ARREST – DEFINITION; NATURE

G.R. No. 234207, June 10, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
MARLON CRISTOBAL Y AMBROSIO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
CAGUIOA, J.:

FACTS:
Police officer’s version
Accused-appellant Marlon Cristobal was flagged down by PO2 Rexy Ramos for driving a
motorcycle without a helmet ordering Ramos to present OR and CR of the motorcycle. Failure to present
such, Ramos then asked for his driver’s license. While being ticketed, Cristobal ran away but was
apprehended and brought back to the checkpoint thereby subjected for search for deadly weapon but
nothing was found. However, PO2 Ramos noticed that accused-appellant's pocket was bulging which
appeared to be small plastic bag therefrom which appeared to be seven plastic sachets of shabu. Hence
his warrantless arrest and thereby charged with violation of with Violation of Section 11, Art. 2 of R.A.
9165 (illegal possession of dangerous drugs) despite denial and defense that he was framed thereof.

Cristobal’s version
He was unable to produce the OR/CR as the key to open the motorcycle compartment was lost.
PO2 Ramos suddenly told him to stand up and empty his pockets. He brought out the contents of his
pockets, ₱18,000.00, which was sent by his mother and was intended for his wedding. PO2 Ramos then
went to his police mobile, returned, said "positive", and frisked him on his waist. Nothing else was found
in his possession.

The RTC-Pasig City found accused-appellant guilty of the crime charged holding that his search
was justified under the "stop and frisk" doctrine, or otherwise called the Terry search. The CA affirmed
the assailed decision. Hence, this instant appeal.

ISSUE: WON accused-appellant’s warrantless arrest and its subsequent search was valid.

HELD:
NO.
As to the warrantless arrest:
His violation of the traffic code was not, ipso facto, the reason of his arrest. In Luz V. People,
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by that
person's voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest. Neither the application of
actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor a formal declaration of arrest, is
required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other, and
that there be an intent on the part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary.
Failure to wear a helmet while riding a motorcycle under RA 10054 and failure to furnish the OR
and CR of the motorcycle are both punishable by fine only. Under the Rules of Court , a warrant of arrest
need not be issued if the information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a fine only. It may
be stated as a corollary that neither can a warrantless arrest be made for such an offense.
As to the search:
The law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made — the process
cannot be reversed. Since there was no valid arrest, there was neither a valid search incidental to a
lawful arrest nor a valid “stop and frisk” search.
In Terry v. Ohio, where the doctrine of stop and frisk search was based, states that where a
police officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his
experience that criminal activity may be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be
armed and presently dangerous, where, in the course of investigating this behavior, he identifies himself
as a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter
serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such persons
in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.
In Manalili vs. Court of Appeals, said doctrine did not, however, abandon the rule that the police
must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and seizures through the
warrant procedure, excused only by exigent circumstances. Hence, in People vs. Cogaed, should be
balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution.
In the case at bar, the police officers' act of proceeding to search Cristobal's body, despite their
own admission that they were unable to find any weapon on him, constitutes an invalid and
unconstitutional search.

WHEN AND HOW ISSUED?

G.R. No. 187094, February 15, 2017

LIZA L. MAZA, SATURNINO C. OCAMPO, TEODORO A. CASINO, AND RAFAEL V. MARIANO, Petitioners
v.
HON. EVELYN A. TURLA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court of Palayan City,
Regional Trial Court of Palayan City, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge Provincial Prosecutor,
ANTONIO LL. LAPUS, JR., EDISON V. RAFANAN, and EDDIE C. GUTIERREZ, in their capacity as members
of the panel of investigating prosecutors, and RAUL M. GONZALEZ, in his capacity as Secretary of
Justice, Respondents
LEONEN, J.:

