PART ONE

I. QUASI-DELICT

A. GENERAL PRINCIPLES

a. Definition (Art. 2176, NCC)

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being

fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is quasi-delict or culpa aquilana (Art. 2176, NCC).

a civil wrong wherein one person’s conduct causes a compensable injury

to the person, property or recognized interest of another, in violation of a
duty imposed by law.

Tortious Act

It is a wrongful act. It is the commission or omission of an act by one,

without right, whereby another receives, some direct or indirect injury, in
person, property, or reputation (De Leon, 2012).

b. Elements

1. Damage to the plaintiff; NOTE: It is the loss, hurt or harm

which results from injury. It differs from damages which term
refers to the recompense or compensation awarded for the
damage suffered (So Ping Bun v. CA, G.R. No. 120554, September
21, 1999).
2. Negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some
person for whose acts, must respond, was guilty; and
3. Connection of cause and effect between such negligence and
damage (Dra. Leila A. Llano v. Rebecca Biong, G.R. No. 182356,
December 4, 2013).
 c. Kinds of Torts

1. Intentional Torts*

Intentional tort: includes conduct where the actor desires to

cause the consequences of his act or believes the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it

2. Negligence

Negligence is the omission of that degree of diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of the persons, time and place

3. Strict Liability

Strict Liability – there is strict liability if one is made independent of fault,

negligence or intent after establishing certain facts specified by law. It
includes liability for conversion and for injuries caused by animals, ultra-
hazardous activities and nuisance.

d. Quasi-Delict distinguished from Delict

Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties,
is quasi-delict or culpa aquilana

Delict- an act of omission punishable by law.

e. Quasi-Delict distinguished from Breach of Contract

There is a pre-existing contractual obligation in breach of contract

f. Expanded Scope of Quasi-Delict (Art. 1902, NCC)

CASES:

Barredo v. Garcia (GR. No. L-48006, July 8, 1942)

Facts:

This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner
herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia
caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said
Fausto Barredo.

there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven
by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela guided by Pedro Dimapilis. The ...
carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy
Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A
criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, and he was convicted and... sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of
one year and one day to two years of prision correccional.

The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to bring a
separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals... affirmed the
sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and
Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased, on March 7, 1939, brought an
action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as
the sole proprietor of the Mulate

Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla.

the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the

plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint.
This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals... by reducing the
damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was
instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla's negligence was the cause pf
the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high
Speed.

As to
Rarredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:

"* * * It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is no

proof that he exercised the diligence of good father of a family to prevent
the damage.

See 22 appellant's brief.) in fact it is shown he was careless in employing

Fontanilla who... had been caught several times for violation of the
Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) violations which appeared in the
records of the Bureau of Public Works available to the public and to
himself. Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the... provisions of
article 1903 of the Civil Code."

The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is
governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary,
and as there has been no civil against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally
liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in... this case.

This fact makes said article inapplicable to a civil liability arising from a
crime as in the case at bur... simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book
IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code
itself, is applicable only to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful or
negligent acts or omissions not punishable by law.'"

Issues:

whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto
Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly responsible under article
1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of Pedro Fontanilla.

Ruling:

Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana" is

a separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a substantivity all its
own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or
crime. Upon this principle, and on the... wording: and spirit of article 1903 of
the Civil Code, the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be
safely anchored.

"Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual,

faults which are not pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived,
according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, from every act or omission
causing losses and damages in which culpa or... negligence intervenes.

Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court
has upheld the principles above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-
contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the
civil responsibility arising from... criminal liability, and that an employer is,
under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for
the negligent acts of his employee.

First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or
with the street car company. This is precisely what happens in the present
case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil action, either alone
or with hia employer.

In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal negligence,
so that if he had even sued for hia civil responsibility arising from the crime,
he would have been held primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would
have been held subsidiarily liable... for the same

But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility
because of his own presumed negligence which he did not overcome under
article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the
subsidiary one because of the civil liability... of the taxi driver arising from
the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as
an employer under article 1903.
The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to take, and they preferred
the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within... their rights. It
might be observed in passing, that the plaintiffs chose the more expeditious
and effective method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or
had just been released, and besides,... he was probably without property
which might be seized in enforcing any... judgment against him for damages.

Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the
employer was held liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the
employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with greater reason
should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held... liable for damages
in a civil suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been convicted.

Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the
employer was held liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the
employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with greater reason
should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held... liable for damages
in a civil suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been convicted.

The degree of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case cited was
less than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former was
acquitted in the previous criminal case... while the latter was found guilty of
criminal negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one
year and one day to two years of prision correctional.

It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's
proposition, because the Court of Appeals based its decision in the present
case on the defendant's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the
Civil Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising from

Fontanilia's criminal negligence

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but
also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to
the literal import of article 1093 of the

Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope
and application in actual life.

Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence
is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages.

Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make, defendant's liability
effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's)
property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a
devious and cumbersome method of obtaining relief.

In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But
we believe... it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by such practice
and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor.

It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa... aquiliana to

flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted
into that of a crime under the Penal Code

This will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private rights
because it re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and... for the
further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the
party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and
efficacious redress.

Principles:
CIVIL COM

"ART. 1089. Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts,
and from acts and omissions which are unlawful or in' which any kind of fault
or negligence intervenes."

* * * * * * *

"ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be

governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.

ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or
negligence, not punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the
provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this book."

"ART. 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another
by his fault Or negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.

"ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is

enforcible, not only for person si acts and omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom another is responsible.

"The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable
for any damages caused by the minor children who live with them.

"Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons

subject to their authority and living with them.

"Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for

any damagea caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the
service in which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their
duties.

"The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special
agent, but not if the damage shall have been caused by the official upon
whom properly devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which case
the provisions of the next preceding article shall be... applicable.

"Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damagea
caused by their pupils Or apprentices while they are under their custody.
"The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons
mentioned therein prove that they exercised all the... diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage."

"ART. 1901. Any person who pays for damage Caused by his employees may
recover from the latter what he may have paid."

"Art. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption from
criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and
in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Coden does not include exemption from
civil liability, which... shall be enforced subject to the following rules:

First. In casts of subdivisions 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for

acts committed by any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine
years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has
acted without discernment, shall... devolve upon those having such person
under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no
fault or negligence on their part.

"Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his
authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said
insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting
property exempt from execution, in accordance... with the civil law.

"Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the persons for
whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in
proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
" The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportinate
amount for which each one shall be liable.

ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability
established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers,
teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their... servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or
employees in the discharge of their duties."

"ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless

impurdence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would
constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional... in its minimum period; if it would
have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.

Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court
has upheld the principles above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-
contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the
civil responsibility arising from... criminal liability, and that an employer is,
under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for
the negligent acts of his employee.

Elcano v. Hill (GR. No. L-24803, May 26, 1977)

Facts:

It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants,

defendant-appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally

After... due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not
criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake. when
appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father,
Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees... filed
the motion to dismiss above-referred to.

Issues:

Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in
the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability was not reserved?

