ANNEX “D’

JURISPRUDENCE ON ARREST
(2017-2021)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v MYRNA GAYOSO Y ARGUELLES

FIRST DIVISION [ G.R. No. 206590, March 27, 2017 ]

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

ACQUITTED

Buy-bust; Test-buy operation

In inducement or instigation —

the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigator and the accused is lured into the commission
of the offense charged to prosecute him. The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into the
commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal. [This is distinguished from entrapment
wherein] ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of capturing the lawbreaker in flagrante delicto.

The "test-buy" operation conducted by police officers is not prohibited by law. It does not amount to instigation.
As in this case, the solicitation of drugs from the appellant by the poseur buyer merely furnishes evidence of a
course of conduct. The police received an intelligence report that the appellant habitually deals with shabu. They
designated a poseur buyer to confirm the report by engaging in a drug transaction with the appellant. There was
no proof that the poseur buyer induced the appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.

MARIO VERIDIANO Y SAPI v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

SECOND DIVISION [ G.R. No. 200370, June 07, 2017]

LEONEN, J.:

ACQUITTED; the warrantless search conducted by the police officers is invalid. Consequently, the marijuana
seized from the accused is rendered inadmissible

Veridiano was charged with the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs (marijuana).

According to the prosecution, at about 7:20 a.m. of January 15, 2008, a concerned citizen called a certain PO3
Esteves, police radio operator of the Nagcarlan Police Station, informing him that a certain alias "Baho," who
was later identified as Veridiano, was on the way to San Pablo City to obtain illegal drugs.

PO3 Esteves immediately relayed the information to PO1 Cabello and PO2 Alvin Vergara (PO2 Vergara) who
were both on duty. Chief of Police June Urquia instructed PO1 Cabello and PO2 Vergara to set up a checkpoint
at Barangay Taytay, Nagcarlan, Laguna.

The police officers at the checkpoint personally knew Veridiano. They allowed some vehicles to pass through
after checking that he was not on board. At around 10:00 a.m., they chanced upon Veridiano inside a passenger
jeepney coming from San Pablo, Laguna. They flagged down the jeepney and asked the passengers to
disembark. The police officers instructed the passengers to raise their t-shirts to check for possible concealed
weapons and to remove the contents of their pockets.

The police officers recovered from Veridiano "a teabag containing what appeared to be marijuana." PO1 Cabello
confiscated the tea bag and marked it with his initials. Veridiano was arrested and apprised of his constitutional
rights. He was then brought to the police station.

At the police station, PO1 Cabello turned over the seized tea bag to PO1 Solano, who also placed his initials. PO1
Solano then made a laboratory examination request, which he brought with the seized tea bag to the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory. The contents of the teabag tested positive for marijuana.

Held:

Validity of Arrest

P a g e | 117
The invalidity of an arrest leads to several consequences among which are: (a) the failure to acquire jurisdiction
over the person of an accused; (b) the criminal liability of law enforcers for illegal arrest; and (c) any search
incident to the arrest becomes invalid thus rendering the evidence acquired as constitutionally inadmissible.

Lack of jurisdiction over the person of an accused as a result of an invalid arrest must be raised through a motion
to quash before an accused enters his or her plea. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived and an accused is
"estopped from questioning the legality of his [or her] arrest."

The voluntary submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the court and his or her active participation during
trial cures any defect or irregularity that may have attended an arrest. The reason for this rule is that "the legality
of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused."

Nevertheless, failure to timely object to the illegality of an arrest does not preclude an accused from questioning
the admissibility of evidence seized. The inadmissibility of the evidence is not affected when an accused fails to
question the court's jurisdiction over his or her person in a timely manner. Jurisdiction over the person of an
accused and the constitutional inadmissibility of evidence are separate and mutually exclusive consequences of
an illegal arrest.

As a component of the right to privacy, the fundamental right against unlawful searches and seizures is guaranteed
by no less than the Constitution. Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

To underscore the importance of an individual's right against unlawful searches and seizures, Article III, Section
3(2) of the Constitution considers any evidence obtained in violation of this right as inadmissible.

The Constitutional guarantee does not prohibit all forms of searches and seizures. It is only directed against those
that are unreasonable. Conversely, reasonable searches and seizures fall outside the scope of the prohibition and
are not forbidden.

In People v. Aruta, this Court explained that the language of the Constitution implies that "searches and seizures
are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest." The
requirements of a valid search warrant are laid down in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution and reiterated
in Rule 126, Section 4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.

However, People v. Cogaed clarified that there are exceptional circumstances "when searches are reasonable even
when warrantless." The following are recognized instances of permissible warrantless searches laid down in
jurisprudence: (1) a "warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest," (2) search of "evidence in 'plain view,'" (3)
"search of a moving vehicle," (4) "consented warrantless search[es]," (5) "customs search," (6) "stop and frisk,"
and (7) "exigent and emergency circumstances."

There is no hard and fast rule in determining when a search and seizure is reasonable. In any given situation,
"[w]hat constitutes a reasonable . . . search . . . is purely a judicial question," the resolution of which depends
upon the unique and distinct factual circumstances. This may involve an inquiry into "the purpose of the search
or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, how the search and seizure was made, the place or thing
searched, and the character of the articles procured."

Whether the warrantless search

Was incidental to a lawful arrest

A search incidental to a lawful arrest requires that there must first be a lawful arrest before a search is made.
Otherwise stated, a lawful arrest must precede the search; "the process cannot be reversed." For there to be a
lawful arrest, law enforcers must be armed with a valid warrant. Nevertheless, an arrest may also be effected
without a warrant.

There are three (3) grounds that will justify a warrantless arrest. Rule 113, Section 5 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides:

Section 5. Arrest Without Warrant; When Lawful. — A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

P a g e | 118
 (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

The first kind of warrantless arrest is known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. The validity of this warrantless arrest
requires compliance with the overt act test as explained in Cogaed:

[F]or a warrantless arrest of in flagrante delicto to be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the person to
be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he [or she] has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer."

Failure to comply with the overt act test renders an in flagrante delicto arrest constitutionally infirm. In Cogaed, the
warrantless arrest was invalidated as an in flagrante delicto arrest because the accused did not exhibit an overt act
within the view of the police officers suggesting that he was in possession of illegal drugs at the time he was
apprehended.

The warrantless search in People v. Racho was also considered unlawful. The police officers received information
that a man was in possession of illegal drugs and was on board a Genesis bus bound for Baler, Aurora. The
informant added that the man was "wearing a red and white striped [t]-shirt." The police officers waited for the
bus along the national highway. When the bus arrived, Jack Racho (Racho) disembarked and waited along the
highway for a tricycle. Suddenly, the police officers approached him and invited him to the police station since
he was suspected of having shabu in his possession. As Racho pulled out his hands from his pocket, a white
envelope fell yielding a sachet of shabu.

In holding that the warrantless search was invalid, this Court observed that Racho was not "committing a crime
in the presence of the police officers" at the time he was apprehended. Moreover, Racho's arrest was solely based
on a tip. Although cases are stating that reliable information is sufficient to justify a warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest, they were covered under the other exceptions to the rule on warrantless searches.

Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court pertains to a hot pursuit arrest. The rule requires that an offense has
just been committed. It connotes "immediacy in point of time." That a crime was in fact committed does not
automatically bring the case under this rule. An arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court entails
a time element from the moment the crime is committed up to the point of arrest.

Law enforcers need not personally witness the commission of a crime. However, they must have personal
knowledge of facts and circumstances indicating that the person sought to be arrested committed it.

People v. Gerente illustrates a valid arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court. In Gerente, the accused
was convicted for murder and violation of Republic Act No. 6425. He assailed the admissibility of dried marijuana
leaves as evidence on the ground that they were allegedly seized from him pursuant to a warrantless arrest. On
appeal, the accused's conviction was affirmed. This Court ruled that the warrantless arrest was justified under
Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Rules of Court. The police officers had personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances indicating that the accused killed the victim:

The policemen arrested Gerente only some three (3) hours after Gerente and his companions had killed Blace. They saw
Blace dead in the hospital and when they inspected the scene of the crime, they found the instruments of
death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used to bludgeon him to death.
The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her
neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. Under those circumstances, since the policemen had personal knowledge of the
violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him, they could lawfully arrest Gerente
without a warrant. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the
law as his two companions did. (Emphasis supplied)

The requirement that law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts surrounding the commission of an
offense was underscored in In Re Salibo v. Warden.

In Re, Salibo involved a petition for habeas corpus. The police officers suspected Datukan Salibo (Salibo) as one
(1) of the accused in the Maguindano Massacre. Salibo presented himself before the authorities to clear his name.
Despite his explanation, Salibo was apprehended and detained. In granting the petition, this Court pointed out
that Salibo was not restrained under a lawful court process or order. Furthermore, he was not arrested pursuant
to a valid warrantless arrest:

It is undisputed that petitioner Salibo presented himself before the Datu Hofer Police Station to clear his
name and to prove that he is not the accused Butukan S. Malang. When petitioner Salibo was in the
presence of the police officers of Datu Hofer Police Station, he was neither committing nor attempting
to commit an offense. The police officers had no personal knowledge of any offense that he might have
committed. Petitioner Salibo was also not an escapee prisoner. (Emphasis supplied)

P a g e | 119
In this case, petitioner's arrest could not be justified as an in flagrante delicto arrest under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of
the Rules of Court. He was not committing a crime at the checkpoint. Petitioner was merely a passenger who did
not exhibit any unusual conduct in the presence of the law enforcers that would incite suspicion. In effecting the
warrantless arrest, the police officers relied solely on the tip they received. Reliable information alone is
insufficient to support a warrantless arrest absent any overt act from the person to be arrested indicating that a
crime has just been committed, was being committed, or is about to be committed.

The warrantless arrest cannot likewise be justified under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The law enforcers had no personal knowledge of any fact or circumstance indicating that petitioner
had just committed an offense.

A hearsay tip by itself does not justify a warrantless arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts,
based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime. This is what gives
rise to probable cause that would justify a warrantless search under Rule 113, Section 5(b) of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure.

Stop and Frisk

A "stop and frisk" search is defined in People v. Chua as "the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street,
interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband." Thus, the allowable scope of a "stop and frisk" search
is limited to a "protective search of outer clothing for weapons."

Although a "stop and frisk" search is a necessary law enforcement measure specifically directed towards crime
prevention, there is a need to safeguard the right of individuals against unreasonable searches and seizures.

Law enforcers do not have unbridled discretion in conducting "stop and frisk" searches. While probable cause is
not required, a "stop and frisk" search cannot be validated on the basis of suspicion or hunch. Law enforcers
must have a genuine reason to believe, based on their experience and the particular circumstances of each case,
that criminal activity may be afoot. Reliance on one (1) suspicious activity alone, or none at all, cannot produce
a reasonable search.

In Manalili v. Court of Appeals, the police officers conducted surveillance operations in Caloocan City Cemetery,
a place reportedly frequented by drug addicts. They chanced upon a male person who had "reddish eyes and
[was] walking in a swaying manner." Suspecting that the man was high on drugs, the police officers approached
him, introduced themselves, and asked him what he was holding. However, the man resisted. Upon further
investigation, the police officers found marijuana in the man's possession. This Court held that the circumstances
of the case gave the police officers justifiable reason to stop the man and investigate if he was high on drugs.

In People v. Solayao, the police officers were conducting an intelligence patrol to verify reports on the presence
of armed persons within Caibiran. They met a group of drunk men, one (1) of whom was the accused in a
camouflage uniform. When the police officers approached, his companions fled leaving behind the accused who
was told not to run away. One (1) of the police officers introduced himself and seized from the accused a firearm
wrapped in dry coconut leaves. This Court likewise found a justifiable reason to stop and frisk the accused when
"his companions fled upon seeing the government agents."

The "stop and frisk" searches in these two (2) cases were considered valid because the accused in both cases
exhibited overt acts that gave law enforcers genuine reason to conduct a "stop and frisk" search. In contrast
with Manalili and Solayao, the warrantless search in Cogaed was considered as an invalid "stop and frisk" search
because of the absence of a single suspicious circumstance that would justify a warrantless search.

In Cogaed, the police officers received information that a certain Marvin Buya would be transporting
marijuana. A passenger jeepney passed through the checkpoint set up by the police officers. The driver then
disembarked and signaled that two (2) male passengers were carrying marijuana. The police officers approached
the two (2) men, who were later identified as Victor Cogaed (Cogaed) and Santiago Dayao, and inquired about
the contents of their bags.

Upon further investigation, the police officers discovered three (3) bricks of marijuana in Cogaed's bag. In
holding that the "stop and frisk" search was invalid, this Court reasoned that "[t]here was not a single suspicious
circumstance" that gave the police officers genuine reason to stop the two (2) men and search their
belongings. Cogaed did not exhibit any overt act indicating that he was in possession of marijuana.

Similar to Cogaed, the petitioner, in this case, was a mere passenger in a jeepney who did not exhibit any act that
would give police officers reasonable suspicion to believe that he had drugs in his possession. Reasonable persons
will act nervously at any checkpoint. There was no evidence to show that the police had basis or personal
knowledge that would reasonably allow them to infer anything suspicious.

Consent to a Warrantless Search

Moreover, the petitioner's silence or lack of resistance can hardly be considered as consent to the warrantless
search. Although the right against unreasonable searches and seizures may be surrendered through a valid waiver,

P a g e | 120
the prosecution must prove that the waiver was executed with clear and convincing evidence. Consent to a
warrantless search and seizure must be "unequivocal, specific, intelligently given . . . [and unattended] by duress
or coercion."

The validity of a consented warrantless search is determined by the totality of the circumstances. This may involve
an inquiry into the environment in which the consent was given such as "the presence of coercive police
procedures."

Mere passive conformity or silence to the warrantless search is only an implied acquiescence, which amounts to
no consent at all. In Cogaed, this Court observed:

Cogaed's silence or lack of aggressive objection was a natural reaction to a coercive environment brought
about by the police officer's excessive intrusion into his private space. The prosecution and the police
carry the burden of showing that the waiver of a constitutional right is knowing, intelligent, and free from
any coercion. In all cases, such waivers are not to be presumed.

The presence of a coercive environment negates the claim that the petitioner consented to the warrantless search.

The search for a Moving Vehicle

The rules governing searches and seizures have been liberalized when the object of a search is a vehicle for
practical purposes. Police officers cannot be expected to appear before a judge and apply for a search warrant
when time is of the essence considering the efficiency of vehicles in facilitating transactions involving contraband
or dangerous articles. However, the inherent mobility of vehicles cannot justify all kinds of searches. Law
enforcers must act based on probable cause.

A checkpoint search is a variant of a search of a moving vehicle. Due to the number of cases involving warrantless
searches in checkpoints and for the guidance of law enforcers, it is imperative to discuss the parameters by which
searches in checkpoints should be conducted.

Checkpoints per se are not invalid. They are allowed in exceptional circumstances to protect the lives of
individuals and ensure their safety. They are also sanctioned in cases where the government's survival is in
danger. Considering that routine checkpoints intrude "on [a] motorist's right to 'free passage'" to a certain extent,
they must be "conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists." The extent of routine inspections must be limited
to a visual search. Routine inspections do not give law enforcers carte blanche to perform warrantless searches.

In Valmonte v. De Villa, this Court clarified that "[f]or as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants
subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks
cannot be regarded as violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search[es]." Thus, a search where an
"officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fairgrounds, or simply
looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein" is not unreasonable.

However, an extensive search may be conducted on a vehicle at a checkpoint when law enforcers have probable
cause to believe that the vehicle's passengers committed a crime or when the vehicle contains instruments of an
offense.

Thus, routinary and indiscriminate searches of moving vehicles are allowed if they are limited to a visual search.
This holds especially true when the object of the search is a public vehicle where individuals have a reasonably
reduced expectation of privacy. On the other hand, extensive searches are permissible only when they are
founded upon probable cause. Any evidence obtained will be subject to the exclusionary principle under the
Constitution.

That the object of a warrantless search is allegedly inside a moving vehicle does not justify an extensive search
absent probable cause. Moreover, law enforcers cannot act solely based on confidential or tipped information. A
tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence
of any other circumstance that will arouse suspicion.

Although this Court has upheld warrantless searches of moving vehicles based on tipped information, there have
been other circumstances that justified warrantless searches conducted by the authorities.

In People v. Breis, apart from the tipped information they received, the law enforcement agents observed suspicious
behavior on the part of the accused that gave them reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being
committed. The accused attempted to alight from the bus after the law enforcers introduced themselves and
inquired about the ownership of a box that the accused had in their possession. In their attempt to leave the bus,
one (1) of the accused physically pushed a law enforcer out of the way. Immediately alighting from a bus that
had just left the terminal and leaving one's belongings behind his unusual conduct.

In People v. Mariacos, a police officer received information that a bag containing illegal drugs was about to be
transported on a passenger jeepney. The bag was marked with "O.K." Based on the tip, a police officer conducted
surveillance operations onboard a jeepney. Upon seeing the bag described to him, he peeked inside and smelled

P a g e | 121
the distinct odor of marijuana emanating from the bag. The tipped information and the police officer's
observations gave rise to probable cause that rendered the warrantless search valid.

The police officers in People v. Ayangao and People v. Libnao likewise received tipped information regarding the
transport of illegal drugs. In Libnao, the police officers had probable cause to arrest the accused based on their
three (3)-month-long surveillance operation in the area where the accused was arrested. On the other hand,
in Ayangao, the police officers noticed marijuana leaves protruding through a hole in one (1) of the sacks carried
by the accused.

In the present case, the extensive search conducted by the police officers exceeded the allowable limits of
warrantless searches. They had no probable cause to believe that the accused violated any law except for the tip
they received. They did not observe any peculiar activity from the accused that may either arouse their suspicion
or verify the tip. Moreover, the search was flawed at its inception. The checkpoint was set up to target the arrest
of the accused.

There are different hybrids of reasonable warrantless searches. There are searches based on reasonable suspicion
as in Posadas v. Court of Appeals where this Court justified the warrantless search of the accused who attempted to
flee with a buri bag after the police officers identified themselves.

On the other hand, there are reasonable searches because of heightened security. In Dela Cruz v. People, the search
conducted on the accused was considered valid because it was done in accordance with routine security measures
in ports. This case, however, should not be construed to apply to border searches. Border searches are not
unreasonable per se; there is a "reasonable reduced expectation of privacy" when travelers pass through or stop
at airports or other ports of travel.

The warrantless search conducted by the police officers is invalid. Consequently, the tea bag containing marijuana
seized from the petitioner is rendered inadmissible under the exclusionary principle in Article III, Section 3(2) of
the Constitution. There being no evidence to support his conviction, the petitioner must be acquitted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v MARCIAL M. PARDILLO

THIRD DIVISION [ G.R. No. 219590, June 07, 2017 ]

TIJAM, J.:

CONVICTION AFFIRMED

Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs (shabu)

On February 2, 2007, at around 3 p.m., SPO1 Metodio Aparis (SPO1 Aparis), together with
PO3 Macarinas and PO2 Tremaine Sotto (PO2 Sotto), conducted a roving patrol at Garfield
Street, Barangay Suba, Cebu City. While doing the same, SPO1 Aparis noticed the accused-
appellant, who was holding two pieces of white transparent sachets in his right hand, in an
alley. SPO1 Aparis suspected that the sachets are dangerous drugs; and so, he introduced
himself as a police officer and inquired what the accused-appellant was holding. Accused-
appellant replied that somebody just asked him to buy shabu.

The police officers brought the accused appellant to the police station. While on their way to
the said station, SPO1 Aparis took custody of the seized articles. Upon reaching the station,
SPO1 Aparis placed the markings "MMP-1" and "MMP-2" on the two plastic sachets for
laboratory examination. The seized items were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory. In a
Chemistry Report, the items were found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu.

Held:

Whether or not there was a valid warrantless arrest

and subsequent seizure of accused-appellant's effects

It is well-settled that no arrest, search and seizure can be made without a valid warrant issued
by a competent judicial authority. Any evidence obtained in violation of this provision is

P a g e | 122
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. However, the rule against warrantless searches
and seizures admits of exceptions.

One of which is a warrantless arrest, which justifies a subsequent search. Section 5(a), Rule
113 provides that:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.-- A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense; xxx

For the exception in Section 5(a) to operate, this Court has ruled that two elements must be
present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

The factual circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused-appellant and the subsequent
seizure of the illegal drugs lead Us to conclude that the exception applies, as (1) SPO1 Aparis,
PO3 Macarinas, and PO2 Sotto were conducting a roving patrol on Garfield St. because of
the rampant drug-trafficking in the said area; (2) SPO1 Aparis saw the accused-appellant
holding transparent sachets, containing a white crystalline substance; (3) SPO1 Aparis
identified himself as a police officer and inquired about the substance which accused-appellant
was holding; and (4) upon SPO1 Aparis' inquiry, accused-appellant replied that somebody just
asked him to buy what he was holding.

Accused-appellant's act of holding sachets of white crystalline substance, in an area where

drug-trafficking is prevalent, was seen by SPO1 Aparis' naked eye as it was exposed to the
latter's view. Also, it is to be noted that he tried to exculpate himself from liability when he
was confronted by a police officer. Thus, the accused-appellants argument that he was just
merely walking, and not committing a crime when he was arrested by SPO1 Aparis, is flimsy
and unlikely.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v WILTON ALACDIS Y ANATIL A.K.A.

"WELTON", DOMINGO LINGBANAN (AT-LARGE), AND PEPITO ANATIL
ALACDIS (AT-LARGE)
THIRD DIVISION [ G.R. No. 220022, June 19, 2017 ]

TIJAM, J.:

CONVICTION MODIFIED from Illegal Sale to Delivery and Transportation of 107 kg of

marijuana

buy-bust operation (no payment made); marijuana on May 6, 2008, in Baguio City

On May 6, 2008, the transaction was set at Rizal Park, Baguio City.

At around 11 a.m., Lingbanan called SPO2 Agbayani and told him that the stocks of marijuana
were inside a taxi and were already on their way to Rizal Park. Accused-appellant arrived and
informed SPO2 Agbayani that the marijuana was still inside the taxi. SPO2 Agbayani asked to
be shown the goods first before he gives the money. Accused-appellant instructed the taxi
driver to open the back of the taxi where several cartons were placed. SPO2 Agbayani could
smell the marijuana. Accused-appellant opened one carton in front of SPO2 Agbayani who
saw several marijuana bricks inside.

P a g e | 123
SPO2 Agbayani gave the pre-arranged signal by removing his ball cap and the backup team
rushed to the scene and arrested the accused appellant and the taxi driver, Danny Sison. The
police confiscated five cartons containing several bricks of marijuana and decided to bring the
same to the PDEA-CAR Office for marking and inventory considering its volume.

Held:

A police officer's act of soliciting drugs from the accused during a buy-bust operation, or what
is known as a "decoy solicitation," is not prohibited by law and does not render invalid the
buy-bust operation. The sale of contraband is a kind of offense habitually committed, and the
solicitation simply furnishes evidence of the criminal's course of conduct. In People v. Sta.
Maria, the Court clarified that a "decoy solicitation" is not tantamount to inducement or
instigation:

It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely
placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons
seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present
and assisting its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the office is
one habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of
conduct.

Here, the solicitation by SPO2 Agbayani and the informant of drugs from Lingbanan and
Alacdis, that was delivered by the accused-appellant, is mere evidence of a course of conduct.
The police received an intelligence report that the accused-appellant has been habitually
dealing with illegal drugs. They duly acted on it by utilizing an informant to effect a drug
transaction with the accused appellant. There was no showing that the informant induced the
accused-appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v ARMANDO MENDOZA Y POTOLIN A.K.A.

"JOJO,"
SECOND DIVISION [ G.R. No. 220759, July 24, 2017 ]

PERALTA, J.:

Appellant contends that his apprehension was not a product of entrapment but an instigation
as it was admitted that it was the asset who allegedly introduced PO2 Ricote to him as the
buyer of marijuana; and that it was the asset who instructed him to sell marijuana to PO2
Ricote.

Held: We find such contention unmeritorious.

In People v. Dansico, we held:

xxx. Instigation means luring the accused into a crime that he, otherwise, had no intention to
commit, to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the employment of ways and
means to trap or capture a lawbreaker. Instigation presupposes that the criminal intent to
commit an offense originated from the inducer and not the accused who had no intention to
commit the crime and would not have committed it were it not for the initiatives by the
inducer. In entrapment, the criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates
in the mind of the accused; the law enforcement officials merely facilitate the apprehension of
the criminal by employing ruses and schemes. In instigation, the law enforcers act as active
co-principals. Instigation leads to the acquittal of the accused, while entrapment does not bar
prosecution and conviction.

P a g e | 124
To determine whether there is instigation or entrapment, we held in People v. Doria that the
conduct of the apprehending officers and the predisposition of the accused to commit the
crime must be examined:

[I]n buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly
and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and
the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the
consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. How the initial
contact was made, whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the
payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the
informant alone or the police officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to ensure
that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be
caught but not at all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the police
should not disable courts from ignoring the accused's predisposition to commit the crime. If
there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism, or plain criminal
proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine
the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to
determine the validity of the defense of inducement.

In this case, it was shown that there was prior surveillance on the appellant's illegal activities
and it was confirmed that indeed appellant was selling illegal drugs, hence, a buy-bust operation
was planned. The CI introduced PO2 Ricote to the appellant as a buyer of marijuana.
Appellant negotiated with PO2 Ricote as to the price of the marijuana to which the latter
agreed and paid the same, and he was arrested. No doubt, what transpired was a typical buy-
bust operation which is a form of entrapment. A police officer's act of soliciting drugs from
the accused during a buy-bust operation, or what is known as a "decoy solicitation," is not
prohibited by law and does not render invalid the buy-bust operations. The sale of contraband
is a kind of offense habitually committed, and the solicitation simply furnishes evidence of the
criminal's course of conduct.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v ARIEL CALVELO Y CONSADA

THIRD DIVISION [ G.R. No. 223526, December 06, 2017 ]

MARTIRES, J.:

Records show that it was Villanueva who was the buyer in the subject transaction for the sale
of shabu. The informant merely acted as the middleman between Villanueva, as a buyer, and
Ariel, as a seller. As testified to by Villanueva and Abalos, on 26 November 2005, at about
5:00 p.m. at the PDEA office, the informant called up Ariel to inform him that he (informant)
already had a buyer, to which Ariel replied that he was already preparing the shabu. The
following day, the informant called up Ariel again, this time to say that he and the would-be
buyer were already at the Travelers' Inn. When they met, Villanueva introduced herself as the
buyer of the shabu. When Ariel had made sure that Villanueva had with her the money to pay
for the items, he handed her the three transparent plastic sachets containing the shabu, and
she, in turn, handed him the marked and boodle money.

Contrary to Ariel's claim, the factual milieu in Rojo (G.R. No. 82737 July 5, 1989) is completely
different from the case at bar. In Rojo, it was the informant who acted as the poseur-buyer of
marijuana during the buy-bust operation. A member of the buy-bust team was positioned 5 to
7 meters away from the informant while the transaction was taking place, while two other
members of the team were inside their vehicle parked one hundred meters away from the
scene.

During the hearing in Rojo, the informant who acted as the buyer was not put on the witness
stand by the prosecution. His identity was not revealed as being confidential information.

P a g e | 125
Significantly, the evidence of the prosecution as to the informant's participation as a buyer
during the entrapment proceeding was contradictory, viz: a patrolman testified that it was
another patrolman who acted as poseur-buyer; while another patrolman testified that it was
the informant who acted as such. The Court held that the fatal flaw in the prosecution's
evidence was its failure to establish how the alleged entrapment proceedings took place, and
to prove beyond reasonable doubt the actual participation of the informant during the buy-
bust operation, thus, casting doubt on whether the entrapment proceedings even took place.

Compared with this case, Villanueva had first-hand knowledge of what transpired during the
transaction with Ariel. She dealt with Ariel, i.e., from receiving the shabu from him to her
actual payment for the delivered item. Indeed, the prosecution was correct in presenting
Villanueva to fortify its case against Ariel as she knew the details of the transaction that took
place on the night of 27 November 2005.

