CHAPTER IX

THE CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHT TO FORM AND JOIN  ASSOCIATIONS

The right of association is especially meaningful in a free society because

mas is by nature gregarious. His disposition to mix with others of the same
persuasions, interests or objectives is guaranteed by Article III, section 8,
provided that,

Article III Sec. 8: “The right of the people to, including those employed in
the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for
purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.”

1. Freedom of Association, 100 SCRA 100 

https://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1980/
sep1980/gr_49272_1980.php

2. The fundamental right of self-organization,108 SCRA 390

https://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence1981/
oct1981/gr_50874_1981.php

3. The right  of self-organization  of managerial employees,47 SCRA

434(still looking for the fulltext)

In re: ATTY. EDILLON, 84 SCRA 554

FACTS: Marcial Edillon, a lawyer, was administratively
sanctioned for refusing to pay his IBP membership dues. He
argued that the provisions: Sec. 10 of the  Rule of Court 139-A
and the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III, of the IBP
(By-Laws pertaining to the organization of IBP, payment of
membership fee and suspension for failure to pay the
same) violates his constitutional rights of being compelled to be
a member of the IBP in order to practice his profession. He
claimed that compelling him to become a member of the IBP
violates his right of freedom toor/and not to associate. Atty.
Edillon strongly induced his take and refused to admit full
competence of the court in this matter. But after some time in
realization, his recalcitrance and defiance were gone in his
subsequent communication with the court. He appealed that his
health, advanced age, and concern to his former clients’ welfare
be considered in his prayer so that he can again practice law.

 139-A, Sec. 9 – Membership Dues

Every member of the IBP shall pay such annual dues as
the board of Governors shall determine with the approval
of the Supreme Court.

 139-A, Sec. 10 – Effect of non-payment of dues

Subject to the provisions of Sec 12 of this rule, default in
the payment of annual dues for t6 months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default ins such payment for one year shall be a ground
for the removal of the name of the delinquent member
from the Roll of Attorneys

 Sec. 6: The Supreme Court shall have administrative

supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.

ISSUES: Whether or not the provisions in question violate Atty.

Edillon’s right of freedom to or/and not to associate.

RULING: NO. The provisions (compelling the members to

pay their dues) of Rules of Court 139-A of the IBP and of the
By-Laws of the IBP are constitutional and legal. Hence,
Edillon was disbarred. The fees compelled is not
determinative of being a member of the IBP.

IBP does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he

is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when
passed the Bar Examinations. The National organization
integrates an unorganized and incohesive group of lawyers. The
only compulsion is the payment of annual dues. The fees
are the cost of improving the profession. It is also deemed as
a police power of the State. Admission to the bar is a privilege
burdened with condition. Failure to abide entails loss of such
privilege. 
Tarnate vs. Noriel, 100 SCRA 93
 right of probationary employee to vote in the election of
union officers
 at least one year of service is required for an employee
to enjoy the benefits of membership in any labor union.

FACTS: 
Petitioner Arthur Ternate and respondent Lucerio Fajardo were
two strong contenders in the election of union officers on
October 23, 1977. Ternate received 308 votes while Fajardo 285
votes. Employees who were classified as second helpers casted
forty (40) ballots which were now challenged. They were
included in the list of qualified voters upon the motion of the
Fajardo faction and over the opposition of the Ternate group. It
was imposed as a condition that the challenged ballots would be
segregated and would be counted only after passing upon the
question of membership of such second helpers. The Ternate
group finally agreed to allow them to participate in the election.
Respondent Director Carmelo C. Noriel at first ruled that they
could not, apparently relying on the applicable provision of
the Labor Code, which reads thus: "Any employee, whether
employed for a definite period or not, with at least one year of
service, whether such service is continuous or broken, shall be
considered a regular employee for purposes of membership in
any labor union. However, when a motion for reconsideration
was filed, he granted it and allowed the votes to be counted. 

The Solicitor General after stressing the constitutional right to

form associations, a corollary of which in the case of labor is the
right to self-organization, pointed to Article 3 of the New Labor
Code in sustaining the power of respondent Director to issue the
assailed order. Thus: "These constitutional mandates are
recognized in Article 3 of the New Labor Code. Further, Article
244 thereof is of the same tenor: ... - All persons employed in
commercial, industrial and agricultural enterprises, including
religious, medical or educational institutions operating for profit,
shall have the right to self-organization and to form, join, or
assist labor organizations for purposes of collective bargain.
Reference to the constitutional right to freedom of association is
not without relevance. The more decisive question, however, is
the force and effect of the Labor Code provision as to when a
probationary employee could in the language thereof "be
considered a regular employee for purposes of membership in
any labor union."