May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code be applied
against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding undisputed fact that at the time of the
occurrence complained of,... Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistence from his father, was already legally married?

Ruling:

Article

2177

Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely

separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from neglige... acquittal
from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or
not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability
arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or
'culpa... aquiliana'.

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case
has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not
a bar to the instant action against him.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of

the child... it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by... marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate
parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor to
administer... his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow
money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his
father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or... guardian."

Now, under Article 2180

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the... mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company."

In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married,

was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of
the occurrence in... question. Factually, therefore, Reginald was still
subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that it is the obligation of the parent
to supervise their minor children in order to... prevent them from causing
damage to third persons.

the order appealed from is reversed

Cinco v. Canonoy (GR. No. L-33171, May 31, 1979)

FACTS:

Porfirio P. Cinco filed a complaint against jeepney driven by Romeo Hilot and
operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito for a vehicular accident

At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to
suspend the civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit,
invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules of Court, which provides:

(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from
the same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in
whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal
proceeding has been rendered

City Court: ordered the suspension of the civil case

CFI by certiorari: dismissed

ISSUE:

W/N there can be an independent civil action for damage to property during
the pendency of the criminal action

HELD:

YES. granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for

nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally

on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code

Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article
is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant

primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed

negligence are principles calculated to protect society

The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly
recognized in section 3, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 3. When civil action may proceed independently.—In the cases provided
in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
independent civil action may be brought by the offended party. It shall
proceed independently of the criminal action and shall require only a
preponderance of evidence. In no case, however, may the offended party
recover damages twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal
action.

Secs. 3(a) and 3(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be
suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is that arising from
the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the
act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.

Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only
injuries to persons but also damage to property

word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for
the harm done

Dulay v. CA (GR. No. 108017, April 3, 1995)

FACTS:

December 7, 1988: Due to a heated argument, Benigno Torzuela, the security

guard on duty at Big Bang Sa Alabang carnival, shot and killed Atty. Napoleon
Dulay

Maria Benita A. Dulay, widow of the deceased Napoleon Dulay, in her own
behalf and in behalf of her minor children filed an action for damages
against Benigno Torzuela for wanton and reckless discharge of the firearm
and Safeguard Investigation and Security Co., Inc., (Safeguard) and/or
Superguard Security Corp. (Superguard) as employers for negligence having
failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision and control of its employee to avoid the injury

Superguard:
Torzuela's act of shooting Dulay was beyond the scope of his duties, and was
committed with deliberate intent (dolo), the civil liability therefor is
governed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, which states:

Art. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of a felony. — Every person

criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.

civil liability under Article 2176 applies only to quasi-offenses under Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code

CA Affirmed RTC: dismising the case of Dulay

ISSUE:

W/N Superguard and Safeguard commited an actionable breach and can be

civilly liable even if Benigno Torzuela is already being prosecuted for
homicide

HELD:

YES. Petition for Review is Granted. remanded to RTC for trial on the
merits

Rule 111 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is

instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly
instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action , reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil
action prior to the criminal action

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal
Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused
Contrary to the theory of private respondents, there is no justification for
limiting the scope of Article 2176 of the Civil Code to acts or omissions
resulting from negligence. Well-entrenched is the doctrine that article 2176
covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are
voluntary and intentional.

Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts
"not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character; whether
intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party
is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on
both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger
award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary

extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111,

refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been
committed by the accused

It is enough that the complaint alleged that Benigno Torzuela shot Napoleon
Dulay resulting in the latter's death; that the shooting occurred while
Torzuela was on duty; and that either SUPERGUARD and/or SAFEGUARD
was Torzuela's employer and responsible for his acts.

Tayag v. Alcantara (GR. No. 50959, July 23, 1980)

FACTS:

September 2, 1974 a.m.: Philippine Rabbit Bus bump Pedro Tayag Sr. was
riding on a bicycle along MacArthur Highway at Bo. San Rafael, Tarlac driven
by Romeo Villa, as a result of which he sustained injuries which caused his
instantaneous death

Judge granted the motion, and consequently, suspended the hearing of Civil
Case while criminal case is pending judgment

RTC: acquitting the Romeo Villa of the crime of homicide on the ground of
reasonable doubt

subsequently, the civil case was dismissed

ISSUE:

W/N the civil case based on quasi-delict should be barred by the acquittal
in a criminal case

HELD:

NO. order of dismissal should be, as it is hereby set aside

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the
act or commission complained of as a felony. such civil action may proceed
independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.

All the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely:
(1) an act or omission constituting fault or negligence on the part of private
respondent; (2) damage caused by the said act or commission; (3) direct
causal relation between the damage and the act or commission; and (4) no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties

g. Who can recover from quasi-delict?

CASE:

Caravan Travel and Tours, Inc., v. Abejar (GR. No. 170631, Feb. 10,
2016)
Facts:

On July 13, 2000, Jesmariane R. Reyes (Reyes) was walking along the west-
bound lane of Sampaguita Street, United Parañaque Subdivision IV,
Parañaque City.[11] A Mitsubishi L-300 van with plate number PKM 195[12]
was travelling along the east-bound lane, opposite Reyes.[13] To avoid an
incoming vehicle, the van swerved to its left and hit Reyes.[14] Alex Espinosa
(Espinosa), a witness to the accident, went to her aid and loaded her in the
back of the van.[15] Espinosa told the driver of the van, Jimmy Bautista
(Bautista), to bring Reyes to the hospital.[16] Instead of doing so, Bautista
appeared to have left the van parked inside a nearby subdivision with Reyes
still in the van.[17] Fortunately for Reyes, an unidentified civilian came to
help and drove Reyes to the hospital.[18]

Upon investigation, it was found that the registered owner of the van was
Caravan.[19] Caravan is a corporation engaged in the business of organizing
travels and tours.[20] Bautista was Caravan's employee assigned to drive the
van as its service driver.[21]

Caravan shouldered the hospitalization expenses of Reyes.[22] Despite

medical attendance, Reyes died two (2) days after the accident.[23]

Respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar (Abejar), Reyes' paternal aunt and the

person who raised her since she was nine (9) years old,24 filed before the
Regional Trial Court of Parañaque a Complaint25 for damages against
Bautista and Caravan.

Caravan argues that Abejar has no personality to bring this suit because she
is not a real party in interest. According to Caravan, Abejar does not
exercise legal or substitute parental authority. She is also not the judicially
appointed guardian or the only living relative of the deceased.36 She is also
not "the executor or administrator of the estate of the deceased."37
According to Caravan, only the victim herself or her heirs can enforce an
action based on culpa aquiliana such as Abejar's action for damages.38

Issues:

First, whether respondent Ermilinda R. Abejar is a real party in interest who

may bring an action for damages against petitioner Caravan Travel and Tours
International, Inc. on account of Jesmariane R. Reyes' death

Second, whether petitioner should be held liable as an employer, pursuant to

Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Ruling:

Having exercised substitute parental authority, respondent suffered actual

loss and is, thus, a real party in interest in this case.

