MALACAT V.
COURT OF APPEALS, 283 SCRA 159 (1997)
FACTS:
Four (4) police officers were conducting a patrol in Quiapo due to bomb
threats that had been occurring in the area for the last seven (7) days. They
found two groups of Muslim-looking men standing on opposite sides of the
Quezon Boulevard corner who were acting suspiciously and their eyes were
moving very fast. After thirty minutes of observing the two groups, they
decided to approach one of the groups. Upon seeing the policemen, the
groups fled in all directions. Fortunately, one of the men later identified as
Malacat, was apprehended. Without a warrant, the police officer searched
him and found a grenade tucked inside his front waist line. Malacat was
arrested and charged with illegal possession of explosives.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the search and seizure conducted by the police was valid.
RULING:
The general rule as regards arrests, searches and seizures is that a warrant is
needed in order to validly effect the same. The Constitutional prohibition
against unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures refers to those effected
without a validly issued warrant, subject to certain exceptions. As regards
valid warrantless arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court.
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances contemplated under Section
5(a) has been denominated as one "in flagrante delicto," while that under
Section 5(b) has been described as a "hot pursuit" arrest. Turning to valid
warrantless searches, they are limited to the following:
(1) customs searches;
(2) search of moving vehicles;
(3) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(4) consent searches;
(5) a search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
(6) a "stop and frisk.
The trial court confused the concepts of a "stop-and-frisk" and of a search
incidental to a lawful arrest. These two types of warrantless searches differ
in terms of the requisite quantum of proof before they may be validly
effected and in their allowable scope.
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent arrest determines
the validity of the incidental search.
Here, there could have been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest
preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part
of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of
petitioner, indicating that a crime had just been committed, was being
committed or was going to be committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case,
plainly, the search conducted on petitioner could not have been one
incidental to a lawful arrest.
Probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless
holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A
genuine reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and
surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has
weapons concealed about him. Finally, a "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold
interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection,
which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under appropriate
circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable
cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation
which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was
invalid:
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a member
of the group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This
claim is neither supported by any police report or record nor corroborated
by any other police officer who allegedly chased that group.

Second, there was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could
have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were
"moving very fast" — an observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu
and his teammates were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30
p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and his companions were merely
standing at the corner and were not creating any commotion or trouble.
Third, there was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that
petitioner was armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as
he admitted, the alleged grenade was "discovered" "inside the front
waistline" of petitioner, and from all indications as to the distance between
Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming that petitioner was indeed
hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu.
SAYO V CHIEF OF POLICE GR NO. L-2128 APRIL 12, 1948
FACTS:
Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with
having committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of
the City of Manila, arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a
complaint against them with the fiscal's office of Manila.
Until April 7, 1948, when the petition for habeas corpus filed with this
Court was heard, the petitioners were still detained or under arrest, and the
city fiscal had not yet released or filed against them an information with the
proper courts of justice.
ISSUE:
W/N the city fiscal of manila a judicial authority within the meaning of
the provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?
W/N there was a failure of delivery of the petitioners to proper judicial
authorities.
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE:
No. the words "judicial authority", as used in said article, mean the courts of
justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the
temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having
committed a public offense, that is, "the Supreme Court and such inferior
courts as may be established by law".
The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code
cannot be construed to include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other
city, because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment or
temporary confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of
a person arrested without warrant.
SECOND ISSUE:
Yes. Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any public officer or
employee who, after detaining a person, “shall fail to deliver such person to
the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours. In the case at
bar, the arresting officer did not deliver Sayo and Mostero to any authority,
much less any judicial authority. Their filing of the complaint with the
office of the fiscal of Manila is not a delivery of the persons of petitioners.
The continued detention and confinement of petitioners for more than six
hours is a clear violation of the article. Hence, Sayo and Mostero were
released immediately.
AGBAY VS. NATIVIDAD G.R. NO. 134503 JULY 2, 1999
TOPIC: Delivery to Judicial Authorities
FACTS
Petitioner was arrested and detained on 7 September 1997 for an alleged
violation of R.A. 7610, which carries a penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period to reclusion perpetua, an afflictive penalty.
