J Quant Criminol (2017) 33:371–395

DOI 10.1007/s10940-016-9305-x

ORIGINAL PAPER

A Matter of Time: A Partial Test of Institutional Anomie

Theory Using Cross-National Time Use Data

Dean Weld1 • Sean Patrick Roche2

Published online: 28 May 2016

 Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016

Abstract
Objectives The institutional anomie theory of crime (IAT) has traditionally been tested
using either survey-based attitudinal measures or government expenditures. However, data
on how people use their time may offer more valid and unobtrusive indicators of the
theory’s key concepts, since choosing how to spend one’s time is inherently an exercise in
expressing values. The present study answers the call for time use data in IAT research.
Methods We perform a cross-national test of IAT using data compiled by the Organi-
sation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) from national time use
surveys administered in 29 countries since 1999. Using multivariate regression, we assess
the relationships between homicide rates and time spent in economic versus noneconomic
institutional domains.
Results Consistent with prior work, we find mixed support for IAT. By itself, time spent
in economic activity is not significantly related to homicide rates. However, the interaction
term for time spent in economic and non-economic activities has a positive and statistically
significant relationship with homicide, even after controlling for several other factors.
Conclusions The results tentatively suggest that non-economic institutions may be
criminogenic in some societies. We discuss the importance of our findings and suggest new
lines of research to further explore the content of non-economic institutions. We also
address other possible applications of time use data in macro-criminological inquiry.

An earlier draft of the manuscript was presented at the 2014 annual meeting of the American Society of
Criminology in San Francisco, CA.

& Dean Weld

dweld@albany.edu
1
Department of Sociology, University at Albany, SUNY, Arts and Sciences 351, 1400 Washington
Avenue, Albany, NY 12222, USA
2
School of Criminal Justice, University at Albany, SUNY, Draper 219, 135 Western Avenue,
Albany NY 12222, USA

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Keywords Institutional anomie
Homicide
Time use data
Cross-national crime rates

‘‘Lost time is never found again.’’ – Benjamin Franklin.

Since its development over 20 years ago, institutional anomie theory (IAT) has spurred
significant comparative research. IAT attempts to explain cross-national variation in crime
by considering the relative influence of different social institutions (e.g., the family,
economy, polity) across societies. Each society, according to the theory, is ‘‘characterized
by a distinctive arrangement of social institutions that reflects a balancing of the sometimes
competing claims and requisites of the different institutions, yielding a distinctive insti-
tutional balance of power’’ (Messner and Rosenfeld 2007, p. 74). Messner and Rosenfeld
(2007) argue, for instance, that the economy dominates other social institutions in the US,
such that economic roles and functions (e.g., paid labor) crowd out non-economic ones
(e.g., caregiving to family members). Drawing from Merton (1938), they posit that this
institutional arrangement is particularly criminogenic. This is because the legitimate means
for economic success are unequally distributed across the social structure, leading people
to pursue illegitimate means (e.g., crime) to achieve monetary goals. Thus, the key
hypothesis of IAT is that rates of serious crime, such as homicide, should be highest in
societies where the economy dominates the institutional balance of power.
While IAT is conceptually rich, it is also empirically challenging. The theory’s society-
wide focus and comparative implications, coupled with the inherent difficulties of inter-
national data, often make it difficult to operationalize core concepts (Chamlin and Cochran
2007; Dolliver 2014; Messner 2003). To capture cross-national variation in institutional
influence, prior research has typically used attitudinal measures from the World Values
Survey (e.g., Cao 2004; Chamlin and Cochran 2007; Jensen 2002) or government estimates
of social welfare expenditures (e.g., Batton and Jensen 2002; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997;
Pratt and Godsey 2003; Savolainen 2000). However, both avenues have significant
drawbacks. Government expenditures may have difficulty capturing the behavior and
values of everyday people (Chamlin and Cochran 2007; Costanza et al. 2009). Respondents
of attitudinal surveys may also feel pressure to give a socially desirable answer (Zaller and
Feldman 1992), or if the question is sufficiently abstract, may vary in their interpretation of
the question itself (Schuman and Presser 1981). These sources of measurement error may
be amplified by translation across many different languages (Heine et al. 2002; Johnson
and Van de Vijver 2003; Van Vaerenbergh and Thomas 2013).
Arguably, the most comparable measure of institutional influence across nations is how
a nation’s citizens use their time. Time is a precious and finite resource. It is also uniformly
distributed, both across all members within a society, and across all societies. People across
the world share the same 24-h day regardless of wealth, social status, or location. The value
a society places on economic roles and goals, and the extent to which citizens tend to
privilege economic roles over noneconomic ones, are topics that are well suited to
exploration with time use data. People fill their days by performing institutional roles:
worker, mother, voter, caregiver, and many others. Yet because of the limits of time, some
roles must give way to others. Thus, social institutions are always in competition for
people’s time, and choosing how to spend one’s time is inherently an exercise in
expressing institutional values.
Recognizing this, Messner et al. (2008, p. 177) call for the leveraging of time use data in
investigating the institutional balance of power. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to

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test predictions derived from IAT using data from cross-national surveys that ask
respondents to account for their activities throughout the day. We test the hypothesis,
derived from institutional anomie theory, that homicide rates are higher in nations whose
citizens devote a larger percentage of their time to economic roles and functions than to
noneconomic activities. We also examine how participation in noneconomic activities may
moderate the relationship between time spent in economic activities and homicide.

Institutional Anomie Theory

Messner and Rosenfeld’s (2007) institutional anomie theory (IAT) draws on insights from
Merton (1938) in viewing crime as a predictable response to particular sociocultural
environments. Merton (1938, 1968) identified two key aspects of a society’s social and
cultural structure: culturally defined goals and the acceptable means for goal attainment.
Societal equilibrium, Merton (1938) observed, is maintained as long as individuals derive
satisfaction from both goal attainment and the legitimate means for achievement. A
society’s sociocultural environment becomes criminogenic, however, when a dispropor-
tionate emphasis is placed on success goals and there is unequal access to the legitimate
means for achievement (Merton 1938). Some individuals then become ‘‘innovators,’’
turning to crime in order to reach culturally prescribed goals of wealth or power (Merton
1938).
IAT combines Merton’s insights with Parsons’ concept of the institutional structure of
societies (see, e.g., Parsons 1990). Social institutions, which allow societies to endure over
time, are ‘‘relatively stable sets of norms and values, statuses and roles, and groups and
organizations that regulate human conduct to meet the basic needs of a society’’ (Messner
and Rosenfeld 2007, p. 71). Institutions such as the economy, family, and polity, though
each organized around a distinct set of activities, function in ways that are interdependent
(Messner and Rosenfeld 2007). The functioning of each institution has consequences for
the others, often requiring individuals to prioritize institutional demands (Messner and
Rosenfeld 2007; Messner et al. 2008). Thus, the ‘‘institutional balance of power’’ (Messner
and Rosenfeld 2007, p. 4) reflects the relative importance that people attach to different
social institutions within a society (see also, Bernburg 2002). Societies where the insti-
tutional balance of power is dominated by the economy place an overwhelming emphasis
on individual monetary success, even when there are few legitimate means to achieve that
success (Messner and Rosenfeld 2007). This competition for material gain leads to a
breakdown of social norms that is ultimately criminogenic.
Though initially an effort to explain high crime rates in the United States, IAT research
has expanded to the cross-national context, focusing on societal variation in the extent of
economic dominance (e.g., Bjerregaard and Cochran 2008; Hughes et al. 2015; Messner
and Rosenfeld 1997; Savolainen 2000). Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) argue that eco-
nomic dominance in a society has a number of consequences for other social institutions.
Economic dominance leads to a devaluing of noneconomic roles and functions, pressure
for noneconomic institutions to accommodate economic requirements, and the penetration
of economic norms into other institutional areas (Messner and Rosenfeld 2007).
This institutional imbalance leads to increases in serious crime for two reasons. First,
when performing economic roles, actors are encouraged to select the most technically
efficient means to achieve their ends regardless of the moral status of those means (Cullen
1994; Cullen and Wright 1997; Messner and Rosenfeld 2007). This efficiency orientation

