CHAPTER IV-A

THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

SECTION 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable

except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise
as prescribed by law.

(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

Meaning: the right to be left alone.

The right of a person to be free from unwarranted publicity, and as the right to live without
unwarranted interference by the public in matters with which the public is not necessarily concerned.

Limitations:

Upon lawful order of the court

When public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law

Worst: Anti-Terrorism Law, does not apply

9400 anti-wire tapping law

1. DISINI VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, GR No. 203335, February 18, 2014;

There are two (2) CATEGORIES of the Right to Privacy as held by the Supreme Court in DISINI VS.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, February 18, 2014. 
1. Decisional Privacy which is the right to independence in making certain
important decisions; and 
2. Informational Privacy which is the interest in avoiding disclosures on
personal matters. 

Further, Informational Privacy has two (2) aspects, namely: 

a. The right not to have personal information about a particular be disclosed; and 
b. The right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.

Facts:

These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175,
the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.

The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop
or computer, a person can connect to the internet, a system that links him to other computers
and enable him, among other things, to:

1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that he needs
for research, study, amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity;

2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for the general
public or for special audiences like associates, classmates, or friends and read postings
from them;

3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and payments;

4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government agencies, banks,
stock exchanges, trade houses, credit card companies, public utilities, hospitals, and
schools; and

5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail address or
telephone.

This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and billions of simultaneous and
ongoing individual accesses to and uses of the internet. The cyberspace is a boon to the need
of the current generation for greater information and facility of communication. But all is not
well with the system since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill will who would
want to use cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for
instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of another or bully
the latter by posting defamatory statements against him that people can read.

And because linking with the internet opens up a user to communications from others, the ill-
motivated can use the cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously
accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding him through false
representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for
exposing to pornography guileless children who have access to the internet. For this
reason, the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and contain
and punish wrongdoings.

Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, to wreak or cause havoc to the
computer systems and networks of indispensable or highly useful institutions as well as to the
laptop or computer programs and memories of innocent individuals. They accomplish this by
sending electronic viruses or virtual dynamites that destroy those computer systems,
networks, programs, and memories. The government certainly has the duty and the right
to prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish their perpetrators, hence the
Cybercrime Prevention Act.

petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable
cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course
asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities,
punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.

February 5, 2013 the Court extended the original 120-day temporary restraining order (TRO)
that it earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent government agencies from
implementing the cybercrime law until further orders.

Issue:

 Whether or not several provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 violated the
right to privacy. (Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the constitutional rights to due
process and to privacy and correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press)

Ruling:

 Yes. Out of the 21 sections in the Cybercrime Law challenged by the petitioners, the
Supreme Court declared three (3) provisions void for being unconstitutional, to wit Sections
4(c)(3), Section 12, and Section 19.

Rationale:

Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft is NOT

unconstitutional

Zones of Privacy

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these
zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in
accordance with customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord
to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy
is a “constitutional right” and “the right most valued by civilized men,” but
also from our adherence to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
which mandates that, “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference
with his privacy” and “every has the right to the protection of the law
against such interference or attacks.”

Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy: (a) the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures, which is the basis of the right
to be let alone, and (b) the right to privacy of communication and
correspondence. In assessing the challenge that the State has
impermissibly intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must
determine whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of
privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated by
unreasonable government intrusion.

In determining whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to privacy, this Court has laid down
a two-fold test. The first is a subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an actual or
legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain matter. The second is an objective test, where
his or her expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared to accept as objectively
reasonable.

Informational:

As to Section 12, the court found that it failed to provide safeguards to the right to privacy of
every individual, as its authority is given to law enforcement authorities to gather electronic
traffic data referred as the date, time, size, origin etc. of a certain communication. It is
declared as unconstitutional, as it must be specific and definite to ensure that the rights of
every individual are protected. The court ruled that the authority given under this Section is
without restraint, although the law states that the collection of data is limited to those
associated with specified communications, it is still the law enforcement agencies that
would specify the target communications. It is noted that every single information when
collected and gathered may create profiles of persons, including their political views,
associations and activities which is protected by the right to privacy.

OPLE VS. TORRES, July 23, 1998

FACTS:

This is a petition raised by Senator Blas Ople to invalidate Administrative Order No. 308
entitled “Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System” issued by
President Fidel V. Ramos on the following important constitutional grounds:
a. It is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate;
b. It is impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry’s protected zone of privacy.

He also contends that the appropriation of public funds by the president for the
implementation of AO 308 is an unconstitutional usurpation of the exclusives right of
congress to appropriate public funds for expenditure.

AO 308 aims to establish a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify persons
seeking basic services on social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations.

Then Executive Secretary Rube Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as
members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, the respondents have the following
counter arguments:

a. The instant petition is not a justiciable case as would warrant a judicial review
b. AO 308 was issued within the executive and administrative powers of the president
without encroaching on the legislative powers of congress. They also contend that
AO No 308 implements the legislative policy of the Administrative Code of 1987.
c. The funds necessary for the implementation of the ID reference system may be
sourced from the budgets of the concerned agancies
d. AO 308 protects an individuals interest in privacy

ISSUE: WON AO 308 violates the right to privacy

HELD:

AO 308 is a violation to the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the “right to be let
alone”. The right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our
Constitution. It is expressly recognized in several provisions of the BIll of Rights, Civil Code
and even the Revised Penal Code.

The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is

burden of the government to show that AO No. 308 is justified by some compelling state
interest and that it is narrowly drawn. AO No 308 is predicated on two considerations: 
1. The need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently
transact business with basic service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities; and
2. The need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services.

The hear of AO No 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for Population Reference
Number (PRN) as a “common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned
agencies” through the use of “Biometrics Technology” and “computer application designs.”
It is noteworthy that AO No 308 does not state what specific biological characteristics and
what particular biometrics technology shall be used to identify people who will seek its
coverage. Considering the banquet of options available to the implementors of AO No 308,
the fear that it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not groundless.

It also does not state whether encoding of date is limited to biological information alone for
identification purposes. The SG claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference
System will contribute to the “generation of population data for development planning”. This
is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely foridentification but for the generation
of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of AO No 308. Clearly, the
indefiniteness of AO No 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and
retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his
PRN.

Page 451 of De Leon

ZULUETA VS. CA, February 10, 1996

FACTS:

Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Alfredo Martin a doctor of medicine. On March 26, 1982,
Zulueta entered the clinic of her husband, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and
Martins secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband’s clinic and took
157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr Martin and his alleged
paramours greeting cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr MArtins passport, and
photographs.

The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation
and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against her
husband.
ISSUE: WON the evidence obtained can be held inadmissible as it violated his right of
communication.

HELD:

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking
the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale
evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by containing marriage, does not shed
his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional
protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it
privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent
of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of
communication, quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with
the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty that each owes to the other. 

KMU VS. ERMITA, & BAYAN MUNA VS. ERMITA, April 19, 2006 & June 20, 2006
For govt employees only

This case involves two consolidated petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of
Executive Order No. 420 (EO 420) on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
EO 420, issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on 13 April 2005, reads:

REQUIRING ALL GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND GOVERNMENT-

OWNED AND CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS TO STREAMLINE AND
HARMONIZE THEIR IDENTIFICATION (ID) SYSTEMS, AND
AUTHORIZING FOR SUCH PURPOSE THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY TO
IMPLEMENT THE SAME, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies and

government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data
collection and format for their existing identification (ID) systems. Petitioners
allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative
functions by the executive branch of the government. Furthermore, they allege that
EO 420 infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy.
 
CONTENTION OF THE PETITIONERS: Petitioners allege that EO 420 is void
based on the following grounds:

1. EO 420 is contrary to law. It violates RA 8282 otherwise known as the

Social Security Act of 1997.
2. The Executive has usurped the legislative power of Congress as she has
no power to issue EO 420. Furthermore, the implementation of the EO will
 use public funds not appropriated by Congress for that purpose.
3. EO 420 violates the constitutional provisions on the right to privacy

(i) It allows access to personal confidential data without the

owner’s consent.
(ii) EO 420 is vague and without adequate safeguards or penalties for
any violation of its provisions.
(iii) There are no compelling reasons that will legitimize the necessity
of EO 420.

ISSUE/S: WON EO 420 infringes on the citizen’s right to privacy. 

RULING: Not a violation of rights to privacy , constitutional yung EO 420
All these years, the GSIS, SSS, LTO, Philhealth and other government
entities have been issuing ID cards in the performance of their governmental
functions. There have been no complaints from citizens that the ID cards of
these government entities violate their right to privacy. There have also been
no complaints of abuse by these government entities in the collection and recording
of personal identification data.
In fact, petitioners in the present cases do not claim that the ID systems
of government entities prior to EO 420 violate their right to privacy. Since
petitioners do not make such claim, they even have less basis to complain
against the unified ID system under EO 420.

The data collected and stored for the unified ID system under EO 420 will
be limited to only 14 specific data, and the ID card itself will show only
eight specific data. The data collection, recording and ID card system
under EO 420 will even require less data collected, stored and revealed than
under the disparate systems prior to EO 420.

On its face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it even

narrowly limits the data that can be collected, recorded and shown compared
to the existing ID systems of government entities. EO 420 further provides
strict safeguards to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast to
the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict administrative safeguards.
The right to privacy does not bar the adoption of reasonable ID systems by
government entities. Some one hundred countries have compulsory national ID
systems
Without a reliable ID system, government entities like GSIS, SSS,
Philhealth, and LTO cannot perform effectively and efficiently their mandated
functions under existing laws. Without a reliable ID system, GSIS, SSS,
Philhealth and similar government entities stand to suffer substantial losses arising
from false names and identities.

Facts:
Bayan, et al., alleged that their right as organizations and individuals were violated
when the rallies they participated in on October 4, 5 and 6, 2005 were violently
dispersed by policemen implementing Batas Pambansa No. 880. 26 petitioners
were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they was
preempted and violently dispersed by the police. 

Since this is a consolidated cases, the following groups are involved:

Bayan, et al., in G.R. No. 169838,allege that they are citizens and
taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as organizations and
individuals were violated when the rally they participated in .

The second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, Jess del Prado, et

al., in G.R. No. 169848,who allege that they were injured, arrested and
detained when a peaceful mass action they held on September 26, 2005
was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. 

The third group, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), et al., petitioners in G.R. No.
169881, allege that they conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights
as organizations.

Bayan  with other petitioners contended that BP 880 is clearly a violation of the
Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and other
human rights treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory. They assert that the
right to peaceful assembly, are affected by BP 880 and the policy of “Calibrated
Preemptive Response” (CPR) being followed to implement it. They argue that BP
880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the
presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of
venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and
place of a public assembly form part of the message which the expression is
sought. 

Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support

of the government. The words “lawful cause,” “opinion,” “protesting or influencing”
suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the
phrase “maximum tolerance” shows that the law applies to assemblies against the
government because they are being tolerated.

Issue: WON there is a the rights of the 3 petitioners violated?

Ruling: yes the court granted their petition

In sum, this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of
our people, especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. In several
policy addresses, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to
uphold the liberty of our people and to nurture their prosperity. He said that "in
cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against the
government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the
dispossessed and the weak. Indeed, laws and actions that restrict fundamental
rights come to the courts with a heavy presumption against their validity. These
laws and actions are subjected to heightened scrutiny."
For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in
our legal firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom.
It merely confuses our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses.
On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does
not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places
as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious,
"maximum tolerance" is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The
delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally "permits" is valid because it is
subject to the constitutionally-sound "clear and present danger" standard.

SABIO VS. GORDON, October 17, 2006

Facts:
-May the PCGG Commissioners refuse to appear before a Senate Committee
conducting alleged irregularities committed by them while sitting in the Board of
PHILCOMSAT, a private firm sequestered by the government on account of
Executive Order No. 1 providing that they should not be the subject of any
investigation in connection with their acts in connection with the performance of
their duties as such? 
-No. Such act would violate Section 28, Art. II of the Constitution mandating
disclosure of all public transactions involving the public interest. Such act would
also violate the “right to information on matters of public concern” as well as the
“public accountability of public officials” as embodied in Section 1, Art. XI of the
1987 Constitution, not to mention that such would render nugatory the power of
Congress under Section 21, Art. VI. IN FACT, GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS HAVE
ONLY A LIMITED RIGHT TO PRIVACY. (SABIO VS. GORDON, 504 SCRA 704)

Two decades ago, on February 28, 1986, former President Corazon C. Aquino
installed her regime by issuing Executive Order (E.O.) No. 1,creating the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). She entrusted upon this
Commission the herculean task of recovering the ill-gotten wealth accumulated by
the deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates. Section 4 (b) of E.O. No. 1 provides that: "No member or staff of
the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its
official cognizance." Apparently, the purpose is to ensure PCGG's unhampered
performance of its task

That on February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced

Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455), "directing an inquiry
4

in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas

Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation (PHILCOMSAT)international events, and PHILCOMSAT Holdings
Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties (corruption) in their
operations by their respective Board of Directors.
Petitioners alleged subpoenae violated petitioners' rights to privacy and against
self-incrimination.

Issue :WON the petitioners claim violative of their right to privacy?

Ruling: Not violative

Under the present circumstances, the alleged anomalies in the PHILCOMSAT, PHC
and POTC, ranging in millions of pesos, and the conspiratorial participation of the
PCGG and its officials are compelling reasons for the Senate to exact vital
information from the directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporations, as
well as from Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting the
necessary legislation to prevent corruption and formulate remedial measures and
policy determination regarding PCGG's efficacy. There being no reasonable
expectation of privacy on the part of those directors and officers over the subject
covered by Senate Res. No. 455, it follows that their right to privacy has not been
violated by respondent Senate Committees.

The right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding compelling state
interest. In Morfe v. Mutuc, the Court, in line with Whalen v. Roe, employed the
rational basis relationship test when it held that there was no infringement of the
individual's right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid
purpose, i.e., to curtail and minimize the opportunities for official corruption,
maintain a standard of honesty in public service, and promote morality in public
administration. In Valmonte v. Belmonte, the Court remarked that as public figures,
the Members of the former Batasang Pambansa enjoy a more limited right to
privacy as compared to ordinary individuals, and their actions are subject to closer
scrutiny. Taking this into consideration, the Court ruled that the right of the people to
access information on matters of public concern prevails over the right to privacy of
financial transactions.

PCGG Chairman Camilo Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Narciso

Nario, Nicasio Conti, and Tereso Javier; and Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni,
PCGG's nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, as well as its directors and
officers, must comply with the Subpoenae Ad Testificandum issued by respondent
Senate Committees directing them to appear and testify in public hearings relative
to Senate Resolution No. 455.

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. Within these zones, any
form of intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with
customary legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises
not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is a "constitutional right" and
"the right most valued by civilized men," but also from our adherence to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that, "no one shall be
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to
the protection of the law against such interference or attacks."
Our Bill of Rights, enshrined in Article III of the Constitution, provides at least two
guarantees that explicitly create zones of privacy. It highlights a person's 

1. "right to be let alone" or the 

2. "right to determine what, how much, to whom and when information about
himself shall be disclosed."

Section 2 guarantees "the right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose." Section 3 renders inviolable the "privacy
of communication and correspondence" and further cautions that "any evidence
obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for
any purpose in any proceeding."
In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine
whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so,
whether that expectation has been violated by unreasonable government intrusion.
Applying this determination to these cases, the important inquiries are: first, did the
directors and officers of Philcomsat Holdings Corporation exhibit a reasonable
expectation of privacy?; and second, did the government violate such expectation?
The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in the Senate's public
hearing to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455, particularly "on the anomalous
losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation
(POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT),
and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties
in the operations by their respective board of directors." Obviously, the inquiry
focus on petitioners' acts committed in the discharge of their duties as officers and
directors of the said corporations, particularly Philcomsat Holdings Corporation.
Consequently, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy over matters
involving their offices in a corporation where the government has interest.
Certainly, such matters are of public concern and over which the people have
the right to information.

Chapter 5

FREEDOM OF SPEECH, PRESS AND EXPRESSION ETC

SECTION 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression,

or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
 Espuelas vs. People, 90 Phil. 524 G.R. No. L-2990     December 17, 1951

Oscar Espuelas was convicted in the Court of First Instance of Bohol of a violation
of Article 142 as provided, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the
Government of the Philippines or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof or
which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community. The
conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, because according to said court.

That on June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran,
Bohol, Oscar Espuelas had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were
hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended from the limb of the tree,
when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel).

After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to several
newspapers and weeklies of general circulation, not only in the Province of Bohol
but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide
note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide,
Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife Suicide letter: 

“Dearest wife and children, bury me five meters deep. Over my grave don't plant a
cross or put floral wreaths, for I don't need them. Please don't bury me in the lonely
place. Bury me in the Catholic cemetery. Although I have committed suicide, I still
have the right to burried among Christians. But don't pray for me. Don't remember
me, and don't feel sorry. Wipe me out of your lives. My dear wife, if someone asks
to you why I committed suicide, tell them I did it because I was not pleased with the
administration of Roxas. Tell the whole world about this. And if they ask why I did
not like the administration of Roxas, point out to them the situation in Central Luzon,
the Leyte. Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that here in
the Philippines our government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis. Teach
our children to burn pictures of Roxas if and when they come across one. I
committed suicide because I am ashamed of our government under Roxas. I
cannot hold high my brows to the world with this dirty government. I
committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez de Cuchillo all
the Roxas people now in power. So, I sacrificed my own self.” 

In disposing of this appeal, careful thought had to be given to the fundamental right
to freedom of speech. Yet the freedom of speech secured by the Constitution
"does not confer an absolute right to speak or publish without responsibility
whatever one may choose." It is not "unbridled license that gives immunity for
every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse
this freedom." So statutes against sedition have guaranty, although they should not
be interpreted so as to agitate for institutional changes.

Issue : Whether or not the article published is a valid exercise of the right of
freedom of speech.

Ruling:  
The Supreme Court said that it is clear that the letter suggested the decapitation
or assassination of all Roxas officials (at least members of the Cabinet and a
majority of Legislators including the Chief Executive himself). And such suggestion
clinches the case against Espuelas.The attack on the President passes the furthest
bounds of free speech and common decency. More than a figure of speech was
intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily
produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a
disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws." The
Supreme court ruled Oscar Espuelas,therefore be found guilty as charged.

Ratio: the freedom of speech secured by the Constitution "does not confer an
absolute right to speak or publish without responsibility whatever one may
choose." It is not "unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible
use of language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this
freedom. "  Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences, the article
cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition
and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the
writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with is failure to
particularize. When the use of irritating language centers not on persuading the
readers but on creating disturbances, the rationable of free speech cannot apply
and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the constitutional
guarantee. 

2. US vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1918/mar1918/gr_l-12592_1918.html 
 A public official should not be onion-skinned with reference to
comments upon his official acts. The interest of the government and
the society demands full discussion of public affairs. 

FACTS: 

(1915) Numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled,

prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary through Crossfield and
O'Brien law office, and 5 individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan,
Justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in
office and asking for his removal. The petition was transmitted by the attorneys of
Crossfield and O'Brien and was signed by 34 citizens (including councilors and
property owners - now the defendants).  

The specific charges against the Justice of the peace were: ( na libelous daw)
1. Francisca Polintan, desiring to make complaint against Mariano de los
Reyes, visited the Justice Punsalan, who first told her that he would draw up
complaint for P5; afterwards he said he would take P3 which she paid; also kept her
in the house for 4 days as a servant and took from her 2 chickens and 12 "gandus;"

2. Valentin Sunga - interested in a case regarding land which was on trial

before the Punsalan, went to see the latter for the result of the trial, and was told by
Punsalan that if he wished to win he must give him P50. Not having this amount,
Sunga gave Punsalan nothing, and a few days later was informed that he had lost
the case. Sunga went again to the office of Punsalan in order to appeal, but he was
told that he could still win if he would pay P50;

3. Leoncio Quiambao, filed a complaint for assault against 4 persons, on the

day of the trial Punsaled called him over to his house, where he secretly gave
Quiambao P30; and the complaint was then shelved.

 The justice denied the charges. In the CFI, not all the charges were proven
but the Judge still found him guilty (2 over 3). 
Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was the victim of prosecution and
one Jaime, an auxiliary Justice, instigated the charges against him for personal
reasons and was acquitted. The complainants filed an appeal to the Governor
General but it wasn’t acted upon. 
Criminal action was instituted against the residents by Punsalan. The CFI
found almost all of the 34 defendants guilty and sentenced them to pay 10 pesos or
suffer imprisonment in case of insolvency.
 
The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to retire the objection made by
Punsalan. The trial court denied the motion. 2 of the defendants appealed. 

ISSUE: WON Bustos, et al. is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his

right to free speech and free press.

RULING: YES.  Bustos and other defendants are entitled to the protection of the
rules concerning qualified privilege, growing out of constitutional guarantees in our
bill of rights. Instead of punishing citizens for an honest endeavor to improve the
public service, we should rather commend them for their good citizenship. Bustos
and other defendants are acquitted.

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full
discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public
men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves
the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an
unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience.
A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his
official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and the dignity of the individual be
exalted. Of course, criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as the
individual is less than the State, so must expected criticism be born for the common
good. Rising superior to any official or set of officials, to the Chief of Executive, to
the Legislature, to the Judiciary — to any or all the agencies of Government —
public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy.

The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct.
The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or
badly enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a
justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be
effectively muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would
be tyranny of the basest sort. 
PEOPLE vs. Perez, 45 Phil. 599
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1923/dec1923/gr_l-21049_1923.html
FACTS: Isaac Perez is the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon withFortunato
Lodovice, citizen of the same municipality engaged in a discussion regarding the
administration of Governor-General Wood. Thereafter, Perez repeatedly shouted
that as Filipinos, they should use a bolo to cut off Wood’s head for killing
their independence. 

“The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for
having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our
independence.”

The CFI of Sorsogon convicted Perez for violation of contempt of ministers of the
crown or other persons in authority. Hence this appeal.

CONTENTION OF WITNESSES FOR THE GOVERNMENT: Perez’s statement

was inviting Filipinos to cut off Wood’s head using their bolos and throw it into the
sea. 

CONTENTION OF PEREZ: The discussion was held in a peaceful manner and that
what he wished to say was to remove and substitute the Governor- General with
another person. On the witness stand, he stated that his words were the following: 
"We are but blaming the Nacionalista Party which is in power but do not take
into account that above the representatives there is Governor-General Wood
who controls everything, and I told him that the day on which the Democrats
may kill that Governor-General, then we, the Filipinos will install the
government we like whether you Democratas want to pay or not to pay
taxes."

ISSUE: Whether or not the remarks of Perez are covered by his constitutional right
on freedom of speech

RULING: 

NO. The person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine
Islands. His official position, like the Presidency of the United States and other high
offices, under a democratic form of government, instead of affording immunity from
promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks. 

In this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest

bounds of free speech as intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words
used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of
feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and
obedient to the laws.

In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a
statement and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet
together for unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done an act which
suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a statement and done
an act which tends to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. He has made
a statement and done an act which tended to disturb the peace of the community
and the safety or order of the Government. 

The decision of the RTC was affirmed with modifications. CONVICTED.

Mercado vs. CFI, 116 SCRA 93

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1982/aug1982/gr_l_38753_1982.html

FACTS:  Rafael Mercado sent an offensive telegram about Virginia

Mercado (Thus: "[Secretary David Consunji Department of Public Works and
[Communications] Manila In line with President Marcos appeal to give information on
undesirable employees in the government service to achieve the objectives of the New
Society request that investigation image of the activities of Mrs. Virginia Mercado of Public
Service Commission as we have reason to believe that she has enriched herself thru
corrupt practices considering that she has properties and spending above what her salary
can afford with the husband jobless stop If investigation confirms this we trust you take
necessary action stop In case you need further details wire me at 101 Mariano Cuenco
Quezon City and I will give further details stop Expecting prompt action on this matter.
Rafael Mercado]

Rafael S. Mercado filed a letter-complaint with the Chairman of the Board of

Transportation on October 14, 1972, against VIRGINIA M. MERCADO, for alleged
grave violations of the Civil Service Act of 1959 (RA No. 2260) and CS rules.