Under these circumstances, a criminal complaint should be filed with the
proper judicial authorities within thirty six (36) hours of arrest. The mother
of complainant filed a complaint on 8 September 1997 against petitioner
before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. Petitioner contends that the same
was for purposes of preliminary investigation as the MCTC has no
jurisdiction to try the offense. Thus, it did not interrupt the period under Art.
125 considering that it is the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction to
try the case against him. As such, upon the lapse of the thirty-six hours
given to the arresting officers to effect his delivery to the proper Regional
Trial Court, private respondents were already guilty of violating Art. 125.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court
constitutes delivery to a "proper judicial authority" as contemplated by Art.
125 of the Revised Penal Code
RULING:
Yes, in contrast with a city fiscal, it is undisputed that a municipal court
judge, even in the performance of his function to conduct preliminary
investigations, retains the power to issue an order of release or commitment.
Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial
Court, the intent behind Art. 125 is satisfied considering that by such act,
the detained person is informed of the crime imputed against him and, upon
his application with the court, he may be released on bail. Petitioner himself
acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order his release when he applied
for and was granted his release upon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose
underlying Article 125 has been duly served with the filing of the complaint
with the MCTC. We agree with the position of the Ombudsman that such
filing of the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in
said Article.
RODOLFO SORIA, PETITIONER VS HON. ANIANO DESIERTO,
RESPONDENT
FACTS:
On the evening of May 13, 2011 (a Sunday before the May 14, 2001
Elections), petitioners were arrested by respondent police officers for
alleged illegal possession of firearms, therefore violating Art 261, par. (f) of
the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner Soria was arrested for the possesion
of .38 cal revolver, while petitioner Bisa for the possession of sub-machine
pistol UZI, cal. 9mm and a .22 cal. Revolver with ammunition. After arrest,
petitioners were detained at the Santa,Ilocos Sur, Police Station.
Petitioner Bisa was identified by one of the police officers to have a
standing warrant of arrest for violation of BP Blg. 6 issued by the MTC of
Vigan, Ilocos Sur. Petitioner Soria was released the following day (May 14)
where his detention lasted for 22hrs.
Petitioner Bisa posted bail on the 15th of May 2001 for the violation of BP
Blg. 6 and an Order of Temporary Release was issued thereafter. However,
no order of release was issued in connection with his arrest for Illegal
Possession of Firearms. Petitioner Bisa was release on June 08, 2001 upon
filing of bail bonds for the said criminal case where his detention laster for
26 days.
On August 15, 2011, petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for
Military Affairs a complaint for the violation of Art 125 of the RPC against
herein privateer spondents.
The Ombudsman rendered its first decision dismissing the complaint for
lack of merit.
Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration which was likewise
denied for the same reason in the second assailed resolution.
ISSUE:
WON Respondents are guilty for violating Art 125 of the RPC (for the
Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities)
RULING:
NO. No grave abuse of discretion, as defined, can be attributed to herein
public respondents. The Petitioners complaint for the said violation was
properly backed up by law and jurisprudence.
As pointed out by the respondents based on applicable laws and
jurisprudence, an election day or a special holiday should not be computed
in the period prescribed by law for the filing of complaint/information in
courts in cases of warrantless arrests, it being a “no-office day”.
There could be no arbitrary detention or violation of Art 125 since petitioner
Soria wasreleased the following day. In the same vein, the complaint of
Edimar Bista against the respondents for Violation of Article 125, will not
prosper because the running of the thirtysix (36)-hour period prescribed by
law for the filing of the complaint against him from the time of his arrest
was tolled by one day (election day). Moreover, he has a standing warrant
of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only on May 15, 2001, at
about 2:00 p.m. that he was able to post bail and secure an Order of Release.
Obviously, however, he could only be released if he has no other pending
criminal case requiring his continuous detention.
Was there a delay in the delivery of detained person to the proper judicial
authorities under the circumstances? The answer is in the negative. The
complaints against him was seasonably filed in the court of justice within
the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law, whereas, the criminal
information against Bisa were filed with the RTC and MTC on May 15,
2001.
Petitioner himself acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order his
release when he applied for and was granted his release upon posting bail.
Thus, the very purpose underlying Article 125 has been duly served with
the filing of the complaint with the MCTC. The court agrees with the
position of the Ombudsman that such filing of the complaint with the
MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in said Article.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition dated 27 May 2002 is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Joint Resolution dated 31
January 2002 and the Order dated 25 March 2002 of the Office of the
Ombudsman are hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R.NO. 117321 FEBRUARY 11, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS HERSON TAN Y VERZO
PONENTE: ROMERO
FACTS:
Tan, along with amido were charged with the crime of highway robbery
with muder before RTC-QC.On arraignment, he pleaded not guilty.