FACTS:
Inpector Palomo referred to the Provincial Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City, Nueva Ecija, three
cases of murder Carlito Bayudang, Jimmy Peralta and Danilo Felipe (supporters of AKBAYAN Party List)
against petitioners, who were former members of the House of Representatives (Maza represented
Gabriela Women's Party; Casino represented Bayan Muna Party-List and Mariano represented
Anakpawis) and 15 other persons.
The panel of investigating prosecutors found probable cause for murder in the killing of
Bayundang and Peralta and for kidnapping with murder in the killing of Felipe, against the nineteen 19
suspects. Two Informations for murder were filed before the RTC-Palayan City (Palayan cases) and an
Information for kidnapping with murder was filed in Guimba, Nueva Ecija (Guimba case).
The Guimba case was dismissed for lack of probable cause. In Palayan case, respondent Judge
Turla held that the proper procedure in the conduct of the preliminary investigation was not followed.
The case was remanded to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Nueva Ecija to conduct the
preliminary investigation. Hence, this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with a Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
 Petitioners claim that Judge Turla's order of remanding the case back to the prosecutors had no
basis in law, jurisprudence, or the rules. Since she had already evaluated the evidence submitted by the
prosecutors along with the Informations, she should have determined the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of arrest warrants or the dismissal of the Palayan cases.

ISSUES:
1. WON petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts in bringing their petition directly
before this Court.
2. WON the remand of the criminal case to the Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct of preliminary
investigation was proper.
3. WON the admissibility of evidence can be ruled upon preliminary investigation.

HELD:
1. YES. This petition is an exception to the principle of hierarchy of courts.
In The Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, the hierarchy of courts was created to ensure that every
level of the judiciary performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. However, direct
resort to this court is allowed, to wit:
1. When there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most
immediate time which includes availing of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition to assail
the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and executive branches of the government;
2. When the issues involved are of transcendental importance. The imminence and clarity of the
threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence;
3. In cases of first impression where no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts
on this matter;
4. The constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court;
5. Exigency in certain situations;
6. The filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ;
7. When there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; or
8. When the petition includes questions that are dictated by public welfare and the
advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders
complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an
inappropriate remedy.

2. NO.
Napoles v. De Lima, the determination of probable cause by the trial court judge is a judicial
function, whereas the determination of probable cause by the prosecutors is an executive function.
Otherwise stated in De Lima v. Reyes, the courts do not interfere with the prosecutor’s conduct of a
preliminary investigation. The prosecutor’s determination of probable cause is solely within his or her
discretion.
Pursuant to Sec 5(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, upon filing of an
information in court, trial court judges must determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause
based on their personal evaluation of the prosecutor's report and its supporting documents. They may:
(1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; (2) issue an arrest
warrant commitment order of findings show probable cause; or (3) require the prosecutor for the
submission of additional evidence if there is doubt on the existence of probable cause.
However, they cannot remand the case for another conduct of preliminary investigation on the
ground that the earlier preliminary investigation was improperly conducted.
3. NO.
A preliminary investigation is merely preparatory to a trial. It is not a trial on the merits.
Moreover, it cannot be expected that upon the filing of the information in court the prosecutor would
have already presented all the evidence necessary to secure a conviction of the accused.

PROBABLE CAUSE
G.R. No. 222870, July 8, 2019
JESSIE TAGASTASON, ROGELIO TAGASTASON, JR., ANNIE BACALA-TAGASTASON, and JERSON
TAGASTASON, Petitioners
v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR OF BUTUAN CITY, SUSANO
BACALA, and BELINDA BACALA, Respondents
CARPIO, J.:

FACTS:
In March 2012, a complaint for murder and Frustrated Murder was filed against the accused,
herein petitioners, Jessie Tagastason, Rogelio Tagastason, Jr., Marlon Tagastason, Jerson Tagastason,
Elias Tagastason, Annie Bacala-Tagastason, Gil Ugacho, and Merlyn Bacala-Ugacho. Through their
counsel, the accused filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File their Counter-Affidavits which was
granted by the prosecutor giving them until April 4, 2012 instead of April 10, 2012, which was the date
prayed for by them. On April 4, 2012, found probable cause thereby filed the pertinent informations
thereto. On April 10, Judge Maclang issued the Warrants of Arrest.
The accused then filed the following: (1) Petition for Review before the Department of Justice
(DOJ); (2) Administrative Complaint against the City Prosecutor; and (3) Motion for Inhibition and
Holding in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest before the trial court.
Judge Maclang denied the Motion to Hold in Abeyance the Issuance of Warrants of Arrest but
set the Motion for Inhibition for hearing. During the pendency of the pertinent motion for
reconsideration, which was later denied, the accused filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
before the Court of Appeals.
The CA denied said petition. It held that that there was no denial of due process because
lawyers should not assume that their motions for extension would be granted as a matter of course. The
resolution of the City Prosecutor pertains only to the positive identification of the accused as the
perpetrators of the crime. The motion for inhibition of Judge Maclang was set for hearing and has not
yet been resolved when the accused filed the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
A motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence this petition.