Case law imparts the "objective test" in a buy-bust operation as follows:

We, therefore, stress that the "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details
of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the
initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or
payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal
drug subject of the sale. How the initial contact was made, whether or not through an
informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust" money, and the
delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be the
subject of strict scrutiny by courts to ensure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully
induced to commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all costs. At the same time,
however, examining the conduct of the police should not disable courts from ignoring the
accused's predisposition to commit the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual
delinquency, recidivism, or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered. Courts
should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense
in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement.

Evaluation of the records applying the "objective test" will prove that the prosecution was
able to establish beyond moral certainty the details of the transaction that took place between
Villanueva and Ariel from the offer to purchase shabu until the consummation of the sale.
Consequently, the claim of Ariel that the poseur - buyer failed to present evidence on how the
illegal drugs were recovered - raising doubts about a buy-bust having been conducted and
warranting a suspicion that the prohibited drugs were planted - miserably weakened in the
light of the convincing and credible testimony of the prosecution witnesses.

There was no need for the prosecution to present the informant if only to determine whether
there was a prior drug deal between him and Ariel. The informant's testimony would only
corroborate that of Villanueva and Abalos who both testified that the informant contacted
Ariel on 26 and 27 November 2005 on the drug deal, and which transaction indeed took place
when Ariel delivered the shabu to Villanueva on 27 November 2005. The sale, to stress, was
between Ariel and Villanueva. We quote our ruling in People v. Bartolome, viz:

Similarly, the presentation of an informant as a witness is not regarded as indispensable to the

success of a prosecution of a drug-dealing accused. As a rule, the informant is not presented
in court for security reasons, because of the need to protect the informant from the retaliation
of the culprit arrested through his efforts. Thereby, the confidentiality of the informant's
identity is protected in deference to his invaluable services to law enforcement. Only when the
testimony of the informant is considered essential in obtaining the conviction of the culprit
should the need to protect his security be disregarded.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v MARILOU HILARIO Y DIANA AND LALAINE

GUADAYO Y ROYO
FIRST DIVISION [ G.R. No. 210610, January 11, 2018 ]

P a g e | 126
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The lack of specific details on the planning and conduct of the buy-bust operation on January
22, 2008 in Brgy. Maguihan casts serious doubts that it took place and/or that the police
officers carried out the same in the regular performance of their official duties. Relevant herein
is the following discourse of the Court on buy-bust operations in People v. Ong:

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment, which in recent years has been accepted as a
valid means of arresting violators of the Dangerous Drugs Law. It is commonly employed by
police officers as an effective way of apprehending law offenders in the act of committing a
crime. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender,
without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. Its opposite is instigation
or inducement, wherein the police or its agent lures the accused into committing the offense
to prosecute him. Instigation is deemed contrary to public policy and considered an absolutory
cause.

To determine whether there was a valid entrapment or whether proper procedures were
undertaken in effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon the courts to make sure
that the details of the operation are clearly and adequately laid out through relevant, material,
and competent evidence. For, the courts could not merely rely on but must apply with studied
restraint the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty by law enforcement
agents. This presumption should not by itself prevail over the presumption of innocence and
the constitutionally protected rights of the individual. Courts have to preserve the purity of
their temple from the prostitution of the criminal law through lawless enforcement. Courts
should not allow themselves to be used as instruments of abuse and injustice lest innocent
persons are made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses.

In People v. Doria, we stressed the "objective" test in buy-bust operations. We ruled that in
such operations, the prosecution must present a complete picture detailing the transaction,
which "must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer
to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the sale
by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. We emphasized that how the initial contact
was made, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the 'buy-bust money, and the delivery
of the illegal drug must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to ensure that law-abiding
citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit an offense."

In the case at bar, the prosecution evidence about the buy-bust operation is incomplete. The
confidential informant who had sole knowledge of how the alleged illegal sale of shabu started
and how it was perfected was not presented as a witness. His testimony was given instead by
SPO1 Gonzales who had no personal knowledge of the same. On this score, SPO1 Gonzales'
testimony is hearsay and possesses no probative value unless it can be shown that the same
falls within the exception to the hearsay rule. To impart probative value to these hearsay
statements and convict the appellant solely on this basis would be to render nugatory his
constitutional right to confront the witness against him, in this case, the informant, and to
examine him for his truthfulness. As the prosecution failed to prove all the material details of
the buy-bust operation, its claim that there was a valid entrapment of the appellants must fail.
(Emphases supplied, citations omitted.)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v ANGELITA REYES Y GINOVE AND JOSEPHINE

SANTA MARIA Y SANCHEZ
SECOND DIVISION [ G.R. No. 219953, April 23, 2018 ]

PERALTA, J.:

First of all, as to the argument of appellant Santa Maria that the arresting officers illegally
arrested them because they did not have with them any warrant of arrest nor a search warrant

P a g e | 127
considering that the police officers had enough time to secure such, the same does not deserve
any merit. Buy- bust operations are legally sanctioned procedures for apprehending drug
peddlers and distributors. These operations are often utilized by law enforcers to trap and
capture lawbreakers in the execution of their nefarious activities. There is no textbook method
of conducting buy-bust operations. Prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not
necessary, especially where the police operatives are accompanied by their informant during
the entrapment. Hence, the said the buy-bust operation is a legitimate, valid entrapment
operation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v RENANTE COMPRADO FBRONOLA

THIRD DIVISION [ G.R. No. 213225, April 04, 2018 ]

MARTIRES, J.:

A stop-and-frisk search is often confused with a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest.
However, the distinctions between the two have already been settled by the Court in Malacat
v. CA:

In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases, e.g.,
whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for searching. In this instance, the law requires
that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed.
At the bottom, assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the
arrestee and the area within which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy,
and seize any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or
the fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the
arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.

xxxx

We now proceed to the justification for and allowable scope of a "stop-and-frisk" as a "limited
protective search of outer clothing for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:

We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him
reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that
the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, wherein the
course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as a policeman and makes reasonable
inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to dispel his
reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled [to] the protection of himself and
others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons
in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a
reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment.

Other notable points of Terry are that while the probable cause is not required to conduct a
"stop and frisk" it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop
and frisk," A genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed
about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer
may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the
more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which permit the police officer to take
steps to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. (emphases supplied and
citations omitted)

III.

P a g e | 128
A valid stop-and-frisk was illustrated in the cases of Posadas v. CA (Posadas), Manalili v. CA
(Manalili), and People v. Solayao (Solayao)

In Posadas, two policemen were conducting surveillance within the premises of the Rizal
Memorial Colleges when they spotted the accused carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously.
They approached the accused and identified themselves as police officers. The accused
attempted to flee but his attempt to get away was thwarted by the policemen who then checked
the buri bag wherein they found guns, ammunition, and a grenade.

In Manalili, police officers were patrolling the Caloocan City cemetery when they chanced
upon a man who had reddish eyes and was walking in a swaying manner. When this person
tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him and introduced themselves as police
officers. The policemen then asked what he was holding in his hands, but he tried to resist.

In Solayao, police operatives were carrying out an intelligence patrol to verify reports on the
presence of armed persons roaming around the barangays of Caibiran, Biliran. Later on, they
met the group of accused-appellant. The police officers became suspicious when they
observed that the men were drunk and that accused-appellant himself was wearing a
camouflage uniform or a jungle suit. Upon seeing the government agents, the accused-
appellant's companions fled. Thus, the police officers found a justifiable reason to stop and
frisk the accused.

IV.

On the other hand, the Court found no sufficient justification in the stop and frisk committed
by the police in People v. Cogaed (Cogaed)[24] In that case, the police officers received a
message from an informant that one Marvin Buya would be transporting marijuana from
Barangay Lun-Oy, San Gabriel, La Union, to the Poblacion of San Gabriel, La Union. A
checkpoint was set up and when a passenger jeepney from Barangay Lun-Oy arrived at the
checkpoint, the jeepney driver disembarked and signaled to the police officers that the two
male passengers were carrying marijuana.

SPO1 Taracatac approached the two male passengers who were later identified as Victor
Cogaed and Santiago Dayao. SPO1 Taracatac asked Cogaed and Dayao what their bags
contained. Cogaed and Dayao told SPO1 Taracatac that they did not know since they were
transporting the bags as a favor. their barrio mate named Marvin, After this exchange, Cogaed
opened the blue bag, revealing three bricks of what looked like marijuana. The Court, in that
case, invalidated the search and seizure ruling that there were no suspicious circumstances that
preceded the arrest. Also, in Cogaed, there was a discussion of various jurisprudence wherein
the Court adjudged that there was no valid stop-and-frisk:

The circumstances of this case are analogous to People v. Aruta. In that case, an informant
told the police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio City by
bus. At the bus terminal, the police officers prepared themselves. The informant pointed at a
woman crossing the street and identified her as "Aling Rosa." The police apprehended "Aling
Rosa," and they alleged that she allowed them to look inside her bag. The bag contained
marijuana leaves.

In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal. There were no
suspicious circumstances that preceded Aruta's arrest and the subsequent search and seizure.
It was only the informant that prompted the police to apprehend her. The evidence obtained
was not admissible because of the illegal search. Consequently, Aruta was acquitted.

Aruta is almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not the police's
informant, who informed the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."

The facts in Aruta are also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin. Here, the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as somebody possessing

P a g e | 129
drugs. The NBI waited for the vessel to arrive and accosted Aminnudin while he was
disembarking from a boat. Like in the case at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudin's bag and
found bundles of what turned out to be marijuana leaves. The court declared that the search
and seizure were illegal. Aminnudin was acquitted.

xxxx

People v. Chua also presents almost the same circumstances. In this case, the police had been
receiving information that the accused was distributing drugs in "different karaoke bars in
Angeles City." One night, the police received information that this drug dealer would be
dealing drugs at the Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a stakeout. A car "arrived and
parked" at the hotel. The informant told the police that the man parked at the hotel was dealing
drugs. The man alighted from his car. He was carrying a juice box. The police immediately
apprehended him and discovered live ammunition and drugs in his person and the juice box
he was holding.

Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about Chua's situation
when the police apprehended him and ruled that "[t]here was no valid 'stop-and-
frisk'."(citations omitted)

The Court finds that the totality of the circumstances, in this case, is not sufficient to incite a
genuine reason that would justify a stop-and-frisk search on accused-appellant. An
examination of the records reveals that no overt physical act could be properly attributed to
the accused-appellant as to arouse suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers that he had
just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime.

xxx

In his dissent from Esquillo v. People,[27] Justice Lucas P. Bersamin emphasizes that there
should be "presence of more than one seemingly innocent activity from which, taken together,
warranted a reasonable inference of criminal activity." This principle was subsequently
recognized in the recent cases of Cogaed[28] and Sanchez v. People[29] In the case at bar, the
accused appellant was just a passenger carrying his bag. There is nothing suspicious much less
criminal in said act. Moreover, such circumstance, by itself, could not have led the arresting
officers to believe that the accused-appellant was in possession of marijuana.

xxx

As regards search incidental to a lawful arrest, it is worth emphasizing that a lawful arrest must
precede the search of a person and his belongings; the process cannot be reversed.[30] Thus,
it becomes imperative to determine whether the accused-appellants warrantless arrest was
valid.

xxx

Here, without the tip provided by the confidential informant, the accused-appellant could not
be said to have executed any overt act in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officers which would indicate that he was committing the crime of illegal possession of
marijuana. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the accused-appellant had just committed an offense. Again, without the tipped information,
the accused-appellant would just have been any other bus passenger who was minding his own
business and eager to reach his destination. It must be remembered that warrantless arrests
are mere exceptions to the constitutional right of a person against unreasonable searches and
seizures, thus, they must be strictly construed against the government and its agents. While the
campaign against the proliferation of illegal drugs is indeed a noble objective, the same must
be conducted in a manner that does not trample upon well-established constitutional rights.
Truly, the end does not justify the means.

P a g e | 130
xxx

Warrantless search and seizure of moving vehicles are allowed in recognition of the
impracticability of securing a warrant under said circumstances as the vehicle can be quickly
moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. Peace officers
in such cases, however, are limited to routine checks where the examination of the vehicle is
limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search,
such would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers made it upon probable cause,
i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of circumstances known to the seizing officer, that
an automobile or other vehicle contains [an] item, article or object which by law is subject to
seizure and destruction.

The search in this case, however, could not be classified as a search of a moving vehicle. In
this particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and not a specific person. Further, in
search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was intentionally used as a means to transport illegal
items. It is worthy to note that the information relayed to the police officers was that a
passenger of that particular bus was carrying marijuana such that when the police officers
boarded the bus, they searched the bag of the person matching the description given by their
informant and not the cargo or contents of the said bus. Moreover, in this case, it just so
happened that the alleged drug courier was a bus passenger. To extend to such breadth the
scope of searches on moving vehicles would open the floodgates to unbridled warrantless
searches which can be conducted by the mere expedient of waiting for the target person to
ride a motor vehicle, setting up a checkpoint along the route of that vehicle, and then stopping
such vehicle when it arrives at the checkpoint to search the target person.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v EVANGELINE ABELLA Y SEDEGO AND MAE

ANN SENDIONG
THIRD DIVISION [ G.R. No. 213918, June 27, 2018 ]

MARTIRES, J.:

The fact is underscored that Tubio testified on what had transpired when he bought shabu
from the accused appellants. Notwithstanding that not one of the members of the buy-bust
team was beside Tubio during the transaction, the record will confirm that the members were
just seven meters away from him and the accused appellants, thus, were able to witness the
transaction. To stress, Tubio's narration before the RTC coincides with that of the buy-bust
team. Additionally, the presence of a police officer beside the poseur-buyer is neither an
element of Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 nor a requirement to secure the conviction of the
accused appellants. More importantly, Sec. 5, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 does not even prescribe
that the poseur-buyer should be a police officer.

LAMBERTO MARIÑAS Y FERNANDO v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

SECOND DIVISION [ G.R. No. 232891, July 23, 2018 ]

REYES, JR., J:

ACQUITTED

The petitioner was caught in flagrante delicto. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court lists the situations when a person may be arrested without a warrant, thus:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:

a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense[.]

P a g e | 131
xxxx

Paragraph (a) of Section 5 is commonly known as an in flagrante delicto arrest. For a

warrantless arrest of an accused caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must
concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act
is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. [18]

All the foregoing requirements for a lawful search and seizure are present in this case.
The police officers had prior justification to be at the petitioner's place as they were conducting
a follow-up operation on carnapping incidents in the area when they chanced upon the
petitioner standing by, holding a plastic sachet containing suspected illegal drugs; when they
approached petitioner and upon introducing themselves as police officers, petitioner ran away.
As the crystalline substance was visible, the police officers were justified in seizing them.
Simply put, when the arresting officers arrested the petitioner and confiscated the subject's
sachet of drugs, they did so under a lawful warrantless arrest and seizure.

DOMINGO AGYAO MACAD @ AGPAD v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

THIRD DIVISION [ G.R. No. 227366, August 01, 2018 ]

GESMUNDO, J.:

CONVICTION AFFIRMED

Facts:
In the afternoon of November 27, 2011, PO1 Davies Falolo (PO1 Falolo), who was not on
duty, boarded a Bing Bush bus bound for Bontoc, Mountain Province. He sat on the top of
the bus as it was full. At Botbot, the petitioner boarded the bus. He threw his carton baggage
over to PO1 Falolo. Petitioner, also carrying a Sagada woven bag, then sat on top of the bus,
two (2) meters away from PO1 Falolo.

When the petitioner threw his carton box, PO1 Falolo already suspected that it contained
marijuana because of its distinct smell and irregular shape. He was also dubious of the Sagada
woven bag that the petitioner had because it was supposed to be oval but it was rectangular.
PO1 Falolo planned to inform other police officers at the barracks but he was unable to do
so because he ran out of load to send a text message.

Upon reaching Bontoc, the petitioner alighted at Caluttit, while PO1 Falolo went down at the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Compound to buy load for his cellular
phone. Unable to find any store selling load, PO1 Falolo hailed a tricycle and asked to be
brought to Caluttit. PO1 Falolo is seated at the back of the driver. When the tricycle arrived
at Caluttit, the petitioner was still there and hailed and rode inside the same tricycle, with PO1
Falolo still seated behind the driver.

When the tricycle reached the Community Police Assistance Center (COMPAC) circle, PO1
Falolo stopped the tricycle and called SPO2 Gaspar Suagen (SPO2 Suagen), who was then on
duty. While SPO2 Suagen approached them, PO1 Falolo asked the petitioner if he could open
his baggage, to which the latter replied in the affirmative. However, the petitioner suddenly
ran away from the tricycle towards the Pines Kitchenette. Both police officers ran after him
and apprehended him in front of Sta. Rita Parish Church. Petitioner was then handcuffed and
he, together with his baggage, was brought to the Municipal Police Station.

At the police station, the baggage of the petitioner was opened and these revealed eleven (11)
bricks of marijuana from the carton baggage and six (6) bricks of marijuana from the Sagada
woven bag. The seized items were marked, photographed, and inventoried in the presence of
the petitioner, the barangay chairman, a prosecutor and a media representative. The bricks

P a g e | 132
from the carton baggage weighed 10.1 kilograms; while the bricks from the Sagada woven bag
weighed 5.9 kilograms. The items were brought to the Regional Crime Laboratory Office for
a forensic examination, which yielded a positive result for marijuana.

Held:
In warrantless arrests made under Section 5 (a), Rule 113, two (2) elements must concur,
namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act
is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section
5 (b), Rule 113 requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact
just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the accused had committed it.

In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense
is essential. Under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b) of the same, he knows for a fact that
a crime has just been committed.

A valid warrantless arrest that justifies a subsequent search is carried out under the parameters
of Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which requires that the apprehending officer
must have been spurred by probable cause to arrest a person caught in flagrante delicto. To
be sure, the term probable cause has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
Specifically, concerning arrests, it is such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested. In this light, the determination of the existence or absence of
probable cause necessitates a re-examination of the factual incidents. Accordingly, after a valid
warrantless arrest is effected, the officer may also conduct a valid warrantless search, which is
incidental to such an arrest.

Aside from a search incident leading to a lawful arrest, warrantless searches have also been
upheld in cases involving a moving vehicle. The search of moving vehicles has been justified
on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be
searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.

A search of a moving vehicle may either be a mere routine inspection or an extensive search.
The search is a routine inspection is limited to the following instances: (1) where the officer
merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fairgrounds;
(2) simply looks into a vehicle; (3) flashes a light therein without opening the car's doors; (4)
where the occupants are not subjected to a physical or body search; (5) where the inspection
of the vehicles is limited to a visual search or visual inspection; and (6) where the routine check
is conducted in a fixed area.

On the other hand, an extensive search of a moving vehicle is only permissible when there is
probable cause. When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search has been held to be valid only as long as the officers searching have
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the instrumentality
or evidence about a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.

This Court has in the past found probable cause to conduct without a judicial warrant an
extensive search of moving vehicles in situations where (1) there had emanated from a package
the distinctive smell of marijuana; (2) officers of the Philippine National Police (PNP) had
received a confidential report from informers that a sizeable volume of marijuana would be
transported along the route where the search was conducted; (3) [police officers] had received
information that a Caucasian coming from Sagada, Mountain Province, had in his possession
prohibited drugs and when the Narcom agents confronted the accused Caucasian, because of
a conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed to present his passport and other identification

P a g e | 133
papers when requested to do so; (4) [police officers] had received confidential information
that a woman having the same physical appearance as that of the accused would be
transporting marijuana; (5) the accused who were riding a jeepney were stopped and searched
by policemen who had earlier received confidential reports that said accused would transport
a large quantity of marijuana; and (6) where the moving vehicle was stopped and searched on
the basis of intelligence information and clandestine reports by a deep penetration agent or
spy - one who participated in the drug smuggling activities of the syndicate to which the
accused belonged - that said accused were bringing prohibited drugs into the country.

In People v. Claudio, a police officer rode a bus with the accused therein from Baguio City to
Olongapo City. The officer noticed that the accused was acting suspiciously with her woven
buri bag. While in transit, the officer inserted his finger in the buri bag and smelled marijuana.
However, the officer did not do anything after he discovered that there was marijuana inside
the bag of the accused until they reached Olongapo City. Right after the accused alighted from
the bus, the officer apprehended her and brought her to the police station. There, a search on
the bag of the accused yielded marijuana. In that case, the Court ruled that the officer had
probable cause to conduct a valid warrantless arrest and make a warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest.

In People v. Vinecario, the accused therein were onboard a motorcycle when they sped past a
checkpoint and the officers ordered them to return. Upon their return, the officers required
them to produce their identification cards, but they failed to comply. The officers noticed that
the accused were acting suspiciously with the military bag they were carrying because it was
passed from one person to another. The officers then ordered one of the accused to open the
bag. When the latter opened it, a package wrapped in paper was taken out and when one of
the accused grabbed it, the wrapper was tom and the smell of marijuana wafted in the air.
Thereafter, the accused were arrested and the items were confiscated. In that case, the Court
ruled that there was probable cause to conduct an extensive search because of the numerous
circumstances indicating that accused were offenders of the law.

In this case, the Court finds that PO1 Falolo had probable cause to believe that petitioner was
carrying marijuana in his baggage.

Petitioner hailed the same bus that PO1 Falolo was riding on the way to Bontoc, Mountain
Province. He then threw his carton baggage to PO1 Falolo who was then seated on the roof
and was toting a Sagada woven bag as well. Immediately, PO1 Falolo smelled the distinct scent
of marijuana emanating from the carton baggage and noticed its irregular shape. He also
noticed that the Sagada woven bag of the petitioner was rectangular instead of an oval and,
upon touching it, he noticed that it was hard.

Accordingly, PO1 Falolo had probable cause that petitiOner was committing the crime of
transporting dangerous drugs, specifically marijuana bricks, due to the unique scent of
marijuana emanating from the bag and the unusual shapes and hardness of the baggage. As
PO1 Falolo was not in uniform at that time, he intended to inform his colleagues at the PHQ
Barracks to conduct a checkpoint so that they could verify his suspicion about the transport
of illegal drugs.[30] As seen in his testimony, PO1 Falolo already had probable cause to
conduct an extensive search of a moving vehicle because he believed before the search that
he and his colleagues would find instrumentality or evidence about a crime, particularly
transportation of marijuana, in the vehicle to be searched.

However, PO1 Falolo discovered that his load was insufficient to make a phone call. Thus,
without the back-up of his colleagues, he chose to remain vigilant of the petitioner until he
could contact them. When the bus reached Bontoc, the petitioner alighted in lower Caluttit.
On the other hand, PO1 Falolo alighted in front of the DPWH Compound, which was not
more than a kilometer away from lower Caluttit, to look for cellphone load to contact his
colleagues. When he failed to find a load for his phone, PO1 Falolo immediately boarded a
tricycle back to lower Caluttit and sat at the back of the driver.

P a g e | 134
There, PO1 Falolo chanced upon the petitioner, who boarded the same tricycle and sat inside.
When the tricycle reached the COMPAC, PO1 Falolo stopped the tricycle and called SPO2
Suagen, who was on duty. He then asked the petitioner if he could check his baggage and the
latter answered in the affirmative. However, when the petitioner saw SPO2 Suagen
approaching the tricycle, he suddenly ran away towards the Pizza Kitchenette and left his
baggage.

At that moment, PO1 Falolo also acquired probable cause to conduct a warrantless arrest on
the petitioner. There were numerous circumstances and overt acts which show that PO1
Falolo had probable cause to effect the said warrantless arrest: (1) the smell of marijuana
emanating from the carton baggage; (2) the irregular shape of the baggage; (3) the hardness of
the baggage; (4) the assent of the petitioner in the inspection of his baggage but running away
at the sight of SPO2 Suagen; and (5) leaving behind his baggage to avoid the police officers.

Petitioner's flight at the sight of the uniformed police officer and leaving behind his baggage
are overt acts, which reinforce the finding of probable cause to conduct a warrantless arrest
against him. The Court has held that the flight of an accused is competent evidence to indicate
his guilt; and flight, when unexplained, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may
be drawn. Indeed, the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the innocent are as bold as lion.

Based on these facts, PO1 Falolo had probable cause to believe that there was a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant
a cautious man's belief that the petitioner is guilty of the offense charged. Petitioner was caught
in flagrante delicto of transporting marijuana bricks by PO1 Falolo.

Consequently, when PO1 Falolo and SPO2 Suagen captured the petitioner in front of the St.
Rita Parish Church, they had probable cause to arrest him and bring him and his baggage to
the police station. There, the police officers properly conducted a search of the petitioner's
baggage, which is an incident to a lawful arrest. Indeed, numerous devious circumstances
surround the incident, from the time petitioner boarded the bus until he was caught after
fleeing at the sight of the police officer, which constitutes as probable cause to arrest him and
to conduct the warrantless search incidental to such lawful arrest.

As properly discussed by the RTC, it was reasonable for PO1 Falolo not to immediately arrest
the petitioner. PO1 Falolo was not on duty and was not in uniform when he smelled the
pungent odor of marijuana from the baggage of the petitioner. They were in a crowded bus
and any commotion therein may cause panic to the civilian passengers. Further, it was not
shown that PO1 Falolo was carrying handcuffs, thus, he may not be able to single-handedly
restrain the petitioner. Moreover, the Court finds that it was sensible for PO1 Falolo to wait
for back-up as the petitioner could be carrying a dangerous weapon to protect his two large
bags of suspected marijuana.

When he saw the petitioner disembark from the bus in lower Caluttit, PO1 Falolo did not
immediately follow him; rather, PO1 Falolo disembarked in front of the DPWH. The RTC
underscored that the proximity of the said place was not more than a kilometer away from
lower Caluttit.[34] Thus, when PO1 Falolo failed to find a load for his cellular phone, he was
able to reach lower Caluttit immediately onboard a tricycle and was able to chance upon
petitioner due to the proximity of their positions. Manifestly, PO1 Falolo's acts showed that
he clung to his determination of probable cause to conduct an extensive search on the baggage
of the petitioner. When PO1 Falolo saw his colleague SPO2 Suagen in the COMPAC, he
decided that it was safe and reasonable to search and immediately asked permission from the
petitioner to examine his baggage.

Nevertheless, when the petitioner suddenly ran away from the tricycle while SPO2 Suagen was
approaching and left his baggage behind, PO1 Falolo also obtained probable cause to conduct
a warrantless arrest. He was earnest in his probable cause that the petitioner was committing
a crime in flagrante delicto, thus, PO1 Falolo religiously pursued him until he was arrested and
his baggage eventually searched as an incident thereof.

P a g e | 135
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v JIMBOY SUICO Y ACOPE
FIRST DIVISION [ G.R. No. 229940, September 10, 2018 ]

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

CONVICTION AFFIRMED

When to question the validity of arrest; Effect of failure to timely raise the issue

At the outset, it should be emphasized that the appellant can no longer question the legality
of his arrest which should have been raised in a motion to quash the Information filed before
his arraignment. When he failed to file such a motion, the appellant was deemed to have
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court which precluded him from questioning
the legality of his arrest.

Probable cause to conduct warrantless search and seizure

In any event, the arrest of the appellant and the incidental search and seizure of the appellant's
backpack and a sack containing marijuana were both valid. The arresting team, in this case,
was tasked to man a checkpoint in Purok 12, Poblacion, Cabanglasan, Bukidnon in the
implementation of a "no plate, no travel" policy. PINSP Naelga received information that a
person carrying a backpack and yellow sack suspected of containing marijuana was riding a
red with black and gray combination Motorstar motorcycle and was bound for Poblacion.
When the motorcycle approached the checkpoint, the driver (appellant) immediately made a
u-turn and fell from the motorcycle. Appellant then attempted to run but one of the police
officers, PO1 Berdon, managed to grab and get a hold of the backpack and yellow sack of
appellant. Upon the request of the arresting officers, the appellant opened the backpack while
admitting that what was inside was dried marijuana. The arresting officers saw two bundles of
dried marijuana inside the backpack and another two bundles of dried marijuana in the yellow
sack. The arresting officers thereafter apprised the appellant of his legal rights and brought the
appellant and the illegal drugs to the police station.

