IDENTIFICATION
eyewitness to the stabbing incident; Dr. Ma.
G.R. No. 192250               July 11, 2012
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee,  The defense, on the other hand, presented the
vs.
HERMOGENES DE GUZMAN @
Mong, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the February 9, 2010
Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
1  evening, Noriel Urieta was in Brgy. Francisco,
CR-HC No. 03458, which affirmed the May 2,
2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
2  Flores. They were drinking in the amusement
Branch 45, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro (RTC),
in Criminal Case No. R-5285, finding accused
Hermogenes De Guzman @ Mong (De
Guzman) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder defined and penalized under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
THE FACTS
De Guzman was charged with the crime of
Murder in the Information, dated November 12,
3 
2002, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That on or about the 20th day of April, 2002 at
around 11:00 o’clock in the evening, in Brgy. San
Francisco, Municipality of Sablayan, Province of
Occidental Mindoro, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
being then armed with a sharp bladed
instrument, with intent to kill, with treachery, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab with the said weapon
one Noriel Rosales Urieta, thereby inflicting upon
the latter serious wounds which caused his
untimely death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
When arraigned, De Guzman entered a plea of
"Not Guilty" to the offense charged. After pre-trial
4  Hermogenes de Guzman was made.
was terminated, trial on the merits ensued. The
prosecution presented the testimonies of Ignacio
Flores (Flores), the childhood friend of victim
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
Noriel Urieta (Urieta) and the purported
Socorro Ragos (Ragos), who conducted a post-
mortem examination on the cadaver of the victim;
and Gina Urieta (Gina), the wife of the victim.
lone testimony of De Guzman.
The Version of the Prosecution
The version of the prosecution is succinctly
summarized by the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) in its Brief as follows:
5 
On April 20, 2002 at around 11:00 o’clock in the
Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro along with Ignacio
area.
When they were about to leave the premises,
appellant suddenly approached them and without
any provocation, suddenly stabbed Noriel Urieta
with a knife on his left chest.
After the first blow, the victim was already
kneeling down and appellant proceeded to stab
him three (3) more times.
Appellant thereafter ran away.
Ignacio Flores called out for help and one Elmer
Honato arrived to give them aid and bring the
victim to a secure place and thereafter
proceeded to call for help.
He waited for Elmer Honato to arrive but he did
not return anymore. With the condition of the
victim uncertain and as he was afraid, he decided
to leave the victim and go home.
Two days later, Police Officer Gamba, together
with the father of Noriel Urieta and Gina Urieta,
the wife of Noriel Urieta, went to the house of
Ignacio Flores in order to get the sworn
statement as to the facts that happened in this
case. They were able to do so.
Subsequently, an arrest on the person of
The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor then filed
the appropriate charges thereafter.6
Page 1 of 38
The Version of the Defense
In his Brief, De Guzman denied the charge
7  following:
against him and presented his version of the
events:
On the evening of April 21, 2002, Hermogenes
De Guzman joined a drinking spree at the house
of a relative at barangay San Francisco. He was
there from 8:00 o’clock in the morning until 12:00
o’clock midnight, when he went home with his
wife.
The following day, he was drying palay when his
wife informed him that police officers were
looking for him. He approached and inquired
from the officers what was the reason.
He was told to go with them to the municipal hall
for questioning. Thereat, he was incarcerated
because of his alleged involvement in a stabbing
incident.
De Guzman does not personally know the victim,
his wife, nor the supposed eyewitness, Ignacio
Flores.  He (De Guzman) was not with Urieta
1âwphi1
when the former had a drinking spree. He denied
having stabbed and killed Urieta.8
The RTC Ruling
On May 2, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment
finding that the prosecution was able to establish
with certitude, through the credible testimony of
prosecution witness Flores, that De Guzman
stabbed and killed Urieta on that fateful night of
April 20, 2002. The RTC rejected the
unsubstantiated defense of alibi proffered by De
Guzman in the face of the positive identification
of Flores pointing him as the perpetrator of the
crime. It held that treachery attended the
commission of the crime which qualified the
killing to murder. The RTC adjudged:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused
HERMOGENES DE GUZMAN alias "Mong"
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder defined and penalized under Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code and with neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstance and in
line with the mandate of Republic Act No. 9346,
hereby imposes the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua.
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
Also, this Court hereby orders the said accused
to PAY the surviving heirs of the victim the
1) The sum of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex-delicto;
2) The sum of P38,000.00 as actual
damages;
3) The sum of P50,000.00 as moral
damages; and
4) The costs of this suit.
The said accused is hereby credited of his total
duration of preventive imprisonment in the
service of his imposed imprisonment.
SO ORDERED. 9
The CA Decision
On appeal, the CA affirmed the judgment of
conviction of De Guzman holding that his guilt for
the crime of murder was proven beyond
reasonable doubt by the prosecution's evidence.
The CA added that the facts established by the
unwavering testimony of eyewitness Flores could
not be displaced by the empty denials and self-
serving alibi of De Guzman. It sustained the RTC
in appreciating the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery which elevated the
killing to Murder. The dispositive portion of the
February 9, 2010 Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal
is hereby DISMISSED. The decision of Branch
45, Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental,
Mindoro in Criminal Case No. R-5285 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 10
On February 18, 2010, De Guzman filed a Notice
of Appeal, which was given due course by the
11 
CA in its March 3, 2010 Minute Resolution. 12
On July 2, 2010, this Court issued a
resolution notifying the parties that they could file
13 
their respective supplemental briefs, if they so
desire, within thirty days from notice. Both parties
Page 2 of 38
manifested that they would no longer file
supplemental briefs.
THE ISSUES
Insisting his innocence, De Guzman imputes to
the RTC the following errors:
I inconsistencies in his testimony. It is of the
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
GIVING FULL CREDENCE TO THE
INCONSISTENT AND DOUBTFUL TESTIMONY
OF THE PROSECUTION’S EYEWITNESS.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF MURDER
DESPITE THE EYEWITNESS' FAILURE TO
POSITIVELY IDENTIFY THE FORMER.
III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
FINDING THAT TREACHERY ATTENDED THE
SUBJECT KILLING. 14
De Guzman argues that the evidence for the
prosecution did not meet that quantum of proof
necessary to convict him of the crime charged.
The testimony of Flores was riddled with
inconsistencies and contradictions which tend to
erode his credibility and raise doubt on the
veracity of the prosecution evidence. It was
highly improbable for Flores to clearly identify the
assailant considering that the stabbing incident
took place suddenly and quickly at 11:00 o'clock
in the evening in a remote barangay with no good
source of illumination. The prosecution miserably
failed to show any ill motive on his part that could
have possibly impelled him to commit the crime.
Since the prosecution's case is weak, his
defense of alibi assumes importance and can
effectively negate his criminal liability. Finally, De
Guzman asserts that even granting arguendo,
that he indeed stabbed Urieta, he cannot be
convicted of murder because the prosecution
failed to establish the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
For the prosecution, the OSG urges this Court to
affirm in toto the challenged decision for failure of
De Guzman to show that the RTC committed any
error in rendering a judgment of conviction. It
contends that the narration of Flores regarding
the bloody assault on Urieta had clearly
established the corpus delicti of the crime which
rendered inconsequential the alleged
position that eyewitness Flores testified in clear
and unequivocal terms as to the identity of the
author of the crime. Lastly, it posits that treachery
was alleged and duly proved by the prosecution
during the trial and, hence, the conviction of De
Guzman for murder was correct.
THE COURT'S RULING
The crucial issue in this case is the sufficiency of
evidence to convict De Guzman. More
particularly, the Court has to inquire whether
there had been sufficient identification of De
Guzman as the perpetrator of the crime.
In every criminal case, the task of the
prosecution is always two-fold, that is, (1) to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the commission
of the crime charged; and (2) to establish with the
same quantum of proof the identity of the person
or persons responsible therefor, because, even if
the commission of the crime is a given, there can
be no conviction without the identity of the
malefactor being likewise clearly ascertained. 15
Although it is entrenched in this jurisdiction that
findings of the trial court on the credibility of the
witnesses are accorded great weight and respect
because it had ample opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the declarants at the witness stand,
this rule admits exceptions. The saving instance
is said to be when a fact or circumstance of
weight and influence has been overlooked, or its
significance misconstrued by the trial court
sufficient to harbor serious misgivings on its
conclusions. 16
After a painstaking review of the records and the
transcripts of stenographic notes of the
testimonies of the witnesses, the Court is not
convinced with moral certainty that De Guzman
committed the crime charged. Reasonable doubt
bothers the conscience. With a cloud of doubt
continuously hovering, the mind cannot rest
easy.
Page 3 of 38
The case for the prosecution was woven
basically on the testimony of Flores, who claimed
to be a childhood friend of Urieta. This alleged
17 
eyewitness recounted that on April 20, 2002, at
around 11:00 o'clock in the evening, he and
Urieta were drinking beer at a store near a
"peryahan" in Barangay Francisco, Sablayan,
Occidental Mindoro; that after they had finished
their third bottle of beer, they decided to leave
their table; that when Urieta was about to stand
up, De Guzman suddenly appeared from
nowhere and stabbed Urieta using a knife with a
red handle, without any reason or provocation;
that the stab blow landed on the left breast of
Urieta and caused him to fall down; that while in
a kneeling position, De Guzman stabbed him
three more times; that Flores cried for help but no
one came to their aid; and that thereafter, De
Guzman ran away.
Flores claimed that a certain Elmer
Honato (Honato) came and brought Urieta to the
corner of the street; that Honato then went to the
barangay hall allegedly to look for a physician
who would attend to the seriously injured Urieta;
that he waited for Honato but sensing that the
latter would no longer return, he hurriedly went
home leaving Urieta alone on the ground; and
that he did not know whether Urieta was still alive
when he left him.
Flores testified that he was just a meter (an arm’s
length) away from Urieta when the latter was
stabbed by De Guzman; that the light of the
"moron" coming from the "peryahan" illuminated
the table where they were drinking, enabling him
to see the face of the perpetrator whom he
identified to be De Guzman; that two (2) days
after the stabbing incident, Police Officer Gamba,
Gina and Urieta’s father came to his house; that
he then executed a sworn statement before a
police officer narrating his accounts of the
stabbing incident which led to the death of Urieta;
that he did not know De Guzman and it was on
the night of the stabbing incident that he first saw
him; and that he came to know of the name of De
Guzman from the policemen.
A nexus of logically related circumstances,
however, rendered the testimony of Flores as
highly suspect. His testimony is laden with
improbabilities that detract from his credibility.
The totality of the evidence for the prosecution
leaves much to be desired. Somehow, the Court
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
cannot help but entertain serious doubts on the
veracity of the malefactor's identity. It is almost
as if it was merely contrived to pin criminal
culpability upon De Guzman.
First, the condition of visibility at the time of the
stabbing incident did not favor the witness Flores,
as it did not lend credence to his testimony. The
incident took place during nighttime at 11:00
o'clock in a remote barangay with no electric
lighting in the surroundings and the only source
of light then was the illumination of a "moron"
coming from a "peryahan." Apart from the
testimony of Flores, no other competent and
corroborative evidence was adduced to settle this
question of visibility and lighting condition as well
as to confirm that indeed the light of the "moron"
was existent and adequate for purposes of
identification on the night of the incident. The
Court observes that in his Sinumpaang
Salaysay, Flores stated that the "moron (de
18 
gas)" was just on the table where they were
drinking which was contrary to what he had
testified in court.
The distance of the "moron" in the "peryahan"
from the site of the stabbing incident was not
disclosed either. It could have helped determine
if the place was well illuminated. It is important to
note that illumination or brightness diffuses as
the distance from the source increases.
Moreover, it is clear from the records that the
stabbing incident was so swift for ample
observation and Flores, who had three bottles of
beer, was admittedly very afraid so much so that
all he did was to cry for help. Under these
circumstances, the Court finds the positive
identification of De Guzman by Flores hazy.
In People v. Faustino, the Court stated that the
19 
identification of an accused by an eyewitness is a
vital piece of evidence and most decisive of the
success or failure of the case for the prosecution.
In the case at bench, however, the inconclusive
and unreliable identification by Flores of De
Guzman as the culprit failed to break the barrier
of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Second, Flores' story, that a certain Honato
came to their aid and brought the seriously
wounded Urieta to the corner of the street but left
thereafter supposedly to seek a physician at the
barangay hall, simply does not make sense. It
appears strange that Honato should proceed to
Page 4 of 38
the barangay hall to look for a doctor when Third, the Court finds disturbing how the police
natural instinct and reason would dictate that he officers were able to identify De Guzman as the
and Flores should have brought Urieta straight to killer of Urieta. It is undisputed that on the day
the hospital for the immediate medical treatment following the stabbing incident, De Guzman was
of his wounds. It appears even stranger that this invited by the police officers to the municipal hall,
Honato was not presented in court to corroborate was informed by them that he was a suspect in
the testimony of Flores. Besides, can one really the commission of a crime and then placed
find a physician at the barangay hall at that late behind bars. De Guzman testified, to wit:
hour of the night?
Atty. Jennifer Garcia
His story about Honato being nebulous, the Court
doubts if Flores ever shouted for help at all. If he (On Direct Examination)
really did, many people in the "peryahan" would
have surely come to their aid. Indeed, if he was a Q: The following day, what did you do?
childhood friend, he would not have second
thoughts in bringing Urieta to the hospital himself. A: I was drying our palay, sir.
As he merely abandoned his dying friend, one
cannot help but harbor a suspicion. Q: While drying your palay, do you know if there
was anything that happened?
Furthermore, the reaction of Flores, in hurriedly
going home and leaving Urieta alone to die, was A: My wife arrived, sir.
unnatural and contrary to common human
experience. The seemingly apathetic behavior Q: When your wife arrived what happened?
displayed by Flores in leaving Urieta without
even checking his condition to see if he was still A: According to her I was being looked by some
breathing and his failure to report the matter to policemen, sir.
the police or at least inform the victim's family
about what happened on the same night were Q: Why are these policemen were looking at
highly inconsistent with the natural/common you?
reaction of one who had just witnessed the
stabbing of his childhood friend. The Court
A: Because according to them they are going to
cannot accept a story that defies reason and
ask something from me, sir.
leaves much to the imagination. The failure of
Flores to lend a touch of realism to his tale leads
Q: After knowing that some policemen are
to the conclusion that he was either withholding
looking for you, what did you do then?
an incriminating information or was not telling the
truth.
A: I was the one who approached them, sir.
The time-honored test in determining the value of
the testimony of a witness is its compatibility with Q: Where did you approach them?
human knowledge, observation and common
experience of man. Thus, whatever is repugnant
20  A: I asked them why they are looking for me, sir.
to the standards of human knowledge,
observation and experience becomes incredible Q: Did they told you why they are looking for
and must lie outside judicial cognizance. you?
