People vs Calantiao

- SC did not rule in favor of Calantiao.

- This Court cannot subscribe to Calantiao’s contention that the marijuana in his
possession cannot be admitted as evidence against him because it was illegally
discovered and seized, not having been within the apprehending officers’ "plain
view."12

- Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by Section 13, Rule 126
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:

- Section 13.Search incident to lawful arrest.– A person lawfully arrested may be

searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or
constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant.

- The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is
"to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who
might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying
evidence within reach."13 It is therefore a reasonable exercise of the State’s police
power to protect (1) law enforcers from the injury that may be inflicted on them by a
person they have lawfully arrested; and (2) evidence from being destroyed by the
arrestee. It seeks to ensure the safety of the arresting officers and the integrity of the
evidence under the control and within the reach of the arrestee.

- In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiao’s possession
and within his immediate control. He could have easily taken any weapon from the
bag or dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it. As the black bag containing the
marijuana was in Calantiao’s possession, it was within the permissible area that the
apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless search.

- Calantiao’s argument that the marijuana cannot be used as evidence against him
because its discovery was in violation of the Plain View Doctrine, is misplaced.

- The Plain View Doctrine is actually the exception to the inadmissibility of evidence
obtained in a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest outside the suspect’s
person and premises under his immediate control. This is so because "[o]bjects in the
‘plain view’ of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence." 16 "The doctrine is usually
applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object x x x. [It] serves to
supplement the prior justification – whether it be a warrant for another object, hot
pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being
present unconnected with a search directed against the accused – and permits the
warrantless seizure."17

- The Plain View Doctrine thus finds no applicability in Calantiao’s situation because
the police officers purposely searched him upon his arrest. The police officers did not
inadvertently come across the black bag, which was in Calantiao’s possession; they
deliberately opened it, as part of the search incident to Calantiao’s lawful arrest.

Cresencio vs People
 - Nonetheless, even if the Court brushes aside the technicality issue, it will still find
that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the petitioner’s
culpability.

- In attempting to escape liability, the petitioner contends that: (a) she had the
supporting documents to show that she bought the questioned lumber from
legitimate sources; and (b) the warrantless search and seizure conducted by the
DENR personnel was illegal and, thus, the items seized should not have been
admitted in evidence against her.

- The Constitution recognizes the right of the people to be secured in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures.23 Nonetheless, the constitutional prohibition against warrantless searches
and seizures admits of certainexceptions, one of which is seizure of evidence in plain
view.1âwphi1 Under the plain view doctrine, objects falling in the "plain view" of an
officer, who has a right to be in the position to have that view, are subject to seizure
and may be presented as evidence.24

- There is no question that the DENR personnel were not armed with a search warrant
when they went to the house of the petitioner. When the DENR personnel arrived at
the petitioner’s house, the lumbers were lying under the latter’s house and at the
shoreline about two meters away from the house of the petitioner. It isclear,
therefore, that the said lumber is plainly exposed to sight. Hence, the seizure of the
lumber outside the petitioner’s house falls within the purview of the plain view
doctrine.

- Besides, the DENR personnel had the authority to arrest the petitioner, even without
a warrant. Section 8025 of the Forestry Code authorizes the forestry officer or
employee of the DENR or any personnel of the Philippine National Police to arrest,
even without a warrant, any person who has committed or is committing in his
presence any of the offenses defined by the Forestry Code and to seize and
confiscate the tools and equipment used in committing the offense orthe forest
products gathered or taken by the offender. Clearly, in the course ofsuch lawful
intrusion, the DENR personnel had inadvertently come across the lumber which
evidently incriminated the petitioner.

- The fact of possession by the petitioner of the 24 pieces of magsihagonlumber, as

well as her subsequent failure to produce the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations constitute criminal liability for violation of the
Forestry Code. Under Section 68 of the Forestry Code, there are two distinctand
separate offenses punished, namely: (1) cutting, gathering, collecting and removing
timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or
disposable public land, or from private land withoutany authority; and (2) possession
of timber or other forest products without the legal documents required under
existing forest laws and regulations.26

People vs Acosta

- Section 2,20 Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that a search and seizure
must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon
the existence of probable cause, absent which, such search and seizure become
"unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. To protect the
people from unreasonable searches and seizures, Section 3 (2), 21 Article III of the
 1987 Constitution provides that evidence obtained from unreasonable searches and
seizures shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding. In other
words, evidence obtained and confiscated on the occasion of such unreasonable
searches and seizures are deemed tainted and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.22

