M.

Latin Rules

a. Verba Legis Non Est Recedendum - Literal Meaning

From the words of the law, there must be no departure.

Explanation

The object of the maxim depends on the interpretation of statutes which is determine the
intention of the legislature conveyed expressly or impliedly in the language used. The court
interprets the legislature whenever a dispute arises before the court. Since the will of the
legislature is generally expressed in the form of statutes, the prime concern of the court is to
find out the intentions of the legislature in the language used by the legislature in the statute. It
is the duty of the court not to modify the language of the Act and if such meaning is clear and
unambiguous, the effect should be given to the provisions of a statute. The concept behind
such a principle is that the legislature, being the supreme law-making body must know what it
intends in the words of the statute. The literal interpretation has been called the safest rule
because the legislature’s intention can be deduced only from the language through which it has
expressed itself.

One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation.32 It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction
that the language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution should
be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the
provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. 33 Verba legis non
est recedendum – from the words of a statute there should be no departure. 34

The raison d’ être for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words
in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be
attained;35 and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document but
essentially that of the people, in whose consciousness it should ever be present as an important
condition for the rule of law to prevail. 36

Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in
itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear
and specific by considering the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is
associated.37 This is because a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with
other words or phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be modified or restricted by the latter. 38 The
particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated
expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing the
meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so
construed as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. 39 In short,
every meaning to be given to each word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the
body of the statute since a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with other
words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted by the latter.

[G.R. No. 82511. March 3, 1992.]

GLOBE-MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO

CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and IMELDA SALAZAR, respondents.

Castillo, Laman, Tan & Pantaleon for petitioner.

Gerardo S. Mansalon for private respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE;

EMPLOYMENT; PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION, REMEDIAL RECOURSE OF
EMPLOYER PENDING INVESTIGATION OF ALLEGED MISCONDUCT OF
EMPLOYEE. — The investigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to
Delfin Saldivar's acts in conflict with his position as technical operations
manager, necessitated immediate and decisive action on any employee
closely associated with Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was further
impelled by the discovery of the missing Fedders airconditioning unit inside
the apartment private respondent shared with Saldivar. Under such
circumstances, preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourse
available to the company pending Salazar's investigation. By itself, preventive
suspension does not signify that the company has adjudged the employee
guilty of the charges she was asked to answer and explain. Such disciplinary
measure is resorted to for the protection of the company's property pending
investigation of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the
employee.
 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; EMPLOYEE ILLEGALLY DISMISSED ENTITLED TO
REINSTATEMENT AND SEPARATION. — To go back to the instant case,
there being no evidence to show an authorized, much less a legal, cause for
the dismissal of private respondent, she had every right, not only to be entitled
to reinstatement, but as well, to full backwages.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSES. — The intendment of the law in
prescribing the twin remedies of reinstatement and payment of backwages is,
in the former, to restore the dismissed employee to her status before she lost
her job, for the dictionary meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a
state, condition, position, etc. from which one had been removed" and in the
latter, to give her back the income lost during the period of unemployment.
Both remedies, looking to the past, would perforce make her "whole."
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ILLEGAL DISMISSAL; REINSTATEMENT; GROUNDS
FOR DENIAL. — Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by
the Court for denying reinstatement under the facts of the case and the law
applicable thereto; that reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the
long passage of time (22 years of litigation) or because of the realities of the
situation; or that it would be "inimical to the employer's interest;" or that
reinstatement may no longer be feasible; or, that it will not serve the best
interests of the parties involved; or that the company would be prejudiced by
the workers' continued employment; or that it will not serve any prudent
purpose as when supervening facts have transpired which make execution on
that score unjust or inequitable or, to an increasing extent, due to the resultant
atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism" or "strained relations" or
"irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and the employee.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; BACKWAGES AND SEPARATION PAY AWARDED
WHERE REINSTATEMENT CAN NOT BE EFFECTED. — In lieu of
reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of backwages
and separation pay or solely separation pay.
6. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION; WHERE
THE STATUTE IS CLEAR AND FREE FROM AMBIGUITY, IT MUST BE
GIVEN ITS LITERAL MEANING. — The wording of the Labor Code is clear
and unambiguous: "An employee who is 'unjustly dismissed from work shall
be entitled to reinstatement . . . and to his full backwages . . . " Under the
principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the
maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the
valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute
correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it
differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to
have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of
such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or
from the words of a statute there should be no departure. Neither does the
provision admit of any qualification.
7. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE;
EMPLOYMENT; REINSTATEMENT; NOT APPROPRIATE IN THE
PRESENCE OF STRAINED RELATIONS BETWEEN EMPLOYER AND
EMPLOYEE; QUALIFICATION. — If in the wisdom of the Court, there may be
a ground or grounds for non-application of Article 279 of the Labor Code,this
should be by way of exception, such as when the reinstatement may be
inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between the employer and the
employee. In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned
occupies a position where he enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer;
and that it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and
antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and
productivity of the employee concerned.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The principle of "strained
relations" cannot be applied indiscriminately. Otherwise, reinstatement can
never be possible simply because some hostility is invariably engendered
between the parties as a result of litigation. That is human nature. Besides, no
strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of asserting one's
right; otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could be easily
separated from the service, by merely paying his separation pay on the
pretext that his relationship with his employer had already become strained.
Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as
systems analyst is one that may be characterized as a position of trust and
confidence such that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations
between employer and employee. Hence, this does not constitute an
exception to the general rule mandating reinstatement for an employee who
has been unlawfully dismissed. In the instant case, petitioner has predicated
its dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence. As we have held countless
times, while loss of confidence or breach of trust is a valid ground for
termination, it must rest on some basis which must be convincingly
established. An employee may not be dismissed on mere presumptions and
suppositions.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; WITHOUT LEGAL GROUND, ILLEGAL; EMPLOYEE
ENTITLED TO REINSTATEMENT AND BACKWAGES. — It is also worth
emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after Saldivar had already
resigned from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar did not have the
opportunity to refute management's findings, the report remained obviously
one-sided. Since the main evidence obtained by petitioner dealt principally on
the alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his having bad a chance to voice
his side in view of his prior resignation, stringent examination should have
been carried out to ascertain whether or not there existed independent legal
grounds to hold Salazar answerable as well and, thereby, justify her
dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we find her to have been unlawfully
dismissed. Petitioner GMRC is ordered to REINSTATE private respondent
Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for a period
of two (2) years only.

DECISION

ROMERO, J  : p

For private respondent Imelda L. Salazar, it would seem that her close
association with Delfin Saldivar would mean the loss of her job. In May 1982,
private respondent was employed by Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio
Corporation (GMCR) as general systems analyst. Also employed by petitioner
as manager for technical operations' support was Delfin Saldivar with whom
private respondent was allegedly very close.
Sometime in 1984, petitioner GMCR, prompted by reports that
company equipment and spare parts worth thousands of dollars under the
custody of Saldivar were missing, caused the investigation of the latter's
activities. The report dated September 25, 1984 prepared by the company's
internal auditor, Mr. Agustin Maramara, indicated that Saldivar had entered
into a partnership styled Concave Commercial and Industrial Company with
Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Elecon Engineering Services
(Elecon), a supplier of petitioner often recommended by Saldivar. The report
also disclosed that Saldivar had taken petitioner's missing Fedders
airconditioning unit for his own personal use without authorization and also
connived with Yambao to defraud petitioner of its property. The airconditioner
was recovered only after petitioner GMCR filed an action for replevin against
Saldivar. 1
It likewise appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation that
Imelda Salazar violated company regulations by involving herself in
transactions conflicting with the company's interests. Evidence showed that
she signed as a witness to the articles of partnership between Yambao and
Saldivar. It also appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and
whereabouts of the Fedders airconditioner but failed to inform her employer.
Consequently, in a letter dated October 8, 1984, petitioner company
placed private respondent Salazar under preventive suspension for one (1)
month, effective October 9, 1984, thus giving her thirty (30) days within which
to explain her side. But instead of submitting an explanation, three (3) days
later or on October 12, 1984, private respondent filed a complaint against
petitioner for illegal suspension, which she subsequently amended to include
illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits, 13th month pay and
damages, after petitioner notified her in writing that effective November
8,1984, she was considered dismissed "in view of (her) inability to refute and
disprove these findings." 2
After due hearing, the Labor Arbiter in a decision dated July 16, 1985,
ordered petitioner company to reinstate private respondent to her former or
equivalent position and to pay her full backwages and other benefits she
would have received were it not for the illegal dismissal. Petitioner was also
ordered to pay private respondent moral damages of P50,000.00. 3
On appeal, public respondent National Labor Relations Commission in
the questioned resolution dated December 29, 1987 affirmed the aforesaid
decision with respect to the reinstatement of private respondent but limited the
backwages to a period of two (2) years and deleted the award for moral
damages. 4
Hence, this petition assailing the Labor Tribunal for having committed
grave abuse of discretion in holding that the suspension and subsequent
dismissal of private respondent were illegal and in ordering her reinstatement
with two (2) years' backwages.  cdll

On the matter of preventive suspension, we find for petitioner GMCR.

The investigative findings of Mr. Maramara, which pointed to Delfin
Saldivar's acts in conflict with his position as technical operations manager,
necessitated immediate and decisive action on any employee closely
associated with Saldivar. The suspension of Salazar was further impelled by
the discovery of the missing Fedders airconditioning unit inside the apartment
private respondent shared with Saldivar. Under such circumstances,
preventive suspension was the proper remedial recourse available to the
company pending Salazar's investigation. By itself, preventive suspension
does not signify that the company has adjudged the employee guilty of the
charges she was asked to answer and explain. Such disciplinary measure is
resorted to for the protection of the company's property pending investigation
of any alleged malfeasance or misfeasance committed by the employee. 5
Thus, it is not correct to conclude that petitioner GMCR had violated
Salazar's right to due process when she was promptly suspended. If at all, the
fault lay with private respondent when she ignored petitioner's memorandum
of October 8, 1984 "giving her ample opportunity to present (her) side to the
Management." Instead, she went directly to the Labor Department and filed
her complaint for illegal suspension without giving her employer a chance to
evaluate her side of the controversy.
But while we agree with the propriety of Salazar's preventive
suspension, we hold that her eventual separation from employment was not
for cause.
What is the remedy in law to rectify an unlawful dismissal so as to
"make whole" the victim who has not merely lost her job which, under settled
jurisprudence, is a property right of which a person is not to be deprived
without due process, but also the compensation that should have accrued to
her during the period when she was unemployed ?  prLL

Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:

"Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the
employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a
just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without
loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld
from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement" 6 (Emphasis
supplied).
Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules
and Regulations of the Labor Code:
"Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment,
the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except
for a just cause as provided in the Labor Code or when authorized by
existing laws.
Sec. 3. Reinstatement. — An employee who is unjustly
dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and to backwages."' 7 (Emphasis supplied)
Before proceeding any further, it must be recalled that the
present Constitution has gone further than the 1973 Charter in guaranteeing
vital social and economic rights to marginalized groups of society, including
labor. Given the pro-poor orientation of several articulate Commissioners of
the Constitutional Commission of 1986, it was not surprising that a whole new
Article emerged on Social Justice and Human Rights designed, among other
things, to "protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural
inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common
good." 8
 Proof of the priority accorded to labor is that it leads the other areas of
concern in the Article on Social Justice, viz., Labor ranks ahead of such topics
as Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform, Urban Land Reform and
Housing, Health, Women, Role and Rights of People's Organizations and
Human Rights. 9
The opening paragraphs on Labor state:
"The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and
overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment
and equality of employment opportunities for all. It shall guarantee the
rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to
strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security of
tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also
participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their
rights and benefits as may be provided by law." 10 (Emphasis mine)
Compare this with the sole provision on Labor in the 1973
Constitution under the Article on Declaration of principles and State Policies
that provides:
"Sec. 9. The State shall afford protection to labor, promote full
employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the
relations between workers and employers. The State shall ensure the
rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, security of
tenure, and just and humane conditions of work. The State may
provide for compulsory arbitration." 11
To be sure, both Charters recognize "security of tenure" as one of the
rights of labor which the State is mandated to protect. But there is no
gainsaying the fact that the intent of the framers of the
present Constitution was to give primacy to the rights of labor and afford the
sector "full protection," at least greater protection than heretofore accorded
them, regardless of the geographical location of the workers and whether they
are organized or not.  LLjur

It was then CONCOM Commissioner, now Justice Hilario G. Davide,

Jr., who substantially contributed to the present formulation of the protection
to labor provision and proposed that the same be incorporated in the Article
on Social Justice and not just in the Article on Declaration of Principles and
State Policies "in the light of the special importance that we are giving now to
social justice and the necessity of emphasizing the scope and role of social
justice in national development." 12
If we have taken pains to delve into the background of the labor
provisions in our Constitution and the Labor Code, it is but to stress that the
right of an employee not to be dismissed from his job except for a just or
authorized cause provided by law has assumed greater importance under
the 1987 Constitution with the singular prominence labor enjoys under the
article on Social Justice. And this transcendent policy has been translated into
law in the Labor Code. Under its terms, where a case of unlawful or
unauthorized dismissal has been proved by the aggrieved employee, or on
the other hand, the employer whose duty it is to prove the lawfulness or
justness of his act of dismissal has failed to do so, then the remedies provided
in Article 279 should find application. Consonant with this liberalized stance
vis-a-vis labor, the legislature even went further by enacting Republic Act No.
6715 which took effect on March 2, 1989 that amended said Article to remove
any possible ambiguity that jurisprudence may have generated which watered
down the constitutional intent to grant to labor "full protection." 13
To go back to the instant case, there being no evidence to show an
authorized, much less a legal, cause for the dismissal of private respondent,
she had every right, not only to be entitled to reinstatement, but as well, to full
backwages. 14
The intendment of the law in prescribing the twin remedies of
reinstatement and payment of backwages is, in the former, to restore the
dismissed employee to her status before she lost her job, for the dictionary
meaning of the word "reinstate" is "to restore to a state, condition, position,
etc. from which one had been removed" 15 and in the latter, to give her back
the income lost during the period of unemployment. Both remedies, looking to
the past, would perforce make her "whole."
Sadly, the avowed intent of the law has at times been thwarted when
reinstatement has not been forthcoming and the hapless dismissed employee
finds himself on the outside looking in. LLphil

Over time, the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for
denying reinstatement under the facts of the case and the law applicable
thereto; that reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long
passage of time (22 years of litigation) or because of the realities of the
situation; 16 or that it would be "inimical to the employer's interest;" 17 or that
reinstatement may no longer be feasible; 18 or, that it will not serve the best
interests of the parties involved; 19 or that the company would be prejudiced
by the workers' continued employment; 20 or that it will not serve any prudent
purpose as when supervening facts have transpired which make execution on
that score unjust or inequitable 21 or, to an increasing extent, due to the
resultant atmosphere of "antipathy and antagonism" or "strained relations" or
"irretrievable estrangement" between the employer and the employee. 22 In
lieu of reinstatement, the Court has variously ordered the payment of
backwages and separation pay 23 or solely separation pay. 24
 In the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. In the
first place, the wording of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous: "An
employee who is 'unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement . . . and to his full backwages . . . " 25 Under the principles of
statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi
sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption
that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its
intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. 26 The
legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used
words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as
are found in the statute. 27 Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words
of a statute there should be no departure. Neither does the provision admit of
any qualification. If in the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or
grounds for non- application of the above-cited provision, this should be by
way of exception, such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to
ensuing strained relations between the employer and the employee.
In such cases, it should be proved that the employee concerned
occupies a position where he enjoys the trust and confidence of his employer;
and that it is likely that if reinstated, an atmosphere of antipathy and
antagonism may be generated as to adversely affect the efficiency and
productivity of the employee concerned.
A few examples will suffice to illustrate the Court's application of the
above principle: where the employee is a Vice-President for Marketing and as
such, enjoys the full trust and confidence of top management; 28 or is the
Officer-In-Charge of the extension office of the bank where he works; 29 or is
an organizer of a union who was in a position to sabotage the union's efforts
to organize the workers in commercial and industrial establishments; 30 or is a
warehouseman of a non-profit organization whose primary purpose is to
facilitate and maximize voluntary gifts by foreign individuals and organizations
to the Philippines; 31 or is a manager of its Energy Equipment Sales. 32
Obviously, the principle of "strained relations" cannot be applied
indiscriminately. Otherwise, reinstatement can never be possible simply
because some hostility is invariably engendered between the parties as a
result of litigation. That is human nature. 33
Besides, no strained relations should arise from a valid and legal act of
asserting one's right; otherwise an employee who shall assert his right could
be easily separated from the service, by merely paying his separation pay on
the pretext that his relationship with his employer had already become
strained. 34
 Here, it has not been proved that the position of private respondent as
systems analyst is one that may be characterized as a position of trust and
confidence such that if reinstated, it may well lead to strained relations
between employer and employee. Hence, this does not constitute an
exception to the general rule mandating reinstatement for an employee who
has been unlawfully dismissed.  cdll

On the other hand, has she betrayed any confidence reposed in her by
engaging in transactions that may have created conflict of interest situations?
Petitioner GMCR points out that as a matter of company policy, it prohibits its
employees from involving themselves with any company that has business
dealings with GMCR. Consequently, when private respondent Salazar signed
as a witness to the partnership papers of Concave (a supplier of Ultra which in
turn is also a supplier of GMCR), she was deemed to have placed herself in
an untenable position as far as petitioner was concerned.
However, on close scrutiny, we agree with public respondent that such
a circumstance did not create a conflict of interests situation. As a system
analyst, Salazar was very far removed from operations involving the
procurement of supplies. Salazar's duties revolved around the development of
systems and analysis of designs on a continuing basis. In other words,
Salazar did not occupy a position of trust relative to the approval and
purchase of supplies and company assets.
In the instant case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on
loss of confidence. As we have held countless times, while loss of confidence
or breach of trust is a valid ground for termination, it must rest on some basis
which must be convincingly established. 35 An employee may not be
dismissed on mere presumptions and suppositions. Petitioner's allegation that
since Salazar and Saldivar lived together in the same apartment, it "presumed
reasonably that complainant's sympathy would be with Saldivar" and its
averment that Saldivar's investigation although unverified, was probably true,
do not pass this Court's test. 36 While we should not condone the acts of
disloyalty of an employee, neither should we dismiss him on the basis of
suspicion derived from speculative inferences.
To rely on the Maramara report as a basis for Salazar's dismissal would
be most iniquitous because the bulk of the findings centered principally on her
friend's alleged thievery and anomalous transactions as technical operations'
support manager. Said report merely insinuated that in view of Salazar's
special relationship with Saldivar, Salazar might have had direct knowledge of
Saldivar's questionable activities. Direct evidence implicating private
respondent is wanting from the records.
It is also worth emphasizing that the Maramara report came out after
Saldivar had already resigned from GMCR on May 31, 1984. Since Saldivar
 did not have the opportunity to refute management's findings, the report
remained obviously one-sided. Since the main evidence obtained by petitioner
dealt principally on the alleged culpability of Saldivar, without his having bad a
chance to voice his side in view of his prior resignation, stringent examination
should have been carried out to ascertain whether or not there existed
independent legal grounds to hold Salazar answerable as well and, thereby,
justify her dismissal. Finding none, from the records, we find her to have been
unlawfully dismissed.  cdll

WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of public respondent National

Labor Relations Commission dated December 29, 1987 is hereby
AFFIRMED. Petitioner GMCR is ordered to REINSTATE private respondent
Imelda Salazar and to pay her backwages equivalent to her salary for a period
of two (2) years only. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide,
Jr. and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., no part as son handled case while still with counsel's
law firm.
Feliciano, J., no part, in view of stock interest in petitioner.
Padilla, JJ., no part, in view of equity interest in petitioner corporation.
Cruz, J., concur in the result.
Narvasa, C.J., I agree with Justice Herrera that there is just cause for
dismissal.
Herrera, J., I believe there is just cause for dismissal per investigative
findings (See Dec., p. 2).
 (Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. National Labor
||| Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 82511, [March 3, 1992], 283 PHIL 649-664)
[G.R. No. 109005. January 10, 1994.]

JUAN D. VICTORIA, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and JESUS JAMES CALISIN, respondents.

Juan D. Victoria for himself and in his own behalf.

The Solicitor General for public respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LOCAL GOVERNMENT; PERMANENT VACANCIES IN THE

OFFICE OF GOVERNOR; HOW FILLED; RULE. — The Local Government
Code provides: "Sec. 44 — Permanent Vacancies in the Office of the
Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. — (a) If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or
vice mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice-
mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent
inability, the second highest ranking sangguniang member, shall become the
governor, vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as the case may be.
Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by other
sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein. . . . "For
purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the
sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes
obtained by each winning candidates to the total number of registered voters
in each district in the immediately preceding local election." The law is clear
that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the
proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total
number of registered voters of each district. It does not mention anything
about factoring the number of voters who actually voted. In such a case, the
Court has no recourse but to merely apply the law. The courts may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words.
2. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; IF THE STATUTE IS CLEAR,
PLAIN AND FREE FROM AMBIGUITY, MUST BE GIVEN ITS LITERAL
MEANING. — In the case of Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation
v. National Labor Relations Commission, 206 SCRA 701 (1992), we held that:
". . . Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied
without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba
legis derived from the maxim, index animi sermo est (speech is the index of
intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by the
legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the
court from construing it differently. The legislature is presumed to know the
meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to have expressed
its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non
est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no
departure. . . ." Petitioner's contention is therefore untenable considering the
clear mandate of the law, which leaves no room for other interpretation. We
are not unmindful of the practicality of petitioner's interpretation but it must
very well be addressed to the legislative branch and not to this Court which
has no power to change the law.