Normally, "searches and seizures are x x x unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued
search warrant or warrant of arrest." However, searches incidental to lawful arrests, as in this
case, are allowed even without a warrant. As correctly ruled by both the lower courts, the
police officers had probable cause to justify the belief that the appellant was an offender of
the law and that the contents of the backpack and sack he was carrying were instruments of
an offense not only in light of the confidential tip they received from an informant but also
because of appellant's peculiar acts of making a sudden u-turn before reaching the checkpoint
and attempting to run when the motorcycle he was driving crashed. Indeed, the arresting
officers were impelled to effect the arrest and seizure because of probable cause. Given that
the search was valid, the arrest was likewise lawful because it was made upon the discovery of
the prohibited drug in the appellant's possession.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V. MONICA JIMENEZ Y

DELGADO
THIRD DIVISION [ G.R. No. 230721, October 15, 2018 ]

PERALTA, J.:

ACQUITTED

Buy-bust operation is a legitimate, valid entrapment operation

P a g e | 136
The argument of the appellant that the arresting officers illegally arrested her, because they did
not have with them any warrant of arrest nor a search warrant, does not deserve any merit.
Buy-bust operations are legally sanctioned procedures for apprehending drug peddlers and
distributors. These operations are often utilized by law enforcers to trap and capture
lawbreakers in the execution of their nefarious activities. There is no textbook method of
conducting buy-bust operations. Prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not necessary,
especially where the police operatives are accompanied by their informant during the
entrapment. Hence, the said the buy-bust operation is a legitimate, valid entrapment operation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v NESTOR ABADILLA Y VERGARA

SECOND DIVISION [ G.R. No. 232496, October 08, 2018 ]

REYES, A., JR., J.:

ACQUITTED

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment

In a series of jurisprudence, the Court has repeatedly held that a buy-bust operation is "a form
of entrapment, in which the violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers
conducting the operation are not only authorized but duty-bound to apprehend the violator
and to search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the
crime."

As discussed in People v. Agulay, it is a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug

pushers, viz.:

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted as a
valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to
commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to
commit the offense. If carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a
buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v EANNA O'COCHLAIN

THIRD DIVISION [ G.R. No. 229071, December 10, 2018 ]

PERALTA, J.:

CONVICTION AFFIRMED

Airport screening search is a constitutionally reasonable administrative search

The search and seizure of an illegal drug during a routine airport inspection made under the
aviation security procedures have been sustained by this Court in several cases. In the leading
case of People v. Johnson, we held:

Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their
persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased
concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the
nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass through
metal detectors; their carry-on baggage, as well as checked luggage, are routinely
subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious

P a g e | 137
 objects, physical searches is conducted to determine what the objects are. There is
little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness,
the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations
associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport
public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject
to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be
subject to seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary
constitutional protections against warrantless searches and seizures do not apply to
routine airport procedures.

Warrantless searches and seizures

Thus, while the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed by Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, a routine security check being conducted in air and seaports has been a
recognized exception. This is in addition to a string of jurisprudence ruling that search and
seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be
admissible in the following instances: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a
moving motor vehicle; (3) customs search; (4) seizure of evidence in "plain view"; (5)
consented warrantless search; (6) "stop and frisk" search; and (7) exigent and emergency
circumstance.

Limitations of airport routine check

The Office of Transportation Security under the Department of Transportation and its
predecessors has been primarily mandated to ensure civil aviation security. To be precise, the
OTS is tasked to implement Annex 17 of the ICAO Convention on aviation security which
seeks to safeguard civil aviation and its facilities against acts of unlawful interference, which
include but are not limited to:

• unlawful seizure of aircraft,

• destruction of an aircraft in service,

• hostage-taking on board aircraft or aerodromes,

• forcible intrusion on board an aircraft, at an airport, or on the premises of an

aeronautical facility,

• introduction on board an aircraft or at an airport of a weapon or hazardous device or

material intended for criminal purposes,

• use of an aircraft in service to cause death, serious bodily injury, or serious damage to
property or the environment,

• communication of false information such as to jeopardize the safety of an aircraft in

flight or on the ground, of passengers, crew, ground personnel, or the general public,
at an airport or on the premises of a civil aviation facility.

Among others, the OTS has to enforce R.A. No. 6235 or the Anti--Hijacking Law. It provides
that an airline passenger and his hand-carried luggage are subject to search for, and seizure of,
prohibited materials or substances and that it is unlawful for any person, natural or juridical,
to ship, load, or carry in any passenger aircraft, operating as a public utility within the
Philippines, any explosive, flammable, corrosive or poisonous substance or material.

P a g e | 138
It is in the context of air safety-related justifications, therefore, that routine airport security
searches and seizures are considered permissible under Section 2, Article III of the
Constitution.

Search that is deliberate and with a conscious effort to discover an illegal drug is not authorized under this
exception

Airport search is reasonable when limited in scope to the object of the Anti-Hijacking
program, not the war on illegal drugs. Unlike a routine search where a prohibited drug
was found by chance, a search on the person of the passenger or his personal
belongings in a deliberate and conscious effort to discover an illegal drug is not
authorized under the exception to the warrant and probable cause requirement. The
Court is not empowered to suspend constitutional guarantees so that the government may
more effectively wage a "war on drugs." If that war is to be fought, those who fight it must
respect the rights of individuals, whether or not those individuals are suspected of having
committed a crime.

Waiver of the Constitutional right against unreasonable searched and seizures; Consented warrantless search

The constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right that
may be waived. A person may voluntarily consent to have government officials conduct a
search or seizure that would otherwise be barred by the Constitution. Like the Fourth
Amendment, Section 2, Article III of the Constitution does not proscribe voluntary
cooperation.

To constitute a waiver, it must first appear that the right exists; secondly, that the person
involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and, lastly,
that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

Lack of objection to the search and seizure is not tantamount to a waiver of constitutional
right or voluntary submission to the warrantless search and seizure. Even when security agents
obtain a passenger's express assent to a search, this assent ordinarily will not constitute a valid
"consent" if the attendant circumstances will establish nothing more than acquiescence to
apparent lawful authority.

Valid consented warrantless search

A person's "consent to a [warrantless] search, to be voluntary, must be unequivocal, specific

and intelligently given, [and] uncontaminated by any duress or coercion[.]" The question of
whether consent to a search was "voluntary" or was the product of duress or coercion, express
or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances.

Relevant to this determination are the following characteristics of the person giving consent
and the environment in which consent is given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2) whether [he]
was in a public or a secluded location; (3) whether [he] objected to the search or passively
looked on; (4) the education and intelligence of the defendant; (5) the presence of coercive
police procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence [will] be found; (7)
the nature of the police questioning; (8) the environment in which the questioning took place;
and (9) the possibly vulnerable subjective state of the person consenting.

Consent to a search is not to be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence.
The government bears the burden of proving "consent."

Test to determine a valid consent

Whether a reasonable person would have felt free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise
terminate the encounter applies equally to police encounters that take place on trains, planes,

P a g e | 139
and city streets. "Consent" that is the product of official intimidation or harassment is not
consent at all.

Consented Search; Subsequent warrantless arrest was effected upon the discovery and recovery of an illegal drug
in his person in flagrante delicto

In this case, the Court finds that there is a valid warrantless search based on express consent.
When SSO Suguitan requested to conduct a pat-down search on Eanna, the latter readily
agreed. Record is devoid of any evidence that he manifested objection or hesitation on the
body search. The request to frisk him was orally articulated to him in such language that left
no room for doubt that he fully understood what was requested. Unperturbed, he verbally
replied to the request demonstrating that he also understood the nature and consequences of
the request. He voluntarily raised his hands by stretching sideward to the level of his shoulders
with palms open. His affirmative reply and action cannot be viewed as merely an implied
acquiescence or passive conformity to an authority considering that SSO Suguitan is not even
a police officer and cannot be said to have acted with a coercive or intimidating stance. Further,
it is reasonable to assume that Eanna is an educated and intelligent man. He is a 53-year old
working professional (claimed to be employed or attached to a drug addiction center) and a
well-traveled man (said to have been in 22 different countries and spent hours in customs).
Indubitably, he knew, actually or constructively, his right against unreasonable searches or that
he intentionally conceded the same. Having been obtained through a valid warrantless search,
the sticks of marijuana are admissible in evidence against him. Corollary, his subsequent arrest,
although likewise without a warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and
recovery of an illegal drug in his person in flagrante delicto.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v BILLY ACOSTA

SECOND DIVISION [ G.R. No. 238865, January 28, 2019 ]

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

ACQUITTED; Marijuana plantation

Plain View, requisites

One of the recognized exceptions to the need for a warrant before a search may be effected
is when the "plain view" doctrine is applicable. In People v. Lagman, this Court laid down the
following parameters for its application":

Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view
are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The
'plain view' doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position
from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view
is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer
must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across
a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and
its discovery inadvertent. (Emphases supplied)

Not plain view when the discovery was not inadvertent

In People v. Valdez, the Court held that the "plain view" doctrine cannot apply if the officers
are actually "searching" for evidence against the accused, to wit:

Note further that the police team was dispatched to the appellant's kaingin precisely
to search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view"

P a g e | 140
 applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. Their
discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note the
testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to "look around
the area" before they could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized marijuana
plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed.
In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or "open to eye
and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply. (Emphases
supplied)

In this case, the police officers proceeded with the arrest of Acosta for the mauling incident
armed with prior knowledge that he was also illegally planting marijuana. Thus, when the police
officers proceeded to Acosta's abode, they were already alerted to the fact that there could
be marijuana plants in the area. This belies the argument that the discovery of the plants
was inadvertent.

Verily, it could not be gainsaid that the discovery was inadvertent when the police officers
already knew that there could be marijuana plants in the area. Armed with such knowledge,
they would naturally be more circumspect in their observations. In effect, they proceeded to
Acosta's abode, not only to arrest him for the mauling incident but also to verify Salucana's
report that Acosta was illegally planting marijuana. Thus, the second requisite for the "plain
view" doctrine is absent. Considering that the "plain view" doctrine is inapplicable to the
present case, the seized marijuana plants are inadmissible in evidence against Acosta for being
fruits of the poisonous tree.

SIMEON LAPI Y MAHIPUS v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

THIRD DIVISION [ G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019 ]

LEONEN, J.:

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; Sec. 15, RA 9165

When to contest the validity of an arrest

The right to question the validity of an arrest may be waived if the accused, assisted by counsel,
fails to object to its validity before arraignment.

Bacolod City Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation Task Group conducted a stake-out
operation in Purok Sigay, Barangay 2, Bacolod City. During the operation, the police officer
heard noises from one of the houses. He "peeped through its window" and saw Lapi, Sacare,
and Lim "having a pot session." Then, another police officer "peeked into the adjacent
room" and saw that the pot session was ongoing. He entered the room and introduced himself
as a police officer. Lapi, Sacare, and Lim tried to escape but were caught.

Having been arrested and their paraphernalia seized, the men were then brought to the City
Anti-Illegal Drug Special Operation Task Group Office, where a police blotter was filed. They
were later brought to the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory to undergo drug tests.
The laboratory report found that Lapi, Sacare, and Lim tested positive for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu).

Petitioner argues that his warrantless arrest was illegal since the police had to peep through
the window to ascertain that something illegal was occurring. However, the petitioner admits
that he failed to question the validity of his arrest before arraignment. He did not move to
quash the Information against him before entering his plea. He was assisted by counsel when
he entered his plea. Likewise, he was able to present his evidence.

Held:

P a g e | 141
The Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the
procedure for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must
be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. We have also
ruled that an accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest if he fails to
move for the quashing of the information against him before his arraignment. And since the
legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused,
any defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed cured when he voluntarily submits to
the jurisdiction of the trial court. We have also held in several cases that the illegal arrest of an
accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient
complaint after a trial free from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction
of the accused.

Herein, the accused-appellant went into arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, he actively participated in his trial. He raised the additional issue of irregularity of
his arrest only during his appeal to this Court. He is, therefore, deemed to have waived such
alleged defect by submitting himself to the jurisdiction of the court by his counsel-assisted
plea during his arraignment; by his actively participating in the trial, and by not objecting to
his arraignment.

It is much too late in the day to complain about the warrantless arrest after valid information
has been filed, the accused arraigned, trial commenced and completed, and a judgment of
conviction rendered against him.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v SIEGFREDO OBIAS, JR., Y ARROYO A.K.A.

"BOBOY"
FIRST DIVISION [ G.R. No. 222187, March 25, 2019 ]

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

CONVICTION AFFIRMED; Search Warrant

Implementation of a search warrant

Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court cautions that:

Section. 8. The search of a house, room, or any other premises to be made in presence of two
witnesses - No search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made except in the
presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or the absence of the
latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.

Thus, to be reasonable and valid, the search must be witnessed primarily by the lawful
occupant of the place or any member of his family. It is only in their absence, that two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion and who are residents of the place searched, may be
witnesses to the search. The order of preference cannot be disregarded, interchanged, or
intercalated.

Police officers were roaming around the house and its surroundings

Indeed, some members of the raiding team were roaming around the house and its
surroundings. However, the appellant failed to present any evidence that, in so doing, they
were searching for incriminating evidence. The evidence showed that they were patrolling the
area to secure the same against the possible escape of the persons earlier rounded up. It must
be noted that the actual search did not commence until after the arrival of Barangay Captain
Baldemoro, the media representatives, and Assistant City Prosecutor Joveliza P. Soriano.

Ownership of the place searched where the illegal items were found; Actual Possession; Constructive Possession

P a g e | 142
It remains unrefuted that, at the time of the search, the appellant was the owner and possessor
of the rest house based on established facts and evidence. As the owner of the cock farm and
the rest house, the appellant had full control and dominion over all the rooms located therein,
including the bedroom where the thing seized were located. Possession, under the law,
includes not only actual possession but also constructive possession. Actual possession exists
when the drug is in the immediate possession or control of the accused. On the other hand,
constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused
or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it [was] found.
Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his
right to exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located is shared
with another.

"The finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a house or building owned or occupied by a
particular person raises the presumption of knowledge and possession thereof which, standing
alone, is sufficient to convict." In the present case, the appellant failed to rebut by sufficient
evidence that he did not exercise power and control over the place searched and the items
seized and that he did not intend to do so. Appellant also failed to adduce evidence that he
was authorized by law to possess the same.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v EDUARDO CARIÑO Y LEYVA

FIRST DIVISION [ G.R. No. 234155, March 25, 2019 ]

GESMUNDO, J.:

ACQUITTED; Drug Den

Valid warrantless arrest

In warrantless arrests made under Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements must concur, namely:
(a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in
the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. A valid warrantless arrest under the
parameters of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court requires that the apprehending
officer must have been spurred by probable cause to arrest a person caught in flagrante delicto.
To be sure, the term probable cause has been understood to mean a reasonable ground of
suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.

Application of the Plain View Doctrine

Objects sighted in plain view by an officer who has a right to be in a position to have that view
are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The
"plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position
from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer
must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he inadvertently comes across
a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and
its discovery inadvertent.

Invalid warrantless arrest

In this case, the appellant was not doing anything beforehand when he was arrested by SPO2
Navarro. Certainly, it does not satisfy the elements of a valid warrantless arrest under Section

P a g e | 143
5(a) of Rule 113 because SPO2 Navarro had no probable cause before the arrest that the
appellant was committing or had just committed the crime of maintenance of a drug den. It
was only after his arrest that SPO2 Navarro purportedly saw the drugs being used inside the
appellant's house. Again, the finding of probable cause cannot apply after the warrantless arrest
had been made.

Notably, Mallari (police officer who saw that drugs were being used inside the appellant's
house during the surveillance operation) could have established the overt act that drugs were
being used inside the appellant's house before the arrest. xxx Thus, it could not be determined
from the records whether the requisites of the plain view search were complied with against
the appellant's alleged crime of maintenance of a drug den. The validity of the plain view search
is crucial since it will determine whether the police officers conducted a valid warrantless
search and arrest against the appellant and his house. The prosecution did not give any
justification for its failure to present Mallari as a witness. xxx

Lamentably, Mallari was not presented as a witness by the prosecution, thus, the facts and
circumstances that would create probable cause to arrest the appellant could not be
determined. The Court cannot make guesswork whether Mallari truly had probable cause to
justify the warrantless arrest of the appellant by SPO2 Navarro.

Fruit of the poisonous tree

The questionable and invalid arrest thus makes the subsequent search in the house of the
appellant also invalid, the exclusionary rule or the doctrine of the fruit of the poisonous tree
applies. According to this rule, once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been
unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also
inadmissible. Stated otherwise, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the
illegal act; whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act.
The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence,
but it is equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained
by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained
evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.

In this case, the primary source is the appellant, who was arrested illegally without probable
cause. Thus, all secondary or derivative evidence drawn from the arrest of the appellant is also
inadmissible as evidence, including those seized from the search inside his house.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v LUISITO CARTINA Y GARCIA, ALLAN JEPEZ Y

TUSCANO AND NELSON RAMOS, JR. Y CARTINA
FIRST DIVISION [ G.R. No. 226152, March 13, 2019 ]

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

ACQUITTED

Stop and Frisk

Indeed, a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise,
it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding. Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions, one of which is
during a stop and frisk situation.

In Sanchez v. People, a stop and frisk was defined and elucidated, thus:

P a g e | 144
x x x as the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him
for a weapon(s) or contraband. The police officer should properly introduce himself and make
initial inquiries, approach and restrain a person who manifests unusual and suspicious conduct,
in other to check the latter's outer clothing for possibly concealed weapons. The apprehending
police officer must have a genuine reason, by the police officer's experience and the
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person to be held has weapons (or
contraband) concealed about him. It should therefore be emphasized that a search and seizure
should precede the arrest for this principle to apply.

In the case under review, sufficient facts engendered in the minds of the police officers that
Jepez and Ramos, Jr. was in the act of committing a crime. Consider the following instances:
the police officers were on a mission to entrap Cartina who was verified to be engaged in
selling illegal drugs; Jepez and Ramos, Jr. was with Cartina when the officers saw the latter at
the target area; when the poseur-buyer introduced himself as a MAD AC operative, the duo
immediately fled from the scene; and when they were subdued, they were searched and each
was found in possession of a plastic sachet containing suspected shabu. Indubitably, Jepez and
Ramos, Jr. was then illegally committing the crime of possession of dangerous drugs in the
presence of the police officers. The seized items were therefore admissible in evidence.

MARLON DOMINGUEZ Y ARGANA v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

SECOND DIVISION [ G.R. No. 235898, March 13, 2019 ]

CAGUIOA, J:

ACQUITTED

Warrantless arrest; in flagrante delicto, elements

For an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto, two elements must concur, namely: (a) the person
to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer. The officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the
commission of an offense is absolutely required. The officer himself must witness the crime.

When to raise the issue of the validity of an arrest

Well settled is the rule that an accused is estopped from assailing the legality of his arrest if he
failed to move to quash the information against him before his arraignment. Any objection
involving the arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the
person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is
deemed waived. Even in the instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a
jurisdictional defect, and an objection thereto is waived where the person arrested submits to
arraignment without objection.

Effect of waiver to timely question the validity of arrest on the evidence seized during the arrest

However, this waiver to question an illegal arrest only affects the jurisdiction of the court over
his person. It is well-settled that a waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it
a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.

Validity of warrantless arrest; plain view

The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position
from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is
inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be
evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer

P a g e | 145
must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across
a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and
its discovery inadvertent.

In the case at hand, while it can be said that the presence of the police officers was legitimate
as they were patrolling the area and that discovery of the plastic sachet was inadvertent, it
should be emphasized that, as to the third requisite, it was not apparent that such plastic sachet
is evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure. To recall, when SPO1
Parchaso saw Dominguez, he only saw that Dominguez was holding a very small plastic sachet.
To the Court's mind, a very small plastic sachet is not readily apparent as evidence
incriminating Dominguez, such that it can be seized without a warrant. A very small plastic
sachet can contain just about anything. It could even be just that — a very small plastic sachet
— and nothing more.

Although laboratory results later showed that the plastic sachet is taken from Dominguez
indeed contained shabu, this cannot justify the seizure of the plastic sachet from Dominguez
because, at the time of the warrantless seizure, it was not readily apparent to SPO1 Parchaso
that the very small plastic sachet contained anything, much less shabu. Thus, the circumstances
of this case do not justify a seizure based on the plain view doctrine.

Validity of warrantless search as incident to the arrest

The determination of the validity of the warrantless arrest would also determine the validity
of the warrantless search that was incident to the arrest. A determination of whether there
existed probable cause to effect an arrest should therefore be determined first.

Searches as incident to arrest

Searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search; generally, the process
cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can
precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to arrest at the outset of the search.

Even though Dominguez can no longer question the validity of his arrest, it is crystal clear
that the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless search is inadmissible in
evidence against him. There being no warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest or seizure
of evidence in plain view, the shabu purportedly seized from Dominguez is rendered
inadmissible in evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. As the confiscated
shabu is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Dominguez must be acquitted and
exonerated from all criminal liability.

SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

2020-2021
ON ARRESTS

SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (2020-2021 Drug-Related Cases)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS SP01 ALEXANDER ESTABILLO y
PALARA
SECOND DIVISION, [G.R.NO. 252902, JUNE 16, 2021]
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:
CONVICTED
The accused assailed the validity of his warrantless arrest, arguing on appeal that he
could not have been caught in flagrante delicto selling dangerous drugs since the arresting
officers had no personal knowledge on whether the four bricks allegedly seized from him were
actually cocaine. SP02 Taldo’s call to SP03 Ngo was not sufficient basis for probable cause
that he had just committed a crime.

P a g e | 146
 The Court was not persuaded. Objections against the lawfulness of an arrest that is
not raised through a motion to quash before the accused enters his or her plea are deemed
waived, for the voluntary submission of an accused to the jurisdiction of the court and his or
her active participation during the trial cures any defect or irregularity that may have attended
an arrest.
Here, the accused questioned the validity of his arrest only on appeal before the Court
of Appeals. By that time, he was already estopped from raising any objections against the
legality of his warrantless arrest. To be sure, the appellant wittingly stipulated during the pre-
trial that the trial court had jurisdiction over his person. He is therefore barred from claiming
otherwise.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SALVADOR AGUNDAY y ALBERTO II &

MARY JANE TURALDE VARGAS
FIRST DIVISION, GR. NO. 247906, February 10, 2021
CARANDANG, J,
CONVICTED:
On whether or not the accused were arrested without a warrant or merely invited by the law
enforcers.
The accused questioned the legality of their arrest. An arrest is defined under Section
1, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure as the taking of a person into custody
so that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. A person is arrested
when there is actual restraint of the person arrested or by that person’s voluntary submission
to the custody of the one making the arrest. It is already settled that the application of actual
force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, or a formal declaration of arrest, is
not required. The intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and the intent
on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary
is sufficient.
In this case, it is clear from the testimonies of the NBI agents that they merely invited
the accused Alberto to question him about the luggage in his possession and to verify the
information that he was in possession of heroin. As to the accused Vargas, they informed her
that they invited the accused Alberto to the NBI and that he claimed that she owned the
luggage he was carrying. It is clear from the testimonies of the NBI agents that they had no
intention to arrest both accused. Aside from their bare claims, the accused did not present any
other evidence to establish that they were arrested. The counsel of the accused even admitted
that they were merely invited by the NBI operatives. Such admission made during trial is
binding upon the accused.
The Court said that the facts show that this case is a consented warrantless search.
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
LEONIDES QUIAP VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 229183, February 17, 2021

M. LOPEZ, J.:

ACQUIITED (The validity of the warrantless arrest was sustained but the accused was
acquitted for failure to comply with the requirements on the chain of custody)

On the legality of the accused’s warrantless arrest.

The Court said that it is too late for the accused to question the legality of his
warrantless arrest because of his arraignment and active participation at the trial. Neither did
he move to quash the information, hence, any supposed defect in his arrest was deemed
waived. Even assuming that the accused can still impugn the legality of his arrest, the

P a g e | 147
circumstances of this case are akin to a “stop and frisk” situation. Here, the accused’s unusual
and suspicious conduct, and the fact that the police officers were on an intelligence mission
to verify the report of illegal drug activity, created a sufficient probable cause where search
and seizure may be effected without first making an arrest. Differently stated, the
apprehending team had reasonable suspicion, based on the police officers’ experience and the
surrounding conditions, that the person to be held had contraband concealed about him. This
suspicion was fortified when the accused attempted to throw out the window an object
wrapped with electrical tape after P02 Garcia boarded the jeepney. Leonides even panicked
when asked to unwrap the object which revealed a plastic sachet containing the shabu.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. NEIL DEJOS Y PINILI

SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 237423, October 12, 2020]

INTING, J.:

CONVICTED

On the validity of the warrantless arrest of the accused.

The accused was validly arrested without a warrant of arrest. In this case, the trial court
found credible the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that the accused-appellant was
caught in flagrante possessing shabu. There is no reason to deviate from the factual findings
of the lower courts since there is no indication that they overlooked, misunderstood, or
misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. The Court again emphasized
that the trial court is in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses
presented by both parties.

The Court also agrees with the conclusion of the trial court that the planned buy-bust
operation was not consummated. In this case, while there was an agreement of sale of illegal
drugs between the accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer, the accused-appellant was
suddenly arrested before having accepted the consideration of the sale. Conformably
with People v. Dasigan and People v. Hong Yeng E, et al., the Court agrees with the trial court
that the offense committed is Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. This is in keeping with
the settled rule that possession of dangerous drugs is necessarily included in the sale of
prohibited drugs.31

Endnotes

31 People v. Bulawan, 786 Phil. 655, 671 (2016).

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EMILIANO BATERINA Y CABADING

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 236259, September 16, 2020]

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

CONVICTED

The accused argues against his arrest allegedly because when the police officers
searched his vehicle, they had no probable cause to do so.

P a g e | 148
 The Court was not persuaded.
First, the right to question one's arrest should be made before one enters his or her
plea on arraignment. People v. Alunday[68] is relevant:
The Court has consistently ruled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or
the procedure for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
We have also ruled that an accused may be estopped from assailing the illegality of his arrest
if he fails to move for the quashing of the information against him before his arraignment. And
since the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused, any defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed cured when he voluntarily
submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court.
In People v. Araza,[69] the Court clarified that the illegal arrest of an accused is not
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a
trial free from error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.
Here, the appellant failed to object to his warrantless arrest before he entered his plea
of "not guilty." He likewise did not move to quash the Information or exclude the evidence
subject of the search and seizure before his arraignment. He actively participated in the
proceeding before the trial court. He, therefore, was deemed to have voluntarily submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court and waived any objection to his warrantless arrest.
Be that as it may, in People v. Cogaed,[70] the Court noted that one of the recognized
instances of a permissible warrantless search is the search of a moving vehicle. Police officers
cannot be expected to appear before a judge and apply for a search warrant when time is of
the essence considering the efficiency of vehicles in facilitating transactions involving
contraband or dangerous articles.[71] A checkpoint search is a variant of a search of a moving
vehicle[72] where only visual searches or inspections are allowed. An extensive search may be
conducted on a vehicle at a checkpoint when law enforcers have probable cause, i.e., upon a
belief, that the vehicle's driver or passengers committed a crime or when the vehicle contains
instruments of an offense[73] which by law is subject to seizure and destruction.[74]
Endnotes

68 People vs Ricardo Alunday 586 Phil. 120, 133 (2008).

69 People vs Rommel Araza 747 Phil. 20, 32 (2014).
70 People vs Victor Cogaed 740 Phil. 212, 228 (2014).
71 Caballes v. Court of Appeals, 424 Phil. 263, 278 (2002).
72 People v. Manago, 793 Phil. 505, 519 (2016).
73 Veridiano v. People, 810 Phil. 642, 668 (2017).

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SAMMY YUSOP Y MUHAMMAD

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 224587, July 28, 2020]

REYES, J. JR., J.:

ACQUITTED (Warrantless arrest was valid but the accused was acquitted for non-compliance with
the three witness rule laid down in Section 21 of R.A. 9165)

The warrantless arrest was valid as the PDEA agents had probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge that the person to be arrested has committed an offense, i.e. illegal transport of
dangerous drugs.

The case falls within paragraph b, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Jurisprudence22 tells us that the following must be present for a valid warrantless arrest under
paragraph (b): i) an offense has just been committed, and ii) the arresting officer has probable cause to

P a g e | 149
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it.