Respondent's right to proceed against petitioner, therefore, is based on

two grounds.

First, respondent suffered actual personal loss. With her affinity for Reyes,
it stands to reason that when Reyes died, respondent suffered the same
anguish that a natural parent would have felt upon the loss of one's child. It
is for this injury—as authentic and personal as that of a natural parent—
that respondent seeks to be indemnified.

Second, respondent is capacitated to do what Reyes' actual parents would

have been capacitated to do.

It is particularly noticeable that Article 1902 (now 2176) stresses the

passive subject of the obligation to pay damages caused by his fault or
negligence. The article does not limit or specify the active subjects, much
less the relation that must exist between the victim of the culpa aquiliana
and the person who may recover damages, thus warranting the inference
that, in principle, anybody who suffers any damage from culpa aquiliana,
whether a relative or not of the victim, may recover damages from the
person responsible therefor

II

Respondent's Complaint is anchored on an employer's liability for quasi-

delict provided in Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code.

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

The resolution of this case must consider two (2) rules. First, Article 2180's
specification that "[e]mployers shall be liable for the damages caused by
their employees . . . acting within the scope of their assigned tasks[.]

Second, the operation of the registered-owner rule that registered owners

are liable for death or injuries caused by the operation of their vehicles.

These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which the

employer is also the registered owner of a vehicle. Article 2180 requires
proof of two things: first, an employment relationship between the driver
and the owner; and second, that the driver acted within the scope of his or
her assigned tasks. On the other hand, applying the registered-owner rule
only requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant-employer is the
registered owner of the vehicle.

Thus, it is imperative to apply the registered-owner rule in a manner that

harmonizes it with Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.
In light of this, the words used in Del Carmen are particularly notable.
There, this court stated that Article 2180 "should defer to"[104] the
registered-owner rule. It never stated that Article 2180 should be totally
abandoned.

Therefore, the appropriate approach is that in cases where both the

registered-owner rule and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first
establish that the employer is the registered owner of the vehicle in
question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there arises a
disputable presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been
proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to
show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen.

This disputable presumption, insofar as the registered owner of the vehicle

in relation to the actual driver is concerned, recognizes that between the
owner and the victim, it is the former that should carry the costs of moving
forward with the evidence.

The registration of the vehicle, on the other hand, is accessible to the

public.

Here, respondent presented a copy of the Certificate of Registration[105]

of the van that hit Reyes.[106] The Certificate attests to petitioner's
ownership of the van.

Petitioner itself did not dispute its ownership of the van.

Consistent with the rule we have just stated, a presumption that the
requirements of Article 2180 have been satisfied arises.

It is now up to petitioner to establish that it incurred no liability under

Article 2180. This it can do by presenting proof of any of the following:
first, that it had no employment relationship with Bautista; second, that
Bautista acted outside the scope of his assigned tasks; or third, that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and
supervision of Bautista.

On the first, petitioner admitted that Bautista was its employee at the time
of the accident.

On the second, petitioner was unable to prove that Bautista was not acting
within the scope of his assigned tasks at the time of the accident.

On the third, petitioner likewise failed to prove that it exercised the

requisite diligence in the selection and supervision of Bautista.

Employing a person holding a non-professional driver's license to operate

another's motor vehicle violates Section 24 of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code

Evidently, petitioner did not only fail to exercise due diligence when it
selected Bautista as service driver; it also committed an actual violation of
law.

III

Petitioner's argument that it should be excused from liability because

Bautista was already dropped as a party is equally unmeritorious. The
liability imposed on the registered owner is direct and primary.

It does not depend on the inclusion of the negligent driver in the action.

Instead of insisting that Bautista—who was nothing more than a necessary

party—should not have been dropped as a defendant, or that petitioner,
along with Bautista, should have been dropped, petitioner (as a co-defendant
insisting that the action must proceed with Bautista as party) could have
opted to file a cross-claim against Bautista as its remedy.

IV
The Court of Appeals committed no reversible error when it awarded actual
damages to respondent.

Respondent had personal knowledge of the facts sought to be proved by the

Certificate, i.e. that she spent P35,000.00 for the funeral expenses of
Reyes. Thus, the Certificate that she identified and testified to is not
hearsay.

Both the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court found Bautista
grossly negligent in driving the van and concluded that Bautista's gross
negligence was the proximate cause of Reyes' death.

As such, petitioner must pay the exemplary damages arising from the
negligence of its driver.

For the same reasons, the award of P50,000.00 by way of civil indemnity is
justified.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 3, 2005

is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS

Principles:

These rules appear to be in conflict when it comes to cases in which the

employer is also the registered owner of a vehicle. Article 2180 requires
proof of two things: first, an employment relationship between the driver
and the owner; and second, that the driver acted within the scope of his or
her assigned tasks. On the other hand, applying the registered-owner rule
only requires the plaintiff to prove that the defendant-employer is the
registered owner of the vehicle.

Therefore, the appropriate approach is that in cases where both the

registered-owner rule and Article 2180 apply, the plaintiff must first
establish that the employer is the registered owner of the vehicle in
question. Once the plaintiff successfully proves ownership, there arises a
disputable presumption that the requirements of Article 2180 have been
proven. As a consequence, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to
show that no liability under Article 2180 has arisen.

This disputable presumption, insofar as the registered owner of the vehicle

in relation to the actual driver is concerned, recognizes that between the
owner and the victim, it is the former that should carry the costs of moving
forward with the evidence.

The victim is, in many cases, a hapless pedestrian or motorist with hardly any
means to uncover the employment relationship of the owner and the driver,
or any act that the owner may have done in relation to that employment.

h. Is breach of contract considered as a tort or not?

CASES:

Air France v. Carrascoso, (GR. No.L-21438, Sept. 28, 1966)

FACTS:

Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims

that left Manila for Lourdes on March 30, 1958.

On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized
agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip
airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff
travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant
airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying
because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white
man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When
asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected,
refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his
dead body. After some commotion, plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class"
seat in the plane.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

1. CFI – Manila: sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso

P25,000.00 by way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;
P393.20 representing the difference in fare between first class and tourist
class for the portion of the trip Bangkok- Rome, these various amounts with
interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until
paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys' fees; and the costs of suit.

2. CA: slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket

from P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all
other respects", with costs against petitioner.

Air France contends that respondent knew that he did not have confirmed
reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist
class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no
guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend
upon the availability of first class seats.

ISSUE:

Is Carrascoso entitled to damages?

RULING:

Yes. The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a
first class seat; worse, he imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him
from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to the tourist
class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right
thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of
course, bad faith has assumed a meaning different from what is understood
in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for
ulterior purpose."
For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his
employer, must answer. Article 21 of the Civil Code says:

ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner
that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate
the latter for the damage.

The contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with

a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's employees, naturally,
could give ground for an action for damages.

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to

be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and
due consideration.