Consistently, the Court has ruled that evidence to
be believed must proceed not only from the A: They are inviting me to go with them in the
mouth of a credible witness but must be credible Municipal Hall, sir.
in itself as to hurdle the test of conformity with the
knowledge and common experience of Q: For what purpose they are asking you to come
mankind. In the case at bench, the testimony of
21  with them in the Municipal Hall?
Flores, the lone eyewitness of the prosecution
does not bear the earmarks of truth and, hence, A: According to them they are going to ask
not credible. something from me, sir.

M.L. DM. ROBLEDO Page 5 of 38

Q: Did you reach the Municipal Hall?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: While in the Municipal Hall, what happened?
A: I was incarcerated, sir.
Q: Did you come to know from them why you are
incarcerated?
A: They said that I was involved in a stabbing
incident, sir. 22
Also, on April 21, 2002, Gina, the wife of the
victim, executed her Sinumpaang
Salaysay wherein she declared, among others,
23 
that she came to know the identity and the name
of the assailant from the police officers. Thus:
T: Kung ikaw ay nasa inyong bahay sa bukid
naroroon kagabi ng maganap ang pananaksak ni
HERMOGENES DE GUZMAN alias "Mong" sa
iyong asawa, papaano mong nalaman na itong si
HERMOGENES DE GUZMAN nga ang may
kagagawan ng pananaksak sa iyong asawa,
gayong wala ka naman kagabi sa lugar ng
pinangyarihan?
S: Napag-alaman ko po sa mga Pulis na
sumurender na ang sumaksak sa aking asawa
kaya't ako nga ay pumunta dito at ipinagtanong
ko ang kanyang pangalan sa mga Pulis kaya ko
siya
nakilala at napag-alamang siya nga ang
sumaksak sa aking asawang si Noriel.
During the trial, Gina stated the same thing as
she testified, to wit:
Asst. Pros. Dante V. Ramirez
(On Direct Examination)
Q: Who was the person who killed your
husband?
A: Hermogenes de Guzman, sir. 24
COURT
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
Q: You mentioned a while ago that when you
were asked who killed your husband, you
answered Hermogenes de Guzman, how did you
come to know the killer of your husband?
A: I came to know from the Police Officer, Your
Honor.
Q: Have you known Hermogenes de Guzman
before the death of your husband??
A: No, Your Honor.
Q: You came to know him only upon the death of
your husband?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Q: Do you know any reason why Hermogenes de
Guzman killed your husband?
A: I do not know any reason, Your Honor. 25
Two days after the incident in question or on April
22, 2002, Flores executed his Sinumpaang
Salaysay and gave his account of the stabbing
incident only because Police Officer Gamba
together with the father and the wife of Urieta
came to his house. Even so, nowhere in the
26 
record does it show that Flores gave the police
officers a description of the physical features and
attributes of the assailant. During the trial, he
admitted that he did not know De Guzman or his
name at the time of the stabbing incident. Thus:
Atty. Jennifer Garcia
(On Cross-Examination)
Q: How about accused, did you know him
personally?
A: I only saw him on that night when he stabbed
Noriel Urieta and I only learned his name from
the Police Officer.
27
The foregoing sequence of events clearly reveals
that the police officers had already a suspect, De
Guzman, in the killing of Urieta, even before
Flores could give his statement and despite the
absence of any description from Flores himself
as to how the culprit looked like. Curiously, no
Page 6 of 38
police officer was called to the witness stand to
shed light on the matter.
This gray area in the case of the prosecution is
fatal to its cause and casts serious doubt on the
veracity and credibility of its evidence.
The Court is likewise puzzled as to how the
prosecution came into possession of the alleged
murder weapon marked as Exhibit "B." During
the trial, a knife with a red handle was shown to
Flores who specifically identified it to be the
same bladed weapon used by De Guzman in
stabbing Urieta. The information, however, as to
who recovered that knife, and from whom it was
seized remained a mystery. At any rate,
considering the visibility condition and other
attending circumstances on the night of the
stabbing incident, the Court indeed doubts how
Flores could have positively identified the murder
weapon.
Lastly, it has not been shown that De Guzman
had any motive for killing Urieta. The brutal and
gruesome attack on Urieta, who sustained two
stab wounds on the chest, a stab wound along
the waist area which hit the liver, and a stab
wound on the elbow, clearly manifested the
intention of the perpetrator to purposely bring
death upon the victim. There was no evidence,
however, that De Guzman carried a grudge or
had an axe to grind against the victim or his
family, or even knew the victim at all. Prosecution
witnesses Flores and Gina even attested that
they did not know of any reason why De Guzman
killed Urieta.
Generally, the motive of the accused in a criminal
case is immaterial and does not have to be
proven. Proof of the same, however, becomes
relevant and essential when, as in this case, the
identity of the assailant is in question. In People
28  proclaim their innocence. Acquittal, therefore, is
v. Vidad, the Court said:
29 
It is true that it is not indispensable to conviction
for murder that the particular motive for taking the
life of a human being shall be established at the
trial, and that in general when the commission of
a crime is clearly proven, conviction may and
should follow even where the reason for its
commission is unknown; but in many criminal
cases, one of the most important aids in
completing the proof of the commission of the
crime by the accused is the introduction of
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
evidence disclosing the motive which tempted
the mind to indulge in the criminal act.
(Underscoring ours)
In light of the weakness in the prosecution's
case, the alibi of De Guzman assumes credence
and importance. While alibi is a weak defense
and the rule is that it must be proved to the
satisfaction of the court, the said rule has never
been intended to change the burden of proof in
criminal cases. Otherwise, an absurd situation
will arise wherein the accused is put in a more
difficult position where the prosecution evidence
is vague and weak as in the present case. The 30 
burden of proof still lies in the prosecution to
establish that De Guzman was responsible for
the killing.
It is oft-repeated that a finding of guilt must rest
on the evidence of the prosecution not on the
weakness or even absence of evidence for the
defense. Thus, it is required that every
circumstance favoring the innocence of the
accused must be duly taken into account. The
proof against him must survive the test of reason
and the strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment. In the case at
31 
bench, the evidence for the prosecution was
unable to pass the exacting test of moral
certainty that the law demands. In People v.
Fernandez, this Court has aptly said:
32 
It is better to liberate a guilty man than to unjustly
keep in prison one whose guilt has not been
proved by the required quantum of evidence.
Hence, despite the Court's support of ardent
crusaders waging all-out war against felons on
the loose, when the People's evidence fails to
prove indubitably the accused's authorship of the
crime of which they stand accused, it is the
Court's duty -- and the accused's right -- to
in order.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The
February 9, 2010 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03458 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused
Hermogenes De Guzman is hereby ACQUITTED
of the crime charged against him and ordered
immediately RELEASED from custody, unless he
is being held for some other lawful cause.
Page 7 of 38
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is
ORDERED to forthwith · implement this decision
and to INFORM this Court, within five ( 5) days
from receipt hereof, of the date when De
Guzman was actually released from confinement.
SO ORDERED.
LAYMEN V FRAILTY OF HUMAN
MEMORY
G.R. No. 209342
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee  Municipality of Binangonan, Province of Rizal,
vs.
CRISENTE PEPAÑO NUÑEZ, Accused-
Appellant
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
To convict an accused, it is not sufficient for the
prosecution to present a positive identification by
a witness during trial due to the frailty of human
memory. It must also show that the identified
person matches the original description made by
that witness when initially reporting the crime.
The unbiased character of the process of
identification by witnesses must likewise be
shown.
Criminal prosecution may result in the severe
consequences of deprivation of liberty, property,
and, where capital punishment is imposed, life.
Prosecution that relies solely on eyewitness
identification must be approached meticulously,
cognizant of the inherent frailty of human
memory. Eyewitnesses who have previously
made admissions that they could not identify the
perpetrators of a crime but, years later and after
a highly suggestive process of presenting
suspects, contradict themselves and claim that
they can identify the perpetrator with certainty are
grossly wanting in credibility. Prosecution that
relies solely on these eyewitnesses' testimonies
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
fails to discharge its burden of proving an
accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
This resolves an appeal from the assailed June
26, 2013 Decision  of the Court of Appeals in CA-
1
G.R. CR HC No. 04474, which affirmed with
modification the February 24, 2010 Decision  of 2
Branch 67, Regional Trial Court, Binangonan,
Rizal. This Regional Trial Court Decision found
accused-appellant Crisente Pepaño Nuñez
(Nuñez) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
robbery with homicide.
In an Information, George Marciales (Marciales),
Orly Nabia (Nabia), Paul Pobre (Pobre), and a
certain alias "Jun'' (Jun) were charged with
robbery with homicide, under Article 294(1) of the
Revised Penal Code,  as follows:
3
That on or about the 22nd of June 2000, in the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
and aiding one another, armed with handguns,
by means of violence against or intimidation of
the persons of Felix V. Regencia, Alexander C.
Diaz and Byron G. Dimatulac, with intent to gain,
did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take and carry away the money
amounting to ₱5,000.00 belonging to the Caltex
gasoline station owned by the family of Felix V.
Regencia to their damage and prejudice; that on
the occasion of the said robbery and to insure
their purpose, the said accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping and aiding
one another, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and shoot said Felix V. Regencia, Alexander C.
Diaz and Byron G. Dimatulac on the different
parts of their bodies, thereby inflicting gunshot
wounds which directly caused their deaths. 4
At first, only Marciales and Nabia were arrested,
arraigned, and tried. In its December 9, 2005
Decision,  the Regional Trial Court found the
5
offense of robbery with homicide as alleged in
the Information, along with Marciales and Nabia's
conspiracy with Pobre and Jun to commit this
offense, to have been established. Thus, it
pronounced Marciales and Nabia guilty beyond
reasonable doubt and sentenced them to
death.  The case against Pobrn and Jun was
6
Page 8 of 38
archived subject to revival upon their
apprehension. 7
On July 2, 2006, accused-appellant Nunez was
apprehended by the Philippine National Police
Regional Intelligence Office on the premise that
he was the same ''Paul Pobre" identified in the
Inforn1ation. Upon arraigru11ent, Nuñez moved
that the case against him be dismissed as he
was not the "Paul Pobre" charged in the
Information. However, prosecution witnesses
identified him as one (1) of the alleged robbers
and his motion to dismiss was denied. The
information was then atnended to state Nuñez's
name in lieu of "Paul Pobre." 8
During trial, the prosecution manifested that it
would be adopting the evidence already
presented in the course of Marciales and Nabia's
trial. Apart from this, it also recalled prosecution
witnesses Ronalyn Cruz (Cruz) and Relen Perez
(Perez). In their testimonies, they both positively
identified Nunez as among the perpetrators of
the crime.9
Cruz's testimony recounted that in the evening of
June 22, 2000, she was working as an attendant
at the Caltex gasoline station mentioned in the
Infonnation. She was then sitting near the
g1;1,soline pumps with her co-employees, the
deceased Byron G. Dimatulac (Dimatulac) and
prosecution witness Pierez. They noticed that the
station's office was being held up. There were
two (2) persons poking guns at and asking for
money from the deceased Alex Diaz (Diaz) and
Felix Regencia (Regencia). Regencia hancied
money to one (1) of the robbers while the other
robber reached for a can of oil. Regencia
considered this as enough of a distraction to put
up a fight. Regencia and Diaz grappled with the
robbers. In the scuffle, Diaz shouted. At the
sound of this, two (2) men ran to the office. The
first was identified to be Marciales and the
second, according to Cruz, was Nunez.
Dimatulac also ran to the office to assist
Regencia and Oiaz. Marciales then shot
Dimatulac while Nunez shot Diaz. Cruz and
Perez sought refuge in a computer shop. About
10 to 15 minutes later, they returned to the
gasoline station where they found Diaz already
dead, Dimatulac gasping for breath, and
Regencia wounded and crawling. By then, the
robbers were rushing towards the highway. 10
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
Perez's testimony recounted that in the evening
of June 22, 2000, she was working as a sales
clerk in the Caltex gasoline station adverted to in
the Information. While seated with Cruz near the
gasoline pumps, she saw Nuñez, who was
pointing a gun at Diaz, and another man who
was pointing a gun at Regencia, inside the
gasoline station's office. Diaz shouted that they
were being robbed. Another man then rushed to
the gasoline station's office, as did her co-
employee Dimatulac. A commotion ensued
where the robber identified as Marciales shot
Dimatulac, Diaz, and Regencia. They then ran to
their employer's house.11
Nunez testified in his own defense and recalled
the circumstances of his apprehension. He stated
that when he was apprehended on July 2, 2006,
he was on his way to his aunt's fish store where
he was helping since 1999 when a man
approached him. He was then dragged and
mauled. With his face covered, he was boarded
on a vehicle and brought to Camp Vicente Lim in
Laguna. He further claimed that on June 22,
2000, he was in Muzon, Taytay, Rizal with his
aunt at her fish store until about 5:00 p.m. before
going home. At home, his aunt's son fetched him
to get pails from the store and bring them to his
aunt's house.12
On February 24, 2010, the Regional Trial Court
rendered a Decision  finding Nunez guilty
13
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with
homicide. This four (4)-page Decision
incorporated the original Regional Trial Court
December 9, 2005 Decision and added the
following singular paragraph in explaining
Nunez's supposed complicity:
To convict Nunez of robbery with homicide
requires proof beyond reasonable doubt that he:
(1) took personal property which belongs to
another; (2) the taking is unlawful; (3) the taking
is done with intent to gain; and (4) the taking was
accomplished with the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or by using force upon
things. Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code
and (5) when by reason or on occasion of the
robbery, the crime of homicide shall have been
committed[.] The facts are simple. Nuñez along
with Marciales and Nabia robbed the Tayuman
Caltex gas station of ₱5,000.00 and some cans
of oil. For such booty, he[,] along with his fellow
thieves[,] shot and killed Felix Regencia,
Page 9 of 38
Alexander C. Diaz and Byron G. Dimatulac. He
was positively and unequivocally identified by
Renel Cruz and Ronalyn Perez as [one] of the
perpetrators even as he tried to hide behind
another name and was arrested later. He ran but
could not hide as the long arm of the law finally
caught up with him. As a defense, he can only
offer his weak alibi which cannot offset the
positive identification of the prosecution
witnesses. His guilt was proven beyond
reasonable doubt. 14
The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment, as
follows:
Based on the foregoing, we find accused
Crisente Pepaño Nuñez
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Robbery with Homicide under Article 294 (1) of
the Revised Penal Code and sentences (sic) him
to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and
order him to pay:
1. The heirs of Felix Regencia Php. 151,630.00
expenses for the wake, burial lot and funeral
service; Php. 75,000.00 death indemnity; Php.
5,000.00 money stolen from the victim;
exemplary damages of Php. 50,000.00; and Php.