ISSUES: Whether or not probationary employees are entitled to

vote in the election of officers and board members of a labor
union. 

RULING: YES. Provided that "at least one year of service" is

rendered as  imposed in the Labor Code. The contention of
the Solicitor General that to bar the probationary employees
from voting for union officials would run counter to such
constitutional right was REVERSED.

In the case of U.E. Automotive Employees and Workers

Union vs. Noriel,  it was stressed that "freedom of association
is explicitly ordained; it is not merely derivative, peripheral or
penumbral, as is the case in the United States . It can trace its
origin to the Malolos Constitution. 

The right to join a labor union remains undisputed. In the

meanwhile however, for purposes of electing the union
officers, assuming it would be chosen as the sole
bargaining unit in the negotiation for a collective bargaining
contract, the right of probationary employees could be thus
restricted as provided for in the Labor Code. The
justification lies in the fact that management could, by the
simple device of appointing probationary employees in the
labor union expected to prevail in the choice of the sole
collective bargaining agent, attain the result that would
serve best its interests, not necessarily that of labor. It must
have been such a purpose that inspired a provision on this
character. At any rate, there being no attack on its validity, it
must be given full force and effect.
Samahan ng Manggagawa vs. Noriel, 108 SCRA 381
FACTS: The Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions
(PAFLU) won over the Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions
(CCLU). CCLU contested the certification of PAFLU as the
workers bargaining agent with Pacific Mill Inc. While the case
was pending, 347 members in the same bargaining unit
disaffiliated from PAFLU and organized the Samahang
Manggagawa Ng Pacific Mills, Inc. and was registered with the
MOLE. It then filed with MOLE a request that a certification
election be held among the workers in Pacific Mills, Inc. It
claimed that it commanded the majority of the workers in the
corporation; that there had been no certification election for
more than 12 months and no existing collective bargaining
agreement (CBA); and that more than 30% of the bargaining
unit had given their consent thereto. The company objected. The
Med-Arbiter dismissed the petition for certification election. The
NLRC sustained the Med-Arbiter’s decision.

ISSUES: Whether or not a petition for certification election

should be granted to a new labor union considering there is a
case pending between the contending unions with regard to its
certification election.

RULING: Yes. There is no showing that the application was into

any infirmities. Hence, with both the employer and the majority
of the rank-and-file workers in agreement that a certification
election should be held, so be it. The last certification election
was held on September 26, 1977. There is no existing CBA. The
petition for a certification election has the written consent of
more than 30% of the members of the bargaining unit. In the
light of these facts, Art. 258 of the New Labor Code makes it
mandatory for the Bureau of Labor Relations to conduct a
certification election.
Villar vs. Inciong, April 20,l983 cvb
FACTS: 
Amigo Employees Union (AEU) under Federation of Unions of
Rizal (FUR) attempted to have a certification election but due to
the opposition of AEU-PAFLU, the petition was denied by the
Med-Arbiter. 

AEU-PAFLU then called a special meeting among members and

it was there decided that an investigation of certain people
would be held pursuant to the constitution and by-laws of the
Federation, of all of the petitioners and one Felipe Manlapao, for
"continuously maligning, libelling and slandering not only the
incumbent officers but even the union itself and the federation;"
spreading 'false propaganda' that the union officers were 'merely
appointees of the management', and for causing divisiveness in
the union. 

A Trial Committee was then formed to investigate the local

union's charges against the petitioners for acts of disloyalty.
AEU-PAFLU and the Company concluded a new CBA which,
besides granting additional benefits to the workers, also
reincorporated the same provisions of the existing CBA,
including the union security clause reading, to wit: 

All members of the UNION as of the signing of this Agreement

shall remain members thereof in good standing. Therefore, any
members who shall resign, be expelled, or shall in any manner
cease to be a member of the UNION, shall be dismissed from
his employment upon written request of the UNION to the
Company.

The petitioners were summoned to appear before the PAFLU

Trial Committee for the aforestated investigation of the charges
filed against them but they did not attend and instead requested
for a "Bill of Particulars" of the charges which had been
formalized by the AEU-PAFLU officers; they contend that their
actions were merely exercise of the right to freedom of
association. 

Not recognizing PAFLU's jurisdiction over their case, petitioners

again refused to participate in the investigation rescheduled and
conducted. Instead, they merely appeared to file their Answer to
the charges and moved for a dismissal.

