De Garcia v.

Locsin
Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usury Board, obtained from the justice of the
peace of Tarlac, a search warrant commanding any officer of the law to search the
person, house or store of Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia, for "certain books, lists, chits,
receipts, documents and other papers relating to her activities as usurer." The search
warrant was issued upon an affidavit given by the said Almeda "that he has and there is
just and probable cause to believe and he does believe that Leona Pasion de Garcia
keeps and conceals in her house and store, certain books, lists, chits, receipts,
documents, and other papers relating to her activities as usurer, all of which is contrary
to the statute in such cases made and provided." On the same date, Almeda,
accompanied by a captain of the Philippine Constabulary, went to the office of Pasion
de Garcia in Victoria and, after showing the search warrant to the latter's bookkeeper,
Alfredo Salas, and, without Pasion de Garcia's presence who was ill and confined at the
time, proceeded with the execution thereof. Two packages of records and a locked filing
cabinet containing several papers and documents were seized by Almeda and a receipt
therefor issued by him to Salas. The papers and documents seized were kept for a
considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury Board and thereafter were turned over by
it to the provincial fiscal Felix Imperial, who subsequently filed, in the Court of First
Instance (CFI) of Tarlac, 6 separate criminal cases against Pasion de Garcia for
violation of the Anti-Usury Law. On several occasions, after seizure, Pasion de Garcia,
through counsel, demanded from the Anti-Usury Board the return of the documents
seized. By motion, the legality of the search warrant was challenged by Pasion de
Garcia's counsel in the 6 criminal cases and the devolution of the documents
demanded. By resolution, Judge Diego Locsin (CFI) denied Pasion de garcia's motion
for the reason that though the search warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on the
latter's part. A motion for reconsideration was presented but was denied by order.
Pasion de Garcia registered her exception.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the warrant is valid by reason of waiver of constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.
RULING:
No. Warrant was declared null and void.
Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a
search warrant to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable
cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other
person; (3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath
or affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4)
the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and persons or
things to be seized.
These requirements are complemented by the Code of Criminal Procedure, particularly
with reference to the duration of the validity of the search warrant and the obligation of
the officer seizing the property to deliver the same to the corresponding court.
Herein, the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by
the applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent
Almeda. He did not decide for himself. It does not appear that he examined the
applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even accepting the description of the properties to
be seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the receipt issued is sufficiently
detailed within the meaning of the law, the properties seized were not delivered to the
court which issued the warrant, as required by law. Instead, they were turned over to
the provincial fiscal and used by him in building up cases against Pasion de Garcia.
Considering that at the time the warrant was issued there was no case pending against
Pasion de Garcia, the averment that the warrant was issued primarily for exploration
purposes is not without basis. The search warrant was illegally issued by the justice of
the peace of Tarlac, Tarlac.
In any event, the failure on the part of Pasion de Garcia and her bookkeeper to resist or
object to the execution of the warrant does not constitute an implied waiver of
constitutional right. It is, as Judge Cooley observes, but a submission to the authority of
the law. As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the
citizen, the courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officer's
authority by force, or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a
peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a consent or an invitation thereto, but
is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law.

Caballes v. CA
FACTS:
Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, while on a routine patrol in Barangay
Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered with “kakawati”
leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the two police officers
flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by appellant. When asked what was
loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, and appeared nervous.
With appellant’s consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered
bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by
National Power Corporation (NPC). When asked where the wires came from, appellant
answered that they came from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from
Sampalucan.
The court a quo rendered judgment finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Theft.
The CA affirmed the judgment of conviction.
Petitioner now comes to the Court contending that the flagging down of his vehicle by
police officers who were on routine patrol, merely on “suspicion” that “it might contain
smuggled goods,” does not constitute probable cause that will justify a warrantless
search and seizure.
ISSUE:
Whether the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible against the
appellant.
RULING:
It is not controverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers in the
case at bar was not authorized by a search warrant.
A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Searches without warrant of
automobiles is also allowed for the purpose of preventing violations of smuggling or
immigration laws, provided such searches are made at borders or ‘constructive borders’
like checkpoints near the boundary lines of the State.
The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within the interior
of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. Still and all, the important thing is
that there was probable cause to conduct the warrantless search, which must still be
present in such a case.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individual’s right against
unreasonable search. The search which is normally permissible in this instance is
limited to the following instances:
(1) where the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked
on the public fair grounds; (2) simply looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein
without opening the car’s doors; (4) where the occupants are not subjected to a physical
or body search; (5) where the inspection of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or
visual inspection; and (6) where the routine check is conducted in a fixed area.
None of the foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the case at bar. The police officers
did not merely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of herein petitioner’s vehicle.
They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks
before they were able to see the cable wires. It cannot be considered a simple routine
check.
The vehicle of the petitioner was flagged down because the police officers who were on
routine patrol became suspicious when they saw that the back of the vehicle was
covered with kakawati leaves which, according to them, was unusual and uncommon.
We hold that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because it is not
common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute “probable
cause” as would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant.
Neither can petitioner’s passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to
the warrantless search.
Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are
insufficient to sustain petitioner’s conviction. His guilt can only be established without
violating the constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable search and
seizure.
The impugned decision was REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and accused Rudy Caballes
was ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
People v. Omaweng,1992
Facts: “In the morning of September 12, 1988, Joseph Layong, a PC constable with the
Mt. Province PC Command at Bontoc, Mt. Province proceeded with other PC soldiers to
Barrio Dantay, Bontoc and, per instruction of their officer, Capt. Eugene Martin, put up a
checkpoint at the junction of the roads, one going to Sagada and the other to. They
stopped and checked all vehicles that went through the checkpoint. At about 9:15 A.M.,
Layong and his teammate, Constable David Osborne Famocod (sic), saw and flagged
down a cream-colored Ford Fiera bearing Plate No. ABT-634 coming from the Bontoc
Poblacion and headed towards Baguio. The vehicle was driven by appellant and had no
passengers. Layong and his companions asked permission to inspect the vehicle and
appellant acceded to the request. When they peered into the rear of the vehicle, they
saw a travelling bag which was partially covered by the rim of a spare tire under the
passenger seat on the right side of the vehicle. Layong and his companions asked
permission to see the contents of the bag. Appellant consented to the request but told
them that it only contained some clothes. When Layong opened the bag, he found that it
contained forty-one (41) plastic packets of different sizes containing pulverized
substances. Layong gave a packet to his team leader, constable David Osborne
Fomocod, who, after sniffing the stuff concluded that it was marijuana. The PC
constables, together with appellant, boarded the latter’s Ford Fiera and proceeded to
the Bontoc poblacion to report the incident to the PC The prohibited drugs were
surrendered to the evidence custodian, Sgt. Angel Pokling. Major Carlos Figueroa, a PC
Forensic Chemist at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet, who has conducted more
than 2500 professional examinations of marijuana, shabu and cocaine samples,
conducted two chemistry examinations of the substance contained in the plastic packets
taken from appellant and found them to be positive for hashish or marijuana. A criminal
complaint was filed against the accused where the judge convicting the accused of the
crime of transporting prohibited drugs penalized under Section 4, Article II of R.A. No.
6425, as amended. Hence the appeal.
Issue: Whether the constitutional rights of the accused against unreasonable search
was violated even if he consented the opening of the said bag.
Held: He willingly gave prior consent to the search and voluntarily agreed to have it
conducted on his vehicle and travelling bag. Thus, the accused waived his right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. When one voluntarily submits to a search or
consents to have it made of (sic) his person or premises, he is precluded from later
complaining thereof, he right to be secure from unreasonable search may, like every
right, be waived and such waiver may be made either expressly or impliedly. “Since in
the course of the valid search forty-one (41) packages of drugs were found, it behooved
the officers to seize the same; no warrant was necessary for such seizure. Besides,
when said packages were identified by the prosecution witnesses and later on formally
offered in evidence, the accused did not raise any objection whatsoever
People v. Lacerna
Facts: Noriel and Marlon Lacerna were inside a taxi when the group of Police Officer
Carlito Valenzuela of the Western Police District signaled the taxi driver to park by the
side of the road in lieu of a police checkpoint. P03 Valenzuela asked permission to
search the vehicle. The officers went about searching the luggages in the vehicle. They
found 18 blocks wrapped in newspaper with a distinct smell of marijuana emanating
from it. When the package was opened, P03 Valenzuela saw dried marijuana leaves.
According to Noriel and Marlon, the bag was a “padala” of their uncle. Marlon admitted
that he was the one who gave the 18 bundle blocks of marijuana to his cousin Noriel as
the latter seated at rear of the taxi with it. He however denied knowledge of the contents
of the package. Marlon was charged before the RTC for “giving away” marijuana to
another. Noriel on the other hand was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The court
noticed that Noriel manifested “probinsyano” traits and was, thus, unlikely to have dealt
in prohibited drugs. Marlon objected on the RTC’s decision, stating that the lower court
erred in saying that the act of “giving away to another” is not defined under R.A. 6425 or
the Dangerous Drugs Act. He also said that he was not aware of the contents of the
plastic bag given to him by his uncle. Marlon also raised that his right against
warrantless arrest and seizure was violated.
Held:Liable
Exceptions to the rule against warrantless arrest
1. Five generally accepted exceptions to the rule against warrantless arrest have been
judicially formulated as follows: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest (2) search of
moving vehicles (3) seizure in plain view,(4) customs searches, (5) waiver by the
accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure.
2. Search and seizure relevant to moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the
impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances. In such cases,
however, the search and seizure may be made only upon probable cause, i.e., upon a
belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains an item, article or object which by law is subject to
seizure and destruction. Military or police checkpoints have also been declared to be
not illegal per se as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected
to body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely visual. Search of luggage
inside a vehicle requires existence of probable cause
3. In this case, the taxi was validly stopped at the police checkpoint. Such search
however is limited to visual inspections without occupants being subjected to a physical
or body searches. A search of a luggage inside the vehicle should require the existence
of probable cause.
4. In several decisions, there was probable cause in the following instances: (a) where
the distinctive odor of marijuana emanated from the plastic bag carried by the accused
(b) where an informer positively identified the accused who was observed to have been
acting suspiciously (c) where the accused fled when accosted by policemen (d) where
the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched by policemen who
had earlier received confidential reports that said accused would transport a large
quantity of marijuana (e) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on the
basis of intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or
spy one who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the
accused belonged that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country.
5. Probable cause in this case is not evident. The mere act of slouching in the seat
when the taxi passed along P03 Valenzuela’s checkpoint does not constitute probable
cause to justify search and seizure. Consented search valid if intelligently made
6. Aniag, Jr. vs. COMELEC outlawed a search based on an implied acquiescence,
because such acquiescence was not consent within the purview of the constitutional
guaranty, but was merely passive conformity to the search given under intimidating and
coercive circumstances.
7. In this case, Marlon was "urbanized in mannerism and speech" when he expressly
said that he was consenting to the search as he allegedly had nothing to hide and had
done nothing wrong. This declaration is a confirmation of his intelligent and voluntary
acquiescence to the search. The marijuana bricks were, therefore, obtained legally
through a valid search and seizure, thus admissible. To be punishable, to “give away” a
prohibited drug should be with the intent to transfer ownership
8. As distinguished from "delivery," which is an incident of sale, "giving away" is a
disposition other than a sale. It is, therefore, an act short of a sale which involves no
consideration. The prohibited drug becomes an item or merchandise presented as a gift
or premium (giveaway), where ownership is transferred.
9. By merely handing the plastic bag to Noriel, Marlon cannot be punished for giving
away marijuana as a gift or premium to another. Intent to transfer ownership should be
proven. Elements of illegal sale of prohibited drugs
10. The elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are as follows (a) the
accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug
(b) such possession is not authorized by law (c) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the prohibited drug. 11. Evidence established beyond reasonable doubt that
Marlon was in possession of the plastic bag containing the prohibited drugs without the
requisite authority. He cannot deny knowledge of the package as its smell is pervasive.
Criminal intent need not be proved in prosecution of acts mala prohibita
12. Criminal intent need not be proved in the prosecution of acts mala prohibita. The
prohibited act is so injurious to the public welfare that, regardless of the person's intent,
it is the crime itself. Intent to perpetrate the act, not intent to commit the crime
necessary in prosecution of acts prohibited by special laws
13. Intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act must be distinguished. A
person may not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but if he did intend to
commit an act, and that act is, by the very nature of things, the crime itself, then he can
be held liable for the malum prohibitum.
14. The rule is that in acts mala in se there must be a criminal intent, but in those mala
prohibita it is sufficient if the prohibited act was intentionally done. Thus in illegal
possession of prohibited drugs, the prosecution is thus not excused from proving that
the act was done “freely and consciously”, which is an essential element of the crime.
15. In this case, Marlon failed to overcome the presumption of his knowledge of the
contents of the package. He was thus held liable for illegal possession of prohibited
drugs.