December 5, 1988,7pm, tricycle driver Freddie Saavedra, went to see his
wife to informe her that he will drive the accused to Brgy. Maligaya. It was
the last time he was seen alive.
Then, an abandoned sidecar of a ricycle was found in Brgy. Malinao which
was brought back to the headquarters. The police officers, invited Tan in
connectiono with the instant case with respect to the two robbery cases
reported in Lucena Ciity. Tan, narrated that Amido and him were
responsible for the loss of the motorcycle and death of Saavedra. That they
sold the motorcycle to Danny Teves.Teves voluntarily surrendered the
motorcycle.
On cross-examination, Lt. Carlos testified that he invited Tan to the
headquarters, without warrant, he did not inform Tan of his rights to remain
silent and counsel, nor did he reduce the confession to writing. Tan alleged
that he had no participation in the offense charged. Amido presented an
alibi that he was assisting the renovation of his mother's house at the time of
the incident. Tan assails the conviction despite failure of the prosecution to
positively identify him as culprit. In light of the above facts and
circumstances, the appealed decision is set aside and appellant acquitted on
the ground that his constitutional rights were violated.
ISSUE:
May the confession of the accused, given before the police investigator
upon invitation and without benefit of counsel be admissible against him?
RULING:
It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or
admission and whatever information is derived therefrom shall be regarded
as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant. Custodial investigation
involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a
person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant manner. The rules on custodial investigation begin to
operate as soon as the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime and begins to focus a particular suspect, the suspect is taken
into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that tends
itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.
Under the Constitution and existing law and jurisprudence, a confession to
be admissible must satisfy the following requirements: (1) it must be
voluntary; (2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and
independent counsel; (3) it must be express; and (4) it must be in writing.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that when appellant was invited for
questioning at the police headquarters, he allegedly admitted his
participation in the crime. This will not suffice to convict him, however, of
said crime. The constitutional rights of appellant, particularly the right to
remain silent and to counsel, are impregnable from the moment he is
investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected to have
committed, even if the same be initiated by mere invitation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, -
VERSUS - VICENTE P. ANCHETA, ET AL., DEFENDANTS,
VICENTE P. ANCHETA, ISIDRO DEL ROSARIO, AND BENITO
GASPI, -APPELLANTS.
G.R. No. 45344, EN BANC, November 29, 1938, ABAD SANTOS, J.
A conspiracy to commit a crime must be established by positive evidence,
and such evidence is not obtained in this case.
In this case, the appellants were acquitted from the crime of murder
because what the appellants did were acts in defense of the life of Del
Rosario.
FACTS:
Ancheta was a member of a constabulary detachment in Balabac, Palawan,
with the rank of third lieutenant and the commander. Ancheta became
engaged to Bibiana Sanson who belonged to one of the most prominent
families in the same municipal district. Bibiana had 2 brothers, Cirilo and
Rufo. However, the engagement between Ancheta and Bibiana was broken.
On 18 January 1935, Bibiana her 2 brothers, and Salazar were gathered in
the store. As Salazar passed by the same store, he was assaulted and beaten
by the Sanson brothers. Ancheta fell down, while Cirilo grappled him and
Rufo continued to box him. Salazar took the pistol that Ancheta was
carrying. In the course of the fight, 6 soldiers came to the scene and
separated the combatants. Ancheta ran to the barracks and called the
soldiers to form garrison. The soldiers then marched to the town while they
fired in the air. They arrested the 2 brothers and Salazar.
Appellant Del Rosario gave Salazar a blow in the stomach and struck him
with a pistol. Salazar became unconscious, and as he fell down, Gaspi shot
him. Version of Ancheta: He saw Bibiana in the store and she came out of
the store to meethim, then embraced him. Then, her brothers suddenly came
out of the store and attackedhim; Rufo struck him on the back of the head
hence Ancheta’s sight became dim. Cirilo also mounted on him and beat
him on the face with stones, but he scratched Cirilo.
Ancheta thereafter stood up and noticed his pistol was missing from his
holster, so he searched for it. Salazar said that it was with him and he will
not give it.
