Pros. Maychelle A.

Isles
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
of Albay
 Lecture on:

• Warrantless Arrest
• Jurisprudence relevant on Arson
• Proper Filing of Arson Cases
 Article 3, Section 1 of 1987 Constitution

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty,

or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
Section 2:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge x x x x.
General Rule:
A valid warrant of arrest is required before an
arrest is made.

Exception:
Warrantless arrest
WARANTLESS
ARREST
 Sec. 5, Rule 113 (ON ARREST) of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A

peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person: 
(a) When, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an
offense;
In flagrante
Delicto Arrests

*
•the arresting officer must
have personal knowledge of
the fact of the commission
of an offense
 
Two elements that must concur:
1. the person to be arrested must execute an overt act
indicating that he has just committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
2. such overt act is done in the presence or within the
view of the arresting officer

*
 The fact that the appellants eyes were moving very
fast and looking at every approaching person were not sufficient to
suspect him of attempting to commit a crime, much less to justify his
arrest and subsequent search without a warrant. The Court said that there
was nothing in [Malacats] behavior or conduct which could have
reasonably elicited even mere suspicion that he was armed with a deadly
weapon. In other words, there was no overt physical act on the part of the
suspect, positively indicating that he had just committed a crime or was
committing or attempting to commit one. There was, therefore, no valid
reason for the police officers to arrest or search him.

(Malacat v. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159, 174, December 12, 1997)
 x x x where the arresting police tried to justify the warrantless
arrest of the appellant on the ground that he appeared
suspicious. The suspicious acts consisted of his darting eyes and
the fact that his hand was over his abdomen. The Court,
rejecting such justification, stated: By no stretch of the
imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an
offense had just been committed, or was actually being
committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence x x
x

People v. Mengote , 210 SCRA 174, June 22, 1992

 

*
The appellant was arrested while disembarking from a
ship, on account of a tip received, two days before the
arrest, from an informant that he is carrying prohibited
drugs.
 
Acting on the information, the police waited for the
accused and approached him as he descended the
gangplank of the ship and arrested him. A subsequent
inspection of his bag disclosed the presence of three kilos
of marijuana leaves.
The Court invalidated the warrantless arrests, explaining
that at the moment of his arrest, the accused was simply
descending the gangplank, without manifesting any
suspicious behavior that would reasonably invite the
attention of the police. To all appearances, he was not
committing a crime; nor was it shown that he was about
to do so or had just done so. There was, therefore, no
valid reason for his arrest.
People v. Aminnudin , 163 SCRA 402, July 6, 1988 *
Probable cause

-an actual belief or reasonable grounds

of suspicion
Malacat vs. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 159

The SC declared that a warrantless arrest cannot

be justified where no crime is being committed at
the time of the arrest because no crime may be
inferred from the fact that the eyes of the person
arrested were “moving fast” and “looking at every
person” passing by.
People vs. Mengote, 210 SCRA 174

The issue on the legality of arrest, search and seizure stemmed from a
telephone call to the police from an alleged informer that suspicious
looking men were at a street corner in Tondo shortly before noon.

The police operative dispatched to the place saw three men one of
whom who turned out to be Mengote, was “looking from side to side”,
clutching his abdomen. The operatives approached the three men and
introduced themselves as policemen. Two of them accordingly tried to run
away but the attempt was foiled. The search yielded a revolver in the
possession of Mengote and a fan knife in the pocket of another.
 Mengote contends that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence
because its sizure was a product of an illegal search and made not as an incident to a
lawful arrest.

SC Ruling:
The requirements of a valid warrantless arrest were not complied with. There was
no offense which could have been suggested by the acts of Mengote of looking from
side to side while holding his abdomen.

Speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz:

“These are certainly not sinister acts. xxx He was not skulking in the shadows but
walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine about his being on
that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun.”
By no stretch of the imagination
could it have been inferred from these
acts that an offense had just been
committed, or was at least being
attempted in their presence .
People vs. Anita Claudio, 160 SCRA 646

The accused who was carrying a woven buri-like plastic bag which
appeared to contain camote tops, boarded a bus bound for the province. Instead
of placing the bag by her side, which is the usual practice of a traveler, she
placed the same on the back seat where a trained anti-narcotics agent was
seated. Since the act of the accused was unusual for a traveler, the suspicion of
the agent was aroused. Feeling that something was unusual, the agent inserted
his finger inside the bag where he felt another plastic bag in the bottom from
which emanated the smell of marijuana. Right after she got off the bus, the
agent arrested the accused.