People v. Correa, 1998

FACTS:
A week before 18 June 1994, Leonardo Dulay was placed under surveillance by the
Police Operatives from the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Western Police District
Command (DEU-WPDC) on account of confidential and intelligence reports received in
said Unit about his drug trafficking around Bambang Street, Tondo, Manila. The police
surveillance brought forth positive results and confirmed Dulay's illegal drug trade. On
17 June 1994, operatives were alerted that Dulay would transport and deliver a certain
quantity of drugs that night on board a owner-type jeep (FMR948). Thereaer, the
operatives, together with the informer proceeded to A. Bonifacio Street on board 3
vehicles, and inconspicuously parked along the side of North Cemetery and waited for
the suspect. The police informant spotted Dulay’s vehicle at 3:00 am. The operatives
tailed the subject jeepney until they reached Bambang extension and Jose Abad Santos
Avenue, where they accosted the passengers of said jeepney. The team inspected a
cylindrical in can of El Cielo Vegetable Cooking Lard, about two feet high, loaded in the
vehicle of the appellants. The can contained 8 bundles of suspected dried marijuana
owering tops wrapped in pieces of paper and plastic tapes. The team seized the
suspected contrabands and marked each bundle consecutively. The 3 suspects were
brought to the police headquarters at DEU-WPDC for investigation. The packages of
suspected marijuana were submitted to the NBI for laboratory analysis to determine
their chemical composition. The tests confirmed that the confiscated stuff were positive
for marijuana and weighed 16.1789 kilograms. The defense, however, contends that the
3 accused were arrested without warrant in Camarin D, Caloocan City, enroute to
Dulay’s house to get the things of his child allegedly rushed previously to the
Metropolitan Hospital, for an alleged charge of trafficking on 'shabu,' and were brought
to the WPDC headquarters at U.N. Avenue, where they were detained. On 12 July
1994, an Information was flled with the RTC Manila (Branch 35) indicting Antonio
Correa y Cayton, Rito Gunida y Sesante, and Leonardo Dulay y Santos for having
violated Section 4, Article II of RA 6425, as amended. When arraigned, the 3 accused
pleaded not guilty. After trial and on 3 March 1995, the lower court found the appellants
guilty as charged and were sentenced to death and a ne of P10 million.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the accused are precluded from assailing the warrantless search and
seizure, due to waiver on their part?
HELD: YES.
Antonio Correa y Cayton, Rito Gunida y Sesante, and Leonardo Dulay y Santos are
precluded from assailing the warrantless search and seizure when they voluntarily
submitted to it as shown by their actuation during the search and seizure. They never
protested when the police officer opened the n can loaded in their vehicle, nor when
he opened one of the bundles, nor when they, together with their cargo of drugs and
their vehicle, were brought to the police station for investigation and subsequent
prosecution. When one voluntarily submits to a search or consents to have it made on
his person or premises, he is precluded from later complaining thereof. The right to be
secure from unreasonable search may, like every right, be waived and such waiver may
be made either expressly or impliedly. Further, they effectively waived their
constitutional right against the search and seizure by their voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, when they entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment
and by participating in the trial.
People v. Cuizon
Facts:The National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) conducted surveillance on the
spouses Cuizon regarding their involvement with illegal drugs. Acting upon a tip coming
from Hongkong the NBI gathered a team to intercept the Spouses Cuizon in Ninoy
Aquino International Airport (NAIA), who allegedly brought with them Shabu drugs. The
spouses Cuizon were seen by the NBI to have handed two pieces of luggage to their
alleged Chinese accomplices and the spouses picked two similar luggage and headed
out of the airport. The intercept at the airport failed due to technical failure of the NBI’s
communication devices. The NBI then split into two groups the first one followed the
Spouses Cuizon to their house and second group followed the alleged accomplices to
their hotel. The NBI conducted an arrest without warrant on the suspicious personalities
and searched the premises of the house of the Spouses Cuizon and the hotel of the
alleged accomplices. The NBI found Shabu hidden on the compartments of all four
luggage found in the spouses Cuizon House and the alleged accomplices’ hotel.
Charges were filed against the spouses Cuizon and their alleged accomplices. The
petitioners then challenged the suit by questioning the validity of how the evidences
were gathered, stating that there was no valid warrantless arrest nor a valid warrantless
search.
Issues
a) Whether or not the warrantless arrest is valid.
b)Whether or not the warrantless search subsequent to the warrantless arrest is valid
c) Whether or not there was a valid representation of the counsel on one of the
accused.
Held
a)
Warrantless Arrest
The Supreme Court ruled that there was no valid warrantless arrest in the case at hand.
The court found it stupendous the circumstance surrounding the arrest, especially the
failure of the NBI to arrest the Couple and their alleged accomplices merely on the fact
that the battery died on their handheld communication device during the operation at the
airport. Instead the NBI waited for the couple and their accomplices to arrive at their
destination before arresting them. The fears (creating a shootout at the airport, airport
employees as accomplices, etc.) expressed by the NBI were found by the court to be
incredulous and baseless. The court reiterated in the ruling the exclusivity of the
circumstances which allows the authorities to conduct warrantless arrest .Under Section
5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure the authorities may conduct a
valid warrantless arrest under the following circumstances:(a) When, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,or is attempting to
commit an offense;(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge offacts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement
toanother.The Supreme Court could not find paragraphs (a) and (b) as basis for the
warrantless arrest as claimed by the NBI. Paragraph (a) cannot apply as there is no
commission of offense happening in the house or at the hotel. If the arrest was made at
the airport or while at transit the NBI may claim a valid warrantless arrest but due to the
incredulous circumstance the NBI failed to do so. Hence we could not qualify that the
arrest was made during the commission of a crime.Paragraph (b) cannot apply as there
was no personal knowledge of the crime. The tip according to the Supreme Court was
mere hearsay evidence, hence it could not qualify as personal knowledge.
b)
Warrantless Search
The Supreme Court ruled that there was no valid warrantless search as there was no
valid warrantless arrest. The Rules of Court under Rule 126 Section 13 states that: "A
person lawfully arrested maybe searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a
search warrant. "Hence a valid arrest first must happen before the authorities can
conduct a valid warrantless search of the person. There is a clear wanting of a valid
arrest in the case at hand, therefore any evidence obtained during an invalid
warrantless arrest is inadmissible, even if they shows a glaring proof of the alleged
felonious act.
c)Right to Counsel
There was no valid representation of one of the accused by his counsel. The law
provides that the right to counsel is an indispensable right, that during a trial it cannot be
subject to waiver. Hence in the case at hand the Supreme Court ruled that one of the
accused was denied of his right to counsel. The defendant was provided with a counsel
but the failure of communication because of language barrier made it seemed like he
doesn’t have one.
Since the defendant was a native speaker of the Cantonese dialect who cannot speak
nor understand any Filipino or English the counsel and the defendant cannot
understand each other making it impossible for them to communicate.
People v. Exala, 1993
I. THE FACTS
A private jeep driven by accused-appellant Bocalan was stopped at a police checkpoint
in Cavite City for routine inspection. With Bocalan were his co-accused Fernandez and
Exala. Pfc. Galang, a member of the inspection team, went near the jeep and asked the
occupants if there were firearms inside. They answered in the negative. Pfc. Galang
proceeded to inspect the vehicle by beaming a flashlight inside. He then noticed a black
leather bag measuring about 1 foot wide and 2 feet long with its sides bulging . When he
asked what it contained, there was deadening silence from the 3 accused. Nobody
answered. Instead, they suddenly became fidgety. Suspicious, Pfc. Galang ordered the
bag opened, which was found out to contain marijuana. The 3 accused were thereafter
prosecuted and convicted of illegal transportation of marijuana. Accused Bocalan
appealed and questioned the legality of the admission of the marijuana as evidence
against him since it was seized without a valid search warrant.
II. THE ISSUE
Was the marijuana seized without warrant during the checkpoint admissible in evidence
against the accused?
III. THE RULING
The Court held that Bocalan is deemed to have waived his objection to the admission of
the seized marijuana because he neither raised this issue before the trial court nor
objected to the admissibility of the marijuana when it was offered in evidence.
And even assuming that there was no such waiver, the Court held that still Bocalan’s
contention deserves scant consideration because there are instances where search and
seizure can be made without necessarily being preceded by an arrest. An illustration
would be the “stop-and-search” without a warrant at military or police checkpoints, the
constitutionality of which has already been upheld by this Court [in Valmonte vs. De
Villa]. Vehicles are generally allowed to pass through these checkpoints after a routine
inspection and answering a few questions. If vehicles are stopped and extensively
searched it is because of some probable cause which justifies a reasonable belief of
those manning the checkpoints that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents
of the vehicle are or have been instruments in the commission of an offense.
According to the Court, lest it be misunderstood, the foregoing doctrine is not intended
to do away with the general rule that no person shall be subjected to search of his
person, personal effects and belongings, or his residence except of virtue of a search
warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest. This case, however, is an incident to or an
offshoot of a lawful “stop-and-search” at a military or police checkpoint.
The checkpoint in the instant case was established in line with “Operational Bakal,” the
main object of which was to search for unlicensed firearms and other prohibited items in
the possession of unauthorized persons passing through it. When the jeep carrying the
contraband passed through the checkpoint, it was flagged down and the occupants
were asked routine questions. In the course thereof, Pfc. Galang noticed a black leather
bag the sides of which were bulging. He asked what the contents of the bag were. None
of the accused answered. At that moment, the demeanor of the accused changed; they
became suspiciously quiet and nervous as if they were concealing something from Pfc.
Galang. The accused clearly appeared to be in abject fear of being discovered. Such
peculiar apprehensiveness if not restrained reaction of the accused, which did not
appear normal, provided the probable cause justifying a more extensive search that led
to the opening of the bag and the discovery of the prohibited stuff.
[NOTE: Incidentally, one of the co-counsels for accused-appellant Bocalan in his appeal
to the Supreme Court was then-Atty. and now Supreme Court Senior Associate Justice
Presbitero Velasco Jr.]
People v. Ramos, 1993