ISSUES:
1. WON the warrant of arrest was valid.
2. WON petitioners were deprived of due process.

HELD:
1. YES.
The issuance of a warrant of arrest is within the discretion of the issuing judge upon
determination of the existence of probable cause.
In Mendoza v. People, there are two kinds of determination of probable cause: executive and
judicial. The executive determination of probable cause is one made during preliminary investigation
whereby the public prosecutor, having the quasi-judicial authority, shall determine whether probable
cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime as defined by law and
thus should be held for trial.
The judicial determination of probable cause, on the other hand, is one made by the judge to
ascertain whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused. He does not act as an
appellate court of the prosecutor and has no capacity to review the prosecutor's determination of
probable cause; rather, the judge makes a determination of probable cause independent of the
prosecutor's finding.
The function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the determination of probable cause
is exclusive and cannot be deferred pending the resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of
Justice as to the finding of probable cause, which is a function that is executive in nature. To defer the
implementation of the warrant of arrest would be an encroachment on the exclusive prerogative of the
judge to issue a warrant of arrest.
Moreover, appeal before the DOJ Secretary does not hold in abeyance the proceeding before
the trial court pursuant to the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal.

2. NO. The petition for review is still pending before the DOJ Secretary. It is premature for this Court to
preempt the DOJ Secretary in resolving the issue. While petitioners filed a motion for extension of
time to file their counter-affidavits, they should not assume that their motion would be granted.

WARRANTLESS ARREST
A. IN FLAGRANTE DELICTO

G.R. No. 234155, March 25, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
EDUARDO CARINO YLEYVA, Accused-Appellant.
GESMUNDO, J.:

FACTS:
SPO2 Navarro arrested, for possession of illegal drugs, a certain Dexter Valencia who admitted
that appellant's house was purposely used for shabu sessions. SPO2 Navarro and his team conducted a
surveillance the vicinity of appellant's house. SPO2 Navarro saw appellant handing some money to a
certain Dulay in exchange for four sachets of shabu. A certain Mallari signaled that a pot session was
being taken place inside appellant’s house. When he later came out of it, appellant was arrested for
delivering shabu and maintaining a drug den.
After the arrest, SPO2 Navarro stooped to look inside the house and confirmed that a certain
Noel Manianglung was heating foil with a lighter and a woman was holding a rolled aluminum foil and
using it as a "tooter”. Several sachets of shabu and drug paraphernalia were seized. Appellant admitted
being a drug user but refused to sign the inventory.
The RTC-Tarlac City acquitted appellant form the charge of illegal sale of dangerous drugs
because the police officers conducted only a surveillance, not a buy-bust operation. But convicted him
for maintenance of drug den under Sec. 6 of RA 9165. The CA affirmed the assailed decision holding that
the drugs seized were admissible since they were the result of a valid warrantless search and seizure
under the "plain view doctrine”. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUES:
1. WON the plain view doctrine was applicable.
2. WON the warrantless arrest and its subsequent search was valid.
3. WON the general reputation of the house was duly established.
4. WON the chain of custody rule was complied.

HELD:
1. NO.
For an accused to be convicted of maintenance of a drug den under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9165,
two things must be established: (a) that the place is a den – a place where any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential chemical is administered, delivered, stored for illegal purposes,
distributed, sold, or used in any form; and (b) that the accused maintains the said place.
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement
officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he
can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately
apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise
subject to seizure.
In the case at bar, it was a certain Mallari who saw that drugs were being used inside appellant's
house during the surveillance operation. However, he was never presented as a witness, thus, it could
not be determined from the records whether the requisites of the plain view search were complied with
against appellant's alleged crime of maintenance of a drug den.

