Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. (G.R. No.

L-
31195)

June 5, 1973

FACTS:

On March 4, 1969, Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (PBMEO) decided to stage a mass
demonstration in front of Malacañang to express their grievances against the alleged abuses of the Pasig
Police.

After learning about about PBMEO's plans, Philippine Blooming Mills Inc. called for a meeting with the
leaders of the union. During the meeting, the planned demonstration was confirmed by PBMEO, which
noted that the demonstration was not a strike against the company. PBMEO stated that the planned
demonstration was an exercise of the laborers' inalienable constitutional right to freedom of expression,
freedom of speech and freedom for petition for redress of grievances against police indignities.

The company asked PBMEO to cancel the demonstration, noting that the same would constitute an
interruption of the normal course of their business which may result in loss of revenue. The company
also threatened the workers that they would lose their jobs if they pushed through with the
demonstration.

A second meeting took place where the company stressed that those from the 1st and regular shifts
should not absent themselves to participate in the demonstration, otherwise, they would be dismissed.

Since it was too late to cancel the plan, the demonstration took place. The officers of PBMEO were
eventually dismissed by the company for violation of the "No Strike and No Lockout" clause of their
Collective Bargaining Agreement.

ISSUE:

Whether the dismissal of PBMEO officers from their employment constituted a violation of their
constitutional right to freedom of expression, assembly, and petition. -- YES.

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that PBMEO needed even the first and regular shift workers for the
demonstration as their complete presence in the mass demonstration would generate the maximum
sympathy for the validity of their cause and immediate action on the part of corresponding agencies.

The company’s contention that it would suffer loss by reason of the absence of the employees from 6
AM – 2 PM is a plea for the preservation of merely their property rights. The appropriate penalty that
could have been imposed by the company – if it deserves any penalty at all – should have been simply to
charge the one-day absence of the workers against their vacation or sick leaves.

While the Bill of Rights protects property rights, human rights such as freedom of expression, assembly,
and petition, are supreme over property rights. Infringement on human right requires a more stringent
criterion for validation, as compared to impairment of property rights.
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights
essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru
these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government
through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of
abusive public officer.

The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere
reasonable or rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose that
the law is neither arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law which
restricts or impairs property rights. On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human
rights requires a more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.

Sandigan v. Republic

FACTS:

Based on the mandate of President Corazon Aquino’s E.O. No. 1 creating the Presidential Commission on
Good Government which was tasked to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former President Marcos, the AFP
Anti-Graft Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent Major
General Josephus Q. Ramas. The AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation on
the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas, finding ill-gotten and unexplained wealth in the amount of
₱2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.

The PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 against Ramas. The Amended
Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army until 1986. On the
other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine Army, assigned as
a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas. It alleged that Ramas “acquired funds, assets and properties
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately
acquired property by taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and
influence as such officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate
of the deposed President Ferdinand Marcos. It prayed for forfeiture of respondents’ properties, funds
and equipment in favor of the State.

In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a residential house at La Vista
Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at ₱700,000, which was not out of proportion to his salary and other
legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash, communications
equipment and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.

Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only,
Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken
from her house by the Philippine Constabulary raiding team.

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the ground that there was an illegal search
and seizure of the items confiscated. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the
confiscated sum of money, communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are ordered returned to
Elizabeth Dimaano.
Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied. Petitioner argues that the
exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only beginning 2 February 1987, the date of
ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all rights under the Bill of Rights had
already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search. Therefore, the government may
confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in evidence against her since at
the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional right.

ISSUES:

Whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during
the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power by the revolutionary
government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March 1986, immediately
before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution.

Whether the protection accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights remained in effect during the interregnum.

RULING:

We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration
remained in effect during the interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme
law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the
abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher
than the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person
could not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution
nor a Bill of Rights during the interregnum.

To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum
would render void all sequestration orders issued by the PCGG before the adoption of the Freedom
Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the freezing and even the takeover of private
property by mere executive issuance without judicial action, would violate the due process and search
and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.

During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound
by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of
Rights because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the
Freedom Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the
Bill of Rights of the Freedom Constitution.

If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to the validity and
propriety of sequestration, freeze and takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that these
particular remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue them have received constitutional
approbation and sanction. As already mentioned, the Provisional or “Freedom” Constitution recognizes
the power and duty of the President to enact “measures to achieve the mandate of the people to
recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect
the interest of the people through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts.” And as also
already adverted to, Section 26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution treats of, and ratifies the
“authority to issue sequestration or freeze orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986.”