People v. Gatward, 1997

FACTS:
U Aung Win was charged and convicted with violating RA 6425 for importing
and bringing into the Philippines 5, 579.80 grams of heroin. Nigel Gatward was also 
charged the same for transporting heroin. The former (U Aung Win) was caught at NAIA
after arriving from Bangkok. While his luggage was being inspected, he then proceeded
to the conveyor as if to get another luggage, but never came back. The Customs
Examiner became alarmed by this and subjected the luggage under x-ray and found the
powdery substance of heroin. Thereafter, Customs Police were alerted and U Aung Win
was arrested a day after.

Meanwhile, Gatward was caught with the help of U Aung Win’s information during his
investigation. U Aung Win pleaded guilty and was sentenced by the RTC to 25 years of
reclusion perpetua, taking into the mitigating circumstance of voluntary plea of guilty.
Gatward was sentenced to 35 years of reclusion perpetua, there being no aggravating
or mitigating circumstance present. The Court rationalized the penalty (reclusion
perpetua to death) under R.A. 6425 as divisible into 3 periods: 20 years and 1 day as
minimum, 30 years and 1 day as medium, and death as maximum. During the
pendency of the case and while awaiting the filing of appellant’s brief , the Court
received a mimeographed Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Itwas signed by
appellant, but not by his counsel. The Court denied the motion for lack of merit.The
pleading of the appellant was unauthorized, and the Court does not discuss or transmit
notices of judicial action except to counsel of the parties

Held:
accused Nigel Richard Gatward is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of transporting,
without legal authority therefor, 5,237.70 grams of heroin, a prohibited drug, in
violation of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by Republic Act No.
People v. Susan Canton, 2002
Facts:
February 12, 1998 at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Canton was a departing
passenger bound to go to Saigon, Vietnam.
She passed through a metal detector which emitted a beeping sound.
Cabunoc, who was a civilian employee of the NATCH and the frisker duty called her
attention. They checked Canton. Cabunoc felt something bulging in several parts of
Canton. This was reported to her supervisor.
Canton was requested to go the comfort room for a physical examination wherein she
was asked to take her clothes off.
The packages that she carried was examined and turned out to be NINE HUNDRED
NINETY EIGHT POINT TWO EIGHT HUNDRED ZERO NINE (998.2809) GRAMS of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or SHABU, a regulated drug, without the
corresponding prescription or license.
She was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the Article 3, Section 16 of
the RA 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act.
Canton filed for Motion for reconsideration but this was denied.
WON the search conducted on Canton was incidental to lawful arrest
No. Susan’s arrest did not precede the search. She was arrested after the shabu was
discovered by the authorities.
As pointed out by the appellant, prior to the strip search in the ladies’ room, the airport
security personnel had no knowledge yet of what were hidden on SUSAN’s body;
hence, they did not know yet whether a crime was being committed. It was only after
the strip search upon the discovery by the police officers of the white crystalline
substances inside the packages, which they believed to be shabu, that SUSAN was
arrested. The search cannot, therefore, be said to have been done incidental to a lawful
arrest. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there be first a
lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be reversed.
Such restraint during the time she was being frisked / search is not tantamount to an
arrest or taking of a person into custody.
WON the scope of search pursuant to airport security is not confined only to search
warrant for weapons under the Terry Search Doctrine.
No.
In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security
procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 reading as
follows:
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall
contain among others the following condition printed thereon: “Holder hereof and his
hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for , and seizure of, prohibited materials
or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the
aircraft,” which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the air
carrier.
This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless searches and
seizures. As admitted by SUSAN and shown in Annex “D” of her Brief, the afore-quoted
provision is stated in the “Notice to All Passengers” located at the final security
checkpoint at the departure lounge. From the said provision, it is clear that the search,
unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to weapons. Passengers are also subject to s
WON the appellant having been caught in flagrante delicto, was lawfully arrested earch
for prohibited materials or substances.
WON the appellant having been caught in flagrante delicto, was lawfully arrested
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense;
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.
The present case falls under paragraph (a) of the afore-quoted Section. The search
conducted on SUSAN resulted in the discovery and recovery of three packages
containing white crystalline substances, which upon examination yielded positive results
for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. As discussed earlier, such warrantless
search and seizure were legal. Armed with the knowledge that SUSAN was committing
a crime, the airport security personnel and police authorities were duty-bound to arrest
her. As held in People v. Johnson, her subsequent arrest without a warrant was
justified, since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person
flagrante delicto.
WON the constitutional right to counsel afforded an accused under the custodial
investigation was not violated
Custodial investigation refers to the “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way.”[32] This presupposes that he is suspected of having
committed a crime and that the investigator is trying to elicit information or a confession
from him.[33] And the right to counsel attaches upon the start of such investigation.[34]
The objective is to prohibit “incommunicado” interrogation of individuals in a police-
dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full warnings of
constitutional rights.[35]
In this case, as testified to by the lone witness for the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, no
custodial investigation was conducted after SUSAN’s arrest. She affixed her signature
to the receipt of the articles seized from her, but before she did so, she was told that
she had the option to sign or not to sign it. In any event, her signature to the packages
was not relied upon by the prosecution to prove its case. Moreover, no statement was
taken from her during her detention and used in evidence against her.[36] Hence, her
claim of violation of her right to counsel has no leg to stand on.
People v. Johnson, 2000
FACTS:
Leila Johnson was about to fly back to the US after having visited her son’s family in Laguna.
Before she boarded the plane, she had to be frisked as per airport security operations. When
frisker on duty Olivia Ramirez frisked Johnson, she felt something hard on Johnson’s abdominal
area. Johnson explained that she had to wear two panty girdles because she has just undergone an
operation as a result of ectopic pregnancy. Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported
the matter to her superior and she was instructed to take Johnson to the restroom, accompanied
by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Upon inspection, Johnson took out 3 plastic bags which contents were
later found out to be shabu. Johnson was later charged of violation of Sec.16 of the R.A. No.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act), as amended by R.A. No. 7659.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of Johnson’s constitutional rights having beensearched and
arrested without a warrant.

RULING:
There was no violation of the constitutional rights of Johnson having been searched and
arrested without a warrant. Johnson was arrested in flagrante delicto pursuant to a valid search
made on her person. Further, the Court held that there was no violation of Johnson’s
constitutional rights as she was never placed under custodial investigation but was validly
arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Sec 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of
Criminal Procedure which provides: “Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace
officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) when in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense; (b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it...” Also, airline passengers are
subjected to airport security procedures and when it is found out that objects are suspicious, the
yare subject to physical searches. Therefore, search done to Johnson is reasonable. The packs of
shabu found, having be obtained through a valid warrantless search, is therefore admissible
inevidence.
seizure. Clearly, they are
informed that ordinary
constitutional protections
against
warrantless searches and
seizures do not apply to routine
airport procedures.
However, the confiscation
of Johnson’s passport,
airline ticket, luggage,
personal
effects, girdle, and the pictures
taken during that time are
inadmissible as evidence
according
to Rule 126, Section 2 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Such provision
authorizes
the search and seizure only of
the personal property (a) subject
of the offense, (b) stolen or
embezzled and other proceeds
or fruits of the offense and
(c) used or intended to be
used as means of committing
an offense.
People v. Suzuki, 2003
FACTS:
-Appellant Hedishi Suzuki and Takeshi Koketsu, both Japanese nationals were at
thepre-departure area of NAIA
-Suzuki was undergoing through security check at the NAIA when the attention
ofNARCOM personnel were caught by the alarm signifying that there was
metallicsubstance or object in the baggage or a person
-Appellant was frisked but no illegal object was found.
-However, upon checking his package marked with “Bongbong’s piaya” with his
consent, eighteen (18) small packs, 17 of which were wrapped in aluminum foil
- When one of the foiled packs were opened, it contained dried fruiting tops whichlooked
like marijuana
-Upon seeing this, Suzuki ran but was apprehended together with Koketsu and the
latter’s wife for conspiracy

