CHAPTER XIII

THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BAIL

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be
required.

 1.Camilo Sabio vs Sandiganbayan Dec 2021

A convicted person's right to bail is subject to the sound discretion of the court
which must be exercised with caution and for strong reasons 

Summary: Former PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio was found guilty for violation of
RA 3019 – Corrupt practices of public officers. He filed for a motion to be placed
under house arrest or any government facility so he could get treatment for his
various medical conditions, he is already 85 yrs old and had a stroke

FACTS:
The Sandiganbayan found petitioner Camilo Loyola Sabio guilty of violation of
Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019 - Corrupt practices of public officers (RA 3019) and
sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of six ( 6) years and one ( 1) month, as
minimum, up to ten (10) years, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from holding
public office.  
Petitioner is eighty-five (85) years old and had a stroke. He has been wheelchair
bound for years already. Lately, he was diagnosed with community-acquired pneumonia
and hypertension.

On July 6, 2020, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be placed under house arrest
or in any government medical facility so he could get treatment for his various medical
conditions which could be aggravated if he remained in a detention facility due to
COVID-19.

In yet another Resolution dated September 14, 2020, the Sandiganbayan also
denied petitioner's urgent omnibus motion, notice of appeal, and urgent motion to
extricate.
It ruled that (1) Sabio had already lost his period to appeal the judgment of
conviction, (2) Enrile v. Sandiganbayan cannot be applied to allow his release on
bail since he was already convicted and should already start to serve his
sentence and, (3) for humanitarian considerations, he is allowed to be confined in
a government hospital of his choice for treatment until he is cleared to serve his
sentence in a penal facility, considering his medical condition and vulnerability to
COVID-19 if placed in a detention facility. But his hospital confinement cannot be
credited in the service of his sentence. 
 By way of reply, petitioner repleads his arguments in his motion for
reconsideration. He prays anew that he be allowed to post bail or be detained at
home so as not to aggravate his failing health and serious physical condition. 

ISSUE: Whether Sabio can be allowed to post bail or to be detained in his home so as
not to further aggravate his frail health.

RULING: The court grants petitioner's prayer for bail.

Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the

offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter
of discretion. For upon conviction, the presumption of innocence is terminated
and accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of
bail is subject to judicial discretion which must be exercised with grave caution
and only for strong reasons.

Here, petitioner, all eighty-five (85) years of age is in his twilight and illness laden
years. The People itself has not refuted his serious medical condition. There is no
indication that he is a flight risk for he is no longer even ambulatory. Nor does he pose a
danger of being a repeat offender since he had long ceased to be in government
service. His continuous incarceration will not do any good to his already failing health,
let alone, to society in general.

Under Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, when the court imposes the
penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, but not more than twenty (20) years,
the accused shall be denied bail, or his or her bail previously granted shall be cancelled
when any of the bail-negating circumstances are present, to wit. 

(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has

committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance on reiteration; 
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid
justification; 
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under
conditional pardon; 
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of
flight if released on bail; or 
( e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused
may commit another crime. The appellate court may review the resolution of the
Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice to the adverse party. 
 Thus, the accused shall be denied bail if any of the aforementioned
circumstances are present. But if none of the bail negating circumstances are present,
the Court may grant bail with extreme caution and only for strong reasons.

 2.Juan Ponce enrile august 18 2015

FACTS: The Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile, 90 years of age, and several
others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in
the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF).

Upon voluntary surrender, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General
Hospital, and his Motion to Fix Bail. Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail
because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b)
although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal , not
reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further
be seriously considered.

Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter
of right; that it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and
conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from
enjoying the right to bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if
convicted of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of
two mitigating circumstances – his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution
has not come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong;
and that he should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already
over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing. In its Comment, the
Ombudsman contends that Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with a
capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory that a bail hearing be conducted
to determine whether there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and that
entitlement to bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the attendant
circumstances.

ISSUE: Is Enrile entitled to bail? If YES, on what grounds?

HELD: YES, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right based on humanitarian

grounds.

The decision whether to detain or release an accused before and during trial is
ultimately an incident of the judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The
strength of the Prosecution’s case, albeit a good measure of the accused’s propensity
for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail,
which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.

The Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to
guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by
the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the
international community arising from the national commitment under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution
which provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees
full respect for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of
protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring
that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to
enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if
justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available
to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right
to liberty. These remedies include the right to be admitted to bail.

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as

value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not
only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear
and convincing showing:

(1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
(2 ) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to
the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or
escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of
his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for
the legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many
years ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal
processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not
seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his
long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be
granted bail.

Senator Enrile was charged of the capital offense of Plunder which is non-bailable. He filed a
Motion to Fix Bail before the Sandiganbayan, instead of Petition for Bail where the
prosecution shall be given the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt is strong and
therefore, bail shall be denied. Enrile claims that since he is over 90 years old and he
voluntarily surrendered which constitutes 1 degree lower, even if he will be convicted, the
penalty imposable on him is not reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. This is aside from
medical and humanitarian grounds which he raised. The same was denied by the
Sandiganbayan. Is Enrile correct?
 A. Yes. Coupled with the fact that he is over 90 years old and with failing health, bail is
justified. These are the factors in fixing bail as enunciated in the case of VILLASENOR VS. ABANO
and the Rules on Criminal Procedure. (ENRILE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, August 17, 2015)
So it is, that experience has brought forth certain guidelines in bail fixing, which may be summarized
as follows: (1) ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) Penalty for the offense
charged; (4) character and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and
strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other
bonds; (9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is
under bond for appearance at trial in other cases.