14 days after the filing of the administrative complaint Rafael S. Mercado sent the
subject libelous telegram or communication to the Secretary of Public Works and
Communication, which was endorsed for investigation to the said Board of
Transportation on October 31, 1972, by first endorsement of the said Department
Secretary, dated Oct. 31, 1972 to the Chairman of the Board of Transportation;

On November 23, 1972,  Rafael S. Mercador filed an amended

administrative complaint against VIRGINIA M. MERCADO with the same Board of
Transportation charging the private respondent with dishonesty, pursuit of private
business or corrupt practices, and misconduct or discourtesy.

VIRGINIA M. MERCADO submitted her answer to the said administrative

charges, and after due hearing, the Board of Transportation rendered a decision on
June 26, 1973, finding the herein VIRGINIA M. MERCADO as innocent of the
charges, and dismissing the complaint filed against her.

On July 17, 1973  Rafael S. Mercado, as complainant therein, filed a motion

for reconsideration of the decision of the Board of Transportation, but the said
Board, in an order issued on August 29, 1973, denied said motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit. While the Administrative Case was pending
determination before the Board of Transportation, Rafael S. Mercador, to further
harass and malign the good character and reputation of VIRGINIA M. MERCADO,
filed with the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group (CHPG), a complaint against the
VIRGINIA M. MERCADO and her husband Lorenzo M. Mercado accusing them of
selling a Ford Willys engine, which was carnapped. The said office, however, after
due hearing, issued a resolution on February 9, 1973, recommending that the said
case be closed for lack of evidence;

Also during the pendency of the administrative complaint filed by Rafael S.

Mercado against VIRGINIA M. MERCADO in the Board of Transportation, he filed
with the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS), PC, Camp Crame, Quezon City, a
complaint for corrupt practices against VIRGINIA M. MERCADO ; and after due
investigation the CIS, in answer to the letter of VIRGINIA M. MERCADO's counsel,
dated March 24, 1973. requesting information about the result of the said
investigation, sent a letter to said counsel, dated March 27, 1973, advising him that
the said case is considered closed for insufficiency of evidence.

The comment was considered as an answer and the case was set for hearing. Prior
to such hearing, there was a motion by petitioner to file a memorandum in lieu of
oral argument. As the motion was not acted upon before the date set for hearing,
the parties appeared. Preliminary questions were asked. They were then required
to simultaneously file their memoranda. Instead of just filing a memorandum,
petitioner had a motion to admit the amended petition enclosing with such motion
the amended petition. The memorandum filed by him was on the basis thereof. The
amendments, however, did not affect the fundamental question raised as to
whether or not the telegram being qualifiedly privileged should be the basis for the
special civil action for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition. Respondents in due
time, after seeking an extension, filed their memorandum. Thereafter, petitioner
even submitted a manifestation, in effect reiterating contentions previously made.

ISSUE: Whether or not the landmark case of United States v. Bustos,

saying the doctrine that the free speech and free press guarantees of the
Constitution, constitute a bar to prosecutions for libel arising from a
communication addressed to a superior complaining against the conduct of a
subordinate, stands in this case

RULING: 
NO. The Court after a careful study, holds that certiorari to annul the order denying
the motion to quash as well as the motion for reconsideration does not lie. Neither
should the respondent court be ordered to dismiss the criminal complaint for libel
against the petitioner. Nor should the court be prohibited from hearing the aforesaid
criminal action. This petition lacks merit.

In United States v. Bustos -  to the effect that a libel prosecution must likewise
survive the test of whether or not the offending publication is within the guarantees
of free speech and free press. To keep such guarantees, if not inviolate, at the very
least truly meaningful, certainly calls for such an approach. The judiciary lives up to
its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been
 before. It should continue to be so.

Justice Malcolm carefully pointed out that qualified privilege, and this is one
such instance, may be "lost by proof of malice."

" 'A communication made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the
party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty,
is privileged, if made to a person having a corresponding interest or duty,
although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be
slanderous and actionable.' (Harrison vs. Bush, 5 E. & B., 344; 1 Jur. [N.S.],
846; 25 L. J. Q. B. 25; 3 W.R., 474; 85 E.C.L., 344.)" 

He then gave what was referred to by him as a "pertinent illustration of the

application of qualified privilege, " namely, "a complaint made in good faith and
without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public official when
addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter.
Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for
belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of
privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual. But the statements
must be made under an honest sense of duty; a self-seeking motive is
destructive. Personal injury is not necessary.

The tenacity with which RAFAEL S. MERCADO had pursued a course of conduct
that obviously seemed to indicate that a doubt could reasonably be entertained as
to the bona fides of the petitioner. The prosecution should be given the opportunity
of proving malice.

Libelous prosecution must likewise survive the test of whether or not the offending
publication is within the guarantees of free speech and free press.

Baguio Midland Courier vs. CA & Ramon Labo, Jr., 444 SCRA 28
RAMON LABO, JR - then Baguio City’s Mayor 
 was represented by Marcos' FORMER DOJ SECRETARY AND SOLGEN
ESTELITO MENDOZA in the Court of Appeals (kung saan nanalo sila
against Afable). SUPREME COURT: Reversed CA’s Decision

 Freedom of Expression includes the public’s right to be informed on the

mental, moral and physical fitness of candidates for public office.

ATTY. GACAYAN’S NOTES: 

 A private individual running for public office may be the subject of criticism
like a public official in order for the electorates to see his merits and demerits
under the “public figure doctrine”.

FACTS: Oseo C. Hamada (Hamada) was the president and general

manager of the Baguio Printing and Publishing Co., Inc., which publishes
the Baguio Midland Courier, a weekly newspaper published and circulated
in Baguio City and other provinces within the Cordillera region. He was
also, at that time, the business manager of said newsweekly. Cecille
Afable (Afable) was Baguio Midland Courier's editor-in-chief and one of
its columnists who ran the column "In and Out of Baguio."

Ramon L. Labo, Jr., was among the mayoralty candidates in Baguio City
for the 18 January 1988 local elections. Prior to this, in 1984, he had
already embarked on a political career by running for a seat in the
former Batasang Pambansa during which time he appointed a certain
Benedicto Carantes (Carantes) as his campaign manager.

It appears that as part of the campaign propaganda for private

respondent in the 1984 local elections, political ads appeared in the
various issues of Baguio Midland Courier and campaign paraphernalia
were printed by Baguio Printing and Publishing Co., Inc., on his behalf.

Before the 1988 local elections, petitioner Afable wrote in her column a
series of articles dealing with the candidates for the various elective
positions in Baguio City.

January 3, 1988 issue of the Baguio Midland Courier (BMC), Cecille Afable, the
Editor-in-Chief, in her column “In and Out of Baguio” made the following comments:

“Of all the candidates for Mayor of Baguio City), Labo has the most
imponderables about him. People would ask: “can he read and write”? Why
is he always talking about his Japanese father-in-law? Is he really a
Japanese Senator or a barrio Kapitan? Is it true that he will send P18M aid
to Baguio? Somebody wanted to put an advertisement of Labo in the
Midland Courier but was refused because he has not yet paid his account of
the last time he was a candidate for Congress. We will accept all
advertisements for him if he pays his old account first.``

 In the same column, Cecille Afable wrote the following comments in her January
10, 1988 column at the Courier:

“I heard that the ‘Dumpty in the Egg’ is campaigning for Cortes. Not fair.
Some real doctors are also busy campaigning against Labo because he has
not also paid their medical services with them. Since he is donating millions
he should also settle his small debts like the reportedly insignificant amount
of P27,000 only. If he wins, several teachers were signifying to resign and
leave Baguio forever, and Pangasinan will be the franca-liqua of Baguio.”

As a result of the above articles, Ramon Labor, Jr. filed a complaint for
Damages  before the regional trial Court of Baguio City as he claimed said
articles were tainted with malice. He likewise filed a separate criminal
complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Baguio but was
dismissed;

Labo claimed that the said articles were libelous because he was allegedly
described as “Dumpty in the Egg”  or one “who is a failure in his business”
which is false because he is a very successful businessman or to mean “zero
or a big lie”;  that he is a “balasubas” due to his alleged failure to pay his
medical expenses;

The petitioners, however, were able to prove that Labo has an unpaid obligation to
the Courier in the amount of P27,415.00 for the ads placed by his campaigners for
the 1984 Batasang Pambansa elections;

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Baguio City, in its Decision dated June 14,
1990 dismissed Labo’s complaint for damages on the ground that the article
of petitioner Afable was privileged and constituted fair comment on matters
of public interest as it dealt with the integrity, reputation and honesty of
private respondent Labo who was a candidate for Mayor of Baguio City;

On January 7, 1992, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC Decision and
ordered the petitioners to pay Ramon Labo, Jr.  damages in the total amount of
P350,000.00 after concluding that the “Dumpty in the Egg” refers to no one
but Labo himself.

Hence, the Petition to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether of not Afable’s articles are covered by the constitutional right to
freedom of speech and press

CONTENTION OF LABO: AFABLE could not invoke “public interest” to justify the
publication since he was not yet a public official at that time. 

SUPREME COURT: This argument is without merit since he was already a

candidate for City mayor of Baguio. 

RULING:

YES. The article is still within the mantle of protection guaranteed by the freedom of
expression provided in the Constitution since it is the public’s right to be informed of
the mental, moral and physical fitness of candidates for public office. This was
recognized as early as the case of US VS. SEDANO, 14 Phil. 338 [1909] and the
case of NEW YORK TIMES VS. SULLIVAN, 376 U.S. 254 where the US Supreme
Court held:

“…it is of the utmost consequence that the people should discuss the
character and qualifications of candidates for their suffrages. The importance
to the State and to society of such discussions is so vast, and the
 advantages derived so great, that they more than counterbalance the
inconvenience of private persons whose conduct may be involved, and
occasional injury to the reputations of individuals must yield to the public
welfare, although at times such injury may be great. The public benefit from
publicity is so great and the chance of injury to private character so small,
that such discussion must be privileged. “

The Court of Appeals is wrong when it held that Labo is the “Dumpty in the
Egg” in the questioned article. This is so because the article stated that “The
Dumpty in the Egg is campaigning for Cortes' ', another candidate for mayor and
opponent of Labo himself. It is unbelievable that Labo campaigned for his opponent
and against himself.

Although such a gracious attitude on the part of Labo would have been
commendable, it is contrary to common human experience. As pointed out by the
AFABLE, had he done that, it is doubtful whether he could have won as City Mayor
of Baguio in the 1988 elections, which he actually did. 

In line with the doctrine in BORJAL VS. CA, 310 SCRA 1, that ‘it is also not
sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person attacked or
defamed, but it must be shown that at least a 3rd person could identify him as the
object of the libelous publication’, the case should be dismissed since Labo utterly
failed to dispose of this responsibility.

Clearly, the questioned articles constitute fair comment on a matter of public

interest as it dealt with the character of the private respondent who was
running for the top elective post in Baguio City at that time.

6. LOPEZ VS. PEOPLE, GR No. 172203, February 14, 2011 

https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2011/feb2011/gr_172203_2011.html 

FACTS:
That on or about the early part of November 2002 in the City of Cadiz, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein DIONISIO LOPEZ did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to impeach the
integrity, reputation and putting to public ridicule and dishonor the offended party
MAYOR SALVADOR G. ESCALANTE, JR., City Mayor of Cadiz City and with
malice and intent to injure and expose the said offended party to public hatred,
contempt and ridicule put up billboards/signboards at the fence of Cadiz Hotel,
Villena Street, Cadiz City and at Gustilo Boulevard, Cadiz City, which
billboards/signboards read as follows:

"CADIZ FOREVER"
"BADING AND SAGAY NEVER"
Note: The incumbent City Mayor of Cadiz City and is popularly known by the
nickname "Bading" and being a "tuta" of Sagay (City)
For which the words in the signboards/billboards were obviously calculated to
induce the readers/passers-by to suppose and understand that something fishy was
going on, therefore maliciously impeaching the honesty, virtue and reputation of
Mayor Salvador G. Escalante, Jr., and hence were highly libelous, offensive and
defamatory to the good name, character and reputation of the offended party and
his office and that the said billboards/signboards were read by thousands if not
hundred[s] of thousands of persons
Lopez was indicted for libel for the preceding information.
Note: The witnesses in this case were either employed in the Cadiz City Hall or
active in the project of the city government.
The RTC and CA ruled that it was libelous. Hence, the appeal to the SC.
ISSUES:
1) whether the printed phrase "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER"
is libelous; and 
2) whether the controversial words used constituted privileged communication.
 
RULING:
The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
Truth be told that somehow the private respondent was not pleased with the
controversial printed matter. But that is grossly insufficient to make it actionable by
itself. "[P]ersonal hurt or embarrassment or offense, even if real, is not automatically
equivalent to defamation," "words which are merely insulting are not actionable as
libel or slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opprobrious, ill-
natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute bases for an
action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages.

The fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by
itself," as the Court ruled in MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da’ Wah Council of
the Phils., Inc.
For that matter, granting that the controversial phrase is considered defamatory,
still, no liability attaches on petitioner. Pursuant to Article 361 of the Revised Penal
Code, if the defamatory statement is made against a public official with respect to
the discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the allegations is
shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even though he does not prove
that the imputation was published with good motives and for justifiable ends. As the
Court held in United States v. Bustos, the policy of a public official may be
22

attacked, rightly or wrongly with every argument which ability can find or ingenuity
invent. The public officer "may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the
wound can be assuaged by the balm of a clear conscience. A public [official] must
not be too thin-skinned with reference to comments upon his official acts."

For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: a) it must be

defamatory; b) it must be malicious; c) it must be given publicity and d) the victim
must be identifiable." Absent one of these elements precludes the commission of
14

the crime of libel.

Although all the elements must concur, the defamatory nature of the subject printed
phrase must be proved first because this is so vital in a prosecution for libel. Were
the words imputed not defamatory in character, a libel charge will not prosper.
Malice is necessarily rendered immaterial.

An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of

a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission,
condition, status or circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in
contempt or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. To determine
"whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their
entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they
would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they
were used and understood in another sense." Moreover, "[a] charge is sufficient if
the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the
person or persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses
or are sufficient to impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation or to hold the person or
persons up to public ridicule."

Tested under these established standards, we cannot subscribe to the appellate

court’s finding that the phrase "CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER"
tends to induce suspicion on private respondent’s character, integrity and reputation
as mayor of Cadiz City. There are no derogatory imputations of a crime, vice or
defect or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending, directly or
indirectly, to cause his dishonor. Neither does the phrase in its entirety, employ any
unpleasant language or somewhat harsh and uncalled for that would reflect on
private respondent’s integrity. Obviously, the controversial word "NEVER" used by
petitioner was plain and simple. In its ordinary sense, the word did not cast
aspersion upon private respondent’s integrity and reputation much less convey the
idea that he was guilty of any offense. 
RE: PETITION  FOR RADIO & TV COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST
MAGUINDANAO GOV. XALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL., A.M. No. 10-15-5-SC, June 14, 2011;

Note: The petitioners are criticizing the public officers, who are part of the trial of the
case, may be influenced by the accused's fearsome reputation that may cause a
biased decision for the cases.
FACTS:
On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners
were killed while on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. Touted as the worst
election-related violence and the most brutal killing of journalists in recent history,
the tragic incident which came to be known as the "Maguindanao Massacre"
spawned charges for 57 counts of murder and an additional charge of rebellion
against 197 accused, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-09-162148-72, Q-09-
162216-31, Q-10-162652-66, and Q-10-163766, commonly entitled People v. Datu
Andal Ampatuan, Jr.,et al. Following the transfer of venue and the re-raffling of the
cases, the cases are being tried by Presiding Judge Jocelyn Solis-Reyes of Branch
221 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon Cityinside Camp Bagong Diwa in
Taguig City.
 
Almost a year later or on November 19, 2010, the National Union of Journalists of
the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network, Inc.,
relatives of the victims, individual journalists from various media entities, and
members of the academe filed a petition before this Court praying that live
television and radio coverage of the trial in these criminal cases be allowed,
recording devices (e.g., still cameras, tape recorders) be permitted inside the
courtroom to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be
formulated to govern the broadcast coverage and the use of devices. The Court
docketed the petition as A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC.
 
Petitioners seek the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage
of court proceedings.They principally urge the Court to revisit the 1991 ruling in Re:
Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquino's Libel
Case and the 2001 ruling inRe: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the
Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President Joseph E.
Estrada which rulings, they contend, violate the doctrine that proposed restrictions
on constitutional rights are to be narrowly construed and outright prohibition cannot
stand when regulation is a viable alternative.
 
Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has attracted
intense media coverage due to the gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of the
accused, and the number of media personnel killed.They inform that reporters are
being frisked and searched for cameras, recorders, and cellular devices upon entry,
and that under strict orders of the trial court against live broadcast coverage, the
number of media practitioners allowed inside the courtroom has been limited to one
reporter for each media institution.
 
The record shows that NUJP Vice-Chairperson Jose Jaime Espina, by January 12,
2010 letter to Judge Solis-Reyes, requested a dialogue to discuss concerns over
media coverage of the proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases.Judge
Solis-Reyes replied, however, that "matters concerning media coverage should be
brought to the Courts attention through appropriate motion." Hence, the present
petitions which assert the exercise of the freedom of the press, right to information,
right to a fair and public trial, right to assembly and to petition the government for
redress of grievances, right of free access to courts, and freedom of association,
subject to regulations to be issued by the Court.
 
ISSUE: 
Whether the trial for the cases should be broadcasted
 
HELD: 
The Court partially grants pro hac vice petitioners prayer for a live broadcast of the
trial court proceedings,subject to the guidelines which shall be enumerated shortly.
 
Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court
judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines
the right to a fair trial must pass the "totality of circumstances" test, applied in
People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an accused to a
fair trial is not incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se
prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation
and proof of the impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision.
Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting
in the deprivation of the right to a fair trial.
 
Moreover, an aggrieved party has ample legal remedies.  He may challenge the
validity of an adverse judgement arising from a proceeding that transgressed a
constitutional right. As pointed out by petitioners, an aggrieved party may early on
move for a change of venue, for continuance until the prejudice from publicity is
abated, for disqualification of the judge, and for closure of portions of the trial when
necessary. The trial court may likewise exercise its power of contempt and issue
gag orders.
 
One apparent circumstance that sets the Maguindanao Massacre cases apart from
the earlier cases is the impossibility of accommodating even the parties to the
cases the private complainants/families of the victims and other witnesses inside
the courtroom.
 
Even before considering what is a "reasonable number of the public" who may
observe the proceedings, the peculiarity of the subject criminal cases is that the
proceedings already necessarily entail the presence of hundreds of families. It
cannot be gainsaid that the families of the 57 victims and of the 197 accused have
as much interest, beyond mere curiosity, to attend or monitor the proceedings as
those of the impleaded parties or trial participants. It bears noting at this juncture
that the prosecution and the defense have listed more than 200 witnesses each.
 
The impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a courtroom that will
accommodate all the interested parties, whether private complainants or accused,
is unfortunate enough. What more if the right itself commands that a reasonable
number of the general public be allowed to witness the proceeding as it takes place
inside the courtroom. Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the
inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative of a transparent, open
and public trial.
DISINI VS. DOJ, February 18, 2014, GR No. 203335.
Fulltext: https://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2014/feb2014/gr_203335_2014.html
Note: The petitioners are criticizing the public officers who wrote the cybercrime
law  on why several of its sections violate the constitutional rights of  the people
and gives the government unreasonable authority to search and seize the peoples
data.

FACTS:
These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.)
10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.

The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace.
Petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating
undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights.

The Petitioners argued that even though the Act is the government’s platform in
combating illegal cyberspace activities, 21 separate sections of the Act
violate their constitutional rights, particularly the right to freedom of expression
and access to information. 
In February 2013, the Supreme Court extended the duration of a temporary
restraining order against the government to halt enforcement of the Act until the
adjudication of the issues.
ISSUES:
Whether some of the provisions of the cybercrime law that regard certain acts as
crimes and impose penalties for their commission as well as provisions that would
enable the government to track down and penalize violators is constitutional.
RULING:
The Court held that Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of the Act were unconstitutional. It
found that Section 4(c)(3) restricted freedom of expression by prohibiting the
unsolicited transmission of commercial communications, such as spam. Section 12
was declared in violation of the right to privacy because it lacked sufficient
specificity and definiteness in collecting real-time computer data. Section 19 was
found to violate the rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, which gave
the government the authority to restrict or block access to computer data
without a judicial warrant.

DIOCESE OF BACOLOD VS. COMELEC, January 21, 2015

MAIN: 
Is the act of the COMELEC in ordering the Diocese of Bacolod City to remove its big
tarpaulin where it impliedly asked the voters to vote for the TEAM BUHAY or the
Senators or Congressmen who opposed the Reproductive Health Bill and against the
members of TEAM PATAY or the Senators and Congressmen who voted in favor of
the Reproductive Health Bill VALID?

No, the order violates the freedom of speech on the part of the Diocese of Bacolod and the
other petitioners.

Was there a violation of the law regulating the size of tarpaulin to be used during
election campaigns because the tarpaulin used by ther Diocese of Bacolod in the
TEAM BUHAY AND TEAM PATAY campaign is bigger than that allowed by the law?

There is no violation because the size of the tarpaulins in this case is beyond the
constitutional powers of the COMELEC to regulate because this is part of the protected
speech of the petitioners WHO ARE NOT CANDIDATES.

FACTS:
On February 21, 2013, Diocese of Bacolod posted 2 tarpaulins within a private compound
housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately 6ft by
10ft in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The
first tarpaulin contains the message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive
Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of
the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and lists
candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-RH) Team
Patay" with an "X" mark. The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote
on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354, otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who
voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising "Team
Patay," while those who voted against it form "Team Buhay"

The tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections, but not of
politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that
election.

Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer, issued a Notice to Remove
Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The
election officer ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within 3 days from receipt for being
oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size requirement of 2ft by
3ft.
On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law Department issued a letter ordering the
immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to file an election
offense against petitioners. The letter of COMELEC Law Department was silenton the
remedies available to petitioners.

ISSUE:
Was there a violation to the Constitutional right of freedom of speech?

HELD:
Yes sa removal ng tarp. Pero sa downsizing, wala.

COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expressions made by private citizens.

Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do they belong to any political party.
COMELEC does not have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred
right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.

True, there is no mention whether election campaign is limited only to the candidates and
political parties themselves. The focus of the definition is that the act must be "designed to
promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office." In
this case, the tarpaulin contains speech on a matter of public concern, that is, a
statement of either appreciation or criticism on votes made in the passing of the RH
law.

The tarpaulins exaggerate. Surely, "Team Patay" does not refer to a list of dead individuals
nor could the Archbishop of the Diocese of Bacolod have intended it to mean that the entire
plan of the candidates in his list was to cause death intentionally. The tarpaulin caricatures
political parties and parodies the intention of those in the list. Furthermore, the list of "Team
Patay" is juxtaposed with the list of "Team Buhay" that further emphasizes the theme of its
author: Reproductive health is an important marker for the church of petitioners to endorse.
The messages in the tarpaulins are different from the usual messages of candidates.
Election paraphernalia from candidates and political parties are more declarative and
descriptive and contain no sophisticated literary allusion to any social objective. Thus, they
usually simply exhort the public to vote for a person with a brief description of the attributes
of the candidate. For example "Vote for [x], Sipag at Tiyaga," "Vote for [y], Mr. Palengke,"
or "Vote for [z], Iba kami sa Makati."

Political Speech v Commercial Speech

Political speech refers to speech both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about the same issue fostering informed and civicminded deliberation while
commercial speech is a speech that does no more than to propose a commercial
transaction.

Content Based regulation from content neutral regulation as restrictions to free speech

Content-based regulation can either be based on the viewpoint of the speaker or the
subject of the expression. Content-based regulations bears a heavy presumption of
invalidity and the Supreme Court had consistently used the clear and present danger as a
measure of its validity or invalidity. A content-based restraint or censorship refers to
restrictions based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech
Content-neutral regulation controls merely on the incident of free speech such as time,
place or the manner of the speech.
2. Freedom of the press, in general
PABLITO V. SANIDAD VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 90878, January 29, 1990
May the COMELEC validly prohibit columnists, radio announcers and TV
commentators from commenting for or against any issue during the
plebiscite period since they can air their views in a program sponsored by the
COMELEC itself?