In Pestilos v. Generoso,23 we said that in connection with Section 5, paragraph (b), Rule 113
of the Rules of Court, the arresting officer's exercise of discretion is limited by the standard of probable
cause to be determined from the facts and circumstances within his knowledge and that the
requirement of the existence of probable cause objectifies the reasonableness of the warrantless arrest
for purposes of compliance with the Constitutional mandate against unreasonable arrests. Moreover,
we enunciated in Vaporoso v. People24 that the element of personal knowledge must be coupled with
the element of immediacy; otherwise, the arrest may be nullified, and resultantly, the items yielded
through the search incidental thereto will be rendered inadmissible.

Here, the PDEA agents had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances upon which they
had properly determined probable cause in effecting a warrantless arrest against Yusop. The PDEA
agents immediately acted on a tip received from a confidential informant that a substantial amount
of shabu will be shipped from Las Pinas to CDO. The details regarding the shipment such as the names
of the shipper and consignee, contents of the subject package, and the courier service were all accurate
upon verification. The PDEA agents then conducted surveillance operations at the LBC branch where
the package will be claimed. The subject package was without a doubt retrieved a day later by Yusop -
who acted like a guilty person and attempted to run when confronted by the authorities. The pieces of
information qualify as the PDEA agents' observation, perception, and evaluation, which are necessary
within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrest.

Endnotes

22 People v Comprado, G.R. No. 213225, April 4, 2018; People v. Gardon-Mentay, G.R. No. 223 140,
September 4, 2019.
23 Pestilos vs Generoso, 746 Phil. 301 (2014).
24 Vaporoso vs. People, G.R. No. 238659, June 3, 2019.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SIU MING TAT AND LEE YOONG HOEW

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 246577, July 13, 2020]

REYES, J. JR., J.:

CONVICTED

On the defense of denial/frame-up

The defense of denial fails in the face of identification and lack of motive from the witnesses.

It is a settled rule that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is
given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to have performed their
duties regularly unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill motive on the part of the police
officers or deviation from the regular performance of their duties.32

The defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been viewed with disfavor for it can easily be
concocted and is a common defense ploy in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act. For this claim to prosper, the defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome
the presumption that government officials have performed their duties regularly and properly.

Absent any clear showing that the arresting officers had ill motive to falsely testify against the
appellant, their testimonies must be respected and the presumption of regularity in the performance of
their duties must be upheld.34 A mere denial, like an alibi, is inherently a weak defense and constitutes
self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the
declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.35

Endnotes

P a g e | 150
32 People v. De Guzman y Miranda, 564 Phil. 282, 293 (2007).
33 Id.
34 People v. Calvelo y Consada, G.R. No. 223526, December 6, 2017.
35 People v. Umapas y Crisostomo, 807 Phil. 975, 989-990 (2017).

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PETER LOPEZ Y CANLAS

FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 247974, July 13, 2020]

CAGUIOA, J:

CONVICTED (SECTION 5, ART. II R.A. 9165) ACQUITTED (SECTION 5, ART. II

R.A. 9165 FOR LACK OF CONFIRMATORY TEST)

Issues:

All elements of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs had been proven considering that
there is positive testimony, corroborated in its material points, and supporting documentary evidence
identifying Lopez as the one who offered to sell and sold, the dangerous drug in exchange for P2,000.00
and who, upon receipt of the consideration, delivered the dangerous drug to the poseur-buyer.

Lopez ascribed irregularity in the conduct of the buy-bust operation because no surveillance
was done nor was a sketch-plan made before the conduct of the buy-bust operation, and that the
operation proceeded merely on the information given by the confidential informant.32 Relying
on People v. Rojo,33 Lopez argued that the trial court should have been circumspect in its appreciation
of the testimonies surrounding the operation.

The Court ruled that the absence of prior surveillance does not affect the validity of an
entrapment operation, much less result in the exoneration of the accused, especially in light of evidence
establishing the elements of the crime. In People v. Manlangit,34 citing Quinicot v. People,35 the
Court pronounced:

Settled is the rule that the absence of prior surveillance or test buy does not affect the legality
of the buy-bust operation. There is no textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations. The Court
has left to the discretion of police authorities the selection of effective means to apprehend drug
dealers. Prior surveillance, much less a lengthy one, is not necessary, especially where the police
operatives are accompanied by their informant during the entrapment. Flexibility is a trait of good
police work. We have held that when time is of the essence, the police may dispense with the need for
prior surveillance. In the instant case, having been accompanied by the informant to the person who
was peddling the dangerous drugs, the policemen need not have conducted any prior surveillance
before they undertook the buy-bust operation.36

Lopez's reliance on Rojo is likewise misplaced. The Court in Rojo appreciated in favor of the
accused the fact that none of the prosecution witnesses saw the accused therein deliver the dangerous
drugs to the informant since the police operatives were meters away from the alleged illegal transaction.

Endnotes
33 People vs Rojo 256 Phil. 571 (1989).
34 People vs Manlangit 654 Phil. 427 (2011).
35 Quinicot vs. People 608 Phil. 259 (2009).

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOEL LIMSON Y FERRER, JOEY C. MENESES

AND CAMILO BALILA, ACCUSED, JOEY MENESES Y CANO

P a g e | 151
FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 233533, June 30, 2020]

PERALTA, C.J.:

CONVICTED

On the defense of frame-up or denial

In the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the delivery of the illicit drug to the
poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money consummate the illegal
transaction. What matters is the proof that the transaction or sale took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the prohibited drug, the corpus delicti, as evidence.20

In this case, Meneses in a way is admitting that there was an actual transaction of illegal
sale of dangerous drugs and the only thing that was missing was the agreement as to the value
of the consideration. Meneses' argument that the sale is null and void as if no sale had
transpired between him and PO2 Dela Cruz is unmeritorious. To be clear, in this kind of
situation, the Civil Code will not apply. Technically, the sale was null and void as the object of
the sale is expressly prohibited by law. To emphasize, what only needs to be proven is that
there should be a transaction or sale that had taken place. The sale means an actual exchange
of the buy-bust money and the illegal drugs. Here, the punishable act was the act of selling
illegal drugs which cannot be negated by mere technicalities of a contract of sale. The fact that
there was an agreement between the buyer and the seller to exchange money and drugs, there
was already a meeting of the minds between the parties. As long as the seller accepted the
consideration, followed by the delivery of the illegal drugs to the buyer, the crime is already
consummated.

Likewise, Meneses maintains that he was merely framed up for the crime of illegal sale
of dangerous drugs. The defenses of denial, frame-up, and extortion, like alibi, have been
invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for they can easily be concocted and are common
and standard defense ploys in most cases involving a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.
As evidence that is both negative and self-serving, this defense of alibi cannot attain more
credibility than the testimony of the prosecution witness who testified clearly, providing
thereby positive evidence on the crime committed.24 In this case, the three (3) police officers
positively identified Meneses as the person who sold the illegal drugs. Another was the fact
that the seized items tested positive for the presence of marijuana and "shabu."

Furthermore, the defense of frame-up or denial in drug cases requires strong and
convincing evidence because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in
the regular performance of their official duties. The presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed can only be overcome through clear and convincing evidence showing
either of two things: (1) that they were not properly performing their duty, or (2) that they
were inspired by any improper motive.25

Meneses failed to overcome such presumption. The bare denial of Meneses cannot
prevail over the positive testimony of the prosecution witnesses that he was the person who
sold "shabu." As correctly pointed out by the CA, no evidence was presented by Meneses to
show that he was coerced and threatened by the CAIDSOG's operatives into admitting the
ownership of the seized illegal drugs. In the same vein, no evidence of malice or ill-motive on
the part of the said operatives was adduced to discredit their testimonies.

Endnotes:

19 People v. Ismael, 806 Phil. 21, 29 (2017).

20 People v. Amaro, 786 Phil. 139, 147 (2016).
24 People v. Tamaño, et al., 801 Phil. 981, 1004 (2016).
25 Id.

P a g e | 152
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. JERRY SAPLA Y GUERRERO A.K.A. ERIC

SALIBAD Y MALLARI

EN BANC [G.R. No. 244045, June 16, 2020]

CAGUIOA, J:

ACQUIITED

The police cannot conduct an extensive and intrusive search without a warrant on a
vehicle on the sole basis of an unverified tip relayed by an anonymous informant.

The Court ruled that a mere informant’s tip is not sufficient to engender probable
cause. The police officer receiving the informant’s tip must rely on his senses. The police
officer must not adopt the suspicion initiated by another person. The police officer, with
his/her personal knowledge, must observe the facts leading to the suspicion of an illicit act
and not merely rely on the information passed on to him/her.
Law enforcers cannot act solely based on a tip. A tip is still hearsay no matter how reliable it
may be. It is not sufficient to constitute probable cause in the absence of any other
circumstance that will arouse suspicion.

The fairly recent case of People v. Comprado (Comprado) is controlling since the facts
of the said case are virtually identical to the instant case.

In Comprado, a confidential informant (CI) sent a text message to the authorities as

regards an alleged courier of marijuana who had in his possession a backpack containing
marijuana and would be traveling from Bukidnon to Cagayan de Oro City. The CI eventually
called the authorities and informed them that the alleged drug courier had boarded a bus with
body number 2646 and plate number KVP 988 bound for Cagayan de Oro City. The CI added
that the man would be carrying a backpack in black and violet colors with the marking "Lowe
Alpine." With this information, the police officers put up a checkpoint, just as what the
authorities did in the instant case. Afterward, upon seeing the bus bearing the said body and
plate numbers approaching the checkpoint, again similar to the instant case, the said vehicle
was flagged down. The police officers boarded the bus and saw a man matching the
description given to them by the CI. The man was seated at the back of the bus with a backpack
placed on his lap. The man was asked to open the bag. When the accused agreed to do so, the
police officers saw transparent cellophane containing dried marijuana leaves.

In Comprado, the Court held that the search conducted "could not be classified as a
search of a moving vehicle. In this particular type of search, the vehicle is the target and not a
specific person."18 The Court added that "in search of a moving vehicle, the vehicle was
intentionally used as a means to transport illegal items. It is worthy to note that the information
relayed to the police officers was that a passenger of that particular bus was carrying marijuana
such that when the police officers boarded the bus, they searched the bag of the person
matching the description given by their informant and not the cargo or contents of the said
bus."19

Applying the foregoing to the instant case, it cannot be seriously disputed that the
target of the search conducted was not the passenger jeepney boarded by accused-appellant
Sapla nor the cargo or contents of the said vehicle. The target of the search was the person
who matched the description given by the person who called the RPSB Hotline, i.e., the person
wearing a collared white shirt with green stripes, a red ball cap, and carrying a blue sack.

P a g e | 153
 As explained in Comprado, "to extend to such breadth the scope of searches on
moving vehicles would open the floodgates to unbridled warrantless searches which can be
conducted by the mere expedient of waiting for the target person to ride a motor vehicle,
setting up a checkpoint along the route of that vehicle, and then stopping such vehicle when
it arrives at the checkpoint to search the target person."20

The Supreme Court noted that there were two previous decisions (Pp. vs Maspil and Pp.
vs Bagista) which ruled that a confidential tip was sufficient to engender probable cause,
however, the Supreme Court, in this case, declared that these two cases are now being
abandoned to settle the issue once and for all.

Endnotes

People v. Comprado, G.R. No. 213225, April 4, 2018, 860 SCRA 420, 440. Italics supplied.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

ROMEO TUMABINI, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

RESPONDENT.
THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 224495, February 19, 2020]
GESMUNDO, J.:

ACQUITTED (The validity of the search was upheld but the accused was acquitted because
the prosecution failed to prove that the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus
delicti were preserved.)

As to the time of making the search

The accused argued that it was unreasonable for the police officers to enforce the
search warrant at dawn because it violates his right against unreasonable searches and seizures.

A search warrant may be served at dawn. Section 9, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court
states:

Section 9. Time of making a search. – The warrant must direct that it be served in
the daytime unless the affidavit asserts that the property is on the person or in the place
ordered to be searched, in which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time
of the day or night.

In People vs. Court of Appeals, the Court explained that a search warrant, as an
exception, maybe enforced at any reasonable hour of the day or night, to wit:

The general rule is that search warrants must be served during the daytime. However, the
rule allows an exception, namely, a search at any reasonable hour of the day or night,
when the application asserts that the property is on the person or place ordered to be
searched. In the instant case, the judge issuing the warrant relied on the positive assertion of
the applicant and his witnesses that the firearms and ammunition were kept at private
respondent's residence. The court issuing the warrant was satisfied that the affidavits of the
applicants satisfied the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The rule on
the issuance of a search warrant allows for the exercise of judicial discretion in fixing the time
within which the warrant may be served, subject to the statutory requirement fixing the
maximum time for the execution of a warrant.

The Court examined the application for the search warrant, and the deposition of the
witnesses supporting the said application, and find that both satisfactorily comply with the
requirements of Section 8, Rule 126. The inescapable conclusion is that the judge who issued
the questioned warrant did not abuse his discretion in allowing a search "at any reasonable

P a g e | 154
hour of the day or night." Absent such abuse of discretion, a search conducted at night were
so allowed, is not improper.

In this case, the search warrant stated that the search shall be made at "ANY TIME
OF THE DAY OR NIGHT." Notably, the RTC Cebu City issued the search warrant based
on the deposition of PO3 Arturo C. Enriquez and PO3 Jesus Manulat, which stated that they
allegedly bought shabu from the petitioner at about 9:00 in the evening. Thus, the RTC Cebu
City had a basis to state that the search warrant may also be implemented at dawn or early
morning.

Further, the petitioner failed to prove that the entry of police officers into his house
was unreasonable. Section 7, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. – The Officer, if refused
admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may
break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything
therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when
unlawfully detained therein.

As testified by SPO2 Matillano, when they went to the house of the petitioner, they
knocked on the door and called out the petitioner's name but nobody answered. Thus, they
bumped the door open on the ground floor to be able to enter the petitioner's house.
However, the second floor, where the petitioner and his children were staying, also had a
locked door. At that moment, they tried to convince the petitioner to open the door, to which
he obliged. Verily, the police officers followed Sec. 7, Rule 126 when they forcibly opened the
door of the first floor because they were refused admittance despite giving notice to the
petitioner.

On the Chain of Custody Rule

Jurisprudence shows that even when the drugs are seized and confiscated pursuant to
a search warrant, the Court still applies Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 to determine whether the
corpus delicti was properly established. The Court has consistently held that in the seizure and
confiscation of seized drugs in the implementation of a search warrant, the Court religiously
applies Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, including the mandatory presence of the
required witnesses during the physical inventory and taking of photographs of the seized
drugs, and the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the same in applying the
saving clause under the IRR. The Court also never stated that Sec. 8, Rule 126 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure on the implementation of search warrants prevails over Sec. 21
of R.A. No. 9165. As a result, Sec. 21 must always be complied with regardless of whether the
seizure and confiscation of the seized drugs are a result of a buy-bust operation or during the
implementation of a search warrant.

Endnotes

18 People vs Court of Appeals 400 Phil. 1247 (2000).

19 Id. at 1256-1257.
32 People vs Gayosoo, 808 Phil. 19 (2017).
35 De Rilo vs. People, 784 Phil. 679 (2016).

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH SOLAMILLO AMAGO &

CERILO BOLONGAITA, JR.
FIRST DIVISION [G.R. No. 227739, January 15, 2020]
PERALTA, C.J.:
CONVICTED

P a g e | 155
 There was a valid in flagrante delicto arrests.

The instant case falls within Section 5(a) of Rule 113. For a warrantless arrest of an accused
caught in flagrante delicto to be valid, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must
execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.24

It is apparent that Amago's act of making an abrupt U-turn, instead of stopping at the
checkpoint sign, made a reasonable belief for the police officers to suspect that accused-appellants
might have committed some traffic violations or delivered something illegal. The police officers
stopped them and, in the course, Amago intentionally slumped down the motorcycle he was riding
causing his t-shirt to be lifted, thereby exposing the handle of a handgun that was tucked in his
waistband. At the same time, Pińero saw a folding knife protruding from the left pocket of Vendiola
who had fallen from the motorcycle. Due to the failure of Amago to produce any license to carry the
firearm and for the illegal possession of a bladed weapon by Vendiola, they were arrested.

Meanwhile, regarding the admissibility of the confiscated items, they fall within the exception
of a warrantless search. The search conducted inside the utility box of the motorcycle was legal. A
search incident to a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court states:

SEC. 13. Search incident to a lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of
an offense without a search warrant.

In the instant case, the shabu was found in a peppermint gum container inside the utility box
of the accused appellant's motorcycle that was within their immediate control. Therefore, it is within
the permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly execute a warrantless search incidental
to a lawful arrest.

In People v. Uyboco, this Court declared that:

In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the apprehending officers to conduct a
warrantless search not only on the person of the suspect but also in the permissible area within the
latter's reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons
either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. The phrase "within
the area of his immediate control" means the area from within which he might gain possession of a
weapon or destructible evidence.

Endnotes:

24 Zalameda v. People, Phil. 710, 729 (2009)

25 People vs Uyboco, 655 Phil. 143 (2011)

P a g e | 156
 ANNEX “E”

SUPREME COURT DECISIONS ON CHAIN OF CUSTODY

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. KUSAIN AMIN y AMPUAN a.k.a. “Cocoy”

G.R. No. 215942, January 18, 2017

On accused-appellant's contention that the prosecution's failure to present the poseur-buyer

weakened the arresting team's testimonies, the CA held that the non-presentation of the
poseur-buyer is fatal only if there is no other eyewitness to the illicit transaction, as held
in People v. Berdadero.[19] In any case, the testimonies of SPO2 Dacara and P/Insp. Ramas, who
were both within clear seeing distance, "presented a complete picture, providing every detail
of the buy-bust operation.”

Issue: From the foregoing, the sole issue before us is whether or not the RTC and the CA
erred in finding the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses sufficient to warrant
appellant's conviction for the crimes charged.

At this juncture, We reiterate our point in Andaya:

Secondly, the reliance on the supposed signal to establish the consummation of the transaction between the
poseur buyer and Andaya was unwarranted because the unmitigatedly hearsay character of the signal rendered it
entirely bereft of trustworthiness. The arresting members of the buy-bust team interpreted the signal from the
anonymous poseur buyer as the sign of the consummation of the transaction. Their interpretation, being
necessarily subjective without the testimony of the poseur buyer, unfairly threatened the liberty of Andaya. We
should not allow that threat to perpetuate itself. And, lastly, the reliance on the signal would deprive Andaya the
right to confront and test the credibility of the poseur buyer who supposedly gave it. [32]
This interpretation is premised on the legal reasoning that "when the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two (2) or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the
other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient
to support a conviction."[33] In light of the pronouncements above, We deem it unnecessary to discuss other
issues raised by both parties.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ADALTON ARCE y CAMARGO

G.R. No. 217979, February 22, 2017

The records also reveal that there was compliance with the rule on the preservation of the
integrity of the confiscated items allegedly sold and possessed by the accused appellant. PO1
Maquinta testified that he had placed the markings on the confiscated items; had made an
inventory;[17] and had taken pictures of these items right after the arrests and in the presence
of the representatives of the media, the DOJ, PDEA, and a barangay official.[18] On the same
day, he forwarded these items, along with the letter request [19] signed by Police Chief Inspector
(PCI) Errol Texon Garchitorena, Jr., to PCI Josephine Suico Llena, a forensic chemist of the
crime laboratory.[20] The items were received and examined by the latter who kept them in the
crime laboratory until the test result,[21] together with the items, was submitted to the court.[22]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SALIM ISMAEL y RADANG

G.R. No. 208093, February 30, 2017

In Mallillin v. People,[13] the Court exp1ained the chain of custody rule as follows:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be
preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it
to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked
up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness'
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the
next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been
no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of
the same. (Emphasis supplied)
The first link in the chain is the marking of the seized drug. We have previously held that:

P a g e | 157
x x x Marking after a seizure is the starting point in the custodial link, thus the seized contraband must be
immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimen will use the markings as reference. The
marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related
evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal
proceedings, obviating switching, ‘planting,’ or contamination of evidence.[14]
The seized drugs must be immediately marked, if possible, as soon as they are seized from the accused.

Aside from the failure to mark the seized drugs immediately upon arrest, the arresting officers
also failed to show that the marking of the seized drugs was done in the presence of the
appellant. This requirement must not be brushed aside as a mere technicality. It must be shown
that the marking was done in the presence of the accused to assure that the identity and
integrity of the drugs were properly preserved. Failure to comply with this requirement is fatal
to the prosecution's case.

The requirements of making an inventory and taking photographs of the seized drugs were
likewise omitted without explaining its non-compliance. This break in the chain tainted the
integrity of the seized drugs presented in court; the very identity of the seized drugs became
highly questionable.

To recap, based on the evidence of the prosecution, it is clear that no markings were made
immediately after the arrest of the appellant. The seized drugs were allegedly turned over to
desk officer PO3 Napalcruz but the prosecution did not bother to present him to testify on
the identity of the items he received from SPO1 Rodriguez and SPO1 Santiago. PO3
Napalcruz supposedly turned over the drugs to PO2 Tan who marked the same at the police
station.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MYRNA GAYOSO y ARGUELLES

G.R. No. 206590, March 27, 2017

In criminal prosecutions for the illegal sale and possession of shabu, primordial importance
must be given to "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused."

xxx xxx

"'The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary
doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed."[22]
Chain of custody is defined as "duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized
drugs or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of
each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to
safekeeping, to presentation in court for destruction."[23] In People v. Havana,[24] the Court
expounded on the custodial chain procedure in this wise:

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission
of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question
is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain,
from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way
that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition
in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the
chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had
been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain
to have possession of the same.

While the testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always
impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when
the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition
at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness.
The same standard obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering,

P a g e | 158
contamination, and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of
susceptibility to fungibility, alteration, or tampering -without regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise not - dictates the level of strictness in the application of the chain of
custody rule.

Thus, as a general rule, four links in the chain of custody of the confiscated item must be
established:

First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by
the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending
officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal
drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.[25]

Marking is the placing by the arresting officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and
signature on the items after they have been seized. It is the starting point in the custodial link.
The seized items must be marked immediately since the succeeding handlers thereof will use
the markings as reference.[26] The chain of custody rule also requires that the marking of the
seized contraband be done "(1) in the presence of the apprehended violator, and (2)
immediately upon confiscation."[27]

In this case, the records do not show that the arresting officers marked the seized items with
their initials in the presence of the appellant and immediately upon confiscation. While PO2
Isip testified that the seized sachets of shabu were marked in the police station,[28] no evidence
was presented to show that the marking was accomplished in the presence of the appellant.
Moreover, the author of the markings on said items was never identified. None of the police
officers admitted placing the markings. There was therefore a complete absence of evidence
to prove authorship of the markings.

While marking of the evidence is allowed in the nearest police station, this contemplates a case
of warrantless searches and seizures.[29] Here, the police officers secured a search warrant
before their operation. They, therefore, had sufficient time and opportunity to prepare for its
implementation. However, the police officers failed to mark immediately the plastic sachets
of shabu seized inside the appellant's house despite an Inventory of Property Seized that they
prepared while still inside the said house. The failure of the arresting officers to comply with
the marking of evidence immediately after confiscation constitutes the first gap in the chain
of custody.

The turnover of the seized shabu from the arresting officers to the investigating officer in the
police station constitutes the second link in the chain of custody. In this regard, the Court
takes note that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to identify the person to
whom the seized items were turned over at the police station. While SPO3 Salamida was
identified as the property custodian of the police station, this does not necessarily mean that
he is also the investigating officer. There is nothing in the records to substantiate this
presumption. This total want of evidence gains importance considering that none of the
arresting officers presented as witnesses identified the shabu presented during the trial as the
same shabu seized from the appellant. Thus, the second link in the chain of custody is missing.

The transfer of the seized shabu from the investigating officer to the forensic chemist in the
crime laboratory is the third link in the chain of custody. While the seized shabu was turned
over by PI Barber to the PDEA, he no longer had any personal knowledge of the manner it
was handled therein. He also did not identify the police officer in whose custody the seized
sachets of shabu were placed at the PDEA. He left it to the responsibility of the PDEA to
forward the seized shabu to the crime laboratory. The request for laboratory examination of
the PDEA identifies the police officer who delivered the seized shabu as a certain SPO1 Asis,
but he was not presented to testify that the shabu delivered to the crime laboratory was the
same shabu confiscated from the appellant. There is a third break in the chain of custody.

P a g e | 159
Nothing also can be gained from the testimony of the forensic chemist PSI Cruto. His
testimony is not clear and positive since he failed to assert that the alleged packs of chemical
substance presented for laboratory examination and tested positive for shabu were the very
same substance allegedly recovered from the appellant. His testimony was limited to the result
of the examination he conducted and not to the source of the substance.

From the foregoing, it appears that no chain of custody was established at all. What we have
here are individual links with breaks in-between that could not be seamlessly woven or tied
together. The so-called links in the chain of custody show that the seized shabu was not
handled properly starting from the actual seizure to its turnover in the police station and the
PDEA, as well as its transfer to the crime laboratory for examination. The Court therefore
cannot conclude with moral certainty that the shabu confiscated from the appellant was the
same as that presented tor laboratory examination and then presented in court.

It is indeed desirable that the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken. In reality,
however, this rarely occurs. The legal standard that must therefore be observed "is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used
to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused."[30] Here, the Court finds that the
apprehending officers failed to properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the
confiscated shabu. There are just too many breaks and gaps to the effect that a chain of custody
could not be established at all. Failure of the prosecution to offer a testimony to establish a
substantially complete chain of custody of the shabu and the inappropriate manner of handling
the evidence before its offer in court diminishes the government's chance of successfully
prosecuting a drug case.[31]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ANASTACIO HEMENTIZA y DELA

CRUZ
G.R. No. 227398, March 22, 2017

Section 1(b) of Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002,[14] which
implements R.A. No. 9165, defines the chain of custody as follows:

Chain of Custody means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs
or controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each
stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping
to presentation in court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item
shall include the identity and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized
item, the date and time when such transfer of custody was made in the course of safekeeping
and use in court as evidence, and the final disposition.

xxx xxx

While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always
impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when
the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not readily identifiable, or when its condition
at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe its uniqueness.
The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is susceptible to alteration, tampering,
contamination, and even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of
susceptibility to fungibility, alteration, or tampering without regard to whether the same is
advertent or otherwise does not dictate the level of strictness in the application of the chain
of custody rule.

Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss, or mistake to an exhibit is greatest when the exhibit
is small and has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to substances
familiar to people in their daily lives. Graham v. State positively acknowledged this danger. In
that case, where a substance was later analyzed as heroin was handled by two police officers
before examination who however did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts

P a g e | 160
of the exhibit at the time it was in their possession was excluded from the prosecution
evidence, the court pointing out that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin
or it could have been sugar or baking powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records
or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of the exhibit at least between the time it came into
the possession of the police officers until it was tested in the laboratory to determine its
composition, testimony of the state as to the laboratory's findings is inadmissible.