Even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the
Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility
for the State’s good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article
2(1) of the Covenant requires each signatory State “to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant.” Under Article
17(1) of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that no one shall be
subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.

The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that “no one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend
it as a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as
part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State.

Thus, the revolutionary government was also obligated under international law to observe the rights of
individuals under the Declaration. The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the
Declaration during the interregnum. The Court considers the Declaration as part of customary
international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are proper subjects of the rules of international
law laid down in the Covenant. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not
escape responsibility for the State’s good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international
law.

It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened,
rendered such directives and orders void.

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by
the revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or
the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since
the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper
application, specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the
items specifically described in the warrant.

However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. Clearly, the raiding
team exceeded its authority when it seized these items. The seizure of these items was therefore void,
and unless these items are contraband per se, and they are not, they must be returned to the person
from whom the raiding seized them, Dimaano.

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS v. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA (G.R. No. L-24693)

Facts:
The petitioners filed a petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 for being violative of the due
process clause, contending that said ordinance is not only arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also
vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise allege the invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty
against self-incrimination.

Ordinance No. 4760 has the following provisions:

1. Refraining from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer unless it fills out a prescribed form in
the lobby in open view;

2. prohibiting admission of less than 18 years old;

3. usurious increase of license fee to P4,500 and 6,000 o 150% and 200% respectively (tax issue also);

4. making unlawful lease or rent more than twice every 24 hours; and

5. cancellation of license for subsequent violation.

The lower court ruled in favor of the petitioners. Hence, the appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Ord 4760 is against the due process clause.

HELD:

The SC ruled in favor of Astorga. There is a presumption that the laws enacted by Congress (in this case
Mun Board) is valid. W/o a showing or a strong foundation of invalidity, the presumption stays. As in this
case, there was only a stipulation of facts and such cannot prevail over the presumption. Further, the
ordinance is a valid exercise of Police Power. There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was
precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. This is to minimize prostitution.
The increase in taxes not only discourages hotels/motels in doing any business other than legal but also
increases the revenue of the LGU concerned. And taxation is a valid exercise of police power as well.

The due process contention is likewise untenable, There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It has a standard to which the governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of
life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. What then is the standard of due process
which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance from
legal infirmity? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice.
Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and unfairness avoided. Nothing in the petition is sufficient to
prove the ordinance’s nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement.

On the impairment of freedom to contract by limiting duration of use to twice every 24 hours- It was not
violative of due process. 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by
law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the
peace and order of society and the general well-being.

The Court reversed the judgment of the lower court and lifted the injuction on the Ordinance in
question.

VILLEGAS v. HSUI CHIONG TSAI PAO (G.R. No. L-29646, 86 SCRA 270)
FACTS

The Municipal Board of Manila Passed Ordinance 6537, which prohibited aliens from being employed or
to engage in any occupation or business, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first
securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying a P50 permit fee.

Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, employed in Manila, filed a petition to declare the Ordinance null and void for
being violative of the rule on uniformity of taxation, and for being discriminatory and arbitrary as there
was no distinction or criteria among aliens in imposing the permit fee.

The CFI judge declared the subject ordinance null and void.
Issue: Whether or not Ordinance 6537 violates due process and equal protection clause of
the Constitution?
Decision: Decision appealed from is affirmed. The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only
because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial differences in
situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. The classification should be
based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from
the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him
the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood. Once an
alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of law. This guarantee
includes the means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal
protection clause is given to all persons, both aliens and citizens.

Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro

Facts:
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro. The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which states that “provincial
governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) are found is
authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him
and approved by the provincial board”. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative
Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the
permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads
on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the
provincial governor. Thereafter, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2,
which says that the provincial governor has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for
the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the
Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the
Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in
Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any
Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not
exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. Said
resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they
roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.

It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the
reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being
illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his
companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will,
and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at
Calapan for having run away form the reservation.

NUÑEZ vs AVERIA and MORALES, substituted by RODOLFO DE LEONG.R. No. L-38415 June 28, 1974

FACTS:

Petitioner is the protestant in Election Case No. TM-470 of respondent court contesting the November
8, 1971 election results in certain precincts for the mayoralty of Ternate, Cavite on the ground of fraud,
irregularities and corrupt practices. Original protestee was the proclaimed mayor-elect Edgardo
Morales, who was ambushed and killed on 1974 and hence was succeeded by then vice-mayor Rodolfo
de Leon (respondent).Respondent court had in its questioned order of January 31, 1974 granted
protestee's motion for dismissal of the election protest on the ground that the court lost its jurisdiction
as the case has become moot and academic, citing the President's authority under the 1973 Constitution
to remove from office all incumbent government officials and employees, whether elective or
appointive. *

ISSUE:

Whether or not the election protest against the respondent be dismissed.