- Appellant told a different tale

-He recounted that he went to the Philippines to collect money from Koketsu as
payment for the latter’s debts but when he arrived, Koketsu admitted that he had no
money to pay
-Suzuki went to Casino Filipino and there he was enticed by
a certain “Pinky” to have
sex with her and so, they proceeded to a motel
-At the airport, Pinky gave him a box of “Bongbong’s Piaya” as “pasalubong” from
Bacolod City
-Due to his trust with the girl, he did not ascertain the contents of the said box
-He was thereafter, joined by Koketsu and his wife at the pre-departure are
-Afterwards, he went through security check and that is where the marijuana
contentswere found
-The trial court rendered its decision finding Suzuki guilty
-Hence, the review
SSUE:
Whether the PASCOM has the authority to inspect luggage or hand-carried bags

RULING:
YES. PASCOM has authority and the warrantless search is valid.
The Police Aviation Security Command (PASCOM) is the implementing arm of the
National Action Committee on Anti-Hijacking (NACAH), which is a creation of
Presidential Letter of Instruction (LOI) 399, dated 28 April 1976. On 18 February 1978, a
Memorandum of Understanding among the Secretary of National Defense, the
Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communication, the Secretary of Justice,
the Director General, National Intelligence and Security Authority and the Secretary of
Finance was signed. Under the said Memorandum of Understanding the then
AVSECOM (now PASCOM) shall have the following functions and responsibilities:
(1) Secure all airports against offensive and terroristic acts that threaten civil aviation;
(2) Undertake aircraft anti-hijacking operations;
(3) Exercise operational control and supervision over all agencies involved in airport
security operations; (4) Take all necessary preventive measures to maintain peace and
order, and provide other pertinent public safety services within the airports; xxx.
Based upon the Memorandum of Understanding, pursuant to President LOI 399, in
relation to RA 6235, the PASCOM had the legal authority to be at the Bacolod Airport,
Bacolod City and to inspect luggages hand-carried bags. This is not the first time that
the Court recognizes a search conducted pursuant to routine airport security procedure
as an exception to the proscription against warrantless searches. In People vs. Canton,
and People vs. Johnson, the Court validated the search conducted on the departing
passengers and the consequent seizure of the shabu found in their persons. Clearly,
the PASCOM agents have the right under the law to conduct search of prohibited
materials or substances. To simply refuse passengers carrying suspected illegal items
to enter the pre-departure area is to deprive the authorities of their duty to conduct
search, thus sanctioning impotence and ineffectivity of the law enforcers, to the
detriment of society. It should be stressed, however, that whenever the right against
unreasonable search and seizure is challenged, an individual may choose between
invoking the constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search
or seizure.
Here, Suzuki voluntarily gave his consent to the search conducted by the PASCOM
agents.

People v. Barros, 1994

FACTS:
While aboard a bus, two peace officers saw Barros carrying a carton, boarded the bus
and seated himself under seat No. 18 after putting the carton under his seat. Before the
two peace officers alighted, it being their station, they called peace officer Bongyao to
inspect the carton under seat No. 18. After Bongyao inspected the carton, he found out
that it contained marijuana and he asked the passengers who the owner of the carton
was but nobody answered. Thereafter, Bongyao alighted with the carton and invited
Barros to the detachment for questioning as he was the suspected owner of the carton
containing marijuana. Barros was convicted of violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant’s constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures had been violated.
RULING:
YES. The accused is not to be presumed to have waived the unlawful search conducted
on the occasion of his warrantless arrest "simply because he failed to object". To
constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person
involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and
lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
In this case, there existed no circumstance which might reasonably have excited the
suspicion of the two (2) police officers riding in the same bus as appellant Barros. There
was, in other words, nothing to show that appellant Barros was then in the process of
"actually committing" or "attempting to commit" a crime. There was, moreover, nothing
on the record that could have reasonably led the two (2) police officers to believe that
"an offense [had] in fact just been committed" when appellant Barros boarded the bus at
Chackchakan or when he was asked whether he owned the box here involved at the
checkpoint in Sabangan. The two (2) police officers, according to the record, had no
"personable knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested (appellant
Barros) had committed it." There was, in brief, no basis for a valid warrantless arrest.
Accordingly, the search and seizure of the carton box was equally non-permissible and
invalid. The "fruits" of the invalid search and seizure — i.e., the four (4) kilos of
marijuana — should therefore not have been admitted in evidence against appellant
Barros.
Kagui Malasugui is not applicable to the instant case, because there the Court explicitly
found that there was probable cause for the warrantless arrest of the accused and
therefore, the warrantless search effected immediately thereafter was equally lawful.
Aniag v. COMELEC, 1994
FACTS:
l The COMELEC issued two resolutions in preparation for the synchronized 1992
national and local elections.
l The first resolution is Resolution No. 2323 otherwise referred to as the "Gun Ban.
l The second resolution Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary disqualification
of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing
special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints.
l Pursuant to the "Gun Ban," Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of
Representatives, wrote petitioner who was then a Congressman of the 1st District of
Bulacan requesting the return of the two (2) firearms3 issued to him by the House of
Representatives.
l Upon being advised of the request on 13 January 1992 by his staff, petitioner
immediately instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from
petitioner's house at Valle Verde and return them to Congress.
l About thirty minutes later, the policemen manning the outpost flagged down the car
driven by Arellano as it approached the checkpoint. They searched the car and found
the firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a bag in the trunk of the car.
Arellano was then apprehended and detained. He explained that he was ordered by
petitioner to get the firearms from the house and return them to Sergeant-at-Arms
Taccad of the House of Representatives.
l The police referred Arellano's case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for an inquest.
l The City Prosecutor ordered the release of Arellano after finding the latter's sworn
explanation meritorious.
l The City Prosecutor invited petitioner to shed light on the circumstances mentioned in
Arellano's sworn explanation. Petitioner not only appeared at the preliminary
investigation to confirm Arellano's statement but also wrote the City Prosecutor urging
him to exonerate Arellano. He explained that Arellano did not violate the firearms ban as
he, in fact, was complying with it when apprehended by returning the firearms to
Congress; and, that he was petitioner's driver, not a security officer nor a bodyguard.
l The Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution which, among other matters,
recommended that the case against Arellano be dismissed and that the "unofficial"
charge against petitioner be also dismissed.
l However, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 92-0829 directing the filing of an
information against petitioner and Arellano for violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), of B.P. Blg.
881 otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Sec. 32 of R.A. No.
7166;7 and petitioner to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for
an elective position
l Petitioner’s MR was denied by COMELEC.
l Hence, petitioner questions the constitutionality of Resolution No. 2327 but the SC
upheld its validity.
l The other issue of this case is….

ISSUE:
WON the warrantless search is valid
HELD:
NO. It was an invalid warrantless search conducted by the PNP.

In the case at bench, we find that the checkpoint was set up twenty (20) meters from the
entrance to the Batasan Complex to enforce Resolution No. 2327.
There was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do so because of a
confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching
the description furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting
firearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor, as adverted to earlier, was there any
indication from the package or behavior of Arellano that could have triggered the
suspicion of the policemen. Absent such justifying circumstances specifically pointing to
the culpability of petitioner and Arellano, the search could not be valid.
It may be argued that the seeming acquiescence of Arellano to the search constitutes
an implied waiver of petitioner's right to question the reasonableness of the search of
the vehicle and the seizure of the firearms.
While Resolution No. 2327 authorized the setting up of checkpoints, it however stressed
that "guidelines shall be made to ensure that no infringement of civil and political rights
results from the implementation of this authority," and that "the places and manner of
setting up of checkpoints shall be determined in consultation with the Committee on
Firearms Ban and Security Personnel created under Sec. 5, Resolution No. 2323."
The facts show that PNP installed the checkpoint at about five o'clock in the afternoon
of 13 January 1992. The search was made soon thereafter, or thirty minutes later. It
was not shown that news of impending checkpoints without necessarily giving their
locations, and the reason for the same have been announced in the media to forewarn
the citizens. Nor did the informal checkpoint that afternoon carry signs informing the
public of the purpose of its operation. As a result, motorists passing that place did not
have any inkling whatsoever about the reason behind the instant exercise. With the
authorities in control to stop and search passing vehicles, the motorists did not have any
choice but to submit to the PNP's scrutiny. Otherwise, any attempt to turnabout albeit
innocent would raise suspicion and provide probable cause for the police to arrest the
motorist and to conduct an extensive search of his vehicle.
In the case of the petitioner, only his driver was in the car at that time it was stopped for
inspection. As conceded by COMELEC, driver Arellano did not know the purpose of the
checkpoint. In the face of fourteen (14) armed policemen conducting the operation,
driver Arellano being alone and a mere employee of the petitioner could not have
marshaled the strength and the courage to protest against the extensive search
conducted in the vehicle. In such scenario, the "implied acquiescence," if there was any,
could not be more than a mere passive conformity on Arellano's part to the search, and
"consent" given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the
purview of the constitutional guaranty.
Hence, the action then of the policemen unreasonably intruded into petitioner's privacy
and the security of his property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the Constitution.
Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of petitioner's right against warrantless
search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding.

