FIRST DIVISION would produce the crime of Homicide as a consequence
nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of cause or causes
[G.R. No. 250185. March 24, 2021.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, v s . EDMUND
LURCHA y JURALBAR, 1 accused-appellant.
NOTICE
Sirs/Mesdames :
Please take notice that the Court, First Division, issued a Resolution
dated March 24, 2021 which reads as follows:
"G.R. No. 250185 (People of the Philippines v. Edmund Lurcha
y Juralbar). — This is an appeal 2 seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision 3 dated October 13, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR-HC No. 08814. The assailed Decision of the CA found accused-appellant
Edmund Lurcha y Juralbar (Edmund) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide.
Facts of the Case
Edmund, along with his brother Joemar Lurcha y Juralbar (Joemar), was
charged with murder and attempted murder. The Informations against them
read:
Criminal Case No. 10-0580
That on or about the 4th day of May 2010, in the City of Las
Piñas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together
and both of them mutually and helping each other, without justifiable
motive, with intent to kill and with treachery, and evident
premeditation, and by taking advantage of their superior strength,
did then and there knowingly, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and use personal violence upon one ALBERTO CARIÑO y
FERRAN @ ABET, by then and there stabbing him on the different
parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wounds which
directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 4 (Emphasis in the original)
Criminal Case No. 10-0587
That on or about the 4th day of May 2010, in the City of Las
Piñas, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together
and both of them mutually and helping each other, with intent to kill
and without justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and stab one ROMANO CARIÑO y
FERRAN, hitting him on the right side of the abdomen, thereby
inflicting upon the latter serious stab wounds, which would ordinarily
cause his death, thus performing all the acts of execution which
but which,
independent of the will of the accused, that is, due to the timely
medical attendance rendered to said ROMANO CARIÑO y FERRAN
which prevented his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 5 (Emphasis in the original)
Only Edmund was arraigned since Joemar remained at large. Edmund
entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thus ensued. 6
The prosecution presented the following witnesses: (1) Romano F.
Cariño (Romano); (2) Ma. Theresa F. Cariño (Theresa); and (3) Atty./Dr.
Antonio Rebosa. The parties stipulated on the testimony of a certain Dr.
Reynaldo Romero, 7 an NBI Medico-Legal Officer who issued a Certificate of
Post-Mortem Examination. 8
For his defense, Edmund testified on his own behalf. 9
The prosecution's evidence established that between 1:00 a.m. to 2:00
a.m. of May 4, 2010, Romano was awoken by his brother Raymond, who
said, "Si Abet pinagtutulungan siya. " 10 Abet was Romano and Raymond's
brother. 11 Upon stepping out of their house, they saw Edmund and Joemar
each stabbing Abet using homemade knives. Romano shouted at them to
stop and told them to talk it over. Joemar approached Romano and uttered,
"Isa ka pa," 12 and stabbed Romano on the right side of his body. As a result,
Romano fell to the ground. Joemar stabbed him a second time, which
Romano parried with his left arm. Raymond was able to prevent Joemar from
stabbing Romano for a third time by hitting him, causing Joemar to fall to the
ground. 13
Thereafter, Theresa approached and hugged a bloodied Abet. Edmund
attempted to stab Theresa but was prevented by Raymond. It was at this
point that Edmund ran away. 14
Romano, Raymond, and Theresa brought Abet to the University of
Perpetual Help Hospital where he was pronounced dead on arrival. Romano's
wounds were also treated. 15 The Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination 16
stated that Abet died at 2:00 a.m. of stab wounds. According to a Medico-
Legal Certificate, 17 Romano sustained the following injuries: (1) Stabwound,
about 2x2 centimeters, lumbar area, right, non-penetrating; (2) Lacerated
wound, about 3.0 centimeters, posterior aspect, distal 3rd of arm, left. 18
For his defense, Edmund denied the accusations hurled against him.
He testified that on May 4, 2010 around 1:00 a.m., he was sleeping inside
his house. When he got up to urinate, he noticed a commotion near his
house. He went to where the commotion was because he saw his brother's
(Joemar's) motorcycle. He saw Abet and Romano, armed with a pipe and a
knife, ganging up on Joemar ("Pinagtulungan nila"). 19 When Edmund pulled
his brother away, Abet and Romano tried to stab him. Edmund was able to
grab the knife and pipe. He stabbed one of his assailants because there was
another person who stabbed Edmund on his stomach. He escaped and called
the barangay tanod to save Joemar. 20
 Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
After evaluating the evidence for the prosecution and the defense, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City, Branch 197, found Edmund
guilty of murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The dispositive portion of the RTC's Joint Decision 21 dated
November 25, 2016 states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, in Criminal Case No. 10-
0580, this court finds accused EDMUND JURALBAR LURCHA, GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, qualified with abuse
of superior strength, and sentences him to a penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Accused EDMUND JURALBAR LURCHA is ordered to pay the
heirs of deceased victim Albert Cariño y Ferran @ Abet, the amount of
Php75,000.00 by way of civil indemnity; Php75,000.00 as moral
damages; plus six percent (6%) interest per annum on all of his civil