RESOLUTION

QUIASON, J  : p

This is a petition for certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of

Court in relation to Section 2, Article IX of the Constitution, to set aside (a) the
Resolution of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated January 22,
1993, which certified respondent James Calisin as the highest ranking
member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Albay and (b) its
Resolution dated February 22, 1993, which denied the motion for
reconsideration of petitioner.
The issue in the case at bench is the ranking of the members of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Albay for purposes of
succession.
In the May 11, 1992 Elections, the following candidates from the first,
second and third districts of the Province of Albay were elected and
proclaimed as members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, to wit:
FIRST DISTRICT
  Name No. of Votes Garnered
     
1. Jesus James Calisin 28,335 votes
2. Vicente Go, Sr. 17,937 votes
3. Clenio Cabredo 16,705 votes

SECOND DISTRICT
1. Juan D. Victoria 32,918 votes
 2. Jesus Marcellana 26,030 votes
3. Lorenzo Reyeg 23,887 votes

THIRD DISTRICT
1. Ramon Fernandez, Jr. 19,315 votes
2. Masikap Fontanilla 19,241 votes
3. Arturo Osia 17,778 votes
4. Nemesio Baclao 17,545 votes
     
  (Rollo, pp. 27-28)  

Due to the suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima of the Province of

Albay, Vice-Governor Danilo Azana automatically assumed the powers and
functions of the governor, leaving vacant his post as vice-governor. Under the
law, Azana's position as vice-governor should be occupied by the highest
ranking Sanggunian member, a post being contested by petitioner and private
respondent.
In answer to private respondent's petition for his declaration as senior
Sanggunian member for the Province of Albay, the COMELEC issued a
resolution dated January 22, 1993, certifying him as first in the order of
ranking with petitioner herein as second ranking member. The COMELEC
based its certification on the number of votes obtained by the Sanggunian
members in relation to the number of registered voters in the district. 
cdasia

Thus, on February 15, 1993, Secretary Rafael M. Alunan III of the

Department of the Interior and Local Government designated private
respondent as acting Vice-Governor of the province.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution
which was denied on February 22, 1993.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members should
not only be based on the number of votes obtained in relation to the total
number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the district
who actually voted therein. He further argues that a district may have a large
number of registered voters but only a few actually voted, in which case the
winning candidate would register a low percentage of the number of votes
obtained. Conversely, a district may have a smaller number of registered
voters but may have a big voters' turn-out, in which case the winning
candidate would get a higher percentage of the votes. Applying his formula,
petitioner would come out to be the highest ranking Sanggunian member.  cdll

Petitioner gives the following illustration:

1. for private respondent.
107,216 (actually voted)
————————————— x 28,335 (votes obtained) = 23.40%
129,793 (registered voters)
(Rollo, pp. 24, 25 and 30)
   
2. for petitioner
121,423 (actually voted)
————————— x 32,918 (votes obtained) = 25.84%
154,665 (registered voters)
(Rollo, p. 9).

We are not persuaded.

The Local Government Code provides:
"SEC. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Office of the Governor,
Vice-Governor, Mayor, and Vice-Mayor. — (a) If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice-governor or vice-
mayor concerned shall become governor or mayor. If a permanent
vacancy occurs in the offices of the governor, vice-governor, mayor, or
vice-mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian member or, in case of his
permanent inability, the second highest ranking sanggunian member,
shall become the governor, vice-governor, mayor or vice-mayor, as the
case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled
automatically by the other sanggunian members according to their
ranking as defined herein. 
prcd

xxx xxx xxx

"For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking
in the sanggunian shall be determined on the basis of the proportion of
votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of
registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local
election" (Emphasis ours).
The COMELEC came up with the following ranking of the top three
Sanggunian members:
——————————————————————————————————
                 
NAME : District : Registered : Votes : Percent
of Elected :   : Voters : Obtained : Dist'n
Candidates :   :   :   :  
                 
——————————————————————————————————
                 
ALBAY :   :   :   :  
CALISIN, :   :   :   :  
JESUS JAMES :   :   :   :  
B. : 1st : 130,085 : 28,335 : 21.78
  :   :   :   :  
VICTORIA, :   :   :   :  
JUAN D. : 2nd : 155.318 : 32,918 : 21.19
  :   :   :   :  
MARCELLANA :   :   :   :  
JESUS, M. : 2nd : 155.318   :     26,030   :     16.76
                 
—————————————————————————————————

(Rollo, p. 14)
The law is clear that the ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined
on the basis of the proportion of the votes obtained by each winning candidate
to the total number of registered voters of each district. It does not mention
anything about factoring the number of voters who actually voted. In such a
case, the Court has no recourse but to merely apply the law. The courts may
not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words
(Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA 561 [1992]).  LexLib

In the case of Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. National

Labor Relations Commission, 206 SCRA 710 (1992), we held that:
". . . Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is
clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule
or verba legis derived from the maxim, index animi sermo est (speech is
the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will
and preclude the court from construing it differently. The legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as
are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the
words of a statute there should be no departure. . . ."
Petitioner's contention is therefore untenable considering the clear
mandate of the law, which leaves no room for other interpretation. We are not
unmindful of the practicality of petitioner's interpretation but it must very well
be addressed to the legislative branch and not to this Court which has no
power to change the law.  cdrep

Considering the foregoing, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the

part of the COMELEC in issuing the Resolution dated January 22, 1993.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
 SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno and Vitug, JJ ., concur.
 (Victoria v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 109005 (Resolution), [January
|||

10, 1994], 299 PHIL 263-268)

[G.R. No. 216691. July 21, 2015.]

MARIA ANGELA S. GARCIA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS and JOSE ALEJANDRE P. PAYUMO
III, respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J  : p

Nature of the Case

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in conjunction with
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, praying for the annulment of the September 10,
2014 1 and January 29, 2015 2 Resolutions of public respondent Commission
on Elections (Comelec), acting through its First Division and En Banc,
respectively, in Case No. EAC [AEL] 11-2014. The assailed rulings reinstated
the election protest of private respondent Jose Alejandre Payumo III
(Payumo) and effectively reversed the trial court's ruling that it was filed out of
time.
The Facts
Petitioner Maria Angela S. Garcia (Garcia) and Payumo were
candidates for the mayoralty race of Dinalupihan, Bataan during the May 13,
2013 national and local elections. In the poll's conclusion, Garcia was
proclaimed winner for having garnered 31,138 votes as against Payumo's
13,202. The Office of the Election Officer of Dinalupihan then released to
Payumo a certified copy of the printed Certificate of Canvass of Votes and
Proclamation (printed COCP), bearing May 15, 2013 as the date of
proclamation of the winning mayoralty candidate. As per the records,
the printed COCP reflected the signatures and thumbprints of the members of
the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBOC). 3
On May 27, 2013, Payumo lodged an election protest 4 with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 5 in Balanga, Bataan (RTC), docketed as
Election Protest No. DH-001-13, citing the alleged prevalence of fraud and
irregularities in all the clustered precincts of Dinalupihan, heightened by the
Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines' unreliability, casting doubt on
the results of the counting and canvassing of votes. 5 Anent the timeliness of
the recourse, Payumo claimed that from May 15, 2013, the proclamation date
appearing on the printed COCP, he had ten (10) days, or until May 25, 2013,
within which to challenge the election results. He added that since May 25,
2013 falls on a Saturday, he filed his protest on the immediately succeeding
working day, Monday, May 27, 2013. 6
In answer, 7 Garcia belied the allegations of fraud and urgently moved
for the dismissal of Payumo's protest. She claimed that she was proclaimed
mayor on May 14, not May 15, 2013, as indicated in the manual Certificate of
Canvass of Votes and Proclamation (manual COCP) 8 issued by
Dinalupihan's MBOC. She, thus, argued that the election protest was filed
beyond the mandatory ten-day (10-day) reglementary period for filing an
election protest, which, as she claimed in this case, lasted only until May 24,
2013, a Friday. On the ground of belated filing, Garcia urged the RTC to
dismiss the election protest outright. 9
On July 1, 2013, the RTC heard the motion for preliminary
determination of the affirmative defense of prescription. Members of the
MBOC of Dinalupihan took the witness stand and testified that Garcia was
proclaimed on May 14, 2013 at around 5:00 PM.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Giving credence to petitioner's assertion, the RTC, through its
Order 10 dated February 17, 2014, dismissed Payumo's protest for being
barred by the statute of limitations. The fallo of the Order reads: 11
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the election protest filed by
protestant Jose Alejandre P. Payumo III on May 27, 2013 is hereby
DISMISSED for having been filed one day beyond the non-extendible
period provided under Rule 2, Section 7, in relation to Rule 2, Section
12 (c), of A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC, the 2010 Rules of Procedure in Election
Contests before the Courts Involving Elective Municipal Officials.
SO ORDERED.
In disposing the case, the trial court cited and relied on the individual
declarations of the Chairman and the two members of the MBOC of
Dinalupihan, Bataan, as well as on the manual COCP, as sufficient proof that
Garcia's proclamation took place on May 14, 2013. 12
Undaunted, Payumo appealed the dismissal with the Comelec,
docketed as EAC (AEL) No. 11-2014, alleging that he cannot be faulted for
relying on the May 15, 2013 date indicated in the printed COCP since it was
the official Comelec document signed by all the members of Dinalupihan's
MBOC; that the manual COCP was only received by Garcia, and no one else;
and that he had no representative when Garcia was allegedly proclaimed the
winner. 
CAIHTE
Rulings of the COMELEC
The Comelec First Division, by its September 10, 2014 Resolution,
granted Payumo's appeal thusly: 13
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Appeal is GRANTED.
The Order dated February 17, 2014 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Regional Trial Court of Balanga, Bataan, Branch 5 is
hereby ordered to proceed with the adjudication of RTC-EP Case No.
DH-001-13 and resolve the same with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Ratiocinating in the following wise: 14
Evidently, appellant could not be faulted for not relying on the
COCP dated May 15, 2013 because that was the only document
officially furnished him. He was unaware of the alleged Manual COCP
dated May 14, 2013. The election officer himself admitted to the trial
court that he could not remember if he had posted a copy of the May
14, 2013 Manual COCP on the bulletin board of the Sangguniang
Bayan as required by Comelec Resolution No. 9648. Neither did he
furnish a copy thereof to the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan and
the Municipal Treasurer.
Additionally, the Comelec First Division relied on the case of Federico
v. Comelec  15 (Federico) and held that the 10-day reglementary period ought
to be reckoned from the time a party became aware in good faith of the
issuance of the COCP, which in this case, according to public respondent, is
May 15, 2013, as indicated in the printed COCP Payumo received. 16
On reconsideration, the Comelec En Banc, by its assailed Resolution
dated January 29, 2015, affirmed the holding of the First Division and
disposed Garcia's motion in the following wise: 17
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission En
Banc RESOLVES to DENY the Motion for Reconsideration filed by
Protestee-Appellee MARIA ANGELA S. GARCIA for failing to show
any reversible error on the part of the First Division and UPHOLD its
Resolution dated 10 September 2014 granting Protestant-Appellant
Payumo's Appeal.
SO ORDERED.
As held by the En Banc:
It would be tantamount to injustice should the 10-day period to
file the Election Protest in this case be reckoned or counted from May
14, 2013, the date indicated in the Manual COCVP as Protestee-
Appellee Garcia's proclamation as winner since its copy was not even
furnished to Protestant-Appellant Payumo. Clearly, Protestant-
Appellant Payumo's only source of information as to the date of the
 proclamation of Protestee-Appellee Garcia was the printed COCVP. It
indicated 15 May 2013 as the date of Protestee-Appellee Garcia's
proclamation as winner. Thus, his reliance on 15 May 2013, as the
reckoning date of the 10-day period to file his Election Protest was in
good faith. 18
Hence, the instant recourse.
The Issue
Succinctly put, the issue in extant case boils down to whether or not
Payumo's election protest was filed out of time. On the main, Garcia contends
that the reckoning date of the 10-day reglementary period is from the actual
date of proclamation, which is May 14, 2013. Meanwhile, Payumo counters
that Garcia was proclaimed on May 15, 2013, and assuming arguendo that it
was done on May 14, 2013, as Garcia insists the proclamation date to be, he
cannot be faulted for relying on the date appearing on the printed COCP he
received.
Respondent Comelec's Consolidated Comment, filed by the Office of
the Solicitor General, echoes the sentiment of Payumo that the latter could
not have known that Garcia was proclaimed on May 14, 2015 because the
printed COCP, which was furnished him, stated otherwise. The Comelec
likewise alleged that Garcia failed to establish that Payumo had a
representative present at the exact moment Garcia was proclaimed winner
and, thus, assuming that it were true, he could not have known that Garcia
was already declared winner on May 14, 2015.
The Court's Ruling
We grant the petition.  DETACa

Garcia's Proclamation Date

Pivotal in resolving whether or not Payumo's election protest is barred
by the statute of limitations is ascertaining when the MBOC proclaimed Garcia
as the winning mayoralty candidate. The significance of verifying this
proclamation date is underscored by Rule 2, Section 12 (c), in relation to Sec.
7 of the same rule, A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC, 19 otherwise known as the 2010
Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts Involving Elective
Municipal Officials, which provisions pertinently state:
Section 12. Summary dismissal of election contests. — The
court shall summarily dismiss, motu proprio, an election protest,
counter-protest or petition for quo warranto on any of the following
grounds:
(a) The court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter;
 (b) The petition is insufficient in form and content as required under
Section 10;
(c) The petition is filed beyond the period prescribed in these
Rules;
(d) The filing fee is not paid within the period for filing the election
protest or petition for quo warranto; and
(e) In a protest case where cash deposit is required, the deposit is not
paid within five (5) days from the filing of the protest.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 7. Period to file protest or petition; non-extendible. — The
election protest or petition for quo warranto shall be filed within
a non-extendible period of ten (10) days counted from the date of
proclamation. (emphasis added)
Jurisprudence teaches that the rule prescribing the 10-day
reglementary period is mandatory and jurisdictional, and that the filing of an
election protest beyond the period deprives the court of jurisdiction over the
protest. Violation of this rule should neither be taken lightly nor brushed aside
as a mere procedural lapse that can be overlooked. The rule is not a here
technicality but an essential requirement, the non-compliance of which would
oust the court of jurisdiction over the case. 20
 
Aware of the repercussions that befall an election protest belatedly
filed, the private parties herein advance two conflicting dates whence the
reglementary period should reckon. But between the two proposed reckoning
dates, May 14, 2013, as claimed by petitioner, appears to be the correct date
of proclamation.
As can be recalled, the RTC, on July 1, 2013, conducted a motion
hearing to determine the timeliness of the election protest. Records reveal
that during the said proceeding, the members of the MBOC testified in the
following manner: 21
Court:
 Please take your seats. So, Election Officer Leonilo Miguel, Municipal
Treasurer Lani Peñaflor, Ms. Socorro Sacdalan, the resolution of
the Motion to Resolve Affirmative Defense on the ground that the
protest was filed out of time will be resolved based on the
answers that you will give this afternoon. . . . So, the first question
of the Court is that, when did you officially proclaim the
winning candidate, the protestee, Maria Angela S.
Garcia? You give your answers one by one. So, for Election
Officer Mr. Miguel, what is your answer?
Leonilo Miguel:
 Sir, we proclaimed Maria Angela Garcia on May 14.
Court:
 What time?
Leonilo Miguel:
 At almost 5:00 o'clock, sir.
Court:
 So, take your seat first. And then Municipal Treasurer Lani Peñaflor, as
part of the members of the [MBOC] of Dinalupihan, when did you
officially proclaim Maria Angela Garcia as the winning mayor of
Dinalupihan, Bataan?
Lani Peñaflor:
 Can I give my statement, sir?
Court:
 Please give up (sic).
Lani Peñaflor:
 I, Lani Peñaflor, vice-chairman of the [MBOC], do hereby certify that our
functions based on general instructions and minutes on the
consolidation, canvass and transmission of votes cannot proceed
on the second step due to the problem occurred on the memory
card of precinct No. 15 of Brgy. Bangal, we resulted to only
98.75% of votes canvass as of May 14, 2013. Due to this
situation, the legal counsel of candidates Herminia Roman and
Renato Matawaran cited Resolution 9700 and used it as basis to
proclaim the winner since votes cast on precinct no. 15, Brgy.
Bangal, will not affect the result and ranking of local candidates.
The members who waited for the instructions of Atty. Rafael
Olano, Regional Election Director who will proceed to the process
of Resolution 9700 and request threshold that this group canvass
to be used for the preparation of Manual Certificate of Canvass of
Votes and Proclamation of the winning candidates. I do also
certify that I signed last May 14, 2013 the Manual Certificate
of Canvass and Proclamation of the winning candidates
pursuant to Comelec Resolution No. 9700. On May 15, 2013
the password has been received and the CCS will then proceed
to the second step of the general instruction and steps presented
on the CCS laptop, afterwhich the CCS then automatically
proceed on the generation and printing of CEF No. 29, COCP and
other documents related thereto. I again certify that last May 15,
2013, signed the generated reports by the CCS, one of which is
CEF No. 29, Certificate of Canvass and Proclamation of winning
 candidates in compliance with the general instruction. Then we
proceed on electronically transmitting the result after signing all
the documents as prescribed by the GI and generated by the
CCS. I assumed that our Election Officer strictly follows the rules
on the investigation of Comelec election forms and reports set
forth by the Commission on Elections. Thank you.
Court:
 Okay, thank you. Ms. Socorro Sacdalan, again, as a member of the
[MBOC], Dinalupihan, Bataan, when did you proclaim Maria
Angela Garcia as the winning mayor for Dinalupihan, Bataan?
Socorro Sacdalan:  aDSIHc

 We proclaimed the winning candidate, Maria Angela S. Garcia, on May

14, 2013, sir.
Court:
 What time, if you recall?
Socorro Sacdalan:
 At around 5:00 o'clock p.m., sir.
xxx xxx xxx
(words in brackets and emphasis added)
As the members of the MBOC individually declared, Garcia was
proclaimed winner of the mayoralty race on May 14, 2013, not on May 15,
2013 as what erroneously appears on the printed COCP.
What is more, the testimony of municipal treasurer Lani Peñaflor
(Peñaflor), vice-chairperson of the MBOC, conveys an explanation for the
discrepancy between the dates appearing on the manual and printed COCPs
— that on May 14, 2013, at around 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon, Garcia was
proclaimed the winner after 98.75% of votes were already canvassed; that the
proclamation was done in light of the fact that the number of voters in the
unaccounted clustered precinct could no longer affect the result of the
recently concluded polls; that the lowering of the threshold was approved by
the Regional Election Director; and that the manual COCP was prepared
reflecting the result of the elections.
The procedure followed by the MBOC, as outlined by Peñaflor, is
consistent with Comelec Resolution No. 9700, 22 wherein the Commission
resolved, among others, that:
1. The Municipal, City, Provincial, District, and Regional Boards of
Canvassers shall proclaim the winning candidates on the basis
of the last "Grouped Canvass Report" generated by the
CCS, by manually preparing a Certificate of Canvass and
 Proclamation of Winning Candidates, supported by a copy of
the last generated "Grouped Canvass Report", even if not all
results are received by their respective CCS; Provided, That,
the standing of the candidates will not be affected by the results
not yet transmitted to, and received by, the CCS, without
prejudice to the ranking of the winning candidates. For this
purpose, attached as Annex "A" is the format of the Certificate of
Canvass and Proclamation to be manually prepared by the
boards of canvassers;
2. The Regional Election Directors are authorized to approve requests of
boards of canvassers in their respective regions to lower the
canvassing threshold to enable said boards to generate the
certificate of canvass for transmission to the next level of
canvassing. For this purpose, the National Support Center shall
provide all Regional Election Directors with the "ADMIN
USERNAME" and corresponding "PASSWORD" needed to lower
canvassing threshold, and the appropriate instructions on how to
set the lowered coming from the said board; . . . (emphasis
added) ATICcS

Apparently, contrary to Payumo's assertion, the manual COCP is the

official Comelec document in cases wherein the canvassing threshold is
lowered. In fact, clear from the language of the Resolution is that the winners,
in such instances, are proclaimed "by manually preparing a Certificate of
Canvass and Proclamation of Winning Candidates," the format for which is
appended to Comelec Resolution No. 9700. It is incorrect to state, therefore,
that only the printed COCP can serve as basis for ascertaining the date of
Garcia's proclamation. As in this case, it is the manual COCP which contains
the true and exact date of Garcia's proclamation — May 14, 2013, not
the printed COCP.
Payumo's reliance on the date appearing on the printed COCP is
misplaced. To be sure, Comelec Resolution No. 9700 is explicit that
the printed COCP becomes necessary only for purposes of transmitting the
results to the next level of canvassing, and not for proclaiming the winning
candidates, insofar as local government units whose canvassing thresholds
have been lowered are concerned. The manual COCP, in such cases, are
more controlling. Furthermore, it appears that May 15, 2013 is the date
the printed COCP was generated, which, as the members of the MBOC
claimed, the Comelec-issued laptop does not allow to be modified. 23 And as
justified by the MBOC, they were only able to produce the printed COCP on
May 15, 2013, the day after the actual proclamation, because that was only
when they were able to retrieve from the Regional Election Director the
username and password for generating the document, denominated as CEF
29. 24
 As aptly concluded by the RTC: 25
The declaration made by the individual members of the MBOC
that the proclamation of protestee [herein private respondent] was
done on May 14, 2013, coupled with the issuance of the manual
certificate of canvass and proclamation on the same date, is sufficient
proof that protestee's proclamation was in fact done on May 14, 2013
and not on May 15, 2013. The printed certificate of canvass and
proclamation issued on May 15, 2013 was not meant to supersede the
proclamation already been done on May 14, 2013, but only to comply
with the "official format" of the COMELEC, according to Municipal
Election Officer Miguel. The printed document merely affirmed what
had already been accomplished with the manually written document.
Having established that Garcia was proclaimed the winning mayoralty
candidate on May 14, 2013, it is then plain to see that Payumo's election
protest, dated May 27, 2013, was filed beyond the 10-day reglementary
period and ought to be dismissed outright.
The ruling in Federico v. Comelec is
not a precedent to the instant case
Payumo next seeks refuge under the case of Federico, in which the
Court indeed nullified the proclamation of therein petitioner Renato Federico
(Federico) as mayor of Santo Tomas, Batangas even though private
respondent Osmundo Maligaya (Maligaya) filed the election protest more than
ten (10) days after such fact. There, the Court reckoned the 10-day
prescriptive period not from the date of proclamation but from the date
Maligaya received notice of the event, rendering the actual date of
proclamation immaterial. It is this holding in Federico that Payumo adamantly
urges that We apply.
The argument is specious.
Guilty of reiteration, Rule 2, Sec. 7 of A.M. No. 10-4-1-SC provides:
Section 7. Period to file protest or petition; non-extendible. — The
election protest or petition for quo warranto shall be filed within a non-
extendible period of ten (10) days counted from the date of
proclamation. (emphasis added)
The above provision is the procedural equivalent of Sec. 251 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, which
states:
 
