are actually two (2) schools of thought insofar as this
matter is concerned.
Under the old school, public use simply means the possession
or the use of particular property involved by the public or by
certain public or government agencies. However, our legal
authorities have introduced a new school of thought as regards
the definition of public use – an expansive definition of the term
public use.
PUBLIC USE, according to case law, means public usefulness,
utility or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit so
that any appropriating of private property by the state under its
right of eminent domain, for purposes of great advantage to the
community, is a taking for public purpose.
In Justa Guido vs. Rural Progress, the government intended
to expropriate private property for the benefit of about 30 or 50
individuals for their housing. The decision handed down by the
Supreme Court in that case, states that it was not legally
considered as public use insofar as the norm governing the
power of eminent domain is concerned. Because there were
only a few beneficiaries. But this does not mean that the state
can no longer take private lands for purposes of sustaining or
implementing housing projects pursuant to its mandate under
the constitution. Housing is actually one of that specific type of
public services which the state is bound to deliver.
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
40
There were many instances where the Government has taken
private property, usually vast tracts of land for the
implementation of housing programs.
In the case of Sumulong Vs. Guerrero, the alleged public
purpose of the taking, was questioned simply because the
private land was taken for purposes of the state's housing
project. According to the petitioners, housing projects cannot
pass the required constitutional scrutiny on public use
because, once the construction of the house is completed and
already awarded to the beneficiary, and the moment the
beneficiary takes possession of the house, it becomes private.
But the Supreme Court here ruled otherwise because there
were a notable number of the beneficiaries who were to
receive housing units from the government. There was real
public use insofar as the taking was concerned. Even if not
ALL can benefit, the State is mandated by law, particularly by
the constitution, to make good with its housing project or
housing responsibilities as one of the required public services it
is supposed to deliver to the public.
**railway (train) projects, or schools, that is for public use.
Just compensation – the rule is that the State is going to pay
the fair market value of the property.
But there was no strict observance of the rule back in the
1960s. The government can just pay the landowner any
amount as long as the owner agrees without really knowing the
fair market value of the land. Question, are the heirs entitled to
just compensation from the government? The answer is YES.
The just compensation shall be computed based on the fair
market value at the time of the taking, not at the time they
asserted the right. — that is the reckoning period.
The heirs cannot also deny or assail the “time of the taking”
because there was already a payment made and there has to
be certain documents found in the appropriate governmental
depository to prove that the project was used on that specific
year.
If the taking is done just recently, the basis of the
determination of just compensation on the day the government
took possession of the property.
Q: Can the State take possession of the private property
sought to be expropriated immediately?
A: YES. Upon payment of 15% of the just compensation. The
remaining balance will be paid after the required paperworks
are complied with.
Another unique exercise by the state of its power of
eminent domain. That's in the case of RA No. 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL). Under this
program, the government will take possession of a particular
agricultural land both publicly and privately owned. The
purpose here is to distribute these lands to the landless. But if
you become a beneficiary under CARL, you do not receive this
piece of land for free, there’s a fee. Once you become a CARL
beneficiary, the government will issue a title or CLOA
(Certificate of Land Ownership Award), you are the beneficiary
but you will have to pay the government the monthly
amortization to the Land Bank of the Philippines.
There were instances where the payment of bonds was also
being questioned. Where the government paid 50% cash to
those landowners for expropriation but the remainin 50% is
paid in bonds – negotiable bonds issued by banks. The
Government is allowed to pay via tax credits. This was
questioned by the landowners to be invalid because there was
no actual payment of just compensation and asserts that it is
not under Mercantile Law because it is not a legal tender. In
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
fact, in contracts of sale, the consummation of the contract of
sale must be by way of the delivery of payment which must be
in legal tender (official Philippine currency). Even checks are
not legal tender until it is encashed. But the Supreme Court
justified the payment scheme adopted in the implementation of
the CARL by saying that this is actually the revolutionary form
of expropriation and there is a need for this kind of
expropriation in order to implement the program because this
involved hundreds of thousands of hectares of lands, and that
would entail billions of pesos on the part of the government.
Q: Does the principle of res judicata apply to expropriation
proceedings?
Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree
on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive
of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all
points and matters determined in the former suit.
Simply put, you can no longer file another case because the
issue had already been passed upon by the judicial court and
in fact, that decision had already become final and executory,
hence, can no longer be disturbed.
Ex: The State will file an expropriation proceeding against a
private owner (in case there is no conformity from the land
owner as to the just compensation offered by the government
because it’s only the Court who can determine the just
compensation). In the end, the Government lost maybe
because hindi sinunod ng government ang procedure.
Say next year, Can the government go back to that property
again for the purpose of expropriation?
A: YES. The principle of res judicata does not apply to
expropriation proceedings. The Government can still exercise
its power of eminent domain to take that same private property
for purposes of expropriation provided there is just
compensation.
QUEZON CITY V. ERICTA, G.R. No. L- 34915 6/24/1983
The City of QC passed an ordinance requiring private
cemeteries to allot 6% of the total area of the cemetery for
pauper burials. The cemetery owners complained because it
amounts to taking and in violation of the 1987 Constitution
because it was without just compensation.
HELD: There is no reasonable relation between the setting
aside of at least 6% of the total area of private cemeteries
for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the
promotion of health, morals, good order, safety, or the
general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a
taking without compensation of a certain area from a private
cemetery to benefit paupers who are in charge of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a
public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes the burden
to private cemeteries. The expropriation without
compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not
covered by Section 12(t) of RA 537, the Revised Charter of
Quezon City which empowers the city council to “prohibit the
burial of the dead within the center of population of the city
and to provide for their burial in a proper place”. Even the
LGC, BP 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a
Sangguniang panlungsod may “provide for the burial of the
dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law
or ordinance” it simply authorizes the city to provide its own
city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to
construct public cemeteries.
ANUNCIACION VDA. DE OUANO ET AL VS. REPUBLIC,
G.R. NO. 168770, 09 February 2011
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
41
FACTS: Lahug Airport was owned by the Ouano’s the
portion of that was taken by the State for the purpose of
airport expansion. After the expropriation proceedings and
the Ouano’s were already paid, the project did not push
through, worse, some of the portions were taken by
squatters and some portions were turned into commercial
establishments. The Ouano’s want to take it back but the
Government said that they can no longer take it back
because the expropriation proceedings are over. However,
the Supreme Court awarded back the land in question to the
owner.
The Rule is that: A condemnor (Government) should commit
to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the
petition for expropriation, failing which it should file another
petition for the new purpose. If not, then it behooves the
condemnor to return the said property to its private owner, if
the latter so desires. Of course with the private owner’s
payment of the prevailing value of the land.
SECTION 10, ARTICLE III
NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall
be passed.
BEFORE, during the time of the Americans, the government, in
order to evade its obligations under a contract it entered into
with private entities, they will just pass a law.
Ex: Government enters into a contract with ABC Corporation
for the construction of the airport. When the project has been
completed, the Government will not pay because they thought
the amount in the contract is excessive (15% surcharge for the
inflation rate). What it will do is, Congress will pass a law to
reduce the price. That is not allowed because it is a clear
violation of the sanctity of contracts. The contract has already
been executed. Under the law on Obligations and Contracts,
as a general rule, both parties must perform their respective
obligations. Especially on the part of the government.
THE GOVT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. FRANK G.
R. No. 2935; March 23, 1909
In 1903, in the city of Chicago, in the state of Illinois, in the
United States, the defendant, through a respective of the
Insular Government of the Philippine Islands, entered into a
contract for a period of two years with the plaintiff, by which
the defendant was to receive a salary of 1,200 dollars per
year as a stenographer in the service of the said plaintiff,
and in addition thereto was to be paid in advance the
expenses incurred in traveling from the said city of Chicago
to Manila, and one-half salary during said period of travel.
There was a disagreement where it was alleged that both
parties expressly agreed to said contract that Laws No. 80
and No. 224 should constitute a part of said contract.To the
complaint of the plaintiff the defendant filed a general denial
and a special defense, alleging in his special defense that
the Government of the Philippine Islands had amended
Laws No. 80 and No. 224 and had thereby materially altered
the said contract.
Q: Will the amended law negatively affect the existing
contract? No. The subsequent amendment of the statute
could not have an effect of amending the terms of the
contract.
Another example, during the infancy of the VAT law,
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
Ex: The vatable goods – you buy a pair of shoes and under the
law, the shoes is subject to VAT so if the price is 1,000.00, the
seller is obliged to add on 10% of that selling price
representing the VAT. So the total price now becomes
P1,100.00 because of the 10% VAT. (Now it’s already at 12%).
Once the seller accepts the payment, the seller has the legal
duty to remit the P100 to the BIR.
Assuming that there is a contract where it covers 10% VAT on
the price and subsequently, the new law on 12% VAT is
passed, will the VAT increase to 12% instead? NO. Because
applying that amended law will be violative of the sanctity of
the contract laws protected by Section 10 of Article III.
VAT is a kind of excise tax placed upon the shoulders of not of
the seller but upon the buyer.
In GASPAR v. MOLINA – there was this law prescribing that
money judgments rendered by courts should be stated in terms
of the new Philippine currency in the amount equivalent to the
value of the old currency. The law was questioned as violative
of the sanctity of contract laws. The Supreme Court held that it
is not violative of the constitution because it did not require the
debtor to pay more nor the creditor to receive less than they
were required to pay or receive under the former law. Although
the currency is new, the value was still based on the old
currency. So there was no problem here.
BUT… that is not the case in CLEMONS VS. NOLTING – this
was when we were still under American rule. There was this
law passed by the Government decreeing to satisfy an
obligation (government’s debt – foreign loan) to pay in USD by
the payment of PHP at the rate of P2 to a $ when the
commercial value of the USD was much more. Where in fact,
the dollar rate at that time was already P4. This law clearly
violates the sanctity of contract clause (non-impairment clause)
protected by Section 10, Article III of the Constitution apart
from that, it would also amount to unjust enrichment.
REMEMBER: This is applicable on contracts entered into by
the Government. Because Article III is addressed to the State.
HILADO V. DELA COSTA – this case involves Japanese war
notes which was made a legal tender during the Japanese
occupation. When the occupation was over, the notes no
longer had value. However, there were notes deposited in the
bank. When the depositors wanted to withdraw it the Bank
denied saying that the notes no longer had value. (This case is
a bit complicated because the Supreme Court treated this case
as one for DEPOSIT).
BANKS AND BANKING; DEPOSIT OF WAR NOTES DURING
OCCUPATION BECAME VALUELESS; WHO WILL BEAR THE
LOSS. — It may safely be laid down as a rule that when a
deposit is made with a bank or a person of notes made legal
tender or currency by the military occupant of an enemy
territory, and the occupation does not ripen into a conquest by
the occupant because the territory is liberated and reoccupied
by its legitimate government, the deposit must be considered
as with specification of currency, that is, as a deposit of money
made legal tender or currency by the occupant, without
necessity of stating it expressly, unless there is evidence to the
contrary, because it is the only kind of money or legal currency
in circulation after the genuine money of the territory has
disappeared from circulation. Therefore, if such currency
becomes valueless, the depositor shall have to suffer the loss,
because the currency so deposited is exactly of the same
condition and validity as that kept in the pockets or safe of the
depositor.
IMPLICATION AS TO SPECIFICATION OF CURRENCY. —
While it does not expressly appear that plaintiff’s deposit in
Japanese war notes were made with a specification of the
currency deposited, the minimum requirements of justice
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
42
demand that said deposits should be considered as made with
an implied specification of currency, and hence Article 307 of
the Code of Commerce, which provides that "when the
deposits consist in cash with specification of the currency
constituting the same, the increase or reduction in value
suffered by the same shall be for the account of the depositor,"
HELD: There is no violation of the sanctity of contract clause.
SECTION 11, ARTICLE III
Section 11. Free access to the courts and quasi-judicial bodies
and adequate legal assistance shall not be denied to any
person by reason of poverty.
In Remedial Law, there are specific matters related to this like
pauper litigation. Ex: When a person files a case, especially
the civil cases, there is a corresponding docket fee that needs
to be paid. And those docket fees like those money claims will
be based on a certain percentage from the claim. If the person
has no means to pay for it, the law will allow for the litigation of
the case but there are certain procedures for it like establishing
that the client is really indigent. Another thing, in PAO (seems
to be the biggest law firm in this jurisdiction), it caters to the
legal needs of the indigents – those that cannot afford the
services of a private counsel.
—- END OF MIDTERM COVERAGE —-
Section 12. Rights During Custodial Investigation
Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him.
Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other
similar forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against
him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violations of this section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their
families.
THREE (3) LAWS RELATED TO ARTICLE 12:
1. RA 7438 – Criminalization of the Violation of the Rules
Setforth in Section 12 on the Right of a Person under Custodial
Investigation.
2. RA 7945 – Philippine Anti-Torture Law
3. Article 33, NCC – In cases of defamation, fraud, and
physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate
and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence.
NOTE: Section 12 is important as this is synonymous with this
doctrine taught by American Jurisprudence called the Miranda
Warning. The Miranda Warning is a very good legal principle
involving respect to the protection of human rights culled from
the two most important American cases of Escobedo vs Illinois
and Miranda vs Arizona. This is where the Constitution
mandates that a police officer or law enforcement officer
placing a person under arrest either by virtue of a warrant or by
virtue of a warrantless arrest, must state the Miranda rights of
the person to wit:
“You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and
will be used against you in a court of law. You have a right to
an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney, one will be
appointed for you.”
1. The right to be informed of his right to remain silent;
2. The right to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one;
3. These rights (Miranda) cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel. – two requisites must concur:
(1) in writing and (2) assisted by a counsel – for the absence of
one will invalidate the other.
The rights under Section 12, Par. 1 – may only be invoked by a
person when in a strict legal sense he/she is already under
custodial investigation?
Q: How do we determine if a person is already under
custodial investigation?
In the case of Escobedo v. Illinois, the Court said that where
a police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect
in police custody and the police carry out an interrogation that
causes them to solicit incriminating statements.
Ex: An incident of stabbing occurred and the suspect fled, you
called 911, when the police officers came and asked you, “who
was stabbed?” – you cannot say that you should be read your
Miranda rights yet because this is only a general inquiry.
Hence, you are not yet placed under custodial investigation.
BUT, if another person points you as the suspect and the
police uttered, “Why did you stab him?” – then you are placed
under custodial investigation because the police is focusing
upon you as the possible suspect.
Even if the real suspect was being successfully apprehended,
it cannot be said that he is already under custodial
investigation. The RECKONING point is when the officers start
to ask you incriminating questions.
REMEMBER: Strict compliance with the requirement under
Section 12 is compulsory on the part of government agents.
Thus, if the confession is obtained by these officers without
observing this rule, the EXCLUSIONARY RULE under the 3rd
paragraph will apply and the officers will also be held liable for
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
43
RA 7438 for violation of the rules set forth in Section 12 on the
right of a person under custodial investigation.
INSTANCES WHEN SECTION 12. CANNOT BE INVOKED:
1. CONFESSION MADE IN FRONT OF THE MEDIA – PP v.
ORDONIO
10 years ago, there was this rich guy who has a cousin, a
member of the TF Davao, this rich guy lent money to this
soldier. Later, the soldier could not pay and got irritated
because the rich guy kept bugging him of his debt. One day,
the soldier took the cousin somewhere in Mandug, Davao City
and killed him and buried him in the cliff of the Banana
Plantation. Some drivers saw him who found him to be too
suspicious coming out of the Banana Plantation. The soldier
was apprehended and it happened that the media was there.
He confessed to the after being interviewed by one of the
reporters saying, “Humihingi po ako ng sorry sa auntie ko, di
ko po yun sinasadya, nagdilim lang ang paningin ko.” During
trial, the recorded video was used by the prosecution as
evidence, in his defense, he imposed his constitutional right
under Section 12 saying that he was interviewed and was not
Mirandized.
The Court here held that the accused is NOT CORRECT.
Because Section 12 may only be invoked against the
government or its agent acting for or its behalf. The radio
announcer or tv reporter is not one of the agents of the State.
The incriminating statement from the accused is ADMISSIBLE
in court for the exclusionary rule found in Paragraph 3 cannot
be applied.
2. CONFESSION MADE IN A CONFIDANT THAT IS A LAW
ENFORCEMENT OFFICER – PP v. WELLA
GR: If the confession is done in front of a law enforcement
officer is INADMISSIBLE.
XPN: If the accused made the confession to a mayor (also
considered as a law enforcement officer) but not because he
was a mayor but because he was his confidante as it turns out
that they were best of friends at that time. Here, the
confession, if done before a government official without
complying with the requirements of Section 12, is
ADMISSIBLE in evidence.
3. ON SPONTANEOUS STATEMENTS – Ex. A person
confessed spontaneously to a desk officer on duty for the day
that he killed a person. If that police officer testifies as to the
fact that the accused made the confession before him in his
presence, it is admissible because the statement was voluntary
and the person was not placed under custodial investigation,
he willingly walked in the police precinct to confess.
However, insofar as the further confessions or questions are
made such as the manner of killing, the motive of killing, etc. is
NO LONGER SPONTANEOUS, what is spontaneous is only
upto the extent that the police officer heard that the accused
committed the crime. What the police officer should do is to
place the person under custodial investigation and read him his
Miranda right until then, any answers to the questions he
obtained is INADMISSIBLE.
4. PARAFFIN TEST – as a matter of police procedure, the
police will place the accused on a paraffin test (although SC
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022 44