Based on the findings and recommendations of the PAFLU trial

committee, the PAFLU President found the petitioners guilty of
the charges against them and it was requested that they be
terminated in conformity with the security clause in the CBA.
Meanwhile, they were placed under preventive suspension and
denied access to the workplace.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Minister acted with grave abuse of discretion
when he affirmed the decision of the RO4-Officer-in-Charge
allowing the preventive suspension and subsequent dismissal of
petitioners by reason of the exercise of their right to freedom of
association.

RULING:
We hold and rule that petitioners, although entitled to disaffiliate
from their union and form a new organization of their own, must,
however, suffer the consequences of their separation from the
union under the security clause of the CBA. 

It is true that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open to legal

objection. It is implicit in the freedom of association ordained by
the Constitution. However, a closed shop is a valid form of union
security, and such provision in a CBA is not a restriction of the
right of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution.

Here, the Company and the AEU-PAFLU entered into a CBA

with a union security clause and the stipulation for closed-shop
is clear and unequivocal and it leaves no room for doubt that the
employer is bound, under the collective bargaining agreement,
to dismiss the employees, herein petitioners, for non-union
membership. 

Petitioners became non-union members upon their expulsion

from the general membership of the AEU-PAFLU pursuant to
the Decision of the PAFLU national president.  

PAFLU had the authority to investigate petitioners on the

charges filed by their co-employees in the local union and after
finding them guilty as charged, to expel them from the roll of
membership under the constitution of the PAFLU to which the
local union was affiliated. 

According to the OIC: stripped of non-essentials, the basic and

fundamental issue in this case tapers down to the determination
of WHETHER OR NOT PAFLU HAD THE AUTHORITY TO
INVESTIGATE OPPOSITORS AND, THEREAFTER, EXPEL
THEM FROM THE ROLL OF MEMBERSHIP OF THE
AMIGOEMPLOYEES UNION-PAFLU. 

Recognized and salutary is the principle that when a labor union

affiliates with a mother union, it becomes bound by the laws and
regulations of the parent organization. 

When a labor union affiliates with a parent organization or

mother union, or accepts a charter from a superior body, it
becomes subject to the laws of the superior body under whose
authority the local union functions. The constitution, by-laws and
rules of the parent body, together with the charter it issues
pursuant thereto to the subordinate union, constitute an
enforceable contract between the parent body and the
subordinate union, and between the members of the
subordinate union inter se. 

'Due process' simply means that the parties were given the
opportunity to be heard. In the instant case, ample and
unmistakable evidence exists to show that the oppositors were
afforded the opportunity to present their evidence, but they
themselves disdained or spurned the said opportunity given to
them. 

Inherent in every labor union, or any organization, is the right of

self-preservation. When members of a labor union, therefore,
sow the seeds of dissension and strife within the union; when
they seek the disintegration and destruction of the very union to
which they belong, they thereby forfeit their rights to remain as
members of the union which they seek to destroy. 
P. vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382
Facts: 
Hon. Judge Simeon Ferrer is the Tarlac trial court judge that
declared RA1700 or the Anti-Subversive Act of 1957 as a bill of
attainder. Thus, dismissing the information of subversion against
the following: 1.) Feliciano Co for being an officer/leader of the
Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) aggravated by
circumstances of contempt and insult to public officers,
subversion by a band and aid of armed men to afford impunity.
2.) Nilo Tayag and 5 others, for being members/leaders of the
NPA, inciting, instigating people to unite and overthrow the
Philippine Government. Attended by Aggravating Circumstances
of Aid or Armed Men, Craft, and Fraud. The trial court is of
opinion that 1.) The Congress usurped the powers of the judge
2.) Assumed judicial magistracy by pronouncing the guilt of the
CPP without any forms of safeguard of a judicial trial. 3.) It
created a presumption of organizational guilt by being members
of the CPP regardless of voluntariness.

The Anti Subversive Act of 1957 was approved 20June1957. It

is an act to outlaw the CPP and similar associations penalizing
membership therein, and for other purposes. It defined the
Communist Party being although a political party is in fact an
organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government, not only by
force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other
illegal means. It declares that the CPP is a clear and present
danger to the security of the Philippines. Section 4 provided that
affiliation with full knowledge of the illegal acts of the CPP is
punishable. Section 5 states that due investigation by a
designated prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice be made prior
to filing of information in court. Section 6 provides for penalty for
furnishing false evidence. Section 7 provides for 2 witnesses in
open court for acts penalized by prision mayor to death. Section
8 allows the renunciation of membership to the CCP through
writing under oath. Section 9 declares the constitutionality of the
statute and its valid exercise under freedom if thought, assembly
and association.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not RA1700 is a bill of attainder/ ex post facto

law.

