Unemployment and Crime Rates in the Post-World War II United States: A Theoretical and

Empirical Analysis
Author(s): David Cantor and Kenneth C. Land
Source: American Sociological Review, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Jun., 1985), pp. 317-332
Published by: American Sociological Association
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 UNEMPLOYMENT AND CRIME RATES IN THE POST-WORLD
WAR II UNITED STATES: A THEORETICAL
AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS*
DAVID CANTOR KENNETH C. LAND
Bureau of Social Science Research University of Texas at Austin

Using annual time-series data for the United States, 1946-1982, two hypotheses are
tested: (1) The level of the unemployment rate in any given year will have a negative
partial contemporaneous effect on detrendedfluctuations (increases or decreases) in
seven Index Crime rates (homicide, rape, aggravated assault, robbery, burglary,
larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft) in that year. (2) Unemployment-rate
fluctuationsfrom one year to the next will have a positive partial effect on detrended
crime-rate fluctuations in the next year. These hypotheses are developed from a
theoretical model that identifies the former with a criminal opportunity effect, and
the latter with a criminal motivation effect, of aggregate unemployment on crime.
For burglary, robbery and larceny-theft, empirical support is found for the expected
pattern of partial effects. However, the relative sizes of the effects are such that the
total impacts of unemployment-through both partial effects-are negative. In
addition, only the negative-levels effect is exhibited for homicide and motor vehicle
theft, while rape and aggravated assault show no consistent association with either
levels orfluctuations in the unemployment rate. Interpretations for these findings are
discussed.

Does aggregate unemployment have a posi-
tive, negative, or null effect on levels of crime
in capitalist societies? This question is cen-
trally important both to the construction of
sociological theories of crime and to the for-
mulation of social policy (U.S. Congress,
1978). Accordingly, the unemployment-crime
relationship (hereafter denoted the U-C re-
lationship) has been the object of much re-
search attentionin sociology and related social
sciences. Yet this research has failed to pro-
duce consensus about the direction of the re-
lationship: some studies find a positive U-C
effect, others conclude that the effect is nega-
tive, and still others infer that the relationship
is essentially null.
In this paper, we reexamineand clarify the
structureof the U-C relationship.To account
for the generally weak and often inconsistent
findingsin the empiricalliterature,we develop
a theoreticalmodel that incorporatestwo dis-
tinct and counterbalancingstructuraleffects of
*Direct all correspondenceto: Kenneth C. Land,
Population Research Center, 1800 Main Building,
University of Texas, Austin, TX 78712.
The researchreportedhere was supportedin part
by National Science Foundation Grant SES 81-
04746andin partby the IC2Institute,The University
of Texas at Austin. However, the conclusionsdo not
necessarily represent the views of the sponsoring
organizations. We are grateful to Lawrence E.
Cohen and anonymous referees for helpful com-
ments on earlier versions of this paper.
American Sociological Review, 1985, Vol. 50 (June:317-332)
unemployment rates on crime rates. Then,
using annual time-series data on the post-
World War II United States, we estimate and
study the numericalimplicationsof this model.
Before describingthe development, identifica-
tion and estimationof our model, however, we
examine, in somewhat more detail, the results
of recent empirical research.
RECENT STUDIES OF THE
U-C RELATIONSHIP
The existence of a strong relationshipbetween
unemploymentand crime rates has been hy-
pothesized for over a hundredyears in the so-
cial science literature(see, e.g., Bonger, 1916;
Ehrlich, 1975; Ferri, 1881; Fleischer, 1966;
Glaser and Rice, 1959; Phillips et al., 1972;
Sellin, 1937;Thomas, 1925). Much of the cur-
rent interest in the U-C relationshipwas stim-
ulated by Brenner's(1971, 1976, 1978a, 1978b)
studies of the social consequences of national
economic policy. Brennerdraws upon several
traditionsof criminogenictheory to predict a
positive U-C connection, but the basic idea of
his approachis that an individual'sinabilityto
maintain a particularstandard of living as a
consequence of becoming unemployed will
cause a (rationalor irrational)reaction in the
form of a criminalact. To test this proposition,
Brenner(1976)studies the temporaldependen-
cies of homicide rates and prison admissions
(for various crimes) on three macroeconomic
variables: (a) the unemploymentrate, (b) the
317

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318
Gross National Productper capita, and (c) the
ConsumerPrice Index. Each of the three vari-
ables is used as an index of macroeconomic
activity towardswhich nationalpolicies are di-
rected, namely, fluctuations in employment
levels, economic growth, and the rate of infla-
tion. All statisticalestimationwas done under
the assumption of polynomial (quadratic)
distributed-lagrelationshipsover 5-yearlag pe-
riods between the economic indicators and
crime. This resultsin such conclusions as that,
for the period 1940-73, ". . . a one percent
increase in the unemploymentrate sustained
over a periodof six years has been associated
... with [an increase] of approximately 648
homicides . . ." (Brenner, 1976:5).
The validity of this inference can be ques-
tioned, however. For instance, Cohen and Fel-
son (1979a)criticize Brenner(1976)for failing
to control for noneconomic variables (e.g.,
changes in age structure) that affect crime
rates, and they point to evidence of autocorre-
lated errorterms in Brenner'sanalyses in sup-
port of this charge of misspecification. Bren-
ner's results seem even more sensitive to his
lag specification. His second-degree polyno-
mial, distributed-lagformulationincludes both
coincident (same year) and lagged effects of
unemploymenton crimefor lags of one through
five years. With average durations of U. S.
economic recessions since 1940 being about
two years, it is entirely possible that the
summedeffects (over all six years) reportedby
Brennerconfoundan initialnegative impactof
unemployment on crime rates with a sub-
sequent surge in crime due to recovery from
recession (and the associated lower unem-
ployment rates). This would be the case, for
example, if the estimated polynomial,
distributed-lagstructuresshow a negative ef-
fect for the coincident and one-year-lagterms
followedby increasinglypositiveeffects for the
second- and higher-order lag terms. The
applicabilityof this interpretationcannot be
determined,however, because Brennerreports
only the summed effects.
A second majorstimulusto recent research
on the U-C relationshiphas been the devel-
opment, duringthe past decade and a half, of
neoclassical macroeconomic models of
crime-following Becker's (1968) seminal
theoretical analysis. While contemporary
utilitarianapproachesto criminalbehaviorare
quite diverse, they essentially argue that the
lower one's economic status, the greater the
gains from illegitimate activity relative to
legitimateactivity and the lower the perceived
costs, through sanctions, if one is unsuc-
cessful at illegitimate activity (Block and
Heinecke, 1975;Heinecke, 1978;Orsagh,1981:
169). Accordingly, if an increase in the unem-
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AMERICANSOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
ploymentrate is viewed as signalinga decrease
in the economic status of a segment of the
population,one would expect, all other things
being equal, a correspondingincreasein crime.
At best, however, econometric tests provide
ratherthin supportfor the hypothesized posi-
tive effect. For instance, in his controversial
study of U. S. trends in homicide and capital
punishment, Ehrlich (1975) found a positive
effect of the unemployment rate on the
homicide rate. However, when controllingfor
trends in gun ownershipin his reassessmentof
Ehrlich's study, Kleck (1979) concluded that
this relationshipis statisticallyinsignificant.
Other time-series studies also tend to find
thatthe U-C relationshipis weakerthanwould
be expected on the basis of utilitarianand most
extant conventionaltheories of criminalmoti-
vation. For instance, Land and Felson (1976)
conclude that the effect of the unemployment
rate on the violent crime rate is null, while the
effect for the property crime rate is weakly
positive. Similarly,both Danzigerand Wheeler
(1975)and Cohen et al. (1980)find weak nega-
tive effects for robberies and strong positive
effects for burglaries, but the latter inves-
tigatorsconclude that the impacton motor ve-
hicle theft is strong and negative, while the
formerinfera weak negativeeffect for assault.