- One of the recognized exceptions to the need of a warrant before a search may be
effected is when the "plain view" doctrine is applicable. In People v. Lagman,23 this
Court laid down the following parameters for its application":

- Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in a position to have
that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be
introduced in evidence. The 'plain view' doctrine applies when the following
requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a
prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is
immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must
lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can
particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must
be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent.24 (Emphases supplied)

- In this case, the first and third requisites were not seriously contested by Acosta.
Instead, he argues that the second requisite is absent since the discovery of the
police officers of the marijuana plants was not inadvertent as it was prompted by
Salucana. After a careful review of the records, this Court is inclined to agree.

- The testimonies of P/Insp. Gundaya, SPO4 Legaspi, and Salucana collectively paint
the picture that the police officers proceeded with the arrest of Acosta for the
mauling incident armed with prior knowledge that he was also illegally planting
marijuana:

- It is clear from Salucana's testimony that he knew of Acosta's illegal activities even
prior to the mauling incident. In fact, it may be reasonably inferred that the mauling
incident had something to do with Acosta's planting of marijuana. It is also clear that
Salucana apprised the police officers of the illegal planting and cultivation of the
marijuana plants when he reported the mauling incident. Thus, when the police
officers proceeded to Acosta's abode, they were already alerted to the fact that
there could possibly be marijuana plants in the area. This belies the argument
that the discovery of the plants was inadvertent. In People v. Valdez,28 the Court held
that the "plain view" doctrine cannot apply if the officers are actually "searching" for
evidence against the accused, to wit:

- Note further that the police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to

search for and uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view"
applies only where the police officer is not searching for evidence against
the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
Clearly, their discovery of the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also
note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they first had to
"look around the area" before they could spot the illegal plants. Patently, the seized
marijuana plants were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search"
was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not in "plain view" or
 "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to
apply.29 (Emphases supplied)

- Verily, it could not be gainsaid that the discovery was inadvertent when the police
officers already knew that there could be marijuana plants in the area. Armed with
such knowledge, they would naturally be more circumspect in their observations. In
effect, they proceeded to Acosta's abode, not only to arrest him for the mauling
incident, but also to verify Salucana's report that Acosta was illegally planting
marijuana. Thus, the second requisite for the "plain view" doctrine is absent.
Considering that the "plain view" doctrine is inapplicable to the present case, the
seized marijuana plants are inadmissible in evidence against Acosta for being fruits
of the poisonous tree.30

Dominguez vs people

- A waiver of an illegal arrest does not warrant a waiver of the inadmissibility of

evidence seized during an illegal arrest.
- For an arrest of a suspect in flagrante delicto, two elements must concur, namely: (a)
the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such
overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. 51 The
officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is absolutely
required.52 The officer himself must witness the crime.53
- The circumstances as stated above do not give rise to a reasonable suspicion that
Dominguez was in possession of shabu. From a meter away, even with perfect vision,
SPO1 Parchaso would not have been able to identify with reasonable accuracy the
contents of the plastic sachet. Dominguez' acts of standing on the street and
holding a plastic sachet in his hands, are not by themselves sufficient to
incite suspicion of criminal activity or to create probable cause enough to
justify a warrantless arrest. In fact, SPO1 Parchaso's testimony reveals that
before the arrest was made, he only saw that Dominguez was holding a small plastic
sachet. He was unable to describe what said plastic sachet contained, if any. He only
mentioned that the plastic contained "pinaghihinalaang shabu" after he had already
arrested Dominguez and subsequently confiscated said plastic sachet:cralawred

- The prosecution failed to establish the conditions set forth in Section 5 (a), Rule
11362 of the Rules of Court that: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer. As already discussed, standing on the street and holding a
plastic sachet in one's hands cannot in any way be considered as criminal acts.
Verily, it is not enough that the arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe
that the accused had just committed a crime; a crime must, in fact, have been
committed first,63 which does not obtain in this case.