2,214,000.00 unearned income;
2. The heirs of Alexander Diaz Php. 20,000.00
expenses for funeral service; Php. 75,000.00
death indemnity; Php. 50,000.00 exemplary
damages; and Php. 1,774,080.00 unearned
income;
3. The heirs of Byron Dimatulac Php. 18,000.00
for funeral service; Php. 75,000.00 death
indemnity; Php. 50,000.00 exemplary damages;
and Php. 966,240.00 unearned income[;] and
4. The costs.
Let the case against alias "Jun" who remains at
large be archived.
SO ORDERED. 15
On March 5, 2010, Nuñez fifed his Notice of
Appeal.16
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
On June 26, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered
its assailed Decision  affirming
17
Nunez's
conviction, with modification to the awards of
moral and exemplary damages, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The Decision dated February 24, 2010 of the
Regional Trial Court of Binangonan, Rizal,
Branch 67, in Criminal Case No. 00-473 is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Accused-appellant Crisente Pepaño Nuñez is
ordered to pay ₱75,000.00 as moral damages
and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages each to
the heirs of Felix Regencia, the heirs of
Alexander Diaz and the heirs of Byron Dimatulac.
SO ORDERED. 18
Nuñez then filed his Notice of Appeal. 19
The Court of Appeals elevated the records of this
case to this Court on October 22, 2013 pursuant
to its Resolution dated July 23, 2013. The
Resolution gave due course to Nuñez's Notice of
Appeal. 20
In its Resolution  dated December 4, 2013, this
21
Court noted the records forwarded by the Court
of Appeals and informed the parties that they
may file their supplemental briefs. However, both
parties manifested that they would no longer do
so.22
The occurrence of the robbery occasioned by the
killing of Regencia, Diaz, and Dimatulac is no
longer in issue as it has been established in the
original proceedings which resulted in the
conviction of Marciales and Nabia.
All that remains in issue for this Court's resolution
is whether or not accused-appellant Crisente
Pepaño Nuñez is the same person, earlier
identified as Paul Pobre, who acted in conspiracy
with Marciales and Nabia.
Contrary to the conclusions of the Court of
Appeals and Regional Trial Court, this Court
finds that it has not been established beyond
reasonable doubt that accused-appellant
Crisente Pepaño Nuñez is thy same person
identified as Paul Pobre. Thus, this Court
Page 10 of 38
reverses the courts a quo and acquits accused-
appellant Crisente Pepano Nunez.
The prosecution's case rises and falls on the
testimonies of eyewitnesses Cruz and Perez.
The necessity of their identification of Nunez is
so manifest that the prosecution saw it fit to recall
them to the stand, even as it merely adopted the
evidence already presented in the trial of
Marciales and Nabia. Cruz's and Perez's
testimonies centered on their supposed certainty
as to how it was Nuñez himself, excluding any
other person, who participated in the robbery and
homicide.
This Court finds this supposed certainty and the
premium placed on it by the Court of Appeals
and the Regional Trial Court to be misplaced.
I jurisprudence commendably refers to as "positive
There are two (2) principal witnesses who
allegedly identified accused-appellant as the
same Pobre who participated in the robbery
holdup. When Cruz, the first witness, was initially
put on the witness stand, she asserted that she
could not recall any of the features of Pobre.
After many years, with the police presenting her
with accused-appellant, she positively identified
him as the missing perpetrator. The second
principal witness' testimony on the alleged
participation of accused-appellant is so
fundamentally at variance with that of the other
principal witness. The prosecution did not
account for the details of the presentation of
accused· appellant to the two (2) witnesses after
he was arrested. Finally, these witnesses'
alleged positive identification occurred almost
eight (8) years, for the first witness, and almost
nine (9) years, for the second witness, from the
time of the commission of the offense.
The frailty of human memory is a scientific fact.
The danger of inordinate reliance on human
memory in criminal proceedings, where
conviction results in the possible deprivation of
liberty, property, and even life, is equally
established.
Human memory does not record events like a
video recorder. In the first place, human memory
is more selective than a video camera. The
sensory environment contains a vast amount of
information, but the memory process perceives
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
and accurately records only a very small
percentage of that information. Second, because
the act of remembering is reconstructive, akin to
putting puzzle pieces together, human memory
can change in dramatic and unexpected ways
because of the passage of time or subsequent
events, such as exposure to "postevent"
information like conversations with other
witnesses or media reports. Third, memory can
also be altered through the reconstruction
process. Questioning a witness about what he or
she perceived and requiring the witness to
reconstruct the experience can cause the witness
memory to change by unconsciously blending the
actual fragments of memory of the event with
information provided during the memory retrieval
process. 23
Eyewitness identification, or what our
identification," is the bedrock of many
pronouncements of guilt. However, eyewitness
identification is but a product of flawed human
memory. In an expansive examination of 250
cases of wrongful convictions where convicts
were subsequently exonerated by DNA testing,
Professor Brandon Garett (Professor Garett)
noted that as much as 190 or 76% of these
Wrongful convictions were occasioned by flawed
eyewitness identifications.  Another observer has
24
more starkly characterized eyewitness
identifications as ''the leading cause of wrongful
convictions." 25
Yet, even Professor Garrett's findings are not
novel. The fallibility of eyewitness identification
has been recognized and has been the subject of
concerted scientific study for more than a
century:
This seemingly staggering rate of involvement of
eyewitness errors in wrongful convictions is,
unfortunately, no surprise. Previous studies have
likewise found eyewitness errors to be implicated
in the majority of cases of wrongful conviction.
But Garrett's analysis went farther than these
previous studies. He not only documented that
eyewitness errors occurred in his cases. He also
tried to determine why they occurred - an issue
eyewitness science has investigated for over 100
years.26
The dangers of the misplaced primacy of
eyewitness identification are two (2)-pronged: on
Page 11 of 38
one level, eyewitness identifications are
inherently prone to error; on another level, the
appreciation by observers, such as jurors,
judges, and law enforcement officers of how an
eyewitness identifies supposed culprits is just as
prone to error:
The problem of eyewitness reliability could not be
more clearly documented. The painstaking work
of the Innocence Project, Brandon Garrett, and
others who have documented wrongful
convictions, participated in the exonerations of
the victims, and documented the role of flawed
evidence of all sorts has clearly and repeatedly
revealed the two-pronged problem of unreliability
for eyewitness evidence: (1) eyewitness
identifications are subject to substantial error,
and (2) observer judgments of witness accuracy
are likewise subject to substantial error.
27
The bifurcated difficulty of misplaced reliance on
eyewitness identification is borne not only by the
intrinsic limitations of human memory as the
basic apparatus on which the entire exercise of
identification operates. It is as much the result of
and is exacerbated by extrinsic factors such as
environmental factors, flawed procedures, or the
mere passage of time:
More than 100 years of eyewitness science has
supported other conclusions as well. First, the
ability to match faces to photographs (even when
the target is present while the witness inspects
the lineup or comparison photo) is poor and
peaks at levels far below what might be
considered reasonable doubt. Second,
eyewitness accuracy is further degraded by
pervasive environmental characteristics typical ·
of many criminal cases such as: suboptimal
lighting; distance; angle of view; disguise;
witness distress; and many other encoding
conditions. Third, memory is subject to distortion
due to a variety of influences not under the
control of law enforcement that occur between
the criminal event and identification procedures
and during such procedures. Fourth, the ability of
those who must assess the accuracy of
eyewitness testimony is poor for a variety of
reasons. Witnesses' ability to report on many
issues affecting or reflecting accuracy is flawed
and subject to distortion (e.g., reports of duration
of observation. distance, attention, confidence,
and others). thereby providing a flawed basis for
others' judgments of accuracy. 28
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
Likewise, decision-makers such as jurists and
judges, who are experts in law, procedure, and
logic, may simply not know better than what their
backgrounds and acquired inclinations permit:
Additionally, the limits and determinants of
performance for facial recognition are beyond the
knowledge of attorneys, judges, and jurors. The
traditional safeguards such as cross-examination
are not effective and cannot be effective in the
absence of accurate knowledge of the limits and
determinants of witness performance among
both the cross-examiners and the jurors who
must judge the witness. Likewise, cross-
examination cannot be effective if the witness
reports elicited by cross-examination are flawed:
for example, with respect to factors such as
original witnessing conditions (e.g., duration of
exposure), post-event influences (e.g.,
conversations with co-witnesses), or police
suggestion (e.g., repo1is of police comments or
behaviors during identification procedures). 29
II
Legal traditions in various jurisdictions have been
responsive to the scientific reality of the frailty of
eyewitness identification.
In the United States, the Supreme Court "ruled
for the first time that the Constitution requires
suppression of some identification evidence"  in 30
three (3) of its decisions, all rendered on June
12, 1967-United States v. Wade,  Gilbert
31
v.
California,   and Stovall
32
v.
Denno.  Stovall emphasized
33
that such
suppression, when appropriate, was "a matter of
due process." 34
Until the latter half of the twentieth century, the
general rule in the United States was that any
problems with the quality of eyewitness
identification evidence went to the weight, not the
admissibility, of that evidence and that the jury
bore the ultimate responsibility for assessing the
credibility and reliability of an eyewitness's
identification. In a trilogy of landmark cases
released on the same day in 1967, however, the
Supreme Court ruled for the first time that the
Constitution requires suppression of some
identification evidence. In United
States v. Wade and Gilbert v. California, the
Court held that a post-indictment lineup is a
critical stage in a criminal prosecution, and,
Page 12 of 38
unless the defendant waives his Sixth
Amendment rights, defense counsel's absence
from such a procedure requires suppression of
evidence from the lineup. The court also ruled,
however, that even when the lineup evidence
itself must be suppressed, a witness would be
permitted to identify the defendant in court if the
prosecution could prove the witness had an
independent source for his identification ...
….
In Stovall v. Denno, the Court held that,
regardless of whether a defendant's Sixth
Amendment rights were in1plicated or violated,
some identification procedures are "so
unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to
irreparable mistaken identification" that
eyewitness evidence must be suppressed as a
matter of due process.  (Citations omitted)
35
In Wade, the United States Supreme Court noted
that the factors judges should evaluate in
deciding the independent source question
include:
[T]he prior opportunity to observe the alleged
criminal act, the existence of any discrepancy
between any pre-lineup description and the
defendant's actual description, any identification
prior to lineup of another person, the
identification by picture of the defendant prior to
the lineup, failure to identify the defendant on a
prior occasion, and the lapse of time between the
alleged act and the lineup identification."
36
Nine (9) months later, in Simmons v. United
States, the United States Supreme Court
calibrated its approach by "focusing in that case
on the overall reliability of the identification
evidence rather than merely the flaws in the
identification procedure."
Ultimately, the Court concluded there was no due
process violation in admitting the evidence
because there was little doubt that the witnesses
were actually correct in their identification of
Simmons. Scholars have frequently
characterized Simmons as the beginning of the
Court's unraveling of the robust protection it had
offered in Stovall; while Stovall provided a per se
rule of exclusion for evidence derived from
flawed procedures, Simmons rejected this
categorical approach in favor of a reliability
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
analysis that would often allow admission of
eyewitness evidence even when an identification
procedure was unnecessarily suggestive. 37
In more recent Supreme Court decisions, the
United States has "reaffirmed its shift toward a
reliability analysis, as opposed to a focus merely
on problematic identification procedures"
beginning in 1972 through Neil v. Biggers: 38
The Biggers Court stated that, at least in a case
in which the confrontation and trial had taken
place before Stovall, identification evidence
would be admissible, even if there had been an
unnecessarily suggestive procedure, so long as
the evidence was reliable under the totality of the
circumstances. To inform its reliability analysis,
the Biggers Court articulated five factors it
considered relevant to the inquiry:
[(l)] the opportunity of the witness to view the
criminal at the time of the crime, [(2)] the witness'
degree of attention, [(3)] the accuracy of the
witness' prior description of the criminal, [(4)] the
level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at
the confrontation, and [(5)] the length of time
between the crime and the confrontation.
The Biggers Court clearly proclaimed that the
"likelihood of misidentification," rather than a
suggestive procedure in and of itself, is what
violates a defendant's due process rights.
However, the BiggersCourt left open the
possibility that per se exclusion of evidence
derived from unnecessarily suggestive
confrontations might be available to defendants
whose confrontations and trials took place after
Stovall.
39
The Biggers standard was further affirmed in
1977 in Manson v. Brathwaite;  40
The Manson Court made clear that the standard
from Biggers would govern all due process
challenges to eyewitness evidence, stating that
judges should weigh the five factors against the
"corrupting effect of the suggestive identification."
Ultimately, the Court affirmed that "reliability is
the linchpin in determining the admissibility of
identification testimony." In rejecting the per se
exclusionary rule, the Court acknowledged that
such a rule would promote greater deterrence
against the use of suggestive procedures, and it
noted a "surprising unanimity among scholars"
Page 13 of 38
that the per se approach was "essential to avoid
serious risk of miscarriage of justice." However,
the Court concluded the cost to society of not
being able to use reliable evidence of guilt in
criminal prosecutions would be too high.
The Manson Court also made clear that its new
stm1dard would apply to both pre-trial and in-
court identification evidence, thus resulting in a
unified analysis of all identification evidence in
the wake of suggestive procedures. In contrast,
the Stovall Court had not specified whether
unnecessarily suggestive procedures would
require per se exclusion of both pre-trial
identification evidence and any in-court
identification, or alternatively, whether witnesses
who had viewed unnecessarily suggestive
procedures might nonetheless be allowed to
identify defendants in court after an independent
source determination. 41
A 2016 article notes that Manson "remains the
federal constitutional standard."  It' also notes
42
that "[t]he vast majority of states have also
followed Manson in interpreting the requirements
of their own constitutions."43
The United Kingdom has adopted the Code of
Practice for the Identification of Persons by
Police Officers.  It "concerns the principal
44
methods used by police to identify people in
connection with the investigation of offences and
the keeping of accurate and reliable criminal
records" and covers eyewitness identifications.
This Code puts in place measures advanced by
the corpus of research in enhancing the reliability
of eyewitness identification, specifically by
impairing the suggestive tendencies of
conventional procedures. Notable measures
include having a parade of at least nine (9)
people, when one (1) suspect is included, to at
least 14 people, when two (2) suspects are
included  and forewarning the witness that he or
45
she may or may not actually see the suspect in
the lineup. Additionally, there should be a careful
46
recording of the witness' pre-identification
description of the perpetrator  and explicit
47
instructions for police officers to not "direct the
witness' attention to any individual." 48
III
Domestic jurisprudence recognizes that
eyewitness identification is affected by "normal
human fallibilities and suggestive
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
influences."  People
49
v. Teehankee,
Jr.   introduced in this jurisdiction the totality of
50
circumstances test, which relies on factors
already identified by the United States Supreme
Court in Neil v. Biggers:51
(1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at
the time of the crime;
(2) the witness' degree of attention at that time;
(3) the accuracy of any prior description given by
the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification;
(5) the length of time between the crime and the
identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.52
A witness' credibility is ascertained by
considering the first two factors, i.e., the witness'
opportunity to view the malefactor at the time of
the crime and the witness' degree of attention at
that time, based on conditions of visibility and the
extent of time, little and fleeting as it may have
been, for the witness to be exposed to the
perpetrators, peruse their features, and ascertain
their identity.  In People v. Pavillare: 
53 54
Both witnesses had ample opportunity to observe
the kidnappers and to remember their faces. The
complainant had close contact with the
kidnappers when he was abducted and beaten
up, and later when the kidnappers haggled on
the amount of the ransom money. His cousin met
Pavillare face to face and actually dealt with him
when he paid the ransom money. The two-hour
period that the complainant was in close contact
with his abductors was sufficient for him to have
a recollection of their physical appearance.