3. LUZVIMINDA VALDEZ VS. PEOPLE, September 8, 2015

https://www.chanrobles.com/cralaw/2015decemberdecisions.php?id=1058 
FACTS: 2 State Auditors of the Commission on Audit conducted a post-audit of the
disbursement vouchers (D.V.) of the Bacolod City Government. Among the subjects
were the reimbursements of expenses of Luzviminda S. Valdez (Valdez), a former
mayor of Bacolod City. 
Based on the verification conducted in the establishments that issued the official
receipts, it was alleged that the cash slips were altered/falsified to enable Valdez to
claim/receive reimbursement from the Government the total amount of
P279,150.00 instead of only P4,843.25; thus, an aggregate overclaim of
P274,306.75.
Consequently, Valdez was charged with eight cases four were for Violation of
Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019, while the remaining half were for the complex
crime of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents.
Since the amount involved is over P22,000.00 in the case of Malversation through
Falsification of Public Documents, no bail was recommended applying Art. 48 of the
Revised Penal Code.
She filed a “Motion to Fix Bail” before the Sandiganbayan which granted it in the amount
of P200,000.00.
Hence, this petition by the prosecution.
ISSUE: Is malversation through falsification of public documents involving an amount
over P22,000.00 which is punishable by reclusion perpetua a bailable offense?

RULING: Yes. The trial is yet to proceed and the prosecution must still prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It is not amiss to point that in charging a
complex crime, the information should allege each element of the complex offense with
the same precision as if the two (2) constituent offenses were the subject of separate
prosecutions. Where a complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to support the
charge as to one of the component offenses, the defendant can be convicted of the
offense proven.
At this point, there is no certainty that Valdez would be found guilty of Malversation of
Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents involving an amount that
exceeds P22,000.00. Falsification, like an aggravating circumstance, must be alleged
and proved during the trial. For purposes of bail proceedings, it would be premature
to rule that the supposed crime committed is a complex crime since it is only
when the trial has terminated that falsification could be appreciated as a means of
committing malversation. Further, it is possible that only the elements of one of
the constituent offenses, i.e., either malversation or falsification, or worse, none
of them, would be proven after a full-blown trial.
It would be the height of absurdity to deny Valdez the right to bail and grant her the
same only after trial if it turns out that there is no complex crime committed. Likewise, it
is unjust for Us to give a stamp of approval in depriving the accused person's
constitutional right to bail for allegedly committing a complex crime that is not even
considered as inherently grievous, odious and hateful.
Just to stress, the inequity of denying bail as a matter of right to an accused charged
with Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Official/Public Documents
involving an amount that exceeds P22,000.00 is palpable when compared with an
accused indicted for plunder, which is a heinous crime punishable under R.A. No.
7080, as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and R.A. No. 9346. Observe that bail is not a
34 35 36

matter of right in plunder committed through malversation of public funds, but

the aggregate amount or total value of ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or
acquired must be at least Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). In contrast, an
accused who is alleged to have committed malversation of public funds thru
falsification of official/public documents, which is not a capital offense, is no
longer entitled to bail as a matter of right if the amount exceeds P22,000.00, or as
low as P22,000.01. Such distinction is glaringly unfair and could not have been
contemplated by the law.
1. Is bail available  in extradition cases?
1. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS. JUDGE LANTION, 322 SCRA 160
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2000/jan2000/gr_139465_2000.html 
FACTS: DOJ received a request from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S. Note
Verbale No. 0522 for the extradition of Mark Jimenez to the United States.

Attached to the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest
issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, and other supporting
documents for said extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private respondent
appears to be charged in the United States with violation of the following provisions of
the United States Code (USC):

A) 18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the United States; two [2]
counts; Maximum Penalty — 5 years on each count);

B) 26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts; Maximum Penalty — 5
years on each count);
C) 18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty
— 5 years on each count);

D) 18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts; Maximum Penalty — 5
years on each count);

E) 2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-three [33] counts;

Maximum Penalty — less than one year).

Petitioner's theory would also infer that bail is not available during the arrest of the
prospective extraditee when the extradition petition has already been filed in court since
Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not provide therefor, notwithstanding Section 13,
Article III of the Constitution which provides that "[a]ll persons, except those charged
with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as
may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. . ." 

ISSUE: In extradition cases, is the respondent therein entitled to notice and hearing
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him?

RULING: No. the Supreme Court on a 9-6 vote held that the extraditee is entitled to
notice and hearing when a request for extradition by another country is still being
evaluated.  However, on Motion for Reconsideration in the same case, in a 9-6
decision, the Supreme Court held that the prospective extraditee is not entitled to
notice and hearing while his case is still under evaluation because this would
defeat the purpose of the arrest warrant since it could give warning that
respondents would be arrested and even encourage them to flee but entitled to
notice and hearing if the case is already filed in court. However, if bail was
granted to an extradite, the same may not be cancelled without notice and
hearing. Otherwise, his right to due process will be violated.

2.  US GOVERNMENT VS. JUDGE PURGANAN & MARK JIMENEZ, 389 SCRA 623

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2002/sep2002/gr_148571_2002.html 

extraditees are not entitled to bail… while the extradition proceedings are pending

FACTS: Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty, the United States
Government, through diplomatic channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note
Verbale requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan
Crespo. 
The Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine DOJ,
filed with the RTC in 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition.  The Petition alleged
that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been
issued in connection with the following charges: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United
States and to commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2)
tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of
Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of Title 18 US
Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2
US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to
prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for
his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
After the hearing, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should
issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.

The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing on June 15, 2001.
Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million
pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash
bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the challenged Order dated July 4,
2001.
Hence, this Petition. 

ISSUE: 1. In extradition cases, is the respondent therein entitled to notice and hearing
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him?
2. In extradition proceedings, are prospective extraditees entitled to the right to bail and
provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending?
RULING: 1. in a 9-6 decision, the Supreme Court held that the prospective extraditee is
not entitled to notice and hearing while his case is still under evaluation because this
would defeat the purpose of the arrest warrant since it could give warning that
respondents would be arrested and even encourage them to flee but entitled to notice
and hearing if the case is already filed in court. However, if bail was granted to an
extradite, the same may not be cancelled without notice and hearing. Otherwise, his
right to due process will be violated.
2. Generally, no. The constitutional provision on bail, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings,
because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
EXCEPTION: Since the judiciary has the constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of
discretion and tyranny, as well as the power to promulgate rules to protect and enforce
constitutional rights, after being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for
bail. Since the applicants have a history of absconding, they have the burden of
showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there
exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the
highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be considered,
under the principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is
not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts
of each case.