As he went to the barracks, he saw Del Rosario so he told to the latter he
was assaulted by Bibiana, her brothers, and Salazar. He ordered Del Rosario
to investigate so as to effect arrest. Ancheta then proceeded to rest in in
residence, but he suddenly heard gunshots. He went out to check the area
and saw soldiers come out of the Samson’s residence. He saw Salazar dead
and Gaspi admitted that it was he who shot Salazar so as to prevent Salazar
from shooting the sergeant again.Version of Gaspi: Salazar was already
under the custody of corporal Bacquiao and himself. Salazar was required to
surrender Ancheta’s pistol, but Salazar told Del Rosario will search him.
Salazar then stepped back and suddenly drew a pistol and fired it at
DelRosario. Salazar again stepped back and pointed to pistol at Del Rosario,
just as he was about to fire, Gaspi shot Salazar to save Del Rosario’s life.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was conspiracy among Bibiana, her brothers, and
Salazar. (NO).
Whether or not Ancheta and Del Rosario are guilty of murder. (NO)
RULING:
A conspiracy to commit a crime must be established by positive evidence,
and such evidence is not obtained in this case. Prosecution was not able to
support the theory of the defense that the Sanson brothers, Bibiana, and
Salazar had conspired to assault Ancheta.
Ancheta, Del Rosario, and Gaspi are not guilty of murder because Gaspi
shot Salazar in defense of Del Rosario’s life. Thus, they must be acquitted.
G.R. NO. L-7284 AUGUST 23, 1912 THE UNITED STATES,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JOSE BATALLONES, ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
FACTS:
Two secret service agents, Apolonio Gumarang and Inocencio Reyes, who
were in the municipality of Cabuyao on official business related to the
Bureau of Internal Revenue. They were seen acting in a suspicious manner
by a local woman named Restituta Catindig, who reported them to the
police officers on duty. The police officers then arrested the agents based on
suspicions of being involved in recent thefts and robberies in the area, as
well as their inability to produce identification documents when requested.
The agents were brought before the justice of the peace, Jose Batallones,
who ordered their detention without conducting a proper investigation to
verify their claims or innocence.
ISSUE:
Whether the actions of the police officers and the justice of the peace in
arresting and detaining the secret service agents were justified and in
accordance with the law. Specifically, the court needed to determine if there
were reasonable grounds for suspicion, proper procedures followed during
the arrest, and if the detention was legally justified based on the
circumstances
RULING:
the Supreme Court found that the police officers’ actions in promptly
arresting the suspects were justified under the circumstances, as they had
reasonable grounds for suspicion, even though the suspicions were later
found to be unfounded. However, the court held that the justice of the
peace, Jose Batallones, failed to conduct a proper investigation before
ordering the agents’ detention, acting negligently and arbitrarily. The court
affirmed the conviction of Jose Batallones but reduced the fine imposed on
him. The police officers, Maximo Cuadro and Isaac Demo, were acquitted
of the charges brought against them.
SANCHEZ VS. DEMETRIOU G.R. NOS. 111771-77 NOVEMBER 9,
1993
FACTS:
On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the
filing of appropriate charges against several persons, including the
petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and
the killing of Allan Gomez.
Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of
Justice conducted a preliminary investigation. Petitioner Sanchez was not
present but was represented by his counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr.
At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by the
witnesses, who both executed confessions implicating him as a principal in
the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then
placed on "arrest status" and taken to the Department of Justice in Manila.
A warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez.
The respondent prosecutors thereafter filed with the RTC-Laguna seven
informations charging Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio
Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., George Medialdea and Zoilo
Ama with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmenta.
ISSUE:
Whether a defect is present in the seven informations filed against the
petitioner and his co-defendants.
RULING: NONE
The petitioner avers that the seven informations charging seven separate are
absurd because the two victims in these cases could not have died seven
times. But this argument was correctly refuted by the Solicitor General in
this wise: Where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the
homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be
deemed as a constituent of the special complex crime of rape with homicide.
Therefore, there will be as many crimes of rape with homicide as there are
rapes committed.
It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that: Sec. 13.
Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one
offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a simple
punishment for various offenses.
Rape with homicide comes within the exception under R.A. 2632 and R.A.
4111, amending the Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape
committed by him in conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven
accused is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply
helping Sanchez in committing only one rape.