ruled a couple of times that this is not conclusive) and the

must be made in writing and with the assistance of a
result came back positive. Sec. 12 cannot be invoked because
counsel. Admission under custodial investigation without the
there is no custodial investigation involved there, it is merely
assistance of a counsel is a BARRED. The records are bare
mechanical in nature (soaking the hand in a melted wax).
of any indication that the accused has waived his rights to
Unless of course, while doing the paraffin test, the police officer
counsel, and hence, any of his admissions are inadmissible
starts asking incriminating questions..
in evidence; this extends as well as to the gun surrendered
by the accused.
**THE MIRANDA RIGHTS**

1. RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT – this is in relation to the REMEMBER!!! Even if the person is GUILTY as hell, if there’s
Constitutional Principle found in Section 14 or the Presumption violation in the rules set forth in Section 12, the guy walks free.
of Innocence.
PP v. AYSON – Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a
2. RIGHT TO HAVE A COUNSEL – in custodial investigation,
ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines (PAL), assigned
there is no case yet filed in court. According to Section 12, the
at its Baguio City station. It has allegedly come to light that
counsel must be the accused’s preferred choice. If he can
he was involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets.
afford to hire a private lawyer, his wishes should be followed. If
Ramos was charged with Estafa. The private prosecutors
he can’t afford, PAO lawyers are there to assist as well as
made a written offer of evidence which included the
volunteer lawyers as the case may be.
statement of the accused taken at the PAL office as his
handwritten admission.
a. Competent – a PAO lawyer is a competent lawyer. A
bar flunker is a competent lawyer. The only time a
HELD: It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that
lawyer is incompetent is if he deliberately neglects his
Felipe Ramos was not in any sense under custodial
duties for the case.
interrogation, as the term should be properly understood,
b. Independent – means that this lawyer must not be
prior to and during the administrative inquiry into the
interested in the prosecution of the case. When the
discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which he appeared
accused during his arrest was assisted by a lawyer
to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person
who is also a police officer, any confession made by
under custodial interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of
the accused is INADMISSIBLE. Because that
the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come into play, were
lawyer/police officer is interested in the case. Even a
of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that
judge who is related to the accused must inhibit or
Ramos had voluntarily answered questions posed to him on
must be disqualified.
the first day of the administrative investigation, February 9,
1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded,
Q: When does Custodial Investigation end?
the record having thereafter been marked during the trial of
A: According to Fr. Bernas, for as soon as the interrogation is
the criminal action subsequently filed against him as Exhibit
over and there have been filing of the criminal case with the
A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit
court.
K) that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the day
before the investigation, offering to compromise his liability
CONFESSION v. ADMISSION – A confession, as
in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even
distinguished from an admission, is a declaration made at any
spontaneous act on his part. They may not be excluded on
time by a person, voluntarily and without compulsion or
the ground that the so-called “Miranda rights” had not been
inducement, stating or acknowledging that he had committed
accorded to Ramos.
or participated in the commission of a crime. The term
admission, on the other hand, is usually applied in criminal
cases to statements of fact by the accused which do not
PP v. BONOLA – FACTS: Bonola was accused of Robbery.
directly involve an acknowledgment of the guilt of the accused
He was arrested while selling fishball at the Public Market.
or of criminal intent to commit the offense with which he is
Inside the Markina Police Station, the police interrogated
charged.
him until he admitted his participation in the crime. The
police officer did not ask the accused if he wanted to be
PP v. ADOR – On the day of the killing, the accused was assisted by a counsel. In other words, nakakuha ng
brought to the police HQ. Now, on the way to the laboratory, uncounselled confession ang mga police which was used
one of the accused told the police escort that he has a gun against him in trial. On appeal, Bonola questioned the
in his house. Of course, after acquiring such information, the admission of such evidence.
police lost no time in retrieving the gun. He also told the
police that he fired the gun on the night of the incident and RULING: SC said that In line with PP v. Morales and PP v.
ballistic examination shows that the bullet found in the Galit, we held in People vs. Decierdo that uncounselled
victim’s head was fired from the recovered gun. confessions are inadmissible in evidence. We elucidated
that when the accused is not assisted by counsel, his
HELD: The confession is INADMISSIBLE with respect to the statement, in contemplation of the law, becomes
gun and to the fact of firing the gun. At the time the accused "involuntary" even if it were otherwise voluntary, in a
made the confession, he was a suspect. Consequently, his technical sense.
right under custodial investigation pursuant to Section 12,
Art. III of the Constitution that is attached, and any waiver