2. NO.
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5(a), Rule 113, two elements must concur,
namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence
or within the view of the arresting officer.
The apprehending officer must have been spurred by probable cause to arrest a person caught
in flagrante delicto. To be sure, the term probable cause has been understood to mean a reasonable
ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious
man's belief that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.
Navarro had no probable cause before the arrest that appellant was committing or had just
committed the crime of maintenance of a drug den. It was only after his arrest that SP02 Navarro
purportedly saw the drugs being used inside appellant's house. The finding of probable cause cannot
apply after the warrantless arrest had been made. Mallari could have established such probable cause
but as earlier stated, he was not presented as a witness.
The subsequent search, therefore, was also invalid applying the exclusionary rule or the doctrine
of the fruit of the poisonous tree which states that once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to
have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also
inadmissible. Evidence illegally obtained by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because
the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained.

3. NO.
A drug den is a lair or hideaway where prohibited or regulated drugs are used in any form or are
found. Its existence may be proved not only by direct evidence but may also be established by proof of
facts and circumstances, including evidence of the general reputation of the house, or its general
reputation among police officers.
A witness can testify only on the facts that are of his own personal knowledge, i.e., those which
are derived from his own perception and not of what he has merely learned, read or heard from others
because such testimony is considered hearsay.
 Hearsay evidence, as a general rule, is inadmissible. However, the lack of objection to hearsay
testimony may result in its being admitted as evidence. But admissibility of evidence should not be
equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given
credence for it has no probative value.
In the case at bar, the hearsay testimony of SP02 Navarro cannot be given evidentiary value to
convict appellant for the crime of maintenance of a drug den.

4. NO.
Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 requires the apprehending team, after seizure and confiscation, to
immediately conduct a physical inventory and photograph the same in the presence of (1) the accused
or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel; (2) a representative from the media and (3) the DOJ; and (4) any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
This saving clause, however, applies only (1) where the prosecution recognized the procedural
lapses and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds, and (2) when the prosecution established
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved.
In the case, no media representative was present and the police officers failed to preserve the
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti. Hence, the acquittal.

G.R. No. 234686, June 10, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v.
MICHAEL FRIAS Y SARABIA ALIAS "NICKER," ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

FACTS:
Prosecution’s version
PDEA agent Tecson eceived a report from a confidential informant that appellant and his live-in
partner Marichu Suson were selling shabu at Purok Mahigugmaon, Brgy. 22, Bacolod City. A buy-bust
operation was executed. Agent Pinanonang, the potential buyer, arrested and frisked appellant and
recovered from him another plastic sachet containing shabu and the buy-bust money. ₱500.00 bill. Sison
was also frisked and recovered from her a plastic sachet also containing white crystalline substance. The
items were marked and inventoried and photographed at the place of arrest and in the presence of
media representatives and barangay officials. An information was thereafter filed charging appellant for
violation of Sec.5 (illegal sale of Dangerous Drugs) and Sec. 11 (Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs),
Art. 2 of RA 9165.

Defense’s version
Appellant and Suson testified they were inside their bedroom when the PDEA agents suddenly
barged in. The agents pointed long firearms to them and announced a raid. They were made to leave
the room but the agents remained inside. They were frisked and found nothing. Appellant denied the
transaction and claimed that he got coerced to sign the inventory of the confiscated items.

The RTC found appellant guilty of the crimes charged which was affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
1. WON the warrantless arrest and its subsequent search was valid.
2. WON the chain of custody rule was properly complied.
HELD:
1. YES.
Sec. 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states that an arrest without warrant is
lawful when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
In People v. Rivera, an arrest made after an entrapment operation, as in this case a buy-bust
operation – a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers, does not require a warrant
inasmuch as it is considered a valid warrantless arrest.
In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without
anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. Prior surveillance is not a requisite thereof.
Flexibility is a trait of good police work. For so long as the rights of the accused have not been violated in
the process, the arresting officers may carry out its entrapment operations and the courts will not pass
on the wisdom thereof. Also, mere absence of ultraviolet powder on the buy-bust money does not
invalidate the buy-bust operation.
Consequently, there being a valid warrantless arrest, the incidental search was, therefore, valid.