liability computed from the date of the finality of this judgment until
they are fully paid; and to pay the costs of suit.
While in Criminal Case No. 10-0587, on reasonable doubt, this
court ACQUITS accused EDMUND JURALBAR LURCHA of the crime of
frustrated homicide charged against him.
SO ORDERED. 22 (Emphasis in the original)
The RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution's
witnesses and concluded that all the elements of the crime of murder were
present — particularly that Edmund and Joemar killed Abet through the
abuse of superior strength. 23 The trial court qualified the killing to murder
because Edmund and Joemar were armed with knives when they attacked
Abet, who was alone and unarmed at that time. Conspiracy was found to be
present because their act of stabbing Abet showed a common design to kill
the said victim. However, the trial court did not appreciate the qualifying
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation in the absence of
evidence proving the presence of such circumstances. 24
The RTC debunked Edmund's claim of self-defense since the defense
failed to prove that Abet and Romano committed unlawful aggression.
Between the contradicting testimonies of the prosecution and defense, the
RTC believed that Edmund and Joemar were the aggressors as they were the
ones armed with knives. 25
Edmund was acquitted of frustrated murder since the prosecution was
not able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Edmund conspired with
Joemar to attack and stab Romano. 26
Edmund appealed his conviction with the CA. 27 In his Brief, 28 Edmund
averred that the trial court should have appreciated his claim of self-defense
as he was able to prove the elements thereof, i.e.: (1) unlawful aggression on
the part of Romano and Abet when they were ganging up on Joemar; (2)
Edmund's use of reasonable means to repel the unlawful aggression by
grabbing the aggressors' knife and pipe and stabbing Abet; and (3) the lack
of sufficient provocation on Edmund's part as he merely went to the area of
the commotion to defend his brother. 29 Edmund also assailed the trial
court's finding that Abet's killing was attended by abuse of superior strength
since the prosecution failed to show that there was a notorious inequality of
forces between Edmund and Abet. The fact that Edmund was accompanied
by Joemar did not automatically qualify the attack as one with abuse of
superior strength. 30
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
For failure to file an appellee's brief despite two motions for extension
of time to file the same, the CA resolved the appeal after denying the Office
of the Solicitor General's third motion for extension of time to file an
appellee's brief. 31
In its Decision 32 dated October 13, 2017, the CA modified the RTC's
Decision by finding Edmund guilty of homicide only, to wit:
WHEREFORE, we DENY the present appeal. The decision
appealed from is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION . The accused-
appellant is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code and
shall accordingly suffer an indeterminate prison term of twelve (12)
years, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four months (4), as
maximum. The accused-appellant is directed to pay the heirs of the
victim P50,000.00, as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00, as moral
damages. In addition, he is ordered to pay interest on all monetary
awards for damages at the rate of six percent (6%) from the date of
finality [of] the Decision until the awards be fully satisfied.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 33
Like the RTC, the CA held that Edmund and Joemar were the
aggressors. The CA pointed out Edmund's dire lack of evidence to prove that
Abet and Romano attacked Joemar and Edmund first. Even the testimony of
Edmund showed that he did not sustain any wound and did not even bother
to seek medical treatment. On the other hand, Abet suffered multiple stab
wounds, showing an intent to kill by Edmund and Joemar. The CA also cited a
Sport Report made by the Investigation and Detective Management Section
of the Las Piñas Police Station, which stated that only a 13-inch dagger was
recovered from the crime scene — negating Edmund's claim that Abet and
Romano used a pipe to hit him. Joemar's act of fleeing the scene of the crime
and hiding from authorities only bolstered Edmund and Joemar's guilt in
relation to the attack on May 4, 2010. 34
Nevertheless, the appellate court agreed with Edmund and held that
the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was not present.
Citing People v. Beduya , 35 the CA explained that mere superiority in
numbers is not indicative of abuse of superior strength in the absence of
showing: (1) the relative strength of the aggressors and the victim; and (2) a
deliberate intent to use excessive force out of proportion to the means of
defense available to the victim. As a result, the CA lowered the crime from
murder to homicide. 36
The CA applied the Indeterminate Sentence Law in determining
Edmund's imposable penalty. Since Edmund was already convicted by final
judgment of another homicide case, 37 making him a recidivist, the appellate
court imposed the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, as minimum,
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as maximum. The monetary
awards were also reduced to P50,000.00 each for civil indemnity and moral
damages 38 in accordance with People v. Jugueta. 39
Edmund filed a Notice of Appeal 40 before this Court. Both the OSG and
Edmund manifested that they will no longer file any supplemental brief. 41
Issue
Between the two issues raised by Edmund before the CA, the only issue
to be resolved in the instant appeal is whether Edmund sufficiently proved
his act of self-defense in killing Abet.
Ruling of the Court
Edmund incorrectly sought to elevate the instant case through an