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact
they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court
cannot reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood or at least the possibility, that at any of the
links in the chain of custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration, or
substitution of substances from other cases by accident or otherwise in which similar evidence
was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in
authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving readily
identifiable objects must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody
of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item
has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with.[16]

Xxx

In this case, Palconit claimed that he had placed his initials on the seized items. Based on his
testimony, it is clear that the marking was not immediately done at the place of seizure; instead,
the markings were only placed at the PDEA office, for which the prosecution did not offer
any justifiable reason. Even if the Court glosses over this lapse, still, it could not be said that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved. For one, neither in the
direct examination nor in the cross-examination of Palconit was it mentioned that the
markings were made in the presence of the accused-appellant or his representatives. He merely
testified that he placed the markings at the PDEA office, without any allusion to the identities
of the persons who were present when he did the markings.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PUYAT MACAPUNDAG y LABAO

G.R. No. 225965, March 13, 2017

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure
police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs, to preserve their integrity and
evidentiary value.[28] Under the said section, the apprehending team shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items
in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the items were seized, his
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over
to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for
examination.[29]

In People v. Sanchez,[34] the Court recognized that under varied field conditions, strict
compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of 9165 may not always be possible, and ruled
that under the implementing guidelines of the said Section, "non-compliance with these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items." However, the Court added that the prosecution bears the burden of proving
justifiable cause.[35]

Thus, in People v. Almorfe,[36] the Court stressed that for the above-saving clause to apply,
the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses and that the
integrity and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved.[37] Also,
in People v. De Guzman,[38] it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance

P a g e | 161
must be proven as a fact because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or
that they even exist.[39]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDDIE BARTE y MENDOZA

G.R. No. 179749, March 01, 2017

When there is failure to comply with the requirements for proving the chain of custody in the
confiscation of contraband in a drug buy-bust operation, the State should credibly explain
such non compliance; otherwise, the proof of the corpus delicti is doubtful, and the accused
should be acquitted for failure to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Xxx xxx

Based on the foregoing, we regard and declare as unwarranted the RTC's position that the
absence of proof showing the compliance by the arresting lawmen with the procedure outlined
under Section 21 of RA No. 9165 was not fatal to the entrapment. Such non-compliance with
the procedural safeguards under Section 21 was fatal because it cast doubt on the integrity of
the evidence presented in court and directly affected the validity of the buy-bust operation. It
put into serious question whether the sachet of shabu had come from the accused-appellant
and whether the sachet of shabu presented in court was the same sachet of shabu obtained from
the accused-appellant at the time of the arrest. Testimonies provided by the police officers and
the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties did not override the non-
compliance with the procedural safeguards instituted by our laws. Indeed, anything short of
observance and compliance by the arresting lawmen with what the law required meant that
the former did not regularly perform their duties. The presumption of regularity in the
performance of their duties then became inapplicable. As such, the evidence of the State did
not overturn the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused-appellant.

Furthermore, although non-compliance with the prescribed procedural requirements would

not automatically render the seizure and custody of the contraband invalid, that is true only
when there is a justifiable ground for such non-compliance, and the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved. Any departure from the prescribed procedure
must then still be reasonably justified, and must further be shown not to have affected the
integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated contraband. Otherwise, the non-compliance
constitutes an irregularity, a red flag, so to speak, that cast reasonable doubt on the identity of
the corpus delicti?[21]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMMEL DIPUTADO

G.R. No. 213922, July 5, 2017

Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items immediately after
they have been seized from the accused." Marking" means the placing by the apprehending officer or the poseur-
buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items seized. Marking after the seizure is the starting point in the
custodial link. The seized contraband must be immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens
will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are
disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus, preventing switching, planting, or contamination of
evidence.19

Xxx xxx

Hence, in the initial step of the chain of custody, a gap already occurred. The seized item was not marked
immediately at the place where the accused-appellant was arrested. Neither was it marked in the house of the
barangay captain where the seized item and the buy-bust money were recorded and listed by PO1 Mayores. The
seized item was marked only after the recording/listing and only at the RSAC-TF. Therefore, the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized item were already compromised. The prosecution was not able to establish an
unbroken chain of custody. From the time of the seizure of the dangerous drug up to the time that the same was
brought to the office of the RSAC-TF, alteration, substitution, or contamination of the seized item could have
happened. The Receipt of Confiscated or Seized Articles22 does not mention any markings on the seized item.

P a g e | 162
Even the Complaint-Affidavit23 executed by PO1 Estares and PO1 Ambrocio did not mention any markings on
the seized item.

There are cases when the chain of custody is relaxed such as when the marking of the seized item is allowed to
be undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest for as long as it is done in the presence of
the accused.1âwphi1 Even if We relax the application of the marking requirement, in this case, the same will not
suffice to sustain the conviction of the accused-appellant.24 In this instance, there is nothing in the testimony of
PO1 Estares that he marked the seized item in the presence of the accused-appellant. Further, PO1 Estares did
not even make an effort to proffer any justification as to why he failed to mark the seized item at the place of the
arrest or even in the house of the barangay captain.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAIME SEGUNDO y IGLESIAS

G.R. No. 205614, July 26, 2017

"Proof of the corpus delicti in a buy-bust situation requires evidence, not only that the
transacted drugs exist, but evidence as well that the drugs seized and examined are the same
drugs presented in court."124 This is a pre-condition "for conviction as the drugs are the main
subject of the illegal sale constituting the crime and their existence and identification must be
proven for the crime to exist."125

Compliance with the chain of custody is necessary due to the unique nature of narcotics.
In Mall ill in v. People,130

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject
to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its
eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody
over the same there could have been tampering, alteration, or substitution of substances from
other cases - by accident or otherwise - in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar
evidence was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more
stringent than that applied to cases involving readily identifiable objects must be applied, a more exacting
standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable
that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered
with.131 (Emphasis provided)

The prosecution offered testimonies to establish the identity of the buyer and seller, as well as
the consideration that sustained the alleged deal and how the sale had transpired. 132 It failed,
however, to comply with the chain of custody that would supposedly ensure that the minuscule
amount of 0.03 grams of shabu offered as evidence in court was the one retrieved from
Segundo at the time of the operation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOHN PAUL CERALDE y RAMOS

G.R. NO. 228894, August 7, 2017

Pertinently, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure that
police officers must follow in handling the seized drugs, to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value.26 Under
the said section, the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation
conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the
person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the
copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the PNP
Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. 27 In the case
of People v. Mendoza, 28 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the representative from
the media or the Department of Justice, or any elected public official during the seizure and marking of
the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the
buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads
as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs] that were
evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the
incrimination of the accused. Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken
chain of custody."29

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible.30 In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 31- provide that the said

P a g e | 163
inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in
instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 -
under justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items
so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehendin2 officer or team.32 In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with
the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody
over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is a justifiable
ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.33 In People v. Almorfe,34 the Court explained that for the above-saving clause to apply, the
prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses and that the integrity and value of
the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. 35 Also, in People v. De Guzman,36 it was emphasized
that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact because the Court cannot
presume what these grounds are or that they even exist. 37

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOCELYN CARLIT y GAWAT

G.R. No. 227309, August 16, 2017

Some links must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation, namely: "first,
the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused
by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and, fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court."10 (emphasis added)

Xxx

There have been cases when the Court relaxed the application of Section 21 and held that the
subsequent marking at the police station is valid. However, this non-compliance is not fatal
only when there are (1) justifiable grounds and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved. And while the amendment of RA 9165 by RA
10640 now allows the conduct of physical inventory in the nearest police station, the principal
concern remains to be the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items. In this case, however, the prosecution did not explain at all the non-compliance
with Section 21, more particularly that relating to the immediate marking of the seized
items. This non-explanation creates doubt on whether the buy-bust team was able to
preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the items seized from
Bartolini.13 (Emphasis supplied)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL LIM CHING

G.R. No. 223556, October 9, 2017

Jurisprudence states that in these cases, it is essential that the identity of the seized
drug/paraphernalia be established with moral certainty. Thus, to obviate any unnecessary
doubts on such identity, the prosecution has to show an unbroken chain of custody over the
same. It must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous
drug/paraphernalia from the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence
of the corpus delicti. 37

ARNELIO B. CALMA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 180586, November 20, 2017

P a g e | 164
Verily, the chain of custody was effectively broken by the fact that the plastic sachets
confiscated from Calma were not marked immediately after their seizure and done at or near
the place where the buy-bust operation was conducted; that there was doubt on the identity
of the persons who had taken custody of the subject sachets before their turnover to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for examination; and that there is material discrepancy in the amount of
the shabu allegedly confiscated from Calma and the amount of shabu examined by the forensic
chemist. The integrity of the sachets of shabu which were presented in evidence before the trial
court was tainted. Needless to state, reasonable doubt was created as to whether the plastic
sachets containing white crystalline substances that were presented before the trial court are
the same ones that were confiscated from Calma. A judgment of acquittal is thus in order.

ARNEL CALAHI, ENRIQUE CALAHI and NICASIO RIVERA vs. PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 195043, November 20, 2017

As object evidence, the nature of narcotic substances requires the establishment of a chain of
custody.

The gap in the chain of custody caused by the lack of marking upon confiscation undermined
the identity and integrity of the confiscated drug, raising a reasonable doubt that the specimen
presented in court is the same one confiscated from the petitioners.

While the Court, on certain occasions, relaxed the stringent application of rules and regulations
relative to the handling of dangerous drugs after seizure and confiscation,
the identity and integrity of the confiscated drug must be shown to have been duly preserved.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NIÑO CALIBOD y HENOBESO

G.R. No. 230230, Nov.20, 2017

By and large, the plurality of the breaches of procedure committed by the police officers,
unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militates against a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus
delicti had been compromised.49 It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165
is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality;
or worse, ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects.50 As such, since
the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for non-compliance with Section 21 of
RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, as well as its IRR, Calibod's acquittal is perforce in order.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.PABLO ARPOSEPLE y SANCHEZ and

JHUNREL SULOGAOL y DATU
G.R. No. 205787, November 22, 2017

Jurisprudence dictates the links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust
situation: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer
of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover
and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court.84

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EMMA BOFILL PANGAN

G.R. No. 206965, November 29, 2017

P a g e | 165
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
cannot be utilized to frustrate the legitimate efforts of law enforcers.1 Minor deviation from the mandated
procedure in handling the corpus delicti must not absolve a guilty defendant.2

While the chain of custody has been a crucial issue that led to acquittals in drugs cases, this Court has still ruled
that non-conformity with the mandated procedure in handling the seized drugs does not automatically mean that
the seized items' identity was compromised, which necessarily leads to an acquittal

In other words, the arresting officers' non-compliance with Section 21 is not fatal, provided
that there is a justifiable reason for their deviation and that the evidentiary worth of the
seized drugs or articles was preserved. Non-conformity with the mandated procedures will not
make the arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized inadmissible as evidence.
What matters most is that the integrity and evidentiary worth of the seized articles were
maintained since these will be used in resolving the guilt or innocence of the accused.168

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARIEL CALVELO y CONSADA

G.R. No. 223526, December 6, 2017

In all prosecutions for violations of R.A No. 9165, the corpus delicti is the dangerous drug
itself.35 The corpus delicti is established by proof that the identity and integrity of the subject
matter of the sale, i.e., the prohibited or regulated drug, has been preserved;36 hence, the
prosecution must establish, beyond reasonable doubt the identity of the dangerous drug to
prove its case· against the accused. The prosecution can only forestall any doubts on the
identity of the dangerous drug seized from the accused to that which was presented before the
trial court if it establishes an unbroken chain of custody over the seized item. The prosecution
must be able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug, from
the moment of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti. 37 In other
words, it must be established with an unwavering exactitude that the dangerous drug presented
in court as evidence against the accused is the same as that seized from him in the first place.38

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL DELA ROSA Y LUMANOG@

"MANNY"
G.R. No. 230228, December 13, 2017

The chain of custody rule

Aside from the inconsistent dates of the conduct of the buy-bust operation, the Court finds
that the prosecution failed to sufficiently comply with the chain of custody rule. In prosecuting
both illegal sale of dangerous drugs, a conviction cannot be sustained if doubt persists on the
identity of said drugs. The identity of the dangerous drug must be established with moral
certainty. Apart from showing that the elements of sale are present, the fact that the dangerous
drug illegally sold is the same drug offered in court as an exhibit must likewise be established
with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.21

xxx

Notably, in the amendment of R.A. No. 10640, the apprehending team is now required to
conduct a physical inventory. of the seized items and photograph the same in (1) the presence
of the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized,
or his/her representative or counsel, (2) with an elected public official, and (3) a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to
sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. In the present case, as the alleged
crime was committed on March 29, 2009, then the provisions of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165
and its IRR shall apply.

P a g e | 166
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. AMRODING MACUD y DIMAAMPAO,,
G.R. No. 219175, December 14, 2017

A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact they are subject to
scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The Court cannot reluctantly close its eyes to
the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of custody over the same
there could have been tampering, alteration, or substitution of substances from other cases-by accident
or otherwise-in which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence was submitted for laboratory
testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than that applied to cases involving
readily identifiable objects must be applied, a more exacting standard that entails a chain of custody of
the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it improbable that the original item has either
been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with. 47 (Emphasis supplied)

Jurisprudence identified four critical links in the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs, to wit: ''first, the seizure
and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the
turnover of the illegal dn1g seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by
the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and, fourth, the
turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court." 48

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALEXANDER ALVARO y DE LEON

and ROSALIE GERONIMO y MADERA
G.R. No. 225596, January 10, 2018

First. Concerning the place of marking, Siborboro testified that he immediately marked and inventoried the seized
items at the place of arrest.42 This was, however, contradicted by P03 Castillo who testified that they did not
prepare the inventory at the place of the arrest since Laperal Compound was teeming with people; instead, they
conducted the inventory along EDSA, at the trunk of the service vehicle. 43

Second. The prosecution failed to show that the inventory was made in the presence of the accused as required by
law. The presence of the required witnesses, i.e., the representatives from the media and the DOJ, and any elected
official, was also not established. While records show that Brgy. Chairman Bobier had signed the inventory
receipt, based on Siborboro's statement, the former was not present when the same was prepared and that it was
only brought to his office for signature.44 For his part, PO3 Castillo testified that the apprehending team
immediately returned to their office right after the inventory and preservation marking, without passing by any
other place. He also contradicted his previous statement that the inventory was made along EDSA when he later
stated that Brgy. Chairman Bobier signed the inventory receipt at the place of arrest. 45

Third. The prosecution failed to show that the seized items were photographed. While Siborboro could not
recall if photographs of the seized items were taken,46 PO3 Castillo testified that the items were photographed
by a designated photographer.47 Unfortunately, the records do not support P03 Castillo's claim as the prosecution
did not offer the photographs of the seized items as evidence. 48

Fourth. The sachet subject of the sale was purportedly marked by Siborboro as "JSJR" and the other sachet
confiscated from Geronimo was marked as "JSJR-l."49 However, the crime laboratory's report shows that S/Insp.
Mangalip, the forensic chemist, examined two (2) sachets, one marked "JSJRND" and the other "JSJR-
1."50 Instead of presenting PO1 Santos - as the receiving investigator - and S/Insp. Mangalip, the prosecution
stipulated upon and dispensed with their testimonies.51 The stipulation was limited to the fact "[t]hat the white
crystalline substance contained in a transparent plastic sachet with markings 'JSJR and JSJR-I' were submitted to
the PNP Crime Laboratory Office together with the Request for Laboratory Examination." 52 Consequently, no
witness could explain the provenance of the sachet "JSJRND" and the whereabouts of the sachet "JSJR" after
the same was left to the custody of PO1 Santos. Neither did the prosecution justify if the said discrepancy was a
mere typographical error.

Fifth. The records reveal that the request for laboratory examination was not delivered by PO1 Santos but by a
certain Serrano.53 Siborboro and PO3 Castillo both failed to explain how Serrano came to possess the seized
items, while PO2 Orante's s testimony54 shows that he had no personal knowledge of the arrest and what
transpired thereafter. With PO1 Santos's testimony stipulated upon and dispensed with, no witness was able to
explain how Serrano came to have custody over the seized items.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARILOU HILARIO y DIANA and

LALINE GUADAYO y ROYO
G.R. No. 210610, January 11, 2018

P a g e | 167
As the Court declared in Mallillin v. People,39 the presumption of regularity is merely just that - a mere presumption
disputable by contrary proof and which, when challenged by the evidence, cannot be regarded as binding truth.
Suffice it to say that this presumption cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if
not overthrown by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The lack of conclusive identification of the illegal drugs
allegedly seized from Hilario in this case strongly militates against a finding of guilt.

Also worth reproducing hereunder is the declaration of the Court in People v. Pagaduan40that:

We are not unmindful of the pernicious effects of drugs in our society; they are lingering maladies that destroy
families and relationships and engender crimes. The Court is one with all the agencies concerned in pursuing an
intensive and unrelenting campaign against this social dilemma. Regardless of how much we want to curb this
menace, we cannot disregard the protection provided by the Constitution, most particularly the presumption of
innocence bestowed on the appellant. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or that quantum of proof sufficient to
produce moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is
indispensable to overcome this constitutional presumption. If the prosecution has not proved, in the first place,
all the elements of the crime charged, which in this case is the corpus delicti, then the appellant deserves no less
than an acquittal.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO SANTOS ZARAGOZA

G.R. No. 223142, January 17, 2018

The Court has explained in a catena of cases the four (4) links that should be established in the chain of custody
of the confiscated item: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused
by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for
laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the
forensic chemist to the court.56

On the first link, jurisprudence dictates that '"(M)arking' is the placing by the apprehending officer of some
distinguishing signs with his/her initials and signature on the items seized. It helps ensure that the dangerous
drugs seized upon apprehension are the same dangerous drugs subjected to inventory and photography when
these activities are undertaken at the police station or some other practicable venue rather than at the place of
arrest. Consistency with the 'chain of custody rule requires that the 'marking' of the seized items - to truly ensure
that they are the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence - should be done
(I) in the presence of the apprehended violator and (2) immediately upon confiscation. 57

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GERALD ARVIN ELINTO RAMIREZ

AND BELINDA GALIENBA LACHICA
G.R. No. 225690, January 17, 2018

This would not be the first instance when the Court would reverse a conviction for these reasons: (1) there was
a patent disregard of the procedure laid out in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165; (2) there were gaps in the chain of
custody over the seized drugs; and (3) the lack of a valid excuse for noncompliance with Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165. The presence of these circumstances quantifies as reasonable doubt involving the most important element
in drug-related cases-the existence of the dangerous drug itself.

It is of prime importance that the identity of the dangerous drug is established beyond a reasonable doubt and
that it must be proven that the item seized during the buy-bust operation is the same item offered in
evidence.16 As the drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense, its preservation is essential to sustain
a conviction for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs.17 Thus, like any other element of a crime or offense, the corpus
delicti must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NIÑO FLOR y MORA

G.R. No. 216017, January 19, 2018

The failure of the police officers to immediately take an inventory of the seized shabu is not
fatal to the prosecution of the case. It did not render the arrest of the appellant who was
caught in flagrante delicto illegal nor did the omission render the seized drugs inadmissible. What
is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the

P a g e | 168
seized drugs. In this case, despite the circumstances that prevented the police officers from
immediately taking an inventory of the seized drugs, we agree and uphold the findings of the
CA that the shabu presented in court was duly preserved with its integrity and evidentiary value
uncompromised.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LAWRENCE GAJO y BUENAFE and RICO

GAJO y BUENAFE
G.R. No. 217026, January 22, 2018

More particularly, the chain of custody refers to recorded authorized movements and custody of confiscated
dangerous drugs, or controlled substances. It involves testimony on every link in the chain - from the confiscation
of the illegal drugs to its receipt in the forensic laboratory up to its presentation in court. Every person who
touched the seized item must describe how and from whom he or she received it; where and what happened to
it while in the witness' possession; its condition when received and at the time it was delivered to the next link in
the chain.40

Generally, there are four links in the said chain of custody: 1)the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal
drug confiscated from the accused by the apprehending officer; 2) the turnover of the seized drug by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; 3) the turnover by the investigating officer of said item to the
forensic chemist 'for examination; and, 4) the turnover and submission thereof from forensic chemist to the
court.41

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BOBBY S. ABELARDE

G.R. No. 215713, January 22, 2018

"Law enforcers should not trifle with the legal requirement [set forth in Section 21 of Republic Act (RA) No.
9165] to ensure integrity in the chain of custody of seized dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia. This is
especially true when only a minuscule amount of dangerous drugs is alleged to have been taken from the
accused."1

Xxx

While the chain of custody has been a critical issue leading to acquittals in drug cases, we have
nevertheless held that non-compliance with the prescribed procedures does not necessarily
result in the conclusion that the identity of the seized drugs has been compromised so that an
acquittal should follow. The last paragraph of Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR of RA No.
9165 provides a saving mechanism to ensure that not every case of non-compliance will
irretrievably prejudice the prosecution's .case. To warrant the application of this saving
mechanism, however, the prosecution must recognize and explain the lapse or lapses in the
prescribed procedures. The prosecution must likewise demonstrate that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the evidence seized have been preserved.

In the present case, the prosecution miserably failed to adduce evidence establishing the chain
of custody of t11e seized illegal drugs and failed as well to establish compliance with the saving
mechanism discussed above.

In Lopez v. People, we laid down the requirements that must be followed in handling an illegal
drug seized:

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission
of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question
is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain,
from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way
that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition
in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the
chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had
been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain
to have possession of the same.

P a g e | 169
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.BRIAN VILLAHERMOSO
G.R. No. 218208, January 24, 2018

Jurisprudence has consistently held that "prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment
operation x x x especially if the buy-bust team is accompanied to the target area by their informant." 11 Such is
the situation in this case. PO2 Villaester, who was designated as the poseur buyer, was assisted by the confidential
informant, who contacted the appellant to inform the latter that there was a prospective buyer of "shabu."12

As to the Chain of Custody Rule, the Court, taking into consideration the difficulty of complete compliance with
the said rule, has considered substantial compliance sufficient "as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending police officers." 13

In this case, although the marking of the evidence was done at the police station, the Court quotes with approval
the discussion of the CA on the matter.

In the instant case, the policemen were justified in marking the sachets of shabu at their office. [Appellant] was
struggling and trying to get away from the police, as testified by defense witness Alex Esconas. [Appellant] himself
testified that he even elbowed one of the arresting officers as he was resisting arrest. The priority of the arresting
officers is to apprehend the offender. They would have had difficulty, if not impossibility, in marking the corpus
delicti at that the scene of the crime considering that the [appellant] was quite out of control. 14

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALVIN JUGO y VILLANUEVA

G.R. No. 231792, January 29, 2018

Nonetheless, it has been clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not always be possible.41 In fact, the IRR of RA
9165 - which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 42 - provides that the
said inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the
apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the
requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render
void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or
team. 43 In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid
out in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody
over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is a
justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved. 44 However, prevailing jurisprudence instructs that for the above-saving clause to
apply, the prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and
value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. Moreover, the justifiable ground for non-
compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that
they even exist.45

Xxx

In this light, prosecutors are strongly reminded that they have the positive duty to prove compliance with the
procedure set forth in Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended. As such, they must have the initiative to not only
acknowledge but also justify any perceived deviations from the said procedure during the proceedings
before the trial court. Since compliance with this procedure is determinative of the integrity and evidentiary
value of the corpus delicti and ultimately, the fate of the liberty of the accused, the fact that any issue regarding the
same was not raised, or even threshed out in the court/s below, would not preclude the appellate court, including
this Court, from fully examining the records of the case if only to ascertain whether the procedure had been
completely complied with, and if not, whether justifiable reasons exist to excuse any deviation. If no such reasons
exist, then it is the appellate court's bounden duty to acquit the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSHUA QUE Y UTUANIS

G.R. No. 212994, January 31, 2018

The chain of custody requirements in the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act is

cast in precise, mandatory language. They are not stringent for stringency's own sake.
Rather, they are calibrated to preserve the even greater interest of due process and the
constitutional rights of those who stand to suffer from the State's legitimate use of

P a g e | 170
force, and therefore, stand to be deprived of liberty, property, and, should capital
punishment be imposed, life. This calibration balances the need for effective
prosecution of those involved in illegal drugs and the preservation of the most basic
liberties that typify our democratic order.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GLENN DE GUZMAN y DELOS REYES

G.R. No. 219955, February 5, 2018

In simpler terms, the following links must be established to ensure that the identity
and integrity of the seized items had not been compromised: first, the seizure and
marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the
investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized
from the forensic chemist to the court.40

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE vs. ABDULWAHID PUNDUGAR

G.R. No. 214779, February 7, 2018

It is settled that failure to strictly comply with the prescribed procedures in the inventory (and marking) of seized
drugs does not render an arrest of the accused illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him inadmissible.
What is essential is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same
would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 17

The primordial concern, therefore, is the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
which must be proven to establish the corpus delicti. Here, records disclosed that after PO2 Julaton received one
plastic sachet and confiscated another four plastic sachets containing shabu from the appellant, he immediately
brought the same to the police station where he marked them "AB," "AB-1," AB-2," "AB-3" and '"AB-4,"
respectively. He then forwarded the said plastic sachets of shabu duly marked to the PNP Crime Laboratory,
Camp Crame, Quezon City for laboratory examination. These duly marked items were received personally by
Forensic Chemist PSI Ballesteros. After a quantitative examination conducted by PSI Ballesteros, the contents
of the plastic sachets were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Upon being
weighed, the plastic sachets were determined to be containing 0.04 grams for the item sold and an aggregate
weight of 0.20 grams for the items recovered from the appellant's possession. When these items were presented
during the trial, PO2 Julaton positively identified them as the items sold and recovered from the possession of
the appellant. The prosecution had established that there was an unbroken chain of custody over the subject
illicit items resulting, undoubtedly, in the preservation of their integrity and evidentiary value.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JESUS DUMA GAY y SUACITO

G.R. No. 216753, February 7, 2018

The Court has consistently ruled that each link in the chain of custody rule must be
sufficiently proved by the prosecution and examined with scrutiny by the court.74 The
prosecution has the burden to show ''every link in the chain, from the moment the
dangerous drug was seized from the accused until the time it is offered in court as
evidence."75 Failure to strictly comply with rules of procedure, however, does not ipso
facto invalidate or render void the seizure and custody over the items as long as the
prosecution is able to show that "(a) there is justifiable ground for noncompliance; and
(b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved."76 Thus, in case the police officers fail to strictly comply with the rules of
procedure, they must be able to "explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and
that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved x x
x because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even
exist."77 In other words, taking into consideration the difficulty of complete

P a g e | 171
compliance with the chain of custody requirement, the Court has considered
substantial compliance sufficient "as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending police officers."78

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRISTHIAN* KEVIN GUIEB y BUTAY

G.R. No. 233100, February 14, 2018

Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 outlines the procedure which the police officers must follow when handling
the seized drugs to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value.29 Under the said section, prior to its amendment
by RA 10640,30 the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure and confiscation
conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused or the
person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign
the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, and the seized drugs must be turned over to the
PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination. 31 In the case
of People v. Mendoza,32 the Court stressed that "[w]ithout the insulating presence of the representative from
the media or the [DOJJ, or any elected public official during the seizure and marking of the [seized
drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts
conducted under the regime of [RA] 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate
the integrity and credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein
of the corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the
accused. Indeed, the x x x presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody." 33

The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible.34 In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA 1064035 - provide that the said
inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21
of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the
seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer or team.36 Tersely put, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with the
procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over
the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is a justifiable
ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.37 In People v. Almorfe,38 the Court explained that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution
must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
evidence had nonetheless been preserved:39 Also, in People v. De Guzman,40 it was emphasized that the justifiable
ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are
or that they even exist.41

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMIL GALICIA y CHAVEZ

G.R. No. 218402, February 14, 2018

Chain of custody of the seized drugs and drug paraphernalia.

With regard to the alleged failure of the police officers to comply with the procedure required in the seizure of
drugs, the records show that the prosecution was able to establish an unbroken chain of custody over the seized
drugs – from the seizure and confiscation of the shabu up to the delivery of the same to the crime laboratory and
presentation in Court. As correctly held by the CA, the police officer properly preserved the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items when SPO2 Agbalog and PO2Beascan seized and marked the sachets
of shabu with the markings "RLB-1 to RLB-8" and "RLB-9-RLB17" for the aluminum foil tooters. Thereafter,
the items were inventoried under the Receipt of Property Seized. 18 PO2 Beascan then delivered the items to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. In the Initial Laboratory Report No. D-122-06 dated February 11, 2006,
by Forensic Chemist P/Insp. Alejandro C. De Guzman, "RLB- 1" to "RLB-8" as well as the aluminum foil
tooters marked as "RLB-10", "RLB- 12'', ''RLB-13", and "RLB-17" tested positive for the presence of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride.19 Finally, the same sachets and aluminum foil tooters were presented and
turned over to the court where SPO2 Agbalog declared that the said items were the same items that were seized
from the appellant.