RULING:

The Court sets aside respondent court's questioned order of dismissal of the pending election protest
before it on the authority of its recent decisions (Paredes, Sunga and Valley),ruling that courts of first
instance "should continue and exercise their jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the election protests".
The Court in its unanimous joint decision en banc in the above-cited cases has already declaredsuch
dismissal orders as "clear error," ruling that "It must be emphasized that the “right” of the private
respondents to continue in office indefinitely arose not only from the New Constitution* but principally
from their having been proclaimed elected to their respective positions as a result of the 1971 elections.

JMM PRODUCTIONS

FACTS:

The Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP for brevity) filed a class
suit on January 27, 1995 assailing that the Department Order No. 3 which establishes various procedures
and requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification
and deployment of the former and other related issuance, principally contending that the said orders,
1.)violated the constitutional right to travel; 2.) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3.)
deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law. FETMOP also averred that the
issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and in gross violation of the
constitutional right to life liberty and property. FETMOP prayed for the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction against the orders.

JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. (JMM for brevity) and Kary International, Inc. (Kary for brevity)
filed a motion for intervention in the civil case which was granted by the trial court on February 15,
1995. However, on February 21, 1995, the trial court issued an order denying petitioner's prayer for writ
of preliminary injunction and dismissed the compliant. An appeal was made to the trial court regarding
its decision but it was also however, dismissed. As a consequences, ARB requirement was issued. The
Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision and concluded that the said issuance constituted a
valid exercise of Police power.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the the said issuance is a valid exercise of Police Power.

RULING:

Yes, the ARB requirement and questioned Department Order related to its issuance were issued by the
Secretary of Labor pursuant to a valid exercise of Police Power by the State. The proper regulation of a
profession, calling, business or trade has always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of
police power by the state particularly when their conduct afffects either the execution of a legitimate
governmental functions, the preservation of the State, the public health and welfare and public morals.
According to the maxim sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (use your property in such a fashion so as to
not disturb others) it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the
mode and manner in which every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or
others.

In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the right of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measures is certainly much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements
violates due process clause is to ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of the police power, of
regulating entry to the practice of various trades or profession. Professional leaving for abroad are
required to pass rigid written and practical exams before they are deemed fit to practice their trade. It is
not claimed that these requirements pose an unwarranted deprivation of a property right under the due
process clause. So long as professionals and other workers meet reasonable regulatory standards no
such deprivation exists.

Republic v. Rosemoor Mining

FACTS: RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: Four respondents were granted permission to look for marble
deposits in the mountains of Biak-na-Bato. When they discovered marble deposits in Mount Mabio, they
applied for license to exploit said marble deposits and they were issued such license. However, in a
letter, Ernest o Maceda (newly-appointed Minister of the Department of Energy and Natural Resources)
cancelled their license. Prclamation No. 84 was then issued, confirming the cancellation of the license.

RULING OF THE TRIAL COURT: The privilege granted under respondents’ license already became a
property right, which is protected unde the due process clause. License cancellation, without notice and
hearing was unjust. Moreover, the proclamation, which confirmed the cancellation of the license was an
ex post facto law. RULING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS: CA affirmed the decision of the Trial Court. It
adds that the Constitution provides for the non-impairment of obligations and contracts, which implies
that the license of the respondents must be respected. ISSUES: 1.

WON the license was valid.

2.WON Proclamation No. 84 – which confirmed the cancellation of the license, is valid.

The Petition is GRANTED. SC set aside the decision of the CA and TC.

1.THE LICENSE IS NOT VALID.

The issue has not been mooted because while RA 7942 has expressly repealed provisions of mining laws
that are inconsistent with its own, it respects previously issued valid and existing licenses. When the
license was issued, the governing law was PD 463. Thus, it was subject to the terms and conditions of PD
463, including the part where it says that the quarry license shall cover an area of not more than 100
hectares in any one province and not more than 1000 hectares in the entire Philippines. The license in
question was issued in the name of Rosemoor Mining Development Corporation and not the 4 individual
stockholders. It clearly violates PD 463 because the license covered an area of 330-hectares.

2.PROCLAMATION NO. 84, CONFIRMING THE CANCELLATION OF THE LICENSE, IS VALID.