Although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in origin

and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a
tort". The stress of Carrascoso's action as we have said, is placed upon his
wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air
carrier — a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper

Orient Freight International. Inc., v. Keilhin-Everett Forwarding Co.,

Inc., (GR. No. 191937, Aug. 9, 2017)

FACTS:

On October 16, 2001, Keihin-Everett entered into a Trucking Service

Agreement with Matsushita. Under the Trucking Service Agreement, Keihin-
Everett would provide services for Matsushita's trucking requirements.
These services were subcontracted by Keihin-Everett to Orient Freight,
through their own Trucking Service Agreement executed on the same day.

When the Trucking Service Agreement between Keihin-Everett and

Matsushita expired on December 31, 2001, Keihin-Everett executed an In-
House Brokerage Service Agreement for Matsushita's Philippine Economic
Zone Authority export operations. Keihin-Everett continued to retain the
services of Orient Freight, which sub-contracted its work to Schmitz
Transport and Brokerage Corporation.

In April 2002, Matsushita called Keihin-Everett about a column in the issue

of the tabloid newspaper Tempo. This news narrated the April 17, 2002
interception by Caloocan City police of a stolen truck filled with shipment of
video monitors and CCTV systems owned by Matsushita

When contacted by Keihin-Everett about this news, Orient Freight stated

that the tabloid report had blown the incident out of proportion. They
claimed that the incident simply involved the breakdown and towing of
tKeihin-Everett independently investigated the incident. During its
investigation, it obtained a police report from the Caloocan City Police
Station. The report stated, among others, that at around 2:00 p.m. on April
17, 2002, somewhere in Plaza Dilao, Paco Street, Manila, Cudas told Aquino
to report engine trouble to Orient Freight. After Aquino made the phone
call, he informed Orient Freight that the truck had gone missing. When the
truck was intercepted by the police along C3 Road near the corner of Dagat-
Dagatan Avenue in Caloocan City, Cudas escaped and became the subject of a
manhunt. The truck was promptly released and did not miss the closing time
of the vessel intended for the shipment.

Matsushita terminated its In-House Brokerage Service Agreement with

Keihin-Everett, effective July 1, 2002. Matsushita cited loss of confidence
for terminating the contract, stating that Keihin-Everett's way of handling
the April 17, 2002 incident and its nondisclosure of this incident's relevant
facts "amounted to fraud and signified an utter disregard of the rule of law.
Keihin-Everett sent a letter to Orient Freight, demanding P2,500,000.00 as
indemnity for lost income. It argued that Orient Freight's mishandling of
the situation caused the termination of Keihin-Everett's contract with
Matsushita.

When Orient Freight refused to pay, Keihin-Everett filed a complaint dated

October 24, 2002 for damages. In its complaint, Keihin-Everett alleged that
Orient Freight's "misrepresentation, malice, negligence and fraud" caused
the termination of its In-House Brokerage Service Agreement with
Matsushita. Keihin-Everett prayed for compensation for lost income, with
legal interest, exemplary damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and
the costs of the suit. The RTC rendered a Decision in favor of Keihin-
Everett. It found that Orient Freight was "negligent in failing to investigate
properly the incident and make a factual report to Keihin [-Everett] and
Matsushita. Orient Freight appealed the said Decision to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals issued its Decision affirming the trial court's
decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 2176 is applicable in this case

RULING:

Negligence may either result in culpa aquiliana or culpa contractual. Culpa

aquiliana is the "the wrongful or negligent act or omission which creates a
vinculum juris and gives rise to an obligation between two persons not
formally bound by any other obligation," and is governed by Article 2176 of
the Civil Code:

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there

being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault
or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
Actions based on contractual negligence and actions based on quasi-delicts
differ in terms of conditions, defenses, and proof. They generally cannot co-
exist.
Once a breach of contract is proved, the defendant is presumed negligent
and must prove not being at fault. In a quasi-delict, however, the complaining
party has the burden of proving the other party's negligence. However,
there are instances when Article 2176 may apply even when there is a pre-
existing contractual relation. A party may still commit a tort or quasi-delict
against another, despite the existence of a contract between them.
Here, petitioner denies that it was obliged to disclose the facts regarding
the hijacking incident since this was not among the provisions of its Trucking
Service Agreement with respondent. There being no contractual obligation,
respondent had no cause of action against petitioner.
The obligation to report what happened during the hijacking incident,
admittedly, does not appear on the plain text of the Trucking Service
Agreement. Petitioner argues that it is nowhere in the agreement.
Respondent does not dispute this claim. Neither the Regional Trial Court nor
the Court of Appeals relied on the provisions of the Trucking Service
Agreement to arrive at their respective conclusions. Breach of the Trucking
Service Agreement was neither alleged nor proved.

While petitioner and respondent were contractually bound under the

Trucking Service Agreement and the events at the crux of this controversy
occurred during the performance of this contract, it is apparent that the
duty to investigate and report arose subsequent to the Trucking Service
Agreement. When respondent discovered the news report on the hijacking
incident, it contacted petitioner, requesting information on the incident.
Respondent then requested petitioner to investigate and report on the
veracity of the news report. Pursuant to respondent's request, petitioner
met with respondent and Matsushita on April 20, 2002 and issued a letter
dated April 22, 2002, addressed to Matsushita. Respondent's claim was
based on petitioner's negligent conduct when it was required to investigate
and report on the incident.

Both the Regional Trial Court and Court of Appeals erred in finding
petitioner's negligence of its obligation to report to be an action based on a
quasi-delict Petitioner's negligence did not create the vinculum juris or legal
relationship with the respondent, which would have otherwise given rise to a
quasi-delict. Petitioner's duty to respondent existed prior to its negligent
act. When respondent contacted petitioner regarding the news report and
asked it to investigate the incident, petitioner's obligation was created.
Thereafter, petitioner was alleged to have performed its obligation
negligently, causing damage to respondent.

The doctrine "the act that breaks the contract may also be a tort," on
which the lower courts relied, is inapplicable here. Petitioner's
negligence, arising as it does from its performance of its obligation to
respondent, is dependent on this obligation. Neither do the facts show
that Article 21 of the Civil Code applies, there being no finding that
petitioner's act was a conscious one to cause harm, or be of such a
degree as to approximate fraud or bad faith.

If a contracting party's act that breaches the contract would have

given rise to an extra-contractual liability had there been no contract,
the contract would be deemed breached by a tort,[61] and the party
may be held liable under Article 2176 and its related provisions.[62

Consequently, Articles 1170, 1172, and 1173 of the Civil Code on negligence in
the performance of an obligation should apply. WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED. The January 21, 2010 Decision and April 21, 2010 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 91889 are AFFIRMED.

i. Culpa Contractual distinguished from Culpa Aquiliana

CASES:

Cangco v. Manila Railroad (GR. No. 12191, Oct. 14, 1918)

FACTS:

Jose Cangco was in the employment of Manila Railroad Company. He lived in

the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located upon the
line of the defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to the
company’s office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass,
supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon the company’s
trains free of charge.

During his ride in the train he arose from his seat and makes his way to the
exit while the train is still on travel. When the train has proceeded a little
farther Jose Cangco step down into the cement platform but unfortunately
step in to a sack of watermelon, fell down and rolled under the platform and
was drawn under the moving car which resulting to his arm to be crashed and
lacerated. He was rushed to the hospital and sued the company and the
employee who put the sack of watermelon in the platform.