Complainant admitted in court that he would
recognize his abductors if he s[aw] them again
and upon seeing Pavillare he immediately
recognized him as one of the malefactors as he
remember[ed] him as the one who blocked his
way, beat him up, haggled with the complainant's
cousin and received the ransom money. As an
indicium of candor the private complainant
admitted that he d[id] not recognize the co-
accused, Sotero Santos for which reason the
case was dismissed against him. 55
Apart from extent or degree of exposure, this
Court has also appreciated a witness' specialized
skills or extraordinary capabilities.  People v.
56
Sanchez  concerned the theft of an armored car.
57
Page 14 of 38
The witness, a trained guard, was taken by this
Court as being particularly alert about his
surroundings during the attack.
The degree of a witness' attentiveness is the
result of many factors, among others: exposure
time, frequency of exposure, the criminal
incident's degree of violence, the witness' stress
levels and expectations, and the witness' activity
during the commission of the crime. 58
The degree of the crime's violence affects a
witness' stress levels. A focal point of
psychological studies has been the effect of the
presence of a weapon on a witness'
attentiveness. Since the 1970s, it has been
hypothesized that the presence of a weapon
captures a witness' attention, thereby reducing
his or her attentiveness to other details such as
the perpetrator's facial and other identifying
features.  Research on this has involved an
59
enactme1'1t model involving two (2) groups: first,
an enactment with a gun; and second, an
enactment of the same incident using an
implement like a pencil or a syringe as substitute
for an actual gun. Both groups are then asked to
identify the culprit in a lineup. Results reveal a
statistically significant difference in the accuracy
of eyewitness identification between the two (2)
groups: 60
[T]he influence of [a weapon focus] variable on
an eyewitness's performance can only be
estimated post hoc. Yet the data here do offer a
rather strong statement: To not consider a
weapon's effect on eyewitness performance is to
ignore relevant information. The weapon effect
does reliably occur, particularly in crin1es of short
duration in which a threatening wea.pon is
visible. Identification accuracy and feature
accuracy of eyewitnesses are likely to be
affected, although, as previous research has
noted ... there is not necessarily a concordance
between the two. 61
Our jurisprudence has yet to give due
appreciation to scientific; data on weapon focus.
Instead, what is prevalent is the contrary view
which empirical studies discredit.  For instance,
62
in People v. Sartagoda:
[T]he most natural reaction for victims of criminal
violence [is] to strive to see the looks a..11d
faces of their assailants and observe the manner
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
in which the crime was committed. Most often the
face of the assailant and body movements
thereof, create a lasting impression which cannot
easily be erased from their memory. 63
Rather than a sweeping approbation of a
supposed natural propensity for remembering the
faces of assailants, this Court now emphasizes
the need for courts to appreciate the totality of
circumstances in the identification of perpetrators
of crimes.
Apart from the witness' opportunity to view the
perpetrator during the commission of the Grime
and the witness' degree of attention at that time,
the accuracy of any prior description given by the
witness is equally vital. Logically, a witness'
credibility is enhanced by the extent to which his
or her initial description of the perpetrator
matches the actual appearance of the person
ultimately prosecuted for the offense.
Nevertheless, discrepancies, when properly
accounted for, should not be fatal to the
prosecution's case, For instance,
in Lumanog v. People,  this Court recognized
64
that age estimates cannot be made accurately:
Though his estimate of Joel's age was not
precise, it was not that far from his true age,
especially if we consider that being a tricycle
driver who was exposed daily to sunlight, Joel's
looks may give a first impression that he is older
than his actual age. Moreover Alejo's description
of Lumanog as dark-skinned was made two (2)
months prior to the dates of the trial when he was
again asked to identify him in court. When
defense counsel posed the question of the
discrepancy in Alejo's description of Lumanog
who was then prese11ted as having a fair
complexion and was 40 years old, the private
prosecutor manifested the possible effect of
Lumanog's incarceration for such length of time
as to make his appearance different at the time
of trial.
65
The totality of circumstances test also requires a
consideration of the degree of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the moment of
identification. What is most critical here is the
initial identification made by the witness during
investigation and case build-up, not identification
during trial.
66
Page 15 of 38
A witness' certainty is tested in court during
cross-examination. In several instances, this
Court has considered a witness' straight and
candid recollection of the incident, undiminished
by the rigors of cross-examination as an indicator
of credibility. 67
Still, certainty on the witness stand is by no
means conclusive. By the time a witness takes
the stand, he or she shall have likely made
narrations to investigators, to responding police
or barangay officers, to the public prosecutor, to
any possible private prosecutors, to the families
of the victims, other sympathizers, and even to
the media. The witness, then, may have
established certainty, not because of a foolproof
cognitive perception and recollection of events
but because of consistent reinforcement borne by
becoming an experienced narrator. Repeated
narrations before different audiences may also
prepare a witness for the same kind of scrutiny
that he or she will encounter during cross-
examination. Again, what is more crucial is
certainty at the onset or on initial identification,
not in a relatively belated stage of criminal
proceedings.
The totality of circumstances test also requires a
consideration of the length of time between the
crime and the identification made by the witness.
"It is by now a well established fact that people
are less accurate and complete in their
eyewitness accounts after a long retention
interval than after a short one."  Ideally then, a
68
prosecution witness must identify the suspect
immediately after the incident. This Court has
considered acceptable an identification made two
(2) days after the commission of a crime,  not so
69
one that had an interval of five and a half (5
1/2)months. 70
The passage of time is not the only factor that
diminishes memory. Equally jeopardizing is a
witness' interactions with other individuals
involved in the event.  As noted by cognitive
71
psychologist Elizabeth F. Loftus, "[p]ost[-]event
information can not only enhance existing
memories but also change a witness's memory
and even cause nonexistent details to become
incorporated into a previously acquired
memory." 72
Thus, the totality of circumstances test also
requires a consideration of the suggestiveness of
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
the identification procedure undergone by a
witness. Both verbal and non-verbal information
might become inappropriate cues or suggestions
to a witness:
A police officer may tell a witness that a suspect
has been caught and the witness should look at
some photographs or come to view a lineup and
make an identification. Even if the policeman
does not explicitly mention a suspect, it is likely
that the witness will believe he is being asked to
identify a good suspect who will be one of the
members of the lineup or set of photos ... If the
officer should unintentionally stare a bit longer at
the suspect, or change his tone of voice when he
says, "Tell us whether you think it is number one,
two, THREE, four, five, or six," the witness's
opinion might be swayed. 73
In appraising the suggestiveness of identification
procedures, this Court has previously considered
prior or contemporaneous  actions of law 74
enforcers, prosecutors, media, or even fellow
witnesses.
In People v. Baconguis,  this Court acquitted the
75
accused, whose identification was tainted by an
improper suggestion.  There, the witness was
76
made to identify the suspect inside a detention
cell which contained only the suspect. 77
People v. Escordiaz  involved robbery with rape.
78
Throughout their ordeal, the victim and her
companions were blindfolded.  The victim, 79
however, felt a "rough projection''  on the back of
80
the perpetrator. The perpetrator also spoke,
thereby familiarizing the victim with his
voice.  Escordial recounted the investigative
81
process which resulted in bringing the alleged
perpetrator into custody. After several individuals
were interviewed, the investigating officer had an
inkling of who to look for. He "found accused-
appellant [in a] basketball court and 'invited' him
to go to the police station for questioning."  When 82
the suspect was brought to the police station, the
rape victim was already there. Upon seeing the
suspect enter, the rape victim requested to see
the suspect's back. The suspect removed his
shirt. When the victim saw a "rough projection"
on the suspect's back, she spoke to the police
and stated that the suspect was the perpetrator.
The police then brought in the other witnesses to
identify the suspect. Four (4) witnesses were
taken to the cell containing the accused and they
Page 16 of 38
consistently pointed to the suspect even as four
(4) other individuals were with him in the cell.83
This Court found the show-up, with respect to the
rape victim, and the lineup, with respect to the
four (4) other witnesses, to have been tainted
with irregularities. It also noted that the out-of-
court identification could have been the subject of
objections to its admissibility as evidence
although these objections were never raised
during trial.
84
Although these objections were not timely raised,
this Court found that the prosecution failed to
establish the accused's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and acquitted the accused.  It noted that
85
the victim was blindfolded throughout her ordeal.
Her identification was rendered unreliable by her
own admission that she could only recognize her
perpetrator through his eyes and his voice. It
reasoned that, given the limited exposure of the
rape victim to the perpetrator, it was difficult for
her to immediately identify the perpetrator. It
found the improper suggestion made by the
police officer as having possibly aided in the
identification of the suspect.  The Court cited
86
with approval the following excerpt from an
academic journal:
Social psychological influences.Various social
psychological factors also increase the danger of
suggestibility in a lh1eup confrontation.
Witnesses, like other people, are motivated by a
desire to be correct and to avoid looking foolish.
By arranging a lineup, the police have evidenced
their belief that they have caught the criminal;
witnesses, realizing this, probably will feel foolish
if they cannot identify anyone and therefore1 may
choose someone despite residual uncertainly.
Moreover, the need to reduce psychological
discomfort often motivates the victim of a crime
to find a likely target for feelings of hostility.
Finally, witnesses are highly motivated to behave
like those around them. This desire to conform
produces an increased need to identify someone
in order to show the police that they, too, feel that
the criminal is in the lineup, and makes the
witnesses particularly vulnerable to any clues
conveyed by the police or other witnesses as to
whom they suspect of the crime.  (Emphasis in
87
the original)
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
People v. Pineda,   involved six (6) perpetrators
88
committing robbery with homicide aboard a
passenger bus.  A passenger recalled that one
89
(1) of the perpetrators was referred to as "Totie"
by his companions. The police previously knew
that a certain Totie Jacob belonged to the
robbery gang of Rolando Pineda (Pineda). At that
time also, Pineda and another companion were
in detention for another robbery. The police
presented photographs of Pineda and his
companion to the witness, who positively
identified the two (2) as among the perpetrators. 90
This Court found the identification procedure
unacceptable.  It then articulated two (2) rules for
91
out-of-court identifications through photographs:
The first rule in proper photographic identification
procedure is that a series of photographs must
be shown, and not merely that of the suspect.
The second rule directs that when a witness is
shown a group of pictures, their arrangement and
display should in no way suggest which one of
the pictures pertains to the suspect.92
Non-compliance with these rules suggests that
any subsequent corporeal identification made by
a witness may not actually be the result of a
reliable recollection of the criminal incident.
Instead, it will simply confirm false confidence
induced by the suggestive presentation of
photographs to a witness.
Pineda further identified 12 danger signals that
might indicate erroneous identification. Its list is
by no means exhaustive, but it identifies
benchmarks which may complement the
application of the totality of circumstances rule.
These danger signals are:
(1) the witness originally stated that he could not
identify anyone;
(2) the identifying witness knew the accused
before the crime, but made no accusation against
him when questioned by the police;
(3) a serious discrepancy exists between the
identifying witness' original description and the
actual description of the accused;
Page 17 of 38
(4) before identifying the accused at the trial, the
witness erroneously identified some other
person;
(5) other witnesses to the crime fail to identify the
accused;
(6) before trial, the witness sees the accused but
fails to identify him;
(7) before the commission of the crime, the
witness had limited opportunity to see the
accused;
(8) the witness and the person identified are of
different racial groups;
(9) during his original observation of the
perpetrator of the crime, the witness was
unaware that a crime was involved;
(10) a considerable time elapsed between the
witness' view of the criminal and his identification
of the accused;
(11) several persons committed the crime; and
(12) the witness fails to make a positive trial
identification.
93
Pineda underscored that "[t]he more important
duty of the prosecution is to prove the identity of
the perpetrator and not to establish the existence
of the crime."  Establishing the identity of
94
perpetrators is a difficult task because of this
jurisdiction's tendency to rely more on testimonial
evidence rather than on physical evidence.
Unlike the latter, testimonial evidence can be
swayed by improper suggestions. Legal scholar
Patrick M. Wall notes that improper suggestion
"probably accounts for more miscarriages of
justice than any other single factor[.]"  Marshall
95
Houts, who served the Federal Bureau of
Investigation and the American judiciary, concurs
and considers eyewitness identification as "the
most unreliable form of evidence[.]" 96
People v. Rodrigo  involved
97
the same
circumstances as Pineda. The police presented a
singular photograph for the eyewitness to identify
the person responsible for a robbery with
homicide. The witness identified the person in the
photograph as among the perpetrators. This
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
Court stated that, even as the witness
subsequently identified the suspect in court, such
identification only followed an impermissible
suggestion in the course of the photographic
identification. This Court specifically stated that a
suggestive identification violates the right of the
accused to due process, denying him or her of a
fair trial:
98
The greatest care should be taken in considering
the identification of the accused especially, when
this identification is made by a sole witness and
the judgment in the case totally depends on the
reliability of the identification. This level of care
and circumspection applies with greater vigor
when, as in the present case, the issue goes
beyond pure credibility into constitutional
dimensions arising from the due process rights of
the accused.
….
The initial photographic identification in this case
carries serious constitutional law implications in
terms of the possible violation of the due process
rights of the accused as it may deny him his
rights to a fair trial to the extent that his in-court
identification proceeded from and was influenced
by impermissible suggestions in the earlier
photographic identification. In the context of this
case, the investigators might not have been fair
to Rodrigo if they themselves, purposely or
unwittingly, fixed in the mind of Rosita, or at least
actively prepared her mind to, the thought that
Rodrigo was one of the robbers. Effectively, this
act is no different from coercing a witness in
identifying an accused, varying only with respect
to the means used. Either way, the police
investigators a.re the real actors in the
identification of the accused; evidence of
identification is effectively created when none
really exists.  (Emphasis supplied)
99
IV
Applying these standards, this Court finds the
identification made by prosecution witnesses
Cruz and Perez unreliable. Despite their
identification, there remains reasonable doubt if
accused-appellant Nuñez is the same Pobre who
supposedly committed the robbery with homicide
along with Marciales and Nabia.