No, such would be an undue interference on the freedom of expression. IT IS

STILL A RESTRICTION ON THE COLUMNIST, ANNOUNCER OR
COMMENTATOR‘S CHOICE OF THE FORUM WHERE HE MAY EXPRESS HIS
VIEW. Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The
people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a
decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the
issues, INCLUDING THE FORUM. The people affected by the issues presented in
a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the
right to expression may be exercised.

FACTS:

Republic Act No. 6766, entitled "AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT
FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION" was enacted into law.
Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, shall take part in a
plebiscite for the ratification of said Organic Act.
The COMELEC will conduct the plebiscite on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera
Autonomous Region.

Pablito V. Sanidad, who claims to be a newspaper columnist of the "OVERVIEW"

for the BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, a weekly newspaper circulated in the City of
Baguio and the Cordilleras, assailed the constitutionality of Section 19 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2167, which provides:

Section 19. Prohibition on columnists, commentators or announcers. — During the

plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on the plebiscite day, no mass
media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or
radio or television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.
Unlike a regular news reporter or news correspondent who merely reports the
news, petitioner maintains that as a columnist, his column obviously and
necessarily contains and reflects his opinions, views and beliefs on any issue or
subject about which he writes.

ISSUE:
Was there a violation to the Constitutional right of freedom of press?

HELD:

Yes.
Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right
to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be
better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the
forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be
unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be
exercised. Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time may provide a forum for
expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public
concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to
specific radio or television times.

In re: Ramon Tulfo, March 19, 1990

FACTS:
On 13 October 1989, respondent Ramon Tulfo (Tulfo, for short) wrote an article
entitled "Idiotic Decision" in his column "On Target" in the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
stating therein that the Supreme Court rendered an "idiotic decision" in legalizing
the checkpoints. This was followed by another article in the same column on 16
October 1989, entitled "Sangkatutak na Bobo," Tulfo referring therein to the
members of the Supreme Court as "stupid" for having rendered such decision on
checkpoints, and calling them "sangkatutak na bobo justices of the Philippine
Supreme Court."

ISSUE:
Was there a violation to the Constitutional right of freedom of press?

HELD:

None. Reading through the two (2) articles written by Tulfo, respectively entitled
"Idiotic decision" and "Sangkatutak na Bobo", it is plain that Tulfo intended to
ridicule and degrade the Court and its members before the public, not merely
to criticize its decision on the merits, as he would now like to make this Court
believe. The general tone and language used in Tulfo's articles belie his belated
allegation that the word "idiotic" was used in the sense of the decision being merely
"illogical, irrational, unwarranted and unwise."

Freedom of expression is not license to insult the Court and its members and
to impair the authority, integrity and dignity of the Court.

The inherent power of courts to punish any publication calculated to interfere with
the administration of justice is not restricted by the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of the press, for freedom of the press is subordinate to the authority,
integrity and independence of the judiciary and the proper administration of justice.
Freedom of the press must not be confounded with license or abuse of that
freedom. Writers and publishers of newspapers have the right, but no greater than
the right of others, to bring to public notice the conduct and acts of courts, provided
the publications are true and fair in spirit; in short, there is no law to restrain or
punish the freest expression of disapprobation of what is done in or by the courts,
provided that free expression is not used as a vehicle to satisfy one's irrational
obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy the courts and their
members. Consequently, Tulfo's as well as intervenors' claim to press freedom, is
not well taken in this instance.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds and adjudges respondent Ramon Tulfo in

CONTEMPT OF COURT, and he is hereby GRAVELY CENSURED, with the
STRONGEST WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct will be
dealt with MORE SEVERELY.

 1-a. In re: Atty. Emil Jurado, July 12, 1990

Emiliano P. Jurado, a lawyer and a journalist who writes in a newspaper of general
circulation (Manila Standard) wrote about alleged improprieties and irregularities in
the judiciary over several months (from about October 1992 to March 1993). Other
journalists had also been making reports or comments on the same subject. At the
same time, anonymous communications were being extensively circulated, by hand
and through the mail, about alleged venality and corruption in the courts. What was
particularly given attention by the Supreme Court was his column entitled “Who will
judge the Justices?” referring to a report that six justices, their spouses and children
and grandchildren (a total of 36 persons) spent a vacation in Hong Kong, and that
luxurious hotel accommodations and all their other expenses were paid by a public
utility firm and that the trip was arranged by the travel agency patronized by this
public utility firm.
This column was made amidst rumors that a Supreme Court decision favorable to
the public utility firm appears to have been authored by a lawyer of the public utility
firm. 
The seed of the proceeding at bar was sown by the decision promulgated by this
Court on August 27, 1992, in the so-called “controversial case” of “Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company v. Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI),” G.R.
No, 94374. In that decision the Court was sharply divided; the vote was 9 to 4, in
favor of the petitioner PLDT. Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., wrote the opinion
for the majority. The opinion however as per a linguistic expert proffered the conclusion
that the Gutierrez decision "looks, reads and sounds like the writing of the PLDT's counsel," 

The Chief Justice issued an administrative order creating an ad hoc committee to

investigate the said reports of corruption in the judiciary. A letter affidavit was also
received from the public utility, denying the allegations in Jurado's column. 
The Supreme Court then issued a resolution ordering that the matter dealt with in
the letter and affidavit of the public utility company be docketed and acted upon as
an official Court proceeding for the determination of whether or not the allegations
made by Jurado are true. 

ISSUE: WON Jurado can invoke the principles of press freedom to justify the
published writings. 

HELD: NO. Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful
exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and
deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy immunity.  

The knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless
disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection. 
The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm for the proper exercise of any
right, constitutional or otherwise, viz.:
 “ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith.” The provision is reflective of the universally accepted
precept of “abuse of rights,” “one of the most dominant principles which must be
deemed always implied in any system of law.” 

Requirement to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements
when publishing statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or
other public officials. Judges, by becoming such, are rightly regarded as voluntarily
subjecting themselves to norms of conduct which embody more stringent standards
of honesty, integrity, and competence than are commonly required from private
persons. Nevertheless, persons who seek or accept appointment to the Judiciary
cannot reasonably be regarded as having forfeited any right to private honor and
reputation. 
For to so rule will be to discourage all save those who feel no need to maintain their
self-respect from becoming judges. 
The public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of
judges (and for that matter, all other public officials) in the maintenance of private
honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to the other. And the point of
adjustment or accommodation between these two legitimate interests is precisely
found in the norm, which requires those, who, invoking freedom of speech, publish
statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other public
officials to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements they
publish. The norm does not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he
says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit the reckless disregard of private
reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide
effort to ascertain the truth thereof. 

Jurado failed to reliably confirmed that raw intelligence or reports he received

surrounding the corruption in the Judiciary. Moreover, some of his reports were
completely untrue because he did not bother to make any further verification.

1-b. Burgos vs. Chief of Staff, 133 SCRA 800

-2 general search warrants were searched without probable cause. The publications office
were searched and seized and closed which according to SC a violation of press freedom. 

FACTS: 
The "Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers were searched, and office and printing
machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing,
publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents,
books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.

As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked and sealed, with
the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued.

ISSUE: Whether the said closure of the We Forum and Metropolitan Mail constitute
violation of press freedom. 
HELD: YES.
Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the
press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express
themselves in print. This state of being is patently anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even
militant press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.

Corro vs. Lising, 137 SCRA 448

-General search warrant was served to seize Philippine times documents including
typewriters, photocopy machines etc. Corro now seeks the return of the confiscated
materials on the ground that the confiscation is rendered moot and academic since the
cases against him were all dismissed. *Sedition, libel, and the slaying of the late Senator
Benigno Aquino, Jr.*
The closure of Philippine Times constitute violation of Press Freedom as held in Burgos, Sr. vs.
Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines

FACTS: 
Petitioner Rommel Corro is publisher and editor of the Philippine Times.
Respondent Judge Esteban Lising, upon application filed by Lt. Col. Berlin Castillo
of the Philippine Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service, issued a search
warrant authorizing the search and seizure of articles allegedly used by petitioner in
committing the crime of inciting to sedition. Seized were printed copies of the
Philippine Times, manuscripts or drafts of articles for publication in the Philippine
Times, newspaper dummies of the Philippine Times, subversive documents, articles
printed matters, handbills, leaflets, banners, typewriters, duplicating machines,
mimeographing machines and tape recorders, video machines and tapes. 
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to recall warrant and to return documents or
personal properties alleging among others that the properties seized are
typewriters, duplicating machines, mimeographing and tape recording machines,
video machines and tapes which are not in any way, inanimate or mute things as
they are, connected with the offense of inciting to sedition. 
Respondent Judge Lising denied the motion. 
Hence, this petition praying that the search warrant issued by respondent Judge
Esteban M. Lising be declared null and void that the padlocked office premises of
the Philippine Times be reopened. Respondents would have this Court dismiss the
petition stating that probable cause exists justifying the issuance of a search
warrant, the articles seized were adequately described in the search warrant, a
search was conducted in an orderly manner and the padlocking of the searched
premises was with the consent of petitioner’s wife.
ISSUE: Whether the said closure of the Philippine Times constitute violation of
press freedom. 
HELD: YES.
"Philippine Times" of which petitioner was the publisher-editor was padlocked and sealed.
The consequence is, the printing and publication of said newspaper were discontinued. In
Burgos, Sr. vs. Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. We held that "[such
closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the
press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of
petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently
anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant press is
essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.

Babst vs. NIB, 132 SCRA 316

Invited to military camp to explain anti marcos writings
FACTS:
Petitioners are columnists, feature article writers and reporters of various
local publications. At different dates since July, 1980, some of them have allegedly
been summoned by military authorities who have subjected them to sustained
interrogation on various aspects of their works, and even their private lives. Aside
from the interrogations, a criminal complaint for libel was filed by Brig. Gen. Artemio
Tadiar, Jr. against petitioners Domini Torrevillas-Suarez, editor of the Panorama,
and Ma. Ceres Doyo based on an article written by Doyo and published in the
March 28, 1982 issue of the Panorama, on which the author had been interrogated
by respondents. The complaint included a staggering P10 million claim for
damages.

Petitioners maintain that the respondents have no jurisdiction over the

proceedings which are violative of the constitutional guarantee on free expression
since they have the effect of imposing restrictive guidelines and norms on mass
media. In their comment, respondents counter that no issue of jurisdiction exists
since they do not pretend to exercise jurisdiction over the petitioners; that what
respondents have sent to petitioners were neither subpoenas nor summonses, but
mere invitations to dialogues which were completely voluntary, without any
compulsion employed on petitioners. 

Relative to the libel case, respondents contend that petitioners have no

cause of action against respondent Board since respondent General Tadiar is not a
member of respondent Board and has filed the libel case in his personal capacity.
Moreover, the proceedings were already terminated by the NIB. 

Issue: 
Was the issuance by respondent NIB to petitioners of letters of invitation,
their subsequent interrogation, and the filing of the aforementioned libel suit
unconstitutional? 

Ruled:
No. An invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions, which the
person invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally
objectionable. If the invitation comes from a powerful group composed
predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time when the country has just
emerged from martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted and the designated interrogation site is a
military camp, it can be an authoritative command which one can only defy at his
peril, especially when the invitation carries the ominous seaming that "failure to
appear . . . shall be considered as a waiver . . . and this Committee will be
constrained to proceed in accordance with law." Fortunately, the NIB director
general and chairman saw the wisdom of terminating the proceedings and the
unwelcome interrogation.

The issue of validity of the libel, charged by reason of their alleged collision
with freedom of expression, is a matter that should be raised in the proper forum,
i.e., before the court where the libel cases are pending or where they may be filed.
The same rule applies to the issue of admissibility as evidence of matters that have
been elicited in the course of an inquiry or interrogation conducted by respondent
NIB, which petitioners claim to have been illegally obtained.
Elizalde vs. Gutierrez,76 SCRA 448
(In order that any news item relating to a judicial proceeding will not be
actionable, the same must be [a] a true and fair report of the actual
proceedings; [b] must be done in good faith; and [c] no comments or remarks
shall be made by the writer)
Facts:
 Manuel Elizalde and Fred J. Elizalde were the Publisher and Assistant
Publisher and Prudencio R. Europa was the Editor-in-Chief of the Evening News.

A news article was published in the Evening News, a newspaper of general

circulation, of an item reproducing in full a dispatch from the Philippine News
Service. It summarized the testimony of the victim of a pending rape case, wherein
the name of the accused was mentioned.

Claiming that the news article is libelous the accused filed an information against
the newspaper for libel. The newspaper filed a Motion to Quash the information, based
on the Constitutional right to Freedom of Expression and of the Press. The trial court
judge denied the motion, hence this Petition before the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
WON the news article is libelous. 

RULED:
No. No culpability could be imputed to petitioners for the alleged offending
publication without doing violence to the concept of privileged communication
implicit in freedom of the press. 

This is a case therefore that falls squarely within the protection of the free press
provision found in the Constitution. That such news item possessed a defamatory
aspect is beside the point.  It cannot justify a prosecution for libel.  Even prior to the
1935 Constitution, under the previous organic act, the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916,
which contained a similar provision mandating a free press, this Court, in the epochal
Malcolm opinion in United States v. Bustos, decided almost sixty years ago, to be
precise on March 8, 1918, enunciated the principle that the freedom of the press is "so
sacred to the people of these Islands and won at so dear a cost, [that it] should now be
protected and carried forward as one would protect and preserve the covenant of liberty
itself." Thus it is clear that a prosecution for libel lacks justification if the offending words
find sanctuary within the shelter of the free press guarantee.  

Policarpio vs. Manila Times, 5 SCRA 148

Court- probable cause
Fiscal’s office can be dismissed
Facts: 
Lumen Policarpio was executive secretary of UNESCO National
Commission. As such, she had filed charges against Herminia Reyes, one of her
subordinates in the Commission, & caused the latter to be separated from the
service.

Reyes, in turn, filed counter-charges which were referred for investigation.

Pending completion, Reyes filed a complaint against Policarpio for alleged
malversation of public funds & another complaint for estafa thru falsification of
public documents.

Policarpio filed a libel suit to Manila Times Publishing Co. for publishing two
defamatory, libelous and false articles/news items in Saturday Mirror of August 11,
1956 and in the Daily Mirror of August 13, 1956.

 The articles contain news on Reyes’ charges against Policarpio for having
malversed public property and of having fraudulently sought reimbursement of
supposed official expenses.

It was said that Policarpio used several sheets of government stencils for her
private and personal use.

The other charge refers to the supposed reimbursements she had made for
a trip to Quezon and Pangasinan.

Reyes’ complaint alleged that Policarpio had asked for refund of expenses
for her car when she had actually made the trip aboard an army plane.

Policarpio was said to be absent from the Bayambang conference for which she
also sought a refund of expenses.

CFI dismissed the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff had not proven that
defendants had acted maliciously in publishing the articles, although portions
thereof were inaccurate or false.

ISSUE:  Whether or not the defendant is guilty of having published

libelous/defamatory articles

HELD: 
Yes. The immunity enjoyed by the press presupposes that the derogatory
information they publish are both TRUE and FAIR and made in good faith, without
any comments or remarks. The errors and omissions by the newspaper were
indeed material (see Ratio).

Although the second article corrected some inaccuracies, it does not wipe
out the responsibility arising from the publication of the first article. It merely
mitigates it. To enjoy immunity, a publication containing derogatory information
must be not only true, but, also, fair, and it must be made in good faith and without
any comments or remarks.

In the case at bar, aside from containing information derogatory to the plaintiff, the
article published on August 11, 1956, presented her in a worse predicament than that in which
she, in fact, was. In other words, said article was not a fair and true report of the proceedings
there in alluded to. What is more, its sub-title — "PCAC RAPS L. POLICARPIO ON FRAUD" —
is a comment or remark, besides being false. Accordingly, the defamatory imputations
contained in said article are "presumed to be malicious".
Lopez vs. CA, 34 SCRA 116
Facts:
Eugenio Lopez was the publisher of the Manila Chronicle. On the front page of such
a newspaper, there was a news story of a sanitary inspector named Fidel Cruz
assigned to the Babuyan Islands, sending a distress signal to a passing United
States Airforce plane which in turn relayed the message to Manila. In response to it,
an American Army plane dropped on the beach of an island an emergency-
sustenance kit containing, among other things, a two-way radio set. Cruz utilized it
to inform authorities in Manila that the people in the place were living in terror, due
to a series of killings committed since Christmas of 1955.
The Philippines defense establishment then rushed to the island a platoon of scout
rangers led by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion. Upon arriving at the Babuyan Island,
Major Encarnacion and his men found, instead of the alleged killers, Fidel Cruz,
who merely wanted transportation home to Manila. Major Wilfredo Encarnacion
branded it as a "hoax," a term which was then used by the newspapers when
referring to the above-mentioned incident.
This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, edited by Juan T. Gatbonton, made a
pictorial article out of Fidel Cruz story the kind of life people living in that place, with
almost everybody sick, only two individuals able to read and write, food and clothing
being scarce.
However, in the January 29, 1956 issue of This Week Magazine, the "January
News Quiz" included an item on the central figure in what was known as the
Calayan Hoax, who nevertheless did the country a good turn by calling the
government's attention to that forsaken and desolate corner of the Republic. In its
Special Year End Quiz appearing in its issue of January 13, 1956, reference was
made to a health inspector who suddenly felt "lonely" in his isolated post, cooked up
a story about a murderer running loose on the island of Calayan so that he could be
ferried back to civilization. He was given the appellation of "Hoax of the Year."
The magazine on both occasions carried photographs of the person purporting to
be Fidel Cruz. Unfortunately, the pictures that were published on both occasions
were that of former Mayor Fidel G. Cruz of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, businessman and
contractor in lieu of the health inspector Fidel Cruz, who was connected with a story
about a murderer running loose on Calayan Island.
Fidel G. Cruz sued petitioners in the Court of First Instance of Manila for the
recovery of damages alleging the defamatory character of the above publication of
his picture.
Ruling: 
Mistake is no excuse to absolve publishers because libel is harmful on its face by
the fact that it exposes the injured party to more than trivial ridicule, whether it is
fact or opinion is irrelevant. Publication of a person's photograph in connection with
an article libelous of a third person, is a libel on the person whose picture is
published, where the acts set out in the article are imputed to such person."
Although, “Public officials must not be too sensitive with reference to comments on
official acts” but of course criticism does not authorize defamation. Nevertheless, as
an individual is less than the state, so must expected criticism be born for the
common good.
So long as it was done in good faith, the press should have the legal right to have
and express their opinions on legal questions. To deny them that right would be to
infringe upon freedom of the press.
Citing Quisumbing v. Lopez: Press should be given leeway and tolerance as to
enable them to courageously and effectively perform their important role in our
democracy. Freedom of the press ranks high in the hierarchy of legal values.  
TEST of LIABLITY: must prove there was actual malice in publishing the
story/photo (but this was not done in this case. It was an honest mistake)
In a nutshell: Lopez is liable for its error in publication. It is libelous in nature as it
tainted someone’s (Cruz) good reputation. However, freedom of the press can be
validly invoked in this case since it was an honest mistake on the part of the
publisher. Thus, the correction promptly made by petitioners would thus call for a
reduction in the damages awarded.  

Liwayway Publishing vs. PCGG, April 15,l988

Facts: 

Liwayway and Bulletin are domestic corporations engaged in the business of

publication of newspapers and magazines.

The Liwayway publishes a daily newspaper, the "Balita", and three weekly
vernacular magazines, namely, "Liwayway", "Bisaya" and "Bannawag", while the
Bulletin publishes the "Manila Bulletin" a daily newspaper and its weekly
magazines, The "Philippine Panorama", all of general and national circulation.
 
In both corporations, Mr. Emilio T. Yap is the biggest stockholder and Chairman of
the Board of Directors. 

I. LIWAYWAY CASE
On February 12, 1987 two writs of sequestration (confiscation, seizure), was issued
by the PCGG, one addressed to the President/Chairman of the Board of the U.S.
Automotive sequestering the President/Chairman's shares of stocks in the
Liwayway as of April 15, 1986,

and the other addressed to the President/Chairman of the Board of Liwayway

sequestering all shares of stocks pertaining to U.S. Automotive in Liwayway
Publishing, Inc. as of April 15, 1986.

The Commission further requested the Central Bank to instruct all commercial
banks and non-bank financial institutions not to allow any withdrawals, transfers or
remittances from funds or assets under any type of deposit accounts, trust
accounts, and/or money market placements, including safety deposit boxes, stocks
and bonds, bearer certificates and unnumbered accounts, except those which may
pertain to payment of regular salaries and wages of Liwayway and HM Holding and
Management, Inc.

Liwayway Publishing plead for a temporary restraining order to restrain the

Commission against denying Liwayway the use and availment of its funds in the
banks to put out its regular publications as well as against the Commission's
interference or intervention in the management or operations of Liwayway,
particularly not allowing any withdrawals or remittances from its funds, except for
"payment of regular salaries and wages" which would virtually shut down its
publications.

During the hearing of the plea for TRO, The Solicitor General, as well as the
Commission's Vice-Chairman assured the Court that Liwayway's funds would not
be choked off and that the Commission would not in any way interfere or intervene
in the management or operations of the publication nor with its editorial policy or
reportage or in any way impinge upon its freedom. 

It was brought out that Liwayway made over P8 million in 1986 and paid more than
half of that in income tax, and they agreed further to preserve the status quo ante
pending joining of the issues on the merits or a showing of some irregularity that
would warrant the Commission's intervention.

Held:
 
On the issue of freedom of the press, the Court noted the Solicitor General's pledge
at the hearing that the Commission will not in any way act in such a way as to
impinge upon the freedom of expression or freedom to publish the newspaper. The
Court gave due faith and credence thereto and the above-cited undertakings of the
Commission. Accordingly, in lieu of a temporary restraining order which has been
rendered unnecessary by the Commission's manifestation and undertakings, the
Court enjoined faithful compliance therewith by all concerned.

This renders moot this particular issue of unwarranted intervention of the

Commission and impairment of press freedom. But with the closing out of this case,
as hereafter ordered and the denial of petitioner's plea to lift the sequestration
orders, the Court will formalize the parties' agreement through the issuance of an
injunction to the same effect, to assure compliance regardless of any change in the
composition of the Commission or of other public officials concerned.

III. BULLETIN CASE

The PCGG issued on April 22, 1986 an order sequestering the shares of former
President Marcos, Emilio Yap, Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., their nominees or agents in
the Bulletin Publishing Corporation. In turn, the Commission declared their intent to
vote the sequestered shares. The instant petition was filed seeking the nullification
of the above mentioned orders. The petitioners contended freedom of press
institutions to independently manage their own affairs and effectively preserve
editorial policies and objectives, without the shadow of government participation in
the same, that governmental presence in petitioner's board will most certainly cast
that shadow and threaten the independence of the press as an institution of mass
media protected and guaranteed by the Constitution. 

The Court issued a temporary restraining order ordering the respondents, their
successors, agents or representatives to cease and desist from voting Bulletin
shares, or otherwise from taking part or intervening, directly or indirectly, in any acts
in the management of the Bulletin daily newspaper.

The Commission and members expressly have declared that the Commission no
longer intends to exercise its right to vote the sequestered shares, that the
Commission's present role is confined largely to monitoring Bulletin's activities in
terms of preventing any dissipation and disposition of funds and assets and does
not extend to the exercise of the voting of the shares, unless subsequent events or
circumstances call for such exercise pursuant to law. 

Held:
As in the Liwayway case, the Commission concedes that it may not lawfully
intervene and participate in the management and operations of a private mass
media such as Bulletin for the purpose of maintaining its freedom and
independence as guaranteed by the Constitution and therefore the temporary
restraining order ordering the Commission or its representative to "cease and desist
from voting the shares or otherwise from intervening directly or indirectly in the
management of petitioner Bulletin" will be made permanent.  
3. Freedom of expression in general
 ***Pardon me for this long case digest. Several personalities are engaged in this case so I
included in case Atty. Gacyan will ask each of them. Anyway, for a summary: 
If you heard about the Maguindanao Massacre, ito po yun. Several Journalists were
killed in that tragic event. Atty.Fortun was the counsel of Ampatuan, the primary
suspect. The group of Quinsayas filed a disbarment case against Fortun because of
his alleged abuse of remedies that in turn delayed the resolution of the case. 