Umil v. Ramos
1 February 1988, the Regional Intelligence Operations Unit of the Capital Command
(RIOU-CAPCOM)received confidential information about a member of the NPA Sparrow
Unit (liquidation squad) being treated for a gunshot wound at the St. Agnes Hospital in
Roosevelt Avenue, Quezon City.Upon verification, it was found that the wounded
person, who was listed in the hospital records as Ronnie Javelon, is actually Rolando
Dural, a member of the NPA liquidation squad, responsible for the killing of two (2)
CAPCOM soldiers the day before (31 January 1988) in Macanining Street, Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the
Regional Medical Services of the CAPCOM, for security reasons. 4 February 1988,
while confined Rolando Dural was positively identified by eyewitnesses as the gunman
who went on top of the hood of the CAPCOM mobile patrol car, and fired at the two (2)
CAPCOM soldiers seated inside the car. As a consequence of this positive
identification, Rolando Dural was referred to the Caloocan City Fiscal who conducted an
inquest and thereafter filed with the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City an information
charging Rolando Dural alias Ronnie Javelon with the crime of “Double Murder with
Assault Upon Agents of Persons in Authority.” The case was docketed therein as
Criminal Case No. C-30112 and no bail was recommended. 15 February 1988, the
information was amended to include, as defendant, Bernardo Itucal, Jr. who, at the filing
of the original information, was still unidentified. As to Rolando Dural, it clearly appears
that he was not arrested while in the act of shooting the two (2) CAPCOM soldiers
aforementioned. Nor was he arrested just after the commission of the said offense for
his arrest came a day after the said shooting incident. Seemingly, his arrest without
warrant is unjustified. However, Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the
New People’s Army (NPA), an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion being a
continuing offense, the arrest of Rolando Dural without warrant is justified as it can be
said that he was committing an offense when arrested. The crimes of rebellion,
subversion, conspiracy, or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses
committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct assaults
against the State and are in the nature of continuing crimes.
WON the warrantless arrest is valid
YES. The arrest without warrant is justified because it is within the contemplation of
Section 5 Rule 113, Dural was committing an offense, when arrested because he was
arrested for being a member of the New People's Army, an outlawed organization,
where membership penalized and for subversion which, like rebellion is, under the
doctrine of Garcia vs. Enrile, a continuing offense. Given the ideological content of
membership in the CPP/NPA which includes armed struggle for the overthrow of
organized government, Dural did not cease to be or became less of a subversive, FOR
PURPOSES OF ARREST, simply because he was, at the time of arrest, confined in the
St. Agnes Hospital.
Dural, given another opportunity, would have shot or would shoot other policemen
anywhere as agents or representatives of the organized government. It is in this sense
that subversion like rebellion (or insurrection) is perceived here as a continuing offense.
Unlike other so-called "common" offenses, i.e. adultery, murder, arson, etc., which
generally end upon their commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an
ideological base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and
violence until the overriding objective of overthrowing an organized government is
attained.
Nor can it be said that Dural's arrest was grounded on mere suspicion by the arresting
officers of his membership in the CPP/NPA. His arrest was based on "probable cause,"
as supported by actual facts mentioned in this case.
Parulan v. Director of Prisons
Facts: Petitioner Parulan was confined in the state penitentiary at Muntinlupa serving
life sentence but commuted to 20 years by the President. In 1964, he was transferred to
Fort Santiago but later escaped . He was rearrested in Manila and sentenced for
evasion of sentence
.Issue: Did the trial court in Manila acquire jurisdiction in his case? Also, is the
warrantless arrest proper?
Held: Yes, it did. The act of the prisoner is a continuous crime. Hence, the court of any
province that may be first to take cognizance of the case acquires jurisdiction.The arrest
is proper for it is one of the instances in Rule 113 of the revised Rules of Court when a
warrantless arrest may be effected

People v. Molina
FACTS:
The accused were arrestd based on an information that it is with their possession some
marijuana. Accused were found guilty for violating the Dangerous Drugs Act and were
sentenced to death.
Accused-appelant jointly filed a demurrer to evidence, contending that the marijuana
allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as evidence for having been obtained in
violation of their constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizure.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the conduct of searches and seizures were valid.
HELD/RULING:
No. Accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest.
The holding of a bag on board a trisikad could not be said to be committing attempting
to commit or have committed a crime. There was no probable cause that leads to the
arrest of the accused-appellants.
Constitution mandates that searches and seizures be caried out ina reasonable fashion,
that is, by virtue or on the strength of a search warrant predicated upon the existence of
a probable cause. In instances where search and seizure may be made without a
warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible only in cases as
allowed by law.
Moreover, the law also requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be
made. In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest. Because the arrest was illegal,
so was the search made by the police officers, therefore the seized marijuana were
inadmissible as evidence.
Therefore, for lack of evidence to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
accused-appellants were acquitted.
Facts: 1. A confidential informer has tipped SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag that the
accused Binad Sy Chua, who is allegedly a drug pusher, is about to deliver drugs at the
Thunder Inn Hotel in Balibago, Angeles City.
2. Immediately, the PNP has formed a team of operatives to apprehend Chua.
3. Thereafter, they have proceeded to the said hotel waiting for Chua to come. When
Chua has alighted from his car carrying with him a sealed Zest-O juice box, the
policemen hurriedly apprehended him and introduced themselves as police officers.
4. When the policemen have noticed the sealed zest- o box, they have conducted a
body search and found in Chua’s possession a crystalline substances and pieces of live
.22 caliber firearm bullters. Consequently, Chua has been brought to the PNP
Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.
5. Upon the examination conducted by the PNP, it has been found out that the
crystalline substances are SHABU.
6. In his defense, Chua alleges that he has just stopped by in front of the said hotel as
he is actually on his way to Manila (he is following his wife and son daw to Manila).
Thereafter, an unidentified man has approached him and inspected the inside of his car.
Suddenly, the said man has pulled out his gun and pointed it at him instructing him to
raise his both hands. The man identified himself later as a policeman. There, other
policemen came and inspected his car. Soon later, Chua has been arrested and sent to
the PNP headquarters.
7. RTC rendered a decision convicting Chua with the crime of illegal possession of
ammunitions and illegal possession of dangerous drugs.
Issue: WON the search and seizure conducted by the policemen is valid.
Held: No. The lower court believed that since the police received information that the
accused will distribute illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its
vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly and there was no more time to secure a
search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a “stop and frisk”. The trial court
confused the concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite quantum of
proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope. In a search
incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned, e.g., whether an arrest was
merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires that
there first be arrest before a search can be made—the process cannot be reversed.
Accordingly, for this exception to apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2)such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer. We find the two aforementioned
elements lacking in the case at bar. Accused-appellant did not act in a suspicious
manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt manifestation that accused-
appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime.
“Reliable information” alone, absent any overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise in
the presence and within the view of the arresting officers, is not sufficient to constitute
probable cause that would justify an in flagrante delicto arrest. With regard to the
concept of “stop-and frisk”: mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a “stop-and-
frisk”. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons
concealed about him.
Finally, a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective
crime prevention and detection for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior
even without probable cause; and (2) the interest of safety and self-preservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he
deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against the police officer. A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to
stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It
should also be emphasized that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this
principle to apply. The foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. To
reiterate, accused-appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure of the
alleged illegal items found in his possession. The apprehending police operative failed
to make any initial inquiry into accused-appellant’s business in the vicinity or the
contents of the Zest-O juice box he was carrying. The apprehending police officers only
introduced themselves when they already had custody of accused-appellant. In the
case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the “stop and frisk” principles is
applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by
the police operatives on accused-appellant. Wherefore, accused-appellant Binad Sy
Chua is hereby Acquitted.

People v. Tudtud, G.R. No. 144037, September 26, 2003

FACTS: Sometime during the months of July and August 1999, the Toril Police Station,
Davao City received a report from a “civilian asset” named Bobong Solier about a
certain Noel Tudtud.
Solier related that his neighbours have been complaining about Tudtud, who was
allegedly responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in their area. Relating to the
report, the police conducted surveillance in Solier’s neighbourhood in Sapa, Toril,
Davao City. For 5 days, they gathered information and leared that Tudtud was involved
in illegal drugs. According to his neighbours, Tudtud was engaged in selling marijuana.
Solier informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later
that day with new stocks of marijuana. Solier described Tudtud as big bodied and short,
and usually wore a hat. At around 4:00 pm that same day, a team of policemen posted
themselves at the corner of Saipon and McArthur Highway to await. Tudtud’s arrival. All
wore civilian clothes. About 8:00 pm, 2 men disembarked from a bus and helped each
other carry a carton marked “King Flakes.” Standing some 5 feet away from the men,
PO1 Desierto and PO1 Floreta observed that one of the men fit Tudtud’s description.
The same man also toted a plastic bag. PO1Floreta and PO1 Desierto then approached
the suspects and identified themselves as police officers. PO1 Desierto informed them
that the police had received information that stocks of illegal drugs would be arriving
that night. The man who resembled Tudtud’s description denied that he was carrying
any drugs. PO1 Desierto asked if he could see the contents of the box. Tudtud then
said “it was alright” and let them see the box which contained bundles of dried fish, one
wrapped in a plastic bag and another in newspapers. When the bundles were
unwrapped, there contained marijuana leaves.
The police arrested Tudtud and his comapanion. They were charged with illegal
possession of prohibited drugs before the RTC of Davao City which convicted the
accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not Tudtud’s implied acquiescence (Tudtud’s statement of “it’s
alright”) is considered a waiver.
RULING: NO. The right against unreasonable searched and seizures is secured by Sec.
2, Art. 3 of the Constitution. Appellants implied acquiescence, if at all, could not have
been more than mere passive conformity given under coercive or intimidating
circumstances and is, thus, considered no consent at all within the purview of the
constitutional guarantee. Consequently, appellants lack of objection to the search and
seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of his constitutional right or a voluntary submission
to the warrantless search and seizure.
As the search of appellant’s box does not come under the recognized exceptions to a
valid warrantless search, the marijuana leaves obtained thereby are inadmissible in
evidence. And as there is no evidence other than the hearsay testimony of the arresting
officers and their informant, the conviction of appellants cannot be sustained.
Finally, there is an effective waiver of rights against unreasonable searches and
seizures if the following requisites are present:
1. It must appear that the rights exist;
2. The person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of
such right;
3. Said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Here, the prosecution failed to establish the second and third requisites. Records
disclose that when the police officers introduced themselves as such and requested
appellant that they see the contents of the carton box supposedly containing the
marijuana, appellant Tudtud said it was alright. He did not resist and opened the box
himself.
Acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights is not to be presumed. The fact that a
person failed to object to a search does not amount to permission thereto.
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED. Appellants Noel
Tudtud y Paypa and Dindo Bolong y Naret are ACQUITTED for insufficiency of
evidence.
People v. Victor Cogaed, 2014
t about 6:00 a.m. of November 25, 2005, a police officer “received a text message from
an unidentified civilian informer” that one Marvin Buya (also known as Marvin Bugat)
would be transporting marijuana.” Thereafter, the police officers established a
checkpoint.
A passenger jeepney from arrived at the checkpoint. The jeepney driver disembarked
and signalled to the police officer indicating the two male passengers who were carrying
marijuana. The two officers approached the two male passengers who were later
identified as Victor Romana Cogaed and Santiago Sacpa Dayao. Cogaed was carrying
a blue bag and a sack while Dayao was holding a yellow bag.