Page 18 of 38
The prosecution banks on the following portion of
Cruz's testimony.  The Court of Appeals heavily
100
relies on the same portion, reproducing parts of it
in its Decision:
101
Q: Madam Witness, where were you on June 22,
2000 in the afternoon?
A: I was on duty at Tayuman Caltex station,
Ma'am.
Q: And while you were on duty, what happened if
any?
A: While we were on duty there was a pick-up
which was getting gas and a person was in front
and we were joking baka kami mahold-up yun
pala, hinoholdup na kami sa opisina.
Q: You mentioned that there was already hold-up
happening?
A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q: What time was that when you noticed that
holdup?
A: Around 8:00p.m.
Q: Where was the hold-up going on?
A: In the office, Ma'am.
Q: And how far is that office from where you were
at that time, how many meters?
A: From here to the wall of the court.
Court:
Anyway, I have the reference.
Prosecutor Aragones:
Q: What happened after you saw that there was
[a] hold[-up] going on inside the office of the
Caltex Station?
A: After that me and my companions ran to the
computer shop which is beside the office.
Q: By the way, why were you at the Caltex
gasoline station?
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
A: I was an attendant, Ma'am.
Q: You mentioned that you proceeded to the
computer shop which is beside the office?
A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q: Where did you run, inside or outside the
computer shop?
A: Inside, Ma'am.
Q: Before you went inside, what did you witness
after you saw that there was hold-up inside the
office?
A: I saw that one of our companions, a gun was
pointed to him and also to our employer.
Q: Who was your companion you saw who was
pointed with a gun?
A: Alex Diaz, and Kuya Alex my employer.
Q: Who were those persons who pointed guns to
your co-worker and to your employer?
A: The two accused who were first arrested.
Q: Aside from the two accused, do they have
other companions?
A: Yes, Ma'am.
Q: Who was that person who was also with the
two accused?
A: Paul Pobre.
Q: By the way, who were those two accused you
are referring to according to you were arrested?
A: George Marciales and I cannot remember the
other one.
Q: You mentioned of the name Paul Pobre,
kindly look around if there is any Paul Pobre in
court?
A: Yes, Ma'am, he is here.
Q: Can you point to him?
Page 19 of 38
A: He is that one (pointing)
INTERPRETER;
Witness is pointing to a person wearing yellow
shirt who when asked gave his name as Crisanto
Pepafio.
PROSECUTOR ARAGONES:
Q: Who told you that the name of that person is
Paul Pobre?
A: Kuya Rommel
Q: Who is Kuya Rommel?
A: Brother of my employer Kuya Alex.
Q: Who was apprehended in Laguna?
A: He is the one, Paul Pobre.
Q: What was the participation of that person you
pointed to as being the companion of accused
George Marciales and the other one?
A: He was the one who entered last and who
shot.
COURT:
Q: Who did he shoot?
A: Kuya Alex. 102
The prosecution similarly banks on the narration
and identification made by Perez:
Q: Madam Witness when Alex, the accused you
pointed a while ago, the other accused Marciales
and your boss, all of them were inside the
computer shop, the office of Caltex?
A: At first no[,] ma'am[.] Nagsimula po kasi
andoon po kami sa labas may lalaking nakatayo
po doon sa malapit sa road, sya po yung na[]
identify before as George Marciales. Ang nakita
po lang naming una sa loob apat po sila si boss,
si Alex, that man (Nunez) and the man identified
before as Orly Nabia.
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
Q: Where were you at that time when these four
persons were inside the office?
A: We were sitting in an island near the three
pumps in front of the gas station[,] ma'am.
Q: The office in relation to that island is at the
back, is that correct?
A: Yes[,] ma'am.
Q: There were no customers at that time?
A: None[,] ma'am.
Q: The cashier were (sic) Alex is positioned is
facing you[.] [I]s that correct?
A: Yes[,] ma'am.
Q: So it was the back of the accused that you
saw, is that correct?
A: No[,] ma'am. Sa pinto po kasi yung register
namin e. So andito po si Alex nakatungo po sya
andito po yung accused naka[-]ganito po sya,
nakatutok pos a (sic) kanya. (Witness was
standing while demonstrating the incident
between the accused and Alex inside the office)
very clear po yung itsura nya nung nakita po
namin sya.
Q: How far is that island from the cashier, from
the place you were seated right now?
A: Around 4 to 5 meters[,] ma'am.
Q: Were you able to hear the conversation
considering that distance of 4 to 5 meters?
A: I heard nothing[,] ma'am[,] except when Alex
shouted[,] "Byron tulong, hinoholdap tayo[.]"
Q: Alex was shouting while he was still inside the
office?
A: Yes[,] ma'am.
Q: And it was Byron who ran towards the office?
A: The first one was George Marciales, Byron
only followed him.
Page 20 of 38
Q: Where was George Marciales before he
entered that office?
A: He was near the road[,] ma'am.
Q: But that is not within the gas station's
premises?
A: Bali eto po yung pinaka sementado, andito
sya. (Witness referring to the place where
Marciales is)
Q: When you said the cemented area, you were
referring to the National road?
A: Yes[,] ma'am.
Q: After Byron went inside the said office, were
you able to see what happened inside?
A: Yes[,] ma'am. Nakasuntok po sya ng isa kay
George tapos tinadyakan po siya sa tagiliran
tsaka binaril po sya. Tapos bumagsak napo (sic)
sya.
Q: You were still outside your office at that time?
A: Yes[,] ma'am.
Q: Nobody was with you at that time aside from
your co-employees, only the accused was inside
at that time?
A: Yes[,] ma'am.
Q: You did not run or ask for help considering
that that Caltex is along the National road? A:
Honestly speaking[,] we were not able to say
anything at that time[,]ma'am.
A: After po ng pag shoot sa kanila tumakbo po
kami ni Rona doon sa may computer shop, sa
bahay po nila. Pagkaraan po ng ilang minuto
lumabas kami nakita po naming sila na
nagtatakbuhan together with Kuya Lawrence.
Nakita po naming (sic) sila na tumatakbo, yung
dalawa papuntang Angono, yung isa hindi ko na
po alam kung [saan] nagpunta. Nakita na lang po
naming si boss na gmnagapang asking for help.
The Court of Appeals also favorably cited the
following identification made by Perez:
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
Prosecutor Aragones
Q : Now can you look inside the court and tell us
if there is anybody here who took part in that
incident or involved in that incident?
Relen Perez
A: Him[,] ma'am. (witness pointing to the
accused)
Q: What was the participation of that man whom
you pointed today in that robbery with homicide
incident in Caltex gasoline station?
A: He was the one who was pointing a gun to my
co-employee Alexander Diaz[,] ma'am. 104
V
These identifications are but two (2) of a
multitude of circumstances that the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals should have
considered in determining whether or not the
prosecution has surmounted the threshold of
proof beyond reasonable doubt. Lamentably,
they failed to give due recognition to several
other factors that raise serious doubts on the
soundness of the identification made by
prosecution witnesses Cruz and Perez.
First and most glaringly, Cruz had previously
admitted to not remembering the appearance of
the fourth robber, the same person she would
later claim with supposed certainty as Nuñez. In
the original testimony she made in Marciales and
Nabia's trial in 2002, she admitted to her inability
to identify the fourth robber:
Fiscal Dela Cuesta
Q: Can you describe the other holdupper during
that date and time who were the companions of
George Marciales?
Ronalyn Cruz
A: I cannot describe them[,] ma 'am.
103
Q: Why can you not describe the appearance of
the other holdupper?
Page 21 of 38
A: I cannot remember their appearances, ma
'am.
….
Fiscal Dela Cuesta
Q: At what particular point in time that the 4th
holdupper went inside the office?
Ronalyn Cruz
A: When they were wrestling with each other,
ma'am.
Q: Was that before the shooting or after?
A: Before the shooting[,] ma'am. 105
Second, by the time Cruz and Perez stood at the
witness stand and identified Nuñez, roughly eight
(8) years had passed since the robbery incident.
Third, as the People's Appellee's Brief concedes,
witnesses' identification of Nunez did not come
until after he had been arrested. In fact, it was
not until the occasion of his arraigmnent,  Nuñez
106
was the sole object of identification, in an
identification process that had all but pinned him
as the perpetrator.
VI
Cruz's admission that she could not identify the
fourth robber anathemized any subsequent
identification. Moreover, the prosecution, the
Court of Appeals, and the Regional Trial Court all
failed to account for any intervening occurrence
that explains why and how Cruz shifted from
complete confusion to absolute certainty.
Instead, they merely took her and Perez's
subsequent identification as unassailable and
trustworthy because of a demeanor apparently
indicating certitude.
The conviction of an accused must hinge less on
the certainty displayed by a witness when he or
she has already taken the stand but more on the
certainty he or she displayed and the accuracy
he or she manifested at the initial and original
opportunity to identify the perpetrator. Cruz had
originally admitted to not having an iota of
certainty, only to make an unexplained complete
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
reversal and implicate Nunez as among the
perpetrators. She jeopardized her own credibility.
Cruz's and Perez's predicaments are not aided
by the sheer length of time that had lapsed from
the criminal incident until the time they made
their identifications. By the time Cruz made the
identification, seven (7) years and eight (8)
months had lapsed since June 22, 2000. As for
Perez, eight (8) years and nine (9) months had
already lapsed.
In People v. Rodrigo,   this Court considered a
107
lapse of five and a half (5 1/2) months as
unreliable. Hence, there is greater reason that
this Court must exercise extreme caution for
identifications made many years later. This is
consistent with the healthy sense of incredulity
expected of courts in criminal cases, where the
prosecution is tasked with surmounting the
utmost threshold of proof beyond reasonable
doubt.
It is not disputed that Nunez's identification by
Cruz and Perez was borne only by Nunez's
arrest on July 2, 2006. The prosecution even
acknowledged that his identification was initially
done only to defeat his motion to have the case
against him dismissed.  Evidently, Nuñez's
108
identification before trial proper was made in a
context which had practically induced witnesses
to identify Nuñez as a culprit. Not only was there
no effort to countervail the likelihood of him being
identified, it even seemed that the prosecution
and others that had acted in its behalf such as
tile apprehending officers, had actively designed
a situation where there would be no other
possibility than for him to be identified as the
perpetrator of the crime.
The dubiousness of Nunez's presentation for
identification is further exacerbated by the
circumstances of his apprehension. In a
Manifestation filed with the Court of Appeals, and
which, quite notably, the prosecution never
bothered repudiating, Nunez recounted how his
apprehension appeared to have been borne by
nothing more than the crudeness and sloth of
police officers:
6). That, the truth of the matter as far as the
offended charged against me, I ha[ve] no any
truthfulness (sic) nor having any reality as it was
indeed only a mere strong manufactured,
Page 22 of 38
fabricated and unfounded allegations against me
just to get even with me of my [untolerable]
disciplinary actions of some individuals who had
a personal grudge against me.
….
9). That, with all due respect, I ha[ve] nothing to
do with the offensed (sic) charged and it is not
true that the case was done was charged against
me it is Paul Borbe y Pipano it was wrong person
pick-up by the police officer, because the said
Paul Borbe y [P]ipano was charged of several
crimes, while me my record has no single offense
against me.
10). That, with due respect, there was no
truthfulness that I was the one who committed
the said crime, it was a big mistake because we
have the [same 1 family name they just pick up
the wrong person which is innocent to the said
crime.
11). That, with all due respect, it was not true,
also that it was me who committed the said
crime, it was Paul Borbe y Pipano is the one
because he was habitual in doing crime in our
community, in fact my record is clean never been
committed any crime in my life, I am a concern
citizen who can help our community
well.  (Emphasis supplied)
109
The identification made during Nunez's trial,
where eyewitnesses vaunted certainty, was but
an offshoot of tainted processes that preceded
his trial. This Court finds Nunez's identification
prior to trial bothersome and his subsequent and
contingent identification on the stand more
problematic.
Nunez's identification, therefore, fails to
withstand the rigors of the totality of
circumstances test. First, the witnesses failed to
even give any prior description of him. Second, a
prosecution witness failed to exhibit even the
slightest degree of certainty when originally given
the chance to identify him as the supposed fourth
robber. Third, a significantly long amount of time
had lapsed since the criminal incident; the
original witness' statement that none of his
features were seen as to enable his identification;
and the positive identification made of him when
the case was re-opened. And finally, his
presentation for identification before and during
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
trial was peculiarly, even worrisomely, suggestive
as to practically induce in prosecution witnesses
the belief that he, to the exclusion of any other
person, must have been the supposed fourth
robber.
These deficiencies and the doubts over Cruz's
and Perez's opportunity to peruse the fourth
robber's features and their degree of
attentiveness during the crime clearly show that
this case does not manage to satisfy even one
(1) of the six (6) factors that impel consideration
under the totality of circumstances test.
VII
Recall that both prosecution witnesses Cruz and
Perez acknowledged the extreme stress and
fright that they experienced on the evening of
June 22, 2000.  As both Cruz and Perez recalled,
1âwphi1
it was enough for them to run and seek refuge in
a computer shop. Their tension was so palpable
that even Cruz's and Perez's recollections of
what transpired and of how Nuñez supposedly
participated in the crime are so glaringly different:
According to Cruz, two (2) other persons initiated
the robbery, by pointing guns at Regencia and
Diaz inside the gasoline station's office. It was
supposedly only later, when Diaz shouted, that a
third robber, Marciales, and a fourth robber,
allegedly Nunez, ran in, to assist the first two (2)
robbers. In contrast, Perez claimed that Nuñez
was one (1) of the two (2) robbers who were
initially already in the office. Nunez was then
supposedly pointing a gun at Diaz while the other
robber was pointing a gun at Regencia.
They both claim that after Diaz shouted, the first
two (2) robbers received assistance. Cruz,
however, claims that two (2) additional robbers
came to the aid of the first two (2), while Perez
claims that there was only one (1) additional
robber.
In the scuffle that ensued in the office, Cruz
claims that Marciales shot Dimatulac while
Nunez shot Diaz. For her part, Perez claims that
Marciales was the only one who fired shots at
Regencia, Diaz, and Dimatulac.
Jurisprudence holds that inconsistencies in the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses do not
Page 23 of 38
necessarily jeopardize the prosecution's
case.  This, however, is on1 y true o f mm. or m.
110
consistencies that are ultimately inconsequential
or merely incidental to the overarching narrative
of what crime was committed; how, when, and
where it was committed; and who committed it. "It
is well-settled that inconsistencies on minor
details do not affect credibility as they only refer
to collateral matters which do not touch upon the
commission of the crime itself." 111
The inconsistencies here between Cruz and
Perez are far from trivial. At issue is precisely the
participation of an alleged conspirator whose
name the prosecution did not even know for
proper indictment. Yet, where the prosecution
witnesses cannot agree is also precisely how the
person who now stands accused actually
participated in the commission of the offense.