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likely spills over into other realms of social action, leading to criminal activity (Messner
et al. 2008). Second, economic dominance weakens the critical socialization function of
institutions such as the family and the education system (Messner and Rosenfeld 2007).
The devaluation of noneconomic institutions limits their ability to instill morality into
citizens, thus weakening internal restraints against crime (Messner and Rosenfeld 2007).
Notice that both mechanisms are directly related to personal time use. Individuals who
spend a larger share of time performing economic roles have greater exposure to economic
norms. Conversely, they have decreased exposure to noneconomic norms and values. Thus,
data on personal time use is highly salient to the theoretical mechanisms outlined in IAT.

Prior Research

Both conceptually robust and intuitively appealing, IAT provides key insights into how
structural characteristics and cultural orientations can come together to influence crime
rates at a systemic level (Bernburg 2002). It is a versatile perspective that has been used
both comparatively across nations (Bjerregaard and Cochran 2008; Dolliver 2014; Hughes
et al. 2015), and also within them (Chamlin and Cochran 1995; Piquero and Piquero 1998;
Maume and Lee 2003). However, this versatility comes with a price. IAT relies on highly
abstract sociological concepts such as ‘‘economic dominance’’ and ‘‘the institutional bal-
ance of power.’’ Unambiguous measurement of these concepts is virtually impossible, and
there is considerable debate about the validity of competing measures (see, e.g., Chamlin
and Cochran 2007; Messner 2003; Messner and Rosenfeld 2006). While there are a variety
of measures of IAT’s core concepts (see e.g., Chamlin and Cochran 1997; Cullen et al.
2004; Hughes et al. 2015), scholars primarily favor two avenues of measurement: (1)
measures of government social expenditures, most notably variations on the decommod-
ification index (Batton and Jensen 2002; Rosenfeld and Messner 2009; Savolainen 2000),
and (2) survey questions that measure attitudes and values regarding different institutions
(Cao 2004; Chamlin and Cochran 2007; Jensen 2002).

Measuring Economic Dominance Through Decommodification

Beginning with Messner and Rosenfeld (1997), several scholars have tested IAT using
decommodification indices (e.g., Pratt and Godsey 2003; Rosenfeld and Messner 2009;
Savolainen 2000). ‘‘Decommodification’’ is the extent to which ‘‘the balance of power in
market societies has shifted from the economy towards the polity; it implies that purely
economic values and criteria are accommodated to collective, political considerations’’
(Messner and Rosenfeld 1997, p. 1397). A decommodification index is then, at its heart, a
measure of the institutional strength of the polity as it seeks to restrain the economy.
Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) derived their measure of decommodification from
Esping-Andersen’s (1990) comparative study of national social welfare regimes. The
original index captures four dimensions of social welfare spending: (1) social welfare
expenditures as a percent of gross domestic product (GDP), (2) average annual expendi-
tures per head of population, (3) percentage of total receipts according to origin, and (4) the
percentage distribution of benefit expenditures across different program types (Messner
and Rosenfeld 1997, pp. 1399–1400). While some studies preserve aspects of this nuanced
measure (see, e.g., Hannon and DeFronzo 1998; Maume and Lee 2003), many other studies
construct decommodification indices that consist solely of social welfare expenditures as a

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percent of GDP (see, e.g., Bjerregaard and Cochran 2008; Rosenfeld and Messner 2009;
Savolainen 2000). In the current literature it is common to find a decommodification index
operationalized as simply the percentage of a nation’s GDP devoted to welfare programs
(Pratt and Cullen 2005; Rosenfeld and Messner 2009).
We contend it is problematic to base decommodification solely on aggregate govern-
ment spending, or conversely, to use a simplified decommodification index as the primary
measure of the institutional balance of power. First, Esping-Andersen (1990) argued that
his index, which included a complex scoring system of public spending on pensions, sick
pay, and unemployment compensation, was necessary precisely because existing research
lacked nuance. Ironically, while Messner and Rosenfeld (1997) originally preserved much
of Esping-Andersen’s sophisticated measure, they and others now condense the measure
back into the simplistic indicator that Esping-Andersen finds lacking. Left on their own,
‘‘leading’’ indicators like GDP, and measures that are derived from them such as
decommodification indices, ignore tremendous cross-national variation in domestic work,
nonmarket leisure, cash transactions, happiness, and contentment (Karabell 2014, p. 99;
see also, Costanza et al. 2009). Simon Kuznets, the Noble Prize-winning economist who
helped create the GDP measure, himself noted, ‘‘The valuable capacity of the human mind
to simplify a complex situation…becomes dangerous when not controlled in terms of
definitely stated criteria’’ (Kuznets 1934, p. 5).
Second, by focusing on expenditures rather than outcomes (e.g., well-being among
Medicaid recipients), the decommodification index allows structural differences across
nations to bias estimates. For example, healthcare expenditures in the United States might
be higher than in other nations because of relative inflation and cost of living, rather than a
greater commitment to non-economic values. Third, the decommodification index is at best
a measure of the relationship between the economy and the polity, and the polity is only
one of several of non-economic institutions (Messner and Rosenfeld 2006; Messner et al.
2008).

Survey Measures of Institutional Strength

Researchers have also used attitudinal survey measures to test IAT by arguing that they are
indicative of cross-national variation in institutional strength. While there are a handful of
cross-national surveys about social attitudes (e.g., European Social Survey, International
Social Survey Program, and European Values Study), studies testing IAT have favored
measures from the World Values Survey (WVS). The WVS is an ongoing international
attitudinal survey designed to allow the comparative analysis of values and norms (Jensen
2002). Researchers have generally focused on two types of WVS measures.
First, there are questions that directly ask respondents about their views on the
importance of social institutions. Jensen (2002, p. 48) used questions that asked respon-
dents to rate the importance of work, family, religion, and leisure from ‘‘1–very important’’
to ‘‘4–not at all important.’’ On the other hand, there are questions that ask for more
concrete information, from which researchers infer institutional strength. For example,
Chamlin and Cochran (2007, p. 49) used two questions from the 1995–1997 WVS. The
first question asks individuals to select which of four factors is most important when
seeking employment: ‘‘good income,’’ ‘‘job security,’’ ‘‘friendly colleagues,’’ or ‘‘feeling
accomplishment.’’ The second question asks respondents whether placing ‘‘less emphasis
on money and material possessions would be a good thing’’ (Chamlin and Cochran 2007,
p. 51).