P a g e | 172
The failure of the prosecution to present the forensic chemist to testify on how the seized items were handled
and taken into custody is not fatal to the admissibility of the seized drugs and their paraphernalia. In People v.
Padua,20 the Court held:

Further, not all people who came into contact with the seized drugs are required to testify in court. There is
nothing in Republic Act No. 9165 or in any rule implementing the same that imposes such requirement. As long
as the chain of custody of the seized drug was established not to have been broken and that the prosecution did
not fail to identify properly the drugs seized, it is not indispensable that every person who came into possession
of the drugs should take the witness stand. x x x

What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized drugs.
In this case, the Court upholds the findings of the CA that the shabu and its paraphernalia that were presented in
court were the same items seized from the appellant with its integrity and evidentiary value uncompromised.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAUL MANANSALA y MANIN ANG

G.R. No. 229092, February 21, 2018

The mere marking of the seized drugs, unsupported by a physical inventory and taking
of photographs, and in the absence of the necessary personalities under the law, fails
to approximate compliance with the mandatory procedure under Section 21 of RA
9165.39 Needless to state, the barangay blotter, which is merely a recording of the
incident, is not equivalent to or a substitute for a physical inventory that accounts and
lists down in detail the items confiscated from the accused. Besides, "[e]ntries in
official records, as in the case of a police blotter, are only prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated" and are "[n]ot necessarily entitled to full credit for it could be
incomplete and inaccurate, sometimes from either partial suggestions or for want of
suggestions or inquiries."40 Neither can the Court excuse the alleged absence of a
camera as a justifiable reason for noncompliance with the photography rule, since the
cause of such absence was never explained. Nor does the plain allegation that the
"commotion had already happened" - without explaining its compelling nature -
dispense with the necessity for the seized items to be properly inventoried. It is well
settled that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive
law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural
technicality.41 Therefore, it must be shown that earnest efforts were exerted by the
police officers involved to comply with the mandated procedure to convince the Court
that the failure to comply was reasonable under the given circumstances. Since this
was not the case here, the Court is impelled to conclude that there has been an
unjustified breach of procedure and hence, the integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti had been compromised. Consequently, Manansala's acquittal is in
order.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NAMRAIDA ALBOKA Y NANING @

"MALIRA" G.R. No. 212195, February 21, 2018

The corpus delicti in cases involving dangerous drugs is the presentation of the dangerous drug
itself.46 "For both offenses, the prosecution must establish the identity of the seized dangerous
drugs in a way that their integrity is well preserved - from the time of seizure or confiscation
from the accused until the time of presentation as evidence in court. The fact that the
substance said to have been illegally sold or possessed was the very same substance offered in
court as an exhibit must be established."47 The chain of custody rule performs this function as
it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed.48

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALVIN VELASCO y HUEVOS

G.R. No. 219174, February 21, 2018

P a g e | 173
Although the last paragraph of Section 2l(a) of the IRR has set a saving mechanism such that
the non-compliance with the required procedures would not automatically invalidate the
seizure and custody of the dangerous drugs recovered or seized, the applicability of the saving
mechanism is conditioned upon the rendering by the apprehending team of a justification for
such non-compliance. Otherwise, the failure to render the justification will create doubt as to
the identity and the evidentiary value of the drugs presented as evidence in court.

Notably, the apprehending officers who had initial custody of the drugs did not reveal why
the requisite inventory, marking, and photographing were done only after transporting of the
seized dangerous drugs from the point of the confiscation of the drugs to the Calapan Police
Station, and why the same was done in the presence only of the barangay chairman. The failure
to justify on the part of the arresting team could only mean that the important links in the
chain of custody were absent, and this constituted a fatal flaw in the incrimination of Velasco.
Indeed, the apprehending officers had to explain during the trial the failure to justify. At the
minimum, such justification would bring the arrest of Velasco back on the road of regularity.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROY MAGSANO y SAGAUINIT

G.R. No. 231050, February 28, 2018

In this case, the Court cannot simply turn a blind eye against the unjustified deviations
in the chain of custody on the sole ground that the defense failed to raise such errors
in detail before the trial court. Considering the nature of appeals in criminal cases as
above-discussed, it is then only proper to review the said errors even if not specifically
assigned. Verily, these errors, which go to the sufficiency of the evidence of the corpus
delicti itself, would indeed affect the court's judgment is ultimately ascertaining whether
or not the accused should be convicted and hence, languish in prison for possibly a
significant portion of his life. In the final analysis, a conviction must prudently rest on
the moral certainty that guilt has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore,
if doubt surfaces on the sufficiency of the evidence to convict, regardless that
it does only at the stage of an appeal, our courts of justice should nonetheless
rule in favor of the accused, lest it betrays its duty to protect individual liberties
within the bounds of the law.[[57]] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

ROMMEL RAMOS y LODRONIO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 227336, February 26, 2018

Based on the foregoing, Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 requires the apprehending team, after seizure and confiscation,
to immediately conduct a physical inventory; and photograph the same in the presence of (1) the accused or
the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, (2) a representative from the media and (3) the DOJ, and (4) any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. 26

In addition, Sec. 21 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 provides a saving clause which states that non-compliance with
these requirements shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over the confiscated items
provided that such non-compliance was under justifiable grounds and the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team. 27

Xxx

In the amendment of R.A. No. 10640, the apprehending team is now required to
conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in (1) the
presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) with an elected public
official and (3) a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the
media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy

P a g e | 174
thereof.28 In the present case, as the alleged crimes were committed on August 23,
2009, then the provisions of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR shall apply.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALLAN BUGTONG y AMOROSO

G.R. No. 220451, February 26, 2018

As a general rule, there are four links in the chain of custody of the recovered item: (1) the confiscation and
marking, if practicable, of the specimen seized from the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) it is turnover
by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (3) the investigating officer's turnover thereof to the
forensic chemist for examination; and, (4) its submission by the forensic chemist to the court.27

As the starting point of the chain of custody, the immediate marking of the specimen is necessary because it
serves as a reference for and by the subsequent handlers of the item. Marking is also used to distinguish the
subject item from any similar or related evidence from their seizure until their disposal after the proceedings.
More particularly, marking refers to the placement by the apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of one's
initials or signature or any identifying signs on the specimen. It must be done in the presence of the apprehended
violator of the law, and immediately upon his or her apprehension. 28

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. WILSON RAMOS y CABANATAN

G.R. No. 233744, February 28, 2018

It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not perse render the
confiscated items inadmissible.39 However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of
any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165
must be adduced.40 In People v. Umipang,41 the Court held that the prosecution must show that
earnest efforts were employed in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law for
"a sheer statement that representatives were unavailable without so much as an explanation
on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other representatives, given the
circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse."42 Verily, mere statements of unavailability,
absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified
grounds for non-compliance.43 These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are
ordinarily given sufficient time - beginning from the moment they have received the
information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest - to prepare for a
buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing
full well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section
21 of RA 9165. As such, police officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their
noncompliance but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to
comply with the mandated procedure and that under the given circumstances, their actions
were reasonable.44

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. TENG MONER y ADAM

G.R. No. 202206, March 5, 2018

To reiterate, noncompliance with the chain of custody rule is excusable as long as there exist
justifiable grounds which prevented those tasked to follow the same from strictly conforming
to the said directive. The preceding discussion clearly shows that the apprehending officers, in
this case, did not totally disregard the prescribed procedure but, instead, demonstrated
substantial compliance with what was required. It was likewise explained that the divergence
in procedure was not arbitrary or whimsical but because the buy-bust team decided that they
could not linger at the crime scene as it would unduly expose them to security risks since they
were outside their area of responsibility.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CRISPIAN MERCED LUMAYA a.k.a.

"IPYANG", and DEREK JOSEPH LUMAYA
G.R. No. 231983, March 7, 2018

P a g e | 175
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of
Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be possible.40 In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of
RA 9165 - which is now crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA 1064041 - provide that the said
inventory and photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in
instances of warrantless seizure, and that non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165
- under justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody over the seized
items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer or team. 42 In other words, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly comply with
the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and the IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody
over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is a justifiable
ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved.43 In People v. Almorfe,44 the Court stressed that for the above-saving clause to apply, the
prosecution must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses and that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. 45 Also, in People v. De Guzman,46 it was
emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact because the Court
cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist .47

While it appears that the apprehending officers, in this case, did conduct a physical inventory and photography
of the drugs allegedly seized from the accused, it is, nonetheless, baffling that the number of sachets shown in
the photographs taken (i.e., eighteen [18]) does not correspond with the number of sachets for which the accused,
as per the subject Information and inventory report, 48 were herein charged (i.e., eleven [11]). This discrepancy -
if left unaccounted for - clearly renders suspect the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs because
not only would it be difficult to determine the actual identity of the drugs for which the accused are charged (that
is, which eleven [11] among the eighteen [18] sachets displayed in the photos taken were the charges based on),
but a numerical variance would also arouse suspicions of planting and/or switching. Indeed, when the law
requires that the drugs be physically inventoried and photographed immediately after the seizure, it follows that
the drugs so inventoried and photographed should - as a general rule - be the self-same drugs for which the
charges against a particular accused would be based. The obvious purpose of the inventory and photography
requirements under the law is precisely to ensure that the identity of the drugs seized from the accused are the
drugs for which he would be charged. Any discrepancy should therefore be reasonably explained; otherwise, the
regularity of the entire seizure procedure would be put into question.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCELINO CRISPO y DESCALSO alias

"GOGO" and ENRICO HERRERA y MONTES
G.R. No. 230065, March 14, 2018

At this point, it is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per
se render the confiscated items inadmissible.48 However, a justifiable reason for such failure or
a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 must be adduced.49 In People v. Umipang,50 the Court held that
the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed in contacting the
representatives enumerated under the law for "[a] sheer statement that representatives were
unavailable - without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed
to look for other representatives, given the circumstances - is to be regarded as a flimsy
excuse."51 Verily, mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact
the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance.52 These
considerations arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time -
beginning from the moment they have received the information about the activities of the
accused until the time of his arrest - to prepare for a buy-bust operation and consequently,
make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they would have to strictly
comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. As such,
police officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their non-compliance but
must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with
the mandated procedure and that under the given circumstances, their actions were
reasonable.[[53]]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NESTOR AÑO y DEL REMEDIOS

G.R. No. 230070, March 14, 2018

While the fact of marking and inventory of the seized item was established by the attached Inventory of
Seized/Confiscated Items,37 the records are glaringly silent as to the presence of the required witnesses, namely,

P a g e | 176
the representatives from the media and the DOJ. To reiterate, Section 21 (1) of RA 9165, before its amendment
by RA 10640, as well as its IRR requires the presence of the following witnesses during the conduct of inventory
and photography of the seized items: (a) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel; (b) any elected public official; and (c) a representative from
the media and the DOJ.38 In their absence, the prosecution must provide a credible explanation justifying the
noncompliance with the rule; otherwise, the saving clause under the IRR of RA 9165 (and now, the amended
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165) would not apply.

Here, no such explanation was proffered by the prosecution to justify the procedural lapse. It then follows that
there are unjustified gaps in the chain of custody of the items seized from Año, thereby militating against a finding
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, which resultantly warrants his acquittal.39 It is well-settled that the procedure
under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple
procedural technicality; or worse ignored as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. 40

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICHAEL LUNA y TORSILINO

G.R. No. 219164, March 21, 2018

Following a plain reading of the law, it is now settled that non-compliance with the
mandatory procedure in Section 21 triggers the operation of the saving clause
enshrined in the IRR of RA 9165. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a
statute there should be no departure. Stated otherwise, in order not to render void and
invalid the seizure and custody over the evidence obtained, the prosecution must, as a
matter of law, establish that such non-compliance was based on justifiable grounds
and that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items were
preserved. 68 Hence, before the prosecution can rely on this saving mechanism, they
(the apprehending team) must first recognize lapses, and, if any are found to exist, they
must justify the same accordingly.69

SALIC MAPANDI y DIMAAMPAO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 200075, APRIL 4, 2018

From his testimony, we gather that he had marked the seized item with his initials "HJ."
However, upon closer examination of the documents prepared after the buy-bust operation,
i.e., the affidavit of apprehension, the receipt of property/evidence seized, and the request for
laboratory examination, shows that the markings on the supposed confiscated drug were
"DEG-SDM-01-11-10-07."19 Even the chemistry report indicates that the specimen that was
examined was "one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with markings "DEG-SDM-01-
11-10-07 containing 16.1 grams of alleged Methamphetamine Hydrochloride" and not an item
that was marked with "HJ."20 On this discrepancy alone, the prosecution's evidence
establishing the chain of custody shatters because we are uncertain if what was explained in
the laboratory was the same item that was confiscated from Mapandi. If the point of marking
is to set it apart from other pieces of evidence of similar nature or to ensure that there was no
planting or switching evidence, we cannot say those objectives were met under these
circumstances.

Given the procedural lapses pointed out above, serious uncertainty hangs over the identification of the shabu that
the prosecution introduced in evidence.1âwphi1 In effect, the prosecution failed to fully prove the elements of
the crime charged, creating a reasonable doubt on the criminal liability of the accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs DINA CALATES y DELA CRUZ

G.R. No. 214759, APRIL 4, 2018

The lack of any justification tendered by the arresting officers for any lapses in the
documentation of the chain of custody of confiscated dangerous drugs warrants the acquittal

P a g e | 177
of the accused in a prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs on the ground of
reasonable doubt. The accused has no burden to prove her innocence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAMONCITO CORNEL y ASUNCION

G.R. No. 229047, APRIL 16, 2018

The CA also ruled that the prosecution was able to sufficiently explain why the item seized
was not immediately marked, thus:

Here, it has been explained by the prosecution that the reason why the item seized from the appellant was not
immediately marked at the target place was that a commotion ensued after the appellant's arrest. For security
purposes and to prevent any damage, the arresting team decided to make the markings at the Barangay Hall of
East Rembo, Makati.22

This Court, however, finds the said explanation as insufficient and unjustifiable considering that the team who
arrested the appellant was composed of eight (8) police officers, and only one of them was unarmed. A such
number of armed police operatives could have easily contained a commotion and proceeded with the immediate
inventory of the seized item to comply with the law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PASTORLITO V. DELA VICTORIA

G.R. No. 233325, APRIL 16, 2018

Marking after the seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, the seized contraband
must be immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the
markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence
from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the
accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus, preventing
switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.

It must be noted that marking is not found in R.A. No. 9165 and is different from the inventory-taking and
photography under Section 21 of the said law. Long before Congress passed R.A. No. 9165, however, this Court
had consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs would cast
reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.47

Xxx

The mere marking of the seized drugs, as well as the conduct of an inventory, in violation of
the strict procedure requiring the presence of the accused, the media, and responsible
government functionaries, fails to approximate compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA
9165.50 The presence of these personalities and the immediate marking and conduct of
physical inventory after seizure and confiscation in full view of the accused and the
required witnesses cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality.51 While non-
compliance is allowed, the same ought to be justified. Case law states that the prosecution
must show that earnest efforts were exerted by the PDEA operatives to comply with the
mandated procedure as to convince the Court that the attempt to comply was reasonable
under the given circumstances. Since this was not the case here, the Court is impelled to
conclude that there has been an unjustified breach of procedure and hence, the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised.52 Consequently, Dela Victoria's
acquittal is in order.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAYCENT MOLA y SELBOSA a.k.a.

"OTOK" G.R. No. 226481, APRIL 18, 2018

P a g e | 178
The illegal drugs being the corpus delicti, the prosecution needs to establish with moral certainty and prove beyond
reasonable doubt that the illegal drugs presented and offered in evidence before the trial court are the same illegal
drugs lawfully seized from the accused, and tested and found to be positive for dangerous substance.29 At bar,
evidence at hand does not support the conclusion that the integrity and evidentiary value of the subject sachet
of shabu were successfully and properly preserved and safeguarded through an unbroken chain of custody. The
prosecution manifestly failed to prove that the marked and inventoried illegal substance was the very same object
taken from Mola and that the one found positive for shabu by the crime laboratory was the same sachet of illegal
drugs that were delivered to and received by the court.

Certainly, the prosecution bears the burden of proof to show valid cause for non-compliance with the procedure
laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended.30 It has the positive duty to demonstrate observance
thereto in such a way that, during the proceedings before the trial court, it must initiate in acknowledging and
justifying any perceived deviations from the requirements of the law. 31 Its failure to follow the mandated
procedure must be adequately explained and must be proven as a fact in accordance with the rules on
evidence. The rules require that the apprehending officers do not simply mention a justifiable ground, but also
clearly state this ground in their affidavit, coupled with a statement on the steps they took to preserve the integrity
of the seized item. 32 A stricter adherence to Section 21 is required where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is
minuscule since it is highly susceptible to planting, tampering, or alteration. 33

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MALOU ALVARADO y FLORES, ALVIN

ALVAREZ y LONQUIAS and RAMIL DAL y MOLIANEDA
G.R. No. 234048, APRIL 23, 2018

In the recent case of People v. Macud, 27 we stressed the importance of this requirement, thus:

We cannot even declare that there was substantial compliance with the law in this case as the police officers
invited no other person to witness the procedures that were done after the buy-bust operation, i.e., the marking,
inventory, and photography of the seized drugs. There was no representative of the media or the DOJ and
no allegation that these people could similarly compromise the operation if they had been informed of and
present before, during, and after the operation.

The presence of the persons who should witness the post-operation procedures is necessary to insulate
the apprehension and incrimination proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity. The
insulating presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody. We have
noted in several cases that a buy-bust operation is susceptible to abuse, and the only way to prevent this is to
ensure that the procedural safeguards provided by the law are strictly observed. In the present case, not only have
the prescribed procedures not been followed but also (and more importantly) the lapses not justifiably explained.
In People v. Dela Cruz where there was a similar failure to comply with Section 21 of RA No. 9165, the Court
declared:

"x x x This inexcusable non-compliance effectively invalidates their seizure of and custody over the seized drugs,
films, compromising the identity and integrity of the same. We resolve the doubt in the integrity and identity of
the corpus delicti in favor of the appellant as every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be established by
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Considering that the prosecution failed to present the required quantum of
evidence, appellants acquittal is in order."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MANUEL FERRER y REMOQUILLO

a.k.a. "KANO," KIYAGA MACMOD y USMAN a.k.a. "KIYAGA" and DIMAS
MACMOD y MAMA a.k.a. "DIMAS,"
G.R. No. 213914, June 6, 2018

While it would appear from the certificate of inventory that the inventory was witnessed by
"Ding Bermudez" (Bermudez) of the Press Corps and barangay kagawad "Artemio P.
Torres" (Torres), the prosecution never tried to elicit from Viernes how and when these
witnesses to the inventory affixed tl1eir respective signatures on the certificate. Neither was
Bermudez and Torres called to the witness stand to testify on how they signed the certificate.
The Court cannot close its eyes on this glaring flaw as it has repeatedly stressed
that" [w]ithout the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the
Department of Justice, or any elected public official during the seizure and marking
of the [seized drugs], the evils of switching, 'planting' or contamination of the
evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of R.A No. 642567 again
reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and credibility of the seizure and

P a g e | 179
confiscation of the [said drugs] that were evidence herein of the corpus delicti, and
thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. Indeed,
the x x x presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody. 68

Xxx xxx

Thus, noncompliance with the requirements of Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 on justifiable grounds shall not render
void and invalid the seizure and custody of the confiscated items as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the items had been properly preserved by the apprehending team. The burden, therefore, is with the
prosecution to prove that: (a) there is a justifiable ground for non-compliance; and (b) the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.73

The record, however, is bereft of any showing that the prosecution was able to establish the justifiable ground
on why the apprehending team did not comply with the guidelines outlined in Sec. 21, R.A. No. 9165, and to
prove that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been preserved. Since the justifiable
ground for noncompliance was not proven as a fact, the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that
they even exist. 74 Unquestionably, the first link in the chain of custody, in this case, was inherently weak causing
it to irreversibly break from the other links. With the absence of the first link, there can no longer be a chain of
custody to speak of; hence, it becomes immaterial to dwell on the succeeding links.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAY SUAREZ y CABUSO

G.R. No. 223141, June 6, 2018

In this case, we find that the prosecution failed to establish the first link in the chain of custody.1âwphi1 As
previously discussed, there was a failure to mark the drugs immediately after they were allegedly seized from the
appellant. The items were marked only at Police Station A, and the prosecution offered no reasonable explanation
as to (a) why the items were not immediately marked after seizure - POI Mateo merely stated in passing that there
was a commotion because it was a public place;47 and (b) why the buy-bust team brought the seized items to
Police Station A instead of Police Station 5 which was closer to the place of arrest.

Xxx

It is settled that "the failure of the authorities to immediately mark the seized drugs raises reasonable doubt on
the authenticity of the corpus delicti and suffices to rebut the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties."59 Such presumption, too, cannot arise in cases where the questioned official acts
are patently irregular.60

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EVELYN SEGUIENTE y RAMIREZ

G.R. No. 218253, June 20, 2018

The Court has already ruled that marking upon immediate confiscation does not exclude the
possibility that marking can be at the police station or office of the apprehending
team. 14 However, while there was testimony about the marking of the seized substance at the
police station, there was no mention that the marking was done in the presence of the
appellant. As ruled in People v. Salonga, 15 the marking "must always be done in the presence of
the accused or his representative."

Another procedural lapse committed by the arresting team was their noncompliance with the photograph and
physical inventory requirements under RA 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). Though
there was a Certificate of Inventory on record, the fact remains that the prosecution admitted that it was not
complete since the only signature appearing thereon was that of the Intelligence Operative (SPO I
Himor). 16 There was no mention whether the inventory was done in the presence of the appellant or her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public
official. Worse, the arresting officer PO1 Ismula was not even sure if an inventory was indeed made because he
did not see the person who signed it. Hence, no inventory was prepared,

Xxx

In the present case, the prosecution did not explain why the procedure was not followed or whether there was a
justifiable ground for failing to do so. The prosecution did not bother to justify its lapses by conducting a re-
direct examination or through rebuttal evidence despite the defense raising such matters during the trial. "These
lapses effectively produced serious doubts on the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti especially in the face of
an allegation of a frame-up. "21 As ruled in People v. Relato,22 "[i]t is settled that the State does not establish

P a g e | 180
the corpus delicti when the prohibited substance subject of the prosecution is missing or when substantial gaps in
the chain of custody of the prohibited substance raise grave doubts about the authenticity of the prohibited
substance presented as evidence in court. Any gap renders the case for the State less than complete in terms of
proving the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt."

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RASHID BINASING y DISALUNGAN

G.R. No. 221439, JULY 4, 2018

Non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Republic Act (RA) No. 91651 casts
doubt on the integrity of the seized items and creates reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. 2

The Court has ruled that the failure of the prosecution to offer any justifiable explanation for its non-compliance
with the mandatory requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 creates reasonable doubt in the conviction of the
accused of violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165.23

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERCINDO BOBOTIOK, JR. y LONTOC

G.R. No. 237804, JULY 4, 2018

The prosecution justified the conduct of the inventory and photograph of the seized item at
the police station instead of the place of the buy-bust operation by raising the issue of security.
However, a reading of the transcript of PO1 Balbin's testimony reveals that this justification
is a mere afterthought since his initial reason is the darkness of the place of arrest. It was only
after the diligent prodding by the public prosecutor that PO1 Balbin mentioned the risk of
security. Other than this statement, nowhere in the records was it shown that there was any
actual threat or risk taken by the buy-bust team during the arrest that had prevented them
from conducting the inventory and photographing the seized drugs.

Even assuming arguendo that the buy-bust team's act of conducting the inventory and
photographing of the seized drugs at the police station was justified, it still suffered from a
major procedural lapse since it was not done in the presence of any elected public official, a
representative of the National Prosecution Service, or the media. While such requirement,
under justifiable reasons, shall not render void the seizure of the subject item, the prosecution
must nonetheless explain its failure to abide by such procedural requirement and show that
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item were preserved.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODEL BELMONTE y SAA

G.R. No. 224588, JULY 4, 2018

The conflicting testimonies of the apprehending team as to who had custody of the
confiscated items from the police station to the laboratory generate unce1iainty as to the
whereabouts of these items that corollary thereto create doubt on whether the evidence
presented before the RTC were the same items seized from the accused-appellant.

xxx

Contrary to the findings of the CA, the deviations by the police officers from the guidelines in R.A. No. 9165
does not relate to minor procedural matters that would not result in the nullification of the arrest of the accused-
appellant and the seizure of the shabu. It is well-settled that the procedure under Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165
is a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored
as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. 63 Additionally, the blunders committed by the police
officers relative to these guidelines cannot qualify as a mere insignificant departure from the law but rather were
gross disregard of the procedural safeguards prescribed in the substantive law, thus, "serious uncertainty is
generated about the identity of the seized items that the prosecution presented in evidence.64

P a g e | 181
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EVELYN PATRICIO Y CASTILLO, ALIAS
"NINGNAY
G.R. No. 202129, JULY 23, 2018

Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 provides the chain of custody rule, outlining the procedure that police
officers must follow in handling the seized drugs to ensure that their integrity and evidentiary value are preserved.
Under the said section, before its amendment by R.A. No. 10640, 16 the apprehending team shall, among others,
immediately after seizure and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and take photographs of the seized items
in the presence of the accused or the person from whom such items were seized, or his representative or counsel,
a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall
then sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same; and the seized drugs must be turned over
to the PNP Crime Laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from confiscation for examination purposes. 1

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. REYNALDO ROJAS y VILLABLANCA, JR.

G.R. No. 222563, JULY 23, 2018

The failure of the arresting officers to explain the lapses in their compliance with the
safeguards imposed by law for preserving the integrity of the confiscated substances as
evidence of the corpus delicti entitles the accused to acquittal on the ground of failure of the
State to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALLAN LUMAGUI y MALIGID

G.R. No. 224293, JULY 23, 2018

The teaching consistently upheld in our jurisdiction is that in all prosecutions for violations of
R.A. No. 9165, the corpus delicti is the dangerous drug itself, the existence of which is essential
to a judgment of conviction; thus, its identity must be established.24 The prosecution must be
able to account for each link in the chain of custody over the dangerous drug from the moment
of seizure up to its presentation in court as evidence of the corpus delicti. 25 The justification for
this declaration is elucidated as follows:

Narcotic substances are not readily identifiable. To determine their composition and nature, they must undergo
scientific testing and analysis. Narcotic .substances are also highly susceptible to alteration, tampering, or
contamination. It is imperative, therefore, that the drugs allegedly seized from the accused are the very same
objects tested in the laboratory and offered in court as evidence. The chain of custody, as a method of
authentication, ensures that unnecessary doubts involving the identity of seized drugs are removed. 26

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARCIANO UBUNGEN Y PULIDO

G.R. No. 225497, JULY 23, 2018

Because of this discrepancy between the marking on the sachet seized by PO1 Abubo and the
marking on the sachet submitted to the crime laboratory, it could not be reasonably and safely
concluded that they are the same.

Indeed, it is possible that the forensic chemist committed a typographical error when she typed
the marking "AJA" instead of "JA" in her chemistry report. The Court, however, could not
just accept this supposition considering that the prosecution did not explain this glaring and
obvious variance. As such, there is reasonable doubt that the third link in the chain of custody
- the transfer of the sachet from the investigating officer to the forensic chemist- was not
complied with.

Xxx

The lapses committed by the prosecution and the law enforcers herein could not be considered minor. Indeed,
establishing every link in the chain of custody is crucial to the preservation of the integrity, identity, and
evidentiary value of the seized illegal drug. Failure to demonstrate compliance with even just one of these links
creates a reasonable doubt that the substance confiscated from the accused is the same substance offered in
evidence.

P a g e | 182
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MICHAEL CABUHAY
G.R. No. 225590, JULY 23, 2018

The chain of custody is established by testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was
picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness'
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in
the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change
in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. 33

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROSE EDWARD OCAMPO y EBESA

G.R. No. 232300, August 1, 2018

Although the requirements stated in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 has not been strictly followed, the prosecution
was able to prove a justifiable ground for doing so.1awp++i1 The refusal of the members of the media to sign
the inventory of the seized items as testified to by PO1 Llacuna can be considered by the Court as a valid ground
to relax the requirement. In People v. Angelita Reyes, et al.,26 this Court enumerated certain instances where the
absence of the required witnesses may be justified, thus:

x x x It must be emphasized that the prosecution must able to prove a justifiable ground in omitting certain
requirements provided in Sec.21 such as but not limited to the following: 1) media representatives are not
available at that time or that the police operatives had no time to alert the media due to the immediacy of the
operation they were about to undertake, especially if it is done in more remote areas; 2) the police operatives,
with the same reason, failed to find an available representative of the National Prosecution Service; 3) the police
officers, due to time constraints brought about by the urgency of the operation to be undertaken and to comply
with the provisions of Article 12527 of the Revised Penal Code in the timely delivery of prisoners, were not able
to comply with all the requisites outlined in Section 21 of R.A. 9165.