Warrantless arrest in this case was upheld to be valid.

Hot Pursuit Arrests
(b) When an offense has in fact
just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
*
 Two elements must concur prior to the
arrest:
(1)an offense has in fact just been committed, and
(2)the arresting officer has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be
arrested xxx committed [the offense].
Personal knowledge 
- actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion, based on actual facts, that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the crime.
 This exception does not require the arresting officers to personally
witness the commission of the offense with their own eyes. Personal
knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause. The grounds are
reasonable when the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably
guilty of comitting the offense is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable
cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.

A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be founded on probable cause,

coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the
arrest.
*
 A certain Masamlok informed police authorities
that the appellant was involved in subversive
activities. Acting on the strength of such
information and without securing a judicial
warrant, the police proceeded to appellants house
to arrest him. There, they also allegedly recovered
an unlicensed firearm and subversive materials.
 The Court held that there was no personal knowledge on the
part of the arresting officers, since the information came in its
entirety from Masamlok, a civilian. The SC pointed out that at
the time of his arrest, appellant was not in actual possession of
any firearm or subversive document; neither was he
committing a subversive act. His warrantless arrest, therefore,
could not be allowed under any of the instances in Rule 113,
Section 6 (now 5) of the Rules of Court.

People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1, 14, September 4, 1986

The appellant was arrested without a warrant, on the
justification that the arresting officer received an intelligence
report that appellant who was carrying marijuana would arrive
the next morning aboard M/V Sweet Pearl. The Court
categorically stated that such [r]aw intelligence information is
not a sufficient ground for a warrantless arrest. And since, at
the time of his arrest, no act or fact demonstrating a felonious
enterprise could be ascribed to appellant, there was no valid
justification for his arrest.

People vs. Encinada *

People vs. Acol, 232 SCRA 406

Two robbers divested the passengers of a jeepney of their belongings

including the jacket of one passenger. The passengers immediately sought
the help of the police officers which formed a team to track down the
suspects. One of the passengers who went with the responding police
officers, saw one of the robbers casually walking in the same vicinity and
wearing his jacket.

The warrantless arrest of the accused was sustained by the Court as

well within the hot pursuit exception.
*
In the case of Umil vs. Ramos, there were strong
 

objections to the warrantless arrest of a suspected

member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), while he was
being treated for a gunshot wound in a hospital. He
alleged that there was no valid justification for his arrest
without a warrant, because he was not then committing
any offense nor were there any indications that he had
just committed or was about to commit one; he was in
fact confined in a hospital.
The Court held that subversion, for which he was arrested and
subsequently charged, was a continuing offense. For purposes of arrest,
the Court said, the NPA member did not cease to be, or became less of a
subversive, xxx simply because he was, at the time of his arrest, confined
in the xxx [hospital]. Unlike other so-called common offenses, i.e.
adultery, murder, arson, etc., which generally end upon their
commission, subversion and rebellion are anchored on an ideological
base which compels the repetition of the same acts of lawlessness and
violence until the overriding object of overthrowing organized
government is attained.

187 SCRA 311, July 9,1990

*
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while
being transferred from one confinement to
another.
JURISPRUDENCE
RELEVANT ON
ARSON
 ARSON
• The malicious destruction of a property
by fire
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALAMADA MACABANDO,
G.R. No. 188708, July 31, 2013

FACTS:

 At around 4:00 p.m. on December 21, 2001, Alamada

Macabando broke bottles on the road while holding a
G.I. pipe, and shouted that he wanted to get even
("manabla ko"). Afterwards, he uttered that he would
burn his house.
 At 6:35 p.m. of the same day, Cornelio Feliciano heard his neighbors
shout that there was a fire. When Cornelio went out of his house to
verify, he saw smoke coming from the appellant’s house. He got a pail of
water, and poured its contents into the fire. Eric Quilantang, a neighbor
whose house was just 10 meters from that of the appellant, ran to the
barangay headquarters to get a fire extinguisher. When Eric approached
the burning house, the appellant (Alamada), who was carrying a traveling
bag and a gun, told him not to interfere; the appellant then fired three (3)
shots in the air. The appellant also told the people around that whoever
would put out the fire would be killed
 Although no one actually saw how the fire started, the
Bureau of Fire Protection conducted a spot investigation of the
incident, and concluded, among others, that the fire started in
the appellant’s house; and that it had been intentional.