From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan

University of Mindanao College of Law
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
In People vs. Dacoycoy and People vs. Pecardal, we
categorically ruled that a waiver of the constitutional right to
counsel shall not be valid when the waiver is made without
the presence and assistance of counsel.
SECTION 13. BAIL
Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided
by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.
BAIL – Bail is the security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to
guarantee his appearance before any court as required under
the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the
form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or
recognizance. (Sec. 1, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court)
NOTE: The right to bail is recognized by our Constitution. This
is connected with the right to be presumed innocent. Each one
of us is presumed to be innocent. The purpose of allowing the
accused to post bail is to secure his attendance.
Q: When is bail a matter of right? When is it a matter of
court discretion?
1. Bail as a matter of RIGHT – All persons in custody shall be
admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or
released on recognize as prescribed by law or this Rule (a)
before or after conviction by the MeTC, MTC, MCTC and (b)
before conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. (Sec. 4, Rule
114 ROC). [NOTE: As of the moment, the capital penalty is
reclusion perpetua (20Y, 1D - 40 Y used in RPC as opposed to
Life Imprisonment which means imprisonment for life, found in
some SPL).
2. Bail as a matter of COURT DISCRETION – if the offense
charged is a CAPITAL OFFENSE and the EVIDENCE OF
GUILT IS NOT STRONG. This means, notwithstanding that the
punishment is charged with capital offense, if the evidence of
guilt is not strong, the court in its discretion may still grant bail.
Remember that when the bail is a matter of court discretion, it
is incumbent upon the defense to prove that the guilt of the
accused is not that strong. The court cannot just grant this
without giving the prosecution the chance to be heard. Itong
hearing ng bail need not necessarily prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. What is needed is that the evidence of guilt
is NOT STRONG. [See also Sec. 5, Rule 114 ROC]
FACTORS IN FIXING BAIL:
Section 9, Rule 114 ROC: Amount of bail; guidelines. — The
judge who issued the warrant or granted the application shall
fix a reasonable amount of bail considering primarily, but not
limited to, the following factors:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
45
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial; (abscond)
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that accused was a Fugitive from justice when
arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
NOTE: Money in Bail can be returned unless the accused
violates the terms of his bail, it will be forfeited. Bail is only a
security for the accused’s appearance in Court.
Instances where the presence of the accused is
indispensable and necessary during trial:
1. When there is a need for the prosecution to establish the
identity of the accused;
2. Whether the accused is a fugitive of justice.
Q: May a person who is not yet arrested, post bail?
GR: You need to post bail because you are under detention;
freedom of movement is being restricted or withheld from you.
XPN: To abbreviate the process, if the person is still not being
arrested but he knows he will eventually be arrested, he can
post bail, consequently he has to surrender, then the court can
acquire jurisdiction over his person.
Even if the person is in the hospital, he still needs to surrender.
But not necessarily go to the police. The police can go to the
hospital to acquire jurisdiction over his person and read his
Miranda rights. After that, the counsel can file the bail on behalf
of the accused.
Q: Is bail available in extradition proceedings (process of
sending a person within the jurisdiction of the requested state
to the territory of the requesting state because the person is
facing criminal charges of the requesting state. It is only
possible if there exists an extradition treaty between the two
countries or an agreement to that effect.)
GOVERNMENT OF US v. PURGANAN (2002)
FACTS: Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty,
the US Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to
the PH Government Note Verbale No. 0522 requesting the
extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario
Batacan Crespo. Upon learning of the request, Jimenez
sought and was granted a TRO by the RTC of Manila to
prohibit the DOJ from filing with the RTC a petition for his
extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed
by the SOJ. Initially, the Court – by a vote of 9-6 dismissed
the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period
within which to file a comment and supporting evidence. The
RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for
hearing in June. In that hearing, petitioner manifested its
reservations on the procedure adopted by the RTC allowing
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022 46

the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the
issuance of a WOA. After the hearing, the court a quo
required the parties to submit their respective memoranda.
As for Jimenez, he sought an alternative prayer: that in case
a warrant should be issued, he be allowed to post bail in the
amount of P100,000. Thereafter, the RTC issued an Order,
directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing
bail for his temporary liberty at P1m in cash. After he had
surrendered his passport and posted the required cash
bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the
challenged Order.
ISSUE: WON the right to bail is available in extradition
proceedings.
1. Yes. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see
no justification why it should not also be allowed in
extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases,
there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition
cases. After all, both are administrative proceedings where
the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail
in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various
treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for
the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these
treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus,
the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of
every individual is not impaired.

RULING: NO. The court agrees with the petitioner. As
suggested by the use of the word “conviction,” the
constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as
Section 4 of Rule 114 of the ROC, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition
proceedings because extradition courts do not render
judgments of conviction or acquittal. It is also worth noting
that before the US government requested the extradition of
the respondent, proceedings had already been conducted in
that country. But because he left the jurisdiction of the
requesting state before those proceedings could be
completed, it was hindered from continuing with the due
processes prescribed under its laws. His invocation of due
process now has thus become hollow. He already had that
opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it,
he ran away.
Now, after 5 years, comes this case of…
2. An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard
of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be
the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the
standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil
cases. While administrative in character, the standard of
substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot
likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to
prevent the prospective extraditee from fleeing our
jurisdiction.
In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate
Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that
a new standard which he termed “clear and convincing
evidence” should be used in granting bail in extradition
cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than
proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must
prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that he is not a
flight risk and will abide by all the orders and processes of
the extradition court.

GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG v. OLALIA (2007)

NB: SC abandoned the ruling in PURGANAN because they
(SC abandoned the ruling in PURGANAN)
realized that it is an extraditee’s constitutional right even if it
was not a criminal proceeding because nothing is more
FACTS: Private respondent Muñoz was charged (in HK) 3
important than the LIBERTY of a person. Invoking the universal
counts of Accepting Advantage as Agent and 7 counts of
covenant of human rights and the international covenant of civil
conspiracy to defraud. Warrants were issued and Hong
and political rights (ICCPR). Furthermore, SC said that “we
Kong filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the
adhere to the generally accepted principles of international law
extradition of Muñoz, he later filed, in the same case, a
under the Doctrine of Incorporation. Hence, a person subject to
petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. The
extradition proceedings CAN POST BAIL.”
petition for bail was denied by Judge Bernardo, Jr. (who
eventually inhibited himself from further hearing the case
Q: If the accused is convicted by the trial court, can he still
and raffled off to J. Olalia). Muñoz filed a motion for
post bail on appeal?
reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail.
This was granted by Olalia. Petitioner filed an urgent motion
A: NOT ANYMORE. In the case of LEVISTE v. CA (Leviste
to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by Olalia.
was convicted by the RTC for the lesser crime of homicide and
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and
court committed GADALEJ in admitting private respondent
one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day
to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory
of reclusion temporal as maximum.) SC gave emphasis on
law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail,
Sec. 13, Art. 3 of the Constitution, after conviction by the trial
the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
court, the presumption of innocence terminates or is
overturned and accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends.
ISSUES:
From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial
1. WON a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail.
discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion
2. What should be the quantum of evidence needed to grant
must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong
such bail to a potential extraditee.
reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by
the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be
RULING:
guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial

From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan

University of Mindanao College of Law
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
disposition finds strong support in the history and evolution of
the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the
Rules of Court (5 bail-negating circumstances). It is likewise
consistent with the trial court’s initial determination that the
accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused
out on bail despite his conviction may destroy the deterrent
effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail
pending appeal because long delays often separate
sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at
the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison
sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail
bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too
freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting
appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice
system and court processes.
Also, in QUI v. PEOPLE – the Supreme Court said the
contention of the petitioner is spurious. Certainly, after one is
convicted by the trial court, the presumption of innocence, and
with it, the constitutional right to bail, ends.
PP VS FITZGERALD – If the penalty imposed by the trial court
is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused shall be
denied bail, or his bail shall be canceled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or
other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail
without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation,
parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability
of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another
crime during the pendency of the appeal.
DIPATUAN v. MANGOTARA (charged with a Capital Offense)
– The rule is very explicit as to when admission to bail is
discretionary on the part of the respondent Judge. It is
imperative that judges be conversant with basic legal principles
and possess sufficient proficiency in the law. In offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua or death, the accused has no
right to bail when the evidence of guilt is strong. Thus, as the
accused in this criminal case had been sentenced to reclusion
perpetua, the bail should have been canceled, instead of
increasing it as the respondent Judge did.
According to Fr. Bernas, the better doctrine is that after
conviction of the trial court when the presumption of innocence
terminates, the constitutional right to bail also terminates.
NOTE: Life imprisonment is treated as the same as reclusion
perpetua. If the charge is murder and the evidence only
indicates homicide (not a capital offense), the right to bail is not
lost.
SECTION 14. THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
47
Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a
criminal offense without due process of law.
(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
1
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the 2right to be heard by himself and counsel, 3to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, 4to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, 5to meet the
witnesses face to face, and 6to have compulsory process to
secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of
evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may
proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided
that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is
unjustifiable.
Due Process of Law – implies the right of the person affected
thereby to be present before the tribunal which pronounces
judgment upon the question of life, liberty and property in its
most comprehensive cases to be heard by testimony or
otherwise and to have to have the right of controverting by
proof of any material fact. (Medenilla vs. CSC). Due process of
law is a proceeding which hears before it condemns, the
punishment of the guilty only proceeds after inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial.
[2 aspects: substantive and procedural due process]
Section 14 in relation to RULE 115: Rights of Accused
Section 1. Rights of accused at the trial. — In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be entitled to the following rights:
(a) To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
(b) To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage
of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of the judgment.
The accused may, however, waive his presence at the trial pursuant to
the stipulations set forth in his bail, unless his presence is specifically
ordered by the court for purposes of identification. The absence of the
accused without justifiable cause at the trial of which he had notice
shall be considered a waiver of his right to be present thereat. When
an accused under custody escapes, he shall be deemed to have
waived his right to be present on all subsequent trial dates until
custody over him is regained. Upon motion, the accused may be
allowed to defend himself in person when it sufficiently appears to the
court that he can properly protect his right without the assistance of
counsel.
(d) To testify as a witness on his own behalf but subject to
cross-examination on matters covered by direct examination. His
silence shall not in any manner prejudice him.
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against
himself.
(f) To confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him at the
trial. Either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a
witness who is deceased, out of or cannot with due diligence be found
in the Philippines, unavailable or otherwise unable to testify, given in
another case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the
same parties and subject matter, the adverse party having the
opportunity to cross-examine him.
(g) To have a compulsory process issued to secure the attendance of
witnesses and production of other evidence on his behalf.
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
(h) To have speedy, impartial and public trials.
(i) To appeal in all cases allowed and in the manner prescribed by law.
First paragraph of Sec. 14 is what we called the right to due
process. One good essence of criminal procedure is the right
of the person to be informed as to why he is criminally charged
and what crime he is charged with. Stated otherwise, the
following must be observed by the court in affording the
accused to his right to due process:
a. There must be adherence to the rules in criminal
procedure.
b. He must be tried by a competent court – It means the
issue was tried by the court who has jurisdiction over the case.
c. He must be tried by an impartial judge – meaning, the
judge should be someone not interested in prosecuting the
case. The judge should defer it if it happens in case he has
interest or inhibits himself or there’s automatic disqualification
(Rule 137, Rules of Court).
Q: Do military courts have jurisdiction over civilians?
GR: NO. Because civilian authorities are always supreme over
the military.
XPN: When civilian courts are not functioning like during
Martial Laws.
REMEMBER: due process is not necessarily judicial process
and that when it is absolutely necessary for public safety, the
legal process can be superseded and the exercise of such
must be authorized with the jurisdiction normally vested in
court. Possible when civilian courts are not functioning.
Second paragraph talks about the accused RIGHTS:
1. PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE – the GUILT of the
accused must be proven BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. If
the evidence were with just an iota of doubt, a mere strand of
ambiguity, this could be a good reason to dismiss the case.
(Sec. 1 (a), Rule 115 ROC)
2. TO BE HEARD – the right to be notified and the right to be
heard; a proceeding which hears before it condemns. Also, it
is the defense who has the onus probandi (burden of proof) to
prove that he is not guilty. meaning, he must be able to present
his own evidence.
3. TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF
ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM – this is the during
ARRAIGNMENT – initial stage of trial. Where the accused
must be present in court and the charges are being read to
him. If the accused is not sure of his answer (as to his guilt), a
“not guilty” plea will be entered. If the accused said he is NOT
GUILTY, trial will proceed. If the accused says GUILTY, no full
blown trial will ensue.
It is the formal mode of implementing the constitutional right of
the accused to be informed of the nature of the accusation
against him. It is made before the court where the complaint or
information has been filed or assigned for trial; and in open
court, by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused a copy of
the complaint or information with the list of the witnesses,
reading it in a language or dialect known to him and asking him
of his plea;
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
48
4. RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL, and PUBLIC TRIAL.
Impartial Trial – The judge must be the one disinterested in
the prosecution of the case, so that if the judge happens to be
the blood relative or a good friend to the accused, then he
must inhibit himself and let someone else try the case.
Public Trial – This is also one of the recognized Constitutional
rights of the accused wherein the public should not be
excluded as a general rule in the trial of the criminal case.
Speedy – This constitutional right is actually a two-edged
sword, to paraphrase the late Rev. Fr. Bernas, because it can
work for or against the advantage of the accused. By
observing this Constitutional tenet, two may happen: It’s either
the CONVICTION or ACQUITTAL is expedited. It works both
ways.
Why do you think this provision exists in the Constitution?
When a person is being charged with a criminal offense, it
causes anxiety, stress, etc. because the people (peers) are
going to judge. The witnesses may fabricate stories maybe for
vengeance and the judges may commit errors, too. This is just
one of the sacrosanct protection afforded by the Constitution
upon a person charged with a criminal offense.
Among others, the Constitution mandates that the accused is
entitled to his right to speedy trial. Here, whenever the
prosecution or the court causes undue delay as to the conduct
of the proceedings and eventually, the conclusion of the trial,
the right of the accused to speedy trial is violated. The
accused’s right to speedy trial, once violated by the court or
prosecution, may amount to his acquittal. Corollarily, while the
accused has the right to speedy trial, the Constitution would
neither tolerate delays caused by him. Simply put, when the
accused himself causes unjustified delays in the criminal case,
then he can no longer invoke this Constitutional right. He will
be considered ESTOPPED because he himself caused the
delay. SC emphasized that while it is the duty of the
prosecution to see to it that criminal cases are tried without
unfounded delays, the accused himself cannot sleep on the
said right but must see to it that the case is tried at an earlier
date.
NOTE: The dismissal of the criminal case for a violation of the
right to speedy trial is equivalent to acquittal and is therefore, a
BAR to subsequent prosecution for the same offense. This is
always with prejudice – meaning the case is already
terminated for good. You can no longer file the very same
case for the second time. Because dismissal due to violation of
the right to speedy trial is equivalent to acquittal and therefore
a bar to prosecution for the same – principle of double
jeopardy.
In criminal procedure, the difference between a dismissal and
acquittal is: ACQUITTAL is always based on the merits, that is,
the defendant is acquitted because the evidence does not
show that defendant's guilt is beyond reasonable doubt; but
DISMISSAL does not decide the case on the merits or that the
defendant is not guilty.
A criminal case could be terminated by the court either:
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
1. Trial on the merits – meaning, both parties have presented
their evidence and then based on both sets of evidence, the
court renders judgment. Either conviction or acquittal of the
accused; or
2. A case is terminated – without going into the merits of the
case, meaning it is “dismissed” without the parties being able
to present their evidence. Mostly due to technicalities. Among
other things, the dismissal of the criminal case without going
through its merits, may be caused by violation of the right of
the accused to speedy trial.
In relation to RA 8493 or “Speedy Trial Act of 1998.” – This
law requires both the prosecution and the court for the
observance:
(1) observe the prescribed time limits for trial (Sec. 6);
(2) contains the rules in terms of the exclusions or exceptions
for the punishability of delays that the State can invoke
(Sec.10); and
(3) provides for the criminal penalties for the violation thereof.
(Sec. 14)
Section 6. Time Limit for Trial. – In criminal cases involving persons
charged of a crime, except those subject to the Rules on Summary
Procedure, or where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed six
(6) months imprisonment, or a fine of One thousand pesos (P1,000.00)
or both, irrespective of other imposable penalties, the justice or judge
shall, after consultation with the public prosecutor and the counsel for
the accused, set the case for continuous trial on a weekly or other
short-term trial calendar at the earliest possible time so as to ensure
speedy trial. In no case shall the entire trial period exceed one hundred
eighty (180) days from the first day of trial, except as otherwise
authorized by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 22 of the Rules of Court.
Sec. 7: Arraignment = 30D from filing of info; After Plea is entered =
15D to prep for Trial; Trial = commence in 30D after arraignment.
Section 10. Exclusions. – The following periods of delay shall be
excluded in computing the time within which trial must commence:
(a) Any period of delay resulting from other proceedings concerning the
accused, including but not limited to the following:
(1) delay resulting from an examination of the accused, and hearing on
his/her mental competency, or physical
incapacity;
(2) delay resulting from trials with respect to charges against the
accused;
(3) delay resulting from interlocutory appeals;
(4) delay resulting from hearings on pre-trial motions: Provided, that
the delay does not exceed thirty (30) days,
(5) delay resulting from orders of inhibition, or proceedings relating to
change of venue of cases or transfer from other courts;
(6) delay resulting from a finding of the existence of a valid prejudicial
question; and
(7) delay reasonably attributable to any period, not to exceed thirty (30)
days, during which any proceeding concerning the accused is actually
under advisement.
(b) Any period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of
the accused or an essential witness. For purposes of this
subparagraph, an accused or an essential witness shall be considered
absent when his/her whereabouts are unknown and, in addition,
he/she is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecution or his/her
whereabouts cannot be
determined by due diligence. An accused or an essential witness shall
be considered unavailable whenever his/her whereabouts are known
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
49
but his/her presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence or
he/she resists appearing at or being returned for trial.
(c) Any period of delay resulting from the fact that the accused is
mentally incompetent or physically unable to stand trial.
(d) If the information is dismissed upon motion of the prosecution and
thereafter a charge is filed against the accused for the same offense,
or any offense required to be joined with that offense, any period of
delay from the date the charge was dismissed to the date the time
limitation would commence to run as to the subsequent charge had
there been no previous charge.
(e) A reasonable period of delay when the accused is joined for trial
with a co-accused over whom the court has not acquired jurisdiction, or
as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance
has been granted.
(f) Any period of delay resulting from a continuance granted by any
justice or judge motu propio or on motion of the accused or his/her
counsel or at the request of the public prosecutor, if the justice or judge
granted such continuance on the basis of his/her findings that the ends
of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the
public and the defendant in a speedy trial. No such period of delay
resulting from a continuance granted by the court in accordance with
this subparagraph shall be excludable under this section unless the
court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its
reasons for finding that the ends of justice served by the granting of
such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the
accused in a speedy trial.
Section 14. Sanctions. - In any case in which counsel for the
accused, the public prosecution or public attorney:
(a) knowingly allows the case to be set for trial without disclosing the
fact that a necessary witness would be unavailable for trial;
(b) files a motion solely for the purpose of delay which he/she knows is
totally frivolous and without merit;
(c) makes a statement for the purpose of obtaining continuance which
he/she knows to be false and which is material to the granting of a
continuance; or
(d) otherwise willfully fails to proceed to trial without justification
consistent with the provisions of this Act, the court may, without
prejudice to any appropriate criminal and/or administrative charges to
be instituted by the proper party against the erring counsel if and when
warranted, punish any such counsel or attorney, as follows:
(1) in the case of a counsel privately retained in connection with the
defense of an accused, by imposing a fine not exceeding; fifty percent
(50%) of the compensation to which he/she is entitled in connection
with his/her defense of the accused;
(2) by imposing on any appointed counsel de officio or public
prosecutor a fine not exceeding Ten thousand pesos (10,000.00); and
(3) by denying any defense counsel or public prosecutor the right to
practice before the court considering the case for a period not
exceeding thirty (30) days.
The authority to punish provided for by this section shall be in addition
to any other authority or power available to the court. The court shall
follow the procedures established in the Rules of Court in punishing
any counsel or public prosecutor pursuant to this section.
5. RIGHT TO CROSS-EXAMINE – The right of the accused to
confront the witnesses against him face-to-face. This is
likewise re echoed in Rule 115, Sec. 1(f) of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure:
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According to Fr. Bernas, this rule has Two-Fold Purposes:
1. To afford the accused the opportunity to test the testimony of
the witness by way of cross-examination; and
2. To allow the judge to observe the deportment and the
demeanor of the witness while testifying on the witness stand.
During Cross-examination, the demeanor of the witness/es can
be observed especially if one is put on the hot seat. The Judge
will be able to observe this every time he utters the words that
would consist of his statement either for or against the
accused.
6. RIGHT TO COMPULSORY PROCESSES – It is recognized
by the Constitution for the accused to be able to raise his
defense intelligently, after all, he is presumed innocent. In fact,
I have already emphasized this before, that it is incumbent
upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt and it is not the duty of the accused to prove
his innocence. When there is a need for the accused to
present defenses, he is always entitled to the production of
evidence for and on his behalf.
Brady Doctrine (Brady vs. Maryland 1963 case) – The act of
the prosecution in withholding or suppressing evidence
material for the establishment of the guilt or innocence of the
accused is fatal to the prosecution’s case and is a violation of
due process. That is the Brady Doctrine in the U.S.
jurisprudence, and the same is true in the jurisdiction of the
Philippines.
To establish the right to continuance by reason of absence
of witnesses, the accused must:
1. Show that the witness is really material;
2. That he is guilty of no neglect in previously obtaining
attendance of said witness;
3. That the witness will be available at the time desired;
4. That no similar evidence could be obtained.
These are the minute rules cited by Fr. Bernas in justifying the
existence of this Right to Compulsory Process for the
production of evidence, for and on his behalf. To aid the
accused to prove his innocence. At least allowed yan ng rules,
kunyari may material witness living in a far away city such as
Cebu, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to do everything to
compel and secure the attendance of that witness at the trial if
his testimony is material to prove his innocence. In fact, under
the Rules of Court, may mga certain rules pertaining to this
one, like the witness meron dapat compensation and libreng
pamasahe. Syempre it would be unfair na gagastos sya ng
sariling pera to give his testimony.
Sec. 14 likewise allows the conduct of TRIAL IN ABSENTIA
– This is where the trial will still proceed even without the