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Single-item survey measures, particularly those translated across languages, have

substantial drawbacks. First, even if they do reflect underlying values and behaviors,
attitudinal questions are still open to interpretation. Chamlin and Cochran (2007, p. 58)
argue that, compared to structural measures like decommodification indices, ‘‘the WVS
offers a more proximate (and accurate) measure of how individuals perceive the cultural
environment at a given time.’’ However, Messner and Rosenfeld (2006, p. 141) contend
that WVS measures ‘‘confound the respondent’s personal evaluation of the importance of
money’’ with the importance of money in the respondent’s society. Indeed, it strikes us that
Chamlin and Cochran’s (2007, p. 51) second measure, which asks if respondents agree that
‘‘less emphasis on money and material possessions is a good thing,’’ is aspirational rather
than descriptive. This may have unintended consequences. For instance, in the same way
we might expect weight loss to be the highest priority in the most obese countries, citizens
of the most economically dominated countries may be the most likely to agree that
deemphasizing materialism is a good thing. Clearly, there is substantial disagreement about
what the WVS questions truly measure.
Second, even in ideal circumstances, asking respondents to rate the importance of
various social institutions reveals little about what people actually do in practice (Jerol-
mack and Khan 2014). This may be especially true when people must negotiate the
competing demands of two or more institutional roles or values in real time. Early soci-
ologists were quite aware of the lack of consistency between reported attitudes and actual
behavior (Dean and Whyte 1958; Merton 1940; Mills 1940). Indeed, Mills (1940, p. 329)
identifies it as the ‘‘central methodological problem of the social sciences.’’ More recent
psychological literature highlights that ‘‘attitude–behavior consistency’’ is far from perfect
(Gross and Niman 1975; Schuman and Johnson 1976; Wicker 1969), meaning that
‘‘people’s verbal responses at time 1 are often unrelated to their observed behavior at time
2’’ (Jerolmack and Khan 2014, p. 2).
Third, asking directly about the importance of social institutions is problematic because
of the social desirability effect (Presser and Stinson 1998). Social desirability entails more
than situations where respondents consciously misreport their preferences in order to avoid
embarrassment, though that is naturally a concern when asking a person if her family is
important to her. Social desirability also includes ‘‘cases in which people are unsure what
their attitudes are but are influenced by the immediate context to give greater weight to a
particular consideration’’ (Zaller and Feldman 1992, p. 601). They therefore may uncon-
sciously conform their preferences to a perceived ideal. It is easy to imagine a person that
has a rose-colored view of her priorities, especially when talking to a stranger, but who in
practice devotes a large portion of her life to economic competition. Arguably, a person’s
behavioral routines ‘‘in practice’’ should have a more substantial influence on their
socialization and exposure to norms than their idealized image of themselves.
In addition, Johnson and Van de Vijver (2003, p. 202) note that ‘‘depending on the topic
of study, social desirability can lead to various distortions of cross-cultural comparisons.’’
While Johnson and Van de Vijver (2003) use abortion as a salient example, the importance
of work, family, and religion may also be sensitive topics that vary in their sensitivity from
culture to culture. Furthermore, people from different nations often use different standards
when answering subjective Likert scale questions (Heine et al. 2002, p. 913, see also,
Pickett and Baker 2014), and there are notable variations in responses styles across
countries (Van Vaerenbergh and Thomas 2013, p. 204). IAT’s abstract concepts may
exacerbate these problems (Schuman and Presser 1981).
Thus, it is critical for IAT research to complement measures such as decommodification
indices and attitudinal survey questions with data on how people actually spend their time,

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examining which institutions are privileged and how role conflicts are resolved. Do parents
leave the office in the afternoon to see their children, or do they work longer hours in hopes
of advancing their careers and being strong financial providers? Do respondents in some
countries rate leisure time as a high priority but have little time for such activities in
practice? These are the types of questions that should be at the heart of IAT research.
Again, time use inevitably structures exposure to institutional roles, norms, and values.

Exploring the Possibilities of Time Use Data

Time use is a systematic accounting of how respondents spend their time over a given
period. This is primarily done either by: (a) experience sampling, (b) stylized questions, or
(c) time use diaries (Al Baghal et al. 2014, p. 520). Time use studies began to appear in the
early 20th century and focused on how specific groups, such as American workingmen and
English rural families, spent their time (Hoeben et al. 2014; see, e.g., Bevans 1913;
Lundberg et al. 1934; Pember Reeves 1913). Today, time use diaries are considered valid
and reliable windows into everyday life (Al Baghal et al. 2014; Michelson 2005). A wide
range of nations, including the United States (ATUS 2013), currently collect time use data
(Harvey and Pentland 1999). Researchers in diverse fields such as economics, urban
planning, political science, and psychology now use this information (Hoeben et al. 2014).
While not very common, time use data have been applied several times in crimino-
logical research (Hoeben et al. 2014). These applications have usually been situated in
individual-level studies of delinquency in adolescents (see, e.g., Anderson and Hughes
2008; Gordon and Caltabiano 1996; Kivivuori 2007; Riley 1987). However, to our
knowledge, no studies have aggregated time use data to the national level as a measure of
institutional strength. Baumer and Gustafson (2007) come perhaps the closest. Their study
assesses familial commitment using three stylized questions from the 1974–1977 General
Social Survey (GSS), asking respondents how often over the previous year they had visited
their siblings, parents, and other relatives, respectively (Baumer and Gustafson 2007,
pp. 635–636). However, Baumer and Gustafson (2007) only use the time use questions as a
partial indicator of one concept (commitment to family). And while the GSS measures are
far less obtrusive than directly asking about how much respondents value their family (as is
done in the World Values Survey), respondents are still required to make a summary
judgment about familial contact throughout an entire year. Stylized questions of this nature
are generally less valid than other methods used to collect time use data, such as diaries,
because of inconsistencies in respondents’ memories (Bolger et al. 2003).
Messner et al. (2008) were the first to explicitly suggest using time use data in IAT
research. In particular, they note that ‘‘indicators could be based on accounts of the actual
allocation of time devoted to the enactment of roles in the respective institutional
domains’’ (Messner et al. 2008, p. 177). Since time is a finite resource that is equally
abundant and distributed in all societies, time use data is useful for both comparative
research generally, and IAT research specifically. Measures of how Italians versus Koreans
spend their time are easily interpretable, unlike more structural indicators such as the
decommodification index, which may be influenced by any number of omitted variables.
Likewise, choosing how to spend one’s time is inherently an exercise in expressing
institutional values, since performing one role (e.g., working overtime) may preclude one
from taking on another role (e.g., acting as a caregiver; running for local office) (Messner
et al. 2008, p. 168). Answering Messner et al.’s (2008) call to research, we examine the
average amounts of time that a country’s citizens spend in economic and noneconomic

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activities, and assess relationships between these new measures of institutional strength
and country-level homicide rates.