May a person subject of extradition from another country and where the cases against him in
said country are bailable, be allowed to post bail pending the extradition hearings?
No. As held in UNITED STATES VS. JUDGE PURUGGANAN & MARK JIMENEZ, 389
SCRA 623 through former Chief justice Panganiban, the Supreme Court held that a
person facing extradition proceedings is not entitled to bail even if the crime he was
charged of in a foreign country is bailable. This is so because the constitutional
provision on the right to bail under Art. III of the 1987 Constitution applies only to
criminal cases, not in extradition proceedings.

1. Rodriguez vs presiding Judge

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/feb2006/gr_157977_2006.html 
Prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice and hearing while his case is
still under evaluation because this would defeat the purpose of the arrest
warrant since it could give warning that respondents would be arrested and
even encourage them to flee but entitled to notice and hearing if the case is
already filed in court.

However, if bail was granted to an extradite, the same may not be cancelled
without notice and hearing. Otherwise, his right to due process will be
violated. (Bail was cancelled- dapat may notice and hearing)

FACTS:
The case stemmed from the petition for extradition filed on March 12, 2001 by the
Government of the United States of America (US government) through the Department of
Justice (DOJ) against Eduardo Rodriguez and Imelda Rodriguez

After their arrest, they applied for bail which the trial court granted. Bail was set for one
million pesos for each.

Petitioners then posted cash bonds. The US government moved for reconsideration of the
grant of bail, but the motion was denied by the trial court. Unsatisfied, the US government
filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. In compliance with our directive, the trial
court, without prior notice and hearing, cancelled the cash bond of the petitioners and
ordered the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

ISSUE:  In an extradition case, is prior notice and hearing required before bail is cancelled? 

RULING: YES. 
Considering that she has not been shown to be a flight risk nor a danger to the community,
she is entitled to notice and hearing before her bail could be cancelled. Based on the record,
we find that, absent prior notice and hearing, the bail’s cancellation was in violation of her
right to due process.
 Bail may be granted to a possible extraditee only upon a clear and convincing showing
(1) that he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community, and
(2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.

If after his arrest and if the trial court finds that he is no flight risk, it grants him bail. The grant of the
bail, presupposes that the co-petitioner has already presented evidence to prove her right to be on
bail, that she is no flight risk, and the trial court had already exercised its sound discretion and had
already determined that under the Constitution and laws in force, co-petitioner is entitled to
provisional release.

1. Hongkong vs judge olalia jr

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2007/apr2007/gr_153675_2007.html 
BUT IN THE CASE OF GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG VS. OLALIA, 521
SCRA 470, it was held that the potential extraditee may be granted bail if :

[2] he can prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not a flight
risk; and

[1] will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
“Clear and convincing evidence” is evidence with a standard lower than proof
beyond reasonable doubt but more than preponderance of evidence.

FACTS: Juan Antonio Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts
of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong.

He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common
law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued
against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.

DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of
private respondent. The DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for the provisional arrest
of private respondent. (Hongkong requested for his Arrest and forwarded to NBI, NBI – RTC
Manila)

RTC, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against Munoz. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and
detained him. Munoz questioned the validity of the Order of Arrest. (Munoz was arrested and
detained)

On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.

On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and
sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private respondent. The Decision became final
and executory on April 10, 2001.

Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the extradition of private respondent, docketed as
Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his
part, private respondent filed, in the same case,- a petition for bail which was opposed by
petitioner.

After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition
for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that
private respondent is a high "flight risk."

On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-
95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge.

On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his
application for bail. This was granted by respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001
allowing private respondent to post bail, thus: (Judge Olalia granted the bail)

In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accused’s further erosion of civil liberties. The petition
for bail is granted subject to the following conditions:

1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes
that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these proceedings and will at all times
hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for
judgment. If accused fails in this undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the
government;

2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;

3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion
for hold departure order before this Court even in extradition proceeding; and

4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they
so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the week; and if they further desire,
manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be
filed with this Court soonest, with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking,
said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.

On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was
denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10, 2002. (Govt of Hongkong filed for a
motion about the granting of bail – but was denied by Judge Olalia)

Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting private respondent to bail; that there is
nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to
bail, the right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not a potential extraditee is entitled to post bail.
2. What should be the quantum of evidence needed to grant such bail to a
potential extraditee.
RULING:
1. Yes. If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why
it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering
that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation
cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases.
After all, both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt
of the person detained is not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective
extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of
the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the
promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the
presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should
see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
2. An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or
denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases nor the
standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in
character, the standard of substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise
apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective extraditee from
fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now
Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that a new standard which he termed "clear and
convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him,
this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than
preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing
evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the
extradition court.

In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to

show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to
the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on
the basis of “clear and convincing evidence.” 

3. Is recognizance allowed after conviction by final judgement

Atty. ADALIM-WHITE vs. JUDGE Arnulfo Bagtas, RTC 2

BORONGAN,SAMAR, 475 SCRA 175
129. May a convicted person be released from jail through recognizance?