Sec. 251. Election contests for municipal offices. — A sworn petition
contesting the election of a municipal officer shall be filed with the
proper regional trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a
 certificate of candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within
ten days after proclamation of the results of the election.
(emphasis added)
As can be gleaned, Sec. 251 of the Omnibus Election Code provides
that the 10-day period ought to be reckoned from the date of proclamation
and not from the date of notice. As the elementary rule in statutory
construction goes, when the words and phrases of a statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from the language employed
and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. 26 This is known
as the plain-meaning or verba legis rule, expressed in the Latin maxim "verba
legis non est recedendum," or "from the words of a statute there should be no
departure." 27 Since the afore-quoted provision, as couched, is clear and free
from ambiguity, its literal meaning must be applied without attempted
interpretation. 28
The rationale behind the non-extendible 10-day prescriptive period is
not difficult to deduce — every candidate interested in the outcome of the
election is expected to be vigilant enough in protecting his or her votes and
would, therefore, enlist the aid of volunteer poll watchers in every clustered
precinct to guard against or document possible irregularities, or that the
candidate would personally be present at or, at the very least, would send
representatives to the canvassing areas to ensure the proper tallying of votes
and to monitor the real-time results of the elections as they are electronically
transmitted. Consequently, they are expected to know of the exact moment
the winning candidate is proclaimed by the board of canvassers concerned.
True, Federico appears to have deviated from the wording of Sec. 251
of the Omnibus Election Code but that is only due to the peculiarities of the
said case. It must be stressed that Our ruling in Federico was based on
considerations not in all fours with the case at bar.
Recapitulating Federico, the MBOC of Santo Tomas, Batangas, on May
11, 2010, printed a COCP showing "SANCHEZ Edna P." (Edna) as the
winning mayoralty candidate. This prompted Maligaya to file a Petition to
Annul Proclamation against Edna Sanchez on May 20, 2010. However, the
petition was later withdrawn, as agreed upon by the parties, leading to the
case's dismissal. Unknown to Maligaya, a second print-out of the COCP was
then issued by the MBOC, bearing the same date "May 11, 2010," crediting
the same number of votes garnered by Edna to Federico after the latter
allegedly substituted Edna as mayoralty candidate. Federico, through the
second print-out, was then declared the winning mayoralty candidate.
Claiming that Maligaya only found out this fact on May 27, 2010, he filed an
election protest against Federico on June 1, 2010.
 Affirming the Comelec's ruling that the election protest against Federico
was timely filed, the Court ratiocinated thusly: 29  TIADCc

It has been argued that there is no evidence that Maligaya

became aware of the issuance of the second COCVP in favor
of Federico only on May 27, 2010. In this regard, the Court
believes that the actions taken by Maligaya after the elections and
the separate proclamations of Edna and Federico strongly
indicate that he was telling the truth. Indeed, there is no rhyme or
reason why he should file a petition questioning the proclamation of
Edna if he had knowledge of the subsequent proclamation of Federico.
The Court adopts with approbation his reasoning on the matter. Thus:
5.35. Private respondent pursued and prosecuted
this case with the knowledge that it was Edna
Sanchez who was proclaimed, until he came to know
of the alleged proclamation of respondent Federico
on May 27, 2010. Consequently, he filed another petition
on June 1, 2010, this time against Federico, to annul his
proclamation. The June 1, 2010 petition was filed within
ten days from the knowledge of the alleged proclamation
of Federico.
5.36. The filing of SPC NO. 10-022 demonstrates that
private respondent Maligaya believed in good faith that
it was Edna Sanchez that was proclaimed and that he
did not initially know that there was a COCVP in the
name of Federico. SPC No. 10-022 is also a proof that
petitioner did not dilly dally in protecting his rights. There
simply is no reason and it runs counter to human conduct
for Maligaya to file a petition for annulment of
proclamation of Edna Sanchez if he knew all along that it
was Federico who was proclaimed.
5.37. In the same manner, the filing of the present
petition against Federico shows that the
proclamation of Federico was fraudulent or at least
made surreptitiously. Had Maligaya known of the
proclamation of Federico, he should have outrightly filed
the petition for annulment of proclamation
against Federico. But because it was made without
any notice to the herein private respondent, he only
knew of it on May 27, 2010, thus, the petition on June
1, 2010. Private respondent did not certainly sleep on his
rights as he filed the proper petition within the prescribed
period. He could not be penalized for belated filing when,
as shown above, the COCVP of Federico was
surreptitiously accomplished. Thus, the Comelec En
Banc did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
 upholding the interest of herein private respondent
Maligaya. (emphasis added)
To begin with, we have considered in Federico the fact that
petitioner Federico therein could not have validly substituted Edna as
mayoralty candidate in Santo Tomas, Batangas, and that as a non-candidate
in the mayoralty race, he cannot legally be declared and proclaimed the
winner. Thus, the nullity of the substitution consequently led to the nullity of
the proclamation. 30 Here lies the difference.
More importantly, the circumstances in Federico that (1) there were
actually two different proclamations made by the MBOC, and (2) that the
second proclamation was surreptitiously made were essential in Our ruling
therein. This is in stark contrast with the case at bench where there was
only one proclamation, which was, by no means, clandestinely made.
Here, there is no dispute that there was only one mayoralty candidate
proclaimed winner. Thus, the only issues pertain to when such proclamation
was done, and which document accurately reported the same.
In addition, there was no allegation whatsoever of a surreptitious
proclamation for Garcia's proclamation was, in fact, publicly announced. As
culled from the records, the members of the MBOC testified that Garcia was
proclaimed on May 14, 2013 in a well-attended ceremony: 31
Atty. Pomer:
 When you said you raised the hand of the winning candidate, protestee,
Maria Angela Garcia, at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 14,
2013, were there persons present?
Leonilo Miguel:
 Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Pomer:
 Would you know if among those who were present there was a
representative from the protestant, Payumo?
xxx xxx xxx
Socorro Sacdalan:
 I am not aware if there are representatives of the protestant
because there were many persons, people inside the center.
Court:
 Question from the Court. Which exact place you said you proclaimed
Maria Angela Garica at 5:00 p.m. on May 14?
Leonilo Miguel:
  At the session hall of the Sangguniang Bayan of Dinalupihan, Bataan.
Court:
 So, Atty. Pomer, do you have any other questions?
Atty. Pomer:
 Yes, Your Honor. Were there other winning candidates that you
proclaimed on that occasion aside from the protestee?
Leonilo Miguel:
 Yes, sir. We proclaimed the vice-mayor and the eight (8) councilors.
Court:
 Same, May 14, 5:00 o'clock?
Leonilo Miguel:
 Yes, sir.
Atty. Pomer:
 So, the proclamation took placed (sic) in the session hall. Was that in
the same place the canvassing took placed (sic)?
Leonilo Miguel:
 Yes, sir.  AIDSTE

Atty. Pomer:
 And that during the canvassing, there were watchers and lawyers
of the candidates present, is it not?
Leonilo Miguel:
 Yes, sir.
(emphasis added)
Indeed, there is a substantial distinction between the extant case
and Federico which, in the latter, prevented Maligaya, through no fault of his
own, from filing an election protest within the period prescribed.
Petitioner Payumo cannot be deemed
to have acted in good faith
Further contrasting the case at bar with Federico, herein petitioner
Payumo's claim of good faith in relying on the printed COCP fails to persuade.
"Good faith" is an intangible and abstract quality with no technical
meaning or statutory definition, and it encompasses, among other things, an
honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence of design to defraud or
to seek an unconscionable advantage. It implies honesty of intention, and
 freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the holder upon
inquiry. 32
Here, knowledge of Garcia's May 14, 2013 proclamation is attributable
to Payumo since he was represented by one Fernando Manalili (Manalili)
during the canvassing proceeding, as per the minutes prepared by the
MBOC. 33 Hornbook doctrine is that notice to the agent is notice to the
principal. 34 And as appearing in the minutes, several representatives were
fielded by the Liberal Party, the political banner under which Payumo filed his
candidacy, to monitor the results real-time: 35
May 13-14, 2013  
     
1. Atty. Mary Kristine Reyes Chu NUP/Ma. Angela Garcia-Albert Garcia
2. Atty. Lowell John J. Fetizanan Nationalist Peoples Coalition Party
3. Atty. Norby Caparas Herminia B. Roman
4. Atty. Honey Lynco Liberal Party
5. Fernando P. Manalili Liberal Party (Jojo Payumo)
6. Ramon Alfonso T. Munez Liberal Party
7. Bohjee Bobby A. Yap Liberal Party
8. Bro. Roy Quiambao PPCRV
9. Reymond Fontanilla Paralegal
10. Janette Oftana Watcher
11. Harold Cacacho Watcher
12. Carlos Caringal Lawyer
 
Noteworthy is that apart from Manalili, Payumo had other
representatives present during the canvassing on May 13-14, 2013. Thus,
even if we entertain Payumo's postulation that Manalili did not stay long
enough to witness the canvassing proceedings from start to finish, and that he
was allegedly not present at least during Garcia's proclamation, We,
nevertheless, still cannot give credence to petitioner's claim of good faith.
Payumo cannot plausibly feign ignorance of Garcia's proclamation since
knowledge of such fact is attributable to him not only through Manalili, but also
through the other party representatives. Consequently, Payumo is then barred
from otherwise claiming that Garcia was proclaimed mayor on May 14, 2013.
 
Moreover, the fact that Payumo only received a copy of the printed, and
not the manual COCP, is of no moment. For as the losing candidate, he is
not, under the Comelec rules, even entitled to be furnished a copy of the
COCP. Section 30 of Comelec Resolution No. 9648 36 provides that insofar as
the electoral candidates are concerned, only the winners are entitled to a copy
of the COCP, viz.:
 Sec. 30. Distribution of COCP and SOVs. — The Board shall
generate and print sufficient copies of the COCP and one (1) copy of
the SOV to be distributed as follows:
a. MBOC/CBOC
1. To the Election Records and Statistics Department (ERSD) of
the Commission;
2. To be posted on the bulletin board of the municipal hall,
supported by SOVP;
3. To the Chairman, MBOC/CBOC;
4. To the Secretary, Sangguniang Bayan/Panlungsod;
5. To the Municipal Treasurer;
6. To a winning Candidate for Mayor; Winning Candidate for
Vice-Mayor; and
7. To each winning Candidate for members of the Sangguniang
Bayan/Panlungsod. (emphasis added)
The wording of the afore-quoted rule is pregnant with meaning. First, its
literal interpretation is that only the winning candidates have the demandable
right to be furnished a copy of the COCP. Second, it amplifies the general rule
that the prescriptive period ought to be reckoned from the actual date of
proclamation, not from notice through service of a COCP, since the losing
candidates are not even required to be served a copy of the COCP in the first
place. Lastly, it warns the candidates to be more vigilant in monitoring the
results of the elections for them to be conscious of the deadline for filing an
election protest, should they opt to contest the results.
In sum, the Court maintains the general rule that the reglementary
period for instituting an election period should be reckoned from the actual
date of proclamation, not from the date of notice. Absent any circumstances
analogous to the factual milieu of Federico, a relaxation of the rules will not be
warranted.
Finally, as regards the MBOC's alleged disregard of the requirement
under Comelec Resolution No. 9648 to post copies of the COCP in the
designated areas, and to serve them to the other winning candidates,
needless to say that they do not and could not invalidate Garcia's
proclamation. Neither do they toll the 10-day period to file an election protest
in this case since Payumo is still deemed aware of the results by way of
notice to his agent or agents. Instead, these alleged omissions merely expose
the members of the MBOC to possible liability should it be proven that they
deviated from procedure, which issue is not yet ripe for Us to decide.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 10, 2014 and January 29, 2015
 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections in Case No. EAC [AEL] 11-2014
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the February 17, 2014
Order of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5 in Balanga, Bataan, dismissing
Petitioner Jose Alejandre Payumo III's election protest for being barred by the
statute of limitations is hereby REINSTATED.  AaCTcI

SO ORDERED.
Carpio, ** Acting C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin,
Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe,
Leonen and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Sereno, * C.J. and Reyes, * J., are on official leave.
 (Garcia v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 216691, [July 21, 2015], 764
|||

PHIL 320-345)
b. Ratio Legis Est Anima Legis -
Ratio est legis anima, mutata legis ratione mutatur et lex. Reason is the soul o
f the law; the reason of the law being changed, the law is also changed.

/reysh(iy)ow liyjas est aenama liyjas/

The reason of law is the soul of law

The reason of the law; the reason underlying the law; the reason for the
existence of the law. Ratio legis est anima legis. The reason of the law is the
spirit or soul of the law …   Ballentine's law dictionary

[G.R. No. 123169. November 4, 1996.]

DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, respondent.

Matias Pangilinan Bansale Tan Feliz Alberto Hernal Buazon & Associates
Law Office for petitioner.
The Solicitor General and Jose P. Balbuena for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RECALL; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE;SK

ELECTION; FOR PURPOSES OF RECALL, SK ELECTION IS NOT A
REGULAR ELECTION UNDER SECTION 74 OF THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
CODE. — The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides —
"SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local official may be the
subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of
confidence, (b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the
official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular
local election." It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute
must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the
statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to
the general intent of the whole enactment. The evident intent of Section 74 is to
subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office.
Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the
period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is,
during the second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's
interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will
unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall,
a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of
his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No 7808 to be held every
three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase
"regular local election," as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall
election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local
Government Code. In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with
the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the
legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a
statute. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or
provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified,
destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant,
meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. It is likewise a basic precept in statutory
construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution.
Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically
paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of
Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local government code which
shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative and referendum . . . ." 
TSEAaD

2. ID.; REGULAR LOCAL ELECTION; CONSTRUED. — Finally, recall

election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government
unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct
of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The
proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the
local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the official's
replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a
successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in
keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular
local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local
elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the
electorate.
3. ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; A TOO LITERAL
INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW LEADS TO ABSURDITY WHICH CANNOT
BE COUNTENANCED. — Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the
law leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court
made the following admonition: "We admonish against a too-literal reading of the
law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention
of its authors. That intention is usually found not in 'the letter that killeth but in the
spirit that vivifieth' . . ." The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its
construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit
and intent. EDIHSC

DAVIDE, JR., J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RECALL; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE;SK
ELECTION; THE SK ELECTION CANNOT BE CONSIDERED A "REGULAR
LOCAL ELECTION" FOR PURPOSES OF RECALL UNDER SECTION 74 OF
THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991; ELECTIVE OFFICIALS OF THE
SANGGUNIANG KABATAAN ARE NOT CONSIDERED LOCAL ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS UNDER THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; REASON. — The
term "regular local election" must be confined to the regular election of elective
local officials, as distinguished from the regular election of national officials. The
elective national officials are the President, Vice-President, Senators and
Congressmen. The elective local officials are Provincial Governors, Vice-
Governors of provinces, Mayors and Vice-Mayors of cities and municipalities,
Members of the Sanggunians of provinces, cities and municipalities, punong
barangays and members of the sangguniang barangays, and the elective
regional officials of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. These are the
only local elective officials deemed recognized by Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of
the Constitution, which provides: SEC 2. The Commission on Elections shall
exercise the following powers and functions: . . . (2) Exercise exclusive original
jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of
all elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of general
jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of
limited jurisdiction. A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to
an election participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage, are not
otherwise disqualified by law, and who are registered voters. One of the
requirements for the exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution is that the person must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite
before he can vote is that he be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on
registration prescribed in the Omnibus Election Code (Sections 113-118). Under
the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21 (Sec.
424 Local Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many who are
not qualified to vote in a regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less than 18.
In no manner then may SK elections be considered a regular election (whether
national or local). Indeed the Sangguniang Kabataan is nothing more than a
youth organization, and although fully recognized in the Local Government
Code and vested with certain powers and functions, its elective officials have not
attained the status of local elective officials. So, in Mercado vs. Board of Election
Supervisors (243 SCRA 422 [1995]), this Court ruled that although the SK
Chairman is an ex-officio member of the sangguniang barangay — an elective
body — that fact does not make him "an elective barangay official," since the law
specifically provides who comprise the elective officials of the sangguniang
barangay, viz., the punong barangay and the seven (7) regular sangguniang
barangay members elected at large by those qualified to exercise the right of
suffrage under Article V of the Constitution, who are likewise registered voters of
the barangay. This shows further that the SK election is not a regular local
election for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local Government
Code.  cIaHDA

RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J  : p

Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula,

Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A
petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of
the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition
signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13,
1995. 1 At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above
the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the
recall election in view of petitioner's opposition. On December 6, 1995, the
COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To
prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action
No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After
conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order,
dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they
should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall
election was without COMELEC approval. 2
In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time,
re-scheduled the recall election on January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition
for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court
issued a temporary restraining order and required the Office of the Solicitor
General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of the
Office of the Solicitor General's manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to
that of the COMELEC, the latter through its law department filed the required
comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a reply. 3
 Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b)
of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code,
which states that "no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of
the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular
local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall
election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set
by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three
years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v.
Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK election
as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a
regular local election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months
separate the SK election from the recall election. We do not agree.
The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:
"SEC. 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local official
may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office
for loss of confidence
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of
the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding
a regular local election."
[Emphasis added.]
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must
be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general
intent of the whole enactment. 4 The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an
elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph
(b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when
such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the
second year of his term of office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of
the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly
circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a
mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his
term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A. No. 7808 to be held every three
years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase
"regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall
election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local
Government Code.  cdasia

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption
that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not
presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. 5 An
interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision
being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed,
emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless,
inoperative or nugatory. 6
It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should
be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. 7 Thus, the interpretation of
Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof,
should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X
of the Constitution to “enact a local government code which shall provide for a
more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a
system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and
referendum . . ."
Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity
which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following
admonition:
"We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt
to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its
authors. That intention is usually found not in 'the letter that killeth but in
the spirit that vivifieth' . . ." 8
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence,
a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.
Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the
local government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition
against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding
the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next
regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The
electorate could choose the official's replacement in the said election who
certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a
recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the
recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring
to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be
recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.  dctai

Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the

limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next
regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7)
months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997. 9
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot
and academic. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January
12, 1996, enjoining the recall election should be as it is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
 Romero, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr.,
Panganiban, and Torres, Jr., JJ ., concur.
Narvasa, C .J ., Padilla, Regalado, Bellosillo, Vitug, and Mendoza,
JJ ., concur in the majority and separate concurring opinions.

Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J ., concurring:

I concur with Mr. Justice Ricardo J. Francisco in his ponencia.

However, I wish to add another reason as to why the SK election cannot
be considered a "regular local election" for purposes of recall under Section 74 of
the Local Government Code of 1991.
The term "regular local election" must be confined to the regular election of
elective local officials, as distinguished from the regular election of national
officials. The elective national officials are the President, Vice-President,
Senators and Congressmen. The elective local officials are Provincial Governors,
Vice-Governors of provinces, Mayors and Vice-Mayors of cities and
municipalities, Members of the Sanggunians of provinces, cities and
municipalities, punong barangays and members of the sangguniang barangays,
and the elective regional officials of the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao. These are the only local elective officials deemed recognized by
Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the Constitution, which provides:
SEC 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts of
general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by
trial courts of limited jurisdiction
A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election
participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise
disqualified by law, and who are registered voters. One of the requirements for
the exercise of suffrage under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution is that the
person must be at least 18 years of age, and one requisite before he can vote is
that he be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in
the Omnibus Election Code (Section 113-118)
 Under the law, the SK includes the youth with ages ranging from 15 to 21
(Sec. 424, Local Government Code of 1991). Accordingly, they include many
who are not qualified to vote in a regular election, viz., those from ages 15 to less
than 18. In no manner then may SK elections be considered a regular election
(whether national or local).
Indeed the Sangguniang Kabataan is nothing more than a youth
organization, and although fully recognized in the Local Government Code and
vested with certain powers and functions, its elective officials have not attained
the status of local elective officials. So, in Mercado vs. Board of Election
Supervisors (243 SCRA 422 [1995]), this Court ruled that although the SK
Chairman is an ex-officio member of the sangguniang barangay — an elective
body — that fact does not make him "an elective barangay official," since the law
specifically provides who comprise the elective officials of the sangguniang
barangay, viz., the punong barangay and the seven (7) regular sangguniang
barangay members elected at large by those qualified to exercise the right of
suffrage under Article V of the Constitution, who are likewise registered voters of
the barangay. This shows further that the SK election is not a regular local
election for purposes of recall under Section 74 of the Local Government Code.
 (Paras v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 123169 (Resolution), [November
|||

4, 1996], 332 PHIL 56-67)

c. Mens Legislatores - The courts look into the object to be accomplished, the
evils and mischief to beremedied or the purpose to be observed. The court
should give the statute a reasonable orliberal construction which will best effect
its purpose rather than one which will defeat iteven though such construction is
not within the strict literal interpretation of the statute.- The court should give the
statute a reasonable or liberal construction which willbest effect its purpose
rather than one which will defeat it.- Statutes must be construed to avoid injustice

[G.R. No. L-28771. March 31, 1971.]

CORNELIA MATABUENA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. PETRONILA
CERVANTES, defendant-appellee.

Alegre, Roces, Salazar & Sañez for plaintiff-appellant.