Respondents’ license may be revoked or rescinded by executive action when the national interest so
requires because it is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of
the Constitution. The license itself provides such condition. The license can also be validly revoked by
the State in the exercise of police power, in accordance with the Regalian doctrine. Also, since the
license is not a contract, the non-impairment clause may not be invoked. Even if it were, the non-
impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State. The proclamation cannot also be said to
be a bill-of-attainder, which is a legislative act which inflicts punishment without judicial trial. The
proclamation only declares the nullity of the license. It does not declare guilt or impose punishment. The
proclamation can also be said to be an ex post facto law because it does not fall under any of the six
recognized instances when a law is considered as such. It is not even criminal or penal in nature. Lastly,
when President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 84, she was still validly exercising legislative powers
under the Provisional Constitution of 1986.

In whether the ordinance is class

legislation, the court held that the
ordinance invades no fundamental
right,
and impairs no personal privilege.
Under the guise of police regulation,
an attempt is not made to violate
personal property rights. The
ordinance is neither discriminatory
nor unreasonable in its operation. It
applies to
all public laundries without
distinction, whether they belong to
Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or
any other
nationality. All, without exception,
and each every one of them without
distinction, must comply with the
ordinance. The obvious objection for
the implementation of the ordinance
is based in Sec2444 (ee) of the
Administrative Code. Although, an
additional burden will be imposed
on the business and occupation
affected
by the ordinance such as that of the
appellant by learning even a few
words in Spanish or English, but
mostly
Arabic numbers in order to properly
issue a receipt, it seems that the
same burdens are cast upon the
them. Yet,
even if private rights of person or
property are subjected to restraint,
and even if loss will result to
individuals
from the enforcement of the
ordinance, this is not sufficient
ground for failing to uphold the
power of the
legislative body. The very
foundation of the police power is the
control of private interests for the
public
welfare.
In whether the ordinance is class
legislation, the court held that the
ordinance invades no fundamental
right,
and impairs no personal privilege.
Under the guise of police regulation,
an attempt is not made to violate
personal property rights. The
ordinance is neither discriminatory
nor unreasonable in its operation. It
applies to
all public laundries without
distinction, whether they belong to
Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or
any other
nationality. All, without exception,
and each every one of them without
distinction, must comply with the
ordinance. The obvious objection for
the implementation of the ordinance
is based in Sec2444 (ee) of the
Administrative Code. Although, an
additional burden will be imposed
on the business and occupation
affected
by the ordinance such as that of the
appellant by learning even a few
words in Spanish or English, but
mostly
Arabic numbers in order to properly
issue a receipt, it seems that the
same burdens are cast upon the
them. Yet,
even if private rights of person or
property are subjected to restraint,
and even if loss will result to
individuals
from the enforcement of the
ordinance, this is not sufficient
ground for failing to uphold the
power of the
legislative body. The very
foundation of the police power is the
control of private interests for the
public
welfare.
In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance invades no
fundamental right,and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an
attempt is not made to violatepersonal property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory
nor unreasonable in its operation. It applies toall public laundries without distinction, whether
they belong to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any othernationality. All, without exception,
and each every one of them without distinction, must comply with theordinance. The obvious
objection for the implementation of the ordinance is based in Sec2444 (ee) of theAdministrative
Code. Although, an additional burden will be imposed on the business and occupation affectedby
the ordinance such as that of the appellant by learning even a few words in Spanish or English,
but mostlyArabic numbers in order to properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same burdens are
cast upon the them. Yet,even if private rights of person or property are subjected to restraint, and
even if loss will result to individualsfrom the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficient
ground for failing to uphold the power of thelegislative body. The very foundation of the police
power is the control of private interests for the public welfare.

Facts
Act No. 2972 (An act to provide in what languages account books shall be kept, and to establish penalties
for its violation), also known as the “Chinese Bookkeeping Act,” was passed by the Philippine Legislature
and approved in 1921. It provides:

 Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, company, or partnership or corporation engaged in

commerce, industry or any other activity for the purpose of profit in the Philippine Islands, in accordance
with existing law, to keep its account books in any language other than English, Spanish, or any local
dialect.
 Section 2. Any person violating the provisions of this act shall, upon conviction, be punished by
a fine of not more than ten thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than two years, or both.
Yu Cong Eng, a Chinese merchant, keeps the books of account of his lumber business in Chinese, as he
cannot read, write nor understand English, Spanish, or any local dialect. He was arrested for violating Act
No. 2972, and his books were seized.