Their divergences are so glaring that they
demonstrate the prosecution's failure to establish
Nunez's complicity.
VIII
These failings by the prosecution vis-a-vis the
totality of circumstances test are also indicative
of many of the 12 danger signals identified
in People v. Pineda  to be present in this case.
12
On the first, fifth, and twelfth danger signals,
prosecution witness Cruz originally made an
unqualified admission that she could not identify
the fourth robber. On the third danger signal,
there is not even an initial description ·with which
to match or counter-check Nuñez. On the tenth
danger signal, a considerable amount of time had
passed since Cruz and Perez witnessed the
crime and their identification of Nunez. On the
eleventh danger signal, several perpetrators
committed the crime.
IX
Conviction in criminal cases demands proof
beyond reasonable doubt. While this does not
require absolute certainty, it calls for moral
certainty.  It is the degree of proof that appeals to
1âwphi1
a magistrate's conscience:
An accused has in his favor the presumption of
innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees.
Unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable
doubt, he must be acquitted. This reasonable
doubt standard is demanded by the due process
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
clause of the Constitution which protects the
accused from conviction except upon proof
beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute the crime with which he is charged.
The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and
unless it discharges that burden the accused
need not even offer evidence in his behalf, and
he would be entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean
such degree of proof as excluding possibility of
error, produces absolute certainty. Moral
certainty only is required, or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind. The conscience must be satisfied that the
accused is responsible for the offense charged. 113
This Court is unable to come to a conscientious
satisfaction as to Nuñez's guilt. On the contrary,
this Court finds it bothersome that a man of
humble means appears to have been wrongly
implicated, not least because of lackadaisical law
enforcement tactics, and has been made to
suffer the severity and ignominy of protracted
prosecution, intervening detention, and potential
conviction. Here, this Court puts an end to this
travesty of justice. This Court acquits accused-
appellant.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
Decision dated June 26, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04474 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant
Crisente Pepaño Nuñez is ACQUITTED for
reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately
RELEASED from detention, unless confined for
any other lawful cause.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa
City, for immediate implementation. The Director
of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report
to this Court within five (5) days from receipt of
this Decision the action he has taken. A copy
shall also be furnished to the Director General of
Philippine National Police for his information.
Let entry of judgment be issued immediately.
SO ORERED.
FORENSIC FOOTWEAR ANALYSIS
G.R. No. 131736-37      March 11, 2002
Page 24 of 38
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-
appellee,  having arisen from the same incident, the two
vs.
JOEY MANLANSING y AMBROSIO, and
MARIO MANLANSING y AMBROSIO, accused-
appellants.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For automatic review is the joint decision1 dated
May 2, 1997, of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabanatuan City, Branch 27, in Criminal Cases
No. 6150-AF and No. 6151-AF, convicting
appellants of two counts of murder and
sentencing them to suffer the penalty of death for
each count. Appellants were also ordered to pay
the heirs of the victims P250,000 for actual
damages and P500,000 as moral damages for
each count of murder.
Appellants are brothers. For four years they were
tenants of the spouses Magin2 and Jorja Soriano.
In an amended information dated December 30,
1994, appellants were charged with the murder
of Jorja Soriano allegedly committed as follows:
That on or about the 27th day of
December, 1994, in the City of
Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring together and mutually
aiding one another, with intent to kill and
with evident premeditation, treachery and
taking advantage of night time and with
the use of bolo, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault
and use personal violence upon the
person of JORJA SORIANO y Rigor by
hacking the latter, thereby inflicting upon
the latter serious injuries which directly
caused her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
In an amended information also dated December
30, 1994, and similarly worded except for the
victim's name, appellants Joey and Mario
Manlansing were likewise charged with the
murder of Magin Soriano.4
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
Inasmuch as the two cases were interrelated,
cases were consolidated.
On arraignment, Joey Manlansing pleaded not
guilty to both charges, while Mario Manlansing
pleaded guilty to two counts of murder. After they
waived pre-trial, both cases were heard on the
merits.
For the prosecution, SPO2 CASTILLONES of the
Philippine National Police (PNP), testified that at
around 8:00 A.M. on December 28, 1994, a
concerned citizen informed the Cabanatuan City
Police Station of an alleged killing in a house at
Bitas, Cabanatuan City. Immediately, a team
composed of P/Insp. Bienvenido Padua, SPO2
Castillones, and SPO1 Edgardo Pangilinan went
to the place.5 When they arrived at the Soriano
residence, they spotted bloodstains on the
ceiling. Before they entered the house, they
waited for Nestor Villa of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) who was tasked to take
fingerprints at the crime scene.6 In the stockroom
on the first floor, they found the lifeless body of
70-year-old Magin in a pool of blood.7 There were
several wounds on his hands and arms, as well
as cuts on his head. They took pictures of the
corpse.8 Upstairs, they found the corpse of his
68-year-old spouse, Jorja, on the floor, her throat
slit and her neck hacked.9 Her throat was stuffed
with a small towel and bloodstains covered her
stomach.10 The investigators also took photos of
the deceased. When they turned her body over,
they found a six-inch bloodstained knife, with the
initials "JF" carved in the handle.11 The police
made rough sketches12 and took more
photographs,  while Villa lifted fingerprints from
13
the scene and the knife.14 These were sent to the
NBI office in Manila. The cadavers were brought
to the City Health Office for autopsy.
DR. JUN CONCEPCION, medical officer of
Cabanatuan City, who autopsied the bodies,
testified that Magin's death was due to
"hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple
hacking wounds on the head and nape."15 Jorja's
death was the result of "hypovolemic shock
secondary to hacking wound on the neck, right
side."16 They died between 10:00 P.M. on
December 27, 1994 to 3:00 A.M. of December
28, 1994. Dr. Concepcion testified that from the
nature of the injuries sustained, the wounds
could have been inflicted by more than one
Page 25 of 38
person, since two different weapons were
used.17 He declared that the weapon used to
inflict the hacking wounds was not pointed, while
the stab wounds were caused by a sharp and
pointed instrument.18
Two carpenters constructing a chapel for the
Sorianos said that appellants frequented the
house of the victims even at night. They reported
seeing appellants enter the Sorianos' house on
the night of December 27, 1994. Thus, the police
ordered a manhunt for the Manlansing brothers.
On December 28, 1994, appellant Joey
Manlansing was arrested in Sta. Clara, Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija and brought back to Cabanatuan
City for questioning. During custodial
investigation, Atty. Edgardo Villarin, the city legal
officer, advised him not to talk.19 Nevertheless, he
named his brother, Mario, as the killer. He denied
participation in the killing, but he admitted boxing
Jorja in the face to prevent her from shouting,
while Mario was assaulting her husband.20
SPO3 CAMPOS declared that on December 29,
1994, the police were tipped that appellant Mario
Manlansing was hiding in Paniqui, Tarlac.
Accompanied by Enrique Manlansing, appellants'
father, they went to Paniqui and apprehended
Mario.21 During the custodial investigation,
assisted by counsel, he confessed.22 He said he
hid the bolo at his sister-in-law's house in Sta.
Clara, Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.23 It was recovered
and sent to the NBI in Manila for examination.
NBI forensic chemist ALICIA LIBERATO testified
that she examined a bolo and a knife and found
human bloodstains on them.24
On December 30, 1994, a re-enactment of the
crime was done at the crime scene. Mario said
that after he killed the spouses, he and Joey
ransacked bags in the house but found neither
money nor jewelry. He told Joey to change his
clothes so they could go. Mario then got some
rags and tried to clean up the place. He went to
the bathroom downstairs to wash the bolo and
the rags.1âwphi1.nêt
NBI fingerprint expert NESTOR VILLA took the
fingerprints from the crime scene and sent them
to the office in Manila for examination.
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
BAYANI25 PALAD, a dactyloscopy expert,
testified that a comparison of the prints from the
crime scene showed that two prints matched the
left middle and ring fingerprints of appellant Joey
Manlansing.26
For the defense, MARIO MANLANSING claimed
he alone was responsible for the deaths. In open
court, Mario affirmed his confession and insisted
that his brother had nothing to do with the
deaths.27 He claimed that Joey woke up only after
he killed Magin28 and that Joey tried to
unsuccessfully stop him from attacking Jorja. He
said he killed the couple out of anger after Jorja
told him that he was going to be ejected as a
tenant. Mario said Joey knew nothing of his
motive.29
On the stand, appellant JOEY MANLANSING
affirmed his sworn statement naming Mario as
the person solely responsible for killing the
spouses. He denied any participation in it,30 but
admitted hitting Jorja because she was shouting
and he did not want his brother to hear her, lest
he attack her too.31
The defense also presented ENRIQUE
MANLANSING, the father of the appellants. He
testified that he fetched Mario from Paniqui,
Tarlac, in order to surrender him to the
authorities.32
Finally, the prosecution presented
a balut vendor, MARIO BARTOLOME, as its
rebuttal witness. He testified that on the night of
the killings, he was plying his trade at "Cynthia's
Eatery," right across the Sorianos' residence. At
around 11:00 P.M. he offered his wares to two
persons who came out of the Sorianos' house.
He noticed that both had bloodied shirts. When
he inquired about the bloodstains, they answered
they had just killed a pig and threatened he could
be next. Scared, he shut up. The following day,
he heard about the killings on the radio but did
not inform the police about his encounter with the
appellants. It was only after his conscience
bothered him that he reported it to the police.33
After trial, appellants were convicted, thus:
WHEREFORE, this Court holds that the
guilt of both accused had been proven
beyond reasonable doubt and therefore
sentences them (to):
Page 26 of 38
 1) Death in Criminal Case No. 6150;
2) Death in Criminal Case No. 6151;
3) In both cases to pay the heirs of the
deceased:
a) P250,000.00 by way of funeral and
other expenses and actual damages.
b) P500,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.34
Hence, this automatic review. Appellants allege
in their brief that the trial court committed the
following errors:
I given and was reiterated by him during trial, the
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT
JOEY MANLANSING IN CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 6150-AF AND 6151-AF
DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT
WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED
IN APPRECIATING THE QUALIFYING
AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF ABUSE OF
SUPERIOR STRENGTH AND TAKING
ADVANTAGE OF NIGHTTIME.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED
IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY.
V different types of weapons, namely, a bolo and a
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED
IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
UPON ACCUSED-APPELLANTS MARIO
MANLANSING AND JOEY
MANLANSING.
Two principal issues are for resolution: (1) Did
the trial court err in convicting both appellants
Mario Manlansing and Joey Manlansing for
alleged conspiracy to kill the Sorianos? (2) Did
the trial court err in imposing the death penalty
upon appellants?On the first issue, appellants
contend that since there were no other
witnesses, nothing can be clearer than the
confession of appellant Mario Manlansing that he
alone killed the couple and that his brother Joey
had nothing to do with the incident. They submit
that a confession if freely and voluntarily given is
deserving of the highest credit. Inasmuch as
Mario's confession was freely and voluntarily
lower court erred in not giving credit to said
confession.
Appellants also aver that the trial court likewise
erred in finding Joey guilty of conspiring with
Mario notwithstanding Mario's categorical
confession that Joey had no participation in the
killings. Appellants contend that the mere fact
that they are siblings does not mean that Mario's
testimony was not credible. According to
appellants, an accused in a criminal case may
competently testify for or against any of his co-
accused.
For the appellee, the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) avers that the guilt of appellant
Joey Manlansing as a conspirator has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt. First, he
admitted boxing Jorja in the face. However, he
explained that he only did this out of fear that
Mario might hear her shout and attack her. But,
as stressed by the OSG, the medico-legal
evidence contradicts Joey's statement that he
boxed Jorja only once. The autopsy report
showed that Jorja sustained hematoma on her
face and chest, an indication that she was struck
several times.Second, the city medical officer, Dr.
Concepcion, testified that from the nature and
types of wounds found on the bodies of the
victims, one person alone could not have inflicted
the fatal injuries. The police recovered two
knife. Third, a comparison of the fingerprints
taken from the crime scene and Joey's standard
fingerprints showed that two of his fingerprints
Page 27 of 38
were recovered from the crime
scene. Fourth,Mario admitted during the re-
enactment of the incident that he and Joey
ransacked the place looking for cash and
jewelry. Fifth, rebuttal witness Mario Bartolome
testified that he saw appellants step out of the
Sorianos' house on the night of the killings
wearing bloodstained shirts. Finally, Joey's flight
from Cabanatuan City belies his innocence
regarding the killing of the Sorianos. Flight is an
indication of guilt, for a truly innocent person
would normally stand his ground, and grasp the
first opportunity to defend himself and clear his
name.
While giving credence to the confession of Mario
Manlansing that he killed the couple, the trial
court disbelieved appellant's claim that he alone
did both killings and that Joey had no
participation therein. Instead, it relied on a chain
of circumstances to show that appellants
conspired to kill the Sorianos, and committed the
crimes pursuant to that conspiracy.
The conviction of Joey Manlansing is thus
anchored on the premise that there was
conspiracy between the brothers. Conspiracy
exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a crime
and decide to commit it.35 Conspiracy does not
require a previous plan or agreement to commit
an assault. It is sufficient that at the time of the
aggression all the accused manifested by their
acts a common intent or desire to
attack.36Jurisprudence tells us consistently that
the conduct of the accused before, during, and
after the commission of the crime may be
considered to show an extant conspiracy.37 The
testimonial and physical evidence on record
reveals that Joey's conduct during and after the
attack of his brother on the spouses was
conspiratorial. Most significant of these pieces of
evidence is the finding of Dr. Concepcion, that
from the depth and nature of the victims' wounds,
the weapon used for hacking could not be the
same as the one used for stabbing. The
discovery of the two weapons, a bolo recovered
in Tarlac where Mario hid and which he admitted
was his, and a knife recovered underneath
Magin's corpse, confirms the finding that the
wounds were inflicted by two different weapons.
If indeed, as Mario confessed, he did the killings
single-handedly, he would then be using a bolo
and a knife either simultaneously, alternatively, or
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
successively in killing Magin. As Dr. Concepcion
opined, simultaneously hacking and stabbing by
using a long weapon and another short bladed
weapon was impossible. That Mario would use
both the bolo and the knife alternatively or
successively is unlikely to be true and contrary to
the nature of reality. The logical conclusion would
then be that, considering the two weapons, there
were at least two attackers, each using one
deadly instrument.