No. In ATTY. JULIANA ADALIM-WHITE VS. JUDGE ARNULFO BUGTAS,

RTC 2 BORONGAN, SAMAR, 475 SCRA 175, it was held that respondent Judge is
guilty of gross ignorance of the law for ordering the release of Bagaporo pending the
approval of his application for parole and before the completion of the minimum period
of the sentence imposed upon him. It is patently erroneous to release a convict on
recognizance. Section 24, Rule 114 provides that there shall no bail for a convict after
final judgment. The only exception is when the convict applies for Probation before he
commences to serve his sentence and that the offense and the penalty for the offense
is within the purview of the Probation Law.
Sections 5 and 16 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court (on the different kinds of bail)
APPLIES ONLY TO AN ACCUSED UNDERGOING PREVENTIVE IMPRISONMENT DURING TRIAL OR
ON APPEAL. THEY DO NOT APPLY TO A PERSON CONVICTED BY FINAL JUDGMENT AND
ALREADY SERVING SENTENCE.
https://www.chanrobles.com/scdecisions/jurisprudence2005/nov2005/
am_rtj_02_1738.php 
FACTS:
Judge Bugtas ordered the Release on Recognizance of Bagaporo, a convict of frustrated murder
before terminating service of the minimum penalty, and pending the approval of the prisoner’s
application for parole. 
Judge Bugtas admitted that he issued such order allowing Bagaporo to be released upon
recognizance of the Provincial Jail Warden Apelado. 

Bugtas avers that Bagaporo was convicted by the trial court of the crime of frustrated murder and
meted the penalty of imprisonment ranging from four years and two months to eight years and
one day  Bagaporo served sentence and subsequently filed an application for release on
recognizance.

In support of his application, Provincial Jail Warden Apelado issued a certification to the effect
that Bagaporo has been confined at the Provincial Jail since February 9, 1996 and is already
entitled to parole; another certification was issued by Supervising Probation and Parole Officer
Columbretis showing that Bagaporo had applied for parole in line with the Department of
Justices Maagang Paglaya Program.

Atty. Adalim-White filed a letter-complaint against Judge Bugtas for Ignorance of the law. 
Bugtos contends that Bagaporo’s application for bail upon recognizance of Apelado was granted
on the basis of the certifications and on the rule that bail being discretionary upon conviction by
the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.

ISSUE: May a convicted person be released from jail through recognizance? 

RULING: 
No, it was held that respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for ordering
the release of Bagaporo pending the approval of his application for parole and before
the completion of the minimum period of the sentence imposed upon him. It is patently
erroneous to release a convict on recognizance. Section 24, Rule 114 provides that
there shall no bail for a convict after final judgment. The only exception is when the
convict applies for Probation before he commences to serve his sentence and that the
offense and the penalty for the offense is within the purview of the Probation Law.

Sections 5 and 16 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court (on the different kinds of bail)
APPLIES ONLY TO AN ACCUSED UNDERGOING PREVENTIVE IMPRISONMENT
DURING TRIAL OR ON APPEAL. THEY DO NOT APPLY TO A PERSON CONVICTED
BY FINAL JUDGMENT AND ALREADY SERVING SENTENCE.

At the time Bagaporo was granted bail on recognizance (February 16, 2000), he had not yet
served the minimum of his sentence  It must be noted that Bagaporo was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from four years and two months to eight years
and one day.  It is not disputed that he began to serve sentence on February 9, 1996.
Counting four years and two months from said date the minimum period of Bagaporo’s
sentence should have been completed on April 9, 2000. 

1. People vs Bucalon
Facts: Luis Bucalon was indicted for Murder. He was found guilty by Judge Tan
(Branch 29, Surigao City).

Because of which, Bucalon filed a petition for review on certiorari and thus his case was
raffled to the Court of Judge Buyser. Judge Buyser, in his decision, found that the
evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt, but only for the crime of homicide and not for murder, as
charged. This is because the qualifying circumstance of treachery alleged in the
information cannot be appreciated in this case.

Bucalon filed a Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, contending that in view of Judge
Buyser’s ruling that the prosecution evidence is sufficient to prove only Homicide, he
could be released on bail. He thus prayed that the bail bond for his temporary liberty be
fixed at ₱40,000.00 which he claimed was the usual bond for Homicide in the RTC of
Surigao City and Surigao del Norte.

The prosecution opposed the motion to fix amount of bail bond, contending that, that the
case being for Murder, it is non-bailable as the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal
to death; that it is the public prosecutor who has exclusive jurisdiction to determine what
crime the accused should be charged with; that the accused should have filed a
motion/application to bail and not just a motion to fix the amount of the bail bond; among
others. 

During the hearing of the Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, Senior State Prosecutor
Rogelio Bagabuyo questioned Judge Buyser’s impartiality, prompting the judge to inhibit
himself and to order the case transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC for further
proceedings.

Branch 29 Presiding Judge Jose Manuel Tan (Judge Tan) heard the Motion to Fix
Amount of Bail Bond, concurring with the finding of Judge Buyser that since the
prosecution evidence proved only Homicide which is punishable by reclusion temporal
and, therefore, bailable, ruled that respondent could no longer be denied bail.
Respondent was subsequently released after he posted a ₱40,000 bond. 
Meanwhile, Roberto Murcia (Roberto), the victim’s brother, faulted Judge Tan for
granting bail without an application for bail having been filed by respondent and without
conducting the mandatory hearing to determine whether or not the prosecution’s
evidence is strong.

Held: 
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that "All persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law."

Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, thus provides that all
persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a
matter of right.

The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an accused
charged with a capital offense thus depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
Stressing this point, this Court held:

. . . When bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the

discretion of the court, should first be conducted to determine the existence of strong
evidence or lack of it, against the accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent
assessment of the evidence presented by the parties. A summary hearing is defined as
"such brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is
practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the
weight of evidence for the purposes of bail." On such hearing, the court does not sit to
try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed
to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the
trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course of
inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving
such evidence as it has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary
examination and cross examination." 

Since Judge Tan concurred with the assessment by Judge Buyser of the prosecution
that the evidence was sufficient to convict respondent of Homicide, holding a summary
hearing merely to determine whether respondent was entitled to bail would have been
unnecessary as the evidence in chief was already presented by the prosecution.