presence of the accused provided he is being notified. What is
important is that the ARRAIGNMENT AND HIS PRESENCE IS
NECESSARY TO BE IDENTIFIED BY THE WITNESSES. This
is in relation to the right of the accused to be present at the
trial. This particular right of the accused may be waived. In
other words, the accused may choose not to be present in the
trial. Notwithstanding his absence, the Constitution allows the
continuation of the trial. However, this rule is not absolute
because there are two very important instances when the
accused’s presence is indispensable during trial that is:
(1) During arraignment; and
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
50
(2) When there is a need for the prosecution to identify the
accused.
THREE (3) CONDITIONS FOR TRIAL IN ABSENTIA:
1. Accused was already been arraigned;
2. Notice of the trial was duly served to the accused and
properly returned; and
3. Failure of the accused to appear during the trial was
unjustified.
NB: From the Book of Fr. Bernas: Trial in absentia can also
take place when the accused voluntarily waives his right to be
present. There are, however, restrictive conditions for allowing
waiver. The right may be waived "provided that after
arraignment he may be compelled to appear for the purpose of
identification by the witnesses of the prosecution, or provided
he unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that
he is the person named as the defendant in the case on trial.
Reason for requiring the presence of the accused, despite his
waiver, is, if allowed to be absent in all the stages of the
proceeding without giving the People's witnesses the
opportunity to identify him in court, he may in his defense say
that he was never identified as the person charged in the
information and, therefore, is entitled to acquittal." Thus, for an
accused to be excused from attending trial, it is not enough
that he vaguely agrees to be identified by witnesses in his
absence. He must unqualifiedly admit that every time a witness
mentions a name by which he is known, the witness is to be
understood as referring to him.
SEC 15. PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not
be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when
the public safety requires it.
It must be read in harmony with Section 18 of Art. VII viz:
Section 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all
armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary,
1
he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case of invasion or
rebellion, when the public safety requires it, 2he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law. Within forty-eight hours from the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President
shall submit a report in person or in writing to the Congress. 3The
Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President. 4Upon the initiative of the President, the
Congress may, in the same manner, extend such proclamation or
suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.
The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours
following such proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance
with its rules without need of a call. 5The Supreme Court may review,
in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, the sufficiency
of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the
extension thereof, and must promulgate its decision thereon
within thirty days from its filing.
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6
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or
legislative assemblies, 7nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction
on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are
able to function, 9nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus.
10
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
apply only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in, or directly connected with invasion.
11
During the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus,
any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within
three days, otherwise he shall be released.
Sec. 18 of Art VII of the Constitution, is otherwise known
as the Commander-in-Chief Clause of the Constitution.
This is indeed, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Art. III that civilian
authority is at all times, supreme to the Military.
The president is a civilian. As a matter of fact, there is no
requirement that the president should have experience in the
military but the Constitution treats him as the
commander-in-chief of the military.
In relation to this, Sec. 18 actually gives us the Constitutional
principle as well as the limitations on the declaration of either:
(1) martial law; or
(2) the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus;
(3) BOTH.
Under the present Constitution, martial law may mean military
government over domestic territory. Martial law, in this sense,
when we talk about Sec. 18 of Art. VII, in relation to Sec. 15 of
Art. III, may be properly treated as martial rule. And this takes
the place of certain governmental agencies, when for the time
being, they are unable to cope with existing conditions in a
locality which makes it subject to sovereignty. There really is no
military government, only martial rule, where the latter merely
assists certain government agencies who for the time being,
are not able to cope with the existing conditions. And this
normally happens during war or during a period of belligerency.
Martial law is an exercise of police power because the object is
public safety – a concern of police power.
Sec. 18, Art. VII provides for the Limitations on the Power
to Declare Martial Law and suspension of the Privilege of
the Writ of Habeas Corpus:
1. The president cannot declare either martial law or suspend
the privilege of the WHC or both when there is no rebellion,
invasion or public safety does not require it. As a matter of fact,
you must not forget that these 2 requirements must concur.
Rebellion or invasion must not only exist, but public safety
must also require it.
2. It cannot exceed the period of 60 days and within 48 hours
of such proclamation, the president shall submit a report either
in person or in writing to Congress.
3. The President does not have the all-encompassing military
powers. He may declare martial law or suspend the privilege of
writ of habeas corpus but it is still subject to the concurrence of
Congress. If Congress disagrees, it has the Constitutional
power to revoke such a declaration.
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
51
4. The President may request Congress to extend martial law,
but this is always largely dependent on the determination of
Congress WON rebellion or invasion persists and public safety
requires it.
5. This power of the president is still subject to the Supreme
Court’s Power of Judicial Review. It is not a pure political
question.
6, 7, and 8 – stated in Section 18, Article VII.
9. If the President intends to suspend the privilege of the writ of
Habeas Corpus during martial law, he must expressly include it
in his declaration.
10 and 11 – stated in Section 18, Article VII.
The concept behind the writ of habeas corpus – may be
prayed before the court by any interested party to request the
court to order a particular government official or private
person to bring in the living body of another who is under his
or her custody or detention. The office of this writ is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint and to relieve such a
person from such restraint, especially if such restraint is illegal.
Ex: During martial law, a person was arrested for probably
committing rebellion or invasion, or any offense relative thereto
and then after 3 days, no criminal case has been filed against
that person, there was already the constitutional violation of his
right because according to Sec. 18, all persons arrested must
be judicially charged within 3 days, otherwise, they must be
released. If the 3-day period the person is still under detention,
the family can now file for a WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS –
that is the best legal remedy. Go to court, and ask the court to
issue an order directing the prison officials to bring before the
court the living body of that person under their custody and
explain and establish the legality of such detention. If the
detaining officials fail to justify the restraint they may be
ordered by the court to release the person detained.
Ex: In private cases such as the father who has visitation rights
failed to return the child. The mother or the family can file for a
writ of habeas corpus and not file a criminal case for
kidnapping because a father cannot kidnap his own child (legal
impossibility). Here, where the court issues the writ, it actually
orders the father to bring in the living body of the child and
explain why he must not be directed to return the custody over
the child to the mother.
Writ of Habeas Corpus – A writ issued by a court directed to a
person detaining another, commanding him to produce the
body of the prisoner at a designated time and place, with the
day and cause of his caption and detention, to do, to submit to,
and to receive whatever the court or judge awarding the writ
shall consider in his behalf [Sombong v. CA, G.R. No. 111876
(1990)].
Q: “Is the president’s power to declare martial law and
suspend the privilege of the WOHC, a political question?”
It is stated in Sec. 18 of Art VII that ANY CITIZEN may
question the validity of the declaration before the Supreme
Court. But take note of the discussion in the following cases:
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
• Barcelon vs. Baker – The Supreme Court held that such
executive power is a political question, meaning that the court
will not arrogate itself to exercise jurisdiction over the matter
because it is not for the court to answer.
• Lansang vs. Garcia – Barcelon was abandoned, and the
court said that the power of the president to declare martial law
is not a political question, meaning, that the court may inquire
into its validity.
• Padilla Garcia vs. Enrile – The court reverted to the ruling in
Barcelon.
• Lagman vs. Medialdea (recent case) – Here among other
things, it was alleged that the basis of the president in
declaring martial law is the report from the military, which were
not all factually correct. The Supreme Court said that no, the
president is not required to establish the factual correctness of
the basis in declaring martial law is not required, because only
probable cause is required of the president in validly declaring
martial law and suspension of the PWHC. – textual approach.
In the book of Fr. Bernas, SC, in reviewing the validity of
the Pres.’s declaration may use 3 kinds of approaches:
1. Textual Approach – The court will base its judgment upon
the black letter of the law. It asks the question, “What does the
letter of the constitution say?” When the law grants
discretionary authority to a person to be exercised upon his
opinion of certain facts, he alone is the judge of the existence
of those facts.
2. Functional Approach – which asks the question, “Are we
capable of resolving the problem posed?” The executive and
legislative departments have the machinery for verifying the
existence of those facts whereas the courts do not. This is also
used in Sec. 18, because the declaration is always subject to
the concurrence of Congress.
3. Prudential or Political Approach – which asks “Whether
there are overriding considerations which prevent the court
from entering thicket?” Interference by the courts in the
decision can result in tying the hands of those charged with
maintaining but these can be reduced to three, each order.
NOTE: The court here will just use Prudence in its review on
the validity of the President’s declaration of martial law. This is
where the balancing of interest will come in. WON the Court
will preclude itself. The Court is faced with a dilemma where if
(a) it will preclude itself – it might endanger the lives of the
people; (b) if the court arrogates – the Court will tie the hands
of the President who is incharge of maintaining public order.
SECTION 16. RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy
disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.
Do not confuse this with the right of the accused to speedy trial
in Sec. 14. (for criminal cases). Under Sec. 16, this is
applicable to both criminal and civil cases.
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
52
SECTION 17. RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself.
NOTE: Section 17 is also known as the Right to
self-incrimination. In the US, they called this the 5th
amendment right.
Rationale: Generally, this was included on grounds of public
policy and humanity. After all, part of the constitutional rights of
a person accused of a crime is the right to be presumed
innocent. A person may invoke this constitutional right even
prior to the filing of charges against him or even during the
pendency of the criminal trial or proceedings.
In some instances, in certain criminal cases, different counsels
would opt not to place the accused on the witness stand
because he would be subjected to cross-examination by the
prosecution. In the event that the accused refuses to take the
witness stand, his refusal can never be used against him.
Q: Which of the following situations can we say that there was
violation of the person’s right against self-incrimination?
A: For example, when the accused is subjected to ultraviolet
examination in buy-bust operations. This is likewise being used
in some other entrapment operations like estafa or extortion. In
order to prove that the person accused of that particular
offense had really received or touched the money, the money
is considered the corpus delicti or the body of the crime. It will
be subject to UV rays. If the powder is found on the accused’s
hands, the conclusion would be that indeed, he had touched
the money.
Q: May the person sought to be subject to UV rays invoke
his right against self-incrimination?
A: The answer is No. Because that is not the type of
compulsion being protected by Section 17. The scope of
Section 17 is testimonial compulsion, necessarily you have to
utter some words. These words would tend to incriminate you
or work against your favor which can be considered as your
admission to the offense. In UV rays, there is no testimonial
compulsion.
ILLUSTRATIONS:
• When subject to a paraffin test for the purpose of determining
whether or not he fired the gun, the accused CANNOT invoke
violation of his right against self-incrimination. The very same
reason that there is no testimonial compulsion in this particular
situation.
• When a judge “orders” in forcing out from the mouth of the
accused morphine, given that the accused is charged with a
violation of the Drugs Law, the accused CANNOT say that his
right against self-incrimination was violated. That could not be
tenable because there is no testimonial compulsion.
• In one case where the accused is charged with rape, the
judge ordered him to put on a pair of pants which was
recovered from the crime scene. When the accused put on the
pants, it fit him. An inference could be made that those pants
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
belong to the accused, and it could be concluded that he was
at the crime scene. This situation DOES NOT depict a violation
of Section 17 because there is no testimonial compulsion.
• When a person is subjected to a police line-up, where the
complainant is tasked to identify the suspect (initial
establishment of the identity of the suspect). Section 17 is
concerned, it CANNOT be invoked by the accused.
In the case of Villaflor v. Summers, the issue is WON a
woman who is charged of adultery could be validly compelled
to undergo a pregnancy test. The Court said in the conduct of
a pregnancy test, there is no testimonial compulsion. However,
when it comes to a person’s handwriting, there is one case:
Beltran vs Samson (GR No. 32025, September 23, 1929).
FACTS: Petitioner complained that the respondent judge
ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take
dictation in his own handwriting from the latter. The order
was given upon petition of said fiscal for the purpose of
comparing the petitioner's handwriting and determining
whether or not it is he who wrote certain documents
supposed to be falsified. Prosecution did not have solid
evidence as to the handwriting of the accused, it was later
offered in Court hich was made basis of the court’s
conviction of the accused.
HELD: The Supreme Court invalidated the act of the court.
According to it, it was a clear violation of a person’s right
against self-incrimination. Writing is something more than
moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a
purely mechanical act, because it requires the application of
intelligence and attention. For the purposes of constitutional
privilege, there is a similarity between one who is compelled
to produce a document, and one who is compelled to furnish
a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness
is required to furnish evidence against himself.
Q: If a person invokes his Fifth Amendment (assuming we
are in the US), and as a result, keeps silent. Will his
silence be considered as a tacit admission?
A: No. This right against self-incrimination, as protected under
Section 17, would be rendered meaningless if the silence of
the witness may be used against him. The refusal of the
accused to be a witness or to answer should in no manner be
used against him.
Q: If a person is compelled to produce documents in his
possession, which are in themselves incriminating, may
he invoke his right against self-incrimination?
A: Yes. The documents that could incriminate the person in
whose possession those papers could be found may invoke
the right against self-incrimination. This was established in the
old case of Boyd v. United States and Stonehill v. Diokno.
In both cases, the Supreme Court held that compulsory
production of the private books and papers of the owner is
compelling him to be a witness against himself. As established
in the case of Boyd, the right against self-incrimination likewise
covers documentary evidence. It is because an accused is
presumed innocent and in relation to this right, it is incumbent
upon the prosecution to prove the accused’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, so we cannot ask from the accused himself
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
53
the proof to convict him. The prosecution cannot compel the
accused to provide the evidence that would show or prove his
guilt. However, in documents, this can only be invoked by
natural persons. Corporations are not entitled to invoke this
right. It is a personal right. The privilege against
self-incrimination is a personal one and would only apply to
natural persons or individuals. Another thing is that privilege
which exists as to private papers cannot be maintained in
relation to records required by law to be kept in order that there
may be suitable information of transactions which are the
appropriate subjects of governmental regulation and
enforcement of restrictions validly established. This is because
of the regulatory powers of the government, if the rule is
otherwise, the regulatory powers of the government would be
rendered nugatory.
Example, in labor laws, part of the powers conferred by law
upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment is the so-called
“visitorial powers.” This means that from time to time, the
DOLE may check upon the records of a particular employer to
see to it that such employer is compliant with the labor
standards. Another example is BIR, when the BIR would want
to look at your financial records. Also in local business taxes,
the City Treasurer conducts an examination of books for the
purpose of determining whether or not the concerned
taxpayers have been paying correct taxes.
Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Dangerous Drugs Board
FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 36
of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office,
students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and
employees of public and private offices, and persons
charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses,
among other personalities. They invoked the right against
self-incrimination.
ISSUE: Is the provision violative of the right against
self-incrimination?
HELD: YES but only with respect to persons charged before
the prosecutor’s office. Unlike the situation covered by Sec.
36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid
justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused
of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability
of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for
students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students
of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school,
and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the
parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private
and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing
proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy
and requirement.
The situation is entirely different in the case of persons
charged before the public prosecutor's office with criminal
offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory
drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the
case of persons charged with a crime before the
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022 54

