6 definition of crime referred to by Muncie (2001)

Introduction

Crime is the breach of rules or laws for which some governing authority can ultimately
prescribe a conviction. Crimes may also result in cautions, rehabilitation, or be unenforced.
Individual human societies may each define crime and crimes differently, in different
localities, and at different time stages of the crime. While every crime violates the law, not
every violation of the law counts as a crime. It allows us to think more explicitly about
whether and in what ways the use of the label ‘crime’ reflects certain interests and priorities.
There are many examples you could reflect on in this context, but consider, for instance, the
use of public order offences to respond to political protests; or the way the approach of the
criminal law to homosexual activity has changed over time.

Many authors and academics have attempted to define the term crime and the behaviors
which it encompasses. McLaughlin and Munice (2001, p. 78) attempt defining crime as
deplorable acts which are deemed as inappropriate by constitutions and generally consented
to. Although upon the surface the notion of crime seems quite rigid when further explored
can be seen as extremely abstract and plastic. According to the Sage Dictionary of
Criminology, the ability to define crime is a difficult concept. It depends at what stage of time
we are in and how we perceive things. The idea of crime also draws upon how an individual,
or a set of individuals are linked with society, in that they show, or do not show solidarity
within civilization. The definition also draws upon the idea of ‘consensus’ meaning how
much an individual agrees with societies’ norms and values (McLaughlin & Muncie, 2001,
p.85).

This essay will refer to Japanese contemporary penal strategies, with brief comparisons to
the US and the UK, to critically discuss the contention that “All theories of crime are
potentially theories of crime reduction/prevention.” Throughout, a focus on crime reduction
and youth justice is maintained, since addressing these `wicked issues' is pivotal to realizing
New Labour's long-term objective of commanding the center ground of law and order politics
in the UK. We argue that an institutionalization and normalization of managerialism is taking
place to `resolve' the contradictions, tensions and disconnections generated by the
Conservatives' incomplete public sector reform project and to create the basis for achieving
the long-held ideal of a cost-effective, efficient, `seamless' criminal justice system. In the
conclusion we discuss the implications of the open-ended relationship between the
unrelenting managerialization of criminal justice and the on-going politicization of law and
order associated with New Labour's electoral promise to be `tough on crime'.. In fact, the
contention is a dependent on factors such as environments (demographic and geographic),
progress (economic and educational), justice (legal and administrative) and cultural factors
that play a role in different penal strategies and crime levels indifferent countries (Komiya,
1999:370)

Body

The first claim of the contention is that the sociological strain theory (i.e. achieving economic
success through illegitimate means) (McLaughlin and Muncie, 2001:923), impacts the
Japanese penal strategy rather than directly being a theory of crime reduction/prevention.
Although most people share the same goal of achieving a certain level of wealth and success,
people within the lower classes do not have the same opportunities of attaining these goals as
wealthier people do. Robert Merton (1938) mentions the role that individual goals plays in
pressuring people to commit crime through structural strain and the role of social structures
conflicting with the perception of need sand opportunities expected of at a general social
level (Ibid.). However, in the Japanese case, most strain is perceived to be individual strain
with foreign residents and young people being the highest of likely in being the main culprits
of safety deterioration in Japan (Johnson, 2007: 374-375)