The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o’ clock on the dark night. It is that
time of the year that may we considered as season to harvest watermelon
explaining why there are sacks of watermelon in the platform. The plaintiff
contends that it is the negligence of the Manila Railroad Co. on why they let
their employees put a hindrance in the platform that may cause serious
accident. The defendant answered that it is the lack of diligence on behalf
of the plaintiff alone on why he did not wait for the train to stop before
alighting the train.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the company is liable or there is a contributory negligence

on behalf of the plaintiff.

RULING:

There is no contributory negligence on behalf of the plaintiff. The Supreme

Court provides some test that may find the contributory negligence of a
person. Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at
the time he alighted from the train which would have admonished a person
of average prudence that to get off the train under the conditions then
existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from
alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory negligence.

Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a common practice

and a lot of people are doing so every day without suffering injury. Cangco
has the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky
for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same act would have
been in an aged or feeble person. He was also ignorant of the fact that sacks
of watermelons were there as there were no appropriate warnings and the
place was dimly lit.

Article 1173, first paragraph: The fault or negligence of the obligor consists
in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the
obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of that persons, of the
time and of the place. When negligence shows bad faith, the provisions of
Article 1171 and 2201, paragraph 2, shall apply.

In the case the proximate cause of the accident is the lack of diligence of
the company to inform their employees to not put any hindrance in the
platform like sacks of watermelon. The contract of defendant to transport
plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety and
to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article
1258). That duty, being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-
performance could not be excused by proof that the fault was morally
imputable to defendant’s servants. Therefore, the company is liable for
damages against Cangco.

Differentiation

Extra-contractual obligation has its source in the breach or omission of

those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon its members, or
which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain
members of society to others, generally embraced in the concept of status.
The legal rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the
corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character, which the existence
of those rights imposes upon all other members of society. The breach of
these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere inattention, if
productive of injury, gives rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured
party. The fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and
those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in cases of non-
contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself
which creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the
vinculum exists independently of the breach of the voluntary duty assumed
by the parties when entering into the contractual relation.

When the facts averred show a contractual undertaking by defendant for

the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused
to perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his
pleadings whether the breach of the contract is due to willful fault or to
negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof
of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficient prima facie to
warrant a recovery.

j. Proscription Against Double Recovery (Art. 2177, NCC)

CASES:

Elcano v. Hill (GR. No. L-24803, May 26, 1977)

Facts:

It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants,

defendant-appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally

After... due trial, he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not
criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.

when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his
father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the
appellees... filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.

Issues:

Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald in
the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability was not reserved?

May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code be applied
against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding undisputed fact that at the time of the
occurrence complained of,... Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistence from his father, was already legally married?

Ruling:

Article

2177

Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely

separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from neglige... acquittal
from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or
not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil liability
arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due to a quasi-delict or
'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double recovery.

It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginald Hill in the criminal case
has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not
a bar to the instant action against him.

While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of

the child... it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399,
emancipation by... marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute.  Thus
"(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate
parental authority over the child's person.  It shall enable the minor to
administer... his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow
money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his
father or mother, or guardian.  He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or... guardian."

Now, under Article 2180

The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the... mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company."

In the instant case, it is not controverted that Reginald, although married,

was living with his father and getting subsistence from him at the time of
the occurrence in... question.  Factually, therefore, Reginald was still
subservient to and dependent on his father, a situation which is not unusual.

the reason behind the joint and solidary liability of parents with their
offending child under Article 2180 is that it is the obligation of the parent
to supervise their minor children in order to... prevent them from causing
damage to third persons.

the order appealed from is reversed

Rafael Reyes Trucking Corp. v. People (GR. 129029, April 3, 2000)

In the early morning of June 20, 1989, the White Truck driven by Romeo
Dunca left Tuguegarao, Cagayan bound to San Fernando, Pampanga loaded
with 2,000 cases of empty beer “Grande” bottles. Seated at the front right
seat beside him was Ferdinand Domingo, his truck helper. At around 4:00
o’clock that same morning while the truck was descending at a slight
downgrade along the national road at Tagaran, Cauayan, Isabela, it
approached a damaged portion of the road covering the full width of the
truck’s right lane going south and about six meters in length. These made the
surface of the road uneven because the potholes were about five to six
inches deep. The left lane parallel to this damaged portion is smooth. As
narrated by Ferdinand Domingo, before approaching the potholes, he and
Dunca saw the Nissan with its headlights on coming from the opposite
direction. They used to evade this damaged road by taking the left lance but
at that particular moment, because of the incoming vehicle, they had to run
over it. This caused the truck to bounce wildly. Dunca lost control of the
wheels and the truck swerved to the left invading the lane of the Nissan. As
a result, Dunca’s vehicle rammed the incoming Nissan dragging it to the left
shoulder of the road and climbed a ridge above said shoulder where it finally
stopped. The Nissan was severely damaged and its two passengers, namely,
Feliciano Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. died instantly. On October 10, 1989,
Provincial Prosecutor Durian filed with the RTC an amended information
charging Dunca with reckless imprudence resulting in double homicide and
damage to property. On November 29, 1989, the offended parties filed with
the RTC a complaint against petitioner Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, as
employer of driver Dunca, based on quasi delict. Respondents opted to
pursue the criminal action but did not withdraw the civil case quasi ex
delicto they filed against petitioner. On December 15, 1989, respondents
withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused
and manifested that they would prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto in the
criminal action. However, they did not withdraw the separate civil action
based on quasi delict against petitioner as employer arising from the same
act or omission of the accused driver. The RTC held that the driver was
guilty. Respondents moved for amendment of the dispositive portion of the
joint decision so as to hold petitioner subsidiarily liable for the damages
awarded to the private respondents in the event of insolvency of the
accused, which the lower court granted.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not petitioner as owner of the truck involved in the accident
may be held subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded to the offended
parties in the criminal action against the truck driver despite the filing of a
separate civil action by the offended parties against the employer of the
truck driver; and

(2) Whether or not the Court may award damages to the offended parties in
the criminal case despite the filing of a civil action against the employer of
the truck driver.

Held:

(1) No. In negligence cases, the aggrieved party has the choice between (1)
an action to enforce civil liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code; and (2) a separate action for quasi delict under Article
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Once the choice is made, the
injured party can not avail himself of any other remedy because he may not
recover damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the
accused. This is the rule against double recovery.In other words, “the same
act or omission can create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender,
that is, civil liability ex delicto, and civil liability quasi delicto” either of
which “may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under
Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party can not recover
damages under both types of liability.” In the instant case, the offended
parties elected to file a separate civil action for damages against petitioner
as employer of the accused, based on quasi delict, under Article 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. Petitioner, as employer of the accused who has
been adjudged guilty in the criminal case for reckless imprudence, cannot be
held subsidiarily liable because of the filing of the separate civil action
based on quasi delict against it. In view of the reservation to file, and the
subsequent filing of the civil action for recovery of civil liability, the same
was not instituted with the criminal action. Such separate civil action was
for recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, arising from
the same act or omission of the accused.