The prosecution charged the appellant with the crime of

destructive arson under Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC), as amended, before the RTC.
 The appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge on
arraignment. In its judgment dated August 26, 2002, the
RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC judgment in toto.

SC Ruling:
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, modified the crime
from destructive arson to simple arson, punishable under Sec.
3(2), P.D. 1613.  The Court explained that simple arson was the
proper crime committed since Destructive arson (Article 320
of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 ) “contemplates
the malicious burning of structures, both public and private,
hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels, aircraft, factories and
other military, government or commercial establishments by any
person or group of persons”
 Simple arson contemplates “the malicious burning of
public and private structures, regardless of size” not
punished under destructive arson.

These include houses, dwellings, government

buildings, farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus
stations, airports, wharves and other industrial
establishments. 
Under Sec. 3(2) PD 1613, two elements
are required for simple arson:

(a) there is intentional burning; and

(b)what is intentionally burned is an
inhabited house or dwelling
 The Court held that both elements were sufficiently
proven in court.  All property destroyed in the fire were
his own house and several other inhabited homes.  Based
on the facts, the burning was clearly intentional.
Other cases of simple arson as provided in Sec. 3, P.D. 1613, include the
burning of the following property:
1) any building used as offices of the government or any of its agencies;
2) any inhabited house or dwelling;
3) any industrial establishment, shipyard, oil well or mine shaft, platform
or tunnel;
4) any plantation, farm, pastureland, growing crop, grain field, orchard,
bamboo grove or forest; any rice mill, sugar mill, cane mill or mill
central; and
5) any railway or bus station, airport, wharf or warehouse.
*
The acts committed under Art. 320 of the Revised Penal
 

Code constituting Destructive Arson are characterized

as heinous crimes “for being grievous, odious, and
hateful offenses and which, by reason of their inherent
or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and
perversity are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just,
civilized, and ordered society.” 
Acts committed under P.D. 1613
 

constituting Simple Arson are crimes

with a lesser degree of perversity and
viciousness that the law punishes
with a lesser penalty.
*
 People v. Soriano:

The accused in this case caused the burning of a

particular house. Unfortunately, the blaze spread and
gutted down five (5) neighboring
houses. The RTC therein found the accused guilty of
destructive arson under paragraph 1 of Art. 320 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No.
7659.
 The SC however declared that:
x x x [T]he applicable provision of law should be Sec. 3, par. 2, of
PD 1613, which imposes a penalty of reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua for other cases of arson as the properties
burned by accused-appellant are specifically described as houses,
contemplating inhabited houses or dwellings under the aforesaid law.
The descriptions as alleged in the second Amended Information
particularly refer to the structures as houses rather than as buildings or
edifices. The applicable law should therefore be Sec. 3, Par. 2, of PD
1613, and not Art. 320, par. 1 of the Penal Code. In case of ambiguity
in construction of penal laws, it is well-settled that such laws shall be
construed strictly against the government, and liberally in favor of the
accused.
 
 The elements of arson under Sec. 3, par. 2, of PD
1613 are:
(a)there is intentional burning; and
(b)what is intentionally burned is an inhabited
house or dwelling. 

Incidentally, these elements concur in the case at

bar.
 People vs. Edna Malngan
G. R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006
FACTS:
From the personal account of witnesses, it was at around 4:45 a.m. on January 2, 2001 when
the accused-appellant EDNA, one hired as a housemaid by Roberto Separa, Sr., was seen with
her head turning in different directions, hurriedly leaving the house of her employer.