ordinary appeal. Under Section 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, 42 an
appeal to this Court may only be taken via a petition for review on certiorari,
save for criminal cases where the penalty imposed is death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. Since Edmund's conviction was modified by
the CA from murder to homicide, the original penalty of reclusion perpetua
imposed on him was likewise modified to reclusion temporal 43 (i.e., an
indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months, as maximum). Therefore, the remedy of an
ordinary appeal was not available to him. Edmund's failure to seek the
proper recourse under the Rules of Court makes the instant appeal
dismissible on such ground.
In any case, a review of the records shows that Edmund's conviction
for homicide was proper. Edmund failed to prove his act of self-defense in
killing Abet.
Edmund interposed the justifying circumstance of self-defense during
trial. Thus, he/she "admits to the commission of acts, which would otherwise
engender criminal liability." 44 Thus, the accused must prove — through
clear and convincing evidence — all the elements of self-defense,
particularly: "(1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3)
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending [one's
self]." 45 In People v. Mahilum , 46 We held that the accused must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's.
47
Edmund's defense only consisted of his unsubstantiated testimony —
i.e., when he woke up to urinate, he saw his brother, Joemar, being stabbed
by Abet and Romano, prompting him to stab Abet as a means of defending
himself while he tried to rescue Joemar. 48 He never presented Joemar, his
co-accused in the instant criminal case who remains at large, to corroborate
his allegation. Neither did he present the barangay tanod whom he
supposedly sought help from.
Edmund's testimony also contradicts the testimonial and documentary
evidence presented by the prosecution. Aside from Romano's and Theresa's
testimonies that Edmund and Joemar took turns stabbing Abet, 49 the
Certificate of Post-Mortem Examination 50 shows that Abet sustained more
than one stab wound. If Abet's stab wounds were a result of Edmund's act of
self-defense, Edmund failed to explain why he needed to stab Abet more
than once. He failed to prove that there was a reasonable necessity to inflict
multiple stab wounds against the victim to prevent or repel an attack against
him. Note that Edmund testified to the commotion ending when he simply
backed away ("umatras ako") . 51 If his testimony were true, it would seem
that his alleged aggressors were not insistent on inflicting mortal wounds on
him.
Edmund's testimony, on its own, is unworthy of belief. He allegedly
sustained a stab wound in the stomach. He also claimed to having being hit
with a pipe. 52 However, Edmund never went to the hospital to seek medical
attention. Human experience dictates that the victim of a stab wound would
promptly seek treatment especially since he already went to the hospital
when he visited Joemar. It is also contrary to human experience: (1) to
defend one's self by indiscriminately stabbing the people hitting him/her
without trying to aim at the aggressor; and (2) not to file any criminal case
against his and Joemar's aggressors.
In a Letter 53 dated January 9, 2014, the Davao Prison and Penal Farm
disclosed that on April 30, 2008, Edmund was released on parole after
serving the minimum of his prison sentence for a different homicide case he
was convicted of by the RTC of Cantilan, Surigao del Sur, Branch 41.
Following Section 13 of the Revised Rules and Regulations of the Board of
Pardons and Parole, 54 a prisoner is qualified for parole after "a showing that
he is confined in prison or jail to serve an indeterminate sentence . . .
pursuant to a final judgment of conviction." Thus, Edmund's grant of parole
proves that he was previously convicted by final judgment for a separate
crime of homicide at the time the instant case was on trial — thereby,
classifying Edmund as a recidivist under Article 14 (9) 55 of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC). Although recidivism was not alleged in the Information
filed against Edmund, this Court has ruled that the same may be appreciated
if proven by evidence. 56
Since recidivism is an aggravating circumstance under Article 14 of the
RPC, the maximum penalty that the CA should have imposed must be within
the range of reclusion temporal in its maximum period. 57 The maximum
period for reclusion temporal has a range of seventeen (17) years, four (4)
months, and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Therefore, this Court modifies
the penalty by imposing a maximum penalty of seventeen (17) years, four
(4) months, and one (1) day.
Lastly, this Court imposes the additional monetary award P50,000.00
as temperate damages following Our ruling in People v. Jugueta 58 "when no
documentary evidence of burial or funeral expenses is presented in court."
59
 WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated 12. Id. at 11.
October 13, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 08814 is
13. Id. at 7-8, 11-13.
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused-appellant Edmund Lurcha y
Juralbar is GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for homicide and is sentenced 14. TSN dated January 22, 2015, p. 9.
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of 15. Id. at 10; TSN dated August 14, 2014, pp. 15-16.
reclusion temporal, as maximum. Accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the
16. Records, p. 247.
heirs of the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral
damages, and P50,000.00 as temperate damages. 17. Id. at 248.
All monetary awards shall earn interest at the legal rate of six percent
18. Id.
(6%) per annum from the date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid.
SO ORDERED." 19. TSN dated August 19, 2016, p. 7.