The SC held that the disbarment case filed against Fortun is valid considering that
Since the disbarment complaint is a matter of public interest, legitimate media had a
right to publish such fact under freedom of the press. The Court also recognizes
that respondent media groups and personalities merely acted on a news lead they
received when they reported the filing of the disbarment complaint.

Any matter related to the Maguindanao Massacre was considered a matter of public
interest and that the personalities involved, including Fortun, are considered as
public figure.  Since petitioner is a public figure or has become a public figure
because he is representing a matter of public concern, and because the event itself
that led to the filing of the disbarment case against petitioner is a matter of public
concern, the media has the right to report the filing of the disbarment case as
legitimate news. It would have been different if the disbarment case against
petitioner was about a private matter as the media would then be bound to respect
the confidentiality provision of disbarment proceedings.

FORTUN VS. QUINSAYAS, GR No. 194578, February, 2013

Disbarment case against Atty Fortun was published

Facts: 
Sometime in November 2009, a convoy of seven vehicles carrying the relatives of
then Maguindanao vice-mayor Esmael "Toto" Mangudadatu, as well as lawyers and
journalists, was on their way to the Commission on Elections office in Shariff Aguak
to file Mangudadatu’s Certificate of Candidacy when they were accosted by a group
of about 100 armed men at a checkpoint in Sitio Malating, Ampatuan town, four to
ten kilometers from their destination.
The group was taken hostage and brought to a hilly and sparsely-populated part of
Sitio Magating, Barangay Salman, Ampatuan, Maguindanao. The gruesome
aftermath of the hostage-taking was later discovered and shocked the world. The
hostages were systematically killed by shooting them at close range with automatic
weapons, and their bodies and vehicles were dumped in mass graves and covered
with the use of a backhoe.
These gruesome killings became known as the Maguindanao Massacre. A total of
57 victims were killed, 30 of them journalists. Subsequently, criminal cases for
Murder were filed and raffled to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, against
Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr. PHILIP SIGFRID A. FORTUN is his counsel.
In November 2010, Atty. Quinsayas, et al. filed a disbarment complaint against
Fortun.
GMA News TV internet website, Inquirer.net, the website of PDI, PhilStar posted an
article, regarding the disbarment case against Fortun. Accordingly, Fortun is
"engaging in every conceivable chichancery or artifice to unduly delay the
proceedings by using and abusing legal remedies available."
ABSCBN’s program on ANC “Crying for Justice: the Maguindanao Massacre." Ces
Drilon, the program’s host, asked questions and allowed Atty. Quinsayas to discuss
the disbarment case against Fortun, including its principal points. Fortun was
allegedly singled out and identified in the program as the lead counsel of the
Ampatuan family.
Fortun further alleged that media groups and personalities conspired with Atty.
Quinsayas, et al. by publishing the confidential materials on their respective media
platforms.
Fortun alleged that the public circulation of the disbarment complaint against him
exposed this Court and its investigators to outside influence and public interference;
that the purpose of respondents in publishing the disbarment complaint was to
malign his personal and professional reputation.
GMA Network contended that it did not broadcast the disbarment complaint on its
television station. GMA Network alleged that the publication had already been done
and completed when Atty. Quinsayas distributed copies of the disbarment complaint
and thus, the members of the media who reported the news and the media groups
that published it on their website, including GMA Network, did not violate the
confidentiality rule.
PDI alleged in its Comment that it shares content with the Inquirer.net website
through a syndication but the latter has its own editors and publish materials that
are not found on the broadsheet. It alleged that Philippine Daily Inquirer, Inc. and
Inquirer Interactive, Inc. are two different corporations, with separate legal
personalities, and one may not be held responsible for the acts of the other.
ABS-CBN alleged that ANC, is maintained and operated by Sarimanok Network
News (SNN) and not by ABS-CBN. SNN, which produced the program "ANC
Presents: Crying for Justice: the Maguindanao Massacre," is a subsidiary of ABS-
CBN but it has its own juridical personality although SNN and ABS-CBN have
interlocking directors. ABS-CBN and Drilon alleged that the presentation and
hosting of the program were not malicious as there was no criminal intent to violate
the confidentiality rule in disbarment proceedings.
In their joint Comment, PhilStar and Punay alleged that the news article on the
disbarment complaint is a qualified privileged communication. They alleged that the
article was a true, fair, and accurate report on the disbarment complaint. The article
was straightforward, truthful, and accurate, without any comments from the author.
They alleged that Punay reported the plan of Mangudadatu, et al. to file the
disbarment complaint against petitioner as it involved public interest and he
perceived it to be a newsworthy subject. They further alleged that assuming the
news article is not a privileged communication, it is covered by the protection of the
freedom of expression, speech, and of the press under the Constitution. 
Held: 
The Court recognizes that "publications which are privileged for reasons of public
policy are protected by the constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech." As a
general rule, disbarment proceedings are confidential in nature until their final
resolution and the final decision of this Court. In this case, however, the filing of a
disbarment complaint against petitioner is itself a matter of public concern
considering that it arose from the Maguindanao Massacre case. The interest of the
public is not on petitioner himself but primarily on his involvement and participation
as defense counsel in the Maguindanao Massacre case. Indeed, the allegations in
the disbarment complaint relate to petitioners supposed actions involving the
Maguindanao Massacre case.
The Maguindanao Massacre is a very high-profile case. Of the 57 victims of the
massacre, 30 were journalists. It is understandable that any matter related to the
Maguindanao Massacre is considered a matter of public interest and that the
personalities involved, including petitioner, are considered as public figure. The
Court explained it, thus:

But even assuming a person would not qualify as a public figure, it would not
necessarily follow that he could not validly be the subject of a public
comment. For he could; for instance, if and when he would be involved in a
public issue. If a matter is a subject of public or general interest, it cannot
suddenly become less so merely because a private individual is involved or
because in some sense the individual did not voluntarily choose to become
involved. The public’s primary interest is in the event; the public focus
is on the conduct of the participant and the content, effect and
significance of the conduct, not the participant’s prior anonymity or
notoriety.

Since the disbarment complaint is a matter of public interest, legitimate media had a
right to publish such fact under freedom of the press. The Court also recognizes
that respondent media groups and personalities merely acted on a news lead they
received when they reported the filing of the disbarment complaint.
The distribution by Atty. Quinsayas to the media of the disbarment complaint, by
itself, is not sufficient to absolve the media from responsibility for violating the
confidentiality rule. However, since petitioner is a public figure or has become a
public figure because he is representing a matter of public concern, and because
the event itself that led to the filing of the disbarment case against petitioner is a
matter of public concern, the media has the right to report the filing of the
disbarment case as legitimate news. It would have been different if the disbarment
case against petitioner was about a private matter as the media would then be
bound to respect the confidentiality provision of disbarment proceedings.
Petitioner also failed to substantiate his claim that respondent media groups and
personalities acted in bad faith and that they conspired with one another in their
postings and publications of the filing of a disbarment complaint against him.
Respondent media groups and personalities reported the filing of the disbarment
complaint without any comments or remarks but merely as it was – a news item.

Adiong vs. Comelec, March 31, 1992

Facts:
On January 13, 1992, COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 which stated
that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas.

Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the 1992 elections, assailed the
COMELEC’s Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in
“mobile” places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him, such
prohibition is violative of Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section
11(a) of Republic Act No. 6646.

In addition, he believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political
advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics, stands to suffer grave
and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on
cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the electorate
that he is a senatorial candidate in the 1992 elections. He further states that the
prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen’s fundamental right of free speech.

Held:

Substantial public interest required to warrant restriction on freedom of

speech

The COMELEC’s prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places

whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC
is null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the
citizen’s fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Constitution.
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is
not so much that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the
freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car,
to convince others to agree with him.

National Press Club vs. Comelec, March 5, 1992. Real also the dissenting and separate opinions of
the justices.
 (3) consolidated Petitions assailing the constitutionality of Section 11 (b) of RA no 6646
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987.

representatives of the mass media are prevented from selling or donating space and
time for political advertisements; two (2) individuals who are candidates for office (one for
national and the other for provincial office) in the coming May 1992 elections; and taxpayers
and voters who claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of the
candidates is being curtailed.

Petitioners argue that Section 11 (b) of RA No. 6646 invades and violates the
constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression and it amounts to
censorship as it selects and singles out for suppression and repression with criminal
sanctions, only publications of a particular content, namely, media-based election or
political propaganda. It is asserted that the prohibition is in derogation of media's
role, function and duty to provide adequate channels of public information and
public opinion relevant to election issues. Further, petitioners contend that it
abridges freedom of speech of candidates, as it would bring about a substantial
reduction in the quantity or volume of information concerning candidates and issues
in the election thereby curtailing and limiting the right of voters to information and
opinion.

ISSUE:

WON Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 is constitutional.

RULING:

COMELEC has been expressly authorized by Article IX(C) (4) of the

Constitution to supervise or regulate enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or
permits for the operation of media of communication and information. The
fundamental purpose of such "supervision or regulation" is spelled out in the
Constitution to ensure "equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply,"
as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media
facilities, in connection with "public information campaigns and forums among
candidates."

The technical effect of Article IX (C) (4) of the Constitution may be seen to be
that no presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercises of supervisory or
regulatory authority on the part of the Comelec for the purpose of securing equal
opportunity among candidates for political office, although such supervision or
regulation may result in some limitation of the rights of free speech and free press.
For supervision or regulation of the operations of media enterprises is scarcely
conceivable without such accompanying limitation. Thus, the applicable rule is the
general, time-honored one — that a statute is presumed to be constitutional and
that the party asserting its unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly
and convincingly proving that assertion. 

4. Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 7960-707 

Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants (for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act) pending before the Sandiganbayan.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1988/apr1988/gr_79690_707_1988.html 

Facts: The court have examined carefully the lengthy and vigorously written Motion
for Reconsideration dated October 18, 1988 filed by counsel for respondent Raul M.
Gonzalez, relating to the per curiam Resolution of the Court dated October 7, 1988.
We have reviewed once more the Court’s extended per curiam Resolution, in the
light of the argument adduced in the Motion for Reconsideration, but must conclude
that we find no sufficient basis for modifying the conclusions and rulings embodied
in that Resolution. The Motion for Reconsideration sets forth copious quotations
and references to foreign texts which, however, whatever else they may depict, do
not reflect the law in this jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, it might be useful to develop further, in some measure, some of the
conclusions reached in the per curiam Resolution, addressing in the process some
of the “Ten (10) Legal Points for Reconsideration,” made in the Motion for
Reconsideration.
Issue: Whether the decision of the SC inviolate the Petitioner’s right to Freedom of
Expression.
Held: No, The Court penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: “any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice.” The “clear and present danger” doctrine invoked by
respondent’s counsel is not a magic incantation which dissolves all problems and
dispenses with analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to
free speech, and which compels a court to exonerate a defendant the moment the
doctrine is invoked, absent proof of impending apocalypse. The clear and present
danger” doctrine has been an accepted method for marking out the appropriate
limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is not, however,
the only test which has been recognized and applied by courts. The right of freedom
of expression indeed, occupies a preferred position in the “hierarchy of civil
liberties”. Freedom of expression is not absolute. The prevailing doctrine is that the
clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible
limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of
the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the “balancing-of-interests
test”. The principle “requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of
the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation.
Under either the “clear and present danger” test or the “balancing-of-interest test,”
the court believes that the statements made by respondent are of such a nature and
were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the
permissible limits of free speech. This conclusion was implicit in the per curiam
Resolution of October 7, 1988. It is important to point out that the “substantive evil”
which the Supreme Court has a right and a duty to prevent does not, in the instant
case, relate to threats of physical disorder or overt violence or similar disruptions of
public order. What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront
and prevent a “substantive evil” consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and
fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the
degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards
of professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts.
The “substantive evil” here involved, in other words, is not as palpable as a threat of
public disorder or rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and more far reaching in
its implications for society.
freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not
absolute and that freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to
and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests.
One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice. 

Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, GR No. 80578

FACTS:
Petitioner filed Resolution including Motion to Cite in Contempt Special Prosecutor
(formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez. Gonzalez in: 
(1) having caused the filing of the information against petitioner in criminal
case before the Sandiganbayan, and 
(2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in
relation to the proceedings in where respondent is claiming that he is acting
as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman. 
A Resolution from the Supreme Court required respondent to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative sanctions
for making certain public statements. 

Portion of the published article from Philippine Daily Globe in his interview:
“What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich
and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is difficult
for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course.”

Respondent has not denied making the above statements; indeed, he

acknowledges that the newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him are
substantially correct.

ISSUE:
Whether the decision of the SC violates the Petitioner’s right to Freedom of
Expression.

RULING:
No, The Court penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: “any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice.” The “clear and present danger” doctrine invoked by
respondent’s counsel is not a magic incantation which dissolves all problems and
dispenses with analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to
free speech, and which compels a court to exonerate a defendant the moment the
doctrine is invoked, absent proof of impending apocalypse. The clear and present
danger doctrine has been an accepted method for marking out the appropriate
limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is not, however,
the only test which has been recognized and applied by courts. The right of freedom
of expression indeed, occupies a preferred position in the “hierarchy of civil
liberties”. Freedom of expression is not absolute. The prevailing doctrine is that the
clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible
limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of
the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the “balancing-of-interests
test”. The principle “requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of
the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation.
Under either the “clear and present danger” test or the “balancing-of-interest test,”
the court believes that the statements made by respondent are of such a nature and
were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the
permissible limits of free speech. This conclusion was implicit in the per curiam
Resolution of October 7, 1988. It is important to point out that the “substantive evil”
which the Supreme Court has a right and a duty to prevent does not, in the instant
case, relate to threats of physical disorder or overt violence or similar disruptions of
public order. What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront
and prevent a “substantive evil” consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and
fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the
degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards
of professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts.
The “substantive evil” here involved, in other words, is not as palpable as a threat of
public disorder or rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and more far reaching in
its implications for society.
&   Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, GR No. 80578, February          1, 1989

Facts: Petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is one of several defendants in a criminal case

pending before the Sandiganbayan. The Office of the Tanodbayan conducted the
preliminary investigation and filed the criminal informations in those cases.
Petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus
naming as respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez.
Petitioner alleged that respondent Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan and under the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with power and authority
independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption
against public officials and employees, and hence the criminal case against the
petitioner were all null and void. The Court further resolved to ISSUE a
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately, ordering respondent
Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST from hearing and trying the criminal cases
againts the petitoner Zalvidar.
Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari and
Prohibition initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as respondent for
recommending that additional criminal charges for graft and corruption be filed
against petitioner Zaldivar and five (5) other individuals. Once again, petitioner
raised the argument of the Tanodbayan’s lack of authority under the 1987
Constitution to file such criminal cases and to investigate the same.
The Court again: (1) required respondent Gonzalez to submit a comment thereon:
and (2) issued a temporary restraining order ordering respondent Gonzalez to
CEASE and DESIST from further acting in the pending cases from filing the criminal
information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary investigation
therein.
Petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in Contempt 11 directed at
respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1)
having caused the filing of the additional information against petitioner in criminal
cases before the Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous
statements to the media in relation to the proceedings.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by respondent Gonzalez in which he alleged
interference in due process by sitting judges of the court. Respondent Gonzalez
also continued to make statements to the media regarding the subjudice case
repeatedly alleging bias in the judiciary against him.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent Gonzalez is in contempt of court?
Decision: Guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of gross misconduct
as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.
The Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary
disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from
the Court’s constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law,
which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of law. Apart from this
constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over
members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of
justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the
furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including
lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the
Court. The power to punish for contempt is “necessary for its own protection against
an improper interference with the due administration of justice,” “(it) is not
dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties litigant.
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like
that before us here; the Court’s inherent power to discipline attorneys and the
contempt power. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is
broader than the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of court may be
committee both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently,
where the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes
professional misconduct which calls into play the disciplinary authority of the
Supreme Court. Where the respondent is a lawyer, however, the Supreme Court’s
disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the
misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of
court. The power to punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of
disciplinary authority of the Court over lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the
Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court’s exclusive power of
admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the
court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of
dispensing justice and resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which
visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade the administration of
justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise of
disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of
the contempt power.

5.  Eastern Broadcasting vs. Dans,137 SCRA 628

Radio Station DYRE was summarily closed on grounds of national security.
The radio station was allegedly used to incite people to sedition. According to
the respondent National Telecommunications Commission, this charge of
"inciting people to commit acts of sedition" arose from DYRE’s shift towards
the coverage of public events and the airing of programs geared towards
public affairs. Aside from the issue of freedom of expression, the petitioner
EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (DYRE) also argued that they were
denied due process when no hearing was held, and no proof was submitted to
establish the basis for the closure of the radio station.

The case, however, became moot and academic because the president of
Eastern Broadcasting Corporation sold the radio station DYRE in Cebu to
Manuel Pastrana who no longer wanted to pursue the case. Despite this, the
SC still decided on the case for the guidance of inferior courts and
administrative tribunals in matters similar to this case.
 

ISSUE:

(1) Was the closure of the radio station DYRE a violation of the constitutional
right of freedom of expression?

(2) Was there a violation of due process? (in case tanungin)

RULING:

(1) Was the closure of the radio station DYRE a violation of the constitutional
right of freedom of expression? Yes. 

(a) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad
protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause.

The test for limitations on freedom of expression is still the clear and
present danger rule which provides “that words are used in such
 circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the
lawmaker has a right to prevent”

(b) The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a
simplistic and all-embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all
forums.

Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be

allocated among qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot
simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government
regulation or for the rights of others.

(c) Broadcasting receives less or limited protection from the freedom

expression clause.

Why? Short Answer: 1. Broadcast media is more pervasive to the lives

of all citizens; and 2. Broadcast media is easily accessible to children. 

Long Answer:

1. Broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence

in the lives of all citizens, Material presented over the airwaves
confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in the privacy of his home. 

The materials broadcast over the airwaves reach every person

of every age, persons of varying susceptibilities to persuasion,
persons of different I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose
reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult
to monitor or predict. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful
and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio
audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate, analyze, and reject
the utterance.

2. Broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores and

motion picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material
available to children, but the same selectivity cannot be done in radio
or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly tuning in and
out.

Likewise, print media compared to radio and TV stations are less

 accessible to the masses and more expensive.

(d) The government has the right to regulate broadcasting. At the same time,
the people have the right to be informed.

The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which

incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and television may
not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread
uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be informed.
Radio and television would have little reason for existence if
broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining
utterances. Since they are the most convenient and popular means of
disseminating varying views on public issues, they also deserve
special protection.

      

(d) The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a

representative democracy.

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government

demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment
on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech.
The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom.
Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation;
the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A
public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment
upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the
individual be exalted. (US vs. Bustos) 

(2) Was there a violation of due process? Yes.

While there is no controlling and precise definition of due process, it gives an

unavoidable standard that government actions must conform in order that
deprivation of life, liberty and property is valid.

The requirements in the Ang Tibay case should be followed before any
broadcast station may be closed. The following are the requirements:

(a) The right to hearing, includes the right to present one’s case and
submit evidence presented.
 (b) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented

(c) The decision must have something to support itself.

(d) Evidence must be substantial (reasonable evidence that is

adequate to support conclusion)

(e) Decision must be based on the evidence presented at hearing

(f) The tribunal body must act on its own independent consideration of
law and facts and not simply accept subordinate’s views

(g) The court must render a decision in such a manner that the
proceeding can know the various issues involved and reasons for
decisions rendered.

6. Newsweek vs. IAC, 142 SCRA 171

FACTS:

Newsweek Inc., a foreign corporation, published an article in their weekly

news magazine Newsweek entitled “An Island of Fear”. This article
supposedly portrayed the island province of Negros Occidental as a place
dominated by big landowners or sugarcane planters who not only exploited
the impoverished and underpaid sugarcane workers/laborers, but also
brutalized and killed them with impunity.

The private respondents, incorporated associations of sugarcane planters in

Negros Occidental claiming to have 8,500 members and several individual
sugar planters filed a civil case in their own behalf and/or as a class suit on
behalf of all sugarcane planters in the province of Negros Occidental against
Newsweek. They asked for P1M as actual and compensatory damages etc.
because the article was libelous.

Newsweek argued that the article did not specifically refer to any of the
private respondents.

ISSUE: Can the libel suit prosper?

RULING: No.
(1) The persons affected by the article were not identifiable.

In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be

identifiable, although it is not necessary that he be named.

Defamatory matter which does not reveal the Identity of the person
upon whom the imputation is cast, affords no ground of action unless it
be shown that the readers of the libel could have identified the
personality of the individual defamed.

(2) The defamation was not directed at a group or a class.

Where the defamation is alleged to have been directed at a group or

class, it is essential that the statement must be so sweeping or all-
embracing as to apply to every individual in that group or class, or
sufficiently specific so that each individual in the class or group can
prove that the defamatory statement specifically pointed to him, so that
he can bring the action separately, if need be.

(3) This case is not a class suit. It is not a case where one or more may sue
for the benefit of all.

In this case, each of the petitioners has a separate and distinct

reputation in the community. They do not have a common or general
interest in the subject matter of the controversy.

(4) The alleged libelous portion of the article which refers to Pablo Sola never
singled out Sola as a sugar planter.

The news report merely stated that the victim had been arrested by
members of a special police unit brought into the area by Pablo Sola,
the mayor of Kabankalan. Hence, as the report referred to an official
act performed by an elective public official, it is within the realm of
privilege and protected by the constitutional guarantees of free speech
and press.

The article further stated that Sola and the commander of the special
police unit were arrested. This is true because there was a case filed -
 > People vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393

7. Kapisanan vs. Camara Shoes, 11 SCRA 477

FACTS: 
Kapisanan ng Manggagawa sa Camara Shoes is a legitimate labor union
composed of the employees of the respondent Camara Shoes; Demetrio Ramos
and Ananias Asturias are members of the petitioner Union.

Petitioners charged Camara Shoes and its owner, Santos Camara, with unfair labor
practice for deducting P1.00 a day from Ramos' salary, and later suspending him
from his work, and dismissing Asturias because of union activities.

Asturias, while employed as mechanic, was directed to buy needles costing P13.00.
The amount as stated in the receipt was tampered and changed to P18.00. The
following day, two other employees were sent to buy the same size and quality of
needles from the same store, and it was discovered that the needles still cost
P13.00. The CAMARA shoes were not able to produce a witness to testify this fact.
Also the company cashier’s records show that Asturias was only given 13.40 (13 for
needles and 0.40 for fare)

Ramos was being deducted the amount of P1.00 by the respondent in partial
payment of his loan of P50.00 for medical expense, and P500.00 for two (2)
cartloads of second hand lumber and building materials taken from the demolished
store at Nueva Street. He also spoiled the payroll of the company by placing therein
"under protest". For this act of dirtying the official copy of the payroll, he was
suspended indefinitely. This loan was never proven to be a fact. 

ISSUE: Whether Ramos’ act of writing "under protest" on the company payroll
within the ambit of freedom of expression clause? 