(2) Whether or Not RA1700 violates freedom of expression.

Ruling:
The court holds the VALIDITY Of the Anti-Subversion Act of
1957.
A bill of attainder is solely a legislative act. It punishes without
the benefit of the trial. It is the substitution of judicial
determination to a legislative determination of guilt. In order for a
statute be measured as a bill of attainder, the following
requisites must be present: 1.) The statute specifies persons,
groups. 2.) the statute is applied retroactively and reach past
conduct. (A bill of attainder relatively is also an ex post facto
law.)

In the case at bar, the statute simply declares the CPP as an

organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for
purposes of example of SECTION 4 of the Act. The Act applies
not only to the CPP but also to other organizations having the
same purpose and their successors. The Act’s focus is on the
conduct not person.

Membership to this organizations, to be UNLAWFUL, it must be

shown that membership was acquired with the intent to further
the goals of the organization by overt acts. This is the element of
MEMBERSHIP with KNOWLEDGE that is punishable. This is
the required proof of a member’s direct participation. Why is
membership punished. Membership renders aid and
encouragement to the organization. Membership makes himself
party to its unlawful acts.

Furthermore, the statute is PROSPECTIVE in nature. Section 4

prohibits acts committed after approval of the act. The members
of the subversive organizations before the passing of this Act is
given an opportunity to escape liability by renouncing
membership in accordance with Section 8. The statute applies
the principle of mutatis mutandis or that the necessary changes
having been made.

The declaration of that the CPP is an organized conspiracy to

overthrow the Philippine Government should not be the basis of
guilt. This declaration is only a basis of Section 4 of the Act. The
EXISTENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE EVIL justifies the limitation to
the exercise of “Freedom of Expression and Association” in this
matter. Before the enactment of the statute and statements in
the preamble, careful investigations by the Congress were done.
The court further stresses that whatever interest in freedom of
speech and association is excluded in the prohibition of
membership in the CPP are weak considering NATIONAL
SECURITY and PRESERVATION of DEMOCRACY.

The court set basic guidelines to be observed in the prosecution

under RA1700. In addition to proving circumstances/ evidences
of subversion, the following elements must also be established:

1. Subversive Organizations besides the CPP, it must be proven

that the organization purpose is to overthrow the present
Government of the Philippines and establish a domination of a
FOREIGN POWER. Membership is willfully and knowingly done
by overt acts.
2. In case of CPP, the continued pursuance of its subversive
purpose. Membership is willfully and knowingly done by overt
acts.

The court did not make any judgment on the crimes of the
accused under the Act. The Supreme Court set aside the
resolution of the TRIAL COURT.
P. vs. Ferrer, 56 SCRA 793 (Read the dissenting     opinion of Justice FERNANDO in
both cases)
FACTS:
             On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of
section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed against the
respondent Feliciano Co in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac.
The abovenamed accused, feloniously became an officer and/or
ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an
outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the
Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence,
deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose of
establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing
the government under the control and domination of an alien
power.
Meanwhile, on May 25, 1970, another criminal complaint was
filed with the same court, sharing the respondent Nilo Tayag and
five others with subversion.
Resolving the constitutional issues raised, the trial court, under
the decision of Hon. Simeon Ferrer in its resolution of
September 15, 1970, declared the statute void on the grounds
that it is a bill of attainder and that it is vague and overboard,
and dismissed the informations against the two accused.
The Government appealed.

ISSUE: 
Whether or not, REPUBLIC ACT No. 1700, otherwise
known as the Anti-Subversion Law a bill of attainder.

RULING:
            No. A bill of attainder is the substitution of judicial
determination to a legislative determination of guilt.

                In the instant case, if Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of

attainder, it would be totally unnecessary to charge Communists
in court, as the law alone, without more, would suffice to secure
their punishment. But the undeniable fact is that their guilt still
has to be judicially established. The Government has yet to
prove at the trial that the accused joined the Party knowingly,
willfully and by overt acts, and that they joined the Party,
knowing its subversive character and with specific intent to
further its basic objective. The ingredient of specific intent to
pursue the unlawful goals of the Party must be shown by "overt
acts." This constitutes an element of "membership" distinct from
the ingredient of guilty knowledge. The former requires proof of
direct participation in the organization's unlawful activities, while
the latter requires proof of mere adherence to the organization's
illegal objectives.