Fernando Gerona, Jr. for defendant-appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND

WIFE; DONATIONS BY REASON OF MARRIAGE; PROHIBITION AGAINST
DONATION BETWEEN SPOUSES DURING MARRIAGE; APPLICABLE TO
COMMON LAW RELATIONSHIP. — While Art. 133 of the Civil Code
considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage",
policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship. A 1954 Court of Appeals decision Buenaventura v. Bautista, (50
O.G. 3679) interpreting a similar provision of the old Civil Code speaks
unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language of the opinion of the
then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit donations in favor of the
other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in our
ancient law; 'porque no se engañen despojandose el uno al otro por amor que
han de consuno,' [according to] the Partidas (Part. IV, Tit. Xl, LAW IV),
reiterating the rationale 'Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur' of the
Pandects (Bk 24, Tit. I, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is every
reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as
husband and wife without benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted that
assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater influence
 of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to avoid is
correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by Ulpian (in his
lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), it would not be just that such donations should
subsist lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should turn out to be
better. So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our family law, reason
and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to marriage should
likewise attach to concubinage.
2. ID.; SUCCESSION; INTESTATE SUCCESSION; SURVIVING
SPOUSE; RULE WHERE A SISTER SURVIVES WITH THE WIDOW. — The
lack of validity of the donation made b~ the deceased to defendant Petronila
Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having exclusive right to the
disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena, the relationship
between him and the defendant was legitimated by their marriage on March
28. 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided in the Civil Code, she is
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as the surviving sister to
the other half.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J  : p

A question of first impression is before this Court in this litigation. We

are called upon to decide whether the ban on a donation between the
spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. 1 The
plaintiff, now appellant Cornelia Matabuena, a sister to the deceased Felix
Matabuena, maintains that a donation made while he was living maritally
without benefit of marriage to defendant, now appellee Petronila Cervantes,
was void. Defendant would uphold its validity. The lower court, after noting
that it was made at a time before defendant was married to the donor,
sustained the latter's stand. Hence this appeal. The question, as noted, is
novel in character, this Court not having had as yet the opportunity of ruling
on it. A 1954 decision of the Court of Appeals, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 2 by
the then Justice J. B. L. Reyes, who was appointed to this Court later that
year, is indicative of the appropriate response that should be given. The
conclusion reached therein is that a donation between common-law spouses
falls within the prohibition and is "null and void as contrary to public
policy." 3 Such a view merits fully the acceptance of this Court. The decision
must be reversed.
In the decision of November 23, 1965, the lower court, after stating that
in plaintiff's complaint alleging absolute ownership of the parcel of land in
question, she specifically raised the question that the donation made by Felix
Matabuena to defendant Petronila Cervantes was null and void under the
aforesaid article of the Civil Code and that defendant on the other hand did
assert ownership precisely because such a donation was made in 1956 and
her marriage to the deceased did not take place until 1962, noted that when
the case was called for trial on November 19, 1965, there was stipulation of
facts which it quoted. 4 Thus: "The plaintiff and the defendant assisted by their
respective counsels, jointly agree and stipulate: (1) That the deceased Felix
Matabuena owned the property in question; (2) That said Felix Matabuena
executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of Defendant, Petronila
Cervantes over the parcel of land in question on February 20, 1956, which
same donation was accepted by defendant; (3) That the donation of the land
to the defendant which took effect immediately was made during the common
law relationship as husband and wife between the defendant-done and the
now deceased donor and later said donor and done were married on March
28, 1962; (4) That the deceased Felix Matabuena died intestate on
September 13, 1962; (5) That the plaintiff claims the property by reason of
being the only sister and nearest collateral relative of the deceased by virtue
of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962 and had the land
declared in her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon'" 5
The judgment of the lower court on the above facts was adverse to
plaintiff. It reasoned out thus: "A donation under the terms of Article 133 of the
Civil Code is void if made between the spouses during the marriage. When
the donation was made by Felix Matabuena in favor of the defendant on
February 20, 1956, Petronila Cervantes and Felix Matabuena were not yet
married. At that time they were not spouses. They became spouses only
when they married on March 28, 1962, six years after the deed of donation
had been executed." 6
We reach a different conclusion. While Art. 133 of the Civil Code
considers as void a "donation between the spouses during the marriage,"
policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of
morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law
relationship. We reverse.
1. As announced at the outset of this opinion, a 1954 Court of Appeals
decision, Buenaventura v. Bautista, 7 interpreting a similar provision of the old
Civil Code 8 speaks unequivocally. If the policy of the law is, in the language
of the opinion of the then Justice J.B.L. Reyes of that Court, "to prohibit
donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of
undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice
deeply rooted in our ancient law; 'porque no se engañen despojandose el uno
al otro por amor que han de consuno [according to] the Partidas (Part IV, Tit.
XI, LAW IV), reiterating the rationale 'Ne mutuato amore invicem spoliarentur'
of the Pandects (Bk. 24, Tit. 1, De donat, inter virum et uxorem); then there is
every reason to apply the same prohibitive policy to persons living together as
husband and wife without the benefit of nuptials. For it is not to be doubted
that assent to such irregular connection for thirty years bespeaks greater
influence of one party over the other, so that the danger that the law seeks to
avoid is correspondingly increased. Moreover, as already pointed out by
Ulpian (in his lib. 32 ad Sabinum, fr. 1), 'it would not be just that such
donations should subsist, lest the condition of those who incurred guilt should
turn out to be better.' So long as marriage remains the cornerstone of our
family law, reason and morality alike demand that the disabilities attached to
marriage should likewise attach to concubinage." 9
2. It is hardly necessary to add that even in the absence of the above
pronouncement, any other conclusion cannot stand the test of scrutiny. It
would be to indict the framers of the Civil Code for a failure to apply a
laudable rule to a situation which in its essentials cannot be distinguished.
Moreover, if it is at all to be differentiated, the policy of the law which
embodies a deeply-rooted notion of what is just and what is right would be
nullified if such irregular relationship instead of being visited with disabilities
would be attended with benefits. Certainly a legal norm should not be
susceptible to such a reproach. If there is ever any occasion where the
principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as
much a part of it as what is written, this is it. Otherwise the basic purpose
discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. Whatever omission
may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must
be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. In the language of
Justice Pablo: "El espiritu que informa la ley debe ser la luz que ha de guiar a
los tribunales en la aplicación de sus disposiciones.'' 10
3. The lack of validity of the donation made by the deceased to
defendant Petronila Cervantes does not necessarily result in plaintiff having
exclusive right to the disputed property. Prior to the death of Felix Matabuena,
the relationship between him and the defendant was legitimated by their
marriage on March 28, 1962. She is therefore his widow. As provided for in
the Civil Code, she is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the plaintiff, as
the surviving sister, to the other half. 11
WHEREFORE, the lower court decision of November 23, 1965
dismissing the complaint with costs is reversed. The questioned donation is
declared void, with the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to
the property in question recognized. The case is remanded to the lower court
for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the above opinion. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
 Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J, took no part.
 (Matabuena v. Cervantes, G.R. No. L-28771, [March 31, 1971], 148 PHIL 295-
|||

300)
[G.R. No. L-8639. March 23, 1956.]

In the Matter of the Adoption of the Minors Pablo Vasquez

Ernesto Vasquez, Maria Lourdes Vasquez and Elizabeth
Prasnik. LEOPOLDO PRASNIK, petitioner-appellee, vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-appellant.

Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Federico V. Sian for

appellant.
Carlos P. Paras for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. ADOPTION; NATURAL CHILDREN, WHETHER RECOGNIZED OR

NOT MAY BE ADOPTED. — Article 338 of the new Civil Code evidently
intends to allow adoption of a natural child whether the child be recognized or
not. If the intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized children, then
said article would be of no useful purpose because such children could have
been validly adopted even without it. This is so because a natural child not
recognized has no right whatever and being considered legally a total
stranger to his parents, he may be adopted under Article 337. The same
cannot be said with regard to an acknowledged natural child because, his
filiation having already been established, his adoption cannot be made under
the general principles governing adoption. There is therefore need of an
express provision allowing the adoption of an acknowledged natural child as
an exception to the rule and that is what is contemplated in Article 338.
2. ID.; ID.; PROHIBITION AGAINST PERSON WHO HAS ALREADY
ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD TO ADOPT; TO WHOM APPLICABLE.
— The prohibition against a person who has an acknowledged natural child to
adopt, provided in Article 335 of the new Civil Code, refers to the adoption of
a minor by a person who has already an acknowledged natural child and it
does not refer to the adoption of his own children even if he has
acknowledged them as his natural children.
3. ID.; ID.; NECESSITY OF ADOPTING ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL
CHILDREN; EFFECT OF. — It may be contended that the adoption of an
acknowledged natural child is unnecessary because there already exists
between the father and the children the relation of paternity and filiation which
is precisely the purpose which adoption seeks to accomplish through legal
fiction. But it should be borne in mind that the rights of an acknowledged
natural child are much less than those of a legitimate child and it is indeed to
the great advantage of the latter if he be given, even through legal fiction, a
legitimate trend which considers adoption as an act not merely to establish
the relation of paternity and filiation but one which may give the child a
legitimate status.

DECISION

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J  : p

Leopoldo Prasnik filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal a

petition seeking to adopt Pablo Vasquez, Ernesto Vasquez, Maria Lourdes
Vasquez and Elizabeth Prasnik who are the minor children of Paz Vasquez.
He claims that they are also his children but without the benefit of marriage
and he desires to adopt them to promote their best interest and well-being.
Since at the hearing of the petition petitioner acknowledged that they are his
natural children, the Solicitor General opposed the petition on the plea that he
could not legally adopt them for the reason that Article 338 of the new Civil
Code which allows a natural child to be adopted by his natural father refers
only to a child who has not been acknowledged as natural child. At first the
court upheld the opposition but, on a motion for reconsideration, the court
reconsidered its decision and granted the petition. Hence this appeal.
Leopoldo Prasnik was formerly married to one Catherine Prasnik but
their marriage was dissolved by virtue of a decree of divorce issued on
December 12, 1947 by the Circuit Court of Miami, Dade Country, Florida,
U.S.A. Thereafter, he and Paz Vasquez lived together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage and out of this relation four children were born
who are the minors he is now seeking to adopt. He claims that it is his
intention to marry Paz Vasquez as soon as he is granted Philippine
citizenship for which he has already applied and in the meantime he wants to
adopt them in order that no one of his relatives abroad could share in his
inheritance. He averred that he had no child with his former wife and
acknowledged said minors as his natural children.
Article 338 of the new Civil Code provides that a natural child may be
adopted by his natural father or mother. The Solicitor General interprets this
provision in the sense that in order that a natural child may be adopted by his
natural father or mother there should not mediate between them an
acknowledgment of the status of natural child by the father or mother as
otherwise the adoption would be repugnant to Article 335 of the same Code
which denies adoption to one who has an acknowledged natural child. And
since petitioner has expressly admitted in open court that the minors subject
of this proceeding are his natural children, he is therefore disqualified to adopt
under the law.
We do not agree to this interpretation. Apparently, Article 338 above
adverted to merely refers to the adoption of a natural child and not to one who
has already been recognized, but there is nothing therein which would prohibit
the adoption of an acknowledged natural child even if the law does not
expressly say so. The reason for the silence of the law is obvious. That law
evidently intends to allow adoption whether the child be recognized or not. If
the intention were to allow adoption only to unrecognized children, as
contended, then the provision of Article 338 would be of no useful purpose
because such children could have been validly adopted even without it. And
we say so because a natural child not recognized has no right whatever 1 and
being considered legally a total stranger to his parents, he may be adopted
under Article 337. The same cannot be said with regard to an acknowledged
natural child because, his filiation having already been established, his
adoption cannot be made under the general principles governing adoption (2
Manresa 5th ed., 80). There is therefore need of an express provision
allowing the adoption of an acknowledged natural child as an exception to the
rule and that is what is contemplated in the article we are considering.
The Solicitor General, in his opposition to the petition, invokes Article
335 of the new Civil Code which provides that a person who has an
acknowledged natural child cannot adopt and considering that petitioner has
acknowledged the minors in question as his children, he contends that he is
disqualified from adopting them under that article. We believe that the Solicitor
General has not made a correct interpretation of that article for he is confusing
the children of the person adopting with the minors to be adopted. A cursory
reading of said article would reveal that the prohibition merely refers to the
adoption of a minor by a person who has already an acknowledged natural
child and it does not refer to the adoption of his own children even if he has
acknowledged them as his natural children.
It may be contended that the adoption of an acknowledged natural child
is unnecessary because there already exists between the father and the child
the relation of paternity and filiation which is precisely the purpose which
adoption seeks to accomplish through legal fiction. But it should be borne in
mind that the rights of an acknowledged natural child are much less than
those of a legitimate child and it is indeed to the great advantage of the latter
if he be given, even through legal fiction, a legitimate status. And this view is
in keeping with the modern trend of adoption statutes which have been
adopted precisely to encourage adoption (In re Havagord's Estate, 34 S. D.
131, 147 N. W. 378). Under this modern trend, adoption is deemed not merely
 an act to establish the relation of paternity and filiation but one which may give
the child a legitimate status. It is in this sense that adoption is now defined as
"a juridical act which creates between two persons a relationship similar to
that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation" (4 Valverde, 473).
The cases cited by the Solicitor General are not in point. 2 In said cases
the petitioners had legitimate children of their own and so their petitions were
denied. They are indeed disqualified from adopting under the law. In the
present case however, petitioner does not have any legitimate children and
his main desire is to give a legitimate status to his four natural children. This
attitude, far from being opposed, should be encouraged. This is in keeping
with the modern trend of the law concerning adoption (In re Havagord's
Estate, supra).
The decision appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion,
Reyes, J. B. L. and Endencia, JJ., concur.
|||  (Prasnik v. Republic, G.R. No. L-8639, [March 23, 1956], 98 PHIL 665-670)
d. Dura Lex Sed Lex - The law may be harsh but it is still the law

[G.R. No. L-12088. December 23, 1959.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

MORO SUMAGUINA MACARANDANG, defendant-appellant.

Valerio V. Rovira for appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Guillermo E. Torres and Assistant
Solicitor General Florencio Villamor for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; SECRET

AGENTS; EXEMPTION FROM FIREARM LICENSE OR PERMIT. — Section
879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides, as shown at least by the
subject matter thereof, that "peace officers" are exempted from the
requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. The
appointment of the accused as secret agent to assist in the maintenance of
peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him
within the category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the
municipal police expressly covered by section 879.

DECISION

PARAS, C. J  :p

Moro Sumaguina Macarandang was accused and, after trial,

convicted of the crime of illegal possession of firearms in the Court of
First Instance of Lanao under the following information:
"That on or about June 8, 1954, in the Municipality of
Marantao, Province of Lanao, Republic of the Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
 accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
keep and have in his custody and control one Riot Gun,
Winchester, 12 GA. SN-942131 and (8) rounds of ammunitions,
without first having obtained the proper license or permit therefor
from competent authority."
In the present appeal the accused, admitting the ownership and
possession of the firearm and ammunitions in question, invokes as his
legal excuse or authority therefor, the appointment issued him by
Governor Dimakuta as secret agent on October 1, 1953, which reads as
follows:
"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
"For having shown good faith by previously surrendering to
this Office a firearm, Datu Sumaguina Macarandang of Kamalig,
Marantao, Lanao, has been appointed SECRET AGENT of this
Office without compensation, to assist in the maintenance of peace
and order campaigns and detection of crimes. Accordingly, he is
hereby authorized to hold and carry in his possession one (1) Riot
Winchester Shotgun, 12 GA. Serial No. 942131 with twenty (20)
rounds of ammunitions for the successful execution of his
hazardous missions.
"Datu Sumaguina Macarandang shall personally report to
me from time to time all activities and whereabouts of lawless and
wanted elements roaming in the Municipal District of Marantao, as
well as all matters affecting tranquility therein existing."
It may be true that, as held by the trial court, the Governor has no
authority to issue any firearm license or permit; but section 879 of the
Revised Administrative Code provides, as shown at least by the subject
matter thereof, that "peace officers" are exempted from the requirements
relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. The appointment
of the accused as secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the
category of a "peace officer" equivalent even to a member of the
municipal police expressly covered by section 879.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed and the
accused acquitted, with costs de oficio. So ordered.
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo,
Labrador and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
 (People v. Macarandang, G.R. No. L-12088, [December 23, 1959], 106 PHIL
|||

713-715)
[G.R. No. L-22301. August 30, 1967.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

appellee, vs. MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG, defendant-appellant.

Francisco P. Cabigao for defendant and appellant.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Asst. Solicitor General
F .R. Rosete and Solicitor O. C . Hernandez for plaintiff and appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; DUTY OF COURTS TO APPLY

THE LAW; WHEN A LAW SHOULD BE CONSTRUED AND INTERPRETED.
— The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. Construction
and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is
impossible or inadequate without them.
2. ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; LICENSE
REQUIREMENT; SECRET AGENT NOT EXEMPT; CASE AT BAR. — As
secret agent is not included in the enumeration in Section 897 of the Revised
Administrative Code of persons who are not prohibited in Section 878,
Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4, from
possessing "any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or
any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture
of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition," appellant is not exempt from the
requirement of license.
3. ID.; ID.; DOCTRINE IN PEOPLE V. MACARANDANG OVERRULED.
— Reliance of the accused in the case at bar on People v. Macarandang, 106
Phil. 713, where a secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption
that the appointment "of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes,
sufficiently put him within the category of a `peace officer' equivalent even to a
member of the municipal police expressly covered by section 897," is
misplaced. It is not within the power of the Supreme Court to set aside the
clear and explicit mandate of a statutory provision.

DECISION
FERNANDO, J  : p

The sole question in this appeal from a judgment of conviction by the

lower court is whether or not the appointment to and the holding of the
position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a
sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition. We hold that it does not.
The accused in this case was indicted for the above offense in an
information dated August 14, 1962 reading as follows: "The undersigned
accuses MARIO MAPA Y MAPULONG of a violation of Section 878 in
connection with Section 2692 of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended by Commonwealth Act No. 56 and as further amended by Republic
Act No. 4, committed as follows: That on or about the 13th day of August,
1962, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
wilfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and
control one home-made revolver (Paltik), Cal. 22, without serial number, with
six (6) rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary
license or permit therefor from the corresponding authorities. Contrary to law."
When the case was called for hearing on September 3, 1963, the lower
court at the outset asked the counsel for the accused: "May counsel stipulate
that the accused was found in possession of the gun involved in this case,
that he has neither a permit or license to possess the same and that we can
submit the same on a question of law whether or not an agent of the governor
can hold a firearm without a permit issued by the Philippine Constabulary."
After counsel sought from the fiscal an assurance that he would not question
the authenticity of his exhibits, the understanding being that only a question of
law would be submitted for decision, he explicitly specified such question to
be "whether or not a secret agent is not required to get a license for his
firearm."
Upon the lower court stating that the fiscal should examine the
documents so that he could pass on their authenticity, the fiscal asked the
following question: "Does the accused admit that this pistol cal. 22 revolver
with six rounds of ammunition mentioned in the information was found in his
possession on August 13, 1962, in the City of Manila without first having
secured the necessary license or permit thereof from the correspondent
authority?" The accused now the appellant, answered categorically: "Yes,
Your Honor." Upon which, the lower court made a statement: "The accused
admits, Yes, and his counsel Atty. Cabigao also affirms that the accused
admits."
Forthwith, the fiscal announced that he was "willing to submit the same
for decision." Counsel for the accused on his part presented four (4) exhibits
consisting of his appointment 'as secret agent of the Hon. Feliciano Leviste,
then Governor of Batangas, dated June 2, 1962; 1 another document likewise
issued by Gov. Leviste also addressed to the accused directing him to
proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon City on a confidential mission; 2 the
oath of office of the accused as such secret agent; 3 a certificate dated March
11, 1963, to the effect that the accused "is a secret agent" of Gov.
Leviste. 4 Counsel for the accused then stated that with the presentation of the
above exhibits he was "willing to submit the case on the question of whether
or not a secret agent duly appointed and qualified as such of the provincial
governor is exempt from the requirement of having a license of firearm." The
exhibits were admitted and the parties were given time to file their respective
memoranda.
Thereafter on November 27, 1963, the lower court rendered a decision
convicting the accused "of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from one year and one day to two
years and to pay the costs. The firearm and ammunition confiscated from him
are forfeited in favor of the Government."
The only question being one of law, the appeal was taken to this Court.
The decision must be affirmed.
The law is explicit that except as thereafter specially allowed, "it shall be
unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms
or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to
be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or
ammunition." 5 The next section provides that "firearms and ammunition
regularly and lawfully issued to officers, soldiers, sailors, or marines [of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, the Philippine Constabulary, guards in the
employment of the Bureau of Prisons, municipal police, provincial governors,
lieutenant governors, provincial treasurers, municipal treasurers, municipal
mayors, and guards of provincial prisoners and jails," are not covered" when
such firearms are in possession of such officials and public servants for use in
the performance of their official duties." 6
The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent.
As such he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental
duty of courts is to apply the law. "Construction and interpretation come only
after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate
without them." 7 The conviction of the accused must stand. It cannot be set
aside. Accused however would rely on People v. Macarandang, 8 where a
secret agent was acquitted on appeal on the assumption that the appointment
"of the accused as a secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and
order campaigns and detection of crimes, sufficiently put him within the
category of a 'peace officer' equivalent even to a member of the municipal
police expressly covered by section 879." Such reliance is misplaced. It is not
 within the power of this Court to set aside the clear and explicit mandate of a
statutory provision. To the extent therefore that this decision conflicts with
what was held in People v. Macarandang, it no longer speaks with authority.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed.
Concepcion, C .J ., Reyes, J .B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J .P.,
Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ ., concur.
 (People v. Mapa y Mapulong, G.R. No. L-22301, [August 30, 1967], 127 PHIL
|||

624-628)
[G.R. No. L-22291. November 15, 1976.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JESUS

SANTAYANA Y ESCUDERO, defendant-appellant.