The People’s recourse to Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure to support its contention that respondent should be denied bail is unavailing,
for said Section clearly speaks of an application for bail filed by the accused after a
judgment of conviction has already been handed down by the trial court.
 1. De la Camara vs. Enage, 41 SCRA 1 – masyadong mataas
ang bail tumakas nalang
the excessive amount required could only mean that provisional liberty would bebeyond his reach.

Facts: Ricardo, de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, was

arrested on November 7, 1968 and detained at the Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his
alleged participation in the killing of fourteen and the wounding of twelve other laborers
of the Tirador Logging Co., at Nato, Esperanza, Agusan del Sur. 

Thereafter, the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan filed with the Court a case for multiple
frustrated murder and another for multiple murder against the Mayor, his co-accused
Nambinalot Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo. 

On January 14, 1969 the accused filed bail with the lower court, on the assertion that
there was no evidence to link him with such a fatal incident. He likewise maintained his
innocence. Judge Enage of Agusan Del Norte and Butuan City started the trial. As of
the time of the filing of the petition, the defense had not presented its evidence.

Judge Manuel Lopez Enage (CFI of Agusan Del Norte and Butuan City), issued an
order granting petitioner's application for bail, admitting that there was a failure on the
part of the prosecution to prove that petitioner would flee even if he had the opportunity,
but fixed the amount of the bail bond at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00, the
sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder and P355,200.00 for
the offense of multiple frustrated murder. 

On August 12, 1970, the Secretary of Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, sent a telegram to
the respondent Judge stating that the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting that
a P40,000.00 bond, either in cash or property, would be reasonable. There was likewise
a motion for reconsideration to reduce the amount. The Respondent Judge however
remained adamant. 

Judge Enage disproved a charge that he was guilty of grave abuse of discretion. In the
hearing of the case set for March 31, 1971, there was no appearance for both the
petitioner and respondents. Instead of a reply, respondent Judge submitted, on May 26,
1971, a supplemental answer wherein he alleged that petitioner escaped from the
provincial jail and had since then remained at large. 

Held: The right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum that
is excessive. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless.
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, the amount of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should
be posted by petitioner, the sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple
murder, there being fourteen victims, and the sum of P355,200 for the other offense of
multiple frustrated murder, there being twelve victims, is clearly violative of constitutional
provision. Under the circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the amount
required as bail could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder
and P25,000.00 for the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored
in this case that the Department of Justice did recommend the total sum of P40,000.00
for the two offenses.

The guidelines in the fixing of bail was there summarized, in the opinion of Justice Sanchez, as
follows: "(1) ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the offense
charged; (4) character and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and
strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other
bonds; (9) whether the accused wasa fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is
under bond for appearance at trial in other cases." 

1.  Pestano vs. Judge Velasco, July 3, 1999 (hindi ko ngay makita ito.
Patulong man kung may makita kayo. Pa paste nalang ng link dito.
Salamat ng marami)

2. People vs Donato
Judge Procoro Donato granted bail to Rodolfo Salas who was charged with rebellion (reclusion
perpetua to death under PD Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834,).

EO 187 was enacted repealing P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring the original penalty for
rebellion, prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000.00

Judge, taking into consideration Executive Order No. 187, granted private respondent's petition for
bail, fixed the bail bond at P30,000.00 and imposed upon private respondent the additional condition
that he shall report to the court once every two (2) months within the first ten (10) days of every
period

it would be dangerous to grant bail to private respondent considering his stature in the CPP-NPA
hierarchy (ask to increase bail from 30,000-100,000) filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration  indirectly asking the court to deny bail to the private respondent and to allow it to
13

present evidence "the right of the State of self-preservation is paramount to any of the rights of an
individual enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution."

Judge Donato increased the amount of bail 30,000-50,000

Ruling: Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of
right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua.  To that
31

extent the right is absolute.

Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a
matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is
limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong.  But once it is determined that the
33

evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right.

Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail in the
instances where bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant of bail is
discretionary, due process requires that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should
resolve the motion for bail.
We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a
right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

3. Amelda vs villaluz
May a judge require “cash bond” only?
No. The Rules provide for four (4) ways of posting bond (cash, property, surety
and recognizance) and it is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the judge to
require cash bond only.

Facts: Leonardo Almeda was charged with qualified theft. Judge Onofre
Villaluz (Circuit criminal Court Pasig, Rizal) approved a bail of P15,000.00 on
the condition that it be posted entirely in cash. At the hearing, petitioner
asked that he be allowed to post instead a surety bond, which request,
however, was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue
Whether the respondent judge has the authority to require a strictly cash bond
and disallow the petitioner’s attempt to post a surety bond for his provisional
liberty.
Held
Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that bail is “the security
required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law,
that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be required
as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.” The purpose of requiring bail
is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure
his appearance at the trial.

 the amount fixed for bail, while reasonable if considered in terms of surety or property bonds, may
be excessive if demanded in the form of cash.

Moreover, the trial court cannot strictly require that bail shall only be in the
form of a cash bond. The condition that the accused may have provisional
liberty only upon his posting of a cash bond is abhorrent to the nature of bail
and transgresses our law on the matter. The sole purpose of bail is to insure
the attendance of the accused when required by the court, and there should be
no suggestion of penalty on the part of the accused nor revenue on the part of
the government.

The allowance of a cash bond in lieu of sureties is authorized in this

jurisdiction only because our rules expressly provide for it. Were this not the
case, the posting of bail by depositing cash with the court cannot be
countenanced because, strictly speaking, the very nature of bail presupposes
the attendance of sureties to whom the body of the prisoner can be delivered.
And even where cash bail is allowed, the option to deposit cash in lieu of a
surety bond primarily belongs to the accused.

4. Marcos vs Cruz
Facts: MARIANO MARCOS, FERDINAND MARCOS, PIO MARCOS and QUIRINO
LIZARDO were charged with having committed the grave crime of murder
upon the person of one who in life was called Julio Nalundasan.