Thirty minutes later, the Barangay Chairman’s group later discovered that a fire gutted the
house of the employer of the housemaid. The Barangay Chairman and his tanods responded to
the fire upon hearing shouts from the residents and thereafter, firemen from the Fire District 1-
NCR arrived at the fire scene to contain the fire.
 
 Later on that same day, Edna was apprehended. Upon
inspection, a disposable lighter was found inside accused-
appellant EDNA’s bag. Thereafter, accused-appellant EDNA
confessed to Barangay Chairman Bernardo in the presence of
multitudes of angry residents outside the Barangay Hall that
she set her employers house on fire because she had not been
paid her salary for about a year and that she wanted to go home
to her province but her employer told her to just ride a
broomstick in going home.
 EDNA was then turned over to arson investigators and was
further investigated and then detained.

And when asked how she burned the house, accused-

appellant EDNA confessed “ Naglukot ako ng maraming
diyaryo, sinindihan ko ng disposable lighter at hinagis ko sa
ibabaw ng lamesa sa loob ng bahay  (I crumpled newspapers,
lighted them with a disposable lighter and threw them on top
of the table inside the house.)
 The fire resulted in [the] destruction of the house of Roberto
Separa, Sr. and other adjoining houses and the death of Separa
family (6 persons).

An Information was filed before the RTC of Manila, Branch

41, charging accused-appellant with the crime of Arson with
Multiple Homicide.

The RTC ruled and found Edna guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime of Arson with multiple homicide
 
SC RULING:
There is no complex crime of arson with (multiple) homicide .

Presently, there are two (2) laws that govern the crime of
arson where death results therefrom:

1.  Article 320 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by

Republic Act (RA) No. 7659, and 

2. Section 5 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1613

 
 Revised Penal Code:
 
ART. 320. Destructive Arson. x x x x

If as a consequence of the commission of any of

the acts penalized under this Article, death results,
the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed.
 Presidential Decree No. 1613:
 
SEC. 5. Where Death Results from Arson. 
If by reason of or on the occasion of the arson
death results, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death shall be imposed.
 
 
Art. 320 of the RPC, as amended, with respect
to destructive arson, and the provisions of PD
No. 1613 respecting other cases of arson
provide only one penalty for the commission of
arson, whether considered destructive or
otherwise, where death results therefrom.

*
  When fire is used with the intent to kill a particular person
who may be in a house and that objective is attained by burning
the house, the crime is murder only. When the Penal Code
declares that killing committed by means of fire is murder, it
intends that fire should be purposely adopted as a means to that
end. There can be no murder without a design to take life. In
other words, if the main object of the offender is to kill by
means of fire, the offense is murder.
 But if the main objective is the burning of the building,
the resulting homicide may be absorbed by the crime of
arson.

If the house was set on fire after the victims therein

were killed, fire would not be a qualifying circumstance.
The accused would be liable for the separate offenses of
murder or homicide, as the case may be, and arson.
*
From a reading of the body of the Information:
That on or about January 2, 2001, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to cause
damage, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and deliberately set fire upon the two-storey
residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA and family mostly made of wooden materials located at No.
172 Moderna St., Balut, Tondo, this city, by lighting crumpled newspaper with the use of disposable lighter inside
said house knowing the same to be an inhabited house and  
situated in a thickly populated place and as a
consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the said building, together with some seven (7) adjoining
residential houses, were razed by fire; that by reason and on the occasion of the said fire, the following, namely,
 
1.    Roberto Separa, Sr., 45 years of age
2.    Virginia Separa y Mendoza, 40 years of age
3.    Michael Separa, 24 years of age
4.    Daphne Separa, 18 years of age
5.    Priscilla Separa, 14 years of age
6.    Roberto Separa, Jr., 11 years of age

sustained burn injuries which were the direct cause of their death immediately thereafter.
 It is clear from the foregoing that Edna’s
intent was merely to destroy her employers
house through the use of fire, however, death
results by reason of or on the occasion of
arson, :

Crime committed: ARSON

 

The killing of a person is absorbed in the charge

of arson, simple or destructive. 

The prosecution need only prove, that the

burning was intentional and that what was
intentionally burned is an inhabited house or
dwelling.