2. NO, hence the accused’s ACQUITTAL.

Chain of Custody is mandatory as it determines the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus
delicti, which is the dangerous drug itself, and ultimately, the liberty of the accused.
Under Sec. 21 (1), RA 9165, the physical inventory and photograph of the sized or confiscated
drugs immediately after seizure or confiscation shall be done in the presence of the accused, a media
representative, a representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected local official.
The saving clause under Sec. 21 (a), Article II of the IRR of RA 9165 commands that non-
compliance with the prescribed requirement shall not invalidate the seizure and custody of the items
provided such non-compliance is justified and the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officers. Moreover, in People v. Jugo, the justifiable ground for
non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or
that they even exist.
In the case at bar, a representative from the DOJ was not present and the prosecution failed to
acknowledge this deficiency, let alone, offer any explanation therefor.

B. HOT PURSUIT

G .R. No. 238659, June 3, 2019

FRANKLIN B. VAPOROSO and JOELREN B. TULILIK, Petitioners,
v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioners suddenly flight upon being flagged by PO2 Torculas, who personally saw petitioners
holding a lady bag which appeared to have been taken from a parked vehicle. The owner of the vehicle,
Narcisa Dombase, approached PO2 Torculas and told him that petitioners broke the window of her
vehicle and took her belongings. Petitioners were arrested six hours later wherein they were bodily
searched but found nothing but personal belongings. A more thorough search was conducted at the
police station which yielded 5 plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from Vaporoso and
4 plastic sachets with similar white crystalline substance from Tulilik. Hence, charged with violation of
Sec. 11, Art. 2 of RA 9165 (Illegal possession of Dangerous Drugs).
The RTC-Panabo City, Davao del Norte found petitioners guilty. The CA affirmed. Hence, this
petiion.

ISSUES:
1. WON the warrantless arrest was valid.
2. WON the subsequent search falls within the purview of a valid search incidental to their lawful
arrest.

HELD:
1. YES.
In warrantless arrests made pursuant to Section 5 (b), Rule 113, it is required that at the time of
the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge
of facts based on probable cause indicating that the accused had committed it. It is essential, therefore,
that the element of personal knowledge must be coupled with the element of immediacy – that the
police officer's determination of probable cause would necessarily be limited to raw or uncontaminated
facts or circumstances, gathered as they were within a very limited period of time ; otherwise, the arrest
may be nullified, and resultantly, the items yielded through the search incidental thereto will be
rendered inadmissible in consonance with the exclusionary rule of the 1987 Constitution.
In the case at bar, petitioners' sudden flight upon being flagged by P02 Torculas, coupled with
Dombase's narration of what had just transpired is enough to provide P02 Torculas with personal
knowledge of facts indicating that a crime had just been committed and that petitioners are the
perpetrators thereof. Moreover, upon gaining such personal knowledge, not only did P02 Torculas chase
petitioners until they entered a dark, secluded area, he also called for back-up and conducted a "stake-
out" right then and there until they were able to arrest petitioners about 6 hours later. Hence, personal
knowledge and immediacy exist.

2. NO, hence the accused’s AQUITTAL.

Searches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure which states that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an
offense without a search warrant.
This is to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be
armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach, either
on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. Such warrantless search
obviously cannot be made in a place other than the place of arrest.
In People v. Calantiao, a gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as
dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested.
In the case at bar, the “more thorough” search cannot be said to fall under this exception
considering that a substantial amount of time had already elapsed from the time of the arrest to the
time of the second search. Moreover, it was conducted at a venue other than the place of actual arrest,
i.e., the Panabo Police Station.

