Filoteo vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.

79543,
October 16, 1996
SEPTEMBER 16, 2018

FACTS:

Petitioner was charged with hijacking a Delivery Truck of the Bureau of Post along MacArthur
Highway in Meycauayan, Bulacan, together with ten others, in that on May 3, 1982, the accused,
two of whom were armed with guns, stopped the Delivery Truck at gunpoint, and then robbed
and carried away the truck with them, including Social Security System Medicare Checks and
Vouchers, Social Security System Pension Checks and Vouchers Treasury Warrants, and several
Mail Matters from abroad worth P253,728.29 belonging to US Government Pensionados, SSS
Pensionados, SSS Medicare Beneficiaries and Private Individuals.

Based on a signed confession, the Sandiganbayan, on June 18, 1987, convicted petitioner and his
cohorts as co-principals for the violation of Section 2 (e), in relation to Section 3 (b) of
Presidential Decree No. 532, or Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974.

ISSUES/HELD:

1. Whether a petition can be treated alternatively as filed under either Rule 45 or Rule 65 – YES
2. Whether an extra-judicial confession executed by the accused without the presence of his
lawyer, is admissible in evidence against him – YES
3. Whether statements of accused obtained through torture, duress, maltreatment and
intimidation are illegal and inadmissible – NO
4. Whether warrantless arrest of petitioner was valid and proper – YES
5. Whether the evidence of the prosecution is sufficient to prove petitioner’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt – YES
6. Whether the crime committed was Brigandage or Robbery – ROBBERY

RATIO:

1. The petition was erroneously filed under Rule 65 when it should be filed under Rule 45. In
any case, the Court brushed aside this procedural defect because of the important issues the
petition raised.

The Supreme Court may dismiss the petition by treating it as having been erroneously filed
under Rule 65 when the proper remedy is Rule 45.
The petition submitted alternatively under either rule 45 or rule 65 gave the Supreme Court the
prerogative to decide how to treat said petition, and may dismiss the petition on the grounds that
it is unqualified for the rule that the court decided the petition falls under. The petition was
considered as one for review on certiorari under Rule 45 as in Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,
because under P.D. No. 1486, amended by P.D. No. 1606, which created the Sandiganbayan,
specified that decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be subject to review on
certiorari by the Supreme Court, ruling out a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 because
certiorari may be invoked only where there is no other plain, speedy or adequate remedy.

This petition could have been dismissed on these grounds but due to the importance of the issues
raised, the Court assumed jurisdiction.

2. Extra-judicial confession executed by the accused without the presence of his lawyer, are
admissible in evidence against the petitioner under the 1973 Constitution, but is no longer the
case in the 1987 constitution.

The petitioner’s extra-judicial confession executed by the accused without the presence of his
lawyer, is admissible in evidence against the petitioner because it falls under Article IV, Section
20 of the 1973 Constitution, which did not contain the right against an uncounseled waiver of the
right to counsel which is provided under paragraph 1, Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution as it had been obtained before the effectivity of the New Constitution, even if
presented after January 17, 1973, and even if he had not been informed of his right to counsel,
since no law gave the accused the right to be so informed before that date. The latter provision
cannot be applied retroactively because while Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
“penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony who
is not a habitual criminal,” what is being construed here is a constitutional provision specifically
contained in the Bill of Rights which is not a penal statute.

Nor is the petitioner protected by the Morales and Galit rulings, that the right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel, because he
executed his extrajudicial confession and his waiver to the right to counsel on May 30, 1982
unlike in People vs. Sison where the extrajudicial confession was executed after April 26, 1983 .
It is in accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code, “judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines,” and Article 4
of the same Code, “laws shall have no retroactive effect unless the contrary is provided.”

The petitioner’s affidavit of May 30, 1982 waiving the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised
Penal Code was made voluntarily and intelligently, categorically and definitively, and rested on
clear evidence. Sgt. Arsenio Carlos, investigating officer, testified that he told the petitioner of
his right to counsel, even in waiving that right. The petitioner did not even inform Sgt. Carlos
that his father-in-law was a lawyer nor did he invoke his right to counsel.