A COMPLETESTRUCTURALMODEL
OF THE U-C RELATIONSHIP
The very pervasivenessand persistenceof this
findingof weak, and often negative, U-C re-
lationshipssuggests that this fact itself should
be an importantobject of explanation.Why, in
the presence of theories that predicta positive
U-C connection, do the empiricalstudies not
consistently support this expectation? In our
view, the answer is that traditional
criminogenic theories are incomplete structural
characterizationsof the effects of unemploy-
ment on crime, because they concentrateonly
on the effects of the unemploymentrate on the
prevalence of motivated offenders in the
population.As Cohenand Felson (1979b)have
noted, however, the production of con-
ventionalcrimes requiresthe presence of both
(1) motivatedoffendersand (2) suitabletargets
(individualsor their property) in (3) the ab-
sence of effective guardians.2Thus, a complete
For a moredetailedreview of the time series and
cross-sectional literatureon the U-C relationship,
see Long and Witte(1981).Suffice it to say here that
there is not much more consensus on the algebraic
signof the relationshipamongcross-sectionalstudies
than among time-series studies.
2 Cohen and Felson (1979b:589)state that these
three elements necessarilyare present in the occur-
rence of direct-contactpredatoryviolations, which
UNEMPLOYMENT AND CRIME RATES
structuralexplanationof the effects of unem-
ployment on crime must incorporateboth the
impact on criminal motivation and the situa-
tional impact on the likelihood of motivated
offenders interacting with ineffectively
guarded,suitabletargets. In other words, such
an explanation must conjoin criminal-
motivation theories that relate unemployment
to the prevalenceof potentialoffenders in the
population with criminal-opportunity theories
that.relate unemploymentto the victim prone-
ness of potential crime targets.
Many conventional criminogenic theories
are motivationallyfocused, in that their main
objective is the explanationand identification
of the forces that drive individuals toward
criminal a6ts. Causal mechanisms vary, of
course, by type of theory. For example, strain
theories (e.g., Cloward and Ohlin, 1960;
Cohen, 1955;Merton, 1938)specify the causes
of crime and delinquency to be structurally
induced frustrations resulting from the dis-
crepancy between aspirations and expecta-
tions; utilitarian or rational-choice theory
(Becker, 1968;Block and Heinecke, 1975)em-
phasizes an individual'srationalcalculationof
expectedcosts and benefits;conflict or Marxist
theory (Bonger, 1916; Hughes and Carter,
1981:10-11)dwells on the contradictionsbe-
tween production and consumption in
capitalist societies.3 Nonetheless, each of
these theories leads to the predictionthat the
U-C relationship is positive (cf. Brenner,
1978b:20-23).
It shouldbe emphasized,however, that none
of these theorieswould supportthe assertionof
a deterministicU-C relationship,i.e., that be-
coming unemployed forces an individual to
commit crimes. Rather, because, under the
same circumstancesthis would be the case for
some individuals but not for others, the re-
are illegal acts in which someone definitely and in-
tentionallytakes or damagesthe propertyof another
(followingGlaser, 1971:4),and in which there is di-
rect physical contact between at least one offender
andat least one personor object which that offender
attempts to take or damage. Thus, this class of
crimes includesthe conventionalFederal Bureauof
Investigation Index Crimes-nonnegligible homi-
cide, forcible rape, aggravated assault, robbery,
motor vehicle theft, burglary, larceny-theft, and
arson. Of these eight crimes, the last was added
in 1979.Therefore,only the first seven are amenable
to time-seriesanalyses.
I Criminologycontains severalother criminogenic
theories that lead to a positive U-C relationship.
For instance,Hughes and Carter(1981:11-16)show
how labelingtheory (Becker, 1973) implies a posi-
tive U-C connection. Thornberryand Christenson
(1984)similarlyarguethat social-controltheory(e.g.,
Hirschi, 1969)implies a positive U-C relationship.
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319
lationshipnecessarily must be viewed as prob-
abilistic.4To be more specific, consider a con-
tinuum of low to high motivation to commit
criminal offenses. Array the members of a
populationalong this continuumaccording to
their levels of such motivation. Then each of
the theories cited in the preceding paragraph
leads to the assertion that, all other things
being equal, an increase in the unemployment
rate producesa shift in the density distribution
of the populationalong this continuumtowards
its higher end. Thus, the central tendency
(mean, median) of the motivationdensity will
have shifted upward. Furthermore,if it is as-
sumed that the level of crime experienced by
the populationis an (unconditional)increasing
functionof the level of the centraltendency of
this densitydistribution,then it follows thatthe
crime rate should increase.
Observethat this formulationdoes not assert
that this upwardshift in the density distribution
is due solely to changes in motivationallevels
of individuals who are unemployed. Some
fraction of the density shift may be due to
individuals who, while not becoming unem-
ployed themselves, are nonetheless adversely
impactedby economic downturns.5However,
theories of crime have traditionally empha-
sized the motivationalprimacyof an individual
becomingunemployedrelative to the compos-
itionaleffect of groupeconomic hardship,even
thoughaggregateindicators,such as the unem-
ployment rate, have been used in empirical
tests. Ourconcernwith the unemploymentrate
is due to its correspondenceto aggregateeco-
nomic activity patternsand the attentionit has
garneredin previous research. The effects of
actually being unemployedon levels of crimi-
nal motivationare best tested when individual
data are available for both offending and un-
employment (Thornberry and Christenson,
1984; Schmidt and Witte, 1984; Berk et al.,
1980).
Note that the unconditional impact of
4 It also should be noted that most criminogenic
theoriesareorientedtowardthe explanationof crime
among the young. However, the unemploymentof
parentsmay reduce the availabilityof financialsup-
portto juvenilechildrenwho thus may be morelikely
to engage in crime in order to recoup their losses.
The indeterminatenessof this family multiplieref-
fect adds to the stochastic character of the U-C
relationship.
5 Technically, this would require that the unem-
ployment rate for the population (i.e., the group
mean)have a positive impacton an individual'slevel
of criminal motivation when the individual's em-
ployment status is controlled (Firebaugh, 1978).
Withonly aggregatedata, it is, of course, impossible
to estimatethe relativesizes of the two effects. Thus,
the issue must be resolved theoretically.
320
changes in the motivationdensity on crime is
denied by recent criminal-opportunity
theories.6 Rather, as noted above, the latter
assert that, for an increase in crime to occur,
theremustbe an increasein the rateof physical
and temporal concurrence of motivated of-
fenders with ineffectively guarded, suitable
targets for offenses. Thus, in recent criminal-
opportunitytheories, it is the impactof unem-
ployment on the rate of this concurrencethat
determinesthe algebraicsign of the U-C con-
nection.
For crimeswith a propertycomponent(e.g.,
robbery,burglary,larceny-theft,motorvehicle
theft), this impact may be negative in two
ways. First, by removing some individuals
from employment outside the household, a
higher unemploymentrate may lead to an in-
creased concentration(in the population, on
the average) of sustenance and leisure activi-
ties within primary-group locations (resi-
dences, neighborhoods),where individualsand
their propertyare at reduced risks of victimi-
zation (Cohen et al., 1980:102).Second, as an
indicatorwhose fluctuationsare roughlycoin-
cident with business cycles (Bober, 1968:48;
Granger, 1980:144), a higher unemployment
rate generally signals a general slowdown in
production and consumption activities, both
for employed and unemployedpersons. Thus,
the unemploymentrate can be viewed as an
index of total system activity, a lower level of
which (i.e., a higherunemploymentrate) cor-
responds to a lower rate of circulation of
people and property.7Both of these effects-
which may be termed the guardianship effect
and the system activity effect, respectively-
lead to the inferencethat, all other thingsbeing
equal, a higher unemploymentrate produces
6 Criminal-opportunity theory recently has been
articulatedby Land and Felson (1976), Cohen and
Felson (1979b),Cohenet al. (1980),and Cohenet al.