REASONABLE SUSPISCION; TIP

G.R. No. 211214, March 20, 2019

LARRY SABUCO MANIBOG, Petitioner
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
LEONEN, J.:

FACTS:
Chief Inspector Beniat arrested petitioner Manibog without a warrant for violation of the
Omnibus Election Code (Gun Ban) based on a tip and upon seeing a bulge on petitioner’s waist, which
the police officer deduced to be a gun due to its distinct contour. In his defense, petitioner did not deny
that he was carrying a gun when the police officers arrested him. However, he claimed that while Chief
Inspector Beniat was frisking him, the police officer whispered an apology, explaining that he had to do
it or he would get in trouble with the police provincial director.
The RTC- Laoag City, Ilocos Norte found Madamba guilty of the crime charged. The CA upheld
the assailed decission that the search made on Manibog was incidental to a lawful arrest being caught in
flagrante delicto and failed to show a permit allowing him to carry his firearm. Consequently. A motion
for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: WON the warrantless search was valid.

HELD: YES.
For an arrest to be lawful, a warrant of arrest must have been judicially issued or there was a
lawful warrantless arrest as provided for in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, to wit:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

For valid warrantless arrests under Section 5(a) and (b), the arresting officer must have personal
knowledge of the offense. The difference is that under Section 5(a), the arresting officer must have
personally witnessed the crime; meanwhile, under Section 5(b), the arresting officer must have had
probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested committed an offense. Nonetheless, whether
under Section 5(a) or (b), the lawful arrest generally precedes, or is substantially contemporaneous, with
the search.
The CA erred in ruling that the search conducted on petitioner fell under the established
exception of a warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest. The tip on petitioner, coupled with the
police officers' visual confirmation that petitioner had a gun-shaped object tucked in his waistband, led
to a reasonable suspicion that he was carrying a gun during an election gun ban. However, a reasonable
suspicion is not synonymous with the personal knowledge required under Section 5(a) and (b) to effect a
valid warrantless arrest.
Nonetheless, the search falls under the “stop and frisk” search. For it to be valid, the totality of
suspicious circumstances, as personally observed by the arresting officer, must lead to a genuine reason
to suspect that a person is committing an illicit act. Consequently, a warrantless arrest not based on this
constitutes an infringement of a person's basic right to privacy.
 In the case at bar, the combination of the police asset's tip and the arresting officers'
observation of a gun-shaped object under petitioner's shirt already suffices as a genuine reason for the
arresting officers to conduct a stop and frisk search on petitioner.

G.R. No. 233777, March 20, 2019

MARVIN PORTERIA Y MANEBALI, PETITIONER
v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
REYES, A., JR., J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Porteria was arrested without a warrant for illegal possession of firearm based on a
report that “there was a suspicious person with something tucked in his waist”. During the search, the
authorities found in his possession photocopies of OR/CR of a stolen motorcycle which appeared to be
owned by Christian P. Mien, hence charged with violation of RA 6539 or the Anti-Carnapping Act of
1972. Virgie, Porteria’s mother, testified that Marvin allegedly admitted taking Christian's motorcycle
and going on a road trip to Quezon.
The RTC-Naga City found Porteria guilty of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the assailed
decision. A motion for reconsideration as denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
1. WON the warrantless arrest and the search subsequent to it was valid.
2. WON the search falls under the stop-and-frisk search.
3. WON the extrajudicial confession was sufficient to prove his guilt.

HELD:
1. NO.
An in flagrante delicto arrest requires the concurrence of two (2) elements: (a) the person
arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he or she has just committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) the overt act was done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer.
It was not established that Porteria had a firearm visibly tucked in his waist, or that he behaved
in a manner which would elicit a reasonable suspicion that he committed an offense. Reliable
information alone is insufficient to support an in flagrante delicto arrest absent any overt act from the
person to be arrested indicating that a crime has just been committed, was being committed, or is about
to be committed.
Meanwhile, for a hot pursuit arrest, there must be an offense that was just committed, and the
arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused committed it. A hearsay tip
by itself does not justify a hot pursuit arrest. Law enforcers must have personal knowledge of facts,
based on their observation, that the person sought to be arrested has just committed a crime.
There being no valid warrantless arrest, the search conducted on Marvin's body and belongings
is likewise unjustified. The law requires that there should be a lawful arrest prior to the search. – the
process cannot be reversed.