The Current Study

The current study is a cross-national test of IAT using a sample of 29 nations, 26 of which
are members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).
While researchers have used the OECD’s GDP and unemployment data (e.g., Rosenfeld
and Messner 2009), this study is the first to use the OECD’s compiled time use data to
measure cross-national variation in institutional strength. While this is, to our knowledge,
the most extensive source of cross-national time use data available, it is still limited largely
to developed nations. We argue, however, that these countries are well suited to assessing
IAT’s predication for the effects of economic dominance, as these are the societies most
likely to have embraced capitalism to at least some degree. Our study proceeds in a series
of three steps, in which we assess four key hypotheses.
First, because prior IAT research has often relied on WVS data to capture cross-national
differences in institutional strength (Jensen 2002; Chamlin and Cochran 2007; Hughes
et al. 2015), we find it instructive to assess the degree of consistency between time use and
WVS data. We examine correlations for two pairs of OECD and WVS variables measuring
the strength of the economy and family. Comparing different indicators of economic and
family strength for the nations in our sample allows us to assess the overlap between
reported attitudes and reported behaviors. Because both pairs of indicators are designed to
measure the same underlying construct, we expect to find consistency despite different
measurement approaches. Thus, we hypothesize that there will be a positive correlation
between each pair of the OECD and WVS measures.
The second objective of our study is to examine the effects of participation in economic
and noneconomic activities on homicide rates. Using the mean number of minutes per day
that respondents devote to four institutional domains (economy, family, education, and
religious/civic activities), we assess whether spending a greater share of daily life in
economic versus noneconomic activities contributes to higher rates of lethal violence. IAT
posits that time spent in economic activities should increase violent crime by weakening
the social control function of noneconomic institutions and encouraging individuals to
adhere to market norms in selecting the most technically efficient means for goal
achievement (Messner and Rosenfeld 2007; Messner et al. 2008). Conversely, behavioral
involvement in noneconomic institutions should reduce lethal violence by encouraging
individuals to derive self-worth from noneconomic pursuits and by fostering a value ori-
entation that favors the common good over individual success (Chamlin and Cochran
1995; Messner and Rosenfeld 2007). Thus, we make two related hypotheses: after con-
trolling for other relevant factors, (a) time devoted to performing economic roles and
functions will have a positive association with homicide rates, and (b) time devoted to
noneconomic roles and functions will have a negative association with homicide rates.
Our third objective is to assess whether participation in noneconomic activities mod-
erates any observed relationship between economic dominance and violent crime. IAT
posits that strong noneconomic institutions should reduce the criminogenic effects of
economic dominance by regulating behavior and promoting noneconomic avenues for
success (Messner and Rosenfeld 2007). Though some prior research has suggested that the
strength of noneconomic institutions may mediate the relationship between the economy

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and crime (Maume and Lee 2003), we argue that it is the simultaneous operation of
exaggerated cultural success goals and weak institutional controls that contributes to
violent crime (Chamlin and Cochran 1995; Piquero and Piquero 1998; Savolainen 2000;
Schoepfer and Piquero 2006). We hypothesize that time spent in noneconomic activities
will moderate the relationship between economic dominance and homicide rates, with
strong noneconomic involvement weakening the criminogenic effects of economic
dominance.

Data and Methods

Time Use Variables

Since results obtained in IAT studies may be sensitive to the measurement of institu-
tional variables (Messner and Rosenfeld 2006; Piquero and Piquero 1998), we introduce
time use measures as a novel approach to capturing institutional strength. Please note
that here ‘‘time use’’ refers to a type of data, and is completely distinct from the method
of ‘‘time series analysis.’’ Although our time use measures come from a small range of
years, our analysis is strictly cross-sectional. Our time use measures come from the
OECD’s compilation of 29 national time use surveys, each administered during one or
two years between 1999 and 2011 (see Miranda 2011, pp. 36–39 for methodological
documentation of national surveys).1 Although we compare time use data collected at
different time points, cross-national time use research suggests consistency in time use
patterns over time. Sullivan and Gershuny (2001, p. 343), for example, analyzed time use
diary data collected from six industrialized countries over a 30-year period, finding
‘‘relative stability in the balance between work and leisure time over the period covered
by the analyses.’’ A full list of countries and years of survey administration is presented
in Appendix A.
Time use surveys in the OECD dataset take the form of time use diaries, in which
respondents (usually age 15 and older, but with some exceptions) autobiographically recall
and report the number of minutes spent on various activities over a 24-h period (Miranda
2011; see also Juster 1985, for time use diaries generally). Most surveys collect two days
of data from respondents, though some surveys such as the American Time Use Survey
(ATUS) use a single day (ATUS 2013; Miranda 2011). The majority of surveys have
respondents report activities in their own words (to be coded later by survey administra-
tors), while respondents in Ireland and Mexico indicate their activities using a list of pre-
coded activity categories (Miranda 2011). Activities are typically recorded for pre-deter-
mined intervals of time that vary from survey to survey, ranging from 1 to 15 min
(Miranda 2011). Sample sizes for the national surveys vary considerably, ranging from
approximately 1000–47,000 respondents (Miranda 2011). We note that the OECD dataset
provides only aggregate country-level estimates, and for reasons of both parsimony and
privacy does not include individual-level data.
The OECD time use dataset covers five broad activity categories—‘‘paid work or
study,’’ ‘‘unpaid work,’’ ‘‘personal care,’’ ‘‘leisure,’’ and ‘‘other’’—with each containing a

1
The OECD time use dataset contains more recent data for some countries than what is reflected in the
survey documentation in Miranda (2011). Veerle Miranda provided updated documentation that is available
from the authors upon request. OECD time use data are available for download at http://www.oecd.org/
gender/data/OECD_1564_TUSupdatePortal.xls.

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larger subset of specific activities. The ‘‘paid work or study’’ category, for example,
consists of six different activities: (1) paid work (all jobs); (2) travel to and from work/
study; (3) time in school or classes; (4) research/homework; (5) job search; and (6) other
paid work or study-related. The number of minutes per day in each activity category for a
particular country is an estimated average value from all responses provided in the
administration of that country’s survey. The time use measures in the OECD’s dataset have
been normalized to 1440 min, meaning that for countries in which the daily time use
estimates do not sum to 1440 min, any remaining minutes are distributed equally among
all activities.
Our independent variables consist of two time use measures. We operationalize eco-
nomic strength as the country-level mean number of daily minutes spent in paid work
(economic participation). This measure includes time spent in all jobs worked for pay. To
operationalize noneconomic institutional strength, we create a composite measure of daily
time spent in three noneconomic activity categories: (1) family, (2) education, and (3)
religious/civic (noneconomic participation).
To create our composite noneconomic participation variable, we operationalize three
subsets of activities as follows. First, we operationalize family activities as the country-
level mean number of minutes per day spent caring for household members and non-
household members (including children and adults). Although caring for non-household
members may consist of time spent with individuals outside of one’s traditional family, we
argue that caring for individuals regardless of familial bond reflects the value orientation of
this institution. Second, educational activities are operationalized as the country-level
mean number of minutes per day spent in school or classes. Third, we operationalize
religious/civic activities by adding two country-level mean values (in minutes per day): (1)
religious/spiritual activities and civic obligations, and (2) volunteering. Messner and
Rosenfeld (2007) are clear in the original formulation of IAT that the four institutions they
identify (economy, family, education, and polity) do not constitute an exhaustive list. We
thus follow prior research (Chamlin and Cochran 1995; Jensen 2002; Maume and Lee
2003) by including religion as an important noneconomic social institution. The OECD
data do not allow for disentangling religious activities from non-religious civic pursuits.
However, we argue that both types of activities reflect a similar value orientation of
concern for others and the common good. This is in stark contrast to the individual success
orientation characteristic of economic pursuits. Note that there are limited instances of
missing data for subcomponents of noneconomic participation. We discuss this further in
our robustness analyses section.

Dependent Variable

Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) state that IAT is intended to help explain rates of serious
crime. Comparing crime rates across nations can be problematic due to differences in
criminal justice systems and in how crimes are defined and reported (Kalish 1988).
Homicide is a popular dependent variable in cross-national studies of violent crime due to
‘‘the mortal nature of the offense and the higher availability, reliability, and validity of
homicide measures for a large number of nations’’ (Howard et al. 2000, pp. 159–160; see
also LaFree 1998). Therefore, consistent with prior cross-national IAT research (e.g.,
Hughes et al. 2015; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997; Savolainen 2000), our dependent
variable is the homicide rate per 100,000 population (homicide).
Our homicide data come primarily from the World Health Organization’s (WHO)
Mortality Database, which ‘‘contains data only for those nations that WHO believes

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provide data of good quality’’ (Howard et al. 2000, p. 186). WHO homicide counts ‘‘are
based on cause-of-death information provided by each nation’s death registration system’’
(Howard et al. 2000, p. 186; World Health Organization 2015). We use homicide rates per
100,000 population for homicides classified as deaths due to assault of any kind. Because
the WHO database does not contain homicide rates for China and India, we obtain
homicide data for these nations from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC). To minimize the effects of annual fluctuations in homicide rates, we follow the
conventional practice of computing multi-year averages for the years 2000–2010, log
transformed to reduce skew (Hughes et al. 2015; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997; Savolainen
2000). For countries with missing data, averages were computed from all years of available
data for that country.