Ernesto C. Hidalgo and Enrique Jocson for appellant.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico
P. de Castro and Trial Attorney Josefina Domingo de Leon for appellee.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, JR., J  : p

Accused, Jesus Santayana y Escudero, was found guilty of the crime of

illegal possession of firearms and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
from one (1) year and one (1) day to two (2) years and to pay the costs.
The essential facts are not in dispute. On February 19, 1962, accused
Jesus Santayana, was appointed as "Special Agent" 1 by then Colonel Jose
C. Maristela, Chief of the CIS. On March 9, 1962, a Memorandum
Receipt 2 for equipment was issued in the name of the accused regarding one
pistol Melior SN-122137 with one (1) mag and stock. Col. Maristela likewise
issued an undated certification 3 to the effect that the accused was an
accredited member of the CIS and the pistol described in the said
Memorandum Receipt was given to him by virtue of his appointment as
special agent and that he was authorized to carry and possess the same in
the performance of his official duty and for his personal protection. On
October 29, 1962, the accused was found in Plaza Miranda in possession of
the abovedescribed pistol with four rounds of ammunition, cal. 25, without a
license to possess them. An investigation was conducted and thereupon, a
corresponding complaint was filed against the accused. The case underwent
trial after which the accused was convicted of the crime charged with its
corresponding penalty. Hence, the case was appealed to US and the accused
assigned three errors allegedly committed by the trial court in disposing of this
case.
Of these assigned errors, the two main issued posed are whether or not
the present subject matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
municipal court pursuant to Republic Act No. 2613; and whether or not the
appointment of the appellant as special agent of the CIS which apparently
authorizes him to carry and posses firearms exempts him from securing a
license or permit corresponding thereto.
Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, there is no doubt that under Section
87 of Republic Act No. 286, as amended by Republic Act No. 2613, the justice
over cases of illegal possession of firearms. But equally the Court of First
Instance of Manila, which took cognizance of this case had jurisdiction over
the offense charged because under Section 44 of Republic Act No. 296, Court
of First Instance have original jurisdiction "in all criminal cases in which the
penalty provided by law is imprisonment for more than six (6) months, or a
fine of more than two hundred pesos (P200.00)"; and the offense charged in
the information is punishable by imprisonment for a period of not less than
one (1) year and one (1) day nor more than five (5) years, or both such
imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or
more than five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
From the foregoing, it is evident that the jurisdiction of the Municipal
Courts over Criminal Cases in which the penalty provided by law is
imprisonment for not more than six (6) months or fine of not more than two
hundred (P200.00) pesos or both such imprisonment and fine is exclusive and
original to said courts. But considering that the offense of illegal possession of
firearms with which the appellant was charged is penalized by imprisonment
for a period of not less than one (1) year and one (1) day or more than five (5)
years, or both such imprisonment and a fine of not less than one thousand
(P1,000.00) pesos or more than five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos (Republic
Act No. 4), the offense, therefore, does not full within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Municipal Court. The Court of First Instance has concurrent
jurisdiction over the same.
As to the second issue to be resolved, there is no question that
appellant was appointed as CIS secret agent with the authority to carry and
possess firearms. 4 Indeed, appellant was issued a firearm in the performance
of his official duties and for his personal protection. 5 It also appears that
appellant was informed by Col. Maristela that it was not necessary for him to
apply for a license or to register the said firearm because it was government
property and therefore could not legally be registered or licensed in
appellant's name. 6 Capt. Adolfo M. Bringas from whom appellant received the
firearm also informed the latter that no permit to carry the pistol was
necessary "because you are already appointed as CIS agent."
At the time of appellant's apprehension, the doctrine then prevailing is
enunciated in the case of People vs. Macarandang 7 wherein We held that the
appointment of a civilian as "secret agent to assist in the maintenance of
peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him
 within the category of a 'peace officer' equivalent even to a member of the
municipal police expressly covered by Section 879." The case of People vs.
Mapa 8 revoked the doctrine in the Macarandang case only on August 30,
1967. Under the Macarandang rule therefore obtaining at the time of
appellant's appointment as secret agent, he incurred no criminal liability for
possession of the pistol in question.
Wherefore, and conformably with the recommendation of the Solicitor
General, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and appellant Jesus
Santayana y Escudero is hereby acquitted. The bond for his provisional
release is cancelled. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Actg. Chairman), Antonio, Aquino and Martin, JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., did not take part.
Martin, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.
 (People v. Santayana y Escudero, G.R. No. L-22291, [November 15, 1976],
|||

165 PHIL 648-652)

e. Expression Unius, Est Exclusion Alterius - Express mention is implied
exclusion

Legal Definition of expressio unius est exclusio alterius

: a principle in statutory construction: when one or more things of a class are
expressly mentioned others of the same class are excluded

History and Etymology for expressio unius est exclusio alterius

New Latin, the explicit mention of one (thing) is the exclusion of another

[G.R. No. 2122. September 13, 1905.]

PEDRO T. ACOSTA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. DAVID

FLOR, defendant-appellee.

W.A. Kincaid, for appellant.
Hartigan, Marple, Solignac & Gutierrez, for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. ACTION TO REMOVE A PUBLIC OFFICER. — A private person can

not maintain an action for the removal of a public officer unless he alleges that
he is entitled to the same office. (Secs. 197 to 216, Code of Civil Procedure.)
2. ID — When such an allegation is made but not proven, the court is
justified in dismissing the case without inquiring into the right of the defendant
to retain the office.

DECISION

MAPA, J  : p

It is alleged in the complaint that at the municipal elections held on the

1st day of December, 1903, in the town of Laoag, Province of Ilocos Norte,
the plaintiff and the defendant were candidates for the office of municipal
president of the said town; that as a result of the said election the plaintiff was
elected to the said office by a majority of 100 votes, and that notwithstanding
this fact the defendant has usurped said office and unlawfully held the same
since the plaintiff was the person entitled to the exercise of said office. The
complaint further sets out other acts in regard to illegalities alleged to have
been committed during the election. The prayer of the complaint is to the
effect that judgment be entered against the defendant, excluding him from the
exercise of such office and that the plaintiff be declared to be entitled to the
same and that he be given possession thereof, and for such other and further
relief as the facts in the case would warrant in favor of the plaintiff.
The case having proceeded to trial, the plaintiff introduced various
witnesses, all and each of whom testified to facts which, if true, would more or
less gravely affect the legality of the election. Not a single witness, however,
confirmed the allegations contained in the complaint, to the effect that the
plaintiff had obtained a majority of 100 votes at the said election, nor can it be
inferred from the evidence introduced by the plaintiff that he, as a result of the
said election, or for any other reason, was entitled to the office of municipal
president of Laoag, now held by the defendant.
In view of the evidence introduced at the trial by the plaintiff, and before
the defendant had presented his, the court, on the latter's motion, acquitted
the defendant, imposing the costs upon the plaintiff. The court based its action
upon the following grounds: (1) That the plaintiff could not maintain the action
brought by him because he had failed to establish his alleged right to the
exercise of the office in question; and (2) that there was no necessity to
inquire into the right of the defendant to hold the said office for the reason that
this question had already been determined by the provincial board after a
consideration of the various protests presented to it in regard to irregularities
committed during the last election held at Laoag for the office of municipal
president and other municipal officials, and for the further reason that the
presumption is that a person holding a public office was duly appointed of
elected thereto.
The plaintiff excepted to this ruling of the court, moved for a new trial,
and thereafter brought the case to this court for review. An examination of the
evidence of record supports the finding of the court below to the effect that the
plaintiff has failed to prove in any way, shape, or form that he was entitled to
the office in question, as alleged by him in his complaint. There is no dispute
upon this question. The appellant, himself, when the motion of the defendant
to dismiss was argued, and from the decision of which he appealed to this
court, clearly admitted that he had failed to establish his right to the exercise
of the office in question. (Page 17 of the bill of exceptions.) And on page 52 of
his brief, he also assumes that he had been unable to establish his alleged
right to the office in question.
The question that we have to decide, therefore, is whether,
notwithstanding what has already been said, and notwithstanding the fact that
the plaintiff has failed to show that he had any right to the office of municipal
president of Laoag, he can maintain an action such as this for the purpose of
excluding the defendant from the exercise of said office on account of
illegalities alleged to have been committed in the elections.
The right to maintain such an action is especially and expressly
governed by the provisions of sections 197 to 216 of the Code of Civil
Procedure.
The code, after enumerating in sections 197 and 198 the cases in
which such an action may be brought and the persons against whom they
may be brought, goes on to determine with careful distinction those who have
the right to maintain such action.
Section 199 provides that "the Attorney-General of the Islands, or the
fiscal of any province, when directed by the Chief Executive of the Islands,
must commence any such action; and when upon complaint or otherwise he
has good reason to believe that any case specified in the two preceding
sections can be established by proof, he must commence such action."
Section 200 provides that "the Attorney-General of the Islands or the
fiscal for a province, may, at his own instance, bring such an action, or he
may, on leave of the court in which the action is to be commenced, or a judge
thereof in vacation, bring the action upon the relation of and at the request of
another person; but, if the action is brought at the request of and upon the
relation of another person, the officer bringing it may require an indemnity for
expenses and costs of the action, to be given to him by the party at whose
request and upon whose relation the same is brought, before commencing it."
Finally, section 201, under the heading "An individual may commence
such action," provides as follows: "A person claiming to be entitled to a public
office, unlawfully held and exercised by another, may bring an action
therefor."
If the legislator had intended to give to all citizens alike the right to
maintain an action for usurpation of public office, he would have plainly said
so in order to avoid doubt on a subject of such far-reaching importance. A
simple provision would have sufficed for this purpose. Far from it, the
legislator has on the contrary especially and specifically provided in sections
199, 200, and 201 who must and who may bring such actions; and it is very
clear that it was his intention to give such right to those expressly mentioned
in the above-cited sections and to no other, following the well- known rule of
law "inclusio unius est exclusio alterius." It has been noticed that the above
referred to three sections only mention the Attorney- General, the provincial
fiscal, and the individual claiming to be entitled to the office unlawfully held
and exercised by another. It is to be inferred from this last provision that the
individual who does not claim to have such a right can not bring an action for
usurpation of public office.
This inference is supported by the provisions of section 202 which says
that when the action is against a person for usurping an office, the complaint
shall set fort the name of the person who claims to be entitled thereto, with an
averment of his right to the same. Why should this be required as an essential
requisite if it were not necessary that the individual bringing the action should
claim the right to exercise the office in question?
Our opinion is that the law has reserved to the Attorney-General and to
the provincial fiscals, as the case may be, the right to bring such action, and in
but one case does the law authorize an individual to bring such an action, to
wit, when that person claims to have the right to the exercise of the office
unlawfully held and exercised by another. Aside from this case an individual
can not maintain such action. The law, in our opinion, does not allow of any
other construction. If an individual, whether or not he has the right to the office
alleged to have been usurped by another were to be permitted to maintain
such an action, it would serve no purpose and section 201 would be evidently
superfluous. It would be a useless and redundant provision of the code.
As a consequence of what has been said no individual can bring a civil
action relating to the usurpation of a public office without averring that he has
a right to the same; and at any stage of the proceedings, if it be shown that
such individual has no such right, the action may be dismissed because there
is no legal ground upon which it may proceed when the fundamental basis of
such action is destroyed as is the case here. This is what actually happened
in this case. After all of the evidence presented by the plaintiff had been
introduced, it was found, and he himself so admitted that he had failed to
establish in any way, shape, or form that he had any right to the office of
municipal president of the town of Laoag as he had alleged in his complaint
without foundation for such allegation. Consequently the judge very properly
acquitted the defendant of the complaint.
The appellant contends that the court below should have first inquired
into the right of the defendant to the office in question and that no other
question can be raised or investigated until this point has been determined,
and alleges that the question of the right of the plaintiff to the said office does
not arise until it has been determined that the defendant is not entitled to the
exercise of such office. In support of his contention he relies upon the
provisions of section 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
 This section provides as follows: "When the action is against a person
for usurping an office, the complaint shall set forth the name of the person
who claims to be entitled thereto, with an averment of his right to the same;
and that the defendant is unlawfully in possession of the same; and judgment
may be rendered upon the right of the defendant, and also upon the right of
the person so averred to be entitled, or only upon the right of the defendant,
as justice requires."
From the words above italicized the appellant infers that the court below
should have first passed upon the right of the defendant and afterwards upon
the right of the plaintiff. In our opinion this should be done at the same time
and in the same judgment. It is immaterial what method the court may follow
in the statement and determination of the questions in the rendition of his
judgment because even though the court may pass upon the right of the
plaintiff first, and the right of the defendant afterwards, or vice versa, this
procedure would not vitiate the judgment, provided the court does not fail to
state therein what the rights of the contending parties to the office are. But all
of this, of course, presupposes that the action has been properly brought and
duly prosecuted to a judgment. This, at the same time, presupposes that the
plaintiff had a right to maintain his action upon the evidence submitted by him
at the trial. It is impossible to prosecute a suit without a cause of action.
Therefore, whenever before judgment it is conclusively proven that the plaintiff
has no right to maintain the action since he has not the essential conditions
required by law in order to bring and maintain such action, his complaint
should be dismissed and it becomes unnecessary to pass upon the right of
the defendant who has a perfect right to the undisturbed possession of his
office, unless the action is brought by a person having a right to maintain the
same under the law.
It may be said that under section 202 the court may only pass upon the
right of the defendant when the justice of the case so demands. This is true,
but this only refers to cases where the action is brought by the Attorney-
General o* by the provincial fiscal, as the case may be. In such cases it is not
necessary that there be a person claiming to be entitled to the office alleged
to have been usurped, because although be no such person, as in the case of
a vacant office, for instance, the fiscal could and even should bring such
action against the person usurping the office in accordance with the
provisions of sections 200 and 199, respectively, as the case may be. The
manner in which judgment should be rendered according to section 202
perfectly meets the various cases provided for in the three preceding sections;
and it becomes the duty of the court to pass upon the rights of the defendant
only whenever it is not an essential requisite for the due prosecution of the
action that there be a person claiming to be entitled to the office thus usurped,
 something which only happens where the Attorney-General or the fiscal of
any province brings the action against the usurper.
As a result of the foregoing, we can not here pass upon the validity or
nullity of the election of the defendant, for the reason, among others which it is
not necessary to state here, that the defendant has no right to maintain such
an action as this.
The order of the court below appealed from, is hereby affirmed. After
the expiration of twenty days let judgment be entered in accordance herewith
and let the case be remanded to the court from whence it came for further
proceedings in accordance with the law. So ordered.
Arellano, C .J ., Torres, Johnson, and Carson, JJ ., concur.
Willard, J ., did not sit in this case.
|||  (Acosta v. Flor, G.R. No. 2122, [September 13, 1905], 5 PHIL 18-24)
[G.R. No. 181517. July 6, 2015.]

GREEN STAR EXPRESS, INC. and FRUTO SAYSON,

JR., petitioners, vs. NISSIN-UNIVERSAL ROBINA
CORPORATION, respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, ** J  :p

For resolution is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of

Court which petitioners Green Star Express, Inc. and Fruto Sayson, Jr.
brought before the Court, assailing the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) dated September 17, 2007 and its Resolution 2 dated January 22, 2008
in CA-G.R. SP No. 86824. The CA nullified the Resolution dated May 5, 2004
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, in Civil
Case No. SPL-0969, and dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
The following are the antecedents of the case:
On February 25, 2003, a Mitsubishi L-300 van which Universal Robina
Corporation (URC) owned figured in a vehicular accident with petitioner Green
Star Express, Inc.'s (Green Star) passenger bus, resulting in the death of the
van's driver. Thus, the bus driver, petitioner Fruto Sayson, Jr., was charged
with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
Thereafter, Green Star sent a demand letter to respondent Nissin-
Universal Robina Corporation (NURC) for the repair of its passenger bus
amounting to P567,070.68. NURC denied any liability therefor and argued
that the criminal case shall determine the ultimate liabilities of the parties.
Thereafter, the criminal case was dismissed without prejudice, due to
insufficiency of evidence.
Sayson and Green Star then filed a complaint for damages against
NURC before the RTC of San Pedro, Laguna. Francis Tinio, one of NURC's
employees, was the one who received the summons. On February 6, 2004,
NURC filed a Motion to Dismiss claiming lack of jurisdiction due to improper
service.
 On May 5, 2004, the RTC issued a Resolution denying NURC's motion
to dismiss. It ruled that there was substantial compliance because there was
actual receipt of the summons by NURC. The dispositive portion of said
Resolution thus reads:  TCAScE

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, defendant's "Motion to

Dismiss" is hereby DENIED. 3
Since its Motion for Reconsideration was denied, NURC elevated the
case to the CA via a Petition for Certiorari. On September 17, 2007, the CA
reversed the RTC ruling, hence:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED.
The assailed Resolutions, dated May 5, 2004 and dated July 26, 2004,
of the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna, Branch 31, in Civil
Case No. SPL-0969, are hereby NULLIFIED and a new one rendered
granting Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss, dated February 3, 2004.
Private Respondents' Amended Complaint for Damages filed against
Petitioner Nissin-Universal Robina Corporation is
accordingly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED. 4
Aggrieved, Green Star and Sayson moved for reconsideration, but the
same was denied. Hence, this petition.
The lone issue is whether or not the summons was properly served on
NURC, vesting the trial court with jurisdiction.
The petition is bereft of merit.
It is a well-established rule that the rules on service of summons upon a
domestic private juridical entity must be strictly complied with. Otherwise, the
court cannot be said to have acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. 5
NURC maintains that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over it as the
summons was received by its cost accountant, Francis Tinio. It argues that
under Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Court, which provides the rule
on service of summons upon a juridical entity, in cases where the defendant is
a domestic corporation like NURC, summons may be served only through its
officers. 6 Thus:
Section 11. Service upon domestic private juridical entity. —
When the defendant is a corporation, partnership or association
organized under the laws of the Philippines with a juridical personality,
service may be made on the president, managing partner, general
manager, corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel. 7
This provision replaced the former Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964
Rules of Court which read:
 Section 13. Service upon private domestic corporation or
partnership. — If the defendant is a corporation organized under the
laws of the Philippines or a partnership duly registered, service may be
made on the president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any
of its directors. 8
In the past, the Court upheld service of summons upon a construction
project manager, a corporation's assistant manager, ordinary clerk of a
corporation, private secretary of corporate executives, retained counsel, and
officials who had control over the operations of the corporation like the
assistant general manager or the corporation's Chief Finance and
Administrative Officer. The Court then considered said persons as "agent"
within the contemplation of the old rule. Notably, under the new Rules, service
of summons upon an agent of the corporation is no longer authorized. 9 The
rule now likewise states "general manager" instead of "manager"; "corporate
secretary" instead of merely "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of
"cashier." 10 It has now become restricted, limited, and exclusive only to the
persons enumerated in the aforementioned provision, following the rule in
statutory construction that the express mention of one person excludes all
others, or expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Service must, therefore, be
made only on the persons expressly listed in the rules. 11 If the revision
committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have
easily done so by clear and concise language. 12  cTDaEH

Here, Tinio, a member of NURC's accounting staff, received the

summons on January 22, 2004. Green Star claims that it was received upon
instruction of Junadette Avedillo, the general manager of the corporation.
Such fact, however, does not appear in the Sheriff's Return. 13 The Return did
not even state whether Avedillo was present at the time the summons was
received by Tinio, the supposed assistant manager. Green Star further avers
that the sheriff tendered the summons, but Avedillo simply refused to sign and
receive the same. She then allegedly instructed Tinio to just receive it in her
behalf. However, Green Star never presented said sheriff as witness during
the hearing of NURC's motion to dismiss to attest to said claim. And while the
sheriff executed an affidavit which appears to support such allegation, the
same was likewise not presented as evidence. It was only when the case was
already before the CA that said affidavit first surfaced. Since the service of
summons was made on a cost accountant, which is not one of the designated
persons under Section 11 of Rule 14, the trial court did not validly acquire
jurisdiction over NURC, 14 although the corporation may have actually
received the summons. 15 To rule otherwise will be an outright circumvention
of the rules, aggravating further the delay in the administration of justice. 16
At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the other
party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial
 matter in any administrative or judicial proceedings. The service of summons
is a vital and indispensable ingredient of due process. Corporations would be
easily deprived of their right to present their defense in a multi-million peso
suit, if the Court would disregard the mandate of the Rules on the service of
summons. 17
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision
dated September 17, 2007 and Resolution dated January 22, 2008 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 86824 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Leonardo-de Castro,  * Perez,  *** Perlas-
Bernabe  ****  and Leonen,  ***** JJ., concur.
 (Green Star Express, Inc. v. Nissin-Universal Robina Corp., G.R. No. 181517,
|||

[July 6, 2015], 763 PHIL 27-32)

[G.R. No. 172087. March 15, 2011.]

PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION

(PAGCOR), petitioner, vs. THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL
REVENUE (BIR), represented herein by HON. JOSE MARIO
BUÑAG, in his official capacity as COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, public respondent,

JOHN DOE and JANE DOE, who are persons acting for, in
behalf, or under the authority of Respondent, public and private
respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J  :p

For resolution of this Court is the Petition for Certiorari and

Prohibition 1 with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction, dated April 17, 2006, of petitioner Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), seeking the declaration of
nullity of Section 1 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9337 insofar as it amends
Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, by excluding
petitioner from exemption from corporate income tax for being repugnant to
Sections 1 and 10 of Article III of the Constitution. Petitioner further seeks to
prohibit the implementation of Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) Revenue
Regulations No. 16-2005 for being contrary to law.
The undisputed facts follow.
PAGCOR was created pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1067-A 2 on January 1, 1977. Simultaneous to its creation, P.D. No. 1067-
B 3 (supplementing P.D. No. 1067-A) was issued exempting PAGCOR from
the payment of any type of tax, except a franchise tax of five percent (5%) of
the gross revenue. 4 Thereafter, on June 2, 1978, P.D. No. 1399 was issued
expanding the scope of PAGCOR's exemption. 5
To consolidate the laws pertaining to the franchise and powers of
PAGCOR, P.D. No. 1869 6 was issued. Section 13 thereof reads as follows:
 Sec. 13. Exemptions. — . . .
(1) Customs Duties, taxes and other imposts on importations. —
All importations of equipment, vehicles, automobiles, boats, ships,
barges, aircraft and such other gambling paraphernalia, including
accessories or related facilities, for the sole and exclusive use of the
casinos, the proper and efficient management and administration thereof
and such other clubs, recreation or amusement places to be established
under and by virtue of this Franchise shall be exempt from the payment
of duties, taxes and other imposts, including all kinds of fees, levies, or
charges of any kind or nature.
Vessels and/or accessory ferry boats imported or to be imported
by any corporation having existing contractual arrangements with the
Corporation, for the sole and exclusive use of the casino or to be used to
service the operations and requirements of the casino, shall likewise be
totally exempt from the payment of all customs duties, taxes and other
imposts, including all kinds of fees, levies, assessments or charges of
any kind or nature, whether National or Local.
(2) Income and other taxes. — (a) Franchise Holder: No tax of
any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges, or
levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall be
assessed and collected under this Franchise from the Corporation;
nor shall any form of tax or charge attach in any way to the
earnings of the Corporation, except a Franchise Tax of five percent
(5%)of the gross revenue or earnings derived by the Corporation
from its operation under this Franchise. Such tax shall be due and
payable quarterly to the National Government and shall be in lieu of
all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or assessments of any kind, nature or
description, levied, established, or collected by any municipal,
provincial or national government authority.
(b) Others: The exemption herein granted for earnings derived
from the operations conducted under the franchise, specifically from the
payment of any tax, income or otherwise, as well as any form of
charges, fees or levies, shall inure to the benefit of and extend to
corporation(s), association(s), agency(ies), or individual(s) with whom
the Corporation or operator has any contractual relationship in
connection with the operations of the casino(s) authorized to be
conducted under this Franchise and to those receiving compensation or
other remuneration from the Corporation as a result of essential facilities
furnished and/or technical services rendered to the Corporation or
operator. 
DcSTaC

The fee or remuneration of foreign entertainers contracted by the

Corporation or operator in pursuance of this provision shall be free of
any tax.
 (3) Dividend Income. — Notwithstanding any provision of law to
the contrary, in the event the Corporation should declare a cash dividend
income corresponding to the participation of the private sector shall, as
an incentive to the beneficiaries, be subject only to a final flat income
rate of ten percent (10%) of the regular income tax rates. The dividend
income shall not in such case be considered as part of the beneficiaries'
taxable income; provided, however, that such dividend income shall be
totally exempted from income or other form of taxes if invested within six
(6) months from the date the dividend income is received in the
following:
(a) operation of the casino(s) or investments in any affiliate
activity that will ultimately redound to the benefit of the
Corporation; or any other corporation with whom the Corporation
has any existing arrangements in connection with or related to the
operations of the casino(s);
(b) Government bonds, securities, treasury notes, or
government debentures; or
(c) BOI-registered or export-oriented corporation(s). 7
PAGCOR's tax exemption was removed in June 1984 through P.D. No.
1931, but it was later restored by Letter of Instruction No. 1430, which was
issued in September 1984.
On January 1, 1998, R.A. No. 8424, 8 otherwise known as the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1997, took effect. Section 27 (c) of R.A. No.
8424 provides that government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs)
shall pay corporate income tax, except petitioner PAGCOR, the Government
Service and Insurance Corporation, the Social Security System, the Philippine
Health Insurance Corporation, and the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,
thus:
(c) Government-owned or Controlled Corporations, Agencies or
Instrumentalities. — The provisions of existing special general laws to
the contrary notwithstanding, all corporations, agencies or
instrumentalities owned and controlled by the Government, except the
Government Service and Insurance Corporation (GSIS), the Social
Security System (SSS), the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(PHIC), the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), and the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), shall
pay such rate of tax upon their taxable income as are imposed by this
Section upon corporations or associations engaged in similar business,
industry, or activity. 9
With the enactment of R.A. No. 9337 10 on May 24, 2005, certain
sections of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 were amended. The
particular amendment that is at issue in this case is Section 1 of R.A. No.
9337, which amended Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code
of 1997 by excluding PAGCOR from the enumeration of GOCCs that are
exempt from payment of corporate income tax, thus:
(c) Government-owned or Controlled Corporations, Agencies or
Instrumentalities. — The provisions of existing special general laws to
the contrary notwithstanding, all corporations, agencies, or
instrumentalities owned and controlled by the Government, except the
Government Service and Insurance Corporation (GSIS), the Social
Security System (SSS), the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(PHIC), and the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), shall
pay such rate of tax upon their taxable income as are imposed by this
Section upon corporations or associations engaged in similar business,
industry, or activity.
Different groups came to this Court via petitions for certiorari and
prohibition 11 assailing the validity and constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337, in
particular:
1) Section 4, which imposes a 10% Value Added Tax (VAT) on sale of
goods and properties; Section 5, which imposes a 10% VAT on importation of
goods; and Section 6, which imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use
or lease of properties, all contain a uniform proviso authorizing the President,
upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, to raise the VAT rate
to 12%. The said provisions were alleged to be violative of Section 28 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, which section vests in Congress the exclusive
authority to fix the rate of taxes, and of Section 1, Article III of
the Constitution on due process, as well as of Section 26 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution, which section provides for the "no amendment rule" upon the
last reading of a bill;
2) Sections 8 and 12 were alleged to be violative of Section 1, Article III
of the Constitution, or the guarantee of equal protection of the laws, and
Section 28 (1), Article VI of the Constitution; and
3) other technical aspects of the passage of the law, questioning the
manner it was passed.  THCSAE

On September 1, 2005, the Court dismissed all the petitions and upheld
the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9337. 12
On the same date, respondent BIR issued Revenue Regulations
(RR) No. 16-2005, 13 specifically identifying PAGCOR as one of the
franchisees subject to 10% VAT imposed under Section 108 of the National
Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended by R.A. No. 9337. The said
revenue regulation, in part, reads:
 Sec. 4. 108-3. Definitions and Specific Rules on Selected
Services. —
xxx xxx xxx
(h). . .
Gross Receipts of all other franchisees, other than those covered
by Sec. 119 of the Tax Code, regardless of how their franchisees may
have been granted, shall be subject to the 10% VAT imposed under
Sec.108 of the Tax Code. This includes, among others, the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), and its licensees or
franchisees. 
Hence, the present petition for certiorari.
PAGCOR raises the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT RA 9337, SECTION 1 (C) IS NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO FOR BEING REPUGNANT TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION
[CLAUSE] EMBODIED IN SECTION 1, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION.
II
WHETHER OR NOT RA 9337, SECTION 1 (C) IS NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO FOR BEING REPUGNANT TO THE NON-IMPAIRMENT
[CLAUSE] EMBODIED IN SECTION 10, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION.
III
WHETHER OR NOT RR 16-2005, SECTION 4.108-3, PARAGRAPH (H)
IS NULL AND VOID AB INITIO FOR BEING BEYOND THE SCOPE OF
THE BASIC LAW, RA 8424, SECTION 108, INSOFAR AS THE SAID
REGULATION IMPOSED VAT ON THE SERVICES OF THE
PETITIONER AS WELL AS PETITIONER'S LICENSEES OR
FRANCHISEES WHEN THE BASIC LAW, AS INTERPRETED BY
APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, DOES NOT IMPOSE VAT ON
PETITIONER OR ON PETITIONER'S LICENSEES OR
FRANCHISEES. 14
The BIR, in its Comment 15 dated December 29, 2006, counters:
I
SECTION 1 OF R.A. NO. 9337 AND SECTION 13 (2) OF P.D.
1869 ARE BOTH VALID AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OF
LAWS THAT SHOULD BE HARMONIOUSLY CONSTRUED
TOGETHER SO AS TO GIVE EFFECT TO ALL OF THEIR
PROVISIONS WHENEVER POSSIBLE.
 II
SECTION 1 OF R.A. NO. 9337 IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 1
AND SECTION 10, ARTICLE III OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
III
BIR REVENUE REGULATIONS ARE PRESUMED VALID AND
CONSTITUTIONAL UNTIL STRICKEN DOWN BY LAWFUL
AUTHORITIES.  AaCTcI

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), by way of Manifestation

in Lieu of Comment, 16 concurred with the arguments of the petitioner. It
added that although the State is free to select the subjects of taxation and that
the inequity resulting from singling out a particular class for taxation or
exemption is not an infringement of the constitutional limitation, a tax law must
operate with the same force and effect to all persons, firms and corporations
placed in a similar situation. Furthermore, according to the OSG, public
respondent BIR exceeded its statutory authority when it enacted RR No. 16-
2005, because the latter's provisions are contrary to the mandates of P.D. No.
1869 in relation to R.A. No. 9337.
The main issue is whether or not PAGCOR is still exempt from
corporate income tax and VAT with the enactment of R.A. No. 9337.
After a careful study of the positions presented by the parties, this Court
finds the petition partly meritorious.
Under Section 1 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Section 27 (c) of
the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, petitioner is no longer exempt
from corporate income tax as it has been effectively omitted from the list of
GOCCs that are exempt from it. Petitioner argues that such omission is
unconstitutional, as it is violative of its right to equal protection of the laws
under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution:
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., 17 this Court expounded the meaning
and scope of equal protection, thus:
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should not be
treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly
discriminate against others. The guarantee means that no person or
class of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws which is
enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like circumstances. The
"equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws."
 It limits governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause
extends to artificial persons but only insofar as their property is
concerned.
xxx xxx xxx
Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of
legislation. If the classification is reasonable, the law may operate only
on some and not all of the people without violating the equal protection
clause. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be
arbitrary. To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.
2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of the class. 18
It is not contested that before the enactment of R.A. No. 9337,
petitioner was one of the five GOCCs exempted from payment of corporate
income tax as shown in R.A. No. 8424, Section 27 (c) of which, reads:
(c) Government-owned or Controlled Corporations, Agencies or
Instrumentalities. — The provisions of existing special or general laws to
the contrary notwithstanding, all corporations, agencies or
instrumentalities owned and controlled by the Government, except the
Government Service and Insurance Corporation (GSIS), the Social
Security System (SSS), the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(PHIC), the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO), and
the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR),
shall pay such rate of tax upon their taxable income as are imposed by
this Section upon corporations or associations engaged in similar
business, industry, or activity. 19 
DIETcH

A perusal of the legislative records of the Bicameral Conference

Meeting of the Committee on Ways on Means dated October 27, 1997 would
show that the exemption of PAGCOR from the payment of corporate
income tax was due to the acquiescence of the Committee on Ways on
Means to the request of PAGCOR that it be exempt from such tax. 20 The
records of the Bicameral Conference Meeting reveal:
HON. R. DIAZ.
The other thing, sir, is we — I noticed we imposed a tax on lotto
winnings.
CHAIRMAN ENRILE.
Wala na, tinanggal na namin yon.
HON. R. DIAZ.
Tinanggal na ba natin yon?
CHAIRMAN ENRILE.
Oo.
HON. R. DIAZ.
Because I was wondering whether we covered the tax on —
Whether on a universal basis, we included a tax on cockfighting
winnings.
CHAIRMAN ENRILE.
No, we removed the —
HON. R. DIAZ.
I . . . (inaudible) natin yong lotto?
CHAIRMAN ENRILE.
Pati PAGCOR tinanggal upon request.
CHAIRMAN JAVIER.
Yeah, Philippine Insurance Commission.
CHAIRMAN ENRILE.
Philippine Insurance — Health, health ba. Yon ang request
ng Chairman, I will accept. (laughter) Pag-Pag-ibig yon, maliliit
na sa tao yon.
HON. ROXAS.
Mr. Chairman, I wonder if in the revenue gainers if we factored in
an amount that would reflect the VAT and other sales taxes —
CHAIRMAN ENRILE.
No, we're talking of this measure only. We will not —
(discontinued)
HON. ROXAS.
No, no, no, no, from the — arising from the exemption. Assuming
that when we release the money into the hands of the public, they
will not use that to — for wallpaper. They will spend that eh, Mr.
Chairman. So when they spend that —
CHAIRMAN ENRILE.
There's a VAT.  TAacHE
 HON. ROXAS.
There will be a VAT and there will be other sales taxes no. Is
there a quantification? Is there an approximation?
CHAIRMAN JAVIER.
Not anything.
HON. ROXAS.
So, in effect, we have sterilized that entire seven billion. In effect,
it is not circulating in the economy which is unrealistic.
CHAIRMAN ENRILE.
It does, it does, because this is taken and spent by government,
somebody receives it in the form of wages and supplies and other
services and other goods. They are not being taken from the
public and stored in a vault.
CHAIRMAN JAVIER.
That 7.7 loss because of tax exemption. That will be extra income
for the taxpayers.
HON. ROXAS.
Precisely, so they will be spending it. 21
The discussion above bears out that under R.A. No. 8424, the
exemption of PAGCOR from paying corporate income tax was not based on a
classification showing substantial distinctions which make for real differences,
but to reiterate, the exemption was granted upon the request of PAGCOR that
it be exempt from the payment of corporate income tax.
With the subsequent enactment of R.A. No. 9337, amending R.A. No.
8424, PAGCOR has been excluded from the enumeration of GOCCs that are
exempt from paying corporate income tax. The records of the Bicameral
Conference Meeting dated April 18, 2005, of the Committee on the
Disagreeing Provisions of Senate Bill No. 1950 and House Bill No. 3555,
show that it is the legislative intent that PAGCOR be subject to the payment of
corporate income tax, thus:
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. RECTO).
Yes, Osmeña, the proponent of the amendment.
SEN. OSMEÑA.
Yeah. Mr. Chairman, one of the reasons why we're even
considering this VAT bill is we want to show the world who our
 creditors, that we are increasing official revenues that go to the
national budget. Unfortunately today, Pagcor is unofficial.
Now, in 2003, I took a quick look this morning, Pagcor had a net
income of 9.7 billion after paying some small taxes that they are
subjected to. Of the 9.7 billion, they claim they remitted to national
government seven billion. Pagkatapos, there are other specific
remittances like to the Philippine Sports Commission, etc., as
mandated by various laws, and then about 400 million to the
President's Social Fund. But all in all, their net profit today should
be about 12 billion. That's why I am questioning this two
billion. Because while essentially they claim that the money
goes to government, and I will accept that just for the sake of
argument. It does not pass through the appropriation
process. And I think that at least if we can capture 35 percent
or 32 percent through the budgetary process, first, it is
reflected in our official income of government which is
applied to the national budget, and secondly, it goes through
what is constitutionally mandated as Congress appropriating
and defining where the money is spent and not through a
board of directors that has absolutely no accountability.
REP. PUENTEBELLA.  cCTAIE

Well, with all due respect, Mr. Chairman, follow up lang.

There is wisdom in the comments of my good friend from Cebu,
Senator Osmeña. 
SEN. OSMEÑA.
And Negros.
REP. PUENTEBELLA.
And Negros at the same time ay Kasimanwa. But I would not
want to put my friends from the Department of Finance in a
difficult position, but may we know your comments on this
knowing that as Senator Osmeña just mentioned, he said, "I
accept that that a lot of it is going to spending for basic services,"
you know, going to most, I think, supposedly a lot or most of it
should go to government spending, social services and the like.
What is your comment on this? This is going to affect a lot of
services on the government side.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. LAPUS).
Mr. Chair, Mr. Chair.
SEN. OSMEÑA.
It goes from pocket to the other, Monico.
REP. PUENTEBELLA.
I know that. But I wanted to ask them, Mr. Senator, because you
may have your own pre-judgment on this and I don't blame you. I
don't blame you. And I know you have your own research. But will
this not affect a lot, the disbursements on social services and
other?
REP. LOCSIN.
Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, if I can add to that question also.
Wouldn't it be easier for you to explain to, say, foreign creditors,
how do you explain to them that if there is a fiscal gap some of
our richest corporations has [been] spared [from] taxation by the
government which is one rich source of revenues. Now, why do
you save, why do you spare certain government corporations on
that, like Pagcor? So, would it be easier for you to make an
argument if everything was exposed to taxation?
REP. TEVES.
Mr. Chair, please.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. LAPUS).
Can we ask the DOF to respond to those before we call
Congressman Teves?
MR. PURISIMA.
Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Yes, from definitely improving the collection, it will help us
because it will then enter as an official revenue although
when dividends declare it also goes in as other income. (sic)
xxx xxx xxx
REP. TEVES.
Mr. Chairman.  DCcIaE

xxx xxx xxx

THE CHAIRMAN (REP. LAPUS).
Congressman Teves.
REP. TEVES.
Yeah. Pagcor is controlled under Section 27, that is on
income tax. Now, we are talking here on value-added tax. Do
you mean to say we are going to amend it from income tax to
value-added tax, as far as Pagcor is concerned?
 THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. RECTO).
No. We are just amending that section with regard to the
exemption from income tax of Pagcor.
xxx xxx xxx
REP. NOGRALES.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. LAPUS).
Congressman Nograles.
REP. NOGRALES.
Just a point of inquiry from the Chair. What exactly are the
functions of Pagcor that are VATable? What will we VAT in
Pagcor?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. LAPUS).
This is on own income tax. This is Pagcor income tax.
REP. NOGRALES.
No, that's why. Anong i-va-Vat natin sa kanya. Sale of what?
xxx xxx xxx
REP. VILLAFUERTE.
Mr. Chairman, my question is, what are we VATing Pagcor with,
is it the . . .
REP. NOGRALES.
Mr. Chairman, this is a secret agreement or the way they craft
their contract, which basis?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. RECTO).
Congressman Nograles, the Senate version does not discuss
a VAT on Pagcor but it just takes away their exemption from
non-payment of income tax. 22
Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. 23 The burden of
proof rests upon the party claiming exemption to prove that it is, in fact,
covered by the exemption so claimed. 24 As a rule, tax exemptions are
construed strongly against the claimant. 25 Exemptions must be shown to
exist clearly and categorically, and supported by clear legal provision. 26
In this case, PAGCOR failed to prove that it is still exempt from the
payment of corporate income tax, considering that Section 1 of R.A. No.
9337 amended Section 27 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Code of
1997 by omitting PAGCOR from the exemption. The legislative intent, as
shown by the discussions in the Bicameral Conference Meeting, is to require
PAGCOR to pay corporate income tax; hence, the omission or removal of
PAGCOR from exemption from the payment of corporate income tax. It is a
basic precept of statutory construction that the express mention of one
person, thing, act, or consequence excludes all others as expressed in the
familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. 27 Thus, the express
mention of the GOCCs exempted from payment of corporate income tax
excludes all others. Not being excepted, petitioner PAGCOR must be
regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule that GOCCs shall
pay corporate income tax, expressed in the maxim: exceptio firmat regulam in
casibus non exceptis. 28 CSIDEc

PAGCOR cannot find support in the equal protection clause of

the Constitution, as the legislative records of the Bicameral Conference
Meeting dated October 27, 1997, of the Committee on Ways and Means,
show that PAGCOR's exemption from payment of corporate income tax, as
provided in Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424, or the National Internal Revenue
Code of 1997, was not made pursuant to a valid classification based on
substantial distinctions and the other requirements of a reasonable
classification by legislative bodies, so that the law may operate only on some,
and not all, without violating the equal protection clause. The legislative
records show that the basis of the grant of exemption to PAGCOR from
corporate income tax was PAGCOR's own request to be exempted.
Petitioner further contends that Section 1 (c) of R.A. No. 9337 is null
and void ab initio for violating the non-impairment clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner avers that laws form part of, and is read into, the contract even
without the parties expressly saying so. Petitioner states that the private
parties/investors transacting with it considered the tax exemptions, which
inure to their benefit, as the main consideration and inducement for their
decision to transact/invest with it. Petitioner argues that the withdrawal of its
exemption from corporate income tax by R.A. No. 9337 has the effect of
changing the main consideration and inducement for the transactions of
private parties with it; thus, the amendatory provision is violative of the non-
impairment clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner's contention lacks merit.
The non-impairment clause is contained in Section 10, Article III of
the Constitution, which provides that no law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed. The non-impairment clause is limited in application
to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by enlarging, abridging or in
any manner changing the intention of the parties. 29 There is impairment if a
subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes
new conditions, dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for
the enforcement of the rights of the parties. 30
As regards franchises, Section 11, Article XII of
the Constitution 31 provides that no franchise or right shall be granted
except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment,
alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so
requires. 32
In Manila Electric Company v. Province of Laguna, 33 the Court held
that a franchise partakes the nature of a grant, which is beyond the
purview of the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. 34 The
pertinent portion of the case states:
While the Court has, not too infrequently, referred to tax
exemptions contained in special franchises as being in the nature of
contracts and a part of the inducement for carrying on the franchise,
these exemptions, nevertheless, are far from being strictly contractual in
nature. Contractual tax exemptions, in the real sense of the term and
where the non-impairment clause of the Constitution can rightly be
invoked, are those agreed to by the taxing authority in contracts, such as
those contained in government bonds or debentures, lawfully entered
into by them under enabling laws in which the government, acting in its
private capacity, sheds its cloak of authority and waives its
governmental immunity. Truly, tax exemptions of this kind may not be
revoked without impairing the obligations of contracts. These contractual
tax exemptions, however, are not to be confused with tax exemptions
granted under franchises. A franchise partakes the nature of a grant
which is beyond the purview of the non-impairment clause of
the Constitution. Indeed, Article XII, Section 11, of the 1987
Constitution, like its precursor provisions in the 1935 and the
1973 Constitutions, is explicit that no franchise for the operation of
a public utility shall be granted except under the condition that
such privilege shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal
by Congress as and when the common good so requires. 35
In this case, PAGCOR was granted a franchise to operate and maintain
gambling casinos, clubs and other recreation or amusement places, sports,
gaming pools, i.e., basketball, football, lotteries, etc., whether on land or sea,
within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the Philippines. 36 Under
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, PAGCOR's franchise is subject to
amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress such as the amendment under
Section 1 of R.A. No. 9377. Hence, the provision in Section 1 of R.A. No.
9337, amending Section 27 (c) of R.A. No. 8424 by withdrawing the
exemption of PAGCOR from corporate income tax, which may affect any
benefits to PAGCOR's transactions with private parties, is not violative of the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution.  SIcEHC

Anent the validity of RR No. 16-2005, the Court holds that the provision
subjecting PAGCOR to 10% VAT is invalid for being contrary to R.A. No.
9337. Nowhere in R.A. No. 9337 is it provided that petitioner can be subjected
to VAT. R.A. No. 9337 is clear only as to the removal of petitioner's exemption
from the payment of corporate income tax, which was already addressed
above by this Court. 
As pointed out by the OSG, R.A. No. 9337 itself exempts petitioner from
VAT pursuant to Section 7 (k) thereof, which reads:
Sec. 7. Section 109 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby
further amended to read as follows:
Section 109. Exempt Transactions. — (1) Subject to the
provisions of Subsection (2) hereof, the following transactions
shall be exempt from the value-added tax:
xxx xxx xxx
(k)Transactions which are exempt under
international agreements to which the Philippines is a
signatory or under special laws, except Presidential Decree
No. 529. 37
Petitioner is exempt from the payment of VAT, because PAGCOR's
charter, P.D. No. 1869, is a special law that grants petitioner exemption from
taxes.
Moreover, the exemption of PAGCOR from VAT is supported by
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9337, which retained Section 108 (B) (3) of R.A. No.
8424, thus:
[R.A. No. 9337], SEC. 6. Section 108 of the same Code (R.A. No.
8424), as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:
SEC. 108. Value-Added Tax on Sale of Services and Use
or Lease of Properties. —
(A) Rate and Base of Tax. — There shall be levied,
assessed and collected, a value-added tax equivalent to ten
percent (10%) of gross receipts derived from the sale or
exchange of services, including the use or lease of properties: . . .
xxx xxx xxx
(B) Transactions Subject to Zero Percent (0%) Rate. —
The following services performed in the Philippines by VAT
registered persons shall be subject to zero percent (0%) rate;
 xxx xxx xxx
(3) Services rendered to persons or entities whose
exemption under special laws or international agreements to
which the Philippines is a signatory effectively subjects the
supply of such services to zero percent (0%) rate;
xxx xxx xxx 38
As pointed out by petitioner, although R.A. No. 9337 introduced
amendments to Section 108 of R.A. No. 8424 by imposing VAT on other
services not previously covered, it did not amend the portion of Section 108
(B) (3) that subjects to zero percent rate services performed by VAT-
registered persons to persons or entities whose exemption under special laws
or international agreements to which the Philippines is a signatory effectively
subjects the supply of such services to 0% rate. cSCTID