Trial was about to proceed when Yu Cong Eng and another petitioner Co Liam (on behalf of all other
Chinese merchants in the Philippines) filed a petition against the fiscal, the collector of internal revenue,
and the presiding judge.
ssues

 WON the PH SC made a valid construction of Act No. 2972. NO

 WON Act No. 2972 is unconstitutional. YES

Issue # 1
WON the PH SC made a valid construction of Act No. 2972.  NO

It is the duty of a court in considering the validity of an act to give it such reasonable construction as can
be reached to bring it within the fundamental law. However, a court may not exercise legislative functions
to save the law from conflict with constitutional limitation.

What the court did was to change a penal prohibitive law to a mandatory law of great indefiniteness to
conform to what the court assumes was, or ought to have been, the purpose of the legislature, and which
in the change would avoid a conflict with constitutional restriction. Such strained construction, in order to
make a law conform to a constitutional limitation, cannot be sustained.

“It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch all possible
offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be rightfully detained and who
should be set at large. This would, to some extent, substitute the judicial for the legislative department of
the government.” (US v. Reese)

Issue # 2
WON Act No. 2972 is unconstitutional.  YES

The law is invalid because it deprives Chinese persons of their liberty and property without due process of
law, and denies them the equal protection of the laws.

Guarantees equivalent to the due process and equal protection clauses of the 14 th Amendment were
extended to the PH; hence, said guarantees are to be interpreted as meaning what the provisions meant
at the time when Congress made them applicable to the PH. (Serra v. Mortiga, citing Kepner v. US)

PH government may make every reasonable requirement of its taxpayers to keep records of their
transactions. However, it is NOT within the police power of the legislature to prohibit Chinese merchants
from maintaining a set of books in Chinese.

To justify the state in interposing its authority in behalf of the public, 1) the interests of the public require
such interference and 2) the means are necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not
oppressive upon individuals. The determination as to what is a proper exercise of the legislature’s police
power is subject to the courts’ supervision. (Lawton v. Steel)

We are likely thus to trespass on the provision of the Bill of Rights that the accused is entitled to demand
the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and to violate the principle that a statute which
requires the doing of an act so indefinitely described that men must guess at its meaning violates due
process of law.
Act No. 2972 deprives the Chinese merchants of something indispensable to the carrying on of their
business, and is obviously intended to affect them (as distinguished from the rest of the community) is
a denial of the equal protection of the laws

In whether the ordinance is class

legislation, the court held that the
ordinance invades no fundamental
right,
and impairs no personal privilege.
Under the guise of police regulation,
an attempt is not made to violate
personal property rights. The
ordinance is neither discriminatory
nor unreasonable in its operation. It
applies to
all public laundries without
distinction, whether they belong to
Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or
any other
nationality. All, without exception,
and each every one of them without
distinction, must comply with the
ordinance. The obvious objection for
the implementation of the ordinance
is based in Sec2444 (ee) of the
Administrative Code. Although, an
additional burden will be imposed
on the business and occupation
affected
by the ordinance such as that of the
appellant by learning even a few
words in Spanish or English, but
mostly
Arabic numbers in order to properly
issue a receipt, it seems that the
same burdens are cast upon the
them. Yet,
even if private rights of person or
property are subjected to restraint,
and even if loss will result to
individuals
from the enforcement of the
ordinance, this is not sufficient
ground for failing to uphold the
power of the
legislative body. The very
foundation of the police power is the
control of private interests for the
public
welfare.
Yes. The assailed Guidelines is
a valid exercise of police power
for it has both the lawful
subject and lawful means,
which are the requisites for the
exercise of police power to
become
valid.
Lawful subject means that the
activity or property sought to be
regulated affect the public
welfare. In the instant case, the
motivating factor of President
Arroyo’s directive on imposing
a
nationwide gun ban and the
further issuance of the assailed
Guidelines is the interest of the
public’s peace and safety in
general.
And the lawful means is the
method or way that is
appropriate and reasonably
necessary
for the accomplishment of the
purpose and are not unduly
oppressive. In the case at
hand,
regulating the carrying of
firearms outside of residence
through the revocation of all
PTCFOR
will essentially curtail crime
incidents. It would be difficult
for criminals to roam around
with
their guns and it would be easier
for the PNP to apprehend them.
With the promotion of public
peace as its subject or objective
and the revocation of all
PTCFOR as the means, the
Court is convinced that the
issuance of the assailed
Guidelines
constitutes a reasonable and
valid exercise of police power.
And with the foregoing
consideration, the petition filed
by the petitioner impleading the
respondents is thereby
DISMISSED by the Court.