The police officer asked Cogaed and Dayao about the contents of their bags. Cogaed
and Dayao told the police officer that they did not know since they were transporting the
bags as a favor for their barriomate named Marvin. After this exchange, Cogaed opened
the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana. Cogaed then
muttered, “nagloko daytoy nga Marvinen, kastoy met gayam ti nagyanna,” which
translates to “Marvin is a fool, this is what [is] contained in the bag.” “SPO1 Taracatac
arrested [Cogaed] and . . . Dayao and brought them to the police station.”

While at the police station, the police officers asked Cogaed and Dayao to empty their
bags. Inside Cogaed’s sack was “four (4) rolled pieces of suspected marijuana fruiting
tops,” and inside Dayao’s yellow bag was a brick of suspected marijuana. After
laboratory testing, the objects obtained were indeed marijuana.

Thereafter, the RTC convicted Cogaed of Violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act No. 9165 (otherwise known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002”).
On the other hand, the case against Dayao was dismissed since he was only fourteen
years old.

Cogaed appealed the trial court’s decision. However, the Court of Appeals denied his
appeal and affirmed the trial court’s decision The Court of Appeals found that Cogaed
waived his right against warrantless searches when “[w]ithout any prompting from SPO1
Taracatac, [he] voluntarily opened his bag.”

Issue
Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure of marijuana.

Held
No. The search was made without a warrant and does not constitute a valid warrantless
search.
The Constitution provides that every person has the right against unreasonable search
and seizure. Hence, as a general rule, search and seizure is valid if it was done by a
police officer who was armed with a search warrant. However, there are exceptions to
the rule that a search warrant is needed to effect a search, to wit:

Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;

Seizure of evidence in “plain view;
Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle’s inherent
mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause
that the occupant committed a criminal activity;
Consented warrantless search;
Customs search;
Stop and frisk; and
Exigent and emergency circumstances.
In this case, there was no valid search since there was no search warrant. Moreover,
the search made does not fall squarely to the exceptions or valid warrantless search.
Lui v. Matillano, 2004
Right against unreasonable searches and seizures; Mission Order does not authorize
an illegal search. Waiver of the right against an unreasonable search and seizure.
In search of the allegedly missing amount of P45,000.00 owned by the employer, the
residence of a relative of the suspect was forcibly open by the authorities by kicking the
kitchen door to gain entry into the house. Thereafter, they confiscated different personal
properties therein which were allegedly part of those stolen from the employer. They
were in possession of a mission order but later on claimed that the owner of the house
gave his consent to the warrantless search. Are the things admissible in evidence? Can
they be sued for damages as a result of the said warrantless search and seizure?
Held:
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be
waived expressly or impliedly. BUT A WAIVER BY IMPLICATION CANNOT BE
PRESUMED. There must be clear and convincing evidence of an actual intention to
relinquish the right.There must be proof of the following:
a. that the right exists;
b. that the person involved had knowledge, either constructive or actual, of the
existence of said right;
c. that the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Finally, the waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently in order that the
said is to be valid.
The search was therefore held illegal and the members of the searching party held
liable for damages in accordance with the doctrine laid down in Lim vs. Ponce de Leon
and MHP Garments vs. CA.
People v. Damaso, 1992
"Maid allowed entry into the house"

The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right.

The constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being personal
one, cannot be waived by anyone except 1) the person whose rights are invaded or 2)
one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.

The group of Lt. Quijardo were sent to verify the presence of CPP/NPA members in
Dagupan City.
They put under surveillance the rented apartment of Rosemarie, sister of someone
whom they earlier arrested.
They interviewed Luzviminda Morados, a visitor of Rosemarie, who stated that she
worked with Bernie Mendoza alias Basilio Damaso, the appellant.
Together with Morados, they reached the house of Damaso where they saw Luz
Tanciangco, a helper. Tanciangco then allowed the group to enter inside the house.
The group of Lt. Quijardo entered the dwelling of Damaso without a valid warrant when
the latter was absent. They requested the persons in the house to allow them to look
around. In one of the rooms, they saw subversive materials which they confiscated.
They likewise brought the persons found in the house to the headquarters for
investigation and the persons revealed that Damaso was the lessee of the house and
owned the items confiscated.
Based on this, Damaso was charged with illegal possession of firearms.
Whether the evidence is admissible? NO.
The Court ruled that the law enforcers failed to comply with the requirements of a valid
search and seizure. None of these exceptions for a warrantless search is present in this
case.
Moreover, the constitutional immunity from unreasonable searches and seizures, being
personal one, cannot be waived by anyone except 1) the person whose rights are
invaded or 2) one who is expressly authorized to do so in his or her behalf.
In this case, the records show that Damaso was not in his house at that time Luz, his
alleged helper, allowed the authorities to enter. There was no evidence that would
establish the fact that Luz was indeed Damaso’s helper or if it was true that she was his
helper, that Damaso had given her authority to open his house in his absence.
Being a helper, she does not qualify as a person authorized to waive such right in
representation of her employer.
Thus, the search being invalid for lack of warrant, the evidence obtained thereafter is
inadmissible.
Jose Lopez v. Commissioner of Customs, 1975
People v. Asis, 2002
Danilo Asis y Fonperada and Gilbert Formento y Saricon were charged in
anInformation; the information stating "That on or about February 1! 1#! in the$ity
of %anila! &hilippines! the said accused! conspiring and confederatingtogether and
mutually helping each other! did then and there wilfully! unlawfullyand feloniously! with
intent to gain and by means of force and 'iolence uponperson! to wit( by then and there
stabbing one )* +I,G G*A, - ./) $+I,G witha bladed instrument on the di0erent parts of the
body thereafter tae! rob andcarry away the following! to wit( $ash money in the
amount of &2!3; 1wristwatch4 1 gold neclace; and undetermined items; or
all in the total amount of &2!3 more or less! belonging to said )* +I,G G*A, - ./)
$+I,G againsthis will! to the damage and pre5udice of the said owner in the aforesaid
amountmore or less of &2!3! &hilippine $urrency! and as a result thereof!
hesustained mortal stab wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of
hisdeath3" 6hen arraigned! both accused pleaded not guilty3 Found to be deaf7mutes!
they were assisted! not only by a counsel de o8cio! but also by an interpreter fromthe
$al'ary 9aptist $hurch3 The prosecution presented  witnesses3 Althoughnone of them
had actually seen the crime committed! strong and substantialcircumstantial e'idence
presented by them attempted to lin both accused to thecrime3After due trial! both
accused were found guilty and sentenced to death3 .T$ of %anila held that the "crime
charged and pro'ed is robbery with homicide underArticle 2:! ,o3 1 of the .&$!" ruled
that "although no witnesses to the actualilling and robbery were presented! the
circumstantial e'idence including thereco'ery of bloodstained clothing from both accused
de8nitely pro'ed that thetwo 2< committed the crime!" and appreciated the aggra'ating
circumstances of abuse of con8dence! superior strength and treachery and thus
sentenced bothaccused to the supreme penalty of death3+ence! the automatic re'iew
before the Supreme $ourt3 9oth the accused donot =uestion the legality of their arrest!
as they made no ob5ection thereto beforethe arraignment! but ob5ect to the introduction
of the bloodstained pair of shortsallegedly reco'ered from the bag of Formento; arguing
that the search wasillegally done! maing the obtainment of the pair of shorts illegal and
taints themas inadmissible3 The prosecution! on the other hand! contends that it
wasFormento4s wife who 'oluntarily surrendered the bag that contained thebloodstained
trousers of the 'ictim! and thus claims that her act constituted a'alid consent to the
search without a warrant3
ISSUES
6hether or not Formento! a deaf7mute! has gi'en consent to the reco'ery of the
bloodstained pair of short! in his possession during the warrantless search>
RULIN&S
,/3 &rimarily! the constitutional right against unreasonable searches andsei?ures! being
a personal one! cannot be wai'ed by anyone e@cept the personwhose rights are
in'aded or who is e@pressly authori?ed to do so on his or herbehalf3 In the present
case! the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses showthat at the time the
bloodstained pair of shorts was reco'ered! Formento! togetherwith his wife and mother!
was present39eing the 'ery sub5ect of the search! necessarily! he himself should
ha'egi'en consent3 Since he was physically present! the wai'er could not ha'e comefrom
any other person3 ope? 's3 $ommissioner of $ustoms does not apply as theaccused
therein was not present when the search was made3
Veroy vs. Layague, 1992
"Qualified consent"

The permission to enter a house and search for persons and effects may be qualified,
and the searching officer may not act in excess of the authority granted to him.
Although the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a malum prohibitum, it does not
follow that the subjects may be seized simply because they are prohibited. A search
warrant is still necessary in the context of this case.

The Veroys moved to QC and left their house in Davao City to a caretaker who had
keys to the kitchen only. The Veroys had the keys to the interior of the house.
Capt. Obrero raided the house based on an information that rebel soldiers are allegedly
hiding there.
With the help of caretakers, they were able to enter only up to the yard since the owner
was not around and they did not have a search warrant.
They contacted Mrs. Veroy, and explained that the house was reportedly being used as
a hideout and recruitment center of rebel soldiers. Mrs. Veroy then gave permission to
search the house with the condition that Major Macasaet, a long-time family friend, must
be there during the search.
Despite the qualified consent, the officers entered various rooms, including the
children’s room, and confiscated a .45 caliber gun and other effects, which were the
basis of the charge of illegal possession of firearms against them.
Despite the fact that the warrants for their arrest have not yet been served on them,
petitioners voluntarily surrendered themselves to Brig. Gen. Pantaleon Dumlao, PC-CIS
Chief, since it was the CIS that initiated the complaint. However, the latter refused to
receive them on the ground that his office has not yet received copies of their warrants
of arrest.
The Spouses Veroy assailed the admissibility of the evidence for being obtained in
violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable search and seizure.
Whether the evidence is admissible? NO.
Petitioners alleged that while Capt. Obrero had permission to enter their house, it was
merely for the purpose of ascertaining the presence of the alleged "rebel" soldiers. The
permission did not include the authority to conduct a room to room search inside the
house. The items taken were, therefore, products of an illegal search, violative of their
constitutional rights. As such, they are inadmissible in evidence against them.
The Court ruled that the case at bar does not fall on the exceptions for a warrantless
search. The reason for searching the house is that it was reportedly being used as a
hideout and recruitment center for rebel soldiers. While Capt. Obrero was able to enter
the yard, he did not enter the house because he did not have a search warrant and the
owners were not present. This shows that he himself recognized the need for a search
warrant, hence, he did not persist in entering the house but rather contacted the Veroys
to seek permission to enter the same. Permission was granted by Mrs. Veroy to enter
the house but only to ascertain the presence of rebel soldiers.
Under the circumstances the police officers had time to procure a search warrant but
they did not.
The Court also ruled that although the offense of illegal possession of firearms is a
malum prohibitum, it does not follow that the subjects may be seized simply because
they are prohibited. A search warrant is still necessary.
The rule having been violated and no exception being applicable, the articles seized
were confiscated illegally and are therefore protected by the exclusionary principle.
They cannot be used as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal action against
them for illegal possession of firearms.
Manalili v. CA, 1997
At about 2:10 PM on April 11, 1988, Police Anti-Narcotics Unit of Kalookan City
conducted surveillance along A. Mabini Street, in front of the Kalookan City Cemetery.
This was done after receiving information that drug addicts were roaming around said
area.
Upon reaching the cemetery, the policemen chanced upon a male person, the
petitioner, in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The petitioner had
reddish eyes and was walking in a swaying manner.
Petitioner was trying to avoid the policemen, but the officers were able to introduce
themselves and asked him what he was holding in his hands. Petitioner resisted.
Policeman Espiritu asked him if he could see what the petitioner had in his hands. The
petitioner showed his wallet and allowed the officer to examine it. Policeman Espiritu
found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana
contents and took petitioner to headquarters to be further investigated.
The suspected marijuana was sent to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section for analysis.