(1981).However, these recentsystematicstatements
were preceded by a large body of descriptive and
analytic evidence for the general proposition that
changes in crime rates are affected by changes in
situational opportunities (see, e.g., Feeney and
Weir, 1973;Gibbons, 1971;Gould, 1969;Hindelang
et al., 1978;Jackson, 1969;Mansfieldet al., 1974).
7 This system-activity effect is essentially the
"businesscycle" effect studiedby sociologistsin the
nineteenthand early twentiethcenturiespriorto the
development of national unemployment statistics
(see Vold, 1979:165-78,for a review). It is notewor-
thy, furthermore,that the more recent and relatively
rigorous studies of this genre, such as Thomas's
(1925) study of England and Wales for the period
1857-1913and Henryand Short's(1954)studyof the
U.S. in the early twentiethcentury,generallyinfera
declinefor some types of crimesduringan economic
downturn.
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AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
lower rates of concurrence of motivated of-
fenders with ineffectively guarded, suitable
property-crime targets, and hence, lower
property-crimerates.
Unlike property crimes, there is an exact
correspondence between the victims and
targets in all violent crimes (e.g.,, homicide,
rape, aggravatedassault). Consequently, the
mainline of negativeinfluenceof levels of eco-
nomic activity on violent crimes will be
throughthe types of situationsin which poten-
tial crime victims will find themselves. Situa-
tions, in this context, refer to "who is involved
... , where the action is taking place and the
nature of the action or activities occurring"
(Monahanand Klassen, 1982:294).As noted in
the precedingparagraph,a highunemployment
rate may lead to an increasedconcentrationof
sustenance and leisure activities within such
primary-grouplocations as homes and neigh-
borhoods.
This may lead to lower violent-crimerates,
because, contrary to the image promoted by
the media and some social scientists, a sub-
stantial fraction of violent crimes involve
causal acquaintances or strangers. For in-
stance, victimization surveys indicate that
about60o of the rapesand aggravatedassaults
reported to the police involve total strangers
(computedfrom U. S. Departmentof Justice,
1981:44,77). The significanceof this statistic
derives from the fact that the empirical
analyses presented below necessarily must
utilize data that are derivedfrom official police
reports.In the case of homicide, statisticsfor a
recentyear (1980;sources describedin the data
section below) show that 75.5%of all murders
were committed by a nonfamily member
(26.4%), stranger (13.3%), or person(s) un-
known to the police (35.8%).Since murderby
close relation should be the easiest for the
police to solve, many of the murdersby "un-
knowns" likely are committed by individuals
unrelated to the victims. It also should be
noted that many violent crimes, especially
homicide,are the resultof propertycrimes (for
robbery, see Kleck, 1979). Consequently, a
higher unemploymentrate may have an indi-
rect negative effect on violent crimes through
lower property-crimerates.
In brief, there are two distinct and poten-
tially counterbalancingmechanisms-criminal
motivationand criminalopportunity-through
which unemploymentmay affect crime rates in
the aggregate.Most traditionalexplanationsof
crime have emphasized the former, while re-
cent developments of criminal-opportunity
theory concentrate on the latter. Taken indi-
vidually, however, each of these mechanisms
constitutes an incomplete theory of the
structuralimpact of unemploymenton crime.
UNEMPLOYMENTAND CRIME RATES
This situation can be represented in con-
ventional path analysis diagram form, as in
Figure 1.8The upperhalf of the figurecontains
the negative impact of unemployment on
criminal opportunity-through the guard-
ianship and system-activity effects. The bot-
tom half incorporates the positive criminal-
motivation effect postulated by the various
criminogenic theories cited earlier. Other
exogenous factors (e.g., changes in age
structure, lifestyles, etc.) also may affect the
opportunityand motivationconstructs, as in-
dicatedin the figure. Finally, in orderto repre-
sent the possibility of direct relationshipsbe-
tween criminal opportunities and motivated
offenders (e.g., as in victim-precipitated
crimes-see, e.g., Balkin and McDonald,
1981;Block, 1981), the figure incorporatesar-
rows representingdirect effects between the
two.
Criminal
opportunity
_ 7
opportunty
U~~enp1~~yme~~t ? (?)
Rate - of unemploymenton crime in the reducedform
~~~~~~~~~~~~Rate Crime
321
mated in empirical research is not the full
structuralmodel, representedby the solid ar-
rows of Figure 1, but ratherthe corresponding
reducedform, indicatedby the dashed arrows.
The reasons for this are very simple: the data
necessary to estimate the full structuralmodel
simply do not exist. Because of obvious mea-
surement problems, there are no national-
sample surveys which contain the questions
necessary to measure individuals' levels of
motivationto commit criminalacts, nor is the
data available to assess levels of criminalop-
portunities.9 Furthermore, it is difficult to
think of meaningfulsurrogates.Consequently,
the "criminal opportunity" and "criminal
motivation" boxes in Figure 1 represent un-
measured, and essentially unmeasurable,
theoretical constructs, ratherthan operational
variables.
In face of this data constraint,empiricalre-
searchers have proceeded by (1) ignoringone
or the other of the (opportunityand motiva-
tion) structuralrelationshipsand (2) collapsing
out the remainingtheoreticalconstruct. When
this is done, one obtains the reduced form of
the structuralmodel, indicatedin Figure 1 by
the dashed arrows. However, since the effect

combines two structural effects of opposite

algebraic sign, it is suppressed in absolute
value towardszero. This explainsthe generally
Other
weak U-C relationships found in empirical
\criminal
X Motivation
I
Moiato
studies. Furthermore,because the structural
Cr'mnal

-Pactors/ effects are counterbalancing,ratherthan rein-

forcing, it is quite possible for one reduced-
Figure 1. Path Diagramof StructuralRelationships form estimate of the U-C relationshipto be
and Reduced-Form Effects of Unem- positive while another is negative, depending
ploymenton Crime on the relative weight of the two structural
effects in the particulardata set and model
Notation:-denotes structuralrelationships specification under which each is produced.
-- denotes reduced-formrelationships This explains the indeterminateness of the
algebraicsigns of the empiricalU-C relation-
The structuralmodel representedin Figure ships estimated via the reduced form.
1 can now be used to explain the weak and
inconsistent U-C effects often found in em-
pirical studies. In brief, what is typically esti- PARTIALIDENTIFICATIONOF THE
U-C STRUCTURALEFFECTS
8 Causal relationships are represented by uni- At this point, it is clear that the structural
directional arrows; unanalyzed correlations (co- model diagrammedin Figure 1 is hopelessly
variances) among the predeterminedvariables are underidentifiedif it is maintained that both
denoted by two-headedarrows; epsilons represent structuraleffects of unemploymenton crime
randomerrorterms;and algebraicsigns (pluses and must be contemporaneous.But there is no rea-
minuses)indicatethe directionof the postulatedef- son why this must be assumed. On the con-
fects. Unlike the usual path model, however, the
model of Figure I is best conceived of as a condi- 9 While it has been shown that the risks of certain
tional, multiplicativemodel of the crime rate. That types of criminal victimization (assault, burglary,
is, following Cohen et al. (1980), we conceive of larceny-theft)as measured in the National Crime
motivatedoffendersand criminalopportunitieseach Surveys vary with criminal-opportuntty risk factors
as necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for (Cohen et al., 1981), risks themselves cannot be
crimes to occur. Thus, the model equation for the identifiedwith opportunitiesbecause the formerare
crime rate is a multiplicativepower function that the consequenceof the concurrentinteractionof op-
becomes linear in the logarithmof the crime rate. portunitiesand motivatedoffenders.

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322 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW

trary,thereis strongempiricaland institutional This suggests that the criminal-motivation

evidencethatthe two structuraleffects differin effects of unemployment are lagged. It is
the rapidity with which they have their im- doubtful, however, that the lagged effects ex-
pacts. tend as far back as specifiedby Brenner(1976).