The petitioner could not have been ignorant of his rights as an accused because he was a fourth
year criminology student and a topnotch student in the police basic course as well as having been
in the police force since 1978, with stints at the investigation division or the detective bureau, so
he was knowledgeable on the matter of extrajudicial confessions.

3. Accused’s extrajudicial confession was admissible because there was no proof of torture,
duress, maltreatment and intimidation.

There was no evidence of physical injuries upon his person, according to the medical report.
When he was presented before Judge Mariano Mendieta of the municipal court in Meycauayan,
he waived his right to present evidence instead of challenging his confession on account of the
torture allegedly inflicted upon him. An examination of his signatures in the different documents
on record bearing the same discloses an evenness of lines and strokes in his penmanship which is
markedly consistent in his certification, extrajudicial confession and waiver of detention.
Therefore, his extrajudicial confession is presumed to have been voluntarily made, as there was
no conclusive evidence showing that petitioner’s consent had been vitiated.

The question of whether petitioner was indeed subjected to torture or maltreatment is a factual
question addressed primarily to trial courts, the findings of which are binding on the Supreme
Court whose function is principally to review only of questions of law as in section 2 of rule 45.
The respondent Court performed its duty in evaluating the evidence.

4. Petitioner’s warrantless arrest is valid.

On the petitioner’s arrest, that the arresting officers “invited” him without a warrant of arrest and
brought him to Camp Crame where he was allegedly subjected to torture almost a month after
the commission of the crime. As he did not question his arrest when he voluntarily submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the trial court by entering a plea of not guilty and by participating in
the trial, any irregularity in his arrest, if any, was cured as explained in People vs. Lopez, Jr.,
because it is well-settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or procedure in the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before he
enters his plea. The illegal arrest of an accused is also not sufficient cause for setting aside a
valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after trial free from error.

5. Prosecution proved accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt

The petitioner’s culpability has been proven beyond reasonable doubt and his alibi has been
correctly considered by the Sandiganbayan to be weak and implausible. Having already ruled on
the admissibility of petitioner’s confession, the Supreme Court holds that the full force of the
totality of the prosecution’s evidence proves his guilt well beyond reasonable doubt. Added to
that is the well-settled doctrine under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court that findings of facts of the
the Sandiganbayan itself, is binding upon this Court, absent any arbitrariness, abuse or palpable
error because the trial court is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.
6. The crime committed was Robbery because there was no proof that the group was formed
for multiple indiscriminate instances of robbery.

The Court believes that the question of which law was violated by the accused should be
discussed and passed upon even if it was not raised as an issue and not argued by the parties in
their pleadings as it may have reduced the petitioner’s penalty.

That P.D. No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of
1974, assumed to have been the statute violated, because the robbery was perpetrated on a
national highway (McArthur Highway), has been debunked by the Supreme Court in the case of
People vs. Isabelo Puno, where it was ruled in that it takes more than the site of the robbery to
bring it within the ambit of PD 532. The Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of
robbers that were purposely organized for several indiscriminate commissions of robbery. It
would not be necessary to show that a member or members of the band actually committed
robbery or kidnapping or any other purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is proven
when the organization and purpose of the band are shown to be such as are contemplated by art.
306. But, if robbery is committed by a band, the crime would be only robbery.

There had been no evidence presented that the accused were a band of outlaws organized for
such purpose as well as of any previous attempts at similar robberies by the accused to show the
“indiscriminate” commission thereof. Instead the evidence proved that robbery was committed as
defined in Art. 293 in relation to Art. 295 and punished by Art. 244, par. 5, all of the Revised
Penal Code that personal property belonging to another were unlawfully taken by the accused
with intent to gain with intimidation against three persons (Art. 293) in an uninhabited place, or
by an band, or by attacking a moving motor vehicle on a highway; and the intimidation was
made with the use of firearms (Art. 295).