(2) No. The award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the
civil action for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action
by the filing of a separate civil action against the employer. The only issue
brought before the trial court in the criminal action is whether accused
Dunca is guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and damage to
property. The action for recovery of civil liability is not included therein, but
is covered by the separate civil action filed against the petitioner as
employer of the accused truck-driver. The policy against double recovery
requires that only one action be maintained for the same act or omission
whether the action is brought against the employee or against his employer.
The injured party must choose which of the available causes of action for
damages he will bring.
Supreme Transportation Liner v. San Andres (GR. No. 200444, Aug. 15,
2018)

Facts:

Ernesto Belchez was driving a passenger bus, Mabel Tours Bus with body...
owned by

Antonio San Andres

Mabel Tours Bus sideswiped a Toyota Revo it was overtaking... hit head-on
the Supreme Bus owned and registered in the name of [petitioner] Supreme
Bus Transportation Line, Inc., and driven by [petitioner] Felix G. Ruz

On December 12, 2002, a complaint for damages before the Court a quo was
instituted by [respondent] Antonio San Andres against [petitioners] alleging
actual damage to Mabel Tours Bus and unrealized profits for the non-use of
the Mabel Tours Bus at the time it underwent repairs in the amount of
P144,500.00 and P150,000.00, respectively. Claims for attorney's fees of
P30,000.00, appearance fee of P1,000.00, litigation expenses of P20,000.00
and cost of the suit were also lodged in the complaint.

Counter Claim by Supreme Bus.

Subsequently, [petitioners] filed their Answer with Counterclaim. They

alleged among others that plaintiff has no cause of action against them; the
proximate cause of the vehicular accident is the reckless imprudence of the
[respondent's] driver, Ernesto Belchez operated the Mabel Tours Bus
recklessly and in violation of traffic laws and regulations in negotiating the
overtaking of another vehicle without regard to the rightful vehicle
occupying the right lane coming from the opposite direction resulting to
head on collision on the lane of defendant Supreme Bus and, at the time of
the accident, [respondent] operated the Mabel Tours Bus outside his
franchise and without a registered plate.

RTC Rulling... the instant complaint for damages filed by the plaintiff is
hereby dismissed for having failed to prove liability on the part of the
defendant. The counterclaim that was filed by the defendants hereof is also
dismissed for failure to adhere to procedural requirements.
RTC Rulings

TC indicated that the petitioners' failure to reserve the right to institute a

separate civil action precluded their right to recover damages from the
respondent through their counterclaim.

CA Rulings.

In the assailed decision promulgated on January 27, 2011,[11] the CA

dismissed the petitioners' appeal, stating that the RTC had correctly ruled
that the counterclaim could not prosper because their recourse was limited
to the enforcement of the respondent's subsidiary liability under Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code;[12] that "to allow the counterclaim of
[petitioners] is tantamount to double recovery of damages, a prohibition
under Article 2177 of the New Civil Code and Sec. 3, Rule 111 of the
Rules;"[13] and that their failure to reserve the separate civil action meant
that their right to recover under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was deemed
instituted with the criminal action.[14] The CA denied the petitioners'
motion for reconsideration through the resolution promulgated on January
26, 2012.[

CA Basis

As we see it, the CA concluded that the petitioners' cause of action should
be limited to the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by virtue of their
having initiated against the respondent's driver the criminal complaint for
criminal negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.

CA Legal Basis

CA pointed out that the petitioners' failure to reserve the civil aspect of
the criminal case proscribed them from instituting a separate civil action
based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code, to wit: Corollary, appellants should
have reserved the civil aspect of the criminal case they have filed. Without
so doing, they were deemed to have elected to recover damages from the
bus driver on the basis of the crime. Therefore, the right of appellants to
institute a separate civil case to recover liability from appellee based under
Article 2176 of the Civil Code is deemed instituted with the criminal action.
Evidently, appellant's cause of action against appellee will be limited to the
recovery of the latter's subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of the Revised
Penal Code. x x x[17] "to allow the counterclaim of [petitioners] is
tantamount to double recovery of damages, a prohibition under Article 2177
of the New Civil Code and Sec. 3, Rule 111 of the Rules;"[13] and that their
failure to reserve the separate civil action meant that their right to recover
under Article 2176 of the Civil Code was deemed instituted with the criminal
action.

Issues:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE COUNTERCLAIM BECAUSE

NO RESERVATION WAS MADE IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 02-253 FILED
AGAINST PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE'S DRIVER ERNESTO BELCHEZ.

Ruling:

The petitioners' counterclaim is allowed and should not have been dismissed
by the RTC and the CA despite their failure to reserve the right to file a
separate civil action in the criminal case they had brought against
respondent's driver. However, whether or not they could recover damages
upon their counterclaim presents a different story, as they should first
show that they will not recover damages twice for the same incident.

Principles:

Not civil liability from a crime ex pari... the petitioners' cause of action was
upon a quasi-delict. As such, their counterclaim against the respondent was
based on Article 2184,[21] in relation to Article 2180[22] and Article 2176,
[23] all of the Civil Code.

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate
civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto,
under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of
as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under
Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and
culpa aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured
party is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the
criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities
may be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article
2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission or under both causes.

We are constrained not to award outright the damages prayed for by the
petitioners in their counterclaim.

Article 2177 of the Civil Code and the present version of Section 3, Rule 111
of the Rules of Court, which is the applicable rule of procedure, expressly
prohibit double recovery of damages arising from the same act or omission.
The petitioners' allegation that they had not yet recovered damages from
the respondent was not controlling considering that the criminal case against
the respondent's driver had already been concluded. It remains for the
petitioners to still demonstrate that the RTC as the trial court did not
award civil damages in the criminal case.
PICART vs. SMITH

Facts:

Plaintiff Picart, seeks to recover from the defendant, Frank Smith, damages
alleged to have been caused by an automobile driven by the defendant.

Plaintiff Amado Picart was riding on his pony over a bridge in La Union.
Before he had gotten half way across, defendant Frank Smith, approached
from the opposite direction in an automobile.

Plaintiff pulled the pony closely up against the railing on the right side of
the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that the reason he did this
was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the other
side. The defendant, however, instead of veering to the right while yet some
distance away or slowing down, continued to approach directly toward the
horse without diminution of speed. When he had gotten quite near, there
being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side, the
defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting
the horse alongside of the railing where it was then standing; but in so doing
the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became
frightened and turned its body across the bridge with its head toward the
railing. In so doing, it was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the
flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was
thrown off with some violence.

The free space where the pony stood between the automobile and the railing
of the bridge was probably less than one and one half meters. As a result of
its injuries the horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused
temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.

The issue is whether or not the defendant in maneuvering his car in the
manner above described was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil
obligation to repair the damage done.

Held: Yes.