In the case of the opportunitymechanism, Economic recessions in the U. S. since World
the impactsappearto be relativelyinstantane- War II generally have lasted only one to two
ous. As noted above, the unemploymentrate is years. While this is long enough to put severe
generallyconsideredto be a "coincident indi- financial stress on some individualsduring a
cator"with business cycles. It follows that an business downturn,many such individualswill
increase in this rate signals a concurrentde- be rehiredor otherwise recover economically
cline in total system activity. Furthermore, within two years after a recession begins."
such an increase likely will produce a concur- Thus, while the motivationaleffects of unem-
rent rise in the concentration of activities ploymentare lagged, they also are of relatively
within primary-group locations, as unem- short durationfor that fraction of the unem-
ployed individuals spend more time in their ployed populationthat is impactedby business
residences and residential neighborhoods cycles. 12
(Hyman, 1979). Thus, it can be expected that To operationalize these motivational im-
the opportunityimpacts of unemploymenton pacts, the level of unemploymentin one year
crime-through both the system activity and can be compared with that in the previous
guardianshipeffects-are contemporaneous. year. If the formeris higherthanthe latter, and
On the other hand, the criminal-motivation if this change in the level of employment re-
impactsof the economy seem less likely to be sults in a positive motivational impact on
contemporaneous.Of critical importancehere crime, then this shouldproduceupwardfluctu-
is the institutionalfact thatin modernindustrial ations in crime rates. Similarly,economic re-
societies, such as the U.S., economic hardship coveries and the associated declines in the un-
is cushioned by both institutionaland social employment rate should produce downward
supportsystems. Newly unemployedpersons perturbationsin crime rates.
usually are covered by government and/or In brief, the underidentificationof the model
union unemployment benefits for several diagrammedin Figure 1 can be attacked by
months after becoming unemployed. Further- distinguishingthe temporal order of its two
more, during relatively long economic slow- structuraleffects. Specifically, the foregoing
downs (as in 1981-1982),the durationof bene- discussion suggests that the effect of the level
fits may be extended by legislators. Other fi- of the unemploymentrate is relatively faster
nancialaid often is forthcomingfrom families, for the opportunitymechanismas comparedto
friends and charitableorganizations.Thus, it its motivational counterpart. In addition, in
cannot be argued that the financial stresses order to account for the length of the business
created by slowdowns in economic activity cycle, the motivationaleffect shouldbe asspci-
are likely to be so severe as to immediately ated with the size of fluctuationin the unem-
motivatepersons to commitcriminaloffenses. ployment rate ratherthan its level.
But, as benefits and other sources of financial It is still not possible to identifyand estimate
and psychological supportdecline and/or stop such structurallinkageon the model of Figure
during a recession, individualsmay be more 1 for two reasons. First, our hypothesis about
likely to engage in criminaloffenses.'0 the timing of each effect is in relative terms.
We are not proposingthat there are no motiva-
10
Space limitations preclude presentation of a tional or opportunity effects concurrent or
detailed summaryof the negative physical health, lagged to the business cycle. Rather, we are
mental health, psychological, and social conse- proposingthat the maximumeffects will occur
quences of unemploymenton unemployedindividu- under different timing schedules. By control-
als and theirfamilies. These deleteriouseffects have
been documentedin numerousstudiesdatingbackto
the GreatDepression(see, e.g., Aiken, 1968;Bakke, 11 The average duration of unemployment, as
1940;Cobb, 1974;Cohn, 1978;Gore, 1978;Jahodaet measuredby the U. S. Departmentof Labor,did not
al., 1933;Komarovsky, 1940). Suffice it to say that exceed 16 weeks during the post-World War II
these studiesdo not supportthe suppositionthat the period, 1946-78; for a detailed analysis of this
event of becomingunemployedhas a relativelycon- concept and its relation to business cycles, see
temporaneouscriminogeniceffect on an unemployed Akerloffand Main (1980).
individual'sbehavior. Rather, if such psychological 12 This is not to deny the existence of a large
consequencesas "increasingalienationfrom society population of chronically unemployed individuals
and its institutions"have criminogeniceffects on an who remain unemployedfor long periods of time.
unemployedindividual'sbehavior, it is likely that However, the crimininal-motivation impactof their
they, like the financial-stresseffects of unemploy- unemploymentstatus is accordinglyto be found in
ment, require substantialtime intervals to be ef- persistentand/orgrowinglevels of crime ratherthan
fected. in fluctuations.

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UNEMPLOYMENTAND CRIME RATES
ling for the differentiallag structure,therefore,
we can at least partialout some of the motiva-
tional effect and observe the signs of the con-
currentand lagged coefficients. Second, there
are still several unmeasuredconstructs. Con-
sequently, we can only partially identify: (a)
the semi-reduced-formeffect throughthe op-
portunity construct and (b) the semi-
reduced-formeffect through the motivational
construct.'3 In this sense, the model has be-
come partially identified.
DATA
We will test this modelfor the post-World War
II U.S. for the Index crimes-nonnegligible
homicide, forcible rape, aggravated assault,
robbery, motor vehicle theft, burglary and
larceny-theft-publishedin the FederalBureau
of Investigation's (FBI) Uniform Crime Re-
ports (UCR) and the revised series published
by the Office of Management and Budget
(1974). In 1958 the UCR system instituted
major changes in the collection of their data
which make pre- and post-1958 data incom-
patible.14The OMB series accounts for this
discontinuityin ways consistent with the origi-
nal trend in the UCR (Cantor and Cohen,
1980).Thus for the years 1946-1959,the crime
data analyzed herein were obtained from the
OMB publication. For the years 1960-1982,
correspondingannualestimates for the first six
Index Crimeswere obtainedfrom the most re-
cently revised estimates available in the UCR
publications.I5
13 Recall that path-analysisconventions state that
the semi-reduced-formeffect of variableA on vari-
able B consists of the sum of the directeffect of A on
B plus the indirecteffects throughcertain interven-
ing variablesbetween A and B (see Duncan et al.,
1972:23-30,for a definitionof the concept of semi-
reducedforms and effects). In the present case, the
model postulates no direct effect, and each of the
indirecteffects contains only two linkages. Conse-
quently, the semi-reduced-formeffects are quite
simple.
14 It is not plausible that the trends and fluctua-
tions in all of the Index Crime series for the post-
WorldWar II years can be accounted for solely by
administrativechanges in police departmentsand
trends in crime reporting rates. For cogent
arguments to this effect, see Cohen et al.
(1980:94-96). Extendingthe analysis prior to 1946
introducesproblemsassociated with separatingthe
impacts of World War II on aggregate economic
trends. In addition, Cantor and Cohen (1980) find
that, in the case of homicide,the UCR data priorto
this periodare substantiallyaffectedby samplingand
coverage problems. Since homicide is generally
consideredthe most reliablecrimemeasurecollected
by the FBI, we do not feel analysis of any Index
crime trend priorto 1946is warranted.
'5 Data for each of the years were taken from
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323
This creates a potential discontinuity be-
tween pre- and post-1960 estimates. Hence,
there is a possibility that inferences from data
analyses of these series may be sensitive to this
discontinuity. In the case of the "larceny"
category, moreover, this discontinuity was
made even more severe by a change in the
UCR definitionin 1973from "larceniesof $50
and over" to "larceny-theft."While the latter
definition has been applied in recent volumes
of the Uniform Crime Reports to produce a
consistent series of revised estimates back to
1960,there is a clear discontinuityat that point
because the "larceny-theft"definitionincludes
a larger numberof crimes. Thus, we shall be
particularlysensitive to the possibilitythat our
analyses of the larceny series are affected by
this definitional discontinuity. Furthermore,
for each of the seven Index Crime series, we
examinethe extent to which the series exhibits
a shift in level from 1959 to 1960.