There are other reasons for us to discount the
story of the brothers that only Mario single-
handedly killed the spouses. For one, we find
inconsistencies in their testimonies. In Joey's
sworn statement, which he executed in front of
witnesses and in the presence of counsel, he
said he punched Jorja , ". . . para walang
makarinig . . . ."38 In his testimony in court he
said, "Because she might be heard by my brother
and he might attack her."39 Again, Mario said that
Joey tried to stop him from hurting Jorja and
while trying to grapple the bolo from him, Joey
got wounded.40 Yet, Joey in his sworn statement
does not mention getting wounded and said that
he was merely elbowed by his brother when he
tried to stop the latter from harming Jorja.41 And,
in his testimony in open court, he merely said
Mario hurled insulting words at him as they
struggled over the bolo.42 He does not say
anything about being wounded. A major variation
in Joey's statements that gives his reason for
assaulting a victim and an omission of an
important detail, i.e. his being wounded, together
cast doubt on Mario's disavowal that Joey did not
participate in the killings. His story was obviously
an afterthought to absolve his younger sibling.
Testimonies to be believed must not only come
from the mouth of credible witnesses but should
by themselves be credible, reasonable and in
accord with human experience.43
In addition, the brothers' footprints and
fingerprints were lifted from the crime scene.
Before they fled they both tried to wipe out traces
of their foot and handprints. Both admitted that
they ransacked the place for valuables after the
spouses were slain. Lastly, on their way out of
the compound, a witness whom they threatened
to be butchered like a hog, saw them with their
shirts bloodstained.
All the foregoing details presented as evidence
by the prosecution more than suffices to show
Page 28 of 38
that the brothers were united and had cooperated
in a conspiracy to attack the spouses. In a
conspiracy, the act of one conspirator is the act
of the other co-conspirator. Thus, Joey is equally
responsible as his brother, Mario for the death of
the Sorianos.
Mario and Joey were convicted on the basis of
Mario's sworn statements confessing to the
killing of the spouses, the testimonies of the
witnesses for the prosecution, as well as on
circumstantial evidence addressed before the
trial court. To sustain a conviction on
circumstantial evidence, the following requisites
must concur: (1) there is more than one
circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.[44] The circumstances themselves, taken
together, should point to overt acts of the
accused that would logically point to the
conclusion, and no other, that the accused is
guilty of the crime charged and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent.45
We agree with the trial court and the OSG that
the chain of circumstances, all of which have
already been discussed, can only lead to the
conclusion that Joey and Mario cooperated to
commit the killings. To summarize, they are: (1)
the medico-legal officer's testimony that two
different bladed weapons were used, (2) his
finding that one person alone could not have
inflicted the wounds simultaneously, (3) the
recovery of two distinct bladed weapons, (4)
Joey's admission that he boxed Jorja (4) both
appellants' admission that they searched the
victims' belongings for cash and valuables, (5)
the presence of Joey's fingerprints at the scene
of the crime, and (6) the testimony of
the balut vendor that he saw the brothers with
bloodstained shirts leaving the locus
criminis together. Thus, we find no error
committed by the trial court in holding that both
appellants had conspired and are guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of killing Magin and Jorja
Soriano.
However, we are unable to agree now with the
trial court that the offenses committed by
appellants could be qualified as murder. They are
guilty only of double homicide. Hence, it is
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
improper now to impose the death penalty on
each of them.
A review of the informations filed against
appellants, in relation to prevailing law and
jurisprudence as well as the newly adopted
revisions of the Rules of Court favorable to the
accused will show that the crimes of the brothers
could not be qualified as murder. Only recently
in People vs. Gario Alba alias "Mario Alba, G.R.
No. 130523, promulgated January 29, 2002, we
ruled that pursuant to Sections 8 and 9 of Rule
110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure46 which took effect on December 1,
2000, the information should state not only the
designation of the offense and the acts and
omissions constituting it but shall also specify its
qualifying and aggravating circumstances.47 We
noted in Gario Alba, that although the
circumstance of treachery was stated in the
information, it was not alleged with specificity as
qualifying the killing to murder. Since the
information in Gario Alba, failed to specify
treachery as a circumstance qualifying the killing
to murder, treachery was considered only a
generic aggravating circumstance, hence, we
said that the crime committed in Gario Alba was
homicide and not murder.
So is it with the present case. None of the
aggravating circumstances were alleged in the
informations nor in the amended informations
with specificity as a qualifying circumstance
elevating either killing to murder. Thus,
conformably with Gario Alba, the offenses
committed by appellants only constitute two
counts of homicide and not murder. Since the
penalty for homicide under 249 of the Revised
Penal Code is reclusion temporal, it is incorrect
to sentence both appellants to death.
In evaluating the circumstances that qualified the
crimes to murder, the trial court considered,
aside from evident premeditation, treachery,
nighttime, and use of a deadly weapon, the
aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior
strength and dwelling.
We note that abuse of superior strength and
dwelling were not alleged in the informations. In
accordance then with Section 8 of Rule 110 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, abuse
of superior strength and dwelling may not be
appreciated to convict the brothers. Further,
Page 29 of 38
should there be a finding of treachery, then
abuse of superior strength is absorbed by the
former. We are thus left to review only the
allegation that the aggravating circumstances of
evident premeditation, treachery, and nocturnity
were present in the commission of the crimes.
At the outset, we shall discount nocturnity as an
aggravating circumstance, since in this case, the
darkness of the night was not purposely sought
by the offenders to facilitate the commission of
the crime nor to ensure its execution with
impunity.
The element of evident premeditation is
manifested by the planning and preparation
undertaken by the offender prior to the
commission of the crime.48 It is not presumed
from the mere lapse of time49 nor can it be
deduced from sheer speculation.50 An intangible
matter, evident premeditation is exhibited from
these circumstances --- (1) the time when the
offender has appeared determined to commit the
crime; (2) the act evidently indicating that the
offender has clung to his determination; (3)
sufficient lapse of time between the
determination to commit the crime and the
execution thereof during which the offender could
have reflected upon the consequences of his
act.51 In the present case, all three circumstances
are present and clear from the testimony alone of
Mario. The TSN reads:
Q:      That conversation about the
seedling, how long did it take?
A:      Only about fifteen minutes also, and
then they went upstairs.
Q:      How long did you stay there after
they left you watching the TV?
A:      When they went up, my brother
Joey also retired for the night and I
continued watching the TV and I turned off
the TV at round 10:00 o'clock.
Q:      After turning off the TV, what else
did you do?
A:      And then, I planned the method by
which I could kill.
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
Q:      Sino? (Literally: "Who?")
Atty. Jackie A. Garcia:
Pinlano mo bang patayin sila?
(Literally: "Did you plan to kill
them?")
A:      I did not plan. It was only after
hearing the words of Mrs. Soriano that
she will have us killed.
Fiscal Amis:
When you switch off the TV at
10:00 o'clock, how long did you
stay here in the sala before you
went up?
A:      After switching off the TV, I stayed
for ten minutes here and planning how to
have them out of their room and I thought
of the telephone.
Q:      After deciding about the method by
which you can have them out of the room,
what did you do?
A:      I got the bolo from my bag which
was then placed on a chair. (witness
pointing to a chair beside the door) I went
upstairs and I placed it beside the laundry
basket.
Q:      What time was that?
Atty. Jackie A. Garcia:
May I request of clarification.
Maybe the time element be
clarified as to how long from the
time to turn the TV off?
Fiscal Amis:
7:15 when they brought the matter
up, saka lang sila na-scold and
then again, they watched the TV
until 10:00 o'clock.
Q:      Do you have a watch?
A:      None, Ma'am.
Page 30 of 38
 Q:      What time approximately do you
think was it when you went upstairs?
A:      It took me ten minutes, after 10:00
o'clock when I stayed in sala and it took
me around five minutes to position the
bolo and the telephone before I knock at
their door.
Q:      How did you know that it was
already 10:00 o'clock when you switched
off the TV?
A:      I was watching and there was no
clock there. (witness pointing to the TV)
Q:      You said that you intended to kill
the victim with the use of bolo. Was that
reason why you brought the bolo with
you?
A:      I have no intention to use the bolo to
kill them initially, it was only that I thought
of the bolo when we were scolded.
Q:      Was Majen Soriano able to shout
for help?
A:      Only at the time when I first hacked
him.
Q:      Was he still able to shout for help
again?
A:      No more.
Q:      When he fell down the stairs, was
he able to shout for help?
A:      He moaned when he fell down.52
Earlier, during the re-enactment, Mario testified,
Q:      What did you do when you went
upstairs?
A:      The phone was ringing and I told
them that there was somebody calling, so
I knocked. When I knocked, the door was
opened by the old man who came out of
the room.
Q:      Who was that old man?
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
A:      Majen.
Q:      You are referring to Majen Soriano?
A:      Yes, Ma'am.
Q:      When he went out of the room, what
happened?
A:      He went by the telephone which is
near the staircase and he told me that
there's nobody in the telephone.
Fiscal Ignacio E. Domingo:
"Talaga bang nagriring ang
telepono? (Literally: "Was the
telephone ringing really?")
A:      The telephone was not really
ringing. It was just my alibi.
Fiscal Amis:
At this juncture, PO3 Enrico Campose is
posing as the old man Majen Soriano.
PO2 Soriano is positioning himself upon
instruction of the respondent Mario
Manlansing beside a small table where
the telephone was supposedly stationed.
Q:      Then what happened?
A:      I gave a telephone to Majen Soriano
and then I took two steps backward and I
got the bolo which was placed beside the
laundry basket. When he saw that I was
holding a bolo, he sprang from his chair
and I immediately hacked him hitting his
head and I saw blood from his head, then
he made several steps and again, I
hacked his head and he fell down the
stairs.
Q:      Where did you get the bolo?
A:      I placed it there.
Q:      When did you place it there?
A:      When I planned to kill him and
before I knock at their door, I placed the
bolo beside the laundry basket. When he
Page 31 of 38
 fell down the stairs, I followed him there.
(witness pointing to the place where the
body was then lying down) Majen rolled
down the stairs and his head was near the
refrigerator (which is located at the bottom
of the stairs). (witness positioning himself
with his left foot on the first step and the
right foot on the second step and
demonstrating that he again hacked the
victim Majen Soriano)
Q:      Saan-saan tinamaan ang victim?
(Literally: "Where was the victim hit?")
A:      I hacked the old man on his head
and then I went down and dragged him.
Q:      Saan mo hinawakan? (Literally:
Where did you hold him?")
A:      I placed my handkerchief in his
mouth and dragged him by his mouth
toward the room while my other hand was
holding his clothes. I dragged him inside
the room and with the handkerchief
stuffed in his mouth was boiling with blood
("kumukulo ng dugo").
Q:      Was he still alive when you dragged
inside the room?
A:      "Buhay siya at nanginginig pa siya
at doon na siya nalagutan ng
hininga."53 (Literally: "He was alive and still
shaking and only then did his breathing
stop.") (Underscoring ours.)
Based on these testimonies on record, we have
no hesitation in concluding that there was evident
premeditation in the commission of the crimes.
Likewise, treachery therein attendant was duly
proved.
The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack by an aggressor on an
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any
real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring
its commission without any risk to the aggressor,
without the slightest provocation on the victim's
part.54 While mere suddenness of attack does not
automatically mean treachery,55 in these cases
the narration of events before and during the
commission of the attacks clearly indicate the
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
presence of treachery. Appellants were allowed
inside the house of the couple. They were even
given supper after which the elderly couple went
upstairs to their bedroom. Appellants remained
downstairs and continued watching television. As
the OSG correctly points out, the victims in
extending their hospitality to their tenants, had
neither hint nor suspicion of the fate that Mario
had in store for them. When Mario lured Magin to
the phone, the latter was unaware he would be
attacked.
In Jorja's case, Joey claims he had boxed Jorja
before Mario hacked her to death. But according
to Mario, she was asleep when he entered the
bedroom. He said she shouted, but "not loud",
before he stuffed her mouth with a towel and
slashed her neck. The attack on Jorja then was
also without warning and was treacherous.
We must reiterate at this juncture, however, that
the evident premeditation and the treachery in
the present cases may only be considered as
generic aggravating circumstances.
Coming now to the consideration of mitigating
circumstances in the commission of the offense,
Mario contends that the trial court failed to take
into account the mitigating circumstances of his
voluntary surrender and plea of guilty.
For voluntary surrender to be a mitigating
circumstance, the following must concur: (1) the
offender has not actually been arrested; (2) the
offender surrendered himself to a person in
authority; and (3) the surrender was
voluntary.56Recall that after the killings, Mario
went into hiding in Paniqui, Tarlac and only
surrendered after the Cabanatuan City police
were tipped on his whereabouts and sent a team
to arrest him. He did not spare the authorities the
trouble and expense necessary to search and
capture him. Clearly, Mario's surrender was
neither spontaneous nor voluntary. Thus, the
OSG was correct when it said that Mario did not
voluntarily surrender.
However, the trial court did err when it failed to
appreciate Mario's plea of guilty to the two
charges against him. Under Article 13 (7)57 of the
Code, a plea of guilty on arraignment is a
mitigating circumstance.1âwphi1.nêt
Page 32 of 38
Insofar as Joey is concerned, there was no
voluntary surrender and no voluntary plea of
guilt, thus no circumstance is available to him to
mitigate his crime.
The rule is that when both mitigating and
aggravating circumstances attend the
commission of the crime, the court shall
reasonably allow them to offset one another in
consideration of their number and importance, for
the purpose of applying the penalty.58
In the case of Mario, the aggravating
circumstance of evident premeditation is offset by
his spontaneous and voluntary admission of guilt.
Thus, there is only treachery, treated as a
generic aggravating circumstance, left to
consider against him. Applying Article 64, par.
3,59 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty
imposable is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period. Further applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum penalty is
imprisonment within the range of prision
mayor as minimum and the maximum of
reclusion temporal as maximum.
In Joey's case, no mitigating circumstance could
be appreciated in his favor for unlike his brother
he did not plead guilty. Two generic aggravating
circumstances, evident premeditation and
treachery, are thus to be considered against him.
Applying Article 64, par. 6, of the Revised Penal
Code,60 and the Indeterminate Sentence Law
Joey shall serve the same indeterminate
sentence as Mario.
A final word on damages. The trial court awarded
the surviving heirs of the victims P250,000 by
way of funeral and other expenses and as actual
damages. In these cases, the prosecution failed
to present any receipts to substantiate their
claims for expenses allegedly incurred. To be
entitled to such damages, it is necessary to prove
the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree
of certainty, premised upon competent proof and
on the best evidence available to the injured
party.61 However, as the heirs of the victims did
actually incur funeral expenses, we are justified
in awarding P10,000 not for purposes of
indemnification, but by way of temperate
damages, in each case.62
We also find the award of P500,000 in moral
damages excessive. Moral damages are not
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
meant to enrich an injured party. In line with
prevailing jurisprudence,63 the award in each
case should be reduced to P50,000. In addition,
P50,000 as civil indemnity in each of these cases
is mandatory and is granted to the heirs of the
victims without need of further proof other than
the commission of the crime.64
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 27 in Cabanatuan City in the
consolidated cases, Criminal Case No. 6150-AF
and Criminal Case No. 6151-AF, finding both
Joey Manlansing and Mario Manlansing, guilty of
murder beyond reasonable doubt for the death of
both Magin Soriano and Jorja Soriano, is
hereby MODIFIED. Appellants Mario Manlansing
and Joey Manlansing are each
declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
two counts of HOMICIDE defined in Article 249 of
the Revised Penal Code. Each appellant is
sentenced to suffer imprisonment for an indefinite
period of 17 years, and 4 months as minimum to
twenty (20) years as maximum for each count of
homicide, with accessory penalties provided by
law. Further, each appellant is ORDERED to pay
the heirs of each victim P50,000 as civil
indemnity, P50,000 as moral damages, and
P10,000 as temperate damages. Costs de
officio.