Once the President/Secretary of Labor assumes jurisdiction

prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be
over the dispute, there is an automatic twin effect:
random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and
being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
(1) For the striking workers to return to work immediately and
defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly
corollary to that, the management must admit all the returning
picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons
striking workers; and
suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are
(2) The dispute is automatically referred to compulsory
singled out and are impleaded against their will. The
arbitration.
persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before
the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves
SECTION 19. RIGHT AGAINST CRUEL PUNISHMENT &
to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily
EXCESSIVE FINES
consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to
privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is
a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for Section 19. (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor
criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall
9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right the death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for
Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to
forced to incriminate themselves. reclusion perpetua.

(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading

SECTION 18. FREEDOM FROM POLITICAL BELIEF AND
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE
Section 18. (1) No person shall be detained solely by reason
of his political beliefs and aspirations.
punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of
substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman
conditions shall be dealt with by law.
SECTION 20. NON-PAYMENT OF DEBT OR POLL TAX

(2) No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a

Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or
punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have been duly
non-payment of a poll tax.
convicted.
Comment: No person shall be imprisoned for a debt, but only
Q: If you know that I believe in Communism, can you go to
when it comes to monetary obligations purely civil in nature
the police and ask the police to arrest me and file a case
(pure contract of loan).
against me because I am a rebel?
Exceptions:
A: No. That is a mere belief and that is protected under
1. B.P. 22 – a criminal offense for issuance of post-dated
Section 18, paragraph 1. In this particular instance, provided
checks that bounced or dishonored by the bank.
that this belief or aspiration remain in thought, so that as soon
2. Estafa – criminal offense of swindling; fraudulent debt.
as this belief is turned into overt acts, and these acts constitute
3. Malversation – committed by a public officer.
elements of a criminal offense, then I can no longer invoke the
protection in par. 1 of Section 18.
Question: What is poll tax? It is a Cedula.

Q: What is the concept of involuntary servitude?

A: No person can compel another to render services in his
favor against his will.
There are many exceptions to this rule:
1. Parental Authority – parents can ask the children to work.
2. Posse comitatus – the power of the State to call on all able
bodied citizens of the Philippines to render civil or military
service especially in times of war or other national
emergencies.
3. Labor as part of criminal penalty – e.g. community service
for offenses punishable under arresto menor (1 - 30 Days). Or
those CICL (Children in Conflict with the Law), they will be
punished by diversion.
4. Doctrine of Assumption of Jurisdiction – the power of the
President thru the Secretary of Labor to automatically assume
jurisdiction over labor disputes in industries whose business is
so impressed with public interest.
SECTION 21. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall
constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.
There are two species of Double Jeopardy under Sec. 21.
1. Prosecution for the second time for the very same offense.
2. Acquittal or conviction of a person of an act both punishable
by a national law or a local ordinance.
NOTE: Double Jeopardy is not a limitation on the enactment of
penal laws but a limitation on the application or enforcement of
penal laws (criminal procedure, more on the judiciary function
not legislative).
First Kind of Double Jeopardy: Prosecution for the second
time for the very same offense. Either he is already acquitted
or convicted.