MODELS AND METHODSOF
STATISTICALANALYSIS
Ourreview of extant empiricalstudies suggests
that inferences about the U-C relationship
may be sensitive to two possible-"methodsef-
fects." First, inferences may differ by type of
crime studied and by whether trends in indi-
vidual crimes are analyzed separately or are
groupedinto "violent," "property,"or "total"
crime rates. Consequently, in order to ac-
commodate possible differences in the U-C
structural relationships between crimes, we
analyze each of the seven Index Crime time
series individually.
Second, inferences about the algebraicsign
of the U-C relationshipmay be conditionalon
the form and substance of the structural
equationsused in the estimation. Usually, the
effects of unemployment-ratefluctuations on
crime rates are estimated in the context of
structuralequations that include several other
variables. Typically, the latter variables are
chosen to accountfor secular changes in crime
rates as opposed to the fluctuations around
secular trends in crime that unemployment
rates might explain.'6 However, the exact list
Table 2 of the following annual UCR publications:
1960-1966, UCR-1975; 1967, UCR-1976; 1968,
UCR-1977; 1969, UCR-1978; 1970, UCR-1979;
1971, UCR-1980; 1972, UCR-1981; 1973-1982,
UCR-1982.
16 Variablesused by researchersto explainsecular
trends in crime include age composition of the
population(Wellford,1973),the proportionof young
blackmalesin the populationandthe consumerprice
index (Fox, 1976), capital punishment (Ehrlich,
1973),residentialpopulationdensity and availability
of propertytargets (Cohen et al., 1980).
 324
of such variablesusually differs from study to
study, because different theories emphasize
different explanations of crime trends and
there is no single agreed-upontheory to deter-
mine when the list is "complete." The conse-
quence is that variabilityin the specifications
may be a source of variabilityin inferences
about the U-C relationship.Furthermore,the
emphasison findingthe optimalcombinationof
variablesto explain seculartrendsin crime de-
tracts attention from estimationof the effects
of unemploymenton crime.
To circumvent this, we adopt a statistical
analysis strategythat eliminatesseculartrends
in levels and variances from the seven Index
Crimetime series. Hence, inferencesaboutthe
U-C structuraleffects based on our analyses
should be invariant'over all possible explana-
tions.
Our procedures can be described as fol-
lows. 17 First, in order to eliminate secular
trendsin levels of the Index Crimetime series,
we apply deterministicpolynomial difference
filters (cf. McCleary and Hay, 1980:30-48).
This is done by takingdifferencesof successive
values of each series. For instance, if the value
of one of the Index Crimeseries at time (year)t
is denoted by Ct, the value at time t- 1 (one
year earlier)by Ct1, the value at time t-2 (two
years earlier)by Ct2, andso forth,then the first
differences of the'series are
ACt Ct - Ct-1;
second differences are defined by
A2Ct = A(ACt)= Ct -2Ct_1 +Ct-2;
third differences are defined by
A3Ct = A(A2Ct) = Ct -3Ct-
+ 3Ct-2 + Ct-3;
and so forth.
Generally,first differencingof a time series
is sufficient to eliminatea linear secular trend
(increase or decrease in level); second dif-
ferencing eliminates a quadratictrend (an in-
crease (decrease) followed by a decrease (in-
17 To those readersfamiliarwith modernstatistical
time-seriesanalysis procedures(see, e.g., Box and
Jenkins, 1976;McClearyand Hay, 1980),these de-
trendingprocedureswill be familiar.Our analyses
depart, however, from the conventional "Box-
Jenkins" ARIMA model-buildingprocedures after
detrending.In brief,we do not use correlogramsand
relatedtools to identifyplausibleclasses of modelsat
that point. For one thing, our time series are too
short to make that a reliablestrategy. Furthermore,
the theoreticalargumentsgiven in the text are suffi-
ciently strong to lead to plausible models a priori,
and these should be subjectedto statisticaltest.
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AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
crease) in level); thirddifferencingeliminatesa
cubic trend; and so forth. All of the seven
Index Crimetime series studied herein exhibit
strongsecularincreasesin the 1960sand 1970s.
In some cases, they also show modest secular
declines from the 1940sto the 1950s.This sug-
gests thatfirst or second differencingshouldbe
sufficient to eliminatetrends in their levels.
In additionto long-termpatternsof increase
and/ordecrease, it is possible that these series
have moreyear-to-yearvariabilityat the higher
levels observed in recent years. A standard
time-seriestechniquefor dealingwith trendsin
the variabilityof a series as well as in its levels
is to log-transformthe series before differenc-
ing (cf. McClearyand Hay, 1980:48-53).As a
check on the presence of this potential insta-
bility in the Index Crime series, we adopt the
procedurehereinof comparingresultsobtained
by differencing-onlyversus those obtained by
log-transformingand then differencing.
After eliminatingseculartrendsin levels and
possibly in variabilityfrom the Index Crime
series, the residuals that remain represent
fluctuationsin each crime rate above or below
the seculartrend in its respective series. Since
the unemploymentseries is a cyclical series, it
is these fluctuationsthat unemploymentshould
be associated with if the criminalopportunity
and motivation effects described above are
presentin the IndexCrimeseries. Accordingto
our earlier discussions, moreover, we expect
(1) the former effect to produce a negative re-
lationshipbetween contemporaneousvalues of
the unemploymentand detrended crime rate
(2) series, while the latter should produce a posi-
tive association between fluctuations or
changes in levels of unemployment(indexed
below by first-differencesin the unemployment
rate series) and detrendedcrime rates.'8
(3) In order to determinewhether or not these
effects are exhibited in the detrended Index
Crime rates, we estimate the following four
models for each of the seven series:
ACt = a + f31Ut+ I2AUt + Et; (4)
A2C = a + PAUt+ /32AUt+ Et; (5)
AlnCt = a + flnUt + /2A&nUt+ Et; (6)
A21nCt= a + flnUt + f2A&nUt+ Et; (7)
18 A trivial algebraic manipulationshows that a
positive impactof changesin unemploymentlevels is
equivalent to a negative impact of unemployment
laggedone year. Specifically,let Yt denote Ctor A2Ct
or their log-transformedequivalents.Then if 813< 0
and 82 > 0,
Yt = a + PlUt + P2AUt + Et
= a + glUt + 132 (Ut Ut-1) + Et
= a + flUt + 162Ut- p2Ut-I + Et
= a + (/31+132)Ut - 82Ut-l + Et,
as claimed.
 UNEMPLOYMENT AND CRIME RATES 325
Table 1. EstimatedCoefficientsand SummaryStatisticsfor the Effects of Unemploymenton CrimeRates
Panel A: Full Models
(df= 33, 32 for 1st and 2nd differencedequations, respectively)
DependentVariable Intercept Ut AUt DW R2
Murder 0.5614 -0.0936 0.0062 .7229a 0.0670
(First Difference) (2.0726)*** (1.8717)** (0.0928)
Murder* 0.3145 -0.0558 -0.0808 2.5302c 0.1452
(Second Difference) (1.3507) (1.3069) (1.4410)
Rape 0.7925 -0.0107 -0.2703 1.0412a 0.0211
(First Difference) (0.9991) (0.0738) (1.3877)
Rape* 0.3379 -0.0651 -0.2458 2.6400c 0.0349
(Second Difference) (0.4197) (0.4411) (1.2678)
Assault 6.7110 -0.1398 -0.1805 .9322a 0.0000
(First Difference) (1.4260) (0.1608) (0.1562)
Assault* 2.5633 -0.4758 -0.4031 2.5111c 0.0000
(Second Difference) (0.5540) (0.5609) (0.3617)
Robbery 23.519 -3.6401 4.7620 .8701a 0.1605
(First Difference) (3.0822)*** (2.5838)** (2.5413)**
Robbery* 20.975 -4.0080 1.3642 1.8659c 0.1371
(Second Difference) (2.5017)*** (2.6075)** (0.6755)
Burglary 134.50 -19.725 22.774 1.0449a 0.1403
(First Difference) (3.2288)*** (2.5649)** (2.2264)**
Burglary* 121.07 -23.510 9.0717 2.0516c 0.1428
(Second Difference) (2.5312)*** (2.6810)** (0.7875)
Auto Theft 39.860 -5.9379 0.3742 .9583a 0.1337
(First Difference) (2.9671)*** (2.3941)** (0.1134)
Auto Theft* 8.6023 -1.3330 -5.3405 2.3434c 0.0860
(Second Difference) (0.6312) (0.5334) (1.6268)**
Larceny-Theft* 145.33 -31.180 38.464 1.4612c 0.1979
(First Difference) (2.0704)*** (2.1566)** (2.1884)**
Larceny-Theft 149.96 -32.503 8.6505 1.7770c 0.0322
(Second Difference) (1.7321)*** (1.8670)** (0.4078)
Dummyfor Larceny-theft,First Difference:31.480 (t = .6531).