RULING: 
It is thus too clear from the foregoing that petitioner Ramos was justified in airing his
grievances against the unauthorized and illegal deductions made by the respondent
company. By writing "under protest" on the company payroll, petitioner Ramos
was well within the ambit(scope) of his constitutional freedom of expression
as well as the right to petition against what was obviously a calculated undue
harassment amounting to unfair labor practice perpetuated by respondent employer
herein.
8. IN RE: Atty. Tipon, 79 SCRA 372 (administrative matter)
Facts:
The Postmaster General in a first endorsement to the Chief Justice dated May 17,
1965 transmitted certain papers purporting to show that Atty. Emmanuel S. Tipon
(admitted to the bar in 1956) might have violated the lawyer's oath for having
imported the magazine Playboy, which was considered a non-mailable matter.
In this Court's resolution of May 31, 1965 action on the complaint of the Postmaster
General was deferred until after Civil Case No. 3898-111 of the Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Norte entitled "Emmanuel S. Tipon vs. Belarmino P. Navarro and
Enrico Palomar" (Assistant Postmaster General and Postmaster General,
respectively) is decided.
That case was a mandamus action filed by Atty. Tipon in 1964 in Ilocos Norte
against the Postmaster General and his assistant. In a decision dated March 19,
1966 the court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction or improper venue. So
that decision is not determinative of the question of whether or not the complaint of
the Postmaster General should be given due course.
What is decisive is the second indorsement dated July 5, 1967 of Hon. Antonio V.
Raquiza, Secretary of Public Works and Communications, who, as Department
Head, exercised direct control, direction, and supervision over the Bureau of Posts.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Tipon violated freedom of speech?
Ruling: Valid freedom of speech
The supreme court ruled that in that indorsement Secretary Raquiza rendered the
opinion that Playboy magazine cannot be characterized as obscene and that it
can be carried and deposited in Philippine mails.
The Secretary said that he scrutinized the background of Atty. Tipon, a 1955 law
graduate of the University of the Philippines who placed third in the bar
examinations, a Fullbright Smith-Mundt scholar, and a holder of the Master of Laws
degree from the Yale Law School. The Secretary concluded that "there is absolutely
no to show that Atty. Tipon had violated or intended to violate the postal laws, the
lawyer's oath or the Canons of Legal Ethics."
Secretary Raquiza requested that the Postmaster General's t of May 17, 1965 be
considered withdrawn.

4. Not within the protection of the  freedom of     expression clause of the Constitution
1. Obscenity; test of
In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the Supreme Court upheld the
prosecution of a California publisher for the distribution of obscene materials. In
doing so, it established the test used to determine whether expressive
materials cross the line into unprotected obscenity.

In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973),

a. Whether the average person applying to contemporary community

standards would find the work appeals prurient interest;

b. Whether the work depicts or describes a patently offensive sexual

conduct;

c. Whether the work as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political or

scientific value.
 1. P. vs. Kottinger, 45 Phil. 352

  On November 24, 1992 detective Juan Tolentino raided Camera Supply Co. located at 110
Escolta, Manila where he found and confiscated postcards depicting non-Christian inhabitants of
the Philippines in their native attire and in poses showing how they live. The six (6) pictures are as
follows:
         Exhibit A – Philippines, Bontoc Woman
         Exhibit A-1 – Greetings from the Philippines (pictures of five (5) young boys)
         Exhibit A-2 – Ifugao Belle, Philippines
         Exhibit A-3 – Igorot Girl, Rice Field Costume.
         Exhibit A-4 – Kalinga Girls, Philippines
         Exhibit A-5 – Moros, Philippines
         J.J. Kottinger, the manager of the company, was charged of having kept for sale in the
store, obscene and indecent pictures in violation of section 12 of Act. No. 277 (The Philippine Libel
Law). The prosecution produced no evidence proving the obscenity and indecency of the postcards
as they believed the postcards themselves are the best evidence of that. Dr. H. Otley Beyer, a UP
professor, testified that none of the pictures showed anything that he did not see on various
occasions in his studies and that what the pictures shown are the true costumes regularly worn by
them.
         The defendant interposed a demurrer based upon the ground that the facts alleged therein
do not constitute an offense and were not contrary to law. The trial court overruled the demurrer.
The defendant was found guilty of the offense. The question was one of first impressions not just in
the Philippines, but also in the US, Great Britain and elsewhere, which is why the case was
submitted en banc for decision.
ISSUE: WON the pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country in native dress and as they
appear and can be seen in the regions in which they live, are OBSCENE or INDECENT.
HELD:       
         NO. The pictures in question merely depict persons as they actually live, without attempted
presentation of persons in unusual postures or dress. The aggregate judgment of the Philippine
community, the moral sense of all the people in the Philippines, would not be shocked by
photographs of this type. We are convicted that the post-card pictures in this case cannot be
characterized as offensive to chastity, or foul, or filthy.
         “Obscenity” is defined as something offensive to chastity, decency or delicacy. “Indecency”
is an act against good behavior and a just delicacy. Whether a picture is obscene or indecent must
depend upon the circumstances of the case. 
         The test for obscenity is whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene is to
deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands
a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall.
         Another test is whether or not it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an
indecency. The Libel Law does not define what constitutes obscene or indecent writings, pictures,
etc. but the words “obscenity” and “indecency” are themselves descriptive, words in common use
and every person of average intelligence understands their meaning. Whether a picture is
obscene/indecent must depend on the circumstances of the case.
Dissenting Opinion (Romualdez):  While the pictures cannot strictly be termed obscene, they must
be regarded as indecent. Such pictures offend modesty and refinement, and as such, is indecent.
This is shown by common sense as no woman claiming to be decent would stand before the public
in Manila (where the pictures where exhibited) in the same fashion as the pictures. In non-Christian
regions, such pictures may not be offensive, but in Manila, where they were exhibited, they are.

2. People vs. GO PIN, August 8, 1955

         Accused Go Pin is an alien and a Chinese citizen. He was charged with a violation of Article
201 of the RPC for having exhibited in Manila at the Globe Arcade, a recreation center, a large
number of one-real 16-millimeter films about 100 feet in length each, which are allegedly indecent
and/or immoral.
         At first, he pleaded not guilty of the information but later was allowed by the court to
change his plea to that of guilty which he did. Not content with the plea of guilty the trial court had
the films in question projected and were viewed by it in order to evaluate the same from the
standpoint of decency and morality. After viewing the films, the trial court noted only a slight
degree of obscenity, indecency and immorality in them. Defendant contends that paintings and
pictures of women in the nude, including sculptures of that kind are not offensive because they are
made and presented for the sake of art. 
ISSUE: WON the pictures here in question were used exactly for art's sake
HELD: NO. The pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for
commercial purposes. In other words, the supposed artistic qualities of said pictures were being
commercialized so that the cause of art was of secondary or minor importance. Gain and profit
would appear to have been the main, if not the exclusive consideration in their exhibition; and it
would not be surprising if the persons who went to see those pictures and paid entrance fees for
the privilege of doing so, were not exactly artists and persons interested in art and who generally
go to art exhibitions and galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, but rather people
desirous of satisfying their morbid curiosity and taste, and lust, and for love for excitement,
including the youth who because of their immaturity are not in a position to resist and shield
themselves from the ill and perverting effects of these pictures.
         If such pictures, sculptures and paintings are shown in art exhibits and art galleries for the
cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated by people interested in art, there would be no offense
committed.
3. Miller vs. California, 37 L. Ed. 2d 419
In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the Supreme Court upheld the
prosecution of a California publisher for the distribution of obscene materials. In
doing so, it established the test used to determine whether expressive
materials cross the line into unprotected obscenity.

In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973),

a. Whether the average person applying to contemporary community

standards would find the work appeals prurient interest;

b. Whether the work depicts or describes a patently offensive sexual

conduct;

c. Whether the work as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political or

scientific value.

Brief Fact Summary: This is one of a group of “obscenity-pornography” cases

being reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States in a re-examination of
the standards, which must be used to identify obscene material that a State may
regulate.
 FACTS: In this case, appellant Marvin Miller conducted a mass mailing
campaign to advertise the sale of illustrated adult material books. The
Appellant’s conviction was specifically based on his conduct in causing five
unsolicited advertising brochures to be sent through the mail in an envelope
addressed to a restaurant in Newport Beach, California. The envelope was
opened by the manager of the restaurant and his mother. They had not
requested the brochures; they complained to the police. The brochures
consist primarily of pictures and drawings very explicitly depicting men and
women in groups of two or more engaging in a variety of sexual activities,
with genitals often predominantly displayed. 

The brochures advertise four books entitled 'Intercourse,' 'Man-Woman,' 'Sex

Orgies Illustrated,' and 'An Illustrated History of Pornography,' and a film
entitled 'Marital Intercourse.' While the brochures contain some descriptive
printed material, primarily they consist of pictures and drawings very
explicitly depicting men and women in groups of two or more engaging in a
variety of sexual activities, with genitals often prominently displayed.
ISSUE: Whether the obscenity presented in this case is prohibited by the applicable
state statute?
HELD:  In sum, the Supreme Court:
(a) reaffirmed the Roth holding that obscene material is not protected by the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution),
(b) held that such material can be regulated by the States, subject to specific
safeguards, without a showing that the material is “utterly without redeeming
social value and
(c) held that obscenity is to be determined by applying “contemporary community
standards.” As a result, the majority determined that the material at issue in this
case was not protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution and that the
California state statute could regulate the matter. Furthermore, the requirement
that a California jury evaluate the materials with reference to “contemporary
standards” is constitutionally adequate.

“contemporary standards” - the standards that were to be used to identify obscene

material that a state might regulate without infringing on the First Amendment,
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that the
standard to determine whether material was obscene was whether the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, not national standards, would
find that the work appealed to the prurient interest, whether the work depicted sexual
conduct defined by state law, and whether the work lacked serious literary, artistic,
or scientific value.
4. Ginsberg vs. New York,390 U.S. 629
(“Sir” and “Mr. Annual”) name of the other magazines instigated by the parents
( “Man to Man” and “Escapade”) instigated by the police

Facts: Sam Ginsberg who operates a stationery store and luncheonette in

Bellmore, Long Island New York, was convicted of selling "girlie" magazines to a
 16-year-old boy in violation of § 484-h of the New York Penal Law. 

The statute makes it unlawful "knowingly to sell . . . to a minor" under 17 "(a) any
picture . . . which depicts nudity . . . and which is harmful to minors," and "(b)
any . . . magazine . . . which contains [such pictures] and which, taken as a whole,
is harmful to minors."

Ruling: “Obscenity is not within the area of protected speech or press” – Roth v
United States

The State has power to adjust the definition of obscenity as applied to minors, for
even where there is an invasion of protected freedoms, "the power of the state to
control the conduct of children reaches beyond the scope of its authority over
adults." Prince v. Massachusetts

Justice Brennan wrote that obscenity was not within the area of protected speech
or press. He acknowledged that the magazines were not obscene for adults, but
emphasized that Section 484-h did not prohibit Ginsberg from selling the
magazines in question to persons seventeen years of age or older.

SECTION 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally
protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The
natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government.

5. Pita vs. CA, 178 SCRA 362

opy of the alleged obscene publication;

search warrant;

he court that it is obscene; and

t issues a search warrant, that is the only time that he could go to the sidewalks and confiscate the said

The following guidelines have been laid out by the court :

(a) The authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge,
if in their opinion, an obscenity rap is in order

(b) The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized
are "obscene", and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough
 to warrant State interference and action.

(c) The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed "obscene:" the
question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on His Honor's sound
discretion.

(d) If, in the opinion of the court, probable cause exists, it may issue the search
warrant prayed for.

(e) The proper suit is then brought in the court under Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code.

(f) Any conviction is subject to appeal. The appellate court may assess whether or
not the properties seized are indeed "obscene".

Facts: 
On December 1 and 3, 1983- an Anti-Smut Campaign was initiated by Mayor
Ramon D Bagatsing of Manila, they seized and confiscated from dealers,
distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines,
publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene, pornographic and
indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along
C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila.

Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines
published and co-edited by Leo Pita.

Ruling: "immoral" lore or literature comes within the ambit of free expression,
although not its protection. In free expression cases, this Court has consistently
been on the side of the exercise of the right, barring a "clear and present danger"
that would warrant State interference and action.
"There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the
existence of such clear and present danger." "It is essential for the validity of ...
previous restraint or censorship that the ... authority does not rely solely on his own
appraisal of what the public welfare, peace or safety may require."
"To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such weight and sufficiency to
satisfy the clear and present danger test." 
 
In People vs. Kottinger, the Court laid down the test, in determining the
existence of obscenity, as follows: "whether the tendency of the matter charged as
obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being
obscene may fall.”

 2. Libel or slander;  test of-

1. Lopez and Manila Times cases, supra

Facts: On January 1856, In the front page of The Manila Chronicle where Eugenio
Lopez was the publisher, a news story of a sanitary inspector assigned to the
Babuyan Islands, Fidel Cruz sending a distress signal to a passing United States
Airforce plane which in turn relayed the message to Manila. He was given an
emergency-sustenance kit containing a two-way radio set.

He utilized it to inform authorities in Manila that the people in the place were living in
terror, due to a series of killings committed since Christmas of 1955 . The Philippine
Defense rushed to the island to look for Babuyan Claro (the alleged killer) only to find out
Fidel Cruz who merely wanted transportation home to Manila.

The report of Fidel Cruz was branded as hoax.

On January 15, 1956, This Week Magazine of the Manila Chronicle, then edited by
Juan T. Gatbonton, devoted a pictorial article mentioning that the story of Fidel Cruz
turned out to be false but was able to brought light to the misery of the people living in that
place, with almost everybody sick, only two individuals able to read and write, food and
clothing being scarce. Fidel Cruz was given the appellation of “Hoax of the Year”

The magazine carried photographs of the person purporting to be Fidel Cruz.

Unfortunately, the pictures that were published were that of Former Mayor Fidel G.
Cruz, a businessman contractor from Santa Maria, Bulacan.

It turned out that the photographs of Cruz and that of Fidel Cruz, sanitary inspector,
were on file in the library of the Manila Chronicle in accordance with the standard
procedure observed in other newspaper offices, but when the news quiz format was
prepared, the two photographs were in advertently switched and the publishers said
that they were rushing to meet the deadline hence, the magazine was inadvertently
published.

Fidel G. Cruz sued Lopez in the Court of First Instance Manila.

Ruling: Here there was no pressure of a daily deadline to meet, no occasion to act
with haste as the picture of Cruz was published in a weekly magazine. Moreover,
there is the added requirement of reasonable care imposed by such a decision
which from the facts here found, appeared not to be satisfied. It cannot be
concluded then that the plea of petitioners is sufficiently persuasive. The mandate
of press freedom is not ignored, but here it does not speak unequivocally. It is not
decisive on the basic issue. By itself, it does not have a controlling significance.
Mistake is no excuse to absolve publishers because libel is harmful on its face by
the fact that it exposes the injured party to more than trivial ridicule, whether it is
fact or opinion is irrelevant.

2. Quisumbing vs. Lopez, 96 Phil. 510

elements : (a) defamatory imputation; (b) malice; (c) publication; and (d) identifiability of
the victim.

FACTS:
         The respondents Eugenio Lopez, Ernesto del Rosario and Roberto
Villanueva are the publisher, editor-in-chief, and general manager
respectively of The Manila Chronicle, a daily newspaper published and
circulated in English in the City of Manila.
         The respondents published in The Manila Chronicles of November 7,
1947 an article entitled, “ NBI MEN RAIDED OFFICES OF 3 USURERS”.
         It stated in the article that one of the raided business offices was that of
Norberto Quisumbing, petitioner, a businessman and broker.
         Petitioner Quisumbing filed a complaint against the respondent
alleging that the publication was libelous.
         Petitioner claims that while the body of the publication may be an
accurate report, the headline (NBI MEN RAID OFFICES OF 3 USURERS is
libelous because the petitioner had thereby been branded as a usurer.
ISSUE:
         Whether the publication is libelous.
HELD:
         No.
         The Court of Appeals found as a fact that "there is no evidence in the record
to prove that the publication of the news item under consideration was prompted by
personal ill will or spite, or that there was intention to do harm," and that on the
other hand there was "an honest and high sense of duty to serve the best interests
of the public, without self-seeking motive and with malice towards none."
Every citizen of course has the right to enjoy a good name and reputation,
but we do not consider that the respondents, under the circumstances of this case,
had violated said right or abused the freedom of the press. The newspapers
should be given such leeway and tolerance as to enable them to
courageously and effectively perform their important role in our democracy.
In the preparation of stories, press reporters and editors usually have to race
with their deadlines; and consistently with good faith and reasonable care, they
should not be held to account, to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or
imperfection in the choice of words.
         Nothing in the headline or the context of the article suggested the idea that
the petitioner was already charged with or convicted of the crime of usury. The word
"userer" simply means one who practices usury or even a mere money lender.

3. Cases under sub-judice

1. P. vs. Alarcon, 69 Phil. 265

FACTS:
         The Court of First Instance of Pampanga, in a criminal case (People vs
Salvador Alarcon), convicted the accused therein, except one, of the crime of
robbery committed in a band.
         A denunciatory letter, signed by Luis Taruc, was addressed to the President.
         A copy of said letter found its way to the herein respondent, Federico Manga
who, as columnist of the Tribune, a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, quoted the letter in an article published by him in the issue of that paper
of September 23, 1937.
         The provincial fiscal of Pampanga filed a petition for Federico Mangahas to
be punished for contempt on the ground that Federico Mangahas’ publication aims
to hinder the correct administration of justice, and tends, in addition, to impress the
spirit of the Court and exert influence on the decision that will be issued in this
cause.
         Note: the provincial fiscal was of the opinion that the publication constitutes
contempt of Court as it was pending before the Court of Appeals.
           
ISSUE:
         Whether the publication tends to hinder the correct administration of justice
(sub judice).
HELD:
         No. There was no contempt of court to speak of because the case had
already been decided by the CFI of Pampanga when it was published by
Mangahas, hence not a case of sub judice daw.
         There is no pending case to speak of when and once the court has come
upon a decision and has lost control either to reconsider or amend it. That, we
believe, is the case at bar, for here we have a concession that the letter complained
of was published after the Court of First Instance of Pampanga had decided the
aforesaid criminal case for robbery in band, and after that decision had been
appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The fact that a motion to reconsider its order confiscating the bond of the
accused therein was subsequently filed may be admitted; but, the important
consideration is that it was then without power to reopen or modify the decision
which it had rendered upon the merits of the case, and could not have been
influenced by the questioned publication.
If it be contended, however, that the publication of the questioned letter
constitutes contempt of the Court of Appeals where the appeal in the criminal case
was then pending, as was the theory of the provincial fiscal below which was
accepted by the lower court, we take the view that in the interrelation of the different
courts forming our integrated judicial system, one court is not an agent or
representative of another and may not, for this reason, punish contempts in
vindication of the authority and de corum which are not its own. The appeal
transfers the proceedings to the appellate court, and this last court be comes
thereby charged with the authority to deal with contempts committed after the
perfection of the appeal.
The elements of contempt by newspaper publications are well defined by the
cases adjudicated in this as in other jurisdictions. Newspaper publications tending
to impede, obstruct, embarrass, or influence the courts in administering justice in a
pending suit or proceeding constitutes criminal contempt which is summarily punish
able by the courts. The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended.
It must, however, clearly appear that such publications do impede, interfere
with, and embarrass the administration of justice before the author of the
publications should be held for contempt. What is thus sought to be shielded
against the influence of newspaper comments is the all-important duty of the court
to administer justice in the decision of a pending case.

Contempt of court is a criminal offense, and where a reasonable doubt in fact

or in law exists as to the guilt of one of constructive contempt for interfering with the
due administration of justice the doubt must be resolved in his favor, and he must
be acquitted.
4. WHEN THE COMMENT/STATEMENT HAS THE TENDENCY TO OBSTRUCT, IMPEDE, OR INSULT THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE

Read:  1. GOV. ENRIQUE GARCIA VS. MANRIQUE, GR No. 186592,

October  10, 2012

FACTS:
         Respondent Manrique is the publisher/editor of Luzon Tribute, a newspaper
of general circulation.
         Petitioner Gov. Garcia was involved in a tax delinquency case which
eventually resulted in the issuance of his preventive suspension. He was, however,
able to obtain a TRO which would enjoin the implementation of his suspension.
         Manrique published an article entitled, "TRO ng Korte Suprema binayaran
ng ₱ 20-M?". The issuance of the TRO was the incident mentioned in Manrique’s
article.
         Petitioners Gov. Enrique et al. alleged that the article undermines the
people’s faith in the Supreme Court due to blunt allusion that they employed bribery
in order to obtain relief from the Court, particularly in obtaining a temporary
restraining order (TRO).

         Portion of the article:

Nang inilabas ng Korte ang TRO, malinaw na naihain na ang suspension order kay
Garcia ng DILG kaya’t opisyal ng epektibo ang suspensyon. Ano pa ba kaya ng na-TRO
gayung sinisimulan na ni Garcia ang kanyang suspensyon.

May mga nagsasabing binayaran umano ng hanggang sa ₱20-Milyon ang isang mahestrado
ng Korte upang pagbigyan ang kahilingan ni Garcia.

 
ISSUE:
         Whether the content of Manrique’s article constitutes indirect contempt for
tending to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.
HELD:
YES. The article constitutes the second kind of contemptuous publication for
insinuating that this Court’s issuance of TRO in G.R. No. 185132 was founded on
an illegal cause.
         The glaring innuendos of illegality in the article is denigrating to the dignity of
this Court and the ideals of fairness and justice that it represents. It is demonstrative
of disrespect not only for this Court, but also for the judicial system as a whol e,
tends to promote distrust and undermines public confidence in the judiciary by
creating the impression that the Court cannot be trusted to resolve cases
impartially.
         Contrary to Manrique’s claim of objectivity, his article contained nothing but
baseless suspicion and aspersion on the integrity of this Court, calculated to incite
doubt on the mind of its readers on the legality of the issuance.
It did not simply dwell on the propriety of the issuance on the basis of some
sound legal criteria nor did it simply blame this Court of an irregularity in the
discharge of duties but of committing the crime of bribery. The article insinuated that
processes from this Court may be obtained for reasons other than that their
issuance is necessary to the administration of justice.
Judging from the title alone, "TRO ng Korte Suprema binayaran ng ₱ 20M?"
the article does not aim for an academic discussion of the propriety of the issuance
of the TRO but seeks to sow mistrust in the dispositions of this Court.
To suggest that the processes of this Court can be obtained through
underhand means or that their issuance is subject to negotiation and that members
of this Court are easily swayed by money is a serious affront to the integrity of the
highest court of the land. Such imputation smacks of utter disrespect to this Court
and such temerity is deserving of contempt.
 
Two kinds of publication that are punishable with contempt:
(1) that which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts in
administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding; and
 (2) that which tends to degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them
or that which tends to bring them in any way into disrepute.
Difference between the two:
In the first, there is no contempt where there is no action pending, as there
is no decision which might in any way be influenced by the newspaper publication.
In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a pending case, as what is
sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity.
 
The truth is we consider public scrutiny of our decisions and official acts as a
healthy component of democracy. However, such must not transcend the wall of
tolerable criticism and its end must always be to uphold the dignity and integrity of
the justice system and not to destroy public confidence in them.
 
Freedom of speech is not absolute.
Certainly, the making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court
is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted
attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the
exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the independence and efficiency of
courts or public respect therefore and confidence therein.
5. Freedom of assembly and to petition the government      for redress of grievances
1. 1.IBP VS. MAYOR ATIENZA, G.R. No. 175241, February 24, 2010

the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz (Cadiz), filed with the
Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter application for a permit to rally at the foot of
Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. to be participated in by IBP
officers and members, law students and multi-sectoral organizations.

Mayor Atienza issued a permit allowing the IBP to stage a rally on the said date but on a
different location, which is in Plaza Miranda. The rally pushed through on June 22, 2006 at
Mendiola Bridge, after Cadiz discussed with P/Supt. Arturo Paglinawan whose contingent
from the Manila Police District (MPD) earlier barred petitioners from proceeding thereto.
Petitioners allege that the participants voluntarily dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the
program.

The MPD thereupon instituted on June 26, 2006 a criminal action, docketed as I.S. No. 06I-
8

12501, against Cadiz for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a venue not
indicated in the permit.

Petitioners asserts that it is against their right to freedom of expression and public assembly
and that Mayor Atienza acted with grave abuse of discretion

Ruling:

In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did not
immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue.
The opportunity to be heard precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may
directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.

Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit
against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears repeating, is an
indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, which "blank" denial or modification
would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any
judicial scrutiny thereof.

Note: Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act reads:

 (c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall
immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.