SO ORDERED.
FINGER PRINT ANALYSIS
G.R. No. L-38434         December 23, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
MARCIANO MEDINA y DIOKNO
(alias MARIANO MEDINA, alias ALEJANDRO
DOLA), defendant-appellant.
Juan R. Chuidian for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for
appellee.
Page 33 of 38
VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of Judge
Anacleto Diaz in the Court of First Instance of
Manila, finding the defendant guilty of robbery in
an inhabited house and of being a habitual
delinquent, and sentencing him to suffer a
principal penalty of ten years and one day
of prision mayor and additional penalty of ten
years of prision mayorbecause of being four
times a recidivist, to indemnify James C.
Rockwell in the sum of P320, and to pay the
costs.
Appellant's attorney makes the following
assignments of error:
1. The trial court erred in finding and
concluding that the finger prints which
were found impressed on the small silver
box of the complainant James C.
Rockwell were identical to the fingerprints
of the accused.
2. The trial court erred in findings and
concluding that it was the accused-
appellant who took away the said small
silver box from the room of Mrs. Rockwell
and the valuables worth P320 belonging
to James C. Rockwell.
3. The trial court erred in finding and
concluding that the accused-appellant is
guilty of the crime of robbery as defined in
article 299, No. 3 of the Revised Penal
Code for which the trial court sentenced
the accused to imprisonment of ten years
and one day plus an additional
imprisonment of ten years of prision
mayor as recidivist and to indemnify the
said James C. Rockwell in the amount of
P320 and to pay the cost of the action.
The defendant was tried on a plea of not guilty to
the following information:
The undersigned accuses Marciano
Medina y Diokno alias Mariano
Medina alias Alejandro Dola of the crime
of robbery in an inhabited house,
committed as follows:
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
That on or about the 12th day of February,
1932, during the nighttime which was
purposely sought, in the municipality of
Pasay, Province of Rizal, Philippine
Islands, within two and one-half miles
from the limits of the City of Manila,
Philippine Islands and within the
jurisdiction of this court, the said Marciano
Medina y Diokno alias Mariano
Medina alias Alejandro Dola did then and
there willfully , unlawfully, and feloniously,
and with intent of gain, break into and
enter through the window by tearing the
wire screen thereof, an opening not
intended for entrance or egress, of house
No. 1155 F.B. Harrison Street, in said
municipality of Pasay, the dwelling house
of James C. Rockwell, and, once inside
said premises, take steal, and carry away
without the consent of the owner thereof
the following personal property, to wit:
One (1) watch "Howard", gold, with an o
monogram containing the initials "JCR" valu
One(1) "Green" wrist watch with a leather
valued at
Total
belongings to James C. Rockwell, to the
damage and prejudice of the said owner
thereof in the afore-mentioned sum of
P320, Philippine currency.
That, at that time of the commission of this
offense, the said accused Marciano
Medina y Diokno aliasMariano
Medina alias Alejandro Dola has already
been convicted three (3) times of the
crime of theft by virtue of final judgments
rendered by competent courts and is,
therefore, a habitual delinquent, his last
date of conviction being on October 23,
1924 and his date of release being on
October 26, 1927.
At the trial the defendant admitted that Mr.
Rockwell's house was robbed on the night of
February 12, 1932, as alleged in the information,
but denied that he was the author of the crime;
admitted that a silver box, which had been taken
from the room of Mrs. Rockwell on the night of
the robbery, was found in the garden the next
Page 34 of 38
morning, and that when it was examined in the
Intelligence Division of the Constabulary it
showed a finger print on the top. The defendant
further admitted the competency of the witness,
Agripino Ruiz, as a finger print expert; and the
lastly the defendant admitted that he had been
convicted three times of theft, his last conviction
being on October 23, 1924 and his release on
October 26, 1927.
It appears from the evidence that while Agripino
Ruiz, a Constabulary agent and finger print
expert, was investigating the robbery in question
he went to see the accused, who was under
arrest for breaking into the house of Capt.
Davidson in Parañaque. Ruiz took the finger
prints of the accused, and found when he
compared them with his records that the accused
had served three terms in Bilibid prison theft.
Ruiz then compared a photograph of the
impression of the middle finger of defendant's
right hand with a photograph of the finger print on
the top of the silver box stolen from the bedroom
of Mrs. Rockwell, and found that they coincided
in ten points. He concluded that the two
impressions were from the same person, and
that the finger print on the box was that of the
defendant.
The defense of the accused was an alibi. He
asserted that on the night of the robbery in
question he was at home with a sore foot. This
contention of the defendant rests on his
uncorroborated testimony.
It is now well settled that evidence as to the
correspondence of finger prints is admissible for
the purpose of proving identity (Moon vs. State,
Arizona Supreme Court, June 7, 1921, 198 Pac.,
288; 16 A.L.R., 362, and the authorities there
cited). The history of the finger print system of
identification is stated in one of the leading
cases, People vs. Sallow (165 N.Y. Supp., 915,
918), as follows:
Scientific authority declares that finger
prints are reliable as a means of
identification. (10 Ency. Brit. [11th ed.],
376.) The first recorded finger prints were
used as a manual seal, to give a personal
mark of authenticity to documents. Such
prints are found in the Assyrian clay
tablets in the British Museum. Finger
prints were first used to record the identity
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
of individuals officially by Sir William
Herschel, in Bengal, to check forgeries by
natives in India in 1858. (C. Ainsworth
Mitchell, in "Science and the Criminal"
1911, p. 51.) Finger print records have
been constantly used as a basis of
information for the courts since Sir Francis
Galton proved that the papillay ridges
which cover the inner surface of the hands
and the soles of the feet form patterns, the
main details of which remain the same
from the sixth month of the embryonic
period until decomposition sets in after
death, and Sir Edward Henry, the head of
the Metropolitan Police Force of London,
formulated a practical system of
classification, subsequently simplified by
an Argentine named Vucetich. The
system has been in general use in the
criminal courts in England since 1891. It is
claimed that by means of finger prints the
metropolitan police force of London during
the 13 years from 1901 to 1914 have
made over 103,000 identifications, and
the Magistrates' Court of New York City
during the 4 years from 1911 to 1915
have made 31,000 identifications, without
error. (Report of Alfred H. Hart,
Supervisor, Fingerprint Bureau, Ann.
Rep., N.Y. City Magistrates' Courts,
1915.) Their value has been recognized
by banks and other corporations, passport
bureaus of foreign governments, and civil
service commissions as a certain
protection against impersonation.
It was held in 1909 by the Lord Chief
Justice of England that the court may
accept the evidence of finger prints,
though it be the sole ground of
identification. (Castleton's Case, 3 Crim.
App. C., 74.)
In the case at bar the principal contentions of
appellant's attorney are that the identification was
incomplete and unreliable because the imprint of
only one finger was found on the box, and that
was blurred, and could not served as a basis of
comparison. There is a little merit in this
argument. Although a portion of the impression
on the box was somewhat blurred, it did not
seriously interfere with the comparison of the two
finger prints. It would of course have been more
satisfactory for the purpose of comparison if
Page 35 of 38
there had been an impression of all the fingers of
the thief on the box, but we are not justified in
rejecting the evidence of record merely because
it might be more complete.
Referring to the care necessary in photographing
accidental imprints, Wentworth and Wilder in
their work, "Personal Identification" (1932), say
that these imprints at best will be poor; that one
will never find an accidental imprint that is
absolutely perfect; that it is seldom, indeed, that
a very good one is found (p.260).
The only important question is whether or not the
evidence identifies the accused beyond a
reasonable doubt as the person whose finger
print appears on the box, because the box was
taken from the bedroom of Mrs. Rockwell on the
night of the robbery, and the finger print thereon,
if that of the accused, could have been made
only on the occasion when the robbery was
committed.
It might be here stated that the finger prints of the
persons living in Mr. Rockwell's house were
taken, but that they did not correspond to the
impression in question.
A photograph showing an enlargement of the
finger print found on the box was marked at the
trial Exhibit A. Further enlargements of it are
shown in Exhibits A-1 and  called upon to make eccentric turns, and to fill up
A-2. Exhibit B is an enlargement of a photograph
of the impression of the middle finger of
defendant's right hand, taken while he was a
prisoner in Bilibid.
When asked which were the ten points of
agreement between the two impressions in
question, the finger print expert replied that there
were three classes of characteristics, namely: the
endings of the ridges, the bifurcation of the
ridges, and the core. The ten points of identity,
which were marked on the photographs, are as
follows:
1. Upward end of a
ridge,
2. Core,
3. Both ends of a short ridge,
4. Both ends of a short ridge,
5. Downward end of a ridge,
6. Upward end of a ridge,
7. Bifurcation,
8. Upward end of a ridge,
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
9. Upward end of a ridge,
10. Bifurcation.
The witness stated that in his opinion eight
characteristics are sufficient to identify a person.
According to Frederick Kuhn of the Bureau of
Criminal Identification, Police Department of the
City of New York, in the "Finger Print Instructor",
p.12, "characteristics" are the peculiarities of the
ridges, such as abrupt endings, bifurcations, the
formation of what is termed an island, short ridge
lines, ridge dots, some peculiarity as to the
information of the delta or core; in fact any
peculiarity out of the ordinary may be considered
a characteristic point, and serve as a positive
means of identification.
The Galton details, the ends, forks, islands and
so on, are so numerous and so variable that
even in a small area a duplication is impossible;
so far as we know all the infinite possibilities in
the formation of the ridges are widely open in
each individual case, so that it is quite safe to say
that no two people in the world can have, even
over a small area, the same set of details,
similarly related to the individual units; the only
possible confusion might result from an area so
small and so featureless as to show nothing but
complete and parallel ridges, and without details,
and could never occur in connection with the
formation of a pattern, where the ridges are
spaces of irregular shape (Wentworth & Wilder,
p. 126).
Explaining the ten points of identity, the expert
witness in the case at bar testified that he found
four endings of ascending ridges in Exhibit B that
corresponded exactly to those of Exhibit A; that
as to the number and location with respect to the
core, which he marked 2 in both photographs, he
found that they agreed; that he found in Exhibit B
two bifurcations or forks that corresponded
exactly to those in Exhibit A as to number and
location; that he found in Exhibit B a short ridge,
the two ends of which he marked 3 and 4, that
was identical with the corresponding short ridge
in Exhibit A, which he also marked 3 and 4.
The attorney for the appellant calls attention to
the fact that there was the impression of another
finger on the that was not identified. That is true,
but as it was the impression of only a small part
of the ball of a finger and was blurred, the expert
Page 36 of 38
did not make any particular study of it. It may
have been made by the person who picked up
the box in the garden. In any event it does not
alter the fact that a finger print identical with that
of the defendant in ten homologous points of
comparison was found on the box.
Although there is some differences of opinion
among the authorities as to what constitutes
proof of identity, the older writers regarding
twelve points as necessary to prove certain
identity; and more than that for absolute
identification, the more recent writers think that
six or eight homologous points of comparison
leave no room for reasonable doubt. "In the end
it is the microscopic identity of the ridge
characteristics (Galton's minutiae) that settles the
question." (Personal Identification, p. 263.)
In the present case the qualifications of the
expert witness were admitted. He stated under
oath that in his opinion the finger print in question
is that of the defendant, and gave the reasons for
his conclusion, which seem to us to be
reasonable and to be sustained by the best
authorities available. No reason has been
adduced that would justify us in rejecting his
findings and conclusion. We wish to add,
however, that the prosecuting attorney ought to
have addressed further questions to the expert
witness to show how he arrived at his findings,
that is, his method of examination and
comparison, his measurements, and other
pertinent facts. Another competent and
experienced specialist might well have been
called to verify the findings of the Constabulary
expert.
The only evidence for the defendant was his
uncorroborated testimony that on the night in
question he was at home in San Luis, Batangas.
In weighing the testimony of the defendant it is
proper to take into account the fact that he has
already been convicted three times of theft.
Robbery in an inhabited house is punished
by prision mayor in its medium period
to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the
value of the property taken exceeds P250, if the
malefactor entered the house by breaking a
window, as in the present case, but when the
offender does not carry arms, as in this case, the
penalty next lower in degree shall be imposed
(article 299 of the Revised Penal Code). The
M.L. DM. ROBLEDO
penalty next lower in degree is prision
correccional in its medium period to prision
mayor in its minimum period, or from two years,
four months, and one day of prision
correccional to eight years of prision mayor. In
the present case in fixing the principal penalty,
we must take into account the aggravating
circumstances of recidivism and nocturnity. The
principal penalty imposed on the accused is
therefore reduced to six years and a one day
of prision mayor.
The additional penalty of ten years imposed by
the lower court is the maximum of the maximum
for a fourth conviction. We think that under the
circumstances of this case the minimum
authorized by law would be sufficient, and the
additional penalty of the appellant is accordingly
reduced to six years and one day.
Modified as hereinabove stated, the decision
appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against
the appellant.
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1575
REQUIRING PRACTITIONERS OF DENTISTRY TO
KEEP RECORDS OF THEIR PATIENTS
WHEREAS, the identification of persons is a
necessary factor in solving crimes and in settling
certain disputes such as claims for damages,
insurance, and inheritance;
WHEREAS, in those cases where the identification of
persons cannot be established through the regular
means, identification through definition has been
proven to be necessary and effective;
WHEREAS, however, records of dentition of persons
are often not available due to the lack of systematic
recording by dental practitioners of the dental history
of their patients.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in
me vested by the Constitution, do hereby order and
decree the following:
Section 1. It shall be obligatory upon all practitioners
of dentistry to keep and maintain an accurate and
complete record of the dentition of all their patients
Page 37 of 38
which shall include a history and description of the
patient's dentition and the treatments made thereon.

Section 2. Upon the lapse of ten years from the last

entry, dental practitioners shall turn over the dental
records of their patients to the National Bureau of
Investigation for record purposes: Provided, that the
said practitioners may retain copies thereof for their
own files.

Section 3. Any violation of the provisions of this

Decree shall be punishable by a fine of not less than
one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand
pesos.

Section 4. This Decree shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 11th day of June, in

the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-
eight.

M.L. DM. ROBLEDO Page 38 of 38