*
2 categories of the crime of arson:

1. destructive arson, under Art. 320 of the

Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 7659; and
2. simple arson, under Presidential Decree
No. 1613
Article 320 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by
RA 7659:

-the malicious burning of structures, both public and

private, hotels, buildings, edifices, trains, vessels,
aircraft, factories and other military, government or
commercial establishments by any person or group of
persons
*
 PD 1613, contemplates the malicious burning of
public and private structures, regardless of size, not
included in Art. 320, as amended by RA 7659, and
classified as other cases of arson. These
include houses, dwellings, government buildings,
farms, mills, plantations, railways, bus stations,
airports, wharves and other industrial
establishments
   Accused-appellant (Edna) was charged with the crime
of Simple Arson for having deliberately set fire upon
the two-storey residential house of ROBERTO SEPARA
and family
x x x knowing the same to be an inhabited house and
situated in a thickly populated place and as a
consequence thereof a conflagration ensued and the said
building, together with some seven (7) adjoining
residential houses, were razed by fire.
 CLIMACO AMORA vs. PEOPLE,
G.R. No. 154466, January 28, 2008.

FACTS:
On June 27, 1993, a fire broke out in the building used by petitioner as residence
and as a bakery. The fire also gutted nearby houses. Petitioner’s edifice was constructed
on a lot owned by Adelfa Maslog Tagaytay (Adelfa). Adelfa’s father had earlier entered
into a contract of lease with petitioner, whereby the latter was to use the lot and erect a
building thereon for a monthly rental of P50.00, for a period of twenty (20) years. The
lease contract provided that, upon the expiration of the contract on July 10, 1993,
ownership over the building shall be transferred to the lessor. On January 4, 1993,
Adelfa informed petitioner that she would no longer renew the contract of lease.
On January 14, 1993, petitioner secured a fire insurance coverage over
the subject building from the Malayan Insurance Company
for P150,000.00, then obtained another fire insurance policy from Makati
Insurance Company for P300,000.00. It appears that the amounts of
insurance coverage were substantially higher than the building’s market
value (pegged at P52,590.00 in the 1985 Tax Declaration).

As found by the trial court, during the actual fire, petitioner

was within the premises, heard shouts from his neighbor,
ignored the same at first, and only later on did he finally stand
up to see what was going on.
 After trial on the merits, the RTC found petitioner guilty as charged.
this finding was affirmed by the CA, which considered the following
circumstances as adequate proof of petitioner’s guilt:
 
First, there is motive on the part of [petitioner] to commit arson, as the
contract of lease over the building would soon be terminated by owner
Adelfa Maslog-Tagaytay, against his will. Settled is the rule that a key
element in the web of circumstantial evidence is motive.

Second, [petitioner] insured the property despite the fact that the lease
would soon be terminated and in fact, he had already been advised to
vacate the place.
Third, the amount covering the fire insurance was substantially more
than its market and assessed value. x x x.

Fourth, [petitioner] was seen in his residence immediately before the

fire and subsequently in a neighbor’s shop during the fire.

Fifth, the Fire Investigators concluded in their report that the fire was
intentionally done. In the absence of any showing that these investigators
were ill-motivated in testifying against [petitioner], their testimonies are
given weight and credit. x x x.
 Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising the sole question of whether the
guilt of petitioner was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

SC Ruling:
The petition was denied for lack of merit.
The applicability of P.D. 1613 is beyond cavil. The facts show that the
crime was committed in a place where bakeries, barber shops, tailoring
shops and other commercial and residential buildings were situated. In
fact, other structures were razed by the fire that originated from
petitioner’s establishment. It is clear that the place of the commission of
the crime was a residential and commercial building located in an urban
and populated area.
This qualifying circumstance places the offense squarely within the ambit
of Section 2(7) of P.D. 1613, and converts it to "destructive arson," viz.:
 
Section 2. Destructive Arson. The penalty of Reclusion Temporal in its
maximum period to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the property
burned is any of the following:
xxxx
7. Any building, whether used as a dwelling or not, situated in a populated
or congested area.
It was also established that the subject building was insured against fire
for an amount substantially more than its market value, a fact that has
given rise to the unrebutted prima facie evidence of arson, as provided in
Section 6 of P.D. 1613:
Section 6. Prima facie evidence of Arson. Any of the
following circumstances shall constitute prima
facieevidence of arson:
xxxx
4. If the building or property is insured for substantially
more than its actual value at the time of the issuance of
the policy.
 