Control Variables

We follow prior cross-national homicide research (e.g., Bjerregaard and Cochran 2008;
Hughes et al. 2015; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997; Pratt and Godsey 2003; Savolainen
2000) by controlling for several structural covariates: percent of the population age 60 or
older (age structure); average life expectancy at birth (life expectancy); average infant
mortality rate per 1000 live births (infant mortality); percent of the population in urban
areas (urban); the ratio of males to females (sex ratio); and GDP per capita in current US
dollars, logged (GDP).2 Infant mortality is an average rate for 2000–2005, while other
covariates are measured at 2005, an approximate midpoint of the time span in which the 29
national time use surveys were administered. We obtain GDP per capita data from The
World Bank, sex ratio data from the 2005 CIA World Factbook, and all other structural
covariate data from the United Nations World Population Policies 2005. In order to pre-
serve degrees of freedom and avoid issues of multicollinearity in regression analyses, prior
studies have combined several structural covariates into a development index (Hughes
et al. 2015; Messner and Rosenfeld 1997; Savolainen 2000). We followed this convention
by conducting an exploratory factor analysis that yielded one factor: development
(KMO = .84; variance explained = 99.0 %). This factor has high loadings for life
expectancy, infant mortality, urban, GDP, and age structure. Sex ratio is retained as a
separate control variable.
In addition to structural covariates, we account for economic inequality and unem-
ployment. Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) argue that economic inequality helps to sustain
the competitive struggle for monetary gain by increasing the rewards for those who suc-
ceed relative to those who do not. We operationalize economic inequality using the Gini
index for the year of administration of each country’s time use survey or the most recent
prior year available (ranging from 1998 to 2010). Gini index data come from The World
Bank and the CIA World Factbook. Because our study is primarily concerned with time
spent working, we also account for the national unemployment rate. We measure unem-
ployment for the year of administration of each country’s time use survey. If a survey was
administered across two consecutive years, we use the unemployment rate from the first
year.

2
Prior research (e.g., Messner and Rosenfeld 1997; Hughes et al. 2015) has also controlled for average
annual population growth. Due to our small sample size, we omitted this variable in order to achieve
parsimony in our regression models. When running our models with a measure of average annual population
growth 2000–2005, the Gini index in Model 1 becomes non-significant, but Models 2 and 3 are substantively
similar to the results presented.

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Additional Variables

As a preliminary step in our analysis, we undertake a brief comparison of time use and
World Values Survey data. Each wave of the WVS asks respondents to rate the importance
of work and family. Both items are rated using a 4-point Likert scale ranging from ‘‘very
important’’ to ‘‘not at all important.’’ We use two country-level measures from the World
Values Survey, Aggregate Data file: (1) percentage of respondents rating work ‘‘very
important’’; and (2) percentage of respondents rating family ‘‘very important.’’ We use
percentages computed from Wave 3 (1994–1998) or Wave 4 (1999–2004), whichever is
most recent for each country.3

Analytic Strategy

We begin our analysis by examining correlations between time use and WVS measures of
the strength of the economy and family. Recall that we measure economic participation
using the country-level mean number of minutes per day spent in paid work. We measure
family participation (a component of our composite noneconomic participation variable)
as the country-level mean number of minutes per day spent caring for household and non-
household members. We examine two pairs of correlations: (1) economic participation and
the percentage of WVS respondents rating work as ‘‘very important’’; and (2) family
participation and the percentage of WVS respondents rating family as ‘‘very important.’’
The remainder of our analyses proceed in a series of three Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) regression models. Model 1 is a baseline model that predicts homicide using de-
velopment, economic inequality, and sex ratio. Model 2 introduces our independent time
use variables for daily time spent in paid work (economic participation) and daily time
spent in noneconomic activities (noneconomic participation). Finally, Model 3 tests our
moderation hypothesis by adding a product term for the interaction between economic
participation and noneconomic participation. VIF values for all models are below 3.5,
indicating no problems of multicollinearity.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Descriptive statistics for all variables are presented in Table 1. Our indicator of economic
strength, economic participation, has a mean of 209.63 min and a standard deviation of
35.18, indicating considerable variation among the 29 nations in our sample. This measure
ranges from a low of approximately 143 min per day in France to a high of about 287 min
in Japan.4 High values of economic participation (e.g., Japan, China, and Mexico) could

3
Data from Wave 4 (1999–2004) of the World Values Survey, Aggregate Data File are used for all
countries for which data are available. For missing values, we substitute Wave 3 (1994–1998) data for
Australia, New Zealand, and Norway.
4
We note that economic participation should not be confused with the average length of a workday in each
country. Economic participation is the average number of minutes that respondents performed paid work on
their time diary days. Values of economic participation reflect the fact that some respondents do not perform
any paid work, and that some working respondents likely fill out diaries for non-working days. The survey
documentation in Miranda (2011) shows that many surveys collect data for 1 week day and 1 weekend day,
while others collect data for a set number of consecutive days. As Miranda (2011, p. 34) notes, ‘‘The time

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Table 1 Descriptive statistics (N = 29)

Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation

Dependent variable
Homicide rate (log) –.82 2.45 .36 .85
Time use variables
Economic participation 143.34 287.37 209.63 35.18
Noneconomic participation 47.28 118.80 69.42 17.63
Family participation 16.00 68.23 34.26 11.40
Control variables
Development –3.28 .70 .00 .97
Economic inequality (Gini) 24.1 57.8 34.17 6.95
Sex ratio .84 1.06 .97 .04
Unemployment (%) 3.6 26.7 7.91 5.32
World values survey
Work is ‘‘very important’’ (%) 39.5 86.9 58.77 11.78
Family is ‘‘very important’’ (%) 60.7 97.3 87.49 8.03

indicate either that working individuals in these nations spend longer days at work or that a
larger share of these national populations works in the paid labor force relative to countries
with lower values (e.g., Belgium, Spain, and France). Interestingly, the United States,
which Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) argue is characterized by economic dominance,
ranks only eleventh out of 29 countries in economic participation, falling behind European
nations such as Austria (fourth) and Sweden (fifth).
Our composite measure noneconomic participation (the average daily time spent in
family, education, and religious/civic activities) has an average of 69.42 min, ranging from
approximately 47 min per day in India to 119 min in Ireland. The standard deviation of
this measure is 17.63, indicating considerably less variation in noneconomic participation
than for our economic measure. We find that the United States ranks eighth out of 29
countries in noneconomic participation, three positions higher than its ranking (eleventh)
for economic participation. Country rankings for economic participation and noneconomic
participation are presented in Table 2.
When considering the relationship between time devoted to economic and noneco-
nomic activities, we expect to see a hydraulic relationship in which populations that are
highly involved in economic activities have less time for noneconomic pursuits, and vice
versa. This expectation is based on Messner et al.’s (2008) argument that because time is
a finite resource, individuals must often resolve role conflicts in favor of one institution
over another. There is some evidence of a hydraulic relationship in our sample, with a
weak inverse correlation (r = –.11) between economic participation and noneconomic
participation that is non-significant. What is striking, however, is how some countries
depart strongly from this pattern. Mexico, for example, ranks third in economic par-
ticipation and fifth in noneconomic participation. Similarly, Republic of Korea ranks

Footnote 4 continued
spent on various activities on any particular day may not be representative of how respondents typically
spend their time, although such anomalies should average out across the full sample of respondents.’’