2. Gesite vs. CA, 444 SCRA 58

Beginning March 1990, simmering unrest struck the ranks of the public school
teachers in Metro Manila. They pressed for, among others, the immediate
payment of their allowances, 13th month pay for 1989 arising from the
implementation of the Salary Standardization Law, the recall of Order No. 39,
Series of 1990, issued by the Department of Education, Culture, and Sports
(DECS), directing the oversizing of classes and overloading of teachers, and
the hiring of 47,000 new teachers. When their demands were not granted, the
dissatisfied teachers resolved to take direct mass actions.

These public school teachers in Metro Manila, about 800, on a regular school
day, assembled in front of the DECS offices to air their grievances. DECS
secretary Carino, did not heed to their call, instead threatening them that they
will lose their jobs for taking illegal mass actions. The group of Casite did not
report for 3 days and continued the mass action in spite of the orders of Carino
for teachers to immediately return to work. Administrative complaints were
filed against them. They were guilty as charged.

On appeal to the CSC, the same was denied and they were found to have acted
without due regard to the adverse consequences of their action which
necessarily resulted in the suspension and stoppage of classes, to the prejudice
of the pupils/students to whom (they) were responsible.

Petitioners contend that they merely exercised their right to assemble

peaceably to air their grievances.

Ruling:

petitioners, in joining the mass actions, failed to hold classes to the prejudice of
their students. While petitioners have the right to assemble peaceably to air
their grievances, however, they should have exercised such right in a lawful
manner. Their absences without authority caused adverse effects upon their
students for whose education they are responsible. Clearly, their acts constitute
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

Note: Employees in the public service may not engage in strikes, mass leaves,
walkouts, and other forms of mass action that will lead in the temporary
stoppage or disruption of public service. The right of government employees
8

to organize is limited to the formation of unions or associations only,

without including the right to strike.
3. Bayan vs. Ermita, 488 SCRA 1

BAYAN VS. ERMITA

Bayan, et al., alleged that their right as organizations and individuals

were violated when the rallies they participated in on October 4, 5 and 6,
 2005 were violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas
Pambansa No. 880. 26. They assert that the right to peaceful assembly is
affected by BP 880. They argue that BP 880 requires a permit before
one can stage a public assembly regardless of the presence or
absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of
venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the
time and place of a public assembly form part of the message which the
expression is sought.

Issue: Whether BP 880 violates the right to assembly?

Ruling:

BP 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction that

simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. BP 880
thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies that
would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause” does not make
it content-based because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and entitled to protection.
Neither the words “opinion,” “protesting,” and “influencing” in of
grievances come from the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot
be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit
of all rallyist and is independent of the content of the expression in the
rally.

Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and
present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public
morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the exercise of
the rights even under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Randy David vs Ermita 489 SCRA 160 232323

Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban’s philosophy of liberty: "In cases involving

liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily against government and in favor
of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the weak." 

FACTS:  On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of
the Edsa People Power I,

President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 declaring a state of

national emergency.
She called upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and PNP to prevent and
suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in the country.  

On that same day, the President issued G. O. No. 5 implementing PP 1017.

         The factual bases of PP 1017 and GO 5, according to respondents,

comprised a conspiracy to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. It was allegedly
hatched by some military officers, leftist insurgents, and members of the political
opposition.

Respondents justified their moves by saying that the aim to oust or assassinate the
President and to take over the reins of government had posed a clear and present
danger.

CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER: THE SUBSTANTIVE EVIL MUST BE

EXTREMELY SERIOUS AND THE DEGREE OF IMMINENCE EXTREMELY HIGH
BEFORE THE UTTERANCE CAN BE PUNISHED

The danger created must have casual connection between the expression and the evil which
the state has the right to prevent

Clear and present danger and dangerous tendency rule (whether the words used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that the State has the right to prevent)

Captain Nathaniel Rabonza and First Lieutenants Sonny Sarmiento, Lawrence San Juan and
Patricio Bumidang, members of the Magdalo Group indicted in the Oakwood mutiny, escaped
their detention cell in Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City. In a public statement, they vowed to remain
defiant and to elude arrest at all costs. They called upon the people to " show and proclaim our
displeasure at the sham regime. Let us demonstrate our disgust, not only by going to the
streets in protest, but also by wearing red bands on our left arms.

authorities got hold of a document entitled "Oplan Hackle I " which detailed plans for bombings
and attacks during the Philippine Military Academy Alumni Homecoming in Baguio City. The
plot was to assassinate selected targets including some cabinet members and President Arroyo
herself.6 Upon the advice of her security, President Arroyo decided not to attend the Alumni
Homecoming. The next day, at the height of the celebration, a bomb was found and detonated
at the PMA parade ground.

Magdalo’s D-Day would be on February 24, 2006, the 20th Anniversary of Edsa I."

         Permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments were revoked.
Rallyists were dispersed. police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a
professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. 

         A week later, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of
national emergency had ceased to exist. Petitioners filed petitions with the SC,
impeaching Arroyo, questioning the legality of PP 1017.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom
of assembly.

SECTION 17. In times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires, the
State may, during the emergency and under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest.

SECTION 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.

Art VII SECTION 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed
forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such
armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. In case
of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a period not
exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place
the Philippines or any part thereof under martial law. Within forty-eight hours from
the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, the President shall submit a report in person or in writing to the
Congress. The Congress, voting jointly, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members in regular or special session, may revoke such proclamation or
suspension, which revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the
initiative of the President, the Congress may, in the same manner, extend such
proclamation or suspension for a period to be determined by the Congress, if the
invasion or rebellion shall persist and public safety requires it.

The Congress, if not in session, shall, within twenty-four hours following such
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without any need
of a call.

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen,
the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate its decision thereon within thirty days from its filing.

A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize
the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where
civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ.

The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with the invasion.

During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person thus arrested or
detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.

HELD:  Yes.  (but PP 1017 was held to be partly constitutional )

Section 4 of Article III guarantees:

No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the

press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the government
for redress of grievances.

         "Assembly" means a right on the part of the citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs. It is a necessary consequence of our
republican institution and complements the right of speech. As in the case of
freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a
right to prevent. In other words, like other rights embraced in the freedom of
expression, the right to assemble is not subject to previous restraint or censorship.
It may not be conditioned upon the prior issuance of a permit or authorization from
the government authorities except, of course, if the assembly is intended to be held
in a public place, a permit for the use of such place, and not for the assembly itself,
may be validly required.

         The ringing truth here is that petitioner David, et al. were arrested while
they were exercising their right to peaceful assembly. They were not
committing any crime, neither was there a showing of a clear and present
danger that warranted the limitation of that right. As can be gleaned from
circumstances, the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP 880 were mere
afterthought. Even the Solicitor General, during the oral argument, failed to justify
the arresting officers’ conduct. In De Jonge v. Oregon, it was held that peaceable
assembly cannot be made a crime, thus:

         Peaceable assembly for lawful discussion cannot be made a crime. The
holding of meetings for peaceable political action cannot be proscribed. Those who
assist in the conduct of such meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that
score. The question, if the rights of free speech and peaceful assembly are not to
be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting was held but as to
its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances
transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the Constitution protects. If
the persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have formed or
are engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and order, they may be
prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violations of valid laws. But it is a different
matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for such offenses, seizes upon
mere participation in a peaceable assembly and a lawful public discussion as the
basis for a criminal charge.

         On the basis of the above principles, the Court likewise considers the
dispersal and arrest of the members of KMU et al.  unwarranted. Apparently, their
dispersal was done merely on the basis of Malacañang’s directive canceling all
permits previously issued by local government units. This is arbitrary. The
wholesale cancellation of all permits to rally is a blatant disregard of the principle
that "freedom of assembly is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the State has a
right to prevent." Tolerance is the rule and limitation is the exception. Only upon a
showing that an assembly presents a clear and present danger that the State may
deny the citizens’ right to exercise it. Indeed, respondents failed to show or
convince the Court that the rallyists committed acts amounting to lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. With the blanket revocation of permits, the distinction
between protected and unprotected assemblies was eliminated.

         Moreover, under BP 880, the authority to regulate assemblies and rallies is
lodged with the local government units. They have the power to issue permits and
to revoke such permits after due notice and hearing on the determination of the
presence of clear and present danger. Here, petitioners were not even notified and
heard on the revocation of their permits. The first time they learned of it was at the
time of the dispersal. Such absence of notice is a fatal defect. When a person’s
right is restricted by government action, it behooves a democratic government to
see to it that the restriction is fair, reasonable, and according to procedure.

         Freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a

representative democracy. It is the duty of the courts to be watchful for the
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.
The motto should always be obsta principiis.

The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the
President for the AFP to prevent or suppress  lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained
by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier.
However, PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to
issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to
lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards
on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are  ultra vires  and unconstitutional. The
Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the
absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business
affected with public interest.

5. Evangelista vs. Earnshaw, 57 Phil 255

FACTS:
         The plaintiff Crisanto Evangelista alleges that he is the president of the
Communist Party in the Philippines.

It is a political group seeking the speedy granting of independence in these Islands

and the redemption of the proletariat.

He sent a letter to the defendant mayor of the city of Manila, Tomas Earnshaw,
requesting the necessary permission to hold a popular meeting at Plaza Moriones
in the city to be followed by a parade in order to deliver to the Governor-General a
message from the laboring class

         The mayor denied the petition, instructing the chief of police to prohibit all
kinds of meetings held by the Communist Party throughout the city, because he had
revoked their permits and licenses.

Consequently, the Communist Party has not been able to hold any private or public
meetings in the city since the 6th day of March, 1931.

In refusing the requested permission and in prohibiting all meetings of the party
within the city, Evangelista claimed that the mayor deprived the Communist Party of
a constitutional right.

         The mayor, in his defense, stated that subsequent to the issuance of the
above-mentioned permit, it was discovered after an investigation conducted by the
office of the fiscal for the City of Manila, that said Communist Party of the
Philippines is an illegal association, or organization, which having for its principal
object to incite the revolt of the proletariat or laboring class, according to its
constitution and by-laws

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of freedom of speech, press and assembly

HELD: No, there is no violation.

         It will be readily seen that the doctrines and principles advocated and urged
in the constitution and by-laws of the said Communist Party of the Philippines, and
the speeches uttered, delivered, and made by its members in the public meetings or
gatherings, as above stated, are highly seditious, in that they suggest and incite
rebellious conspiracies and disturb and obstruct the lawful authorities in their duty.

         Considering the actions of the so-called president of the Communist Party, it
is evident that he cannot expect that the mayor will permit the Communist Party to
hold meetings or parades in the manner herein described.

It must be considered that the respondent mayor, whose sworn duty it is "to see
that nothing should occur which would tend to provoke or excite the people to
disturb the peace of the community or the safety or order of the Government," did
only the right thing under the circumstances, that is, cancel and withdraw, as was
done, the permit previously issued by him to said Communist Party, in accordance
with the power granted him by law

"To grant and refuse municipal licenses or permits of all classes and to revoke the
same for violation of the conditions upon which they were granted, or if acts
prohibited by law or municipal ordinance are being committed under the protection
of such licenses or in the premises in which the business for which the same have
been granted is carried on, or for any other good reason of general interest." 

         In the case of People vs. Perez (45 Phil., 599, 605), this court said:
. . . when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties
of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive
measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy
of the constitution and the laws, and the existence of the State.

Clear and Present danger rule – the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a
right to prevent.

Serious and the degree of imminence is extremely high

There is Clear and present danger, freedom of assembly is not absolute

Primicias vs. Fuguso, 80 Phil. 71

Facts:

         An action was instituted by Cipriano Primicias (campaign manager of a

minority party against Valeriano Fugoso Mayor of the City of Manila) for the refusal
of Mayor Fugoso to issue a permit to them to hold a public meeting in Plaza
Miranda for redress of grievances to the government.

The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, "that
there is a reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon
the fact that passions, especially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and
high, that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and
confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted authorities,
which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public order."

         Giving emphasis as well to the delegated police power to local government.
Stating as well Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against public
peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place, meeting, or
procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with other
persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any
congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein is Sec. 1119, Free
use of Public Place.

(exercise of police power to Municipal Board 2439 of the Administrative Code, Sec 2444
provide for prohibition and suppression of riots)

Sec 844 and 1119 Revised ordinance of 1927 prohibits and offense against public peace

section 1262 of the same Revised Ordinance penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any
public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot; or collect with
other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any
congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." And section 1119 provides the following:

"SEC. 1119 Free for use of public — The streets and public places of the city shall be
kept free and clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the
pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or occupied for other purposes as
provided by ordinance or regulation: Provided, that the holding of athletic games, sports,
or exercise during the celebration of national holidays in any streets or public places of
the city and on the patron saint day of any district in question, may be permitted by
means of a permit issued by the Mayor, who shall determine the streets or public places
or portions thereof, where such athletic games, sports, or exercises may be held: And
provided, further, That the holding of any parade or procession in any streets or public
places is prohibited unless a permit therefor is first secured from the Mayor who shall,
on every such ocassion, determine or specify the streets or public places for the
formation, route, and dismissal of such parade or procession: And provided, finally, That
all applications to hold a parade or procession shall be submitted to the Mayor not less
than twenty-four hours prior to the holding of such parade or procession."

one is that the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to grant or
refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in
the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; and the other is that the applicant has
the right to a permit which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject only to the latter's reasonable
discretion to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, with
the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public
places by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of disorder.

Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was violated.

Held: Yes.

         The Supreme Court stated that the mayor's fear that trouble may arise during
the rally was not enough reason to suppress the fundamental right of the people to
free speech and peaceful assembly to petition the government for redress of
grievances.

         Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech
and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of
irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be reasonable
ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be
reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must
be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one. The
fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in destruction of property is
not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury
to the state.

Dangerous Tendency Doctrine

De la Cruz vs. Ela, 99 Phil. 346

Facts:
Simeon De la Cruz on behalf of the Jehova’s witnesses (Watch Tower Bible and
Tract Society) brought in the action to force Mayor Norberto Ela of Santa Cruz
Zambales grant them permit to hold public meeting at the public plaza together with
their kiosk.

Mayor Norberto Ela in his answer stated that he had not refused the request of
petitioners to hold a religious meeting at the public plaza as in fact he gave them
permission to use the northwestern part of the plaza on July 27, 1952.

He adopted  a policy not to allow the use of the kiosk for any meeting by any
religious denomination as it is his belief that said kiosk should only be used "for
legal purposes.", but De la Cruz and company declined to avail of it. He prayed that
the action be dismissed.

Issue: 
WON the action taken by Mayor Norberto Ela is unconstitutional being an
abridgement of the freedom of speech, assembly, and worship guaranteed by our
Constitution.

Ruling:
No. It is not a violation of freedom of assembly. The Supreme court ruled in
favor of Mayor Norberto Ela, stating that the right to freedom of speech and to
peacefully assemble, though guaranteed by our Constitution, is not absolute, for it
may be regulated in order that it may not be "injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society" ,
and this power may be exercised under the "police power" of the state, which is the
power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, education, good order
or safety, and general welfare of the people.

It is true that there is no law nor ordinance which expressly confers upon
respondents the power to regulate the use of the public plaza, together with its
kiosk, for the purposes for which it was established, but such power may be
exercised under his broad powers as chief executive in connection with his specific
duty "to issue orders relating to the police or to public safety" within the municipality
(section 2194, paragraph c, Revised Administrative Code). And it may even be said
that the above regulation has been adopted as an implementation of the
constitutional provision which prohibits any public property to be used,
directly or indirectly, by any religious denomination (paragraph 3, section 23,
Article VI of the Constitution).
Navarro vs Villegas, 31 SCRA 731
Facts:
Navarro (walang surname hehe) applied for a permit to conduct an assembly in
Plaza Miranda.

Mayor Villegas expressly stated his willingness to grant permits for peaceful
assemblies at Plaza Miranda during weekends and holidays when they could not
cause unnecessary disturbance of the normal activities of the community.

Instead of granting the request, Mayor Villegas offered Sunken Garden as an

alternative venue for the reason that rallies in Plaza Miranda pose a clear and
imminent danger of public disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts and even
bloodshed as aftermath of the assembly.

every time that such assemblies are announced, the community is placed in such a
state of fear and tension that offices are closed early and employees dismissed,
storefronts boarded up, classes suspended, and transportation disrupted, to the
general detriment of the public

Issue:  WoN Mayor Villegas’s denial of the permit to hold assembly violates
Freedom of Expression.

Ruling:
No, the denial of the permit does not violate freedom of assembly.

The court held that civil rights and liberties can exist and be preserved only in an
order society and that the petitioner has failed to show a clear specific legal duty on
the part of respondent Mayor Villegas to grant their application for permit
unconditionally;

In his concurring opinion, Justice Villamor stated that freedom of assembly is not
denied; but this right is neither unlimited nor absolute.

It is not correct to say that the Mayor Villegas refused to grant the permit applied
for; he offered an alternative which is not unreasonable.
Philippine Blooming Mills Case, 51 SCRA 189
Facts: (medyo mahaba yung case :)) time of Marcos regime

On March 1 1969, members and officers of the Philippine Blooming Mills

Employees Organization (PBMEO) (an iron smelting company that produced nails)
decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacañang on 4 March 1969, in protest
against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in
the first shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third
shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M.,

They informed the Company of their proposed demonstration, and proceeded with
the demonstration despite pleas from the Philippine Blooming Mills.

The Company filed on 4 March 1969 with the lower court, charging the PBMEO
officers and participating members of violation of Section 4(a) to 6 in relation to
Section 13 to 14, as well as Section 15, of Republic Act 875 and with the CBA
providing for No Strike and No Lockout. 

Contention: did not violate CBA because there was prior notice and the declaration
of strike was not directed against the company but against pasig police officers

The charge was followed by the filing of a corresponding complaint on 18 April

1969. Judge Joaquin Salvador, in an order dated 15 September 1969, found
PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and declaring the officers and members
directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair labor practice and were
considered to have lost their status as employees of the company.

  A motion for reconsideration was filed 15 September 1969, which was dismissed
in a resolution dated 9 October 1969. On 31 October 1969, PBMEO filed with the
Court of Industria Relations (CIR) a petition for relief from the order dated 9 October
1969, on the ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time
was due to excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the president of
the Union and of the office clerk of their counsel.

Issue:  Whether the Company can prevent its workers from engaging in concerted
activity against alleged abuses of policemen, especially if such work stoppage
would prejudice the Company’s operation, else its profits.

Ruling:
No. The demonstration, being directed against alleged abuses of policemen and not
against their employer, was purely and completely an exercise of their freedom
of expression in general and of their right of assembly and of petition for redress
of grievances in particular before the appropriate governmental agency.

They exercised their civil and political rights for their mutual aid and protection from
what they believed were police excesses. It was the duty of the firm to protect the
Union and its members from the harassment of local police officers. It was to the
interest of the firm to rally to the defense of, and to take up the cudgels for, its
employees, so that they can report to work free from harassment, vexation or peril
and as a consequence perform more efficiently their respective tasks to enhance its
productivity as well as profits.

Although the demonstration paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the

complainant company, there is no finding involving the loss actually sustained by
the firm. On the contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages
for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and electric consumption that day.

Such savings could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages it
might have sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for only one day.

Not a strike as it is not against employer

Reyes vs. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553
Facts:
Retired Justice Jose sought a permit from the City of Manila to hold a peaceful
march and rally from Luneta to the gates of the United States Embassy. Once
there, and in an open space of public property, a short program would be held.

The march would be attended by the local and foreign participants of such a
conference. That would be followed by the handing over of a petition based on the
resolution adopted at the closing session of the Anti-Bases Coalition.

There was likewise an assurance in the petition that in the exercise of the
constitutional rights to free speech and assembly, all the necessary steps would be
taken by it "to ensure a peaceful march and rally.

However, the request was denied. Reference was made to persistent intelligence
reports affirming the plans of subversive/criminal elements to infiltrate or disrupt any
assembly or congregations where a large number of people is expected to attend.
 
Ramon Bagatsing (Mayor of the City of Manila) suggested that a permit may be
issued if it is to be held at the Rizal Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the
safety of the participants themselves and the general public may be ensured.

An oral argument was heard and the mandatory injunction was granted on the
ground that there was no showing of the existence of a clear and present danger of
a substantive evil that could justify the denial of a permit.

However, Justice Aquino dissented that the rally is violative of Ordinance No. 7295
of the City of Manila prohibiting the holding of rallies within a radius of five hundred
(500) feet from any foreign mission or chancery and for other purposes.

Issue:
Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably assemble
violated.

Held:
Yes. The invocation of the right to freedom of peaceable assembly carries with it the
implication that the right to free speech has likewise been disregarded. It is settled
law that as to public places, especially so as to parks and streets, there is freedom
of access. Nor is their use dependent on who is the applicant for the permit,
whether an individual or a group. There can be no legal objection, absent the
existence of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of
Luneta as the place where the peace rally would start.
Time immemorial, Luneta has been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.

Such use of public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.

 With regard to the ordinance, there was no showing that there was violation and
even if it could be shown that such a condition is satisfied it does not follow that
respondent could legally act the way he did. The validity of his denial of the permit
sought could still be challenged.

A summary of the application for permit for rally: 

 The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing
authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take
place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one
entitled to its legal possession is required. 
 Such application should be filed well ahead in time to enable the public
official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid objections to the
grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. 

It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and

present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. Notice is given to
applicants for the denial.

Ground- dangerous tendency rule

Vienna – all countries are order to prohibit rallies within 50 ft from embassies

International law-ordinary law enacted by congress, Constitutional supremacy

Ruiz vs. Gordon, 126 SCRA 233

Facts: Ruiz filed a mandamus against Gordon for the alleged delay in the
issuance of the permit- Gordon granted the permit

On 21 November 1983, Hector S. Ruiz, as coordinator of the Olongapo Citizen's

Alliance for National Reconciliation, and in behalf of the Olongapo Citizen's Alliance
for National Reconciliation, Justice for Aquino Justice for All (JAJA), Concern (sic)
Citizen for Justice and Peace (CCJP), Damdamin Bayan na Nagkakaisa
(DAMBANA), United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO), personally
delivered to Richard Gordon, as City Mayor of Olongapo City, a letter-application
dated 19 November 1983, requesting for a permit to hold a prayer-rally at the
Rizal Triangle, Olongapo City on 4 December 1983 from 1:00 P.M. until it will be
finished in the early evening.
It was also requested that the organizations be allowed to hold a parade/march
from Gordon Avenue to the Rizal Triangle starting at 1:00 P.M.

The permit was issued on 23 November 1983, granting Ruiz’s request for a permit
to hold a prayer rally at the Rizal Triangle, Olongapo City and a parade/march from
Gordon Avenue at 1:00 p.m. of 4 December 1983, provided that 
(1) The parade/march and rally will be peaceful and orderly;  
(2) Your organization will be responsible for any loss or damage to government
property and for the cleanliness of the Rizal Triangle;  
(3) The parade/march shall proceed from the corner of Gordon Ave., and
Magsaysay Drive, through Magsaysay Drive, to Rizal Ave., then to the Rizal
Triangle. 

Ruiz filed a petition for mandamus on 25 November 1983 against Gordon.

On November 27, the Court resolved to grant Gordon’s plea for dismissal.

Ruiz, on 1 December 1983, filed a motion dated November 29 to withdraw a petition

on the ground that the permit being sought in the prayer-rally to be held on 4
December 1983 from 1:00 to 6:00 PM has been granted by Gordon.

Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of expression and the right to peaceably
assemble violated.

Ruling: No. Petition dismissed.

The Reyes case was given some discussion in the course of this petition as to the
role of the judiciary in petitions for permits to hold peaceable assembles.

"The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly should inform the licensing
authority of the date, the public place where and the time when it will take place.

If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its
legal possession is required. Such an application should be filed well ahead in time
to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid
objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place.

It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and

present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view
that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the
applicants must be heard on the matter.

Thereafter, his decision must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity.

They can have recourse to the proper judicial authority.

Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual freedoms,
are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too strongly
stressed that on the judiciary, — even more so than on the other departments —
 rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to
such preferred rights.

As shown both in the manifestation and the answer, this action for mandamus could
have been obviated if only petitioner took the trouble of verifying on November 23
whether or not a permit had been issued. 