The separate informations filed against each of them allege that each of the
seven successive rapes is complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta
and aggravated by the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The
separate rapes were committed in succession by the seven accused,
culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.
It is of course absurd to suggest that Mary Eileen Sarmenta and Allan
Gomez were killed seven times, but the informations do not make such a
suggestion. It is the petitioner who does so and is thus hoist by his own
petard.
RANDOLF S. DAVID V. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.: , G.R. NO. 171396, MAY 3, 2006
FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th
Anniversary of the EDSA People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP
1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of national emergency,
thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the
Republic of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18,
Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution which states that: “The President. . .
whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to
prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . .,” and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent
or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection
or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;
and as provided in Section17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,
respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances
was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the
New People’s Army, and some members of the political opposition in a plot
to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust
or assassinate the President and take-over the reins of government as a clear
and present danger.
Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February
24, 2006 on their way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper
Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was searched
without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the
premises – in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the
security guard of the building – were several materials for publication. The
law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as basis of
the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was
Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to call out the Armed
Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless violence.
THE ISSUE
1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to
PP 1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices
conducted pursuant to PP 1017 valid?
THE RULING
[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]
1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to
PP 1017, were NOT valid.
[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized
by a validly issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides [for the following
circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests]
justifies petitioner David’s warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the
charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880, all that the arresting
officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were wearing
t-shirts with the invective “Oust Gloria Now” and their erroneous
assumption that petitioner David was the leader of the rally. Consequently,
the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing
the subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to
charge him with inciting to sedition.
2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribune’s offices
conducted pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.
[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126
of The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the
conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires that a search warrant be
issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8
mandates that the search of a house, room, or any other premise be made in
the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or
in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient
age and discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states
that the warrant must direct that it be served in the daytime, unless the
property is on the place ordered to be searched, in which case a direction
may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these
rules were violated by the CIDG operatives
PEOPLE V. UY (G.R. NO. 157399)
FACTS:
The accused in this case accused Uy at the time stated in the information
was a Treasurer at the NPC; accused Ernesto Gamus was at the time
mentioned in the information was the Manager of Loan Management and
Foreign Exchange Division (LOMAFED); Jaime Ochoa was the Senior
Financial Analyst, LOMAFED, at the time mentioned in the information;
Gamus does not have any custody to public funds; Ochoa’s position as Sr.
Financial Analyst did not require
him to take custody or control of public funds.
In July of 1990, the National Power Corporation (“NPC”) became
embroiled in a controversy involving the disappearance of P183,805,291.25
of its funds which were originally on deposit with the Philippine National
Bank, NPC Branch (“PNB”) but were subsequently used to purchase two
(2) managers’/cashier’s checks (the first check was in the amount of
P70,000,000.00 while the second was for P113,805,291.25) in order to
comply with its loan
obligations to the Asian Development Bank (“ADB”). As NPC’s debt in
favor of ADB was in yen, NPC was obligated to follow an intricate and
circuitous procedure of buying US dollars from a local bank (in this case,
United Coconut Planters Bank or UCPB T.M. Kalaw Branch), which local
bank was supposed to remit the US dollars to an off-shore bank. This off-
shore bank (in this case, the Credit Lyonnais, New York) was then supposed
to remit the yen equivalent of the US dollars to a third bank (in this case, the
Bank of Japan, Tokyo Branch) which would then credit the funds to the
account of the ADB. The contracts of NPC with the concerned banks
(embodied in three 3 “Payment Instructions”) included a “value date”
(which was July 13, 1990), the mere arrival of which would trigger the
above-mentioned procedure, culminating in the payment to ADB of the
NPC obligation in the foreign currency agreed upon.
On value date, per routing procedure, Credit Lyonnais (the second bank)
remitted Japanese Yen 1,143,316,130.00 to the Bank of Japan, Tokyo
Branch. Likewise, per routing procedure, UCPB T.M. Kalaw Branch was
supposed to have remitted on said value date the amount of
US$7,740,799.80. UCPB T.M. Kalaw, however, despite the fact that the
PNB had already issued two (2) manager’s/cashier’s checks for such
purpose, did not make the agreed remittance to Credit Lyonnais, so Credit
Lyonnais received no payment for the funds it had remitted to the Bank of
Japan, Tokyo. Both the State and the accused have offered explanations for
the failure of UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch to remit the dollar equivalent of
P183,805,291.25 to Credit Lyonnais. Both explanations, naturally, were
diametrically opposed.