Subsequently, through the use of theory of strain as an influence, the Japanese government
controls criminal activity through tackling the foreigners as well as the poor. With the
dramatic increase in poverty in lower-class areas in Japan, high rates of people receiving
‘livelihood protection assistance’ (welfare) from the government is similarly causing moral
panic towards crime rates (Ibid. 404). In this case, moral panic is a disproportional social
reaction leading to the demand for social control i.e. of the assumption of rising crime rates
once welfare provision stops (McLaughlin and Muncie, 2001:175). Another response is
through a ‘deterioration of public order’ by police force expansion (by 10,000 officers in
2004) and increasing aggression. Although there is a difference between the cultural
dynamics of policing between the US and Japan, the policing response is partly inspired by
the “zero tolerance” and “broken windows” policing strategies from the United States (Ibid.
393). Therefore, the situation of strain would impact decision-making to the police (and
private corporations) on the best response to crime reduction and/or prevention. As a result,
the Japanese prosecutors alongside the immigration bureau and Ministry of Justice
strengthening the immigration control by doubling the number of Japan’s foreign inmate
population, fingerprint immigration tracking as well as conducted arrests of ganggroups and
illegal aliens in the country. The Japanese House of Representatives approved an April2006
bill on revising the immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Law to require foreigners
tobe photographed and fingerprinted when entering the country. The justifications of the law
are that it will “... “be helpful for dealing with crimes committed by foreigners" and that
"fingerprinting visitors [is] common" in other nations” (Ota, 2004 cited in Gregory, 2004:407
)

Similarly, the Japanese police force has been increasingly policing and blockades on sex
trade indistricts such as the Kabukisho sex district (Johnson, 2007: 394). This data does not
justify thecontention that theories of crime are theories of punishment, rather, visibly
illustrates that theoriesof crime result to impacts of the penal strategies in Japan.On the other
hand, one must critically evaluate that some theories of crime are indeed potentially theories
of crime reduction/prevention such that the decision between the two theories of crime
isusually taken over by the proletariats (i.e. elites). In the case of the Japanese, social norms
and moral education that is passed on from one generation to another play a role in this
‘natural’ form of crime prevention i.e.

A second supporting point to the contention, is that conflict theory, i.e. the class conflict
theory of power differentials in the “systematic generation of structured inequalities in
capitalist societies” (McLaughlin and Muncie, 2001:48), can potentially be a theory of crime
prevention/reduction. Thesis such that the elites (i.e. the bourgeoisie) use their power in order
to increase their authority (Johnson, 2007: 411). David Leheny (2006) examined the Japanese
officials’ exploitation of criminal events and public anxiety to enhance their own power in
order to choose the types of responses to terrorism, child prostitution and pornography (ibid).
This form of power as a social control is done through manipulation of media on what the
consequences of crime are as well as remaining in power through their responses to them for
public favoritism. Therefore, the Japanese elite has higher ‘power’ towards affecting public
as well as government responses indecision-making on crime control - making the social
(class) aspect of the theory potentially being a theory of crime prevention/reduction.

Conclusion

In conclusion, this paper has critically challenged the contention that not all theories of crime
are potentially theories of crime prevention/reduction, and that the responses to crime are
highly dependent on factors such as the environment (demographic and geographic), progress
(economic and educational), justice (legal and administrative) and cultural factors that play a
role in different penal strategies and crime levels in different countries (Komiya, 1999:370).
While countries like the UK and the US have a culture of ‘crime control’, Japan has lower
crime rates by adopting both the western justice systems as well as traditional forms of
progress, environmental and cultural factors to prevent rising crime rate. Criminological
theories have different ideas on the concept of defining crime, although it cannot be
dismissed that crime is a social and ideological construct. Constructionist theories locate
power in the ability to classify and label what behavior is criminal. This has complications for
policies as the definitions of crime are not self-evident; but are embedded in power relations
that implicate all human behaviors and all people

References

 Muncie, J and McLaughlin, E (2001) The Problem of Crime (2nd ed, London:

Sage)
 Cohen, S. (1985) Visions of Social Control. Cambridge: Polity Press.
 Fenwick, M. (2013). ‘Penal populism’ and penological change in contemporary Japan.
TheoreticalCriminology , 17(2), pp.215-231.
 Ferri. E. (1901) ‘Causes of Criminal Behaviour ’ in McLaughlin, E., Muncie, J. and Hughes, G.(2013)
Criminological Perspectives (3rd Edition), London: Sage
 Garland, D. (2001) The Culture of Control: Crime and Social Order in Contemporary Society .
Chicago:University of Chicago Press.

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