A party desirous of exercising the right to peaceable assembly should be the

one most interested in ascertaining the action taken on a request for a permit.
Necessarily, after a reasonable time or, if the day and time was designated for the
decision on the request, such party or his representative should be at the office of
the public official concerned. If he fails to do so, a copy of the decision reached,
whether adverse or favorable, should be sent to the address of petitioner.

Teehankee concurring:
The burden to show the existence of such grave and imminent danger that
would justify an adverse action lies on the mayor as the licensing authority.
There must be objective and convincing, not subjective or conjectural, proof of the
existence of such clear and present danger. As the Court stated in its Resolution of
October 25, 1983 in the J. B. L. Reyes case, "It is essential for the validity of a
denial of a permit which amounts to a previous restraint or censorship that the
licensing authority does not rely solely on his own appraisal of what public welfare,
peace or safety may require. To justify such a limitation, there must be proof of such
weight and sufficiency to satisfy the clear and present danger test. The possibility
that subversives may infiltrate the ranks of the demonstrators is not enough."
As likewise underscored in the J. B. L. Reyes case, the exercise of the right of
peaceable assembly is not to be 4 abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in
some other place" (at paragraph 6) and "It is the duty of the city authorities to
provide the proper police protection to those exercising their right to peaceable
assembly and freedom of expression" (at paragraph 7).
J. Conception concurring opinion
In order that public officials may not be charged, rightly or wrongly, with
dereliction of duty or abuse of powers in the granting or denying of such
permits, the following guidelines are deemed necessary:
(a) When a peaceful assembly is to be held in a private lot, house, or edifice, only
the consent of the owner of the place is necessary. No permit from the government
or any public officer is required.
(b) When an application to hold a rally, parade, or peaceful assembly has to make
use of public places like parks, plazas, and streets, the public authority charged with
the duty of granting or denying the permit should also consider the convenience and
the right of the rest of the public to use and enjoy these same facilities.

(c) Conditions of peace and order in the locality should be carefully considered and
precautionary steps taken to prevent vandals, hooligans, provocateurs, and other
criminals from turning into a violent one what otherwise should be a peaceful
demonstration
The action for mandamus could have been obviated if only petitioner took the trouble of verifying
on November 23 whether or not a permit had been issued. A party desirous of exercising the right
to peaceable assembly should be the one most interested in ascertaining the action taken on a
request for a permit. Necessarily, after a reasonable time or, if the day and time was designated for
the decision on the request, such party or his representative should be at the office of the public
official concerned. If he fails to do so, a copy of the decision reached, whether adverse or favorable,
should be sent to the address of petitioner. In that way, there need not be waste of time and effort
not only of the litigants but likewise of a court from which redress is sought in case of a denial or
modification of a request for a permit. Lately, several petitions of this character have been filed
with the Supreme Court. It could be due to the lack of knowledge of the guidelines set forth in the
extended opinion. Steps have been taken to send the Regional Trial judges copies thereof. In the
future, therefore, without precluding the filing of petitions directly with the Supreme Court, the
interest of justice and of public convenience would be better served if litigation starts on the trial
court level.
Villar vs. TIP, 135 SCRA 705
Facts:
Venecio Villar,Inocencio Recitis, Noverto Barreto, Rufino Salcon, Egardo de Leon,
Regloben Laxamana and Romeo Guilatco were all refused enrollment at the
Technological Institute of the Philippines (TIP) due to their exercise of their
constitutional right to freedom of assembly.

As held in MALABANAN vs RAMENTO, petitioners cannot be barred from

enrollment for their exercise of their freedom of assembly.

Contention of TIP: referred to the academic records of petitioners, invoking the

constitutional provision on academic freedom enjoyed by institutions of higher
learning.

Petitioners Barreto, de Leon, Jr. and Laxamana all obtained failing grades while
petitioners Villar, Salcon, Guilatco and Recitis met the requirements for retention in
the said institute, entitling them to the writs of certiorari and prohibition against TIP.

Issues: Whether or not petitioners can be barred from their enrollment for their
exercise of their freedom of assembly?

Ruling: No. Petitioners have a valid cause for complaint if the exercise of the
constitutional rights to free speech and peaceable assembly was visited by their
expulsion from respondent College.

The academic freedom enjoyed by "institutions of higher learning" includes the right to set
academic standards to determine under what circumstances failing grades suffice for the
expulsion of students. Once it has done so, however, that standard should be followed
meticulously. It cannot be utilized to discriminate against those students who exercise their
constitutional rights to peaceable assembly and free speech. 
SC reiterated that the exercise of the freedom of assembly could not be a basis for barring
students from enrolling. It enjoined the school and its official from acts of surveillance,
blacklisting, suspension and refusal to re-enroll. But the court allowed the non-enrollment of
students who clearly marked academic deficiency.
Malabanan vs. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359
Student leaders were suspended for 1 academic year for holding assembly allegedly
in violation of the permit granted to them

Facts:

The petitioners are all officers of the Supreme Student Council of Gregorio Araneta
University Foundation. They sought and were granted by the school authorities a permit to
hold a meeting from 8:00 A.M. to 12:00 P.M, on August 27, 1982.

Pursuant to such permit, along with other students, they held a general assembly at
the Veterinary Medicine and Animal Science basketball court (VMAS), the place indicated
in such permit, not in the basketball court as therein stated but at the second-floor lobby. 

At such gatherings, they manifested in vehement and vigorous language their

opposition to the proposed merger of the Institute of Animal Science with the Institute of
Agriculture.

The same day, they marched toward the Life Science Building and continued their
rally. It was outside the area covered by their permit. Even they rallied beyond the period
allowed.

They were asked to explain on the same day why they should not be held liable for
holding an illegal assembly.

Then on September 9, 1982, they were informed that they were under preventive
suspension for their failure to explain the holding of an illegal assembly.

The validity thereof was challenged by petitioners both before the Court of First
Instance of Rizal against private respondents and before the Ministry of Education, Culture,
and Sports.

Respondent Ramento found petitioners guilty of the charge of illegal assembly

which was characterized by the violation of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance
of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was suspension for one academic year.
Issue: 
WON there was an infringement of the right to peaceable assembly and its cognate
right of free speech.

Held: 
Yes. Student leaders are likely to be assertive and dogmatic. They would be
ineffective if during a rally they speak in the guarded and judicious language of the
academe. But with the activity taking place in the school premises and during the daytime,
no clear and present danger of public disorder is discernible. This is without prejudice to the
taking of disciplinary action for conduct, "materially disrupts classwork or involves
substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others."

The rights to peaceable assembly and free speech are guaranteed to students
of educational institutions. Necessarily, their exercise to discuss matters affecting their
welfare or involving public interest is not to be subjected to previous restraint or subsequent
punishment unless there be a showing of a clear and present danger to a substantive evil
that the state has a right to present.

As a corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is accorded to the content of the
placards displayed or utterances made. The peaceable character of an assembly could be
lost, however, by an advocacy of disorder under the name of dissent, whatever grievances
that may be aired being susceptible to correction through the ways of the law. If the
assembly is to be held in school premises, permit must be sought from its school
authorities, who are devoid of the power to deny such request arbitrarily or unreasonably.
In granting such permit, there may be conditions as to the time and place of the assembly
to avoid disruption of classes or stoppage of work of the non-academic personnel. Even if,
however, there are violations of its terms, the penalty incurred should not be
disproportionate to the offense.
Carpio vs. Guevara, 106 SCRA 68
With the lifting of martial law, the people have a right to expect that reliance on the
constitutional right to a peaceable assembly would not be visited with adverse
consequences. It should be safeguarded and respected not only by courts but by other
public officials, especially those entrusted with the task of maintaining peace and order. The
danger to public security that could conceivably arise by people gathering en masse is
certainly much less. It is quite true that turbulence may mark such an event. One who is
responsible certainly can be held accountable if the assembly is utilized for illegal purposes.
The guilty parties can be duly proceeded against. In the absence of such a showing, it is of
the essence in a constitutional government that no encroachment on the rights of an
individual is permissible.

Nestle' Phils. vs. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542

Facts:
The   Union   of   Filipro   Employees   and   Kimberly   Independent   Union  
forSolidarity,   Activism   and   Nationalism-Olalia   had   been   conducting   pickets which
intensified during the period of July 8-10, 1987 outside Padre Fauragate of the SC building
since June 17, 1981.

They set up pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at
times obstructing access to and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices,
officials and employees. They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a
kitchen and littered the place with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene
and sanitation. They waved their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns
haranguing the court all day long with the use of loud speakers.

On July 10, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving the said unions the
opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring the union leaders and their counsels and
other individuals to appear before the Court on July 14 and then and there to show cause
why they should not be held in contempt of court.

Atty. Jose C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, was further required to show cause
why he should not be administratively dealt with. Atty.  Espinas, for himself and on behalf of  the 
union  leaders  concerned, apologized   to   the   Court   with   an   assurance   that   such   acts   will
not   be repeated. He prayed for the Court’s leniency considering that the picket was actually  
spearheaded   by   the   leaders   of   the   PAMANTIK, an   unregistered loose alliance of about 75
unions in the southern Tagalog area and not by either the UFE or KILU. 

ISSUE: 
WON the respondents should be held in contempt and Atty. Espinasbe
administratively dealt with. 

HELD:  
Grievances, if any, should be ventilated to the proper channels, i.e., through appropriate petitions,
The Court will not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish
for contempt those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any
case pending before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e.,
through appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the
Courts as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business
in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to
embarrass the administration of justice."

The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free
governments. However, such right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never been
invoked to shatter the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it is a
traditional conviction of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of
issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be
decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be
uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies." 4

Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an
impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound
personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the
courts, under the protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or interference."   The
5

aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of this Court,
but equality a violation of the above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large.

They are not aware that even as the rights of free speech and of assembly are protected by the
Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence courts of justice through the exercise of either
right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor
did they realize that any such efforts to influence the course of justice constitutes contempt of
court.   The duty and responsibility of advising them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon
6

the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty. Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by
this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the pickets the untenability of their acts and posture.
Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder to all members of the legal profession that it is
their duty as officers of the court to properly apprise their clients on matters of decorum and
proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to labor leaders of the importance of a continuing
educational program for their members.
Arreza vs. Araneta University Foundation, 137
Facts:

Gregorio Araneta University refuse enrollment to Carmelo Arreza, Lonesto G. Oidem, Jacob F.
Meimban, and Eduardo S. Fernando, officers and members of the Supreme Student Council of
said university due to rallies and demonstrations characterized by condemnatory
language in speeches and leaflets.

According to the version of petitioners, they were  either  leaders or  participants  in 
what  respondent  University  referred  to  as  a rally/demonstration held on
September 28, 1982, in front of the Life Science Building of the University, but
which for them, could be more accurately described as “a continuation  of  the 
General Assembly  of  the  student  body  held  the  day  before one authorized by 
the  School  Administration.

Its purpose was to register the opposition of the students to the abolition of the school's Institute
of Animal Science, as those taking courses therein would not be able to graduate.

Such  exercise  of  their  right  to  peaceable assembly was visited by respondent
University with a refusal to let them enroll after what for petitioners was a sham
investigation of their alleged violation of school rules and regulations.

TheUniversity denied granting the authorization to hold such general assembly, or

student rally on September 28, 1982, alleging that the students on said date
through the use of battery operated megaphones criticized and lambasted the
school administration, specifically the decision of the Board of Trustees of  Gregorio
Araneta University.

Moreover, there were other rallies, according to respondent, held on for the purpose
of sympathizing with the suspension of five (5) student leaders who conducted an
illegal assembly, causing  additional  disturbance  on  the campus,  not  only  by 
the  disorderly conduct observed but also by the resulting boycott of classes.

Issue:  WON  Gregorio Araneta University may refuse to enroll the students for
staging a rally inside school premises

Ruling:

No. The Supreme Court granted the petition.Where in it was held that there is no
need, to inquire into the allegations of respondent University as to the non
peaceable character of the rally or demonstration. As made clear from the excerpt
in its companion  case Malabanan  vs  Ramento infractions  of  University  rules  or
regulations by petitioner students justify the filing of appropriate charges.

What cannot be justified is the infliction of the highly disproportionate penalty of

denial of enrollment and the consequent failure of senior students to graduate, if in
the exercise of the cognate rights of free speech and peaceable assembly,
improper conduct could be attributed to them.

Freedom from prior restraint

Newsounds Broadcasting Network vs. Hon. Ceasar Dy, April 2,
2009
Facts: mahaba na case po
According to the version of Newsounds broadcasting networks, they were  either  leaders
or  participants  in  what  respondent  University  referred  to  as  a 
rally/demonstration held on September 28, 1982, in front of the Life 
Science Building of the University, but which for them, could be more accurately described
as “a continuation  of  the  General Assembly  of  the  student  body  held  the  day  before
one authorized by  the  School  Administration. Such  exercise  of  their  right  to  peaceable
assembly was visited by respondent University with a refusal to let them enroll after what
for Newsounds broadcasting networks was a sham investigation of their alleged violation of
school rules and regulations. The University denied granting the authorization to hold such
general assembly, or student rally on September 28, 1982, alleging that the students on
said date  through the use of battery operated megaphones criticized and lambasted the
school administration, specifically the decision of the Board of Trustees of  Gregorio
Araneta University.

Moreover, there were other rallies, according to respondent, held on 

for the purpose of sympathizing with the suspension of five (5) student leaders who
conducted an illegal assembly, causing  additional  disturbance  on  the campus,  not  only 
by  the  disorderly conduct observed but also by the resulting boycott of classes

Newsounds broadcasting networks operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan
(DZNC), an AM radio broadcast station, and Star FM DWIT Cauayan, an FM radio
broadcast station, in Cauayan Citry, Isabela. Back in 1996, Newsoundss commenced
relocation of its broadcasting station, management office, and transmitters on propery
located in Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela.

On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office of the
Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed and certified that the
commercial structure to be constructed conformed to local zoning regulations, noting as
well that the location is classified as a “commercial area”. The radio station was able to fully
operate smoothly thereafter.

In 2002 however, when Newsounds broadcasting networks applied for a renewal of

mayor’s permit, City Zoning Administratior-Designate Bagnos Maximo refused to issue
zoning clearance on the grounds that Newsounds broadcasting networks were not able to
submit conversion papers showing that the agricultural land was converted to commercial
land. Newsounds broadcasting networks asked the court to compel the issuance of mayor’s
permit but the court denied the action. In the meantime, the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) Region II office issued to Newsounds broadcasting networks a formal recognition of
conversion of the property from agricultural to commercial.

In 2003, Newsounds broadcasting networks again filed their application for renewal of
mayor’s permit, attaching the DAR Order. Respondent Felicisimo Meer, acting City
Administrator of Cauayan City denied the same, claiming that it was void on the grounds
that they did not have record of the DAR Order.

The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-
Garcia, City Legal Officer of Cauayan City, closed the radio station. Due to the prvosion of
Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the closure of radio station during the pendency of
election period, COMELEC issued an order allowing the Newsounds broadcasting networks
to operate before Febuary 17, 2004, but was barred again by respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy
on the grounds that the radio station had no permit. Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them
to run again until June 10, 2004 after elections.

Newsounds broadcasting networks filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of
mayor’s permit but both courts denied the petition.

A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized under the LGC to issue licenses and
permits, and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which
said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. In case of Cauayan
City, the authority to require a mayor’s permit was enacted through Ordinance No. 92-004,
enacted in 1993. However, nothing in the ordinance requires an application for a mayor’s
permit to submit “either an approved land conversion papers from DAR, showing that its
property was converted from prime agricultural land or an approved resolution from the
Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the reclassification of
property from agricultural to commercial land.

In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that classified the property as commercial.
Newsounds broadcasting networks are also armed with several certifications stating that
the property is indeed a commercial area. Also, Newsounds broadcasting networks paid
real property taxes based on the classification of property as commercial without objections
raised by the respondents.
Newsounds broadcasting networks argued that this consistent recognition by the local
government of Cauayan of the commercial character of the property constitutes estoppels
against respondents from denying the fact before the courts. The lower courts had ruled
that “the government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels, but Newsounds
broadcasting networks classified that this concept is understood to only refer to acts and
mistakes of its official especially to those which are irregular.

Issue:  Are the acts of closing the radio stations or preventing their operations as an
act of prior restraint against speech?
Ruling: 
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of  Newsounds broadcasting networks.
Without taking into account any extenuating circumstances that may favor the
respondents, we can identify the bare acts of closing the radio stations or
preventing their operations as an act of prior restraint against speech, expression or
of the press. Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press
or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.
While any system of prior restraint comes to court bearing a heavy burden against
its constitutionality, not all prior restraints on speech are invalid

That the acts imputed against respondents constitute a prior restraint on the
freedom of expression of respondents who happen to be members of the press is
clear enough. There is a long-standing tradition of special judicial solicitude for free
speech, meaning that governmental action directed at expression must satisfy a
greater burden of justification than governmental action directed at most other forms
of behavior. We had said in SWS v. COMELEC: "Because of the preferred status of
the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a measure is
vitiated by a weighty presumption of invalidity. Indeed, ‘any system of prior
restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against
its constitutional validity. . . . The Government 'thus carries a heavy burden of
showing justification for the enforcement of such restraint.’ There is thus a reversal
of the normal presumption of validity that inheres in every legislation."
At the same time, jurisprudence distinguishes between a content-neutral
regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that
merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards; and a
content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject
matter of the utterance or speech. Content-based laws are generally treated as
more suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial concern with
discrimination in the regulation of expression Content-neutral regulations of speech
or of conduct that may amount to speech, are subject to lesser but still heightened
scrutiny

Bro. Eliseo Soriano vs. MTRCB, April 29, 2009 (Read also the dissenting opinion of Justice Antonio
Carpio)

Facts:
On August 10, 2004, the petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired
on UNTV 37 the following remarks: “Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang
babae ang gumagana lang doon yung ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang
itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko masahol pa sa
putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.” To which
the MTRCB found the petitioner liable for his utterances, thereby imposing a penalty
of three (3) months suspension from his program.

Issue: 
WON Eliseo’s restraint on speech valid?

Ruling:Not freedom of prior restraint

The Supreme Court also held that the three-month suspension is not a prior
restraint on speech which is illegal and presumed to be unconstitutional breaches of
the freedom of speech. The suspension is in the form of a permissible
administrative sanction or subsequent punishment for the offensive and obscene
remarks he uttered in his television program. Moreover, the petitioner is deemed to
have yielded his right to the full enjoyment of his freedom of speech to regulation
under PD 1986 as it has impliedly accepted the power of the MTRCB to regulate
the broadcast industry when it acquired a permit or license to show a motion picture
or broadcasting a TV program pursuant to the same decree.

Justice Carpio Dissenting: 

Justice Carpio dissents as he feels that the three-month suspension of petitioner’s

TV program constitutes an unconstitutional prior restraint on freedom of
expression. However, said suspension is, much more so, a form of subsequent
punishment, levied petitioner in response to the blatantly obscene remarks he had
uttered on his television program on the night of 10 August 2004. The primary intent
of the suspension is to punish petitioner for such obscene remarks he had made on
the broadcast airwaves, and not to restrain him from exercising his right to free
expression.

That the assailed subsequent punishment aside from being such also takes on the
character of a prior restraint (unlike, e.g., if the punishment levied is a fine)
somewhat muddles the issue. But to better clarify the point, let us assume instead
that petitioner made the same exact remarks not on television, but from his pulpit.
The MTRCB learns of such remarks, and accordingly suspends his program for
three months. In that scenario, neither the MTRCB nor any arm of government has
the statutory authority to suspend the program based on the off-camera remarks,
even if such action were justified to prevent petitioner from making similar remarks
on the air. In that scenario, the suspension unmistakably takes on the character of
prior restraint, rather than subsequent punishment.
It is clear that the MTRCB is vested under its organic law with ample powers to
impose prior restraint on television programs. Section 7 of Pres. Decree No. 1986
declares it unlawful to air any television program unless it had been duly reviewed
and approved by the MTRCB. As emphasized in the recent case of MTRCB v. ABS-
CBN, penned by Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, such power of review and
4

prior approval of the MTRCB extends to all television programs–even news and
public affairs programs–and is valid notwithstanding the constitutional guarantee to
free expression. Moreover, in conducting its prior review of all television programs,
the MTRCB has the power to approve or disapprove, or to delete "objectionable"
portions of such television programs submitted for its approval, based on the
standards set forth in Section 3 of Pres. Decree No. 1986.
Under this review and approval schematic established by Pres. Decree No. 1986,
all broadcast networks labor under a regime of prior restraint before they can
exercise their right to free expression by airing the television programs they
produce. If the MTRCB were indeed absolutely inhibited from imposing "prior
restraint", then the entire review and approval procedure under Pres. Decree No.
1986 would be unconstitutional. I am not sure whether Justice Carpio means to
imply this.
I do take it though that Justice Carpio wishes to bring forth as a core issue whether
or not the MTRCB can impose the penalty of suspension in a television program, an
issue which necessarily takes for granted that the program had violated the matters
enumerated as objectionable under Section 3 of Pres. Decree No. 1986. Justice
Carpio, to my understanding, believes that the MTRCB can never suspend a
program despite its "guilt" because suspension is a prohibited prior restraint on
future speech.1avvphi1 Following that line of thought, the imposition of a fine in lieu
of suspension would be permissible because such fine would not take the form of
prior restraint, even if it may constitute subsequent punishment.
Curiously, Presidential Decree No. 1986 does not expressly confer on the MTRCB
the power to levy a penalty other than imprisonment for between three months and
a day to a year, a fine of between fifty to one hundred thousand pesos, and the
revocation of the license of the television station. The less draconian penalties,
5

such as suspension, are provided for instead in the implementing rules of the
MTRCB, particularly Chapter XII, Section 1 thereof. The ponencia justifies the
adoption of such penalties not specified in Pres. Decree No. 1986 through the
conferment by the same law on the MTRCB of the authority "to supervise [and]
regulate xxx television broadcast of all xxx television programs" and "[t]o exercise
6

such power and functions as may be necessary or incidental to the attainment of

the purposes and objectives of this Act".7

I have no doubt that suspending the petitioner will inhibit his speech, even if such
ban is enforced in the name of subsequent punishment rather than prior restraint.
Such a penalty must endure strict scrutiny since it is related to the exercise of that
fundamental guarantee of free speech. However, it is extremely material to my view
the fact that the obscene utterances were made on television, and that the penalty
imposed relates to the right of petitioner to broadcast on television. If the current
concern pertained to speech in a different medium, such as the print media or the
Internet, then I would be much less tolerant over the penalties imposed
corresponding to the exercise of speech. Yet the fact is, broadcast media enjoys a
lesser degree of protection than expression in other mediums, owing to the unique
nature of broadcasting itself.

MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN, 448 SCRA 575

FACTS: 
ABS-CBN, at 10:45 in the evening of October 15, 1991, aired a show entitled
"Prosti-tuition", an episode of the television (TV) program "The Inside Story"
produced and hosted by Legarda.

It was about female students moonlighting as prostitutes to be able to pay for their
tuition fees. In the course of the program, student prostitutes, pimps, customers,
and some faculty members were interviewed.
The Philippine Women’s University (PWU) was named as the school of some of the
students involved and the facade of PWU Building at Taft Avenue, Manila in plain
view served as the background of the episode. 

The PWU community was upset with the show. Dr. Leticia P. de Guzman,
Chancellor and Trustee of the PWU, and the PWU Parents and Teachers
Association filed letter-complaints with MTRCB. MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a
formal complaint with the MTRCB Investigating Committee, alleging among others,
that ABS CBN:

(1) did not submit "The Inside Story" to MTRCB for its review;
(2) exhibited the show without its permission, thus, violating Section 74 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 19865 and Section 3,6 Chapter III and
Section 7,7 Chapter IV of the MTRCB Rules and Regulations.

CONTENTION OF MTRCB: ABS CBN has no power, authority and jurisdiction to

impose any form of prior restraint upon respondents.

CONTENTION OF ABS CBN: The "The Inside Story" is a "public affairs program,
news documentary and socio-political editorial," the airing of which is protected by
the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press.

("The Inside Story" is a television program, it is within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB
over which it has power of review.)

RULING: There has been no declaration at all by the framers of the

Constitution that freedom of expression and of the press has a preferred
status. In Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals, religious programs were not
exempt  from the jurisdiction and review power of petitioner MTRCB, with more
reason, therefore there is no justification to exempt "The Inside Story".