The accused allegedly diverted the funds covered by the two PNB
Manager’s checks by falsifying a commercial document called an
“Application for Cashier’s Check” (ACC) by inserting an account number
(A/C #111-1212-04) of a private individual after the name of the payee,
UCPB, T.M. Kalaw Branch. It claims that NPC did not authorize the
insertion considering that the Payment Instruction (PI) issued by NPC
instructing PNB to prepare a Manager’s check to be charged to NPC’s
savings account did not contain any account number. Through the insertion,
the accused allegedly succeeded in diverting the funds from the UCPB,
T.M. Kalaw Branch in favor of Raul Gutierrez, Raul Nicolas, George
Añonuevo and Mara Añonuevo.

On May 28, 2002, the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision, finding the
accused Jaime B. Ochoa guilty of the crime of malversation of public funds
thru falsification of commercial documents. On the ground of reasonable
doubt accused Jose Ting Lan Uy, was acquitted. An alias warrant of arrest
was issued against Raul Gutierrez.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the herein accused is guilty of Malversation of Public Funds
thru Falsification of Commercial Documents?
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that to be found guilty of malversation, the
prosecution must prove the offender is a public officer; that he has the
custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;
that the funds or property involved are public funds or property for which
he is accountable; and that he has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or
has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted the
taking by another person of, such funds or property.
The Supreme Court further ruled that Malversation may be committed
either through a positive act of misappropriation of public funds or property
or passively through negligence by allowing another to commit such
misappropriation. To sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be
criminal intent or criminal negligence and while the prevailing facts of a
case may not show that deceit attended the commission of the offense, it
will not preclude the reception of evidence to prove the existence of
negligence because both are equally punishable in Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code. More pointedly, the felony involves breach of public
trust, and whether it is
committed through deceit or negligence, the law makes it punishable and
prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even when the information charges
willful malversation, conviction for malversation through negligence may
still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission
of the offense.
The Supreme Court explicitly stated that even on the putative assumption
that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case of malversation by
negligence but the information was for intentional malversation, under the
circumstances of this case his conviction under the first mode of
misappropriation would still be in order. Malversation is committed either
intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in the offense
is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode
charged differs from mode proved, the same offense of malversation is
involved and conviction thereof is proper. The question of whether or not an
information charging the commission of the crime by means of deceit will
preclude a conviction on the basis of negligence is neither novel nor of first
impression. An accused charged with willful or intentional falsification can
validly be convicted of falsification through negligence.
PEOPLE VS. OLIVA (G.R. NO. 106826)
FACTS:
The plaintiff-appellee is the People of the Philippines. The accused are
Oscar Oliva, Edgar Manlapaz, etc. In the case at bar, on the morning of May
26, 1986, a certain Jacinto Magbojos Jr. left their house to count coconuts at
his father’s coconut land uphill. Later on, certain Cinco and Ibaya went to
Magbojos’ house. They were informed by Magbojos’ child that
the latter’s father went uphill. When the victim Magbojos arrived home,
four persons also arrived and entered the house. The victim was hogtied by
tying his hands at his back, and was told by the group to go out.
Prior to that, a resident Inopia had visitors in his house, Oliva and Salcedo
and another two armed men named Manlapaz and Cinco. The said visitors
asked why yhet were in his house, and Oliva replied, saying that they were
on a mission to get Magbojos, and warned not to report to police authority,
otherwise he will be killed. Three years later, after the alleged capture of
Magbojos, the victim’s elder brother met a certain Levelito telling him that
he know the place where the victim’s body was buried because he was
present when the victim was buried as he was asked to accompany the
herein accused. Thus, they were prosecuted for the crime of murder and
were held guilty by the trial court. On appeal, they said that the trial court
erred in trying them for murder considering that they were members of
CPP.
ISSUE:
Whether or not they could be held liable for the crime of murder.
RULING:
The Supreme Court said that the killing was not in furtherance of rebellion.
There were no factual and legal basis that the killing of the victim was
politically motivated. Also, the Supreme Court said that mere killing by a
rebel does not necessarily mean that such killing is politically motivated.
Hence, all the accused may be held guilty and liable for the crime of
murder.