where Ct denotes the crime rate in year t, Ut
denotes the unemploymentrate in year t, in
denotes the naturallogarithmtransformation,
the first- and second-differenceoperators are
as definedin equations(1) and (2), a, f31,and 12
are constantsto be estimated,and E is a zero-
mean, constant variance, serially uncorrelated
errorterm. Which of these alternativemodels
"best fits" a crime rate series depends on the
type of variabilitythe series exhibits. By "best
fits," we mean that alternative of models
(4)-(7) which producesresidualsthat are most
consistent with the white-noise specification
on the error term. This, of course, must be
assessed by computinga suitabletest statistic.
Because none of models (4)-(7) contains a
stochastic laggeddependentvariable,the con-
ventional Durbin-Watsontest for autocorre-
lated disturbancesis suitable for this purpose
(cf. Johnston, 1972:250-54).'9
'9 Takingfirst differences,for example, is equiva-
lent to settingthe coefficientof the laggeddependent
variable in a stochastic first-differencedequation
equal to one. Since this is done a priori,there is no
coefficient to estimate and hence no stochastic
lagged dependent variable, as required for strict
applicabilityof the Durbin-Watsontest. It should
In brief, if an Index Crime series exhibits a
linear seculartrendin levels but no trendin its
variability,then the residualsobtained by fit-
ting the unlogged, first-differenced model of
equation (4) should exhibit less evidence of
autocorrelationthan those that would be ob-
tained by fittingany of the other three models.
Similarly, if the series contains a quadratic
trend in levels but no trend in variability,the
unlogged, second-differencedmodel of equa-
tion (5) should produce residuals with little
evidence of autocorrelation.By comparison,if
also be noted that the Durbin-Watsontest can detect
only first-orderserial correlation of disturbances.
Consequently,its use leaves open the possibilitythat
the residualsof our estimatedequationscontain un-
detected higher-orderdependencies. Based on the
computationof Box-JenkinsQ-statistics (Box and
Jenkins, 1976)for various higher-orderlags of the
residual correlations,we find no evidence for this
possibility for six of the seven Index crimes. The
exception is larceny-theft,which has significantcor-
relationsof residualsat lags 2, 3 and 5. Given the
measurementproblems and discontinuitiesof this
series, however, we are not willing to rush to a
substantiveinterpretationof what may be a statisti-
cal anomaly.

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 326 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW

Table 1. Continued
Panel B: ContemporaneousEffect RestrictedModels
(df= 34, 33 for 1st and 2nd differencedequations, respectively)
DependentVariable Intercept Ut DW R2
Murder 0.5500 -0.0912 .7308a .0942
(First Difference) (2.3276)*** (2.1542)**
Murder* 0.4718 -0.0874 2.2940C .1173
(Second Difference) (2.2575)*** (2.3495)**
Rape 1.3054 -0.1146 0.9415a 0.0000
(First Difference) (1.8350)*** (0.8983)
Rape* 0.8164 -0.1613 2.5188c 0.0172
(Second Difference) (1.1376) (1.2627)
Assault 7.0535 -0.2092 0.9137a 0.0000
(First Difference) (1.7187)*** (0.2842)
Assault* 3.3480 -0.6336 2.4648c 0.0000
(Second Difference) (0.8303) (0.8825)
Robbery 14.484 -1.8098 1.1389a 0.0256
(First Difference) (1.9913)*** (1.3875)**
Robbery* 18.319 -3.4742 2.0094c 0.1513
(Second Difference) (2.4944)*** (2.6571)**
Burglary 91.290 -10.972 1.3108b 0.0403
(First Difference) (2.3441)*** (1.5711)**
Burglary* 103.41 -19.960 2.1923c 0.1526
(Second Difference) (2.4619)*** (2.6691)**
Auto Theft 39.150 -5.7941 0.9705a 0.1589
(First Difference) (3.3424)*** (2.7585)**
Auto Theft* 18.988 -3.4231 2.1888c 0.0404
(Second Difference) (1.5401) (1.5587)**
Larceny-Theft* 71.662 -13.816 1.3745b 0.1050
(First Difference) (1.1019) (1.0826)
Larceny-Theft 133.12 -28.644 1.7804c 0.0565
(Second Difference) (1.7726)*** (1.9863)**
Dummyfor Larceny-theft,First Difference: 101.40 (t = 2.4557).
Dummyfor Larceny-theft,Second Difference:27.409 (t = 0.5901).

the crime series combines either a linear or a
quadratictrendin levels with a secularincrease
(or decrease) in variability, then the log-
transformed, first-differenced and log-
transformed, second-differenced models of
equations(6) and (7), respectively, shouldpos-
sess residuals with the least evidence of au-
tocorrelation. Our choice of the best-fitting
equation is based on that which has a
Durbin-Watsontest statistic indicatingno au-
tocorrelationof disturbancesand is the most
parsimonious (i.e., has the fewest trans-
formations).
RESULTS
Numerical results from application of the
foregoing models to the seven Index Crime
series, 1946-1982,are given in Table 1.20 Panel
20 The annual average unemployment rate and
changes thereinused in the estimationof equations
(4)-(7) are taken from annual governmentpublica-
tions (1946-1979 from U.S. Departmentof Labor,
1980,TableA-1; 1980-1982fromExecutive Officeof
the President,1984,Table B-29). It mightbe thought
that the relationshipsmodeled in equations (4)-(7)
would be stronger if the unemploymentvariables
A reports the results of applyingthe full ver-
sions of the unlogged alternative models (4)
and (5)'21 Those equationsthat are considered
were made specific to subpopulationswith high of-
fense rates-say, males age 15-29. However, since
time trends in the generaland group-specificunem-
ploymentrates are highly correlated,this change in
the definitionof the unemploymentvariableswould
mainlyaffectthe size of the regressioncoefficientsof
equations (4)-(7), not their statistical significance.
21 The correspondinglogged versions (6) and (7)
produced similar substantive results. The primary
differenceswere: (1) the logged second-differenced
version for homicide did not have a significant
negative contemporaneouscoefficient; (2) the fluc-
tuationtermfor the first-differencedversionfor rape
was significantlynegative;(3) the fluctuationterm in
the first-differencedversion of larceny drops to in-
significance;(4) the contemporaneousterm in the
second-differencedversion of larceny was not sig-
nificantlynegative;and (5) the first-differencedver-
sions of the rape and assault equationsborderedon
having an acceptable Durbin-Watsonstatistic (rape
= 1.36 and assault = 1.31, which are both in the
indeterminaterange for the one percent level of
significance).The significanceof the coefficients in
these equations, however, did not indicateany sub-
stantialchange in the conclusions stated below.