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Table 2 Mean number of minutes per day in economic and noneconomic participation (N = 29)
Economic Minutes per Noneconomic participation Minutes
participation day (family, education, and religious/civic) per day
(paid work)

1 Japan 287 1 Ireland 119

2 China 268 2 Turkey 101
3 Mexico 257 3 Republic of Korea 98
4 Austria 251 4 Netherlands 91
5 Sweden 246 5 Mexico 86
6 India 240 6 Australia 86
7 Canada 235 7 South Africa 85
8 Portugal 234 8 United States 77
9 Estonia 229 9 Poland 77
10 Republic of Korea 225 10 Canada 76
11 United States 222 11 New Zealand 70
12 New Zealand 218 12 Finland 70
13 Hungary 214 13 United Kingdom 68
14 Netherlands 213 14 Spain 67
15 United Kingdom 213 15 Denmark 63
16 Ireland 211 16 Hungary 62
17 Norway 206 17 Austria 61
18 Slovenia 202 18 Estonia 60
19 Italy 202 19 Portugal 58
20 Australia 186 20 Germany 58
21 Poland 185 21 France 58
22 Finland 179 22 Japan 57
23 Germany 178 23 Norway 57
24 Turkey 178 24 China 57
25 Denmark 177 25 Slovenia 54
26 South Africa 164 26 Italy 53
27 Belgium 163 27 Sweden 49
28 Spain 154 28 Belgium 48
29 France 143 29 India 47
Values rounded to the nearest minute

tenth in economic participation and third in noneconomic participation. These countries

may reflect an emerging trend toward ‘‘demanding societies,’’ characterized by both high
economic pressures and heavy reliance on traditional social groups (e.g., family,
religion).
Our dependent variable, a multi-year average of homicide rates per 100,000 population,
has a mean (before log transformation) of 2.25 and a standard deviation of 2.80. Values
range from a low of .44 in Japan to a high of 11.56 in Mexico. This variable was log
transformed for analyses due to positive skew in the distribution. Four countries have
especially high homicide rates: Mexico (11.56), South Africa (9.03), Estonia (8.05), and
the United States (6.29).

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Correlations Between Time Use and WVS Variables

To assess the degree of consistency between behavioral and attitudinal indicators, we

examine correlations between OECD time use and WVS variables measuring economic
strength and family strength. First, we examine the correlation between economic par-
ticipation and the percentage of WVS respondents in each country that rate work as ‘‘very
important.’’ Surprisingly, we find a weak inverse relationship (r = –.11) between the two
measures that is non-significant. This appears to indicate a strong absence of consistency
between expressed attitudes and reported behaviors. Second, we examine the correlation
between family participation and the percentage of WVS respondents in each country
rating family as ‘‘very important.’’ This correlation is in the expected direction (r = .17),
but it is weak and non-significant.
There is thus a lack of consistency between the attitudinal (WVS) and behavioral
(OECD time use) indicators of institutional strength. This disparity may be an indicator
that time use measures are tied to lived social life, while the attitudinal survey responses of
the WVS reflect only aspirations or ideals. At the very least, it indicates that these two pairs
of measures may be tapping different underlying dimensions of institutional strength. This
has implications for future IAT research, as it supports the claim that tests of IAT are
sensitive to the measurement of institutional variables (see Piquero and Piquero 1998).

Bivariate Results

Table 3 presents bivariate correlations. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Chamlin and
Cochran 2006; Hughes et al. 2015), we find a moderately strong inverse relationship
between our development index and homicide (r = –.54), indicating that more developed
nations tend to have lower levels of lethal violence. Also consistent with Hughes et al.
(2015), we find a moderately strong positive relationship between economic inequality and
homicide (r = .63) and a moderately strong inverse relationship between economic
inequality and development (r = –.51). While neither sex ratio nor unemployment is

Table 3 Bivariate correlations (N = 29)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

1. Homicide rate (logged) –

2. Development –.54** –
3. Economic inequality (Gini .63*** –.51** –
index)
4. Sex ratio –.20 –.37* –.02 –
5. Unemployment .36* –.27 .49** –.36 –
6. Economic participation .10 –.12 .05 .17 –.50** –
7. Noneconomic participation .19 –.06 .35 .16 .10 –.11 –
8. WVS work is ‘‘very .46* –.58** .44* .01 .41* –.11 .11 –
important’’
9. WVS family is ‘‘very .06 .00 .14 .13 .13 –.10 .32 .41* –
important’’

* p \ .05, ** p \ .01, *** p \ .001

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significantly associated with homicide, we find that unemployment has a moderate inverse
relationship with economic participation (r = –.50). This is expected, as nations with
higher unemployment rates should naturally have lower average amounts of time spent in
paid work. Neither economic participation nor noneconomic participation are significantly
associated with homicide at the bivariate level.

Regression Results

Results from our OLS regression models are displayed in Table 4. Model 1 is a
baseline model predicting homicide rates using development, sex ratio, and economic
inequality. Model 2 adds our independent time use measures of economic participation
and noneconomic participation, while Model 3 incorporates a product term for the
interaction between economic participation and noneconomic participation. Due to
limited statistical power with a small sample size, we follow Hughes et al. (2015) in
adopting a relaxed standard of significance equal to p \ .10. Table 4 displays both
standardized and unstandardized coefficients. To aid in the interpretation of coefficients
for variables of differing scales, we discuss standardized coefficients below.
Predictor variables in Model 1 are consistent with prior research (e.g., Messner and
Rosenfeld 1997; Hughes et al. 2015). As expected from our bivariate results, development
has a significant negative relationship with homicide (b = –.48), net of control variables.
This indicates that homicide rates tend to be higher in nations that have younger

Table 4 OLS regression estimates predicting logged homicide rates (N = 29)

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

b b b b b b

Development -.418** -.477 -.477** -.543 -.595*** -.678

(.150) (.169) (.161)
Economic inequality (Gini index) .047** .379 .042 .344 .024 .196
(.020) (.025) (.024)
Sex ratio -7.603** -.366 -9.569** -.460 -7.873** -.379
(3.052) (3.735) (3.449)
Unemployment -.017 -.104 .023 .142
(.036) (.036)
Economic participation .001 .060 .008 .316
(.004) (.005)
Noneconomic participation .007 .136 .008 .169
(.007) (.007)
Economic participation 9 noneconomic .001** .407
participation (.000)
Constant 6.142* 7.565* 7.036*
(3.204) 4.012 (3.573)
R2 .568 .595 .684
Adjusted R2 .516 .484 .578
Standard errors are in parentheses. In Model 3, economic participation and noneconomic participation are
mean centered
* p \ .10, ** p \ .05, *** p \ .01