As to the WAIVER
When there is an irregularity in the arrest of an accused, the accused must object to the validity
of his arrest before arraignment. Otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. However, the waiver of an
illegal warrantless arrest does not carry the admissibility of evidence seized during the illegal
warrantless arrest.

2. NO.
A stop-and-frisk search is defined as "the act of a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate
him, and pat him for weapon(s) or contraband." Searches under stop-and-frisk are limited to the
protective search of outer clothing for weapons. The search must be premised on the manifest overt
acts of an accused, which give law enforcers a less than probable cause, but more than mere suspicion –
genuine reason to conduct the search.

3. NO. Hence, his acquittal.

Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states that persons under investigation for the
commission of an offense should be informed of their right to remain silent, and their right to counsel.
These rights may not be waived, except in writing and in the presence of a counsel. Any confession or
admission obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible as evidence against the accused.
Sec. 2 (d) of RA 7438 further states that any extrajudicial confession made by a person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation shall be in writing and signed by such person in the presence
of his counsel or in the latter's absence, upon a valid waiver, and in the presence of any of the parents,
elder brothers and sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, the municipal judge, district school
supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel as chosen by him; otherwise, such extrajudicial confession
shall be inadmissible as evidence in any proceeding.
These safeguards are meant to insulate the accused from "coercive psychological, if not
physical, atmosphere of [a custodial] investigation.

As to Porteria’s supposed admission to P/Insp. Villamer that the motorcycle is in the possession of a
certain Felix.
Porteria was not informed of his custodial rights when he was arrested. When police officers
began questioning Marvin about the items found in his possession, there should have been a counsel
present to assist him. Without the assistance of a counsel, and in the absence of a valid waiver of this
right, Porteria’s "voluntary" answer to P/Insp. Villamer is inadmissible as evidence of his guilt.

As to the supposed confession to his mother:

It is not within the scope of the constitutional and statutory limitations on extrajudicial
confessions. However, the prosecution must establish that the accused spoke freely, without
inducement of any kind, and fully aware of the consequences of the confession. This may be inferred
from the language of the confession, as when the accused provided details known only to him or her.
The Court cannot determine the voluntariness of said confession because it was not reduced
into writing or recorded in another manner. Nonetheless, such may be admitted as an independently
relevant statement but does not necessarily mean that the Court is persuaded.
An extrajudicial confession is not a sufficient ground for conviction, unless it is corroborated by
either direct or circumstantial evidence. If it is the latter, the accused may be convicted when: (a) there
is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived and proven; and (c)
the combination of jail the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The only remaining circumstance is the recovery of the stolen motorcycle in Sta. Rosa, Laguna.
The driver of the stolen motorcycle was Albert, not the petitioner in this case.87Marvin was not even
present at the time Albert was driving the motorcycle.

WAIVER
G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019
SIMEON LAPI y MAHIPUS, Petitioner
v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
LEONEN, J.:

FACTS:
Prosecution’s version:
PO2 Villarin, during a stake-out operation in Purok Sigay, Barangay 2, Bacolod City, heard heard
noises from one of the houses. He peeped through its window and saw petitioner Lapi, and 2 others,
Sacare and Lim, having a pot session. Having been arrested without a warrant and their paraphernalia
seized, these three, along with 2 other companion, were subjected to a drug test.

Defense’s version
Petitioner Lapi alleged that he was at the place to deliver mahjong set to a certain Antonio
Kadunggo. On his way home, two (2) persons approached him and searched his pocket. They took his
money, handcuffed him,, boarded him on a tricycle with four (4) other persons whom he did not know
and were subjected to a drug test.

The RTC found Lapi guilty of Violation of Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165 (Use of Dangerous Drugs). The
CA affirmed said decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
1. WON Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 was proper.
2. WON the warrantless arrest and its subsequent search was valid.
3. WON petitioner has waived his right to question the validity of the arrest.