Petitioner's exemption from VAT under Section 108 (B) (3) of R.A. No.
8424 has been thoroughly and extensively discussed in Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Acesite (Philippines) Hotel Corporation. 39 Acesite was
the owner and operator of the Holiday Inn Manila Pavilion Hotel. It leased a
portion of the hotel's premises to PAGCOR. It incurred VAT amounting to
P30,152,892.02 from its rental income and sale of food and beverages to
PAGCOR from January 1996 to April 1997. Acesite tried to shift the said taxes
to PAGCOR by incorporating it in the amount assessed to PAGCOR.
However, PAGCOR refused to pay the taxes because of its tax-exempt
status. PAGCOR paid only the amount due to Acesite minus VAT in the sum
of P30,152,892.02. Acesite paid VAT in the amount of P30,152,892.02 to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, fearing the legal consequences of its non-
payment. In May 1998, Acesite sought the refund of the amount it paid as
VAT on the ground that its transaction with PAGCOR was subject to zero rate
as it was rendered to a tax-exempt entity. The Court ruled that PAGCOR and
Acesite were both exempt from paying VAT, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
PAGCOR is exempt from payment of indirect taxes
It is undisputed that P.D. 1869, the charter creating PAGCOR,
grants the latter an exemption from the payment of taxes. Section 13
of P.D. 1869 pertinently provides:
Sec. 13. Exemptions. —
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Income and other taxes. — (a) Franchise Holder: No
tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees,
charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local,
 shall be assessed and collected under this Franchise from the
Corporation; nor shall any form of tax or charge attach in any way
to the earnings of the Corporation, except a Franchise Tax of five
(5%) percent of the gross revenue or earnings derived by the
Corporation from its operation under this Franchise. Such tax
shall be due and payable quarterly to the National Government
and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or
assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied,
established or collected by any municipal, provincial, or national
government authority.
(b) Others: The exemptions herein granted for earnings
derived from the operations conducted under the franchise
specifically from the payment of any tax, income or otherwise, as
well as any form of charges, fees or levies, shall inure to the
benefit of and extend to corporation(s), association(s),
agency(ies), or individual(s) with whom the Corporation or
operator has any contractual relationship in connection with the
operations of the casino(s) authorized to be conducted under this
Franchise and to those receiving compensation or other
remuneration from the Corporation or operator as a result of
essential facilities furnished and/or technical services rendered to
the Corporation or operator.
Petitioner contends that the above tax exemption refers only to
PAGCOR's direct tax liability and not to indirect taxes, like the VAT. ITScHa

We disagree.
A close scrutiny of the above provisos clearly gives
PAGCOR a blanket exemption to taxes with no distinction on
whether the taxes are direct or indirect. We are one with the CA ruling
that PAGCOR is also exempt from indirect taxes, like VAT, as follows:
Under the above provision [Section 13 (2) (b) of P.D.
1869], the term "Corporation" or operator refers to PAGCOR.
Although the law does not specifically mention PAGCOR's
exemption from indirect taxes, PAGCOR is undoubtedly exempt
from such taxes because the law exempts from taxes
persons or entities contracting with PAGCOR in casino
operations. Although, differently worded, the provision clearly
exempts PAGCOR from indirect taxes. In fact, it goes one step
further by granting tax exempt status to persons dealing with
PAGCOR in casino operations. The unmistakable conclusion is
that PAGCOR is not liable for the P30,152,892.02 VAT and
neither is Acesite as the latter is effectively subject to zero percent
rate under Sec. 108 B (3), R.A. 8424. (Emphasis supplied.)
 Indeed, by extending the exemption to entities or individuals
dealing with PAGCOR, the legislature clearly granted exemption also
from indirect taxes. It must be noted that the indirect tax of VAT, as in
the instant case, can be shifted or passed to the buyer, transferee, or
lessee of the goods, properties, or services subject to VAT. Thus, by
extending the tax exemption to entities or individuals dealing with
PAGCOR in casino operations, it is exempting PAGCOR from being
liable to indirect taxes.
The manner of charging VAT does not make PAGCOR liable to said
tax.
It is true that VAT can either be incorporated in the value of the
goods, properties, or services sold or leased, in which case it is
computed as 1/11 of such value, or charged as an additional 10% to the
value. Verily, the seller or lessor has the option to follow either way in
charging its clients and customer. In the instant case, Acesite followed
the latter method, that is, charging an additional 10% of the gross sales
and rentals. Be that as it may, the use of either method, and in particular,
the first method, does not denigrate the fact that PAGCOR is exempt
from an indirect tax, like VAT.
VAT exemption extends to Acesite
Thus, while it was proper for PAGCOR not to pay the 10% VAT
charged by Acesite, the latter is not liable for the payment of it as it is
exempt in this particular transaction by operation of law to pay the
indirect tax. Such exemption falls within the former Section 102 (b) (3) of
the 1977 Tax Code, as amended (now Sec. 108 [b] [3] of R.A. 8424),
which provides:
Section 102. Value-added tax on sale of services. — (a)
Rate and base of tax — There shall be levied, assessed and
collected, a value-added tax equivalent to 10% of gross receipts
derived by any person engaged in the sale of services . . .;
Provided, that the following services performed in the Philippines
by VATÂregistered persons shall be subject to 0%.
xxx xxx xxx
(3) Services rendered to persons or entities whose
exemption under special laws or international agreements to
which the Philippines is a signatory effectively subjects the supply
of such services to zero (0%) rate (emphasis supplied).
The rationale for the exemption from indirect taxes provided for
in P.D. 1869 and the extension of such exemption to entities or
individuals dealing with PAGCOR in casino operations are best
elucidated from the 1987 case of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
John Gotamco & Sons, Inc., where the absolute tax exemption of the
 World Health Organization (WHO) upon an international agreement was
upheld. We held in said case that the exemption of contractee WHO
should be implemented to mean that the entity or person exempt is the
contractor itself who constructed the building owned by contractee WHO,
and such does not violate the rule that tax exemptions are personal
because the manifest intention of the agreement is to exempt the
contractor so that no contractor's tax may be shifted to the contractee
WHO. Thus, the proviso in P.D. 1869, extending the exemption to
entities or individuals dealing with PAGCOR in casino operations,
is clearly to proscribe any indirect tax, like VAT, that may be shifted
to PAGCOR. 40  SCHIcT

Although the basis of the exemption of PAGCOR and Acesite from VAT
in the case of The Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Acesite (Philippines)
Hotel Corporation was Section 102 (b) of the 1977 Tax Code, as amended,
which section was retained as Section 108 (B) (3) in R.A. No. 8424, 41 it is still
applicable to this case, since the provision relied upon has been retained
in R.A. No. 9337. 42  
It is settled rule that in case of discrepancy between the basic law and a
rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the basic law prevails,
because the said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and
provisions of the basic law. 43 RR No. 16-2005, therefore, cannot go beyond
the provisions of R.A. No. 9337. Since PAGCOR is exempt from VAT
under R.A. No. 9337, the BIR exceeded its authority in subjecting PAGCOR to
10% VAT under RR No. 16-2005; hence, the said regulatory provision is
hereby nullified.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Section 1 of
Republic Act No. 9337, amending Section 27 (c) of the National Internal
Revenue Code of 1997, by excluding petitioner Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation from the enumeration of government-owned and
controlled corporations exempted from corporate income tax is valid and
constitutional, while BIR Revenue Regulations No. 16-2005 insofar as it
subjects PAGCOR to 10% VAT is null and void for being contrary to
the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997, as amended by Republic Act
No. 9337.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., Carpio, Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro,
Bersamin, Del Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza and Sereno,
JJ., concur.
Nachura and Brion, JJ., are on official leave.
 (Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corp. v. Bureau of Internal Revenue, G.R.
|||

No. 172087, [March 15, 2011], 660 PHIL 636-664)

f. Ejusdem Generis - When general words follow the designation of

particular things, or classes of persons or subjects, the general words will
usually be construed to include only those persons or things of the same
class or general nature as those specifically enumerated.

Legal Definition of ejusdem generis

: of the same kind or class

[G.R. No. L-32717. November 26, 1970.]

AMELITO R. MUTUC, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, respondent.

Amelito R. Mutuc in his own behalf.

Romulo C. Felizmeña for respondent.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J  : p

The invocation of his right to free speech by petitioner Amelito Mutuc,

then a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention, in this special
civil action for prohibition to assail the validity of a ruling of respondent
Commission on Elections enjoining the use of a taped jingle for campaign
purposes, was not in vain. Nor could it be considering the conceded absence
of any express power granted to respondent by the Constitutional Convention
Act to so require and the bar to any such implication arising from any
provision found therein, if deference be paid to the principle that a statute is to
be construed consistently with the fundamental laws which accords the
utmost priority to freedom of expression, much more so when utilized for
electoral purposes. On November 3, 1970, the very same day the case was
orally argued, five days after its filing, with the election barely a week away,
we issued a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition prayed for. This
opinion is intended to explain more fully our decision.
In this special civil action for prohibition filed on October 29, 1970,
petitioner, after setting forth his being a resident of Arayat, Pampanga, and his
candidacy for the position of delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
alleged that respondent Commission on Elections, by a telegram sent to him
five days previously, informed him that his certificate of candidacy was given
due course but prohibited him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped
with sound systems and loud speakers, an order which, according to him, is
"violative of [his] constitutional right . . . to freedom of speech."  1 There being
no plain, speedy and adequate remedy, according to petitioner, he would
seek a writ of prohibition, at the same time praying for a preliminary injunction.
On the very next day, this Court adopted a resolution requiring respondent
Commission on Elections to file an answer not later than November 2, 1970,
at the same time setting the case for hearing for Tuesday November 3, 1970.
No preliminary injunction was issued. There was no denial in the answer filed
by respondent on November 2, 1970, of the factual allegations set forth in the
petition, but the justification for the prohibition was premised on a provision of
the Constitutional Convention Act, 2 which made it unlawful for candidates "to
purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral
propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature),
flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats,
matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin."  3 It
was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the
recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda
material, under the above statute subject to confiscation. It prayed that the
petition be denied for lack of merit. The case was argued, on November 3,
1970, with petitioner appearing in his behalf and Attorney Romulo C.
Felizmeña arguing in behalf of respondent.
This Court, after deliberation and taking into account the need for
urgency, the election being barely a week away, issued on the afternoon of
the same day, a minute resolution granting the writ of prohibition, setting forth
the absence of statutory authority on the part of respondent to impose such a
ban in the light of the doctrine of ejusdem generis as well as the principle that
the construction placed on the statute by respondent Commission on
Elections would raise serious doubts about its validity, considering the
infringement of the right of free speech of petitioner. Its concluding portion
was worded thus: "Accordingly, as prayed for, respondent Commission on
Elections is permanently restrained and prohibited from enforcing or
implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order banning the
use ,of political jingles by candidates. This resolution is immediately
executory." 4
1. As made clear in our resolution of November 3, 1970, the question
before us was one of power. Respondent Commission on Elections was
called upon to justify such a prohibition imposed on petitioner. To repeat, no
such authority was granted by the Constitutional Convention Act. It did
contend, however, that one of its provisions referred to above makes unlawful
the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens,
lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas,
shirts, hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words "and the
like." 5 For respondent Commission, the last three words sufficed to justify
such an order. We view the matter differently. What was done cannot merit
our approval under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general
words following any enumeration being applicable only to things of the same
kind or class as those specifically referred to.  6 It is quite apparent that what
was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind
referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the
candidate responsible for its distribution.
The more serious objection, however, to the ruling of respondent
Commission was its failure to manifest fealty to a cardinal principle of
construction that a statute should be interpreted to assure its being in
consonance with, rather than repugnant to, any constitutional command or
prescription. 7 Thus, certain Administrative Code provisions were given a
"construction which should be more in harmony with the tenets of the
fundamental law."8 The desirability of removing in that fashion the taint of
constitutional infirmity from legislative enactments has always commended
itself. The judiciary may even strain the ordinary meaning of words to avert
any collision between what a statute provides and what the Constitution
requires. The objective is to reach an interpretation rendering it free from
constitutional defects. To paraphrase Justice Cardozo, if at all possible, the
conclusion reached must avoid not only that it is unconstitutional, but also
grave doubts upon that score. 9
2. Petitioner's submission of his side of the controversy, then, has on its
favor obeisance to such a cardinal precept. The view advanced by him that if
the above provision of the Constitutional Convention Act were to lend itself to
the view that the use of the taped jingle could be prohibited, then the
challenge of unconstitutionality would be difficult to meet. For, in unequivocal
language, the Constitution prohibits an abridgment of free speech or a free
press. It has been our constant holding that this preferred freedom calls all the
more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination
of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.
What respondent Commission did, in effect, was to impose censorship on
petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional right is directed. Nor could
respondent Commission justify its action by the assertion that petitioner, if he
would not resort to taped jingle, would be free, either by himself or through
others, to use his mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional guarantee
is not to be emasculated by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not
perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other mechanical
contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondent Commission, then the
effect would hardly be distinguishable from a previous restraint. That cannot
be validly done. It would negate indirectly what the Constitution in express
terms assures. 10
3. Nor is this all. The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental
law, setting forth the criterion for the validity of any public act whether
proceeding from the highest official or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of
our system of government. That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with
priority accorded to that which occupies the topmost rung in the legal
hierarchy. The three departments of government in the discharge of the
functions with which it is entrusted have no choice but to yield obedience to its
commands. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed. Congress in the
enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest the restrictions on its
authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended. The Presidency in
the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it ordains. In its task
of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the judiciary is
called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental law.
Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the
coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this
basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any
governmental measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a
recognition of its being the supreme law.
To be more specific, the competence entrusted to respondent
Commission was aptly summed up by the present Chief Justice thus: "Lastly,
as the branch of the executive department — although independent of the
President — to which the Constitution has given the 'exclusive charge' of the
'enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections,' the power of decision of the Commission is limited to purely
'administrative questions.' " 11 It has been the constant holding of this Court,
as it could not have been otherwise, that respondent Commission cannot
exercise any authority in conflict With or outside of the law, and there is no
higher law than the Constitution. 12 Our decisions which liberally construe its
powers are precisely inspired by the thought that only thus may its
responsibility under the Constitution to insure free, orderly and honest
elections be adequately fulfilled. 13 There could be no justification then for
lending approval to any ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission,
the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free
speech. Petitioner's case, as was obvious from the time of its filing, stood on
solid footing.
WHEREFORE, as set forth in our resolution of November 3, 1970,
respondent Commission is permanently restrained and prohibited from
enforcing or implementing or demanding compliance with its aforesaid order
banning the use of political taped jingles. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro,
Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., are on official leave.
Teehankee, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
In line with my separate opinion in Badoy vs. Ferrer  1 on the
unconstitutionality of the challenged provisions of the 1971 Constitutional
Convention Act, I concur with the views of Mr. Justice Fernando in the main
opinion that "there could be no justification . . . for lending approval to any
ruling or order issuing from respondent Commission, the effect of which would
be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech." I would only add the
following observations:
This case once again calls for application of the constitutional test of
reasonableness required by the due process clause of our Constitution.
Originally, respondent Commission in its guidelines prescribed summarily that
the use by a candidate of a "mobile unit — roaming around and announcing a
meeting and the name of the candidate . . . is prohibited. If it is used only for a
certain place for a meeting and he uses his sound system at the meeting
itself, there is no violation." 2 Acting upon petitioner's application, however,
respondent Commission ruled that "the use of a sound system by anyone be
he a candidate or not whether stationary or part of a mobile unit is not
prohibited by the 1971 Constitutional Convention Act" but imposed the
condition — "provided that there are no jingles and no streamers or posters
placed in carriers."
Respondent Commission's narrow view is that "the use of a 'jingle,' a
verbally recorded form of election propaganda, is no different from the use of
a 'streamer' or 'poster,' a printed-form of election propaganda, and both forms
of election advertisement fall under the prohibition contained in sec. 12 of R.A.
6132," and "the record disc or tape where said 'jingle' has been recorded can
 be subject of confiscation by the respondent Commission under par. (E) of
sec. 12 of R.A. 6132." In this modern day and age of the electronically
recorded or taped voice which may be easily and inexpensively disseminated
through a mobile sound system throughout the candidate's district,
respondent Commission would outlaw "recorded or taped voices" and would
exact of the candidate that he make use of the mobile sound system only
by personal transmission and repeatedly personally sing his "jingle" or deliver
his spoken message to the voters even if he loses his voice in the process or
employ another person to do so personally even if this should prove more
expensive and less effective than using a recorded or taped voice.
Respondent Commission's strictures clearly violate, therefore,
petitioner's basic freedom of speech and expression. They cannot pass the
constitutional test of reasonableness in that they go far beyond a reasonable
relation to the proper governmental object and are manifestly unreasonable,
oppressive and arbitrary.
Insofar as the placing of the candidate's "streamers" or posters on the
mobile unit or carrier is concerned, respondent Commission's adverse ruling
that the same falls within the prohibition of section 12, paragraphs (C) and (E)
has not been appealed by petitioner. I would note that respondent
Commission's premise that "the use of a 'jingle' . . . is no different from the use
of a 'streamer' or 'poster' "in that these both represent forms of election
advertisements — to make the candidate and the fact of his candidacy known
to the voters — is correct, but its conclusion is not. The campaign appeal of
the "jingle" is through the voters' ears while that of the "streamers" is through
the voters' eyes. But if it be held that the Commission's ban on "jingles"
abridges unreasonably, oppressively and arbitrarily the candidate's right of
free expression, even though such "jingles" may occasionally offend some
sensitive ears, the Commission's ban on "streamers" being placed on the
candidate's mobile unit or carrier, which "streamers" are less likely to offend
the voters' sense of sight should likewise be held to be an unreasonable,
oppressive and arbitrary curtailment of the candidate's same constitutional
right.
The intent of the law to minimize election expenses as invoked by
respondent Commission, laudable as it may be, should not be sought at the
cost of the candidate's constitutional rights in the earnest pursuit of his
candidacy, but is to be fulfilled in the strict and effective implementation of the
Act's limitation in section 12(G) on the total expenditures that may be made by
a candidate or by another person with his knowledge and consent.
 (Mutuc v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-32717, [November 26, 1970],
|||

146 PHIL 798-811)

[G.R. No. 5000. March 11, 1909.]

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICTOR SANTO

NIÑO, defendant-appellee.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellant.

No appearance, for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION' FIREARMS; CONCEALED

WEAPONS NOT PARTICULARLY SPECIFIED. — The phrase "or other
deadly weapon" in Act No. 1780, an Act prohibiting the carrying of concealed
weapons, includes arms which are of a different class from those particularly
specified in the law.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE OF "EJUSDEM GENERIS." — The rule of
ejusdem generis can not be applied in the construction of Act No. 1780, by
reason of the proviso contained therein.

DECISION

WILLARD, J  : p

Act No. 1780 is entitled as follows: "An Act to regulate the importation,
acquisition, possession, use, and transfer of firearms, and to prohibit the
possession of same except in compliance with the provisions of this Act."
Section 26 of this Act is in part as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his
person any bowie knife, dirk, dagger, kris, or other deadly
 weapon: Provided, That this prohibition shall not apply to firearms in
possession of persons who have secured a license therefor or who are
entitled to carry same under the provisions of this Act."
The amended complaint in this case is as follows:
"The undersigned accuses Victor Santo Nino of the violation of
Act No. 1780, committed as follows:
"That on or about the 16th day of August, 1908, in the city of
Manila, Philippine Islands, the said Victor Santo Nino, voluntarily,
unlawfully, and criminally, had in his possession and concealed about
his person a deadly weapon, to wit: One (1) iron bar, about 15 inches in
length provided with an iron ball on one end and a string on the other to
tie to the wrist, which weapon had been designed and made for use in
fighting, and as a deadly weapon.
"With violation of the provisions of section 26 of Act No. 1780 of
the Philippine Commission."
A demurrer to this complaint was sustained in the court below the
Government has appealed.
The basis for the holding of the court below was that —
"The words or other deadly weapon' only signify a kind of weapon
included within the preceding classification. In other words, the rule
of ejusdem generis must be applied in the interpretation of this law,
which rule is as follows:
"'The most frequent application of this rule is found where specific
and generic terms of the same nature are employed in the same act, the
latter following the former. While in the abstract, general terms are to be
given their natural and full signification, yet where they follow specific
words of a like nature they take their meaning from the latter, and are
presumed to embrace only things or persons of the kind designated by
them.'"
In short, the court below held that the carrying of a revolver concealed
about the person would not be a violation of this Act. The rule of construction
above referred to is resorted to only for the purpose of determining what the
intent of the legislature was in enacting the law. If that intent clearly appears
from other parts of the law, and such intent thus clearly manifested is contrary
to the result which would reached by application of the rule of ejusdem
generis, the latter must give way. In this case the proviso of the Act clearly
indicates that in the view of the legislature the carrying of an unlicensed
revolver would be a violation of the Act. By the proviso it manifested its
intention to include in the prohibition weapons other than the armas
blancas therein specified.
 The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the case is remanded
for further proceedings.
No costs will be allowed to either party in this court. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson and Carson, JJ., concur.
|||  (U.S. v. Santo Niño, G.R. No. 5000, [March 11, 1909], 13 PHIL 141-143)

[G.R. No. 148408. July 14, 2006.]