This, according to ABS CBN’s contention that the show is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press, a freedom
bearing no preferred status. The only exceptions from the MTRCB’s power of
review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No. 1986, such as (1)
television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its
departments and agencies, and (2) newsreels. The Court upheld MTRCB’s power
of review over the TV program “The Inside Story”, citing Sec.7 of PD 1986 which
exempts only television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine
Government and/or its departments and agencies, and newsreels. “The Inside
Story”, a public affairs program described as a variety of news treatment, cannot be
considered a newsreel.

ABS CBN, still in a desperate attempt to be exempted, contend that "The Inside
Story" falls under the category of newsreels but SC said it’s unpersuasive.

The issue is not whether MTRCB violated Section 4, Article III (Bill of Rights)
of the Constitution providing that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, of oppression or the press BUT whether MTRCB have jurisdiction over
the ABS CBN show. MTRCB did not disapprove or ban the showing of the
program. Neither did it cancel ABS CBN’s permit. ABS CBN were merely penalized
for their failure to submit to MTRCB, "The Inside Story" for its review and approval.
Therefore, SC need not resolve whether certain provisions of P. D. No. 1986
and the MTRCB Rules and Regulations specified by respondents contravene
the Constitution.
Gonzales vs. Kalaw Katigbak, 137 SCRA 71
 The power of the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television
(BRMPT) [now the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
(MTR'CB)] can be exercised only for purposes of “classification”, not
censorship. 

FACTS: 
 Jose Antonio U. Gonzalez, President of the Malaya Films – a movie
production registered as a single proprietorship with the Bureau of Domestic
Trade, questioned the classification of the movie as “For Adults Only”, the
petition was dismissed because the Board did not commit grave abuse of
 discretion.
 Maria Kalaw Katigbak (Chairman) and Brigador General Wilfredo C. Estrada
(Vice-Chairman) of the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television.

In a resolution of a sub-committee of the Board of 23 October 1984, a permit to

exhibit the film "Kapit sa Patalim" under the classification "For Adults Only," with
certain changes and deletions enumerated was granted.

The film was given an adult classification to serve as a warning to theater operators
and viewers that some contents of Kapit are not fit for the young.  Some of the
scenes in the picture were taken in a theater-club and a good portion of the film
shots concentrated on some women erotically dancing naked, or at least nearly
naked, on the theater stage. It also depicted the women kissing and caressing as
lesbians. Near the end of the picture, there are scenes of excessive violence
attending the battle between a group of robbers and the police.

According to the Board, the scenes are vulnerable and imitative and can be
misunderstood by the young audience. The Board gave Malaya films an option to
have the film reclassified to For General-Patronage if it would agree to remove the
obscene scenes and pare down the violence in the film. 

ISSUE: Whether the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television have the
power to classify the movie “Kapit sa Patalim” under the classification “For Adults
Only” and impose conditions to edit the material to allow it a “General patronage”
rating

RULING: YES. There was an abuse of discretion by the Board in the light of
the difficulty and travail undergone by Gonzales, et. al. before “Kapit sa
Patalim” was classified as "For Adults Only," without any deletion or cut but
the petition for certiorari was dismissed solely on the ground that there are
not enough votes for a ruling that there was a grave abuse of discretion in the
classification of Kapit sa Patalim as "For-Adults-Only." 
Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of ideas and
the expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perception by our people
of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits
is considerable. The "importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion
lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as to inform."  There
is no clear dividing line between what involves knowledge and what affords
pleasure. If such a distinction were sustained, there is a diminution of the basic right
to free expression. Press freedom "may be identified with the liberty to discuss
publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or
punishment."  This is not to say that such freedom, as is the freedom of speech, is
absolute. It can be limited if "there be a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that [the State] has a right to prevent.” Censorship or previous restraint
certainly is not all there is to free speech or free press.

It is, however, except in exceptional circumstances a sine qua non for the
 meaningful exercise of such right not to deny that equally basic is the other
important aspect of freedom from liability. To avoid an unconstitutional taint on its
creation, the power of the Board is limited to the classification of films. It can, to
safeguard other constitutional objections, determine what motion pictures are for
general patronage and what may require either parental guidance or be limited to
adults only. That is to abide by the principle that freedom of expression is the rule
and restrictions the exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be
presumed, rather the presumption is against its validity. The test determining
whether freedom of expression may be limited is the clear and present danger of an
evil of a substantive character that the State has a right to prevent. Such danger
must not only be clear but also present.  

Where the movies, theatrical productions, radio scripts, television programs, and
other such media of expression are concerned — included as they are in freedom
of expression — censorship, especially so if an entire production is banned, is
allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other legitimate
public interest. 
Justice Douglas observed that "every writer, actor, or producer, no matter what
medium of expression he may use, should be freed from the censor." 

Clear and present danger and dangerous tendency rule - theoretical

formulas devised to determine conflicting rights of similar import in an attempt to draw
the proper constitutional boundary between freedom of expression and independence
of the judiciary. 

Clear and present danger - imminent danger 

 Whether the words are used in such circumstances and of such a nature as
to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that the State has the right to prevent [Schenck v. U.S., 249
U.S. 97].
 “The substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of
imminence extremely high before utterances can be punished”.
 The rule is that the danger created must not only be clear and present but
also traceable to the ideas expressed.
 the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be "extremely
serious and the degree of imminence extremely high" before the utterance
can be punished. 
 The advocacy of ideas cannot constitutionally be abridged unless there is a
clear and present danger that such advocacy will harm the administration of
justice.

In one of said cases, the United States Supreme Court has made the significant
suggestion that this rule "is an appropriate guide in determining the constitutionality
of restriction upon expression where the substantial evil sought to be prevented by
the restriction is destruction of life or property or invasion of the right of privacy"
(Thornhill vs. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88).
Extent and scope of the application of this rule:
The Supreme Court of the United States said 

 "Clear and present danger of substantive evils as a result of

indiscriminate publications regarding judicial proceedings justifies an
impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press only if
the evils are extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.
 A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional
protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a
judicial proceeding still pending in the courts, upon the theory that in such a
case it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of
justice. The possibility of engendering disrespect for the judiciary as a result
of the published criticism of a judge is not such a substantive evil as will
justify impairment of the constitutional right of freedom of speech and press."
(Bridges vs. California, 314 U.S. 252, syllabi)
 "Freedom of speech and press should not be impaired through the exercise
of the punishment for contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the
utterances in question are a serious and imminent threat to the
administration of justice. A judge may hold in contempt one who ventures to
publish anything that tends to make him unpopular or to belittle him. . . . 
 The vehemence of the language used in newspaper publications concerning
a judge's decision is not alone the measure of the power to punish for
contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent not merely a
likely threat to the administration of justice. (Craig vs. Harney, 331 U. S. 367,
syllabi)
 In weighing the danger of possible interference with the courts by newspaper
criticism against the right of free speech to determine whether such criticism
may constitutionally be punished as contempt, it was ruled that "freedom of
public comment should in borderline instances weigh heavily against a
possible tendency to influence pending cases." (Pennekamp vs. Florida, 328
U. S. 331).

According to Justice Holmes, the question is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree (Schenck vs. U. S., supra).
dangerous tendency rule - possibility of danger only
 if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency of an evil which the
State has the right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is
sufficient if the natural tendency and the probable effect of the
utterance were to bring about the substantive evil that the legislative
body seeks to prevent. (CABANSAG VS. FERNANDEZ)
 A rule that applies where extreme difficulty is confronted, determining where
the freedom of expression ends and the right of courts to protect their
 independence begins. 
 There must be a remedy to borderline cases and the basic principle of this
rule lies in that the freedom of speech and of the press, as well as the right to
petition for redress of grievance, while guaranteed by the constitution, are
not absolute. 
 They are subject to restrictions and limitations, one of them being the
protection of the courts against contempt. (Gilbert vs. Minnesota, 254 U. S.
325.)

Extent and scope of the application of this rule: (Epitomized)

 If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right
to prevent, then such words are punishable. 
 It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in
general terms. 
 Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite
persons to acts of force, violence or unlawfulness. 
 It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be
to bring about the substantive evil the utterance be to bring about the
substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent. (Gitlow vs. New
York, 268 U.S. 652.)

Cabansag vs. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 152

Dangerous Tendency Rule
 if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency of an evil which the State has the
right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is sufficient if the natural
tendency and the probable effect of the utterance were to bring about the
substantive evil that the legislative body seeks to prevent.

FACTS: Germiniana Fernandez, et al. were faced with an ejection complaint (action or
process of evicting a tenant from property) filed by Apolonio Cabansag for a parcel of land
in CFI of Pangasinan. Apolonio Cabansag wrote a letter to the Presidential Complaints and
Action Commission (PCAC) regarding the delay in the delivery of the decision in the
mentioned complaint. This led to finding Apolonio Cabansag and his lawyers Roberto V.
Merrera and Rufino V. Merrera was found guilty  in a contempt proceeding which arose in
Civil Case No. 9564 and sentenced the first to pay a fine of P20 and the last two P50 each
with the warning that a repetition of the offense will next time be heavily dealt with. The
Judge sees the letter of Cabansag as a way of degrading the capacity of the court and its
members before the people and in the eyes of that time, President Magsaysay.

ISSUE: Has the letter of Cabansag created a sufficient danger to a fair administration of
justice? NO
Did its remittance to the PCAC create a danger sufficiently imminent to come under Clear
and present danger and dangerous tendency rule? NO

RULING: The letter sent by Cabansag to the PCAC was not made intentionally to put
the court in ridicule  and much less to belittle or degrade it in the eyes of those to
whom the letter was addressed for, undoubtedly, he was compelled to act the way he
did simply because he saw no other way of obtaining the early termination of his
case. 

This is clearly inferable from its context wherein, in respectful and courteous language,
Cabansag gave vent to his feeling' when he said that he "has long since been deprived of
his land thru the careful maneuvers of a tactical lawyer"; that the case which had long been
pending ' "could not be decided due to the fact that the transcript of the records has not, as
yet, been transcribed by the stenographers who took the stenographic notes"; and that the
"new Judges could not proceed to hear the case before the transcription of the said notes."
Analyzing said utterances, one would see that if they ever criticize, the criticism refers, not
to the court, but to opposing counsel whose "tactical maneuvers" has allegedly caused the
undue delay of the case. 

The only disturbing effect of the letter which perhaps has been the motivating factor
of the lodging of the contempt charge by the trial judge is the fact that the letter was
sent to the Office of the President asking for help because of the precarious
predicament of Cabansag. The danger must cause a serious imminent threat to the
administration of justice. Nor can we infer that such an act has "a dangerous tendency" to
belittle the court or undermine the administration of justice for the writer merely exercised
his constitutional right to petition the government for redress of a legitimate grievance.

While the conduct of Cabansag may be justified considering that, being a layman, he is
unaware of the technical rules of law and procedure which may place him under the
protective mantle of our constitution, such does not obtain with regard to his co-appellants.
Being learned in the law and officers of the court, they should have acted with more care
and circumspection in advising their client to avoid undue embarrassment to the court or
unnecessary interference with the normal course of its proceedings. Their duty as lawyers
is always to observe utmost respect to the court and defend it against unjust criticism and
clamor. Had they observed a more judicious behavior, they would have avoided the
unpleasant incident that had arisen. However, the record is bereft of any proof showing
improper motive on their part, much less bad faith in their actuation. But they should be
warned, as we now do, that a commission of a similar misstep in the future would render
them amenable to a more severe disciplinary action.

Read again the Reyes and Ruiz cases, supra

Read again Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No.          7960-707& Zaldivar vs. Gonzales, GR No.         
80578, February 1, 1989

FACTS:
Petitioner filed Resolution including Motion to Cite in Contempt Special Prosecutor
(formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez. Gonzalez in: 
(1) having caused the filing of the information against petitioner in criminal
case before the Sandiganbayan, and 
(2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in
relation to the proceedings in where respondent is claiming that he is acting
as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman. 
A Resolution from the Supreme Court required respondent to show cause why he
should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative sanctions
for making certain public statements. 

Portion of the published article from Philippine Daily Globe in his interview:
“What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich
and influential persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is difficult
for an ordinary litigant to get his petition to be given due course.”

Respondent has not denied making the above statements; indeed, he

acknowledges that the newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him are
substantially correct.

ISSUE:
Whether the decision of the SC inviolate the Petitioner’s right to Freedom of
Expression.

RULING:
No, The Court penalizes a variety of contumacious conduct including: “any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice.” The “clear and present danger” doctrine invoked by
respondent’s counsel is not a magic incantation which dissolves all problems and
dispenses with analysis and judgment in the testing of the legitimacy of claims to
free speech, and which compels a court to exonerate a defendant the moment the
doctrine is invoked, absent proof of impending apocalypse. The clear and present
danger doctrine has been an accepted method for marking out the appropriate
limits of freedom of speech and of assembly in certain contexts. It is not, however,
the only test which has been recognized and applied by courts. The right of freedom
of expression indeed, occupies a preferred position in the “hierarchy of civil
liberties”. Freedom of expression is not absolute. The prevailing doctrine is that the
clear and present danger rule is such a limitation. Another criterion for permissible
limitation on freedom of speech and of the press, which includes such vehicles of
the mass media as radio, television and the movies, is the “balancing-of-interests
test”. The principle “requires a court to take conscious and detailed consideration of
the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of situation.
Under either the “clear and present danger” test or the “balancing-of-interest test,”
the court believes that the statements made by respondent are of such a nature and
were made in such a manner and under such circumstances, as to transcend the
permissible limits of free speech. This conclusion was implicit in the per curiam
Resolution of October 7, 1988. It is important to point out that the “substantive evil”
which the Supreme Court has a right and a duty to prevent does not, in the instant
case, relate to threats of physical disorder or overt violence or similar disruptions of
public order. What is here at stake is the authority of the Supreme Court to confront
and prevent a “substantive evil” consisting not only of the obstruction of a free and
fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the
degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards
of professional conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts.
The “substantive evil” here involved, in other words, is not as palpable as a threat of
public disorder or rioting but is certainly no less deleterious and more far reaching in
its implications for society.

The balancing-of-interest test

Distinguish clear and present danger, dangerous tendency rule and
balancing of interest test.
 Clear and present danger and dangerous tendency rule (whether the
words used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
the State has the right to prevent) 
 Dangerous tendency rule (If the words uttered create a dangerous
tendency which the State has the right to prevent, then such words are
punishable) 
 The balancing-of-interest test (When a particular conduct is regulated in
the interest of the public order, and the regulation results in an indirect,
conditional, partial abridgment of speech, the duty of the courts is to
determine which of the 2 conflicting interests demand greater protection
under the circumstances presented.)

1. AYER PRODUCTION VS. JUDGE CAPULONG, JUAN PONCE

ENRILE, ET AL., 160 SCRA 861
May Senator Juan Ponce Enrile prevent the movie producer of the EDSA I
Revolution movie from including his participation during the uprising since it
violates his right to privacy? No, as between Enrile‘s right to privacy and the
freedom of expression on the part of the movie producer, the latter‘s right prevail
because Enrile‘s part in the movie deals solely on his acts as a public officer then.
To exclude him as integral part of the revolution would be a distortion of history.
FACTS: 
In 1987 Hal McElroy, an Australian film maker, and his movie production
company, Ayer Productions,  proposed, for commercial viewing and for Philippine
and international release, to re-enact the historic peaceful struggle of the
Filipinos at EDSA to be entitled as “The Four Day Revolution”.

They were advised to consult with the appropriate government agencies and
also with General Fidel V. Ramos and Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, who had played
major roles in the events proposed to be filmed. They did so.
Fidel V. Ramos approved. Enrile disapproved even to that of the exhibition of
any of his family members as he contends that this would be an intrusion to his
right of privacy.

Ayer Productions acceded to this demand and the name of  Enrile was
deleted from the movie script, and petitioners proceeded to film the projected
motion picture.
 Later on, Enrile filed an application to the RTC for TRO to enjoin the
petitioners from producing the movie.

RTC granted the petition.

Hence, this petition. (Right to privacy asserted by respondent and the right of
freedom of expression invoked by petitioner)

ISSUE:
1. Will there be a violation to the right of privacy of Enrile if the movie pushed
through?
2) Will there be a violation to the right of freedom of expression of AYER
Productions if the production of the movie is restrained?
3)  What should be given greater protection?

HELD:
1)  None. The production and filming by petitioners of the projected motion picture
"The Four Day Revolution" does not, in the circumstances of this case,
constitute an unlawful intrusion upon private respondent's "right of privacy." In
fact, Juan Ponce Enrile is a public figure as he had been a principal actor during
the EDSA revolution. He already appeared in different television news and
newspapers for his successful political campaign. The right of privacy of a
"public figure" is necessarily narrower than that of an ordinary citizen.
Furthermore, the proposed film does not relate to the individual life and certainly
not to the private life of private respondent Ponce Enrile.
2. Yes. The subject matter of "The Four Day Revolution" relates to the non-
bloody change of government. Clearly, such subject matter is one of public
interest and concern. Indeed, an international interest. The subject thus
relates to a highly critical stage in the history of this country and as such,
must be regarded as having passed into the public domain and as an
appropriate subject for speech and expression and coverage by any form of
mass media. 
3)  The right to freedom of expression should be given greater protection. (ibase mo
sa answers sa 1 and 2 plus ito) The line of equilibrium in the specific context of
the instant case between the constitutional freedom of speech and of expression
and the right of privacy, may be marked out in terms of a requirement that the
proposed motion picture must be fairly truthful and historical in its presentation
of events. The proposed motion picture should not enter "matters of essentially
private concern." To the extent that "The Four Day Revolution" limits itself in
portraying the participation of private respondent in the EDSA Revolution to
those events which are directly and reasonably related to the public facts of the
EDSA Revolution, the intrusion into private respondent's privacy cannot be
 regarded as unreasonable and actionable. Such portrayal may be carried out
even without a license from private respondent.
AS TO CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER: Neither private respondent nor
the respondent trial Judge knew what the completed film would precisely
look like. There was, in other words, no "clear and present danger" of any
violation of any right to privacy that private respondent could lawfully
assert.
Lagunzad vs. Gonzales, 92 SCRA 476
May the mother of a murdered Mayor stop the filming of the life story of her
son which would include his alleged love affairs which would blacken his
memory? Yes. As between the right to privacy invoked by the mother and the
freedom of expression invoked by the movie producer, the state shall balance their
respective interests. Since the movie producer is primarily after profits only, the
right to privacy shall prevail.
FACTS: 
was involved in a suit motion picture producer as licensee and the widow and family
of the late Moises Padilla as licensors.

This agreement gave the licensee the right to produce a motion Picture Portraying
the life of Moises Padilla, a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the
Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental during the November 1951 elections
and for whose murder, Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then
in power and his men were tried and convicted. In the judgment of the lower court
11

enforcing the licensing agreement against the licensee who had produced the
motion picture and exhibited it but refused to pay the stipulated royalties. CA
affirmed the decision of the lower court.

ITO YUNG DETAILED, ANG HABA SORRY NA AGAD: Manuel Lagunzad, a

newspaperman, began the production of a movie entitled "The Moises Padilla
Story" under the name of his own business outfit, the "MML Productions." It
was based mainly on the copyrighted but unpublished book of Atty. Ernesto
Rodriguez, Jr., entitled "The Long Dark Night in Negros" subtitled "The
Moises Padilla Story," the rights to which petitioner had purchased from
1

Atty. Rodriguez in the amount of P2,000.00.

The book narrates the events which culminated in the murder of Moises
Padilla who was then a mayoralty candidate of the Nacionalista Party for the
Municipality of Magallon, Negros Occidental, during the November 1951 elections.
Governor Rafael Lacson, a member of the Liberal Party then in power and his men
were tried and convicted for that murder. In the book, Moises Padilla is portrayed as
"a martyr in contemporary political history."

The movie was scheduled for a premiere showing on October 16, 1961, or at
the very latest, before the November, 1961 elections.
 Later on, Mrs. Amante, half-sister of Moises Padilla, for and on behalf of
her mother, private respondent, demanded in writing for certain changes,
corrections and deletions in the movie. Petitioner contends that he acceded to
the demands because he had already invested heavily in the picture to the extent of
mortgaging his properties, in addition to the fact that he had to meet the scheduled
6

target date of the premiere showing. 

On the same date, October 5, 1961, after some bargaining as to the amount
to be paid, which was P50,000.00 at first, then reduced to P20,000.00, petitioner
7

and private respondent, represented by her daughters and Atty. Ernesto Rodriguez,
at the law office of Jalandoni and Jamir, executed a "Licensing Agreement"

The petitioner contends that this is null and void for having been entered into
by him under duress, intimidation and undue influence.

On October 10, 1961, petitioner paid private respondent the amount of

P5,000.00 but contends that he did so not pursuant to their Agreement but just to
placate private respondent. 9

On October 14, 1961, the filming of the movie was completed. On October
16, 1961, a premiere showing was held at the Hollywood Theater, Manila, with the
Moises Padilla Society as its sponsor. Subsequently, the movie was shown in
10

different theaters all over the country

Petitioner failed to pay the remaining balance. Hence, the private

respondents filed a suit. RTC ruled against Lagunzad. CA affirmed.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
What should be given greater protection?

HELD:
The court gave greater protection to privacy than to freedom of expression.

While it is true that petitioner had purchased the rights to the book entitled "The
Moises Padilla Story," that did not dispense with the need for prior consent and
authority from the deceased heirs to portray publicly episodes in said deceased's
life and in that of his mother and the members of his family. As held in Schuyler v.
Curtis, "a privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased person to
protect his memory, but the privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect
their feelings and to prevent a violation of their own rights in the character and
memory of the deceased."
The prevailing doctrine is that the clear and present danger rule is such a limitation.
Another criterion for permissible limitation on freedom of speech and the press,
which includes such vehicles of the mass media as radio, television and the movies,
is the "balancing of interest test" (Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on the Bill of
Rights, 1970 ed. p. 79). The principle "requires a court to take conscious and
detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in given situation or
type of situation"(Separation Opinion of the late Chief Justice Castro in Gonzales v.
Commission on Elections, supra, p. 899).

In the case at bar, the interests observable are the right to privacy asserted by
respondent and the right of freedom of expression invoked by petitioner. taking into
account the interplay of those interests, we hold that under the particular
circumstances presented, and considering the obligations assumed in the Licensing
Agreement entered into by petitioner, the validity of such agreement will have to be
upheld particularly because the limits of freedom of expression are reached when
expression touches upon matters of essentially private concern."

OVERBREADTH AND VOID FOR VAGUENESS DOCTRINE:

A statute is considered void for overbreadth when "it offends the constitutional
principle that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." (Adiong
vs. COMELEC)
Void-for-vagueness doctrine- a statute which either forbids or requires the doing
of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of
due process of law. (People vs. Siton)

PEOPLE VS. SITON, G.R. No. 160364, September 18, 2009

FACTS: 
Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy for
wandering and loitering around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets in Davao City.

Further, in the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1 Jay Plaza, it was stated
that there was a prior surveillance conducted on the two accused in an area
reported to be frequented by vagrants and prostitutes who solicited sexual favors
(soliciting male customer).

Respondents thus filed their motion to quash as they assailed the constitutionality of
vagrancy under Article 202 par. 2 (The following are vagrants: xxx 2. Any person
found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or
wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support; xxx) as
they contend that this vague and overbroad.
MTC denied.

RTC granted and par. 2 of Article 202 of the RPC was declared unconstitutional.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether the overbreadth and vagueness doctrine also applies to penal statutes.

HELD:
No.
In Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines have
special application to free-speech cases only and are not appropriate for testing the
validity of penal statutes.
Should the provision be rendered unconstitutional?
No.
In relation to warrantless arrest, probable cause was established. The police
authorities have been conducting previous surveillance operations on respondents
prior to their arrest.
Police power. The streets must be protected. The reason why we have public order
laws is to maintain minimum standards of decency, morality and civility in human
society.
This does not violate equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against
the poor and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are punished not for
their status, as for being poor or unemployed, but for conducting themselves under
such circumstances as to endanger the public peace or cause alarm and
apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or a
justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.