HELD:
1. YES.
A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must, as a general rule,
only raise questions of law. In criminal cases, however, the accused has the constitutional right to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proven. To prove guilt, courts must evaluate the evidence
presented in relation to the elements of the crime charged. Thus, the finding of guilt is essentially a
question of fact.
In Ferrer v. People, an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review and
that it becomes the duty of the Court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed
from, whether they are assigned as errors or not.

2. YES.
Art. 3, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, the State cannot
intrude into the citizen's persons, house, papers, and effects without a warrant issued by a judge finding
probable cause.
The case of People v. Aruta, however, outlines the situations where a warrantless search and
seizure may be declared valid: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under
Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) Seizure of evidence in
"plain view," the elements of which are: (a) prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was
inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; and (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search; (3)
Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces
expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; (4) Consented
warrantless search; (5) Customs search; (6) Stop and Frisk; and (7) Exigent and Emergency
Circumstances.

For the above situations to be valid, the arrest must have been committed under the following
circumstances:
RULE 113, SECTION 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or
is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is
pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be
forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance
with Section 7 of Rule 112.

3. YES.
The right to question the validity of an arrest may be waived if the accused, assisted by counsel,
fails to object to its validity before arraignment. This waiver, however, does not carry with it a waiver of
the inadmissibility of the evidence seized during the illegal arrest. The illegal arrest of an accused is not a
sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free
from error; such arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of the accused.
In the case at bar, accused-appellant deemed to have waived such alleged defect by submitting
himself to the jurisdiction of the court by his counsel-assisted plea during his arraignment; by his actively
participating in the trial and by not raising the objection before his arraignment.

RA 7438
G.R. No. 227195, July 29, 2019
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
FABIAN MABALATO@ "BOY," JULIO CARTUCIANO and ALLAN CANATOY@"ALLAN EDWARD,", Accused
ALLAN CANATOY @ "ALLAN EDWARD," Accused-Appellant
CAGUIOA, J.:

FACTS:
Omega Barbas was found lying her face down, bathed in her own blood in her apartment.
Witnesses Soliman and Tan, both tenants in the same apartment where Barbas lived, identified the two
men who were fleeing from Barbas’ room as accused Canatoy and Mabalato. Accused were arrested.
While in detention, Mabalato and Cartuciano executed an extrajudicial confessions with the
assistance of Atty. Truya. Mabalato admitted that he and Canatoy were hired by Cartuciano to kill
Barbas for a consideration. Canatoy, on the other hand implicated Sato, whom he claimed to be his
lover, as the person who contacted him more than a week from the incident. The y both signed the
affidavit upon the promise of their release.
The RTC-Cebu City found the accused guilty of murder under Art. 248 of the RPC. The CA
affirmed the assailed decision. However,deceased Mabalato's criminal and civil liabilities were
extinguished. Hence, this appeal taken by Canatoy.

ISSUE:
1. WON the testimonies of Soliman and Tan were properly given ample weight by the RTC and the CA.
2. WON the extrajudicial confessions of Cartuciano and the deceased Mabalato are admissible.
3. WON there was treason.

HELD:
1. YES.
Direct evidence is not indispensable for conviction in criminal cases, hence, circumstantial
evidence may be enough to support a court's decision of guilt.
Sec. 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence will be sufficient to convict the
offender if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from which the inference is derived are
proven; and 3) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.

2. YES.
Article III, 1987 Constitution:
Section 12.
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation or any other means which vitiate the free will
shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar
forms of detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Extra judicial confessions, to be admissible in evidence pursuant to RA 7438, must be: 1)

voluntary; 2) made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel; 3) express; and 4) in
writing.
First, where the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did not institute
any criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of
violence was presented, all these will be considered as indicating voluntariness. Second, a lawyer
provided by the investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection
against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter
subscribed to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer.

3. NO.
 There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing
means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. For
this circumstance to be appreciated, two elements must be alleged and proved, namely: (1) that the
means of execution employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or herself, or
retaliate; and (2) that the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.