When the petitioners were brought in court, they asked that they be placed
on bail. The fiscal objected and this brought about prolonged incidents
which culminated in the filing by the petitioners of a petition for certiorari
before this court (G.R. No. 46490) which was decided in the sense that the
petition to bail be set for trial at which the prosecution as well as the
defense should adduce evidence so that the court may determine if the
offense was bailable and if the petitioners were entitled to bail. the fiscal
preferred to see the petitioners at liberty on bail to avoid discovery of all the evidence which the
prosecution had in support of the information. The court thereupon fixed P15,000 as the bond which
Ferdinand Marcos had to file and P20,000 for each of the others. The petitioners put up the bonds
thus fixed and were accordingly released.

Ruling:  If the evidence adduced morally convinces the judge that the crime
or offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty
thereof, in which event, he may imprison him or admit to bail if the offense
is bailable. On the other hand, if the justice of the peace be of the opinion
that no crime has been committed, or that there is no reasonable ground to
believe the accused guilty thereof, the justice of the peace shall order the
discharge of the accused. Such discharge, however, shall not operate as a
final acquittal of the accused but, he may be again arrested and prosecuted
for the same offense.

7. Villasenor vs. Abano, 21 SCRA 312 

It is in this case where the Supreme Court provided the 10 standards to be considered by the trial
court when fixing bail. These standards were later added to Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court.

FACTS: Reynaldo VILLASEÑOR is a government employee earning a monthly

salary of P210.00 and the sole breadwinner of a family of five. He was charged
with murder for the killing of Alfonso MADLA, who is a Boac police sergeant. For
this murder charge, he was given a P60,000.00-bail which was reduced to
P40,000.00. VILLASEÑOR then posted a property bond and was set at
provisional liberty.
Before he was arraigned for the murder charge, the prosecutor amended the
information from Murder to “Direct Assault Upon an Agent of a Person in
Authority with Murder.”

Due to this, Judge Maximo ABANO canceled the P40,000.00 initial bond of
VILLASEÑOR and ordered his arrest. After hearing, Judge ABANO ruled that he
will admit VILLASEÑOR to bail if he will put up a cash bond of P60,000.00

VILLASEÑOR filed a motion for reconsideration and asked to have his previous
bond reinstated but Judge ABANO resolved to fix the bond anew in real property
in the amount of P60,000. Judge ABANO added that the bondsmen of
VILLASEÑOR must be residents of Marinduque who are actually staying there
and that the properties of these residents must be in their possession and
ownership for five years.

ISSUE: Does the P60,000.00-bond fixed by Judge ABANO transgress the

constitutional injunction that excessive bail shall not be required, in light of the
fact that the accused is a mere government employee, earning but a monthly
salary of P210.00, and the sole breadwinner of a family of five?

RULING: No, it did not. The inability of a defendant to secure bail in a certain
amount does not make the amount excessive. 

But, where an accused has no means of his own, no one to bail him out, or none
to turn to for premium payments, any amount fixed no matter how small would
fall into the category of excessive bail; and, he “would be entitled to be
discharged on his recognizance.”

TEN factors to be considered by a trial judge in fixing a reasonable

amount of bail:
(1) ability of the accused to give bail;
(2) nature of the offense;
(3) Penalty for the offense charged;
(4) character and reputation of the accused;
(5) health of the accused;
(6) character and strength of the evidence;
(7) probability of the accused appearing in trial;
(8) forfeiture of other bonds;
(9) whether the accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases.

 
Note, however, that the principal factor to be considered is the probability of the
appearance of the accused, or his flight to avoid punishment. Of importance then
is the possible penalty that may be meted. The penalty depends to a great extent
upon the gravity of offense.

In this case, VILLASEÑOR is charged with a capital offense which is direct

assault upon an agent of a person in authority with murder. It is a complex crime
that may call for the imposition of the capital punishment. Under Circular 47 of
the DOJ, the prosecuting attorneys were directed to recommend bail at the rate
of P2,000.00 per year of imprisonment, corresponding to the medium period of
the penalty prescribed for the offense charged, unless circumstances warrant a
higher penalty. As this circular was already declared reasonable by the Supreme
Court, the P60,000.00-bond fixed by the trial judge should also be considered
reasonable.

8. . P vs. IAC, January 10,1987, 147 SCRA 219 

FACTS:

Angelito ALIVIA ran for Barangay Captain but lost against Antonio Bagauisan. He
filed an election protest. The former Municipal Judge of Cabatuan, Atty. Norberto
Maramba, was his counsel. While ALIVIA, Atty. Maramba and their companions
were at the Azarcon Restaurant, ALIVIA suddenly shot Atty. Maramba, Lt. Cesar
Rumbaoa and Pat. Sagun. ALIVIA was charged before the CFI of Isabela with
the crimes of

(1) assault upon an agent of person in authority with murder with the use of
illegally possessed firearm, with respect to the killing of Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa
(Crim. Case No. 1272),

(2) assault upon an agent of person in authority with murder with use of illegally
possessed firearm (Crim. Case No. 1274) and

(3) murder of Atty. Norberto Maramba with the use of illegally Possessed firearm,
(Crim. Case No. 1273).

ALIVIA filed a motion for bail arguing that the evidence of his guilt is not strong
but this was denied by the trial court. His motion for recommendation was
likewise denied.

He questioned the decision of the trial court to the Intermediate Appellate Court
(IAC). The IAC ruled that the evidence against the accused is not strong. As a
result, they nullified the order of the trial court and granted bail for ALIVIA in the
amount of P80,000.00.

ISSUE: Is the IAC’s grant of bail valid, despite the gravity of the crimes
committed by the accused?

RULING: No. IAC’s decision should be set aside and the trial court’s ruling
should be reinstated. It is the trial court which is tasked to determine whether or
not the evidence of guilt is strong. In the absence of manifest abuse of discretion,
the judgment of the trial court should not be changed.