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UNEMPLOYMENT AND CRIME RATES 327
Panel C: Lagged Effect Restricted Models
(df= 34, 33 for 1st and 2nd differenced equations, respectively)
Dependent Variable Intercept AUt DW R2
Murder 0.0704 -0.0575 .7967a .0000
(First Difference) (1.0072) (0.9702)
Murder* 0.0196 -0.1185 2.4587c .1269
(Second Difference) (0.3377) (2.4374)**
Rape , 0.7364 -0.2776 1.0451 a 0.0497
(First Difference) (3.7852)*** (1.6829)
Rape* -0.0062 -0.2898 2.6129c 0.0585
(Second Difference) (0.0318) (1.7642)**
Assault 5.9777 -0.2756 0.9443a 0.0000
(First Difference) (5.1775)*** (0.2815)
Assault* 0.0486 -0.7245 2.5047c 0.0000
(Second Difference) (0.0430) (0.7660)
Robbery 4.4232 2.2868 0.9899a 0.0204
(First Difference) (2.1556)*** (1.3145)
Robbery* -0.2089 -1.3430 1.9151c 0.0000
(Second Difference) (0.0930) (0.7151)
Burglary 31.020 9.3616 1.1366a 0.0000
(First Difference) (2.7727)*** (0.9869)
Burglary* -3.1890 -6.8078 2.0130c 0.0000
(Second Difference) (0.2476) (0.6323)
Auto Theft 8.7097 -3.6635 0.9984a 0.0131
(First Difference) (2.4402)*** (1.3106)
Auto Theft* 1.5571 -6.2408 2.3511c 0.1058
(Second Difference) (0.4674) (2.2409)**
Larceny-Theft* 7.1031 17.662 1.3826c 0.1083
(First Difference) (0.2355) (1.1407)
Larceny-Theft 1.8446 12.877 1.7470c 0.0000
(Second Difference) (0.0512) (0.6967)
Dummy for Larceny-theft, First Difference: 82.176 (t=2.1817).
Dummy for Larceny-theft, Second Difference: -6.2908 (t=0.1388).
Note: Estimates are OLS metric coefficients; figures in parentheses are t-ratios calculated from the
coefficients divided by their standard errors; df=degrees of freedom; R2 = squared multiple correlation
coefficient corrected for degrees of freedom; DW = Durbin-Watson autocorrelation test statistic.
a Reject the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation of disturbances at a = .01.
b
Durbin-Watson test for autocorrelation disturbances is inconclusive at a=.01.
e Fail to reject the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelation of disturbances at a=.01.
* Denotes preferred equations.
** Significantly nonzero at a=.10, one-tailed test.
Significantly nonzero at a=.10, two-tailed test.

the best fitting,accordingto the above criteria, The finalequationswere chosen primarilyon
are starred.In order to ascertainthe extent to the basis of evidence of no autocorrelation,as
which the final coefficients may be spuriously indicated by the DW statistic. The first-
influencedby collinearity between the unem- differenced version for larceny and the
ployment and unemployment-changeseries, second-differencedversion for all the other
we also report the restricted models corre- crimes meet our criteria of displaying no au-
spondingto each of the equations in Panels B tocorrelation.Hence, it can be inferredthat the
and C.22 statistical relationshipsreported in these ver-
sions are not "spuriousregressions"(Granger
22
An examination of the data-series discon- and Newbold, 1974) and it is meaningfulto
tinuitiesat the 1960splicingdate noted earlierin the interpretthe starredequations substantively.
text revealedthat there is a change in level only for
the larceny-theftseries. Consequently,we estimated larcenies). Consequently, for the first-differenced
the larceny-theftmodels with a dummy variableto series, we substitutedthe observed mean first dif-
controlfor the changein level from 1959'andearlier ference after the 1960-1959differencefor use in the
to 1960andafter.The correspondingcoefficientsare regression. For the second-differencedseries, the
statisticallysignificantand are given in the footnotes observed mean of (C,) before the 1960-1959 dif-
of Table 1. Applying the transformations(4)-(7) ference was used for the 1960-1959difference.The
combines the discontinuousjump in larcen'-theft observed mean of (Ctl) after the 1960-1959 dif-
between 1959-1960in an illogicalway (i.e.. larcenies ference was used for the 1960-1959 difference for
of $50 and over, while 1960 and beyond is for all (C t-l-

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328
In orderto measurethe degree of statistical
significance of the relationships reported in
Table 1, we reportboth t-statisticsfor the esti-
mated coefficients and multiple correlation
coefficients (correctedfor degrees of freedom)
for the equations. The latter are smaller than
those often obtained in time-series analyses,
because seculartime trends (which usually ac-
count for the sizeable R2s in time-series
analyses) have been removed from the crime
rates. Since the degrees of freedominvolved in
the estimationof the relationshipsreportedin
Table 1 are relatively modest, we use a = .10
as a criterionfor statistical significanceof the
regressioncoefficients. For df = 32, 33, this
requirest-values greaterthan 1.309, 1.308, re-
spectively, for a one-tailedtest. In those cases
in which the coefficients have an algebraicsign
opposite to that expected on the basis of our
theoretical arguments, we use the corre-
spondingtwo-tailedtest, for which the df = 32,
33 criticalvalues are 1.695and 1.693.The latter
test also is applied to the intercepts of the
equations,for which we have made no specific
directionalpredictions.
The empiricalestimates in Table 1 provide
mixed supportfor our theoreticalexpectations.
The expected combinationof a negative con-
temporaneous(criminalopportunity)and posi-
tive fluctuation (lagged criminal motivation)
effect of unemploymenton crime rates shows
up most stronglyfor crimes that have a prop-
erty component. This inconsistency is due
primarilyto the lack of any positive effect for
any of the purely violent crimes.
Larceny is the only crime that has a best-
fitting equation with significant negative and
positive effects. A comparisonof the full model
in Panel A with those of the restrictedmodels
in PanelsB andC suggeststhatthe strengthsof
the negative contemporaneous and positive
fluctuationeffects are suppressedwhen each is
estimated by itself.
Robberyalso shows indicationsof both pos-
itive and negative effects in the tnlogged first-
differencedmodel. However, this specification
is flawedby the presenceof a DW indicativeof
autocorrelation. This problem disappears in
the second-differencedmodel, but the positive
coefficient for unemployment fluctuations
drops to insignificance.The results appearjust
as confusing in the corresponding specifi-
cations of the restricted models in Panels B
and C-the first-differencedversion suggests
that the positive change effect is significant,
while the second-differencedspecification in-
dicates a strong negative contemporaneous
effect. These inconsistencies may arise be-
cause first differencing is not sufficiently
strongto take out trends in levels of robbery,
while second differencingis too strong.
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AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
A similarpatternemerges for burglary.The
first-differencedversion shows signs of sig-
nificantpositive and negativeeffects, while the
preferred version only exhibits a significant
negative effect. A comparisonof the full first-
differenced version shown in Panel A with
those of the restrictedmodels in Panels B and
C suggests that the strengths of the negative
contemporaneousand positive fluctuation ef-
fects are suppressedwhen each is estimatedby
itself.
Unlike the effects of criminalmotivation, a
negative contemporaneouseffect is indicated
for all crimesexcept rapeand assault. It should
be noted that this resultholds whetherthe first-
or second-differencedversion is selected. In-
spection of only the preferredequations shows
a significantnegative contemporaneouseffect
for murder, robbery, burglary, and larceny.
The staffed equationfor auto theft indicates a
lagged negative effect, and inspection of the
restrictedequations in Panels B and C shows
some suppression of the negative contem-
poraneous effect.
The stronglaggedopportunityeffect for auto
theft might, in part, be the result of the associ-
ation between economic activity and the de-
mand for automobiles and auto parts. As the
demandfor new vehicles increases duringeco-
nomic recovery, there will likely be an
eventual increase in the illegal demand for
these commodities.23
The effects of unemploymenton homicide
may be amplifiedthroughits effects on other
crimes, especially those with a propertycom-
ponent. This is the case not only because many
crimes eventually lead to a homicide, but the
FBI classification procedures only require
police to report a homicide in the case of
events where homicide occurs in conjunction
with other crimes (U.S. Departmentof Justice,
1980).