Issue:
Whether or not the search and seizure of the suspected marijuana is unreasonable, and
hence inadmissible as evidence.
Held:
The general rule is a search and seizure must be validated by a previously secured
judicial warrant; otherwise, such a search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to
challenge. Any evidence obtained in violation of this constitutionally guaranteed right is
legally inadmissible in any proceeding.
The exceptions to the rule are: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of
moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the
accused of their right against unreasonable search and seizure. In these cases, the
search and seizure may be made only with probable cause. Probable cause being at
best defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts
and circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe
that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in
connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by is in the place to
be searched.
Additionally, stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the
general rule against a search without a warrant.
In the present case, petitioner effectively waived the inadmissibility of the evidence
illegally obtained when he failed to raise the issue or object thereto during the trial.
The Supreme Court affirmed with modifications the assailed Decision and Resolution of
the respondent court.
People v. Sy Chua, 2003
Facts: Accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua was charged with violation of Section 16,
Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, and for Illegal Possession of
Ammunitions and Illegal Possession of Drugs in two separate Informations.
SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag received a report from their confidential informant that
accused-appellant was about to deliver drugs that night at the Thunder Inn Hotel in
Balibago, Angeles City. So, the PNP Chief formed a team of operatives. The group
positioned themselves across McArthur Highway near Bali Hai Restaurant, fronting the
hotel. The other group acted as their back up.
Afterwards, their informer pointed to a car driven by accused-appellant which just
arrived and parked near the entrance of the hotel. After accused-appellant alighted from
the car carrying a sealed Zest-O juice box, SPO2 Nulud and PO2 Nunag hurriedly
accosted him and introduced themselves as police officers. As accused-appellant pulled
out his wallet, a small transparent plastic bag with a crystalline substance protruded
from his right back pocket. Forthwith, SPO2 Nulud subjected him to a body search
which yielded twenty (20) pieces of live .22 caliber firearm bullets from his left back
pocket. When SPO2 Nunag peeked into the contents of the Zest-O box, he saw that it
contained a crystalline substance. SPO2 Nulud instantly confiscated the small
transparent plastic bag, the Zest-O juice box, the twenty (20) pieces of .22 caliber
firearm bullets and the car used by accused-appellant. SPO2 Nulud and the other police
operatives who arrived at the scene brought the confiscated items to the office of Col.
Guttierez at the PNP Headquarters in Camp Pepito, Angeles City.
Accused-appellant vehemently denied the accusation against him and narrated a
different version of the incident.
Accused-appellant alleged that he was driving the car of his wife to follow her and his
son to Manila. He felt sleepy, so he decided to take the old route along McArthur
Highway. He stopped in front of a small store near Thunder Inn Hotel to buy cigarettes
and candies. While at the store, he noticed a man approaches and examines the inside
of his car. When he called the attention of the onlooker, the man immediately pulled out
a .45 caliber gun and made him face his car with raised hands. The man later on
identified himself as a policeman. During the course of the arrest, the policeman took
out his wallet and instructed him to open his car. He refused, so the policeman took his
car keys and proceeded to search his car. At this time, the police officer’s companions
arrived at the scene in two cars. PO2 Nulud, who just arrived at the scene, pulled him
away from his car in a nearby bank, while the others searched his car.
Thereafter, he was brought to a police station and was held inside a bathroom for about
fifteen minutes until Col. Guttierez arrived, who ordered his men to call the media. In the
presence of reporters, Col. Guttierez opened the box and accused-appellant was made
to hold the box while pictures were being taken.

The lower court acquitted Sy Chua for the Illegal Possession of Ammunitions, yet
convicted him for Illegal Possession of 1,955.815 grams of shabu. Hence, this appeal to
the Court.

Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the arrest of accused-appellant was lawful; and
(2) WON the search of his person and the subsequent confiscation of shabu allegedly
found on him were conducted in a lawful and valid manner.

Held: The lower court believed that since the police received information that the
accused will distribute illegal drugs that evening at the Thunder Inn Hotel and its
vicinities. The police officer had to act quickly and there was no more time to secure a
search warrant. The search is valid being akin to a “stop and frisk”.
The trial court confused the concepts of a “stop-and-frisk” and of a search incidental to a
lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ in terms of the requisite
quantum of proof before they may be validly effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity
of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned, e.g., whether an arrest
was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. In this instance, the law requires
that there first be arrest before a search can be made—the process cannot be reversed.
Accordingly, for this exception to apply, two elements must concur: (1) the person to be
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the
presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
We find the two aforementioned elements lacking in the case at bar. Accused-appellant
did not act in a suspicious manner. For all intents and purposes, there was no overt
manifestation that accused-appellant has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime. “Reliable information” alone, absent any overt act
indicative of a felonious enterprise in the presence and within the view of the arresting
officers, is not sufficient to constitute probable cause that would justify an in flagrante
delicto arrest.

With regard to the concept of “stop-and frisk”: mere suspicion or a hunch will not
validate a “stop-and-frisk”. A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer’s
experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained
has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a “stop-and-frisk” serves a two-fold interest:
(1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the
interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take steps to
assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
A stop-and-frisk was defined as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband. It should also be emphasized
that a search and seizure should precede the arrest for this principle to apply. The
foregoing circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. To reiterate, accused-
appellant was first arrested before the search and seizure of the alleged illegal items
found in his possession. The apprehending police operative failed to make any initial
inquiry into accused-appellant’s business in the vicinity or the contents of the Zest-O
juice box he was carrying. The apprehending police officers only introduced themselves
when they already had custody of accused-appellant.
In the case at bar, neither the in flagrante delicto nor the “stop and frisk” principles is
applicable to justify the warrantless arrest and consequent search and seizure made by
the police operatives on accused-appellant.
Wherefore, accused-appellant Binad Sy Chua is hereby Acquitted.
People v. Solayao, 1996
FACTS:

l SPO3 Nio and his team of CAFGU went to Brgy. Caulangohan, Caibiran, Biliran to
conduct an investigation regarding reports on the presence of armed men roaming
around barangays of Caibiran.
l Upon arriving in Brgy. Onion, the agents became suspicious to the group of Solayao
because the accused-appellant himself is drunk and wearing a camouflage uniform or a
jungle suit. What’s more suspicious is when they noticed the team of SPO3 Nio, the
group fled leaving behind Solayao, herein accused-appellant.
l According to Solayao, he’s not aware that he is carrying a “latong” (49-inch firearm)
wrapped in dried coconut leaves. He thought that it’s only a torch which Hermogenes
Cenining gave to him and that he is not aware that there’s a concealed weapon inside.
He further claimed that this was the third torch handed to him after the others had been
used up.
l Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was charged before the RTC of Biliran, with the crime
of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition defined and penalized under PD No.
1866.
l The lower court found that accused-appellant did not contest the fact that SPO3 Nino
confiscated the firearm from him and that he had no permit or license to possess the
same. It hardly found credible accused-appellant's submission that he was in
possession of the firearm only by accident and that upon reaching Barangay Onion, he
followed four persons, namely, Hermogenes Cenining, Antonio Sevillano, Willie Regir
and Jovenito Jaro when he earlier claimed that he did not know his companions.

ISSUE:

WON the trial court erred in admitting the subject firearm in evidence as it was the
product of an unlawful warrantless search.

HELD:
NO. There was no error on the part of the trial court when it admitted the homemade
firearm as evidence nor violation of the constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures.

The SC ruled that the search and seizure conducted in this case be likened to the
Posadas case where the suspicious conduct of Posadas himself can be likened to a
"stop and frisk" situation. There was a probable cause to conduct a search even before
an arrest could be made.

In the present case, after SPO3 Nino told accused-appellant not to run away, the former
identified himself as a government agent.[16] The peace officers did not know that he
had committed, or was actually committing, the offense of illegal possession of firearm.
Tasked with verifying the report that there were armed men roaming around in the
barangays surrounding Caibiran, their attention was understandably drawn to the group
that had aroused their suspicion. They could not have known that the object wrapped in
coconut leaves which accused-appellant was carrying hid a firearm.

As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes an instance where a search and seizure
may be effected without first making an arrest. There was justifiable cause to "stop and
frisk" accused-appellant when his companions fled upon seeing the government agents.
Under the circumstances, the government agents could not possibly have procured a
search warrant first.

However, the prosecution failed to produce evidence that the accused-appellant has no
license to carry the firearm by merely relying on the lone witness’ (SPO3 Nio) testimony
that accused-appellant admitted to them during the time he was apprehended that he
has no license to carry such weapon.

The prosecution should have presented a certification from the Firearms and Explosives
Unit of the Philippine National Police that accused-appellant was not a licensee of a
firearm of any kind or caliber would have sufficed for the prosecution to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the second element of the crime of illegal possession of firearm.