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populations, lower life expectancies, higher infant mortality rates, lower GDPs per
capita, and fewer urban residents. Consistent with prior research by Messner and
Sampson (1991), sex ratio also has a significant negative relationship with homicide
(b = –.37), suggesting that nations with more men relative to women have lower levels
of lethal violence. Economic inequality has a significant positive relationship with
homicide (b = .38). This is consistent with our bivariate results, indicating that violent
crime is higher in nations with a greater disparity between wealthy and less affluent
segments of the population.
Model 2 introduces our time use variables, economic participation and noneconomic
participation, as well as a control for unemployment. Contrary to our predictions, neither
economic participation nor noneconomic participation is significantly related to homi-
cide. Development (b = –.54) and sex ratio (b = –.46) continue to be negatively related
to homicide, while controls for economic inequality and unemployment are non-
significant.
Model 3 tests our moderation hypothesis by introducing a product term for the inter-
action between economic participation and noneconomic participation. Because IAT
posits that the effect of economic dominance on crime is greatest when coupled with weak
institutional controls (Messner and Rosenfeld 2007), we expected to find a negative
interaction term, indicating that the relationship between economic participation and
homicide is weakened by greater noneconomic participation. Contrary to our hypothesis,
we found a positive product term (b = .41), indicating that the relationship between
economic participation and homicide is actually exacerbated by strong noneconomic
participation. This may be indicative of greater anomic pressures in societies where
individuals face competing pressures to succeed in multiple institutional domains. As with
prior models, development (b = –.68) and sex ratio (b = –.38) continue to be negatively
related to homicide, while the coefficients for economic participation, noneconomic par-
ticipation, economic inequality, and unemployment are non-significant. The adjusted

Fig. 1 Scatterplot of homicide rates and economic participation for 29 countries

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Fig. 2 Scatterplot of homicide rates and noneconomic participation for 29 countries

R-square (Adj. R2 = .57) indicates that adding the interaction term in Model 3 results in a
9 % increase in explained variance compared to Model 2 (Adj. R2 = .48).

Robustness Analyses

In order to assess the robustness of results presented above, we undertake two sets of
supplementary analyses. First, we present scatterplots for homicide and economic partic-
ipation (Fig. 1), and homicide and noneconomic participation (Fig. 2). Examination of the
scatterplot of homicide and economic participation (Fig. 1) reveals that two countries stand
out. South Africa has low economic participation but a very high homicide rate, while
Japan has high economic participation but a very low homicide rate. To assess whether
either country meets the criteria for an influential case, we examine Cook’s distance (Cook
1977) for each country in all three OLS models. Using a threshold for influence of
D [ .138 (4/n, n = 29), we find that South Africa is influential in Model 1, while Japan is
influential in Model 2 and nearly so in Model 3. When re-estimating our models without
South Africa, results remained highly similar to those reported above. Models were also
highly similar when dropping Japan. Interestingly, the absence of Japan caused the coef-
ficient for economic participation to become statistically significant in Model 3. However,
because this finding does not emerge in any other analyses, this result may be due to
chance.5

5
To further investigate the influence of each country in our regression analyses, we re-ran our OLS models
29 times, each time dropping one country from the analyses. Our product term (economic participa-
tion 9 noneconomic participation) remained significant 28 out of 29 times, becoming non-significant only
when dropping Mexico (p = .11). This demonstrates that our product term is robust to different model
specifications. Our significant control variables remained robust as well. Sex ratio became non-significant
only when dropping Estonia, while development became non-significant only when omitting India.

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Our second set of supplementary analyses concern missing data for subcomponents of
our noneconomic participation variable. Eight countries have missing data for ‘‘care for
non-household members’’ and three countries have missing data for at least one of the
two subcomponents of religious/civic activities. For our main analyses, in instances of
missing data we substitute the average value for all the OECD countries with valid data
for that measure. For these supplementary analyses, we first re-compute noneconomic
participation without ‘‘care for non-household members’’ entirely. We drop this sub-
component because it is missing for a substantial number of cases (8), and because it is a
relatively minor subcomponent of noneconomic participation. Secondly, we drop the
three countries (China, Norway, Sweden) that account for missing values in reli-
gious/civic activities. After rerunning the models, results are substantively similar to the
original models, indicating that results were not influenced by our mean substitution
strategy.

Discussion and Conclusion

This study is the first in the IAT literature to use cross-national time use data to opera-
tionalize economic and noneconomic institutional strength. Prior cross-national IAT
research has often operationalized institutional strength using attitudinal survey data (e.g.,
Hughes et al. 2015; Jensen 2002) or measures of government expenditures (e.g., Messner
and Rosenfeld 1997; Savolainen 2000). We contribute to the IAT literature by testing the
theory’s core hypotheses using behavioral measures of involvement in economic and
noneconomic institutions. It should be noted that we are not the first to use aggregate
behavioral indicators to operationalize IAT variables. Both subnational and cross-national
tests of IAT have operationalized institutional variables using rates of church membership,
voter turnout, college enrollment, and female labor force participation (Bjerregaard and
Cochran; 2008; Chamlin and Cochran 1995; Piquero and Piquero 1998). These measures,
however, are both less direct and less universally applicable than time use indicators. We
further IAT research by using two country-level time use measures: (1) average daily time
spent in paid work, and (2) average daily time spent in family, education, and reli-
gious/civic activities. We also assess the degree of consistency between our time use
measures of economic and family participation and World Values Survey (WVS) variables
measuring economic and family strength. Our analyses present four notable findings. We
summarize these findings and discuss their implications below.
First, in examining correlations between OECD time use and WVS attitudinal measures
of economic and family strength, we find almost no consistency between the behavioral
and attitudinal indicators. Correlations are weak and non-significant, and indeed are neg-
ative in the case of the economic measures. This finding is contrary to our expectation that
there would be considerable overlap between different measures of the same underlying
construct (e.g., economic dominance). However, this finding is consistent with research
that suggests that there is only a tenuous connection between expressed attitudes on a
subject and actual behaviors regarding that subject (Glasman and Albarracin 2006;
Jerolmack and Khan 2014). For instance, it is possible that people may express an attitude
of disdain for the ‘‘rat race’’ of paid work, but they do so in societies that require an
increasing amount of labor to achieve and/or sustain a desired lifestyle. This may lead
people to verbally disdain economic goals, while still actively pursuing them in the
practice. Thus, one explanation for the inverse correlation between time spent working and