Xxx

If, from the examples of justifiable grounds is not strictly following the requirements in Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165, as provided by this Court, the presence of the required persons can be dispensed with, there is more reason
to relax the rule in this case because the media representatives were present but they simply refused to sign the
inventory. It needs no elucidation that the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty must be
seen in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the performance of an act or duty or
prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. 29 The presumption, in other words, obtains only where
nothing in the records is suggestive of the fact that the law enforcers involved deviated from the standard conduct
of official duty as provided for in the law.30 Otherwise, where the official act in question is irregular on its face,
an adverse presumption arises as a matter of course. 31 There is indeed merit in the contention that where no ill
motives to make false charges was successfully attributed to the members of the buy-bust team, the presumption
prevails that said police operatives had regularly performed their duty, but the theory is correct only where there
is no showing that the conduct of police duty was irregular.32 Suffice it to say at this point that the presumption
of regularity in the conduct of police duty is merely just that - a mere presumption disputable by contrary proof
and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. 33

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RYAN MARALIT y CASILANG

G.R. No. 232381, August 1, 2018

Considering that the police officers explained the absence of the DOJ representative, coupled
with the fact that they endeavored to comply with the mandatory procedure by securing the
presence of elected officials and a representative from the media, their failure to strictly
observe Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not fatal to the case. The integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized evidence were nonetheless preserved because there were other witnesses to the
marking and inventory of the seized bricks of marijuana. Two (2) barangay officials and a
representative from the media were present during this stage, photographs were taken, and an
inventory signed by these witnesses was prepared.61 Furthermore, while the inventory does

P a g e | 183
not bear the signature of Maralit, the photographs show that Maralit was present during the
marking and inventory of the seized items.62

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARICEL PATACSIL y MORENO

G.R. No. 234052, August 6, 2018

At this point, it is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per
se render the confiscated items inadmissible.39 However, a justifiable reason for such failure or
a showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 must be adduced.40 Mere statements of unavailability, absent
actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are unacceptable as justified grounds
for non-compliance.41 These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are
ordinarily given sufficient time - beginning from the moment they have received the
information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest - to prepare for a
buy-bust operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing
full well that they would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section
21, Article II of RA 9165.42

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. DOMINGO ASPA, JR. y RASIMO

G.R. No. 229507, August 6, 2018

In People v. Dasigan,22 the Court declared that the chain of custody is not established solely by compliance with
the prescribed physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs in the presence of the enumerated
persons. In the said case, no photographs were taken by the apprehending officers, and the inventory was not
shown to have been made in the presence of selected public officials, yet we sustained the judgment of conviction.
This Court explained:

However, this Court has, in many cases, held that while the chain of custody should ideally be perfect, in reality,
it is not, "as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain." The most important factor is the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the
guilt or innocence of the accused. Hence, the prosecution's failure to submit in evidence the physical inventory
and photograph of the seized drugs as required under Article 21 of R.A. No. 9165, will not render the accused's
arrest illegal or the items seized from him inadmissible.23

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH PONTIJOS LIBRE @ "JOY JOY"

and LEONILA PUEBLAS LIBRE @ "INDAY NILAY,"

G.R. No. 235980, August 20, 2018

Notably, the absence of a DOJ representative during the inventory and photography of the
seized drugs is not per se fatal to the prosecution's cause.1a\^/phi1 However, as earlier
intimated, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to demonstrate that genuine and earnest
efforts were employed in securing the presence of the DOJ representative or that there exists
a justifiable reason for non-compliance. Here, the police officers, in their affidavits, merely
stated that "the team exerted efforts to contact any representative from the Department of Justice but to no
avail."47 Far from satisfying the legal requirement, this statement partakes of a mere general
conclusion that is bereft of any discernible detail regarding the steps and efforts the police
officers had undertaken to secure the presence of the DOJ representative. As the Court held
in People v. Umipang,48 "[a] sheer statement that representatives were unavailable - without so
much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other
representatives, given the circumstances - is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse"49 - as in this
case - and hence, not a valid excuse for non-compliance.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HENRY BANQUILAY y ROSEL

G.R. No. 231981, August 20, 2018

As demonstrated by the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and the supporting documents they presented
and offered, the chain of custody did not suffer from serious flaws. In the recently promulgated People of the

P a g e | 184
Philippines v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro,26 citing People of the Philippines v. Teng Manery Adam,27 We held that "if the
evidence of illegal drugs was not handled precisely in the manner prescribed by the chain of custody rule, the
consequence relates not to the inadmissibility that would automatically destroy the prosecution's case but rather
to the weight of evidence presented for each particular case." The Court further held that:

x x x x requirements of marking of the seized items, the conduct of inventory, and taking of photographs in the
presence of a representative from the media or the DOJ and a local elective official, are police investigation
procedures that call for administrative sanctions in case of non-compliance. Violation of such procedure may
even merit penalty under RA No. 9165, to wit:

xxxx

However, non-observance of such police administrative procedures should not affect the validity of the seizure
of the evidence, because the issue of chain of custody is ultimately anchored on the admissibility of evidence,
which is exclusively within the prerogative of the courts to decide under the rules on evidence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. BENJAMIN FERIOL y PEREZ

G.R. No. 232154, August 20, 2018

In this case, while the inventory34 and the photography of the seized items were made in the presence of Feriol
and an elected public official, the records do not show that the said inventory and photography were done before
any representative from the DOJ and the media. The apprehending officers did not bother to acknowledge or
explain such lapse, as the records even fail to disclose that there was an attempt to contact or secure these
witnesses' presence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. YASSER ABBAS ASJALI

G.R. No. 216430, September 3, 2018

The markings on the three sachets of shabu, purportedly seized or confiscated from accused-
appellant, was done not by any of the members of the buy-bust team who apprehended
accused-appellant, but by P/Insp. Tubo, the assigned investigating officer, at the police station
where the accused-appellant was brought following his arrest. In addition, there is no proof
that the markings were done in the presence of the accused-appellant.

Moreover, the records do not bear any stipulation between the parties, or a statement in the
affidavits of the buy-bust team members, or an averment in the prosecution witnesses'
testimonies that a physical inventory and photograph of the seized drugs were taken
immediately upon accused-appellants arrest or even later on at the police station. No certificate
of inventory or inventory receipt or photograph of the seized drugs is attached to the records
of the case. There is also no showing at all that representatives from the media and the DOJ
and an elected public official were present at the place of arrest or at the police station to
witness, together with the accused-appellant or his representative or counsel, the conduct of
the physical inventory and taking of photographs of the seized drugs:

Ultimately, the corpus delicti has not been satisfactorily established by the prosecution in this
case. That the prosecution failed to present evidence to account for the very first link in the
chain of custody already puts the rest of the chain into question and compromises the integrity
and evidentiary value of the three sachets of shabu supposedly seized from the accused-
appellant. Thus, there is already reasonable doubt as to whether the seized drugs were the
same drugs presented in court as evidence.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMY LIM y MIRANDA

G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018

Thus, the links in the chain of custody that must be established are: (1) the seizure and marking, if practicable, of
the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the turnover of the seized illegal drug
by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (3) the turnover of the illegal drug by the investigating

P a g e | 185
officer to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and ( 4) the turnover and submission of the illegal
drug from the forensic chemist to the court. 18

Xxx

The prosecution likewise failed to explain why they did not secure the presence of a
representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ). While the arresting officer, IO1 Orellan,
stated in his Affidavit that they only tried to coordinate with the barangay officials and the
media, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to show that they tried to contact a
DOJ representative.

The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses also failed to establish the details of an earnest
effort to coordinate with and secure the presence of the required witnesses. They also failed
to explain why the buy-bust team felt "unsafe" in waiting for the representatives in Lim's
house, considering that the team is composed of at least ten (10) members, and the two
accused were the only persons in the house.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JIMBOY SUICO y ACOPE

G.R. No. 229940, September 10, 2018

Appellant finally argues that the absence of testimony of PO1 Romeo Adlaon, Jr. (PO1
Adlaon), the officer who received the specimen in the crime laboratory, was fatal and
constituted a glaring gap in the chain of custody. We are not swayed by the appellant's
argument that the non-presentation of PO1 Adlaon as a witness was fatal to the prosecution's
case. As the Court held in People v. Padua:32

[N]ot all [the] people who came into contact with the seized drugs are required to testify in court. There is nothing
in Republic Act No. 9165 or in any rule implementing the same that imposes such requirement. As long as the
chain of custody of the seized drug was established not to have been broken and that the prosecution did not
fail to identify properly the drugs seized, it is not indispensable that every person who came into possession of
the drugs should take the witness stand. x x x

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JANET PEROMINGAN y GEROCHE

G.R. No. 218401, September 24, 2018

We further note that the "TURN OVER RECEIPT/INVENTORY OF SEIZED ITEMS" allegedly prepared
by SPO1 Antonio Marcos had not been signed by SPO 1 Marcos, or by the accused-appellant, or by any of the
personalities required by law to witness the inventory and the photographing of the confiscated dangerous drugs
(namely: the media representative, the representative from the DOJ, and an elective official). 14 The absence of
SPO1 Marcos' signature from the document engendered doubts about the proper custody and handling of the
dangerous drug after leaving the hands of SPO3 Del Rosario. Indeed, there was no way of ascertaining whether
or not SPO1 Marcos had truly received the dangerous drug from SPO3 Del Rosario unless there was evidence
from which to check such information. It is notable that the inventory itself - being dated June 28, 2008 - was
faulty by virtue of its being dated before the apprehension of the accused-appellant on July 1, 2008.

PEOPLE VS. OBIAS, G.R. NO. 222187, MARCH 25, 2019

FACTS: By virtue of a Search Warrant, the cock farm and rest house of
the accused were searched by the NBI, PNP, and PDEA. dangerous drugs
were found inside the bedroom being occupied by two employees of the
accused.

ISSUE: Can the accused be held liable even if the dangerous drugs were
not found in his actual possession?

HELD: It remains unrefuted that, at the time of the search, appellant was
the owner and possessor of the rest house based on established facts and
evidence. As owner of the cock farm and the rest house, appellant clearly
had full control and dominion over all the rooms located therein, including

P a g e | 186
 the bedroom where the thing seized were located. Possession, under the
law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession.
Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate possession or
control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exists
when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when
he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it
[was] found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The accused
cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over
the place where the contraband is located is shared with another.

The finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a house or building

owned or occupied by a particular person raises the presumption of
knowledge and possession thereof which, standing alone, is sufficient to
convict." In the present case, appellant failed to rebut by sufficient
evidence that he did not in fact exercise power and control over the place
searched and the items seized and that he did not intend to do so.
Appellant also failed to adduce evidence that he was authorized by law to
possess the same.

PEOPLE VS. MERANDO, G.R. NO. 232620, AUGUST 05, 2019

ISSUE#1: What constitutes the corpus delicti in illegal sale of drugs?

HELD: In prosecutions for illegal sale of drugs, what is material is proof

that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence. The dangerous drug
itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense and to sustain a
conviction, the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti must be shown
to have been preserved. This requirement necessarily arises from the ‘illegal
drug's unique characteristic that renders it indistinct, not readily
identifiable, and easily open to tampering, alteration or substitution either
by accident or otherwise.’ In drugs cases, it is essential that the identity of
the prohibited drug be established beyond reasonable doubt. The mere fact
of unauthorized possession or sale is not sufficient to sustain a finding of
guilt. The fact that the substance said to be illegally sold is the very same
substance offered in court as exhibit must be established.

ISSUE#2: When failure to comply with Section 21 is excused

HELD: The Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.

9165 states that noncompliance with the law's requirements may be
allowed as long as the arresting officers offer a justifiable ground and prove
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, despite
noncompliance, have been properly preserved. This clause, however, will
not work to help the prosecution's case. A perusal of the records reveals
that the prosecution offered no justifiable reason for their failure to strictly
comply with the mandate of Section 21. They merely relied on the
presumption that unless there was contrary evidence indicating ill motive
on their part, they were presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner. However, this presumption arises only when no facts exist
suggesting that the arresting officers deviated from the standard conduct of
official duty. It will not be applied when their official act is irregular on its
face.

P a g e | 187
PEOPLE VS. SANTOS, G.R. NO. 243627, NOVEMBER 27, 2019

HELD: Due to varying field conditions, strict compliance with the chain
of custody procedure may not always be possible. As such, the failure of
the apprehending team to strictly comply with the same would not ipso facto
render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided
that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is a justifiable
ground for noncompliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preserved.

SAYRE VS. XENOS, ET AL., G.R. NOS. 244413, 244415-16, FEBRUARY 18, 2020
(EN BANC)

ISSUE#1: Whether or not the adoption by the Supreme Court of the

Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases (A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC)
is an exercise of its constitutionally mandated power to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts

HELD: A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC is a rule of procedure established

pursuant to the rule-making power of the Supreme Court that serves as
a framework and guide to the trial courts in plea bargaining in violations
of R.A. 9165.

ISSUE#2: Did DOJ Circular No. 27 violate the rule making

authority of the Supreme Court?

HELD: DOJ Circular No. 27 did not repeal, alter, or modify the Plea
Bargaining Framework in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC. Therefore, the DOJ
Circular No. 27 provision pertaining to acceptable plea bargain for
Section 5 of R.A. 9165 did not violate the rule-making authority of the
Court. DOJ Circular No. 27 merely serves as an internal guideline for
prosecutors to observe before they may give their consent to
proposed plea bargains.

TUMABINI VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 224495, FEBRUARY 19, 2020

ISSUE#1: In applying the Chain of Custody Rule, what is the

difference between a warrantless seizure and a seizure by means of a
Search Warrant?

HELD: The only recognizable difference between seizure and

confiscation of drugs pursuant to a search warrant and a buy-
bust operation is the venue of the physical inventory and
taking of photographs of the said drugs. In People v. Lazaro, the Court
explained that the venue of physical inventory is not limited to the
place of apprehension. The venues of the physical inventory and
photography of the seized items differ and depend on whether the seizure
was made by virtue of a search warrant or through a warrantless seizure
such as a buy-bust operation.

When the drugs are seized pursuant to a search warrant, the physical
inventory and taking of photographs shall be conducted at the place where
the said search warrant was served. In contrast, when the drugs are seized

P a g e | 188
 pursuant to a buy-bust operation or a warrantless seizure, then these can
be conducted at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending team. Other than that, there is no other difference between
seizure and confiscation of drugs with a search warrant and without it
(such as a buy-bust operation).

ISSUE#2: Does the “saving clause” of Section 21 of RA 9165 (and its

IRR), also apply to seizures by virtue of a Search Warrant?

HELD: This saving clause does not distinguish between cases with
a search warrant and a buy-bust operation. Whether drugs were seized
in a buy-bust operation or in the implementation of the search warrant, the
prosecution can invoke the saving clause provided that there is justifiable
reason for noncompliance with the procedural lapses and the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized drugs are established.

ISSUE#3: When the implementation of a Search Warrant on a house

yields dangerous drugs, and the lawful occupant or any member of
his family are absent, may the marking, inventory, and taking of
photographs of the said dangerous drugs be witnessed by two
persons of “sufficient age and discretion residing in the same
locality.”

HELD: Based on verba legis, Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended,

operates as long as there is seizure and confiscation of drugs. It does not
distinguish between warrantless seizure of the drugs in a buy-bust
operation and in the implementation of a search warrant. Accordingly, in
every situation where there is a seizure and confiscation of drugs, the
presence of the accused, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official,
is required during the physical inventory and taking of photographs of the
seized drugs, because they shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof.

The Court is aware that Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised

Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that only two (2) witnesses are
required to be present during the implementation of a search warrant:

Section 8. Search of house, room, or premise to be made in

presence of two witnesses. — No search of a house, room, or any other
premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant
thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, two
witnesses of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.

Nevertheless, Sec. 8 of Rule 126 is a general provision with respect to

the implementation of search warrants in all kinds of cases, such as for
illegal firearms, infringing goods, or incriminating documents. On the
other hand, Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and as implemented by
its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR), is a special provision that
applies specifically to the seizure and confiscation of dangerous drugs. In
case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must
prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Thus, it has been held
that — [t]he fact that one law is special and the other general creates a
presumption that the special act is to be considered as remaining an
exception of the general act, one as a general law of the land and the other
as the law of the particular case.
|||

P a g e | 189
PEOPLE VS. BALUYOT, 243390, OCTOBER 5, 2020

HELD: (Citing the case of People vs. Romy Lim) In the event of absence
of one or more of the witnesses, the prosecution must allege and prove
that their presence during the inventory of the seized items was not
obtained due to reasons such as:

(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a
remote area;

(2) their safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs
was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the accused or any
person/s acting for and in his/her behalf;

(3) the elected official themselves were involved in the punishable acts
sought to be apprehended;

(4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative

and an elected public official within the period required under Article 125
of the Revised Penal Code proved futile through no fault of the arresting
officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or

(5) time constraints and urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often
rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from
obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders
could escape.

PEOPLE VS. DEJOS, G.R. NO. 237423, OCTOBER 12, 2020

ISSUE#1: The plan was a buy-bust operation but the accused, after
giving the drugs to the poseur-buyer, was immediately arrested
without yet receiving the buy-bust money. What is the crime
committed?

HELD: In this case, while there was an agreement of sale of illegal drugs
between accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer, accused-appellant was
suddenly arrested before having accepted the consideration of the sale.
Conformably with People v. Dasigan and People v. Hong Yeng E, et al.,
the Court agrees with the trial court that the offense committed is Illegal
Possession of Dangerous Drugs. This is in keeping with the settled rule
that possession of dangerous drugs is necessarily included in the sale of
prohibited drugs.

ISSUE#2: How is the identity of the dangerous drugs established with

moral certainty?

HELD: To establish the identity of the dangerous drugs with moral

certainty, the prosecution must be able to account for each link of the chain
of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in
court as evidence of the offense. As part of the chain of custody procedure,
the law requires, inter alia, that the marking, physical inventory, and
photography of the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and
confiscation of the seized drugs: What is more, the inventory and
photography must be done in the presence of the accused or the person
from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well
as certain required witnesses, namely: (a) if prior to the amendment of RA

P a g e | 190
 9165 by RA 10640, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any
elected public official; or (b) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA
10640, an elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service or the media. The law requires the presence of these
witnesses primarily to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and
remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence.

PEOPLE VS. REAFOR, G.R. NO. 247575, NOVEMBER 16, 2020

FACTS: Accused filed a Motion to Plea Bargain contending that as

per A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, he may be allowed to plead guilty to a lesser
offense of violation of Section 12, Article II of RA 9165, which is
punishable only by imprisonment ranging from six (6) months and one (1)
day to four (4) years, and a fine ranging from P10,000.00 to P50,000.00.
The prosecution opposed the motion, invoking Department of Justice
(DOJ) Circular No. 27, which provides that for the crime charged against
respondent, the acceptable plea bargain is for violation of Section 11 (3),
Article II of RA 9165, punishable by imprisonment ranging from twelve
(12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years, and a fine ranging from
P300,000.00 to P400,000.00. The judge granted the motion despite the
opposition of the prosecution.

ISSUE: Whether or not a judgment of conviction based on a plea

bargain to which the prosecution did not give consent is valid.

HELD: Effectively, respondent's plea of guilty to a lesser offense (to

which he was convicted of) was made without the consent of the
prosecution. Since respondent's plea of guilt and subsequent conviction
for a lesser offense clearly lack one of the requisites of a valid plea bargain,
the plea bargaining is void. Resultantly, the judgment rendered by the RTC
which was based on a void plea bargaining is also void ab initio and
cannot be considered to have attained finality for the simple reason that a
void judgment has no legality from its inception. Thus, since the judgment
of conviction rendered against respondent is void, it is only proper to
resume with the trial of Criminal Case No. 2017-0053 — which prior to
respondent's filing of his motion to plea bargain, was at the stage of the
prosecution's presentation of evidence — without violating respondent's
right against double jeopardy.

PEOPLE V. ABALLARI, G.R. NO. 205880, JANUARY 12, 2021

FACTS: After conducting the buy-bust operation, the poseur-

buyer did not immediately mark the confiscated sachets. He turned it over
to the investigating officer who, however, was not part of the buy-bust
team. The investigating officer was also not present when the accused was
arrested and the sachets were confiscated from him. There was also no
physical inventory and photographing made. Likewise, none of the
required witnesses under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was
present, as the apprehending team did not even bother to prepare a
physical inventory of the seized items.

ISSUE: Whether or not the no-compliance with the requirements

of the chain of custody rule was justified.

P a g e | 191
 RULING: The record is silent of any justification proffered by the
prosecution as to why the markings were not made immediately after the
seizure and confiscation of the plastic sachets in the presence of accused-
appellant.The apprehending team likewise offered no explanation or
justification as to why the preparation of an inventory was impracticable. The
apprehending team neither offered a justification nor even recognized the
flagrant irregularities in their apprehension of accused-appellant and the seizure
and confiscation of the illegal drugs. In fact, the apprehending team displayed
an egregious indifference towards the mandatory guidelines
under R.A. No. 9165. Thus, the chain of custody rule was not complied with.

PEOPLE VS. ALUNAN, G.R. No. 244170, JANUARY 25, 2021

FACTS: This case involves a buy-bust operation conducted by the

police with the help of a confidential informant. The buy-bust money was
not recorded in the blotter before the buy-bust operation, and prior
surveillance was also not conducted. The poseur-buyer, however, was able
to purchase marijuana from the accused.

ISSUE#1: Was there instigation on the part of the poseur-

buyer?

HELD: This Court has already held that a police officer's act of
soliciting drugs from the accused during a buy-bust operation, or what is
known as a "decoy solicitation," is not prohibited by law and does not
render invalid the buy-bust operations. The sale of contraband is a kind of
offense habitually committed, and the solicitation simply furnishes
evidence of the criminal's course of conduct.

Here, the solicitation by PO3 Mananquil and the confidential

informant of drugs from appellant is mere evidence of a course of
conduct. PO3 Mananquil received an intelligence report that appellant had
been selling prohibited drugs. The police officers duly acted on it by
utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with appellant. There
was no showing that the confidential informant induced appellant to sell
drugs to him. In fact, appellant already sold marijuana to the confidential
informant before the buy-bust operation.

ISSUE#2: Did the absence of a prior surveillance cast doubt

on the existence of a buy-bust operation?

HELD: No, it did not. This Court has ruled that there is no rigid
or textbook method of conducting buy-bust operations, and the selection
of appropriate and effective means of entrapping drug traffickers is best
left to the discretion of police officers. Thus, the absence of a prior
surveillance does not affect the regularity of a buy-bust operation,
especially when the buy-bust team was accompanied to the scene by the
informant, as in this case.

ISSUE#3: Since the police did not record the mark money in
the police blotter prior to the buy-bust operation, is it fatal to the
prosecution’s case?

HELD: The fact that the marked money was not recorded in the
police blotter before the buy-bust operation is not fatal to the
prosecution's case. As properly held by the CA, the recording of the buy-

P a g e | 192
 bust money in the police blotter before the buy-bust operation is not an
element of the illegal sale of dangerous drugs and is not required by law or
jurisprudence.

ISSUE#4: Was the chain of custody established?

HELD: Yes. Here, the inventory and photographing of the seized

evidence were done at the place of arrest in the presence of appellant,
Barangay Captain Fontelo, media representative Mira, and DOJ
representative Abrio. After the inventory, PO3 Mananquil remained in
possession of the seized items until their turn over to PCI Llena for the
forensic examination. Thereafter, PCI Llena stored the seized items in their
evidence room and only retrieved the same on May 18, 2015 for its
presentation to the trial court.
(NOTE: There is no second link in this case because the poseur-
buyer did not turn over the drug evidence to an investigator.)

REMOQUILLO VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 239508, FEBRUARY 3, 2021

HELD: Contrary to the finding of the appellate court that the

prosecution was able to present a chain of custody that removed any doubt
or suspicion on the confiscated items, this Court found an apparent break
in the chain of custody. As testified to by PO1 San Francisco, PO1
Durwin, Jr. personally received and held the seized items in his possession.
As observed PO1 Durwin, Jr. was never presented in court to testify on
the circumstances while the items were in his possession until the same
was forwarded to Forensic Chemist Soriano. Worse, the stipulations and
admissions between the parties showed a different story, that is, PO1
Durwin, Jr. was never a part of the equation.||

PEOPLE VS. GUZMAN, G.R. NO. 253145, FEBRUARY 8, 2021

FACTS: Charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the

accused moved to plea bargain under Section 12. Despite opposition from
the prosecution, the RTC granted the motion and allowed the accused to
plead guilty under Section 12 but declared him ineligible for probation.
The RTC explained that Guzman was convicted for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs although his sentence corresponds to the penalty for
illegal possession of drug paraphernalia. Dissatisfied, accused elevated the
case to the CA on certiorari. The CA allowed his probation. The OSG thus
elevated the case to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether the basis of the right to probation is the crime

charged or the crime to which the accused pleaded guilty.

HELD: It is clear from both Section 24, Article II of RA 9165 and the
provisions of the Probation Law that in applying for probation, what is
essential is not the offense charged but the offense which the accused is
ultimately found guilty of. Thus, regardless of what the original charge was
in the Information, the judgment would be for the lesser offense to which
the accused pled guilty. This means that the penalty to be meted out, as
well as all the attendant accessory penalties, and other consequences under
the law, including eligibility for probation and parole, would be based on
such lesser offense.

P a g e | 193
LINDONGAN VS. PEOPLE, UDK-16615, FEBRUARY 15, 2021

HELD: Insofar as the witness requirement is concerned, non-compliance

may be permitted if the prosecution proves that the apprehending officers
exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure the presence of such
witnesses, albeit they eventually failed to appear. Thus, mere statements of
unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required
witnesses, are unacceptable as justified grounds for non-compliance.

PEOPLE VS. LABAY, G.R. No. 251444, March 3, 2021

ISSUE: Whether or not the prosecution was able to establish

an unbroken chain of custody

HELD: No. For one, Police Officer 1 Jeremias Ramos (PO1

Ramos) testified that he had sole custody of the confiscated items from the
time they were seized until the same had been turned over to the forensic
laboratory. There is nothing on the records, however, showing how PO1
Ramos properly handled or stored the seized items prior to its qualitative
examination.

In People v. Beran, the arresting officer failed to explain how he

preserved his exclusive custody of the seized item until he turned it over to
the forensic chemist. The Court ruled that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized item had been fatally compromised, warranting the
accused's acquittal.

Also, in People v. Gayoso, the Court acquitted Gayoso for the

prosecution's failure to adduce evidence how the seizing officers properly
handled and preserved the drug kept under their custody until it was
turned over to the forensic chemist for qualitative examination. Thus, it
cannot be reasonably concluded that the confiscated item was the same
one seized from Gayoso and eventually presented in court as evidence.

For another, PO1 Ramos claimed that one "Senior Police Officer 1
Jocelyn Sibal (SPO1 Sibal)" purportedly received the seized drugs at
Laguna Provincial Crime Laboratory Office. But "SPO1 Sibal" did not take
the stand to attest that he/she, indeed, personally received the items from
PO1 Ramos. Likewise, "SPO1 Sibal" did not have the opportunity to
testify on the circumstances surrounding: a) the condition of specimens
upon purported receipt thereof; b) the proper handling of the specimens
while they were in his/her custody; c) the exact time he/she turned over
the specimens to Forensic Chemist Grace Plantilla-Bombasi (Forensic
Chemist Plantilla-Bombasi) who performed the qualitative examination
over the same; and d) the condition of the specimens upon being handed
to Forensic Chemist Plantilla-Bombasi. Surely, this is another gap in
the chain of custody of the corpus delicti.