Last clear chance doctrine

1. As the defendant started across the bridge, he had the right to assume
that the horse and rider would pass over to the proper side; but as he moved
toward the center of the bridge it was demonstrated to his eyes that this
would not be done; and he must in a moment have perceived that it was too
late for the horse to cross with safety in front of the moving vehicle.

2. In the nature of things this change of situation occurred while the

automobile was yet some distance away; and from this moment it was not
longer within the power of the plaintiff to escape being run down by going to
a place of greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed
entirely to the defendant; and it was his duty either to bring his car to an
immediate stop or, seeing that there were no other persons on the bridge, to
take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid
the danger of collision. Instead of doing this, the defendant ran straight on
until he was almost upon the horse.
Test of Negligence

3. Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable
care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used in the
same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The law here in effect
adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the
discreet paterfamilias of the Roman law. The existence of negligence in a
given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the
actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless,
blameworthy, or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence
and determines liability by that.

Conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must be determined in light of

human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular case

4. Reasonable men govern their conduct by the circumstances which are

before them or known to them. They are not, and are not supposed to be,
omniscient of the future. Hence they can be expected to take care only
when there is something before them to suggest or warn of danger. Could a
prudent man, in the case under consideration, foresee harm as a result of
the course actually pursued? If so, it was the duty of the actor to take
precautions to guard against that harm. Reasonable foresight of harm,
followed by the ignoring of the suggestion born of this prevision, is always
necessary before negligence can be held to exist. Stated in these terms, the
proper criterion for determining the existence of negligence in a given case
is this: Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of
the tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was
sufficiently probable to warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding
against its consequences.

Separate opinion by Malcolm, J.,:

Again, if a traveller when he reaches the point of collision is in a situation to

extricate himself and avoid injury, his negligence at that point will prevent a
recovery. But Justice Street finds as a fact that the negligent act of the
defendant succeeded that of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval of time,
and that at that moment the plaintiff had no opportunity to avoid the
accident. consequently, the "last clear chance" rule is applicable. In other
words, when a traveller has reached a point where he cannot extricate
himself and vigilance on his part will not avert the injury, his negligence in
reaching that position becomes the condition and not the proximate cause of
the injury and will not preclude a recovery.

Phoenix vs. IAC

At about 1:30 a.m. on November 15, 1975, private respondent Leonardo

Dionisio was on his way home from cocktails and dinner meeting with his
boss. He was proceeding down General Lacuna Street when he saw a Ford
dump truck parked askew, partly blocking the way of oncoming traffic, with
no lights or early warning reflector devices. The truck was driven earlier by
Armando Carbonel, a regular driver of the petitioner company. Dionisio tried
to swerve his car to the left, but it was too late. He suffered some physical
injuries and nervous breakdown. Dionision filed an action for damages against
Carbonel and Phoenix Insurance. Petitioners countered the claim by imputing
the accident to respondent’s own negligence in driving at high speed without
curfew pass and headlights, and while intoxicated. The trial court and the
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of private respondent.

Issue:

Whether the collision was brought about by the way the truck was parked,
or by respondent’s own negligence

Held:

We find that private respondent Dionisio was unable to prove possession of a

valid curfew pass during the night of the accident and that the
preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have such a pass during
that night. It is the petitioners' contention that Dionisio purposely shut off
his headlights even before he reached the intersection so as not to be
detected by the police in the police precinct which he (being a resident in
the area) knew was not far away from the intersection. We believe that the
petitioners' theory is a more credible explanation than that offered by
private respondent Dionisio, i.e., that he had his headlights on but that, at
the crucial moment, these had in some mysterious if convenient way
malfunctioned and gone off, although he succeeded in switching his lights on
again at "bright" split seconds before contact with the dump truck. We do
not believe that this evidence is sufficient to show that Dionisio was so
heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute his driving a motor
vehicle per se an act of reckless imprudence. The conclusion we draw from
the factual circumstances outlined above is that private respondent Dionisio
was negligent the night of the accident. He was hurrying home that night and
driving faster than he should have been. Worse, he extinguished his
headlights at or near the intersection of General Lacuna and General Santos
Streets and thus did not see the dump truck that was parked askew and
sticking out onto the road lane.
Nonetheless, we agree with the Court of First Instance and the
Intermediate Appellate Court that the legal and proximate cause of the
accident and of Dionisio's injuries was the wrongful or negligent manner in
which the dump truck was parked in other words, the negligence of
petitioner Carbonel. The collision of Dionisio's car with the dump truck was a
natural and foreseeable consequence of the truck driver's negligence.

The distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the 'petitioners

would have us adopt have already been "almost entirely discredited. If the
defendant has created only a passive static condition which made the
damage possible, the defendant is said not to be liable. But so far as the
fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of necessary antecedents which
have played an important part in producing the result it is quite impossible to
distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly since,
as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces
which have gone before. Even the lapse of a considerable time during which
the "condition" remains static will not necessarily affect liability. "Cause"
and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the
distinction is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at
all, it must refer to the type of case where the forces set in operation by
the defendant have come to rest in a position of apparent safety, and some
new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is not the distinction
between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of the
risk and the character of the intervening cause.

We believe, secondly, that the truck driver's negligence far from being a
"passive and static condition" was rather an indispensable and efficient
cause. The improper parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk
of injury for anyone driving down General Lacuna Street and for having so
created this risk, the truck driver must be held responsible. In our view,
Dionisio's negligence, although later in point of time than the truck driver's
negligence and therefore closer to the accident, was not an efficient
intervening or independent cause.

The defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk or
a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has
subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening
forces are within the scope original risk, and hence of the defendant's
negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes
which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's
responsibility. Thus, a defendant who blocks the sidewalk and forces the
plaintiff to walk in a street where the plaintiff will be exposed to the risks
of heavy traffic becomes liable when the plaintiff is run down by a car, even
though the car is negligently driven; and one who parks an automobile on the
highway without lights at night is not relieved of responsibility when another
negligently drives into it. We hold that private respondent Dionisio's
negligence was "only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate
cause" of the injury remained the truck driver's "lack of due care" and that
consequently respondent Dionisio may recover damages though such damages
are subject to mitigation by the courts.

Petitioners also ask us to apply what they refer to as the "last clear chance"
doctrine. The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to
grant recovery to a plaintiff who had also been negligent provided that the
defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do
so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any, the common law last
clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the common law
concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by the
plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in technical
terms, is to determine whose negligence - the plaintiff's or the defendant's
- was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. The relative location in the
continuum of time of the plaintiff's and the defendant's negligent acts or
omissions, is only one of the relevant factors that may be taken into account.
Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or
omission of each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by
such act or omission for the rest of the community. Our law on quasi-delicts
seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate
them among the members of society. To accept the petitioners' pro-position
must tend to weaken the very bonds of society.

We believe that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by

allocating most of the damages on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the damages
awarded by the respondent appellate court, except the award of P10,000.00
as exemplary damages and P4,500.00 as attorney's fees and costs, shall be
borne by private respondent Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be
paid by petitioners Carbonel and Phoenix who shall be solidarity liable
therefor to the former. The award of exemplary damages and attorney's
fees and costs shall be borne exclusively by the petitioners. Phoenix is of
course entitled to reimbursement from Carbonel. 18 We see no sufficient
reason for disturbing the reduced award of damages made by the
respondent appellate court.