The crimes charged in this case are clearly capital offenses. Under Section 5,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an offense is capital, if it may be punished by
death under both the law prevailing at the time of its commission and that
prevailing at the time of the application for bail, even if after conviction a penalty
less than death was imposed.

The criterion to determine whether the offense charged is capital is the penalty
provided by the law regardless of the attendant circumstances. The rationale of
the provision lies in the difficulty and impracticability of determining the nature of
the offense on the basis of the penalty actually imposable. Otherwise, the test will
require consideration not only of evidence showing commission of the crime but
also evidence of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Thus, there has
to be not only a complete trial, but the trial court must also already render a
decision in the case. This defeats the purpose of bail, which is to entitle the
accused to provisional liberty pending trial.

9. Manotoc vs. CA, May 30,1986 

Q: Does a person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail have
an unrestricted right to travel? No.

A: Bail is the security required and given for the release of a person who is in the
custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance may be
required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance. The condition imposed upon
petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his
presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.

Doctrine of the case:

A person out on bail in a criminal case pending before the Sandiganbayan or RTC may travel
abroad as long as he can prove the following:
       1. Urgency of his travel
       2. Duration of his travel
       3. Consent of the surety

FACTS: Six criminal complaints of estafa were filed against Ricardo MANOTOC
in connection with a Torrens title submitted and accepted by Manotoc Securities,
Inc.  In all cases, MANOTOC posted bail with FGU Instance Corporation as a
surety.

He then filed a permission to leave the country before the trial courts because of
his desire to go to the US as his trip is related to his business transactions and
opportunities.

The trial court denied this because there was no urgency in the statement.
MANOTOC claimed that because he posted bail, neither the courts which
granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no
jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional
right to travel.

ISSUE: Does a person released on bail have an unrestricted right to travel?

RULING: No.

1. A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail
bond. The object of a bail is to release the accused from imprisonment and at the
same time relieve the state of the burden of keeping him pending trial. This will
also signify that the court has acquired jurisdiction over the offender. That way,
they can impose a condition that the offender must make himself available at all
times whenever the court requires his appearance.

2. If the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason,
the courts may not be able to reach him. Also, if the sureties have the right to
prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has the court from
which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the
person of the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter.

Note: The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or

filed on record, and the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the
custody of the accused from the public officials who have him in their
charge to keepers of his own selection (surety). The sureties are then
authorized to prevent the principal from leaving the state.
  

3. In this case, MANOTOC has not sufficiently shown that there is absolute
necessity for him to travel abroad. There is no indication that the alleged
business transactions could not be undertaken by any other person on his behalf.
Neither is there any hint that his absence from the United States would
absolutely prevent him from taking advantage of business opportunities therein,
nor is there any showing that MANOTOC’s non-presence in the United States
would cause him irreparable damage or prejudice.

MNAOTOC did not even specify the duration of the proposed travel or shown
that his surety has agreed to it.

10. P vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA 522 

Mario Henson, Rafael Gonzales, Angel Mendoza, Rogelio Lazaro and Bienvenido
Wijangco were charged as principals for murder of Jess Lapid at CFI Rizal Quezon City
presided by Judge Lourdes San Diego.

The prosecution and the defense agreed that the motions for bail of the defendants
would be considered in the course of the regular trial instead of in a summary
proceeding.

In the course of the regular trial, after the prosecution had presented eight witnesses,
the trial court resolved the motions by granting the bail on the ground that the evidence
of guilt was not strong despite the objection of the prosecution that it still had material
witnesses to present. (Bail is in the amount of P50,000.00 for each defendant)

Issue: Whether or not the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process when
trial court granted bail without allowing the prosecution to present their other witnesses.

Ruling: Yes, they were deprived of due process and granting of bail is considered void.
Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense
be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all
the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court. Should it be denied
such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order
of the court granting bail should be considered void.

The court’s discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the
light of a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it
would be uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical. Hence, the court’s
order granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the
prosecution followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is
strong.
6. See Section 10, Rule 114, 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure

a. Procedure when prosecutor does not object to the petition for bail
in capital offenses:

1. PEOPLE VS. AGBAYANI, 284 SCRA 315 

Facts: Eduardo Agbayani was found guilty of raping his 14-year old daughter Eden
Agbayani. At his arraignment, Eduardo Agbayani was assisted by Attys. Samuel
Baldado and Edwin de la Cruz as counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.

Upon agreement of the parties, trial on the merits immediately followed, during the
hearings, however, Eduardo was represented by Atty. Arturo Temanil of the Public
Attorney's Office.

The defense, however, presented the affidavit of desistance of eden and cited her for
contempt, reasoning that her "intentional falsehood" was "offensive to its dignity and a
blatant disrespect to the Court, and actually degrading [to] the administration of justice." 

On rebuttal, the prosecution had EDEN back on the witness stand. She retracted her
affidavit of desistance and claimed that she had signed it under coercion by her mother
and elder sister.

RTC found Eduardo guilty of rape and imposed upon him the penalty of death. Eduardo
filed for a new trial with a new counsel de parte Attorneys Froilan V. Siobal and
Domingo Floresta, due to serious irregularities. The motion was denied by the trial
court. Hence, an appeal was filed in the Supreme Court contending that (1) the lower
court failed to apprise him of his right to have counsel of his own choice; and (2) the
lower court did not give him the opportunity to prepare for trial, despite the mandated
period of two days prescribed in Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.

Ruling: When appellant appeared without counsel at the arraignment, the trial court
informed him that it would appoint de oficio counsel for him if he so desired, to which
appellant agreed. Moreover, the 2-day period to prepare for trial provided in Section 9 of
Rule 116 is merely directory and does not prohibit the court from proceeding with trial
after arraignment, especially if the defense, as here, consented thereto. It would have
been entirely different if the defense did not agree, in which case the court would have
no other alternative but to grant him the period.

the OSG points out that throughout all the hearings, appellant never questioned the way
his defense was being handled by his counsel de oficio. The latter's request for a
continuance because he had not yet conferred with appellant was not evidence of
counsel's lack of sincerity. On the contrary, it showed counsel's awareness of his duty to
confer with appellant to ferret out the relevant facts as regards the second witness for
the prosecution. 