To further investigate the inconsistencies
noted between the first- and second-
differencedversions for robberyand burglary,
we reestimated the first-differencedversions
using the well-knownCochrane-Orcuttcorrec-
tion for autocorrelatederrors (Cochrane and
Orcutt, 1949; Johnston, 1972:261-62). This
allows us to assess whetherthe results in these
equations are significantly affected by serial
correlationof the residuals (see Table 2). For
each crime, both the level and fluctuationef-
fects of unemploymentincrease in statistical
significance.24The coefficients change more
23 This explanationsuggests as muchof a negative
motivationaleffect as one stemmingfrom increases
in opportunities.
24 Because this is the second in a sequence of
statisticaltests performedon these impacts,we raise
the a level from .10 to .05.
UNEMPLOYMENT AND CRIME RATES 329
Table 2. Cochrane-OrcuttEstimatesof Coefficientsand SummaryStatistics for the Effects of Unemploy-
ment on Robberyand Burglary
DependentVariable Intercept Ut AUt R2 DW
Robbery 46.898 -8.3501 7.2727 0.4694 0.74 1.6531a
(First difference) (4.3799)** (4.7919)* (5.4350)*
Burglary 241.87 -41.685 36.613 0.3512 0.65 1.6711a
(First difference) (4.1191)** (4.1326)* (4.4712)*
Note: Estimatesare metriccoefficients;figuresin parenthesesare t-ratioscalculatedfromthe coefficients
divided by their standarderrors; R2= squared multiple correlation coefficient corrected for degrees of
freedom; j = estimated residual autocorrelation coefficient used in the Cochrane-Orcuttprocedure;
DW= Durbin-Watsonautocorrelationtest statistic.
a Fail to reject the null hypothesis of zero autocorrelationof disturbancesat a=.01.
* Significantly nonzero at a=.05, one-tailed test.
** Significantly nonzero at a=.05, two-tailed test.

for robberythan for burglary.This is expected
since the original robbery equation exhibited
strongersigns of autocorrelations.
For the three property crimes that exhibit
the predicted negative-positive pattern, the
relative sizes of the estimated coefficients in
Tables 1 and 2 imply that the total impacts of a
cyclical increase in economic activity, as indi-
cated by changes in the unemploymentrate,
are negative.25For instance, suppose that the
unemploymentrateincreasesfrom6 percentin
year t- 1 to 9 percent in year t-a not unrea-
sonable example for the U.S. in recent years.
Then the coefficients imply that the larceny
rate is expected to decrease in year t by
145.33-31.180(9) + 38.464(3) = - 19.898
crimes reported per 100,000 population. Cal-
culations using the correspondingcoefficients
for robberyand burglaryin Table 2 show simi-
lar results. Thus, even though an increase in
the unemploymentrate has a positive fluctua-
tion effect on these crimes, the relativesizes of
the estimated coefficients for the opportunity
and motivationeffects are such that the total
impacts of an increase in the unemployment
rate are negative-at least within the typical
rangesof U.S. unemploymentlevels and fluc-
tuations.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Previous analyses of the U-C relationship
have greatly oversimplified the causal pro-
25 In econometric terminology, the distinctions
dealt with here pertainto the differences between
impact (contemporaneous) and total multipliers(for
formaldefinitionsandexamplesof the concepts, see
Theil, 1971:465-66).In the presentanalysis, the im-
pact multipliersare given by the algebraicsums of
the coefficients of U. and AUt in Table 2 for each
equation;i.e., -0.0247 for robberyand +6.3450 for
burglary.These suggest an essentially null impact
multiplierfor robbery and a small positive impact
multiplierfor burglary.In both cases, however, the
computationsgiven in the text show that the total
effects are large and negative.
cesses. We have argued that any inference
about the effect of the unemploymentrate has
to account for both criminalopportunityand
criminal-motivationeffects. Neglect of both of
these factors has led to finding inconsistent
empiricalresults on this topic, since the total
effect of the unemploymentrate is the sum of
positive motivationaland negativeopportunity
impacts.
Our empirical results indicate a small, but
significant, total effect of the unemployment
rate on five of the seven Index crimes tested
here. Weak supportwas found for the timing
hypotheses proposed to identify the positive
and negative effects. Unlike most of the previ-
ous studies on this topic, therefore, this
analysisfoundevidence for both a positive and
negative effect of economic activity on crime.
It is the case, however, that these results indi-
cate a negative partial effect across all the
types of crimes showing a significant effect
(i.e., homicide,robbery,burglary,larceny-theft
and motor vehicle theft). Evidence for a sig-
nificant positive partial effect was found
primarilyfor crimes that contain a property
component (i.e., robbery, burglary and lar-
ceny).26
The absence of any measurableeconomic-
hardshipinfluenceon the purelyviolent crimes
is not surprisingin light of the highly individu-
alistic factors that are associated with violent
behavior (Wolfgangand Weiner, 1982). While
this fact has been recognized by at least one
theorist (Merton, 1938), very few recent em-
pirical investigations (e.g., Brenner, 1976;
Ehrlich, 1975)have attendedto this distinction.
It is, of course, not possible to rule out the
contingency that the findings reported herein
are spurious due to the inappropriatenessof
26 Of course, as with all statistical analyses, our
empiricalinferencesare conditionalon the observed
rangesof variationof the variablesin our data. Thus,
we cannot extrapolateour findings to situationsof
extremely high levels or fluctuationsof unemploy-
ment.

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 330
the statistical models and methods that we
have applied. Inspectionof Table 1, however,
shows that within the types of models esti-
mated here, our selection criteria make very
little differencewith respect to the basic con-
clusions stated above: (a) there is a small, but
significant,effect of the unemploymentrate on
crime; (b) the contemporaneous effect is
primarilyan opportunity(negative) one; and
(c) the only evidence of a lagged motivational
effect is for crimes that have a propertycom-
ponent.27
To furtherexplorethis possibilityoutside the
models used here, we have also conducted
preliminarytests in the context of a family of
structuralequation models containingvarious
combinationsof variablesto explaintrendsand
fluctuationsin Index Crimerates. These mod-
els were estimated under the stochastic first-
difference-equation form recommended in
Cohen et al. (1980). We concentrated on ex-
amining the partial effect of unemployment
when other variables, importantto the deter-
minationof both secularandcyclical crimerate
changes, were controlled.These results gener-
ally corroboratethe argumentsand inferences
described above. Specifically, they confirm
that if both the level and fluctuationeffects are
not controlled,it is impossibleto detect a posi-
tive impact of the unemploymentrate. Also,
the patternof positive and negative partialef-
fects for propertycrimesderivedin the present
paper generally is confirmedin the structural
equation analyses, although the relative de-
grees of significance depend on the precise
structuralspecificationsemployedand the type
of crime (Cantor, 1985).
In brief, the theory and analyses described
above imply that the relationshipbetween un-
employmentrates and crime rates can be posi-
tive, negativeor null, dependingon the type of Bober, Stanley
crime and on whether one focuses on the ef- 1968 The Economics of Cycles and Growth.
fects on criminalopportunityor criminalmoti-
vation. Withavailabletheory it is not possible Bonger, W.
to measureabsolutely the direct effects of un- 1916 Criminality and Economic Conditions.
employment on each of these two factors.
Nonetheless, the evidence presentedhere indi- Box, George E. P. and Gwilym M. Jenkins
cates that for the post-World WarII U.S., the 1976 Time Series Analysis: Forecasting and
net result of this process is a dominantoppor-
27 Using the equation in footnote 18, the coeffi-
cients in Table 1, Panel A, can be used to compute
models that assume a full-year lag for the unem-
ployment rate (as opposed to using the difference
term).Overallindicationsof a net positive effect for
either the contemporaneousor lagged terms are
similar to that discussed under our hypothesized
model. Only two of the laggedtermsare statistically
significantin a positive direction(murder,rape and
auto theft) and none of the contemporaneousterms
are significantin a positive direction. All other sig-
nificanteffects are negative.
AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICALREVIEW
tunity effect. Future work.in this area, at a
more disaggregatedlevel, is still requiredbe-
fore more detailed conclusions can be drawn
with respect to either of the structuraleffects.
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