Syllabi:

1. Torts; Evidence; Private respondent had no curfew pass during the night
the accident took place. The certification by a major assigned in Pampanga
that respondent has a curfew pass is not credible as it lacks the necessary
details.-

Private respondent Dionisio was not able to produce any curfew pass during
the trial. Instead, he offered the explanation that his family may have
misplaced his curfew pass. He also offered a certification (dated two years
after the accident) issued by one Major Benjamin N. Libarnes of the Zone
Integrated Police Intelligence Unit of Campo Olivas, San Fernando,
Pampanga, which was said to have authority to issue curfew passes for
Pampanga and Metro Manila. This certification was to the effect that
private respondent Dionisio had a valid curfew pass. This certification did
not, however, specify any pass serial number or date or period of effectivity
of the supposed curfew pass. We find that private respondent Dionisio was
unable to prove possession of a valid curfew pass during the night of the
accident and that the preponderance of evidence shows that he did not have
such a pass during that night. The relevance of possession or non-possession
of a curfew pass that night lies in the light it tends to shed on the other
related issues: whether Dionisio was speeding home and whether he had
indeed purposely put out his headlights before the accident, in order to
avoid detection and possibly arrest by the police in the nearby police station
for travelling after the onset of curfew without a valid curfew pass.

2. Torts; Evidence; Information gathered by a traffic investigator from

persons who saw how the accident took place is admissible as part of the res
gestae.-

We think that an automobile speeding down a street and suddenly smashing

into a stationary object in the dead of night is a sufficiently startling event
as to evoke spontaneous, rather than reflective, reactions from observers
who happened to be around at that time. The testimony of Patrolman Cuyno
was therefore admissible as part of the res gestae and should have been
considered by the trial court. Clearly, substantial weight should have been
ascribed to such testimony, even though it did not, as it could not, have
purported to describe quantitatively the precise velocity at which Dionisio
was travelling just before impact with the Phoenix dump truck.

3. Torts; Evidence; Petitioner's theory that respondent deliberately shut

off his headlights as he turned the intersection where his car later on
bumped a parked dumptruck is more credible than respondent's claim that
his car's lights suddenly turned off.-
A third related issue is whether Dionisio purposely turned off his headlights,
or whether his headlights accidentally malfunctioned, just moments before
the accident. The Intermediate Appellate Court expressly found that the
headlights of Dionisio's car went off as he crossed the intersection but was
non-committal as to why they did so. It is the petitioners' contention that
Dionisio purposely shut off his headlights even before he reached the
intersection so as not to be detected by the police in the police precinct
which he (being a resident in the area) knew was not far away from the
intersection. We believe that the petitioners' theory is a more credible
explanation than that offered by private respondent Dionisio—i.e., that he
had his headlights on but that, at the crucial moment, these had in some
mysterious if convenient way malfunctioned and gone off, although he
succeeded in switching his lights on again at "bright" split seconds before
contact with the dump truck.

Allied Banking vs. BPI

FACTS:

On October 10, 2002, a check in the amount of P1,000,000.00 payable to

MMGI was presented for deposit and accepted at petitioner’s Kawit Branch.
The check, post-dated “Oct. 9, 2003”, was drawn against the account of
Marciano Silva, Jr. with respondent BPI Bel-Air Branch. Upon receipt,
petitioner sent the check for clearing to respondent through the Philippine
Clearing House Corporation (PCHC).

The check was cleared by respondent and petitioner credited the account of
MMGI with P1,000,000.00. On October 22, 2002, MMGI’s account was
closed and all the funds therein were withdrawn. A month later, Silva
discovered the debit of P1,000,000.00 from his account. In response to
Silva’s complaint, respondent credited his account with the aforesaid sum.
Petitioner filed a complaint before the Arbitration Committee, asserting
that respondent should solely bear the entire face value of the check due to
its negligence in failing to return the check to petitioner within the 24-hour
reglementary period as provided in Section 20.1 of the Clearing House Rules
and Regulations 2000. In its Answer with Counterclaims, respondent charged
petitioner with gross negligence for accepting the post-dated check in the
first place. It contended that petitioner’s admitted negligence was the sole
and proximate cause of the loss.

The Arbitration Committee further noted that respondent not only failed to
return the check within the 24-hour reglementary period, it also failed to
institute any formal complaint within the contemplation of Section 20.3 and
it appears that respondent was already contented with the 50-50 split
initially implemented by the PCHC. Finding both parties negligent in the
performance of their duties, the Committee applied the doctrine of “Last
Clear Chance” and ruled that the loss should be shouldered by respondent
alone

ISSUE:

Whether the doctrine of last clear chance applies to the case and whether
there was contributory negligence by the respondent?

RULING:

The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is that the negligence of
the plaintiff does not preclude a recovery for the negligence of the
defendant where it appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable
care and prudence, might have avoided injurious consequences to the
plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff’s negligence. The doctrine necessarily
assumes negligence on the part of the defendant and contributory
negligence on the part of the plaintiff, and does not apply except upon that
assumption. Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff
does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening
negligence of the defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the
impending harm by the exercise of due diligence. Moreover, in situations
where the doctrine has been applied, it was defendant’s failure to exercise
such ordinary care, having the last clear chance to avoid loss or injury, which
was the proximate cause of the occurrence of such loss or injury.

In this case, the evidence clearly shows that the proximate cause of the
unwarranted encashment of the subject check was the negligence of
respondent who cleared a post-dated check sent to it thru the PCHC clearing
facility without observing its own verification procedure. As correctly found
by the PCHC and upheld by the RTC, if only respondent exercised ordinary
care in the clearing process, it could have easily noticed the glaring defect
upon seeing the date written on the face of the check “Oct. 9, 2003”.
Respondent could have then promptly returned the check and with the check
thus dishonored, petitioner would have not credited the amount thereof to
the payee’s account. Thus, notwithstanding the antecedent negligence of the
petitioner in accepting the post-dated check for deposit, it can seek
reimbursement from respondent the amount credited to the payee’s account
covering the check.

“Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of the injured party,

contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which falls below
the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection.”
Admittedly, petitioner’s acceptance of the subject check for deposit despite
the one year postdate written on its face was a clear violation of established
banking regulations and practices. In such instances, payment should be
refused by the drawee bank and returned through the PCHC within the 24-
hour reglementary period. As aptly observed by the CA, petitioner’s failure
to comply with this basic policy regarding post-dated checks was “a telling
sign of its lack of due diligence in handling checks coursed through it.”
It bears stressing that “the diligence required of banks is more than that of
a Roman pater familias or a good father of a family. The highest degree of
diligence is expected,” considering the nature of the banking business that is
imbued with public interest. While it is true that respondent’s liability for
its negligent clearing of the check is greater, petitioner cannot take lightly
its own violation of the long-standing rule against encashment of post-dated
checks and the injurious consequences of allowing such checks into the
clearing system.