Hence, Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence

Malacat v. CA, 1997
FACTS:
Four (4) police officers were conducting a patrol in Quiapo due to bomb threats that had
been occurring in the area for the last seven (7) days. They found two groups of
Muslim-looking men standing on opposite sides of the Quezon Boulevard corner who
were acting suspiciously and their eyes were moving very fast. After thirty minutes of
observing the two groups, they decided to approach one of the groups. Upon seeing the
policemen, the groups fled in all directions. Fortunately, one of the men later identified
as Malacat, was apprehended. Without a warrant, the police officer searched him and
found a grenade tucked inside his front waist line. Malacat was arrested and charged
with illegal possession of explosives.
ISSUE:Whether or notthe search made on Malacat wasvalid.
DECISION:The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision. The search
made on Malacat was not valid.Even assuming that petitioner admitted possession
of the grenade during his custodial investigation by police officer Serapio, such
admission was inadmissible in evidence for it was taken in palpable violation of
Section 12(1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution.Mere suspicions are not sufficient
to validate warrantless arrest.First, serious doubt surrounds the story of police
officer Yu that a grenade was found in and seized from petitioner's possession.
Notably, Yudid not identify, in court, the grenade he allegedly seized.Yu did not, and
was not made to, identify the grenade examined by Ramilo, and the latter did not claim
that the grenade he examined was that seized from petitioner. Plainly, the law
enforcement authorities failed to safeguard and preserve the chain of evidence so
crucial in cases such as these.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity
of the incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of
these cases, e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a
search. 36 In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a
search can be made — the process cannot be reversed. 37 At bottom, assuming a valid
arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area within
which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize any
money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the fruit of
the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the arrestee
with the means of escaping or committing violence
A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed about
him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police
officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a
person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable
cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit
the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is
not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against
the police officer.
People v. Calantiao, 2014
On November 13, 2003, Edwin Lojera (Lojera) arrived at the police station where PO1
Nelson Mariano (PO1 Mariano) and PO3 Eduardo Ramirez (PO3 Ramirez) were on
duty. According to Lojera, while driving a towing truck and traversing
along EDSA, Balintawak, QC, he had a traffic dispute (gitgitan) with a
white taxi prompting him to follow said taxi until they reached
along 8th Ave., St., corner C3 Road in Caloocan City. At that moment, the
passengers of the taxi, one of which was Calantiao, alighted and fired
their guns. With this, PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez immediately
respondent to said complaint where they found the white taxi. However,
while they were approaching the vehicle, two (2) armed men alighted and fired their
guns towards the police officers, then ran away. After which, PO1 Mariano recovered a
black bag from Calantiao containing two (2) bricks of dried marijuana,
while PO3 Ramirez recovered a magazine of super 38 stainless with
ammos from the companion of Calantiao. The seized items were
marked and forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis, the
result of which tested positive for marijuana. ISSUE: 1. WON the seized items were
illegally discovered and seized, hence inadmissible as evidence. 2. WON the seized
items’ custodial chain is broken. RULING: 1. NO. Pursuant to Section 13, Rule 125 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, it provides that a person lawfully arrested may
be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. The purpose
of which is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested,
who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying
evidence within reach. Further, in warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest, it is
also the duty and right of the apprehending officer to conduct said warrantless search
not only on the person of the suspect but also in the permissible area within the area of
the latter’s immediate control. The contention that the marijuana was illegally
discovered and seized for it did not fall under the apprehending
officer’s plain viewis misplaced. Said doctrine is an exception to the
inadmissibility of evidence obtained in a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
outside the suspect’s person and premises under his immediate
control.In this case, although the marijuana was found in the black
bag of Calantiao, said bag was within the immediate control of
Calantiao, meaning it is within the area which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence. Therefore, the apprehending officers had the duty and right to
validly conduct a warrantless search.
2. NO. The Court held that failure to strictly comply with Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No.
9165 such as immediately marking the seized drugs, will not
automatically impair the integrity of chain of custody because what is
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items. Particularly, Section 21 and its IRR, did not mention the term
marking, instead it required physical inventory and taking of photographs. In this
case, the chain of custody was established from the time the police
officers confiscated the marijuana, to the time it was turned over to the
investigating officer, until it was brought for laboratory examination.
People v. Estella, 2003
acts: According to the accused, the policemen asked him as to where his house is
located and accused told them that his house is located across the road. The police did
not believe him and insisted that accused’s house (according to their asset) is that
house located about 5-8 meters away from them. Accused told the policemen to inquire
from the Barangay Captain Barnachea as to where his house is and heard the latter
telling the policemen that his house is located near the Abokabar junk shop. After about
half an hour, the policemen went inside the house nearby and when they came out, they
had with them a bulk of plastic and had it shown to the accused.
Accused denied having surrendered to policeman Buloron tin cans containing marijuana
and likewise having any firearm.
Issue: Whether the search and seizure undertaken in the hut where the subject
marijuana was seized was valid/legal.

Held: No.
We cannot sustain the OSG’s supposition that since it was being rented by the alleged
live-in partner of appellant, it follows that he was also occupying it or was in full control
of it.
We have often ruled that courts do not rely on evidence that arouses mere suspicion or
conjecture. To lead to conviction, evidence must do more than raise the mere possibility
or even probability of guilt. It must engender moral certainty.

Neither do we find merit in the OSG’s argument that appellant cannot deny ownership
or control of the hut, since he was found in front of it, sitting on a rocking chair and
drinking coffee.
As earlier adverted to, there is no convincing proof that he indeed surrendered the
prohibited drug, whether voluntarily or otherwise.
Given this backdrop, the police authorities cannot claim that the search was incident to
a lawful arrest. Such a search presupposes a lawful or valid arrest
Having ruled that the prosecution failed to prove appellant’s ownership, control of or
residence in the subject hut, we hold that the presence of appellant or of witnesses
during the search now becomes moot and academic.
Obviously, appellant need not have been present during the search if he was neither the
owner nor the lawful occupant of the premises in question
With the failure of the prosecution to establish the propriety of the search undertaken —
during which the incriminating evidence was allegedly recovered — we hold that the
search was illegal. Without the badge of legality, any evidence obtained therein
becomes ipso facto inadmissible.
People v. Gregg Buenventura, 2011
FACTS:
Appellant, Herminio Buenaventura y Recto, was charged beforethe RTC of
Mandaluyong for illegal selling and possession of dangerousdrugs.On April 11, 2002,
SPO2 Manzano and PO1 Rivera reported toP/Insp. Palisoc that “Demet” whose real
name is Herminio Buenaventuraand a resident of 270 Daang Bakal Street,
Mandaluyong City, wasindeed selling marijuana. A buy-bust operation was scheduled.
P/Insp.Palisoc, together with an informant went to the stated address while theother
team members took strategic positions in the vicinity. P/Insp.Palisoc posed as buyer
and was able to obtain marijuana from theappellant. Convinced by its smell, he
signalled to the other teammembers, introduced himself to appellant as a police officer
andarrested him. The other team members introduced themselves as policeofficers and
searched the premises where they recovered the blacktravelling bag which contained
nine (9) bricks of marijuana. Themarijuana bricks were subjected to laboratory
examination and gavepositive results with a total weight of 8,757.346 grams. The RTC
of Mandaluyong found appellant guilty of both chargesand the appellate court affirmed
the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court a quo erred in convicting accused-appellant.
HELD:
Petition is DENIED. Appellant was convicted of violating Section 5of RA 6425, for the
sale of marijuana. Jurisprudence has firmlyentrenched the following elements in the
crime of illegal sale of prohibited drugs: (1) identity of the buyer and the seller, the
object of the sale and the consideration; and (2) delivery of the thing sold andthe
payment. These essential elements have been established in thepresent case.
Appellant sold and delivered the marijuana to P/Insp.Palisoc posing as a buyer. It was
seized and identified as a prohibiteddrug and subsequently presented as evidence.
Appellant was awarethat he was selling and delivering marijuana as he in fact asked
P/Insp.Palisoc to sniff it upon handling the same.With respect to illegal possession of
prohibited drugs, it wasproven that appellant has knowingly carried with him the
travelling bagwhich contained bricks of marijuana without legal authority at the timehe
was caught.

People v. Nuevas, G.R. No. 170233, February 22, 2007

PO3 Fami testified that he and SPO3 Cabling conducted a surveillance and monitoring
of illegal drug trafficking after they received information that a certain male person (other
information were also provided such as height, weight and estimated age) would make
a delivery of marijuana dried leaves. On that day, they saw a man who fit the
description, carrying a plastic bag, who was identified as Nuevas. They informed
Nuevas that they are police officers and accordingly, Nuevas voluntarily gave the plastic
bag which contained the dried marijuana leaves. Nuevas informed them that there were
other stuff in possession of two other male persons. The two companions were
identified as Din and Inocencio who were similarly carrying a light plastic bag and upon
inspection, contained marijuana packed in newspaper and wrapped therein. The
people charged present different testimonies (please see in facts for full narration). As
such, the issue is W/N the warrantless searches and seizures were validly made. The
Court ruled that only the search and seizure of Nuevas was valid.
W/N the search constitutes a reasonable search or seizure
onsidering the foregoing, Din must be acquitted as a warrantless search puts the dried
marijuana leaves under the exclusionary principle. Without the dried marijuana
leaves, the conviction cannot be sustained. In Inocencio;s case, the basis was that he
took a look into the plastic bag that Din was carrying. It must be noted that taking a look
is not the same as taking possession thereof. The prosecution failed to show by
convincing proof that Inocencio knew of the contents of the bag and that he conspired
with Din to possess the illegal items.
People v. Montilla, 1998
People v. de la cruz
People v. kalubiran
People v. Musa
People v. Zapanta, 1991
People v. Luisito, 2001
People v. Aruta, 1998
People v. malmstedt, 1991
People v. Sucro. 1991
People v. Valdez, 1999
Posadas v. CA, 1990
People v. Rodriguez, 1994
People v. Tangliben, 1990
People v. Chua Ho San, 1999
People v. Hindoy
People v. Cunanan
People v. Molina
Antiquera v. People
People v. Antinero
People v. Butial
People v. Peralta
De Garcia v.Locsin

People v. barros
Aniag v. COMELEC
People v. Damaso
People v. Cogaed
People v. Estella
People v. Nuevas
Espano v. CA
Valmonte v. de villa
Caballes v. CA
People v. Musa
People v. Aruta
People v. Salanguit
United Laboratories v. Isip
People v. Hunag Zuan Hua