- As regards the ruling of the CA, wherein it noted that Dominguez was caught with a
sachet of shabu in plain view, the Court holds that the plain view doctrine is
inapplicable in the case at bar. In People v. Compacion,64 citing People v. Musa,65 the
Court explained how the plain view doctrine applies and ruled that it does not apply if
it is not readily apparent to the police officers that they have evidence incriminating
the accused, thus:cralawred
- The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches
and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely
to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied
where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. [Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564 (1971)] Furthermore, the U.S. Supreme
Court stated the following limitations on the application of the doctrine:cralawred

- What the "plain view" cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them
had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently
across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to
supplement the prior justification — whether it be a warrant for another object, hot
pursuit, search incident to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being
present unconnected with a search directed against the accused — and permits the
warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the original justification is
legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they
have evidence before them; the "plain view" doctrine may not be used to
extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until
something incriminating at last emerges. [Id., 29 L. Ed. 2d 583. See also Texas
v. Brown, 460 U.G. 730, 75 L. Ed. 2d 502 (1983)]

- It was not even apparent to the members of the composite team whether the plants
involved herein were indeed marijuana plants. After said plants were uprooted, SPO1
Linda had to conduct a field test on said plants by using a Narcotics Drug
Identification Kit to determine if the same were indeed marijuana plants. Later,
Senior Inspector Villavicencio, a forensic chemist, had to conduct three (3) qualitative
examinations to determine if the plants were indeed marijuana. 66

-
The plain view doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law
enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion
or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the
evidence in plain view is inadvertent; and (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer
that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise
subject to seizure.67 The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial
intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the
area.68 In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand, and
its discovery inadvertent.69

- In the case at hand, while it can be said that the presence of the police officers was
legitimate as they were patrolling the area and that discovery of the plastic sachet
was inadvertent, it should be emphasized that, as to the third requisite, it was clearly
not apparent that such plastic sachet is an evidence of a crime, a contraband, or
otherwise subject to seizure. To recall, when SPO1 Parchaso saw Dominguez, he only
saw that Dominguez was holding a very small plastic sachet. To the Court's mind, a
very small plastic sachet is not readily apparent as evidence incriminating
Dominguez, such that it can be seized without a warrant. A very small plastic sachet
can contain just about anything. It could even be just that — a very small plastic
sachet — and nothing more.

- Although laboratory results later showed that the plastic sachet taken from
Dominguez indeed contained shabu, this cannot justify the seizure of the plastic
sachet from Dominguez because at the time of the warrantless seizure, it was not
 readily apparent to SPO1 Parchaso that the very small plastic sachet contained
anything, much less shabu. Thus, the circumstances of this case do not justify a
seizure based on the plain view doctrine.

Manalili vs CA

We disagree with petitioner and hold that the search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-
frisk. In the landmark case of Terry vs. Ohio,18 a stop-and-frisk was defined as the vernacular
designation of the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and
pat him for weapon(s):

. . . (W)here a police officer observes an unusual conduct which leads him reasonably
to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the
persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous, where in
the course of investigating this behavior he identified himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of
the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be
used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search under the Fourth
Amendment, and any weapon seized may properly be introduced in evidence against
the person from whom they were taken.19

In allowing such a search, the United States Supreme Court held that the interest of
effective crime prevention and detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in
appropriate circumstances and manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even though there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest. This was
the legitimate investigative function which Officer McFadden discharged in that case, when
he approached petitioner and his companion whom he observed to have hovered alternately
about a street corner for an extended period of time, while not waiting for anyone; paused
to stare in the same store window roughly 24 times; and conferred with a third person. It
would have been sloppy police work for an officer of 30 years' experience to have failed to
investigate this behavior further.

In admitting in evidence two guns seized during the stop-and-frisk, the US Supreme Court
held that what justified the limited search was the more immediate interest of the police
officer in taking steps to assure himself that the person with whom he was dealing was not
armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him.

It did not, however, abandon the rule that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain
advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure, excused
only by exigent circumstances.

In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated
by a previously secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is
unconstitutional and subject to challenge.20 Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution,
gives this guarantee:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
 produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.

Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is legally inadmissible in

evidence as a "fruit of the poisonous tree," falling under the exclusionary rule:

Sec. 3. . . .

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of . . . the preceding section shall be

inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

This right, however, is not absolute.21 The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five
recognized exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: "(1) search
incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4)
customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against
unreasonable search and seizure."22 In People vs. Encinada,23 the Court further explained
that "[i]n these cases, the search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as the
essential requirement. Although the term eludes exact definition, probable cause for a
search is, at best, defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person
accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and
circumstances which could lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s) sought in connection
with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched."

Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a
search without a warrant. In Posadas vs. Court of Appeals,24 the Court held that there were
many instances where a search and seizure could be effected without necessarily being
preceded by an arrest, one of which was stop-and-frisk. In said case, members of the
Integrated National Police of Davao stopped petitioner, who was carrying a buri bag and
acting suspiciously. They found inside petitioner's bag one .38-cal. revolver with two rounds
of live ammunition, two live ammunitions for a .22-cal. gun and a tear gas grenade. In
upholding the legality of the search, the Court said that to require the police officers to
search the bag only after they had obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless,
futile and much too late under the circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a
police officer to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to determine his identity or to
maintain the status quo while obtaining more information, rather than to simply shrug his
shoulders and allow a crime to occur.

In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their
surveillance that appellant had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan
City Cemetery, which according to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts.
From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police, such
suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were "high." The policemen
therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on
drugs. During such investigation, they found marijuana in petitioner's possession: 2

- Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor General's contention that petitioner

effectively waived the inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he
failed to raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial. A valid waiver of a right,
more particularly of the constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires the
concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed; (2) the
person waiving it had knowledge, actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she
had an actual intention to relinquish the right. 26 Otherwise, the Courts will indulge
 every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not
deduce acquiescence from the failure to exercise this elementary right. In the
present case, however, petitioner is deemed to have waived such right for his failure
to raise its violation before the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as distinguished
from an ordinary appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review,
the appeal is generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not raised
below cannot be pleaded for the first time on appeal. 27

People vs canton

We do not agree with the trial court and the OSG that the search and seizure
conducted in this case were incidental to a lawful arrest. SUSAN’s arrest did not
precede the search. When the metal detector alarmed while SUSAN was passing
through it, the lady frisker on duty forthwith made a pat down search on the former.
In the process, the latter felt a bulge on SUSAN’s abdomen. The strip search that
followed was for the purpose of ascertaining what were the packages concealed on
SUSAN’s body. If ever at the time SUSAN was deprived of her will and liberty, such
restraint did not amount to an arrest. Under Section 1 of Rule 113 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, arrest is the "taking of a person into
custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense."lawphi1.ñet

As pointed out by the appellant, prior to the strip search in the ladies’ room, the
airport security personnel had no knowledge yet of what were hidden on SUSAN’s
body; hence, they did not know yet whether a crime was being committed. It was
only after the strip search upon the discovery by the police officers of the white
crystalline substances inside the packages, which they believed to be shabu, that
SUSAN was arrested. The search cannot, therefore, be said to have been done
incidental to a lawful arrest. In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires
that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made; the process cannot be
reversed.26

II. The scope of a search pursuant to airport security procedure is not confined only to
search for weapons under the "Terry search" doctrine.

The Terry search or the "stop and frisk" situation refers to a case where a police
officer approaches a person who is acting suspiciously, for purposes of investigating
possibly criminal behavior in line with the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection. To assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing
is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him,
he could validly conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such
person to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.27

In the present case, the search was made pursuant to routine airport security
procedure, which is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6235 reading as
follows:

SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall
contain among others the following condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof and his
hand-carried luggage(s) are subject to search for , and seizure of, prohibited
materials or substances. Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board
the aircraft," which shall constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and
the air carrier.
 This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless searches
and seizures. As admitted by SUSAN and shown in Annex "D" of her Brief, the afore-
quoted provision is stated in the "Notice to All Passengers" located at the final
security checkpoint at the departure lounge. From the said provision, it is clear that
the search, unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to weapons. Passengers are also
subject to search for prohibited materials or substances.

In this case, after the metal detector alarmed SUSAN consented to be frisked, which
resulted in the discovery of packages on her body. It was too late in the day for her to
refuse to be further searched because the discovery of the packages whose contents
felt like rice granules, coupled by her apprehensiveness and her obviously false
statement that the packages contained only money, aroused the suspicion of the
frisker that SUSAN was hiding something illegal. It must be repeated that R.A. No.
6235 authorizes search for prohibited materials or substances. To limit the action of
the airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry into the aircraft and
sending her home (as suggested by appellant), and thereby depriving them of "the
ability and facility to act accordingly, including to further search without warrant, in
light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectivity in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society."28 Thus, the strip search in the ladies’ room
was justified under the circumstances.

IV. The appellant, having been caught flagrante delicto, was lawfully arrested without a
warrant.

Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides:

SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. -- A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is

actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or is
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.