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the value placed on work could be increasing disenchantment with the modern, global
economy.
Second, in examining the correlation between our two time use variables, economic
participation and noneconomic participation, we also find a surprisingly weak and non-
significant correlation. A key component of IAT is that, because time is a finite resource,
individuals must often resolve role conflicts in favor of one institution over another
(Messner and Rosenfeld 2007). We thus expected to find a hydraulic relationship, where
countries with high levels of economic activity had low levels of noneconomic activity,
and vice versa. It should be noted that this expectation is predicated on relatively
stable levels of activities, such as leisure and sleep, which are not captured by the eco-
nomic and noneconomic activity measures. Contrary to our expectation, some countries
(e.g., Mexico, Republic of Korea) show fairly high levels of both economic and
noneconomic participation.
We contend that there are at least two possible explanations for the lack of a hydraulic
relationship in these nations; one is methodological and the other is substantive. First,
nations may fail to exhibit a hydraulic relationship because of national differences in time
diary response style or the quality of data collection. We find this explanation implausible,
however, for two reasons: (1) our sample is mainly limited to developed nations, which
ostensibly have high-quality data collection procedures; and (2) there is little systematic
pattern in the nations that exhibit a non-hydraulic relationship, helping to rule out a shared
language or culture explanation. A second explanation is that respondents in some nations
may simply be involved in both economic and noneconomic activities at higher levels than
respondents in other nations. Countries such as Mexico and the Republic of Korea may
reflect a trend toward increasingly ‘‘demanding’’ societies that expect high investment in
both economic activities and more traditional social structures (family, polity, and reli-
gion). Such societies must necessarily pull their constituents away from low-stress, non-
competitive activities like sleep and leisure.
Third, we find that contrary to IAT’s claim of American exceptionalism, the US ranks
only eleventh out of 29 nations in economic participation. The US also ranks eighth in
noneconomic participation, demonstrating similar rankings for both types of activities.
This supports prior research (Chamlin and Cochran 2007; Jensen 2002) where WVS
measures seem to indicate that American respondents are far from exceptional in the
emphasis they place on work and material gain. However, it is important to note that our
data come from the mid- and late 2000s, when crime levels in the United States had already
markedly declined from their peaks in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Baumer and Wolff
2014; Levitt 2004; Zimring 2006). Our data may thus reflect a relatively recent decrease in
economic dominance in the United States.
Fourth, testing our main time use hypotheses, we found that neither economic partic-
ipation nor noneconomic participation was significantly related to homicide. The inter-
action term for these two variables, however, has a positive and significant association with
homicide rates, net of control variables. This finding indicates that homicide rates are
higher in nations whose populations devote greater amounts of time to both economic and
noneconomic activities. This association is consistent with our second main finding—the
very weak hydraulic relationship between economic and noneconomic participation.
Messner and Rosenfeld (2006, 2007) have consistently noted that economic dominance
in a society is not simply the size or allure of the economy itself. Rather, the economy
dominates a society by undermining, subverting, and recasting the other noneconomic
social institutions. Recall that Messner and Rosenfeld’s (1994) original formulation of IAT
is over two decades old. It may be that the economic dominance that Messner and

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Rosenfeld first identified in the mid 1990s has progressed to a more advanced stage in
many nations—a state where noneconomic institutions have been infused with the spirit of
economic competition. Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) argue that the four core values
underlying the American Dream are universalism, individualism, materialism, and an
achievement orientation. Perhaps noneconomic institutions in many nations have been
inculcated with these very same values. These ‘‘demanding’’ societies pressure individuals
to succeed across multiple institutional domains, simultaneously driving out noncompet-
itive activities like leisure and sleep. It is possible this in turn contributes to higher rates of
lethal violence. Future research should explore this possibility in greater depth.
Indeed, a critique of the IAT literature in general is that it often assumes that
noneconomic institutions socialize individuals in ways that counteracts the antisocial
orientation associated with performing economic roles. This is not necessarily the case.
Chamlin and Cochran (2007, p. 43) point out that it is critical to measure not only the
strength of noneconomic institutions, but also the ‘‘content of what these institutions impart
to societal members.’’ As Messner and Rosenfeld (2007) argue, one result of economic
dominance in the institutional balance of power is that the economy penetrates into other
institutional domains. If noneconomic institutions, such as the education system and the
family, become subverted by the economy, they may contribute to rather than inhibit the
drive for citizens to pursue economic goals using the most technically efficient means
(Chamlin and Cochran 2007). In fact, our results suggest that economic and noneconomic
obligations may combine to drive out noncompetitive, leisurely activities from daily life.
Measuring the content of the messages being transmitted in noneconomic institutional
domains should remain an important part of the IAT research agenda.
We also contend that there is a need to explore alternative operationalizations of key
theoretical concepts in IAT generally, and to investigate additional possibilities of time use
data. Future research should leverage other existing time use datasets. While we have
elected to use the OECD’s compilation of national level datasets, other studies could utilize
the Multinational Time Use Survey (Fisher and Gershuny 2013; Hoeben et al. 2014) for
comparative purposes. Following previous research (Chamlin and Cochran 1995; Hannon
and DeFronzo 1998; Maume and Lee 2003), future studies could assess variation in
institutional strength at the regional or national level using the Eurostat Time Use Project
(Eurostat 2009), the American Time Use Survey (ATUS 2013), or other nationally rep-
resentative surveys (Harvey and Pentland 1999, p. 7). Perhaps interested IAT researchers
could cooperate with time use projects to further refine their data, providing more infor-
mation about context of activities rather than just the time spent. For instance, it would be
helpful to know why a respondent is going to school rather than just how much of their day
is spent there. This would allow researchers to better assess the content of socialization in
non-economic institutions.
This study is limited in certain respects. First, cross-national time use data is currently
only available for a small set of countries. Second, measurement of key variables is difficult
when attempting to combine independently administered surveys into a harmonized data
set. While the OECD has made considerable strides, future research should attempt to
administer the same survey instrument to a sample of nations to measure independent
variables the same way at the same time. Third, the surveys have a broad age range,
sometimes including respondents 15 and younger. We believe controlling for age structure
in the development index mitigates the impact of this feature of the data. Still, opportunities
for economic and non-economic roles most likely change in quality and quantity across the
life course. Future research should further explore how age, particularly the teenage period,
influences performance of institutional roles and, consequently, criminal behavior. Fourth,

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time use data are still ultimately derived from self-report surveys, and therefore share
limitations common to most survey research (Hoeben et al. 2014, p. 2), not the least of
which is limited coverage of some subsets of the population, such as those engaged in
the illegal economy. Respondents may also be unsure about the exact activities of their
day, or the duration of those activities (Juster et al. 2003). They may have difficulty
disentangling periods of the day when they are multitasking, and may still feel some
pressure to give social desirable answers (Robinson 1999). Respondents may also con-
flate their daily routines with what actually occurred during the data collection reference
period (Al Baghal et al. 2014; Linton 1982). However, because we use time use esti-
mates as a proxy for investment in social institutions, the exact recall of specific events
in a given day is not highly preferable over a general sense of what usually happens in a
given respondent’s life. We are more interested in general patterns of life, believing that
they provide a better indication of the institutional balance in a society.
To conclude, IAT is an evolving intellectual enterprise (Messner et al. 2008, p. 179),
open to both theoretical and methodological innovation. Theoretically, our results suggest
that IAT research should consider the possibility of ‘‘demanding’’ societies, where both
economic and traditionally noneconomic institutions are infused with a criminogenic
competitive ethos. Methodologically, we have argued that time use data is more proximate
and salient than structural indicators, while sidestepping the personal biases that limit
attitudinal surveys. However, we do not contend that these indicators are without merit.
Instead, structural indicators, attitudinal survey measures, and time use measures should all
play a part in future IAT research, helping to triangulate the often difficult theoretical
mechanisms of the theory. We look forward to the application of other innovative data
sources to this important criminological theory.

Acknowledgments The authors thank Steven Messner, Justin Pickett, and Kate Hart for their comments on
earlier drafts of the manuscript, and Meghan Rogers for her advice.

Appendix A: Sampled Countries and Year of Time Use Survey

Administration (N 5 29)

Australia* (2006) Hungary* (1999–2000) Poland* (2003–2004)

Austria* (2008–2009) India (1999) Portugal* (1999)
Belgium* (2005) Ireland* (2005) Slovenia* (2000–2001)
Canada* (2010) Italy* (2008–2009) South Africa (2000)
China (2008) Japan* (2011) Spain* (2009–2010)
Denmark* (2001) Korea, Republic of* (2009) Sweden* (2010)
Estonia* (1999–2000) Mexico* (2009) Turkey* (2006)
Finland* (2009–2010) Netherlands* (2005–2006) United Kingdom* (2005)
France* (2009) New Zealand* (2009–2010) United States* (2010)
Germany* (2001–2002) Norway* (2010)
* OECD member countries

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