 FILING OF
(ARSON) CASES
 COURTS:
INFORMATION

Arrest

Bail (for bailable offenses)

Arraignment

Pre-Trial

Trial Judgment Appeal (RTC – CA - SC)

 INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL ACTION; HOW AND WHERE
COMMENCED

a) For offenses that requires preliminary investigation pursuant to

Section 1, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
by filing of the complaint with the proper officer for the purpose
of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation

b) For offenses that do Not require preliminary investigation:

by filing the complaint or Information directly with the MTC,
MeTC, MCTC
by filing the complaint with the Office of the Prosecutor
ARSON CASES
- punishable by afflictive penalty (imprisonment of more than 6 years)
- requires preliminary investigation, unless Inquest is necessary
- complaint is filed with the Office of the Prosecutor

Cases within Cities Cases outside Cities

Office of the City Prosecutor Office of the Provincial Prosecutor

 Preliminary Investigation

A preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding to determine

whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial.

A preliminary investigation is essentially a judicial inquiry since there

is the opportunity to be heard, the production and weighing of evidence,
and a decision rendered on the basis of such evidence. In this sense, the
investigating prosecutor is a quasi-judicial officer.
 COMPLAINT (commencement of P.I)

A written complaint filed with the Office of the Prosecutor may come in
different forms:
• Referral letter from the law enforcement agency – need not be
sworn to by complainants
• An affidavit of the offended party or any other person authorized by
law to file criminal complaint – GR: must be sworn to by the
complainant before the prosecutor
• A letter (sworn or not) from the offended party or any other person
authorized by law to file criminal complaint
• A referral letter from a committee
• Formal complaint similar in form to that filed in court
 Complaint. - For purposes of preliminary investigation, the complaint
filed with the prosecutor's office shall, as far as practicable, be
accompanied or covered by an Information Sheet and shall state, among
others –

a) the full and complete names and exact home, office or postal
addresses of the complainant and his witnesses;
b) The full and complete name and exact home, office or postal
address of the respondent;
c) The offense charged and the place and exact date and time of its
commission; and
d) Whether or not there exists a related case and, if so, the docket
number of said case and the name of the Investigating Prosecutor
thereof.
 Preliminary Investigation at Prosecution’s Office:
in court

With ground Subpoena counter-affidavit Resolution

Complaint

no ground Dismissal
 With probable cause INFORMATION
(filed in court)

RESOLUTION

without probable cause Dismissal of Complaint

 INQUEST

-an informal and summary investigation conducted by a public

prosecutor in criminal cases involving persons arrested and
detained without the benefit of a warrant of arrest issued by the
court for the purpose of determining whether or not said
persons should remain under custody and correspondingly be
charged in court

-only in cases of warrantless arrests

 Commencement and termination of inquest.- The inquest proceedings
shall be considered commenced upon receipt by the Inquest Officer
from the law enforcement authorities of the complaint/referral
documents which should include:
 
a) the affidavit of arrest;
b) the investigation report;
c) the statement of the complainant and witnesses; and
d) other supporting evidence gathered by the police in the course
of the latter's investigation of the criminal incident involving the
arrested or detained person.
 
 The inquest proceedings must be terminated within the
period prescribed under the provisions of Article 125 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.

12 hours – offenses punishable by light penalties

18 hours- for offenses punishable by correctional penalties
36 hours- for offenses punishable by afflictive or capital
penalties
Effect:
-respondent must be released, otherwise, police
will be charged with Delay in the delivery of
detained persons to proper judicial authorities
 INQUEST PROCEDURE
No waiver with probable cause Information
Arrest is proper w/o probable cause recommend release

With waiver Preliminary Investigation proper (15 days only)

Affidavit of Arrest
+ IR + SS + other
Docs
Reg. P.I +
Release
Arrest NOT proper

Recommends dismissal of complaint

+ release of respondent