In other words, the trial court is presumed to have complied with its four-fold duties
under Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, namely, (1) to inform the accused
that he has the right to have his own counsel before being arraigned; (2) after giving
such information, to ask accused whether he desires the aid of counsel; (3) if he so
desires to procure the services of counsel, the court must grant him reasonable time to
do so; and (4) if he so desires to have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court
must assign counsel de oficio to defend him.

Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court provides that after a plea of not guilty, the
accused is entitled to two (2) days to prepare for trial unless the court for good cause
grants him further time. It must be pointed out that the right must be expressly
demanded. Only when so demanded does denial thereof constitute reversible error and
a ground for new trial. Further, such right may be waived, expressly or impliedly. In the
instant case, appellant did not ask for time to prepare for trial, hence, he effectively
waived such right. It is untenable to believe that the counsel who represented the
appellant was not prepared during the trial as records showed he was able to cross-
examine the complainant and there was no ground to claim he is incompetent to
represent the appellant in court. The SC thereby affirmed the decision of the lower
court.

2. MARZAN-GELACIO VS. JUDGE FLORES, 333 SCRA 1

Facts: Juana Marzan-Gelacio filed an administrative complaint against Judge Alipio V.
Flores, Presiding Judge of the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur for Gross Ignorance of the Law
and Evident Partiality.

Juana Marzan Gelacio filed two (2) counts of rape against Emmanuel Artajos. Judge
Flores concluded that the evidence of guilt was weak but made a finding of a probable
cause. Consequently, he issued warrants of arrest with a recommendation of
P200,000.00 bailbond in both cases.

Juana Marzan-Gelacio through her private prosecutor, Atty. Jessie Emmanuel A.

Vizcarra, filed an Urgent Motion to Deny Bail. On the other hand, counsel for the
accused, Atty. Salacnib Baterina filed a Petition to Reduce Bailbond with a notation: "No
objection for P100,000.00 in each case by Provincial Prosecutor Jessica G. Viloria.”

Judge Flores issued an order denying the "Motion to Deny Bail" filed by Vizcarra
(counsel of Gelacio) stating that the proper and appropriate recourse of an aggrieved
party, as in these cases, should have been to ask for a reconsideration of the granting
of bail to the Provincial Prosecutor and/or appeal direct to the Secretary of Justice,
being a capital offense, within the reglementary period set forth by the Rules of said
Office.

Judge Flores issued an order granting Motion for Reduction of Bail of the accused.
(Granted bail without hearing, bail granted was based on recommendation of
the Fiscal)

Ruling: "Whatever the fiscal recommends as the amount of bail for the provisional
release of an accused is only recommendatory. The Judge still retains the discretion to
apply the precedents laid down by the Supreme Court regarding the reasonable nature
of the bail to be required. It is not bound by the Fiscal’s recommendation. More binding
are the decisions of the Supreme Court."

In the case at bar, respondent Judge does not deny that he granted bail to a person
accused of two (2) counts of rape. He however attempted to excuse himself by saying
that when he inquired inside his chambers from the Prosecutor as to whether there was
really a recommendation of bail for P200,000.00 for each case and he (Fiscal) answered
in the affirmative, he had no choice, according to him, but to adopt the same.
Moreover, he added the Prosecutor relied on the Bail Bond Guide issued by the
Department of Justice. Such an excuse is unacceptable. It only manifested his
weakness and displayed his ignorance of the law and several court decisions on matters
such as this. It is very elementary that felonies are defined and their corresponding
penalties are found in the Revised Penal Code. Hence, respondent Judge should not
have been misled by the insinuation of the Fiscal that the 1996 Bail Bond Guide clearly
expresses the bail to be recommended in the crime of rape. Instead, mindful perhaps of
the basic legal principles, the Revised Penal Code should have prevailed. Besides, he
should have known that the Bail [Bond] Guide is addressed to the Prosecutors and their
Assistants and not to the Judges.’

A hearing is indispensable before a Judge can aptly (sic) said to be in a position to

determine whether the evidence for the prosecution is weak or strong. And the
discretion to determine whether it is weak or strong may be exercised only after the
evidence is submitted to the Court at the hearing. Whether in a summary proceeding or
in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to
present, within a reasonable time, as the evidence it may desire to introduce before the
court may resolve the motion for bail.

Besides, the Judge should have known that even when bail is a matter of right, in fixing
the amount of bail, he is required to take into account a number of factors, such as the
character and reputation of the accused, forfeiture of other bonds, or whether or not he
is a fugitive from justice.

The fact that the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence, it is still mandatory for the
court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions from which it
may infer the strength of the evidence of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused.
Where the prosecution does not oppose the application for bail and refuses to satisfy his
burden of proof, but the court has reasons to believe that the prosecutor’s attitude is
not justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross error or a dereliction of duty,
the court, in the interest of justice, must inquire from the prosecution as to the nature
of his evidence to determine whether or not it is strong, it being possible that the
prosecutor [may] have erred in considering it weak and therefore, in recommending,
bail.
The following duties of judges in case an application for bail is filed have been clearly
and repeatedly spelled out during seminars conducted by the Philippine Judicial
Academy, to wit: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of
the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation
(Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);

2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that
the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
sound discretion; (Sections 7 and 8, supra)

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence
of the prosecution;

4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bail bond (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, the petition should be denied. 5

The procedural necessity of a hearing relative to the grant of bail can not be dispensed
with especially in this case where the accused is charged with a capital offense. Utmost
diligence is required of trial judges in granting bail especially in cases where bail is not
a matter of right. Certain procedures must be followed in order that the accused would
be present during trial. As a responsible judge, respondent must not be swayed by the
mere representations of the parties; instead, he should look into the real and hard facts
of the case.