People v. Gajo ordained that persons who had custody of the

seized item should be able to testify on precautionary measures taken to
ensure that its integrity and evidentiary value remained intact from the time
it was confiscated until presented in court as evidence, thus:
x x x to establish an unbroken chain of custody, every person who touched
the seized illegal drug must describe how and from whom it was received;

P a g e | 194
 its condition upon receipt, including its condition upon delivery to the next
link in the chain.

Finally, both the prosecution and defense stipulated on and

dispensed with the testimony of Forensic Chemist Plantilla-Bombasi
during the pre-trial on March 30, 2017. The stipulation focused on the
following: 1) the Laguna Provincial Crime Laboratory Office received ten
(10) pieces heat-sealed plastic sachets; 2) Forensic Chemist Plantilla-
Bombasi conducted a qualitative examination of the specimens which
tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride; and 3) Forensic
Chemist Plantilla-Bombasi had no personal knowledge from whom the
specimens subject of the qualitative examination had been seized.

The stipulation did not bear: 1) the condition of the specimens

before Forensic Chemist Plantilla-Bombasi received them; 2) whether
Forensic Chemist Plantilla-Bombasi labeled the specimens to prevent any
case of alteration or tampering; 3) whether the specimens had been placed
in a secured container or evidence bag; 4) the exact location where the
specimens had been stored; 5) the precautionary steps that Forensic
Chemist Plantilla-Bombasi undertook in preserving the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized drugs while it remained in her possession;
and 7) the proper handling of the seized items upon their retrieval from
an unknown place where they had been kept until the same reached the
court.

Indeed, no explanation was given regarding the custody of the

seized drugs in the interim — from the moment the seized items were
received for laboratory examination until they were presented in court.

PEOPLE VS. MENDOZA, G.R. NO. 242269, March 3, 2021

FACTS: The police conducted the photography and inventory of the seized
items in the absence of a representative of the NPS or media. The
prosecution alleged that it was PO1 Sanoy who tried to contact the required
witnesses but only Kgd. Dela Cruz appeared because it was already night time
and the offices were closed.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reason advanced by the police officer was
justifiable

HELD: While the absence of the required witnesses does not per se render
the confiscated items inadmissible, a justifiable reason for such failure or a
showing of any genuine and sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses
under Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 must be adduced. However, the
mere allegation that PO1 Sanoy contacted the needed witnesses is
insufficient to validate the inventory and marking of the seized items. PO1
Sanoy was not even called to testify to prove this claim. The records are
bereft of any proof that earnest efforts were made to contact the DOJ or
the media. Considering that the police had time to prepare a Coordination
Sheet and a Pre-Operation Report prior to conducting the buy-bust
operation, they should have also had the time to notify the needed witnesses.
Thus, for the prosecution's failure to provide a justifiable reason for its
deviation from the procedure, the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items became doubtful.
||

P a g e | 195
PEOPLE VS. BORRAS, G.R. NO. 250295, MARCH 15, 2021
FACTS: Charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of RA
9165, the accused moved to plea bargain under Section 12 on both
violations. The RTC granted the motion despite opposition from the
prosecution, and declared DC 27 (including its forerunner, DC 61)
unconstitutional. The CA agreed with the RTC but ordered that the
pronouncement declaring DC 27 unconstitutional be deleted.

ISSUE: Whether or not the consent of the Prosecutor is

indispensable in
plea bargaining

HELD: Contrary to the position taken by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, the conformity of the prosecutor to the
proposed plea bargaining in drugs cases is not optional, nay, to be
disregarded. For the prosecutor has full control of the prosecution of
criminal actions; his duty is to always prosecute the proper offense, not any
lesser or graver one, based on what the evidence on hand can sustain. As
guardian of the rights of the people, the State files the criminal action in
the name of the People of the Philippines. The prosecutor who represents
the government is duty bound to defend the public interests, threatened by
crime, to the point that it is as though he or she were the person directly
injured by the offense. Viewed in this light, the consent of the offended
party, i.e., the State, will have to be secured from the prosecutor who acts
on its behalf. (Note: The SC also cited Sayre vs. Xenos).

PEOPLE VS. MAJINGCAR AND LLLAGUNO, G.R. NO. 249629, MARCH 15, 2021

FACTS: Both accused were charged for violation of Sections 5 and 11,
Article II, RA 9165. They moved to plea bargain under Section 12 on both
charges. The prosecution did not object to the plea bargain from Section
11 to Section 12, but opposed the motion to plea bargain from Section 5
to Section 12 citing DC 27. The RTC allowed the motion to plea bargain
of both accused and declared DC 27 unconstitutional. The CA upheld the
ruling of the RTC. It also held that the petition for Certiorari was filed out
of time. It further upheld the trial court's declaration that DOJ Circular
Nos. 027 and 061 and RPO Order No. 027-E-18 are unconstitutional for
being contrary to the intent of Estipona and A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC. At the
SC, a new issue was raised by Majingcar, that is, that his right against
double jeopardy will be violated because his conviction was already final.

ISSUE#1: Was the petition before the CA filed out of time?

HELD: No. The 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 should be counted from notice of the judgment of conviction, not
from the date when both accused got re-arraigned and pleaded guilty to the
lesser offense of violation of Section 12. Plea Bargaining Resolutions
dated August 6, 2018 and September 1, 2018 are mere interlocutory orders
which cannot be the subject of a petition for certiorari.

ISSUE#2: Was the RTC correct in allowing the plea bargaining

without the consent of the prosecutor?

HELD: In drug cases where there is no private offended party, the

consent of the prosecutor is the operative act which vests discretion upon
the court to allow or reject the accused's proposal to plead guilty to a lesser

P a g e | 196
 offense. Thus, where this consent is withheld, no such discretion gets
vested in the court.

ISSUE#3: Did the trial court gravely abuse its discretion when it
motu proprio declared DC 27 unconstitutional?

HELD: The trial court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it motu proprio declared as unconstitutional DOJ Circular
No. 27, albeit there was a total absence of the Constitutionally prescribed
requisites for the exercise of judicial review, viz.: (1) there must be an actual
case or justiciable controversy before the court; (2) the question before it
must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the act must
be a proper party; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest opportunity and must be the very litis mota of the case. Where
the law is straightforward and the facts so evident, failure to know it or to
act as if one does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.
(citing Sayre vs. Xenos).

ISSUE#4: Was there a violation of the right of the accused against

double jeopardy?

HELD: No violation. Under Section 7, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court,

the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for
an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former
complaint or information under any of the following instances:
(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising
from the same act or omission constituting the former charge;
(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were
discovered only after a plea was entered in the former complaint or
information; or,
(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the
consent of the prosecutor and of the offended party except as
provided in Section 1(f) of Rule 116.

PEOPLE VS. DE BALMES, G.R. NO. 250136, MARCH 17, 2021

FACTS: The confiscated evidence was not turned over by the poseur-
buyer to an investigator. The poseur-buyer held on to the seized evidence
and was the one who turned them over to the forensic chemist. This was
allegedly in violation of the 2014 Revised PNP Manual on Anti-Illegal
Drugs Operation and Investigation which requires that the evidence be
turned over to the investigating officer.

ISSUE: Was the chain of custody of the evidence sufficiently established?

HELD: Yes, it was sufficiently established. The absence of an investigator

did not affect the chain of custody since the only ones who had custody of
the seized items were the arresting officer and the forensic chemist.

PEOPLE VS. CONCEPCION, G.R. No. 204019, MARCH 24, 2021

P a g e | 197
 FACTS: This case involves a buy-bust operation conducted prior to the
amendment of R.A. No. 9165 by R.A. No. 10640. Under R.A. No. 9165,
three (3) insulating witnesses were required. Under R.A. No. 10640, only
two (2) are required. The buy-bust operation was consummated but an
issue arose with respect to the chain of custody rule since only two (2)
insulating witnesses were present when the law required three (3).

ISSUE: Whether or not the chain of custody of the evidence was

established

HELD: The Court holds that the buy-bust operation was not conducted
in accordance with law. A perusal of the records reveals that PO1 Gray,
who acted as the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation, supposedly
received the transparent plastic sachet containing shabu from Concepcion.
The transparent heat-sealed plastic sachet was marked and inventoried, as
witnessed and attested to by a media person and a barangay official before
being brought to the Marikina Police Station. There appears to be an
absence of a required witness, i.e., the representative from the Department
of Justice (DOJ). The prosecution failed to establish that the arresting
officers exerted genuine and sufficient efforts to secure the presence of the
said witness. It must be stressed that Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 requires
that the copies of the inventory should be signed by all the following
persons: (a) accused or his/her representative or counsel, (b) an elected
public official, (c) a representative from the media, and (d) a representative
from the DOJ.

PEOPLE VS. SANGCUPAN, G.R. NO. 220462, MARCH 24, 2021

HELD: (This case involves an apprehension by chance, not a

buy-bust operation) First, the apprehending team failed to properly mark
the seized drugs immediately after its seizure and confiscation, in the
presence of accused-appellant. According to PO2 Rillorta, they were only
able to mark the seized items at the police station, since they allegedly
had no marking instruments on them at the time of arrest. DTC

We find this excuse weak and unavailing.

Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link. It

consists of affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items by the
apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his initials or signature or
other identifying signs, should be made in the presence of the apprehended
violator immediately upon arrest.

We emphasized in People v. Gonzales that the prompt marking of the

seized drugs or related items is crucial, because succeeding handlers of the
dangerous drugs or related items will use the marking as reference. Also,
the marking operates to set apart as evidence the dangerous drugs or
related items from other material from the moment they are confiscated
until they are disposed of at the close of the criminal proceedings, thereby
forestalling switching, planting or contamination of evidence. In short, the
marking immediately upon confiscation or recovery of the
dangerous drugs or related items is indispensable in the preservation
of their integrity and evidentiary value.

Second, the apprehending team completely failed to prepare a

physical inventory and take photographs of the seized items.

P a g e | 198
 A review of the record shows that neither an inventory nor
photographs of the seized items were presented in court.

Third, none of the required witnesses under Section 21, Article II

of R.A. No. 9165 was present, as the apprehending team did not even
bother to prepare a physical inventory of the seized items. Similarly, the
apprehending team offered no explanation or justification as to why the
same was impracticable.

The lack of the inventory signed by accused-appellant himself or by

his representative as well as by the representative of the media, the DOJ,
and the elected official as required by law could very well be held to mean
that no dangerous drug had been seized from petitioner on that occasion.

PEOPLE VS. ANCHETA, G.R. NO. 238404, MAY 3, 2021

FACTS: The apprehending officers did not mark the seized sachet
at the place of arrest. They opted to conduct the initial custody requirements
at their office as it was raining at that time, and there was no available table
in the area.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reasons advanced by the

apprehending officer are sufficient to justify deviation from the
requirements of the chain of custody rule

HELD: This explanation is untenable. Foremost, there

was no allegation, much less proof, of how heavy the rain was to prevent
them from inscribing a couple of letters and numbers on one sachet before
leaving the place of arrest and seizure. Moreover, records show that Ancheta
had an umbrella with him during his arrest, which could have been used by
the officer while marking the seized item. Even the team's vehicle could have
served as a shelter for them to be able to perform the simple act of marking.
For the same reason, the lack of table is likewise a flimsy excuse. To be sure,
a table is not indispensable to mark one plastic sachet. In People v.
Ramirez, the apprehending officer claimed that it was not safe to mark,
inventory, and photograph the confiscated items at the place of arrest — a
parking lot in SM Bicutan. The Court, however, did not sustain this excuse
considering that there were more than enough PDEA agents at that moment
to ensure the security in the area while marking the seized items. The Court
even noted that it will not take more than five to 10 minutes for the officer
to mark the items. Thus, in the present case, we find no justifiable
explanation for the apprehending officers' failure to mark one
piece of evidence immediately upon its confiscation and before transport.

In brief, the sachet presented in evidence against Ancheta remained

unmarked from the time it was allegedly confiscated up to the team's arrival
in the office. Doubts, therefore, linger as to the item's identity, integrity, and
whereabouts during the period of transport, creating a critical gap in
the chain of custody, which warrants Ancheta's acquittal.

PEOPLE VS. SABATER, G.R. NO. 249459, JUNE 14, 2021

P a g e | 199
 FACTS: The accused was charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of
RA 9165. About five (5) after the prosecution formally offered its
evidence, he filed a motion to plea bargain from Section 5 to Section 12.
The prosecution opposed citing DC 27. The trial court granted the motion
despite the opposition stating that DC 27 is an encroachment on the Rule-
Making Power of the Supreme Court. The CA denied the Petition for
Certiorari on the ground that it was filed thirty-five (35) days late.

ISSUE#1: Was the petition filed out of time?

HELD: Yes. However, the SC computed and found that the petition was
not thirty-five (35) days late but only one (1) day late. The SC applied the
computation of the period as enunciated in People vs. Majingcar.

ISSUE#2: Since the petition was belatedly filed, did the judgment
become final?

HELD: No. Citing Sayre vs. Xenos, the SC stated that the judgment did
not become final because it was void from the beginning as it was based
on an invalid plea bargaining. Since it is void, it will never lapse into
finality. The SC further stated that the principle of immutability of
judgment is not absolute and admits of four (4) exceptions, viz.:
(1) Correction of clerical errors;
(2) So-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party;
(3) Void judgments; and
(4) Whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.

||| PEOPLE VS. GARAIS, G.R. NO. 246163, JUNE 23, 2021

ISSUE: On the relaxation of the Chain of Custody Rule

HELD: As a general rule, strict compliance with

the chain of custody procedure laid down under Section 21 of RA 9165 is
required in order to preserve the integrity of the corpus delicti. However, due
to varying complexities during police operations, strict compliance with
the chain of custody rule under Section 21 may be relaxed provided the
apprehending team offer justifiable grounds and as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.

We declared in People v. Nandi the four links that should be

established in the chain of custody in order to preserve the integrity of the
seized drug, to wit: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal
drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the
turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the
illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth,
the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the
forensic chemist to the court.

SPO3 Antiporda testified that the buy-bust operation resulted in a

commotion prompting them to conduct the marking and inventory of the
seized Item at the CIDG Camarines Norte for security reasons. Thereafter,
the preparation of the Certificate of Inventory was witnessed by a media

P a g e | 200
 representative and an elected official and in the presence of Garais.
Moreover, the Certificate clearly mentioned that the item subject of sale is
the very same item seized from Garais. SPO3 Antiporda testified that the
same item was brought to the crime laboratory and personally received by
PCI Briñas for examination. Thereafter, PCI Briñas attested that she placed
a masking tape with a red marking on top of the specimen in order to
identify the same and prevent any tampering on it. PCI Briñas also affirmed
that she recorded the retrieval of the said specimen and the time she
conducted the examination.

PEOPLE VS. KENDO & KENDO, G.R. No. 247713, June 23, 2021

FACTS: Based on the testimony of PO2 Saboriendo, the poseur-buyer,

after conducting a buy-bust operation, they brought the accused to the
hospital then to the police station. There, the necessary documents were
prepared, one of which was the Request for Laboratory Examination. This
document was prepared by Chief Police Inspector Jerry Flores. Thereafter,
the buy-bust team proceeded to the crime laboratory and turned over the
specimens to the forensic chemist.

With respect to the forensic chemist, the prosecution and the

defense agreed to stipulate on her testimony. The stipulations are as
follows:

(a) that she received a request for laboratory examination and that
the
specimens were the same specimens submitted to her by PO2
Saboriendo (the poseur-buyer) before she conducted the
examination, which was found positive for shabu, a dangerous
drug, as evidenced by Physical Science Report No. MCSO-D-003-
15; and,

(b) that upon written request of SAIDSOTG, EPD, Marikina City

to the EPD Crime Laboratory Office, she conducted an
examination of the urine sample taken from accused-appellants,
which tested positive for shabu, as evidenced by Physical Science
Report No. MCSO-DT-005-15 to MCSO-DT-006-15.

ISSUE#1: Whether or not the second link (from the seizing officer to
the investigating officer) in the chain of custody was sufficiently
proven.

RULING: The records fail to identify the police officer who conducted
the investigation after the buy-bust team brought the accused-appellants to
the police station, or whether the seized shabu was indeed transmitted to
an investigating officer. PO2 Saboriendo merely testified that after
inventory of the seized shabu and their visit to Amang Rodriguez Medical
Center, the buy bust team travelled to the police station, then to the EPD
Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination of the seized specimens and
turnover to PCI Libres, the forensic chemist. While case records show that
the request for laboratory examination was prepared by CPI Flores, it was
not stated whether he conducted the investigation or if he handled the
seized drug while in the course of accomplishing the necessary documents
for its transfer to the crime laboratory. Thus, a gap exists on who had

P a g e | 201
 custody during and after the investigation and how the seized sachets of
shabu were stored and preserved during such time.

We note from an examination of the Chain of Custody Form and PO2

Saboriendo's testimony that he may have held on to the seized specimen
from the time he recovered it from the appellants until he personally
delivered the same for laboratory examination, and thus he could arguably
account for the condition of the same while it was in his custody until
turnover to PCI Libres. Assuming this to be the case, we nevertheless find
that the failure to turn over the specimens to the investigating officer
remains a serious procedural breach which necessarily casts doubt on the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items.

ISSUE#2: Whether or not the fourth link (from the forensic chemist
to the court) in the chain of custody was sufficiently proven.

RULING: Where parties stipulate on the testimony of the forensic

chemist, such stipulation should include the precautionary steps required in
order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item,
thus: (1) the forensic chemist received the seized item as marked, properly
sealed, and intact, (2) he or she resealed it after examination of the content,
and (3) he or she placed his or her own marking on the same to ensure that
it could not be tampered pending trial. Absent any testimony regarding the
management, storage, and preservation of the illegal drug allegedly seized
herein after its examination, the fourth link in the chain of custody of the
seized items could not be deemed established to a moral certainty.

In the case at bar, the parties stipulated on the proposed testimony

and dispensed with the presentation of PCI Libres, the forensic chemist.
However, the stipulation was confined to her receipt of the request for
laboratory examination, the identity of the specimens she received from
PO2 Saboriendo, and the results of the examination of the seized
specimens. The parties' stipulation did not mention that the
abovementioned precautionary steps were in fact done by the forensic
chemist to preserve their integrity and evidentiary value, nor discuss how
the seized items were handled and stored post-examination.

Moreover, the failure to show as to who brought the seized items

before the trial court is considered a serious breach of the chain of custody
rule. Here, the records do not show how the drugs were turned over to the
court. The Minutes and Pre-Trial Order indicate that the sachets
containing the seized specimens were brought to the court during pre-trial,
and then marked as exhibits C to F. Thereafter, during the direct
examination of PO2 Saboriendo, the fiscal opened the orange and brown
pouch and took out the plastic sachets containing the specimens for the
identification of the witness. There was no mention on who turned over
the drugs to the court, or how the fiscal acquired the sachets. Given the
foregoing, we find that the prosecution also failed to establish the fourth
link of the chain of custody.

PEOPLE VS. LUMA, G.R. NO. 253856 (NOTICE), JUNE 28, 2021

ISSUE: Links in the Chain of Custody Rule in drug cases

HELD: After a judicious study of the case, the Court resolves

to DISMISS the appeal for failure to sufficiently show that the Court of

P a g e | 202
 Appeals (CA) committed any reversible error in affirming the conviction of
accused-appellant for the crimes of Illegal Sale and Illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs, respectively defined and penalized under Sections 5 and
11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
'Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.'

As correctly ruled by the courts a quo, all the respective elements

of the foregoing crimes are present in this case as the prosecution clearly
established that, during a legitimate buy-bust operation conducted by law
enforcement operatives of the San Pedro Police Station in Davao City,
accused-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto selling a plastic sachet
containing 0.1835 gram of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, or shabu, to the
designated poseur-buyer, Police Officer (PO) 3 Gerry R. Tudlasan (PO3
Tudlasan), and when searched upon arrest, thirteen (13) more plastic
sachets containing a total of 6.8096 grams of the same substance were
recovered from her possession.

Furthermore, all the links of the chain of custody were likewise

established, considering that: (a) PO3 Tudlasan had custody of the seized
items from the moment of seizure, conducted the marking, inventory, and
photography in the presence of accused-appellant herself, as well as the
required witnesses, and finally, turned over the seized items to PO2
Perfecto Tuloy (PO2 Tuloy) at the police station for recording purposes;
(b) after recording, PO2 Tuloy gave the seized items back to PO3
Tudlasan, who then brought the same to the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory, where they were received by PO2 Jeffrey Cabalon and
then turned over to Police Senior Inspector April Dela Rosa Fabian (PSI
Fabian), the expert forensic chemist; and (c) after examination, PSI Fabian
turned over the seized items to PO3 Bernadine Magallanes, the evidence
custodian, who stored them until they were duly presented in court for
identification.

PEOPLE VS. GONZALES, G.R. NO. 252327 (NOTICE), JUNE 28, 2021

ISSUE: Failure to make the proper stipulations on the testimony of

the forensic chemist; Links in the Chain of Custody Rule in drug
cases

HELD: “In the prosecution of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, the

following elements must be proved: (1) proof that the transaction or sale
took place, and (2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit
drug as evidence. On the other hand, in Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs, it must be shown that (1) the accused was in possession of an item
or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such
possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and
consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. The evidence of
the corpus delicti must be established beyond reasonable doubt. |||

“the following four (4) links in the chain of custody must be

proved: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the dangerous drug
recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the
turnover of the dangerous drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the
dangerous drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination;
and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked dangerous drug
seize from the forensic chemist to the court.

P a g e | 203
 “The fourth link refers to the turnover and submission of the
dangerous drug from the forensic chemist to the court. In drug related
cases, it is of paramount necessity that the forensic chemist testifies as to
details pertinent to the handling and analysis of the dangerous drug
submitted for examination i.e., when and from whom the dangerous drug
was received; what identifying labels or other things accompanied it;
description of the specimen; and the container it was in, as the case may
be. Further, the forensic chemist must also identify the name and method
of analysis used in determining the chemical composition of the subject
specimens.

“Here, the prosecution and the defense stipulated to dispense with,

the testimony of forensic chemist Police Chief Inspector Wilfredo
Pabustan (PCI Pabustan) during the hearing on January 26, 2017. The
stipulations, nonetheless, only mentioned that he was the forensic chemist
who conducted the laboratory examination of the specimens; he issued
Chemistry Report No. D-112-2015 reflecting his findings on the results of
the laboratory examinations he did on the specimens; and he signed the
Chain of Custody Form. Notably, none of these stipulations even
mentioned the condition of the specimens when PCI Pabustan received
them and how he handled and stored the same before, during, and after
the chemical examination until the same reached the court. There was
further no description of the method he utilized in analyzing the chemical
composition of the drug samples.

“More, nothing in the records shows how PCI Pabustan turned over the
items to evidence custodian Police Officer 2 Ralph Eleazar (PO2 Eleazar),
and how the latter, in turn, handled the specimens after he received them.
Notably, PO2 Eleazar's testimony, too, was dispensed with. But the
stipulations pertaining to him merely focused on PO2 Eleazar's position as
evidence custodian of the Regional Crime Laboratory — Legazpi City; his
custody of the four (4) subject sachets of shabu; and his turnover of the
specimens to the court on October 5, 2015. Nothing was stipulated on
how he safeguarded the items from the time he received the same until he
turned them over to the trial court for presentation as evidence.|

PEOPLE VS. MAGPANTAY, G.R. NO. 252329, JULY 14, 2021

ISSUE: On compliance with the Chain of Custody Rule

HELD: The RTC and the CA correctly found that the prosecution was
able to establish an unbroken chain of custody beyond reasonable doubt,
and was able to account for every link in the handling of the seized items
from the moment of their seizure up to their presentation in court as
evidence. The irrefutable pieces of evidence that the prosecution presented
show that immediately after PO1 Aguiron seized the items and arrested
Sharon and Dennis, he marked the confiscated items at the place of seizure
and arrest in the presence of the suspects and the rest of the assisting
police officers. The required taking of photograph was also done. Notably,
the marked and photographed seized items remained in PO1 Aguiron's
custody during transit to the police station, where the physical inventory,
which was done in the presence of Sharon and Dennis, a local official, and
a DOJ representative, in conformity with the amended witness
requirement under RA No. 10640. Thereafter, it was also PO1 Aguiron
who personally delivered the items and the request for examination to the

P a g e | 204
 crime laboratory. The items were received by PO2 Barcelona and then
were immediately turned over to PSI Llacuna, who conducted the
examination. After examination, which yielded a positive drug content, PSI
Llacuna placed all the items in a transparent bag. She sealed, marked, and
signed the bag to ensure that the identity of the seized items inside is not
compromised before returning them to PO2 Barcelona for safekeeping.
Finally, it was PO2 Barcelona, the evidence custodian, who retrieved the
items and presented them in court as evidence. These custodial links were
duly recorded in the Chain of Custody Form. Indubitably, the Court
sustains the RTC and the CA in holding that there is sufficient compliance
with the chain of custody rule, and thus, the integrity and evidentiary value
of the corpus delicti has been preserved.

RODRIGUEZ VS. PEOPLE, G.R. NO. 256484, JULY 28, 2021

ISSUE: Was the failure of the apprehending officers to secure the

presence of either a representative of the National Prosecution
Service or the media, to serve as the second witness, excused insofar
as complying with the requirements of the chain of custody rule is
concerned?

HELD: As correctly ruled by the courts a quo, all the respective elements
of the foregoing crimes are present. The prosecution clearly established
that during a legitimate buy-bust operation conducted by law enforcement
operatives, Rodriguez was caught in flagrante delicto selling a caliber .38
revolver (paltik) without a serial number and loaded with
ammunition, making him guilty of Illegal Sale of Firearms and
Ammunitions. The warrantless arrest and corresponding search upon his
person yielded two (2) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets containing a
total of 0.105 gram of white crystalline substance. Rodriguez failed to show
any documents authorizing him to possess the same. Furthermore, all the
links of the chain of custody were likewise established, considering
that: (a) the seized drugs and firearm were immediately marked,
inventoried, and photographed in the presence of Rodriguez and Barangay
Councilors Cresencio Bueno, Sr. and Angel Tamesa; (b) the failure of the
apprehending officers to secure the presence of either a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media to
serve as the second witness is excused since the remote nature of the
place of arrest, i.e., an uninhabited side of a mountain in Barangay
Tampac, Aguilar, Pangasinan, is among the recognized justifiable
reasons therefor; (c) the caliber .38 revolver, the live ammunition, and the
spent shell were delivered to the Pangasinan Provincial Crime Laboratory
Office for requisite examination while the seized drugs were sent to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for Police Chief Inspector
Myrna Todeno's (PCI Todeno) confirmatory examination; (d) after
examination, PCI Todeno turned over the seized drugs to PO3 Elmer
Manuel (PO3 Elmer), the evidence custodian; and (e) PCI Todeno
retrieved the seized items from PO3 Elmer and delivered the same to the
court for identification. As the chain of custody over the seized items
remained unbroken, preserving the integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti, Rodriguez' conviction for the two (2) crimes must stand.

PEOPLE VS. BARAGUNA, G.R. 252137, AUGUST 4, 2021

P a g e | 205
 ISSUE#1: Whether or not the weight of the confiscated drug
evidence should be stated on the rest of the documents other than
the Chemistry Report or Physical Science Report

HELD: In the present case, the Affidavit of Poseur Buyer, Affidavit of

Arresting Officer, Booking Sheet and Arrest Report, Certificate of
Inventory, and Request for Laboratory Examination do not indicate the
weight of the seized item. In fact, the weight of the seized item only
appears in the Chemistry Report PDEAROV-DD014-013. Due to the
omission of seized item's weight from the documents, coupled with the
lapses in the chain of custody and Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165, there
exists reasonable doubt whether the alleged seized shabu from Baraguna is
the same one delivered to the crime laboratory for examination.

ISSUE#2: Whether or not the signing by the witnesses of the

Certificate of Inventory after almost three hours from the conduct of
the buy-bust operation is fatal

HELD: Here, the witnesses signed the Certificate of Inventory after

almost three hours from the conduct of the buy-bust operation. This is a
deviation from the procedure under Section 21 which requires the
witnesses to be physically present as early as the time of arrest. Since a buy-
bust operation is a planned activity, securing the presence of the required
witnesses is indispensable considering there is sufficient time to request
their presence.

P a g e | 206
P a g e | 207