From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan

University of Mindanao College of Law
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
Requisites for the attachment of Double Jeopardy:
(1) First jeopardy must have been attached prior to the second.
(2) The first double jeopardy must have been terminated; and
(3) The second double jeopardy must be for the same offense
as that in the first.
As regards to the first requirement, the attachment of the first
jeopardy must have taken place prior to the attachment of the
second jeopardy, meaning there was already either acquittal or
conviction as regards to the first criminal case filed against the
accused and the second criminal action only came in later.
First Requisite: This have sub-requisites:
When do we say that the first requisite has already taken
place? There are 5 requisites:
1. Upon a good or valid Indictment;
2. Must be before a Competent Court (Jurisdiction);
3. Must be after Arraignment;
4. After the accused enters his Plea;
5. After the trial of the case has actually commenced by
the questioning of at least one witness (this is an
obiter dictum – Fr. Bernas)
NOTE: In the Book of Riano and cited in the case of Braza v.
SandiganBayan and many other jurisprudence, the 5th
requisite is the acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the
dismissal or termination of the case against him without his
express consent.
UPON A GOOD OR VALID INDICTMENT – Means the
information filed before the court is valid; it satisfies all the legal
as well as the procedural requirements. Section 7, Rule 117,
New Rules of Court, says that there must be a "valid
complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction." Under such
rule, it has been uniformly held that if the charge is fatally
defective in form, as in a charge of rape where the complaint is
signed not by the complainant but by the police chief, jeopardy
does not attach." Thus, too, when the substance of the
information does not allege sufficient facts to constitute an
offense, jeopardy does not attach." Under this and similarly
defective information, the accused can never be convicted and,
hence, he cannot be said to have been in jeopardy of
conviction."
SECOND REQUISITE: Termination of the First Jeopardy
Here, there can be no Double Jeopardy if there is no judgment
of conviction, or acquittal, or no dismissal or termination in a
former case for the same offense.
Example: Whenever a criminal case is dismissed by the Court
prior to the conduct on the trial on the merits on the grounds
that the right of the accused to speedy trial has been violated
by the prosecution, then the EFFECT OF THAT DISMISSAL is
tantamounts to ACQUITTAL. Hence, this is a BAR to another
prosecution to the same offense.
DISMISSAL – Termination of the case without going to the trial
on the merits. Or in some other cases, the accused filed a
DEMURRER to evidence and the court granted it.
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
55
ACQUITTAL or CONVICTION – There had been trial on the
merits, meaning both parties are given their day in court, both
the prosecution and defense presented their evidence in court.
PEOPLE v. SALICO – it was ruled that there was dismissal in
the proper sense of the rule on double jeopardy because the
termination was not based on the merits but on a jurisdictional
issue. By the appeal, therefore, the accused was not placed in
second jeopardy. The only issue raised on appeal was one of
jurisdiction. The most that the appellate court could do was to
remand the case to the court of origin. In such an event, there
would be no new trial but merely a continuation of the first. The
dismissal, obtained with the express consent of the accused,
indeed, upon his instance, "constituted a waiver of his
constitutional right or privilege, for the reason that he thereby
prevented the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits
and rendering a judgment of conviction against him." The
heart of the teaching in Salico, therefore was: Dismissal that is
not on the merits and without the consent of the accused is a
bar to subsequent prosecution. Implicitly, too, Salico taught that
termination based on the merits, even when improperly called
dismissal, and with or without the consent of the accused, is a
bar to further prosecution, because such termination is, in fact,
an acquittal.
GR: A judgment of dismissal of the criminal case which would
also include acquittal is also a BAR to another prosecution for
the same offense, meaning there is DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
NOTE: This will only apply if the dismissal or the termination of
the criminal case by either way (acquittal or conviction or
dismissal) this presupposes that the court that rendered the
judgment of dismissal had jurisdiction over the case or the
court is competent. Thus, APPEAL tantamounts to Double
Jeopardy. Judgment of Dismissal/Acquittal must be FINAL (No
Motion for Reconsideration) except if there is GADALEJ.
XPNs:
1. ERROR OF JURISDICTION (court has no jurisdiction) = NO
Double Jeopardy; Dismissal is VOID.
2. Dismissal with expressed CONSENT (moved for the
dismissal of the case on his own instance even prior to the
inception of the prosecution’s evidence in chief) = NO Double
Jeopardy because it tantamounts to waiver of his constitutional
right against Double Jeopardy.
3. GADALEJ (Grave Abuse of Discretion Amounting to Lack or
Excess of Jurisdiction) = When it comes to dismissal/acquittal
handed by trial courts out of GADALEJ, then this judgment is
NULL and VOID under the law which will preclude the
attachment of the constitutional protection of Double Jeopardy.
In one case, the Supreme Court allowed the attachment of first
Double Jeopardy in a criminal case when the Prosecution for
so many times failed to appear to present its evidence in chief
(always postponing or the case is being dragged at the
expense of the accused).
If the accused should deem such conditional or provisional
dismissal to be unjust and prejudicial to him because he has
been deprived of his right to speedy trial as for instance, his
case has been dragged for an unreasonably long time, he
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022 56

could object to such dismissal and insist that he be decided on
the merits.
NOTE: Verbal Dismissal is not final unless it is written and
signed by the judge. There must be an order or decision.
Second Kind of Double Jeopardy: Acquittal or conviction
of a person of an act both punishable by a national law or
a local ordinance.
and/or (ii) where there is a denial of a party’s due process
rights. A judgment of acquittal sought to be reviewed on the
basis of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction or on the ground of denial of due process implies
an invalid or otherwise void judgment. If either or both grounds
are established, the judgment of acquittal is considered void;
as a void judgment, it is legally inexistent and does not have
the effect of an acquittal. Thus, the defense of double jeopardy
will not lie in such a case.

Ex. Smoking in public places – Anti-Smoking Ordinance of

LITO BAUTISTA and JIMMY ALCANTARA v. SHARON G.
Davao City and RA 9211 (National Law). The accused pleaded
CUNETA-PANGILINAN
guilty or not guilty and there was a conduct of trial and later on
convicted of the ordinance, then the Prosecution wanted to file
FACTS: Sharon filed a criminal case of libel against Lito
another case for RA 9211, that is NOT ALLOWED because
Bautista, Editor-Publisher of Bandera. During trial, after the
Double Jeopardy has already been attached, viz-a-viz.
prosecution rested its case, Lito Bautista filed a demurrer of
evidence on the ground that the Prosecution failed to
Q: What about the happening of a supervening event, may
establish the identity of the accused. Apparently, during the
the accused invoke double jeopardy?
trial, when the Prosecution presented its evidence, when
Sharon’s private lawyer conducted a trial, he forgot to let the
Ex. A mauled B and B was hospitalized, and A was charged
witness identify the accused (very fatal) and the trial court
criminally for serious physical injuries. While serving his
granted the demurrer (amounts to acquittal). Because of the
sentence, A died on account of supervening effect, may the
dismissal, the Prosecution filed an appeal. Bautista
Prosecution filed for homicide for a heavier penalty?
interposed his right against double jeopardy.
A: There are two (2) rules here:
HELD: It should be stressed that the granting of petitioners’
1. Old rule – (People v. Tarok) the death of the injured person
Demurrer to Evidence already amounted to a dismissal of
was the principal element of homicide but it was not a part of
the case on the merits and a review of the order granting the
the assault of battery. At the time of the trial, death had not yet
demurrer to evidence will place the accused in double
ensued and not until it did ensue was the homicide committed.
jeopardy.
Here, there is Double Jeopardy because the second
offense is necessarily included in the first offense or
Corollarily, after the prosecution rests its case, and the
viz-a-viz.
accused files a Demurrer to Evidence, the trial court is
required to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the
2. New rule – enunciated in the case of Melo v. People
prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of
(1950), the rule for the determination of identity of offenses "did
the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
not apply when the second offense was not in existence at the
time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such
In criminal cases, the grant of demurrer is tantamount to
a case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first
acquittal and the dismissal order may not be appealed
prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then
because this would place the accused in double jeopardy.
inexistent." The rule is that: "Where after the first prosecution a
Although the dismissal order, is not subject to appeal, it may
new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible,
be reviewed only through certiorari under Rule 65 (special
which changes the character of the offense and together with
civil action not a mode of appeal which contains a prayer
the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct
that the court review the validity of the act of the court in
offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if
dismissing the case with the allegation of GADALEJ such as
indicted for the new offense." {trial proceed with amended info}
where the prosecution is denied the opportunity to present
its case or when the trial is a sham, thus rendering the
People v. Buling (1960) – ISSUE: whether the prosecution
assailed judgment void).
and conviction of Balaba for less serious physical injuries is a
bar to the second prosecution for serious physical injuries.
The burden on the petitioner is to clearly demonstrate that
HELD: The Court does not believe that a new fact supervened,
the trial court abused its authority to a point so grave as to
or that a new fact has come into existence. Added the
the privy of its very power to dispense justice. In this case,
qualification that where the exact nature of the injury could
no such circumstance exists to warrant a departure from the
have been discovered, but was not, because of the
general rule and reverse the findings of SB.
incompetence of the physician, the subsequent discovery of
the real extent of the injury would not be a supervening fact
which could warrant the application of the Melo doctrine. NOTE: In a criminal case, it must only be appealed by the
SolGen, not the private prosecutor which Sharon’s party did.
ON APPEALS – In PEOPLE v. SANDIGANBAYAN, the
proscription against double jeopardy only envisages appeals
JASON IVLER v. MARIA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO
based on errors of judgment, but not errors of jurisdiction.
Jurisprudence recognizes two grounds where double jeopardy FACTS: Jason Ivler was charged with a criminal case of (1)
will not attach, these are: (i) on the ground of grave abuse of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injury and
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; (2) reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage

From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan

University of Mindanao College of Law
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022
to property in the other court. Ivler pleaded guilty to the first
case and was meted out a penalty of public censure (did not
go to prison). He then moved for the dismissal for the other
criminal action invoking double jeopardy. He asserted that
since his first case has already been dismissed, his second
case should also be dismissed. The Prosecution disagreed.
ISSUE: Will double jeopardy bar the prosecution of Ivler in
the other criminal case considering he was already
convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical
injury?
HELD: Yes. Reckless Imprudence is a Single Crime, its
consequences on persons and property are material
only to determine the penalty prior conviction or
acquittal of Reckless Imprudence Bars Subsequent
Prosecution for the Same Quasi-Offense. The two charges
against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were
prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and
penalizing quasi-offenses.
Structurally, the acts as defined in Art. 365 are collapsible
into four sub-groupings relating to (1) the penalties attached
to the quasi-offenses of "imprudence" and "negligence" (par.
1-2); (2) a modified penalty scheme for either or both
quasi-offenses (par. 3,4,6 and 9); (3) a generic rule for trial
courts in imposing penalties (par. 5); and (4) the definition of
"reckless imprudence" and "simple imprudence" (par. 7 & 8).
Conceptually, quasi-offenses penalize "the mental attitude or
condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack
of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible," unlike willful
offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. These
structural and conceptual features of quasi-offenses set
them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the
first 13 Titles of Book II of the RPC, as amended.
In other words, there was error on the part of the
Prosecution to file two separate criminal cases when the
accused here sought to be penalized for ONLY ONE
SINGLE ACT – reckless imprudence.
There must be one case filed but all the allegations such as
the slight physical injury, death of the husband and damage
to the property and these three material facts will only be
material to the determination to determine the severity of the
penalty to be imposed.
SECTION 22. EX POST FACTO LAW & B.O.A
Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be
enacted.
The Congress is prohibited by the Constitution to enact ex-post
facto laws and bills of attainder (bills of pain).
BILL OF ATTAINDER – Kinds of law that provides for
automatic determination of a crime depriving the accused of
due process, trial, remedies.
EX-POST FACTO LAW – Retroactive application of laws; Fait
Accompli; Adheres to the elementary rule of nullum crimen
nulla poena sine lege. It is an act by the Congress to impose a
penalty to an act which is not criminal or penalized at the time
of commission.
Six types of ex post facto law: [CAPERPS] Lacson v.
ExSec
From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan
University of Mindanao College of Law
57
1. Criminalizes an act and punishes such an act which was
innocent when done before the passage of the law;
2. Aggravates a crime, makes it greater than it was committed;
3. Inflicts a greater Punishment than that annexed to the crime
when committed;
4. Alters the legal rules of Evidence, authorizes conviction
upon less or different testimony than the law required at the
time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant;
5. Assumes to Regulate civil rights and remedies only, but in
effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right for something
which when done was lawful; ie. Art. 34 Civil interdiction.
6. Which deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful
Protection i.e. acquittal, amnesty, Presidential clemency (Art.
19, Sec 7 of the 1987 Constitution)
7. Every law which, in relation to the offense or its
consequences, alters the Situation of a person to his
disadvantage.
Illustration/Examples of the Prohibition:
1. One which makes an action done before the passing of the
law and which was innocent when done, CRIMINAL and
punishes such action.
Ex: Wearing of masks – Both the Bayanihan Laws and Local
ordinances criminalizes the non wearing of facial masks
because of the pandemic. Say the provision will state that
non-wearing of the facial mask is considered CRIMINAL and
those who failed to wear their face mask in public 90 days prior
to the effectivity of this act shall also be criminally liable. - This
is an example of an ex-post facto law. Here, the law is given a
RETROACTIVE effect as regards to the applicability of criminal
sanctions. This is prohibited.
2. Those which AGGRAVATES a crime or makes it greater
than when it was committed.
Ex: Murder and Homicide. Murder is considered a heinous
crime, in fact it is considered as a capital offense as opposed
to homicide where the penalty is only reclusion temporal. If
Congress will pass a law that all killings regardless of the
attendance or non attendance of the qualifying circumstance
will be considered as murder that is an ex-post facto law.
3. That which changes the PUNISHMENT and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was
committed.
Ex: In Slight Physical Injuries. This is punishable by arresto
menor. Now, under the ISLAW (Indeterminate Sentence Law)
the minimum penalty is only 1-10 days. If Congress will pass a
law that the penalty of the same will be changed from arresto
menor to arresto mayor. And further, all slight physical injuries
committed within 1 year before the effectivity of this act shall be
punished under this law. This is an ex-post facto law.
4. That which alters the legal rules of EVIDENCE and receive
less or different testimony than the law required at the time of
the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant.
Ex: In criminal laws, the prosecution is constitutionally required
to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
That is the quantum of evidence when it comes to criminal
cases. In civil cases, it is mere preponderance of evidence. In
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022 58

administrative proceedings, it is substantial evidence. If
Congress will pass a criminal law that will only require
preponderance of evidence to acquire a conviction.. Of course,
that cannot be because that is an ex-post facto law.
NOTE: The prohibition against ex-post facto laws may only be
applicable to criminal legislation which affects the substantial
rights of the accused. Also applies to criminal procedural law
prejudicial to the accused. This would mean that any
amendment to an existing criminal law or rules of criminal
procedures that will not have the effect of negatively affecting
the substantial rights of the accused but rather would benefit
him CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AN EX-POST FACTO LAW.
GR: Criminal laws should always be prospective.
XPN: When the retroactive effect would benefit the accused.
Simply put, Congress by way of Republic Act can just convict a
person for a particular crime without judicial trial, the act is
properly termed as the BILLS OF PAINS AND PENALTY.
Historical background of this Particular Principle: It
originated from Thomas Wenworth when he was still the legal
advisor to King Charles I. Because he was so brilliant he was
brought to the impeachment court for attempting to suburbed
the liberties of England. People created false accusations
against him so he’d be abdicated. However, he was able to
defend himself so ably and so brilliantly that his enemies
fearing for his acquittal withdrew the impeachment case and
passed a bill ordering for the beheading of Thomas without
going through the process of impeachment proceedings. The
law itself already pronounces the guilt of the person and
provides for his punishment.

Ex: Robin Padilla was convicted in a criminal case for illegal

LUMANOG v. PEOPLE G.R. No. 182555
possession of firearm (9mm pistol) during the effectivity of PD
1866 where all firearms regardless of the caliber have the
FACTS: Sec. 3 of RA 9346 abolished the Death Penalty –
same penalty. A new law which amended PD 1866 and
all death sentences even including those which became final
categorized the offense under this law as to the penalty was
and executory were reduced to Reclusion Perpetua and in
enacted. Under the new law, those who were convicted of this
addition to that the death convicts were precluded to avail
particular offense by way of having in their possession firearms
Propbation. This was questioned to be an ex post facto law.
of low caliber entails a lower penalty. So when this law took
effect, it turned out that Robin Padilla had already served the
RULING: No, this is not an ex-post facto law. The SC said
minimum sentence for those who have been convicted for
No constitutional sanctities will be offended if persons
possession of lower caliber firearms. He was given a
previously sentenced to death, or persons sentenced to
retroactive effect because it is favorable to the accused.
reclusion perpetua, are denied the benefit of parole. As to
persons previously sentenced to death, it should be
Q: WHAT IS NOT EX-POST FACTO LAW?
remembered that at the time of the commission of the crime,
the penalty attached to the crime was death. To their benefit,
A: The statutory changes in the mode of trial or Rules of
Rep. Act No. 9346 reduced the penalty attached to the
Evidence which do not deprive the accused of defense
crime to reclusion perpetua. Yet such persons cannot claim
and which occur only in limited and substantial manner to
the benefit of parole on the basis of the ex-post facto clause
his disadvantage are not prohibited. Rules of Procedure
of the Constitution, since an ex-post facto law is one which,
which have nothing to do with the substantial rights of the
among others, "changes punishment, and inflicts a greater
accused will not amount to ex-post facto law.
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
committed." RA 9346 had the effect of "inflicting" a lighter
Ex: Under the Summary Procedure (criminal cases under the
punishment, not a greater punishment, than what the law
jurisdiction of MTCs; penalty is less than one year), this
annexed to the crime when committed.
particular kind of statutory change is not tantamount to ex-post
facto law because it does not negatively affect the statutory
rights of the accused. The amendatory rule will only be
PEOPLE v. JOSEPH ESTRADA G.R. No. 164368-69
pertaining to the Rules that should be followed during the
proceedings.
FACTS: One of the issues raised here as a defense of
Estrada in the alleged use of the name of Jose Velarde in
Ex: The Judicial Affidavit Rule – here, direct testimony of a
violation of the Anti Money Laundering Law. However RA
witness is given by way of a written affidavit. All you have to do
9160 or AMLA was not yet in effect when Estrada used such
is to let the witness Identify the document and afterwards, the
alias. Despite that, he was indicted.
opposite party will examine it. This particular instance is NOT
an ex post facto law.
HELD: The enactment of R.A. 9160, is a significant
development only because it clearly manifests that prior to
BILL OF ATTAINDER – PJ-BRIM
its enactment, numbered accounts or anonymous accounts
•Legislative act which inflicts Punishment without Judicial trial
were permitted banking transactions, whether they be
•Imposition of a Burden on it
allowed by law or by a mere banking regulation. To be sure,
•Retroactive application to past conduct suffice to
stigmatize an indictment against Estrada using this relatively recent law
•A legislative Intent cannot be maintained without violating the constitutional
•Singling out a definite Minority prohibition on the enactment and use of ex post facto laws.
•Bill of Attainder is objectionable because of its ex post Finally, R.A. No. 9160, as a law of recent vintage in relation
facto features. Accordingly, if a statute is a Bill of Attainder, to the indictment against Estrada, cannot be a source or an
it is also an ex post facto law. influencing factor in his indictment.

From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan

University of Mindanao College of Law
REVIEWER ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II | CYNDI SATORRE-BICERA | 2nd Sem | S.Y. 2021-2022 59

BILLS OF ATTAINDER; DEFINED:

termination of a BIR or BOC official or employee and
provides for the consequences thereof. The democratic
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY v. CA – Bills of attainder are
processes are still followed and the constitutional rights of
legislative acts which inflict punishment on individuals or
the concerned employee are amply protected.
members of a particular group without a judicial trial. Essential
to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain individuals or
NOTE: The CSC Laws must be adhered also.
a group of individuals, the imposition of a punishment, penal or
otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial.
An act declaring all the members of the CPP-NPA guilty of the
Bills of attainder are an ancient instrument of tyranny. In more crime of rebellion and hereby provides for their penalty to suffer
modem terms, a bill of attainder is essentially a usurpation the penalty of reclusion temporal, etc. – IS A BOA
of judicial power by a legislative body. It envisages and
effects the imposition of a penalty — the deprivation of life NOTE: Prohibition against the bill of attainder cannot be
or liberty or property — not by the ordinary processes of invoked in non-criminal issues. [Bosea case]
judicial trial, but by legislative fiat. While cast in the form of
special legislation, a bill of attainder (or bill of pains and —- END OF FINALS COVERAGE —
penalties, if it prescribed a penalty other than death) is in intent
and effect a penal judgment visited upon an identified person
or group of persons (and not upon the general community)
Without a prior charge or demand, without notice and hearing,
without an opportunity to defend, without any of the civilized
forms and safeguards of the judicial process as we know it.
Such is the archetypal bill of attainder wielded as a means of
legislative oppression. [TUAZON v. ROD]

BOSEA VS. MARGARITO TEVES G.R. No. 181704

FACTS: RA 9335 intends to encourage BIR and BOC

officials and employees to exceed their revenue targets by
providing a system of rewards and sanctions through the
creation of a Rewards and Incentives Fund and a Revenue
Performance Evaluation Board. It covers all officials and
employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months
of service, regardless of employment status. The provision
states that:

a. That he/she will meet the allocated Revenue Collection

Target and thereby undertakes and binds himself/herself
that in the event the revenue collection falls short of the
target with due consideration of all relevant factors affecting
the level of collection as provided in the rules and
regulations promulgated under the Act and its IRR, he/she
will voluntarily submit to the provisions of Sec. 25 (b) of the
IRR and Sec. 7 of the Act; and

b. That he/she will cascade and/or allocate to respective

Appraisers/Examiners or Employees under his/her section
the said Revenue Collection Target and require them to
execute a Performance Contract, and direct them to accept
their individual target. The Performance Contract executed
by the respective Examiners/Appraisers/Employees shall be
submitted to the Office of the Commissioner through the
LAIC on or before March 31, 2008.

HELD: No, RA 9335 is NOT a bill of attainder. A bill of

attainder is a legislative act which inflicts punishment on
individuals or members of a particular group without a
judicial trial. Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification
of certain individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition
of a punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial
trial. RA 9335 does not possess the elements of a bill of
attainder. It does not seek to inflict punishment without a
judicial trial. It merely lays down the grounds for the

From the Discussions of Atty. Enrique Jr. Bonocan

University of Mindanao College of Law