20. Id. at 5-11.

By authority of the Court:
21. Penned by Judge Ismael T. Duldulao; records, pp. 291-302.

(SGD.) LIBRADA C. BUENA 22. Id. at 302.

Division Clerk of Court
23. Id. at 296.

24. Id. at 298-299.

By:
25. Id. at 300-301.
MARIA TERESA B. SIBULO
26. Id. at 302.
Deputy Division Clerk of Court
 27. Id. at 305.

Footnotes 28. CA rollo, pp. 35-49.

1. Also referred to as "Edmund Joralbar Lutcha" before the Regional Trial Court. 29. Id. at 42-47.

2. Rollo , p. 16. 30. Id. at 47-48.

3. Penned by Associate Justice Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr., with the concurrence of 31. Id. at 112.
Associate Justices Leoncia R. Dimagiba and Henri Jean Paul B. Inting (now a
Member of this Court); CA rollo, pp. 95-106. 32. Supra note 3.

4. Records, p. 1. 33. CA rollo, p. 106.

5. CA rollo, pp. 53-54. 34. Id. at 99-102.

6. Id. at 54. 35. 641 Phil. 399 (2010).

7. Id. 36. CA rollo, pp. 102-105.

8. Records, p. 13. 37. Records, p. 33.

9. Rollo , p. 57. 38. CA rollo, pp. 105-106.

10. TSN dated August 14, 2014, p. 6. 39. 783 Phil. 806 (2016).

11. Id. at 6-7. 40. CA rollo, p. 117.

41. Rollo , pp. 25, 29-30. 57. Article 64 (3) of the Revised Penal Code, which states:

42. Section 3. How appeal taken. — 3. When only an aggravating circumstance is present in the commission of
the act, they shall impose the penalty in its maximum period.
xxx xxx xxx
58. Supra note 39.
(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where the penalty imposed by
the Regional Trial Court is death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or 59. Supra note 39 at 853.
where a lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses committed on the same
occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the Â
more serious offense for which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or
life imprisonment is imposed, shall be by filing a notice of appeal in
accordance with paragraph (a) of this section.

xxx xxx xxx.

(e) Except as provided in the last paragraph of Section 13, Rule 124, all other
appeals to the Supreme Court shall be by petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45.

43. REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 249.

44. People v. Advincula, 829 Phil. 516, 526-527 (2018).

45. People v. Roxas, 780 Phil. 874, 881 (2016).

46. 438 Phil. 641 (2002).

47. Id. at 647.

48. TSN dated August 19, 2016, pp. 5-9.

49. TSN dated August 14, 2014, pp. 11-12; TSN dated January 22, 2015, p. 7.

50. Records, p. 247.

51. TSN dated August 19, 2016, p. 10.

52. Id. at 9.

53. Records, p. 33.

54. Section 13. Review of Cases for Parole. — Unless otherwise disqualified under
Section 15 of these Rules, a case for parole of a prisoner shall be reviewed
upon a showing that he is confined in prison or jail to serve an indeterminate
sentence, the maximum period of which exceeds one (1) year, pursuant to a
final judgment of conviction and that he has served the minimum period of
said sentence.

55. A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been
previously convicted by final judgment of another crime embraced in the
same title of this Code.

56. People v. Ga, G.R. No. 49831, June 27, 1990, citing People v. Ang, 223 Phil.
333, 341 (1985).