In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

The present case falls under paragraph (a) of the afore-quoted Section. The search
conducted on SUSAN resulted in the discovery and recovery of three packages
containing white crystalline substances, which upon examination yielded positive
results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. As discussed earlier, such
warrantless search and seizure were legal. Armed with the knowledge that SUSAN
was committing a crime, the airport security personnel and police authorities were
duty-bound to arrest her. As held in People v. Johnson, her subsequent arrest without
 a warrant was justified, since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of
shabu in her person flagrante delicto.

People vs Cogaed

Police officers cannot justify unbridled searches and be shielded by this exception, unless
there is compliance with the "genuine reason" requirement and that the search serves the
purpose of protecting the public. As stated in Malacat:

[A] "stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of
investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable cause; and (2) the more
pressing interest of safety and self-preservationwhich permit the police officer to take steps
to assure himself that the person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon
that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer. 99 (Emphasis supplied)

The "stop and frisk" searchwas originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of
detecting dangerous weapons.100 As in Manalili,101 jurisprudence also allows "stop and frisk"
for cases involving dangerous drugs.

The circumstances of thiscase are analogous to People v. Aruta. 102 In that case, an informant
told the police that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be bringing in drugs from Baguio City by
bus.103 At the bus terminal, the police officers prepared themselves.104 The informant pointed
at a woman crossing the street105 and identified her as "Aling Rosa."106 The police
apprehended "Aling Rosa," and they alleged that she allowed them to look inside her
bag.107 The bag contained marijuana leaves.108

In Aruta, this court found that the search and seizure conducted was illegal. 109 There were no
suspicious circumstances that preceded Aruta’s arrest and the subsequent search and
seizure.110 It was only the informant that prompted the police to apprehend her.111 The
evidence obtained was not admissible because of the illegal search. 112 Consequently, Aruta
was acquitted.113

Arutais almost identical to this case, except that it was the jeepney driver, not the police’s
informant, who informed the police that Cogaed was "suspicious."

The facts in Arutaare also similar to the facts in People v. Aminnudin. 114 Here, the National
Bureau ofInvestigation (NBI) acted upon a tip, naming Aminnudin as somebody possessing
drugs.115 The NBI waited for the vessel to arrive and accosted Aminnudin while he was
disembarking from a boat.116 Like in the case at bar, the NBI inspected Aminnudin’s bag and
found bundles of what turnedout to be marijuana leaves.117 The court declared that the
searchand seizure was illegal.118 Aminnudin was acquitted.119

People v. Chua120 also presents almost the same circumstances. In this case, the police had
been receiving information that the accused was distributing drugs in "different karaoke
bars in Angeles City."121 One night, the police received information that thisdrug dealer
would be dealing drugs at the Thunder Inn Hotel so they conducted a stakeout. 122 A car
"arrived and parked"123 at the hotel.124The informant told the police that the man parked at
the hotel was dealing drugs. 125 The man alighted from his car.126 He was carrying a juice
box.127 The police immediately apprehended him and discovered live ammunition and drugs
in his person and in the juice box he was holding. 128
Like in Aruta, this court did not find anything unusual or suspicious about Chua’s situation
when the police apprehended him and ruled that "[t]here was no valid‘stop-and-frisk’." 129

VI

None of the other exceptions to warrantless searches exist to allow the evidence to be
admissible.The facts of this case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest.

Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest.
For there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful
warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court:

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may,
withouta warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe
based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.

The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances
enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present whenthe arrest was
made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or
was about to commit a crime. As in People v. Chua, for a warrantless arrest of in flagrante
delictoto be affected, "two elements must concur: (1) the person to bearrested must
execute anovert act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done inthe presence or within the
view of the arresting officer."130 Both elements were missing when Cogaed was
arrested.131 There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that suggested
that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time.

Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for
the last allowable warrantless arrest.

Commerciante vs People

In this case, the Court reiterates that Comerciante's acts of standing around with a
companion and handing over something to the latter do not constitute criminal acts. These
circumstances are not enough to create a reasonable inference of criminal activity which
would constitute a "genuine reason" for PO3 Calag to conduct a "stop and frisk" search on
the former. In this light, the "stop and frisk" search made on Comerciante should be deemed
unlawful.

In sum, there was neither a valid warrantless arrest nor a valid "stop and frisk" search made
on Comerciante. As such, the shabu purportedly seized from him is rendered inadmissible in
evidence for being the proverbial fruit of the poisonous tree. Since the confiscated shabu is
the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, Comerciante must necessarily be acquitted and
exonerated from all criminal liability.