CONCEPCION PARAYNO, petitioner,vs.JOSE JOVELLANOS

and the MUNICIPALITY OF CALASIAO,
PANGASINAN,  * respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J  : p

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of

Court questioning the resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed
the petition for certiorari,mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for issuance of a
preliminary and mandatory injunction, filed by petitioner Concepcion Parayno
against respondents Jose Jovellanos and the Municipality of Calasiao,
Pangasinan.
Petitioner was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao,
Pangasinan. In 1989, some residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang
Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the station to
another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of
Police, Municipal Health Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for
investigation. Upon their advise, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to the
Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioner's gasoline station. In
Resolution No. 50, it declared:
a) ...the existing gasoline station is a blatant violation and disregard of
existing law to wit:
The Official Zoning Code of Calasiao, Art. 6, Section
44, 1 the nearest school building which is San Miguel Elementary
School and church, the distances are less than 100 meters. No
 neighbors were called as witnesses when actual measurements
were done by HLURB Staff, Baguio City dated 22 June 1989.
b) The gasoline station remains in thickly populated area with
commercial/residential buildings, houses closed (sic) to each
other which still endangers the lives and safety of the people in
case of fire. Moreover, additional selling and storing of several
LPG tanks in the station (sic).
c) The residents of our barangay always complain of the irritating smell
of gasoline most of the time especially during gas filling which
tend to expose residents especially children to frequent colds,
asthma, cough and the like nowadays.
d) ...the gasoline station violated Building and Fire Safety Codes
because the station has 2nd floor storey building used for
business rental offices, with iron grilled windows, no firewalls. It
also endangers the lives of people upstairs.
e) It hampers the flow of traffic, the gasoline station is too small and
narrow, the entrance and exit are closed to the street property
lines. It couldn't cope situation (sic) on traffic because the place is
a congested area. 2
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the SB resolution but it was
denied. Hence, she filed a special civil action for prohibition and mandamus with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44 against respondents.
The case, docketed as SP Civil Case No. 99-03010-D, was raffled to the sala of
Judge Crispin Laron.
Petitioner claimed that her gasoline station was not covered by Section 44
of the Official Zoning Code since it was not a "gasoline service station" but a
"gasoline filling station" governed by Section 21 thereof. She added that the
decision of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), 3 in a
previous case filed by the same respondent Jovellanos against her predecessor
(Dennis Parayno), barred the grounds invoked by respondent municipality in
Resolution No. 50. In the HLURB case, respondent Jovellanos opposed the
establishment of the gas station on the grounds that: (1) it was within the 100-
meter prohibited radius under Section 44 and (2) it posed a pernicious effect on
the health and safety of the people in Calasiao.  cIADTC

After the hearing on the propriety of issuing a writ of preliminary prohibitory

and mandatory injunction, the trial court ruled:
There is no basis for the court to issue a writ of preliminary
prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Albeit, Section 44 of the Official
Zoning Code of respondent municipality does not mention a
gasoline filling station, [but] following the principle of ejusdem
generis,a gasoline filling station falls within the ambit of Section 44.
 The gasoline filling station of the petitioner is located under the
establishment belonging to the petitioner and is very near several
buildings occupied by several persons. Justice dictates that the same
should not be allowed to continue operating its business on that
particular place. Further, the gasoline filling station endangers the
lives and safety of people because once there is fire, the
establishment and houses nearby will be razed to the
ground. 4 (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the decision but it was denied by
the trial court.
Petitioner elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari,prohibition
and mandamus, 5 with a prayer for injunctive relief. She ascribed grave abuse of
discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of Judge Laron
who dismissed her case.
After the CA dismissed the petition, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied. Hence, this appeal.
Before us, petitioner insists that (1) the legal maxim of ejusdem generis did
not apply to her case; (2) the closure/transfer of her gasoline filling station by
respondent municipality was an invalid exercise of the latter's police powers and
(3) it was the principle of res judicata that applied in this case. 6
We find merit in the petition.
THE PRINCIPLE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS
We hold that the zoning ordinance of respondent municipality made a clear
distinction between "gasoline service station" and "gasoline filling station." The
pertinent provisions read:
xxx xxx xxx
Section 21. Filling Station.A retail station servicing automobiles
and other motor vehicles with gasoline and oil only. 7
xxx xxx xxx
Section 42. Service Station.A building and its premises where
gasoline oil, grease, batteries, tires and car accessories may be supplied
and dispensed at retail and where, in addition, the following services
may be rendered and sales and no other.
a. Sale and servicing of spark plugs, batteries, and distributor
parts;
b. Tire servicing and repair, but not recapping or regrooving;
 c. Replacement of mufflers and tail pipes, water hose, fan belts,
brake fluids, light bulbs, fuses, floor mats, seat covers,
windshield wipers and wiper blades, grease retainers,
wheel, bearing, mirrors and the like;
d. Radiator cleaning and flushing;
e. Washing and polishing, and sale of automobile washing and
polishing materials;
f. Grease and lubricating;
g. Emergency wiring repairs;
h. Minor servicing of carburators;
i. Adjusting and repairing brakes;
j. Minor motor adjustments not involving removal of the head or
crankcase, or raising the motor. 8
xxx xxx xxx
It is evident from the foregoing that the ordinance intended these two terms
to be separate and distinct from each other. Even respondent municipality's
counsel admitted this dissimilarity during the hearing on the application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction. Counsel in
fact admitted:
1. That there exist[ed] an official zoning code of Calasiao, Pangasinan
which [was] not yet amended;
2. That under Article III of said official zoning code there [were]
certain distinctions made by said municipality about the
designation of the gasoline filling station and that of the
gasoline service station as appearing in Article III, Nos. 21
and 42, [respectively];
3. That the business of the petitioner [was] one of a gasoline filling
station as defined in Article III, Section 21 of the zoning code
and not as a service station as differently defined under
Article 42 of the said official zoning code;
4. That under Section 44 of the official zoning code of Calasiao, the
term filling station as clearly defined under Article III, Section
21, [did] not appear in the wordings thereof; 9 (emphasis
supplied)
The foregoing were judicial admissions which were conclusive on the
municipality, the party making them. 10 Respondent municipality thus could not
find solace in the legal maxim of ejusdem generis 11 which means "of the same
kind, class or nature." Under this maxim, where general words follow the
enumeration of particular classes of persons or things, the general words will
apply only to persons or things of the same general nature or class as those
enumerated. 12 Instead, what applied in this case was the legal maxim expressio
unius est exclusio alterius which means that the express mention of one thing
implies the exclusion of others. 13 Hence, because of the distinct and definite
meanings alluded to the two terms by the zoning ordinance, respondents could
not insist that "gasoline service station" under Section 44 necessarily included
"gasoline filling station" under Section 21. Indeed, the activities undertaken in a
"gas service station" did not automatically embrace those in a "gas filling station."
THE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWERS
Respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the
closure/transfer of petitioner's gasoline station. While it had, under RA
7160, 14 the power to take actions and enact measures to promote the health and
general welfare of its constituents, it should have given due deference to the law
and the rights of petitioner. 
TSacAE

A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police

powers only when the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary
for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly
oppressive. 15 The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the
second, to the due process clause of the Constitution. 16
 
Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause
when it passed Resolution No. 50. While it maintained that the gasoline filling
station of petitioner was less than 100 meters from the nearest public school and
church, the records do not show that it even attempted to measure the distance,
notwithstanding that such distance was crucial in determining whether there was
an actual violation of Section 44. The different local offices that respondent
municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never conducted such
measurement either.
Moreover, petitioner's business could not be considered a nuisance which
respondent municipality could summarily abate in the guise of exercising its
police powers. The abatement of a nuisance without judicial proceedings is
possible only if it is a nuisance per se.A gas station is not a nuisance per se or
one affecting the immediate safety of persons and property, 17 hence, it cannot
be closed down or transferred summarily to another location.
As a rule, this Court does not pass upon evidence submitted by the parties
in the lower courts. 18 We deem it necessary, however, to recall the findings of
the HLURB which petitioner submitted as evidence during the proceedings
before the trial court, if only to underscore petitioner's compliance with the
requirements of law before she put up her gasoline station.
Another factor that should not be left unnoticed is the diligence
exercised by [petitioner] in complying with the requirements of the
several laws prior to the actual implementation of the project as can be
attested by the fact that [petitioner] has secured the necessary building
permit and approval of [her] application for authority to relocate as per
the letter of the Energy Regulatory Board ....  19
On the alleged hazardous effects of the gasoline station to the lives and
properties of the people of Calasiao, we again note:
Relative to the allegations that the project (gasoline station) is
hazardous to life and property, the Board takes cognizance of the
respondent's contention that the project "is not a fire hazard since
petroleum products shall be safely stored in underground tanks and that
the installation and construction of the underground tanks shall be in
accordance with the Caltex Engineering Procedures which is true to all
gasoline stations in the country. ...
Hence, the Board is inclined to believe that the project being
hazardous to life and property is more perceived than factual.For,
after all, even the Fire Station Commander, after studying the plans and
specifications of the subject proposed construction, recommended on 20
January 1989, "to build such buildings after conform (sic) all the
requirements of PP 1185." It is further alleged by the complainants
that the proposed location is "in the heart of the thickly populated
residential area of Calasiao." Again, findings of the [HLURB] staff
negate the allegations as the same is within a designated
Business/Commercial Zone per the Zoning
Ordinance.... 20 (emphasis supplied)
The findings of fact of the HLURB are binding as they are already final and
conclusive vis-à-vis the evidence submitted by respondents.
THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA
Petitioner points out that the HLURB decision in the previous case filed
against her predecessor (Dennis Parayno) by respondent Jovellanos had
effectively barred the issues in Resolution No. 50 based on the principle of res
judicata.We agree.
Res judicata refers to the rule that a final judgment or decree on the merits
by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or
their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former
suit. 21 For res judicata to apply, the following elements must be present: (1) the
judgment or order must be final; (2) the judgment must be on the merits; (3) it
must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties and (4) there must be, between the first and second actions,
identity of parties, of subject matter and of cause of action. 22
Respondent municipality does not contest the first, second and third
requisites. However, it claims that it was not a party to the HLURB case but only
its co-respondent Jovellanos, hence, the fourth requisite was not met. The
argument is untenable.
The absolute identity of parties is not required for the principle of res
judicata to apply. 23 A shared identity of interests is sufficient to invoke the
application of this principle. 24 The proscription may not be evaded by the mere
expedient of including an additional party. 25 Res judicata may lie as long as
there is a community of interests between a party in the first case and a party in
the second case although the latter may not have been impleaded in the first. 26
In the assailed resolution of respondent municipality, it raised the same
grounds invoked by its co-respondent in the HLURB: (1) that the resolution
aimed to close down or transfer the gasoline station to another location due to
the alleged violation of Section 44 of the zoning ordinance and (2) that the
hazards of said gasoline station threatened the health and safety of the public.
The HLURB had already settled these concerns and its adjudication had long
attained finality. It is to the interest of the public that there should be an end to
litigation by the parties over a subject matter already fully and fairly adjudged.
Furthermore, an individual should not be vexed twice for the same cause. 27
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed resolution
of the Court of the Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent
Municipality of Calasiao is hereby directed to cease and desist from enforcing
Resolution No. 50 against petitioner insofar as it seeks to close down or transfer
her gasoline station to another location.  caTIDE

No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna and Garcia, JJ., concur.
|||  (Parayno v. Jovellanos, G.R. No. 148408, [July 14, 2006], 527 PHIL 413-424)
g. Cassus Omissus Pro Omisso Habendus Est - A case omitted is to be held
as intentionally omitted

It is a rule of statutory construction. If a person, object, or thing is omitted from

being enumerated in a statute, it must be held or considered to have been
omitted intentionally. 

Definition

A person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration in a statute must be held

to have been omitted intentionally.

[G.R. No. L-14129. July 31, 1962.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-

appellant, vs. GUILLERMO MANANTAN, defendant-appellee.

Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.

Padilla Law Office for defendant-appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. ELECTIONEERING; OFFICERS PROHIBITED FROM ENGAGING

IN POLITICS; JUSTICES OF THE PEACE. — A justice of the peace is
included among the officers enjoined from active political participation by
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. There was no need of including
justices of the peace in the enumeration in said Section 54 because the
Legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term "judge."
2. ID.; ID.; TERM "JUDGE" CONSTRUED. — The term "judge" not
modified by any word or phrase, is intended to comprehend all kinds of
judges, like judges of the courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of
 Agrarian Relations, judges of the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of
the peace.
3. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; RULE OF "CASUS OMISUS"
WHEN APPLICABLE. — The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est"
can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly
established. In the case at bar, the Legislature did not exclude or omit justices
of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in
partisan political activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term -
"judge." The rule, therefore, has no applicability to the instant case.
4. ID.; PENAL STATUTES; RUIN OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION. —
The rule that penal statutes are given strict construction is not the only factor
controlling the interpretation of such laws, instead, the rule merely serves as
an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the
meaning of penal laws. (3 Sutherland Statutory Construction, p. 56). The court
may consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular instance
where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or
would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmaker (Crawford Interpretation of
Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294).
5. ID.; ID.; RULE OF EXCLUSION. — Where a statute appears on its
phase to limit the operation of its provisions to particular persons or things by
enumerating them, but no reason exist why other persons or things not so
enumerated should not have been included and manifest injustice will follow
by not so including them, the maxim expresio unius est exclusio, alterius,
should not be invoked. (Blevins vs. Mullally, 135 p. 307, 22 CAL. A pp. 519).
6. DOUBLE JEOPARDY; FAILURE OF DEFENDANT TO RAISE
ISSUE; WAIVER OF DEFENSE. — As defendant neither raised the issue of
double jeopardy by way of resisting the appeal of the state, nor argued in his
brief the said plea, he is deemed to have waived this defense.

DECISION

REGALA, J  :p

This is an appeal of the Solicitor General from the order of the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing the information against the
defendant.
The records show that the statement of the case and of the facts, as
recited in the brief of plaintiff-appellant, is complete and accurate. The same
is, consequently, here adopted, to wit:
 "In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in
the Court of First Instance of that Province, defendant
Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation conducted by said
court resulted in the finding of a probable cause that the crime charged
was committed by the defendant. Thereafter, the trial started upon
defendant's plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the
information on the ground that as justice of the peace, the defendant is
not one of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a
justice of the peace is within the purview of Section 54. A second motion
was filed by defense counsel who cited in support thereof the decision of
the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraeg, (C.A.-G.R. No. 15613-R,
54 Off. Gaz., pp. 1873-76) where it was held that a justice of the peace
is excluded from the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election
Code. Acting on this second motion to dismiss, the answer of the
prosecution, the reply of the defense, and the opposition of the
prosecution, the lower court dismissed the information against the
accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the
defense."
Both parties are submitting this case upon the determination of this
single question of law: Is a justice of the peace included in the prohibition of
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code?
Section 54 of the said Code reads:
"No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province,
no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national,
provincial, city, municipal or rural police force, and no classified civil
service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any
influence in any manner in any election or take part therein, except to
vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace
officer."
Defendant-appellee argues that a justice of the peace is not
comprehended among the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code. He submits that the aforecited section was taken from Section
449 of the Revised Administrative Code, which provided the following:
"SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No
judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or
assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine
Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service,
shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election
or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote."
When, therefore, Section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words
"justice of the peace," the omission revealed the intention of the Legislature to
exclude justice of the peace from its operation.
The above argument overlooks one fundamental fact. It is to be noted
that under Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code, the word "judge"
was modified or qualified by the phrase "of First Instance," while under
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, no such modifications exists. In
other words, justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of
the Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were
specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section
54, however, there was no necessity anymore to include justice of the peace
in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more
generic and broader term, "judge." It was a term not modified by any word or
phrase and was intended to comprehend all kinds of judges, like judges of the
courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of
the courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace.
It is a well known fact that a justice of the peace is sometimes
addressed as "judge" in this jurisdiction. It is because a justice of the peace is
indeed a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is
clothed with judicial authority (U.S. vs. Clark 25 Fed. Case. 441, 442).
According to Bouvier, Law Dictionary, "a judge is a public officer lawfully
appointed to decide litigated questions according to law. In its most extensive
sense the term includes all officers appointed to decide litigated questions
while acting in that capacity, including justice of the peace, and even jurors, it
is said, who are judges of facts."
A review of the history of the Revised Election Code will help to justify
and clarify the above conclusion.
The first election law in the Philippines was Act No. 1582 enacted by
the Philippine Commission in 1907, and which was later amended by Act Nos.
1669, 1709, 1726 and 1768. (Of these 4 amendments, however, only Act No.
1709 has a relation to the discussion of the instant case as shall be shown
later.) Act No. 1582, with its subsequent 4 amendments were later on
incorporated in Chapter 18 of the Administrative Code. Under the Philippine
Legislature, several amendments were made through the passage of Act Nos.
2310, 3336 and 3387. (Again, of these last 3 amendments, only Act No.
3387 has pertinence to the case at bar as shall be seen later.) During the time
of the Commonwealth, the National Assembly passed Commonwealth Act No.
233 and later on enacted Commonwealth Act No. 357, which was the law
enforced until June 21, 1947, when the Revised Election Code was approved.
Included as its basic provisions are the provisions of Commonwealth Acts
Nos. 233, 357, 605, 666, 657. The present Code was further amended by
Republic Acts Nos. 599, 867, 2242 and again, during the session of Congress
in 1960, amended by Rep. Acts Nos. 3036 and 3038. In the history of our
election law, the following should be noted:
Under Act 1582, Section 29, it was provided:
"No public officer shall offer himself as a candidate for elections,
nor shall he be eligible during the time that he holds said public office to
election at any municipal, provincial or Assembly election, except for
reelection to the position which he may be holding, and no judge of the
First Instance, justice of the peace, provincial fiscal, or officer or
employee of the Philippine Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education
shall aid any candidate or influence in any manner or take part in any
municipal, provincial, or Assembly election under the penalty of being
deprived of his office and being disqualified to hold any public office
whatsoever for a term of 5 years: Provided, however, that the foregoing
provisions shall not be construed to deprive any person otherwise
qualified of the right to vote at any election. (Enacted January 9, 1907;
Took effect on January 15, 1907.)
Then, in Act 1709, Sec. 6, it was likewise provided:
 
". . . No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, provincial
fiscal or officer or employee of the Bureau of Constabulary or of the
Bureau of Constabulary or of the Bureau of Education shall aid any
candidate or influence in any manner or take part in any municipal,
provincial or Assembly election. Any person violating the provisions of
this section shall be deprived of his office or employment and shall be
disqualified to hold any public office or employment whatever for a term
of 5 years. Provided, however, that the foregoing provisions shall not be
construed to deprive any person otherwise qualified or the right to vote
at any election. (Enacted on August 31, 1907; Took effect on September
15, 1907.)
Again, when the existing election laws were incorporated in the
Administrative Code on March 10, 1917, the provisions in question read:
"SEC. 449. Persons prohibited from influencing elections. — No
judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or
assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine
Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service,
shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election
or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.
(Emphasis supplied)
After the Administrative Code, the next pertinent legislation was Act No.
3387. This Act reads:
 "SEC. 2636. Officers and employees meddling with the election.
— Any judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, treasurer, fiscal
or assessor of any province, any officer or employee of the Philippine
Constabulary or of the police of any municipality, or any officer or
employee of any Bureau or the classified civil service, who aids any
candidate or violated in any manner the provisions of this section or
takes part in any election otherwise by exercising the right to vote, shall
be punished by a fine of not less than P100.00 nor more than P2,000.00,
or by imprisonment for not less than 2 months nor more than 2 years,
and in all cases by disqualification from public office and deprivation of
the right of suffrage for a period of 5 years." (Approved, December 3,
1927.) (Emphasis supplied.)
Subsequently, however, Commonwealth Act No. 357 was enacted on
August 22, 1938. This law provided in Section 48:
"SEC. 48. Active intervention of public officers and employees. —
No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer or assessor of any province, no officer
or employee of the Army, the Constabulary of the National, provincial,
municipal or rural police, and no classified civil service officer or
employee shall aid any candidate, nor exert influence in any manner in
any election nor take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to
preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer."
The last law was the legislation from which Section 54 of the Revised
Election Code was taken.
It will thus be observed from the foregoing narration of the legislative
development or history of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code that the
first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48
of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present Code as averred by
defendant-appellee. Note carefully, however, that in the two instances when
the words "justice of the peace" were omitted (in Com. Act No. 357 and Rep.
Act No. 180), the word "judge" which preceded in the enumeration did not
carry the qualification "of the First Instance." In other words, whenever the
word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance," the words
"justice of the peace" would follow; however, if the law simply said "judge," the
words "justice of the peace" were omitted.
The above-mentioned pattern of congressional phraseology would
seem to justify the conclusion that when the legislature omitted the words
"justice of the peace" in Rep. Act No. 180, it did not intend to exempt the said
officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already
comprehended in the broader term "judge".
It is unfortunate and regrettable that the last World War had destroyed
congressional records which might have offered some explanation of the
discussion of Com. Act No. 357, which legislation, as indicated above, had
eliminated for the first time the word "justice of the peace." Having been
completely destroyed, all efforts to seek deeper and additional clarifications
form these records proved futile. Nevertheless, the conclusions drawn from
the historical background of Rep. Act No. 180 is sufficiently borne out by
reason and equity.
Defendant further argues that he cannot possibly be among the officers
enumerated in Section 54 inasmuch as under the said section, the word
"judge" is modified or qualified by the phrase "of any province." The last
mentioned phrase, defendant submits, cannot then refer to a justice of the
peace since the latter is not an officer of a province but of a municipality.
Defendant's argument in that respect is too strained. If it is true that the
phrase "of any province" necessarily removes justices of the peace from the
enumeration for the reason that they are municipal and not provincial officials,
then the same thing may be said of the Justices of the Supreme Court and of
the Court of Appeals. They are national officials. Yet, can there be any doubt
that Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals are not
included in the prohibition? The more sensible and logical interpretation of the
said phrase is that it qualifies fiscals, treasurers and assessors who are
generally known as provincial officers.
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked
by the defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing
omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.
If that rule is applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace must
be held to have been intentionally and deliberately exempted from the
operation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
The rule has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus
omisus" can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been
clearly established. In the case under consideration, it has already been
shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from
the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political
activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term. In the new law, or
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, justices of the peace were just
called "judges."
In insisting on the application of the rule of "casus omisus" to this case,
defendant-appellee cites authorities to the effect that the said rule, being
restrictive in nature, has more particular application to statutes that should be
strictly construed. It is pointed out that Section 54 must be strictly construed
against the government since proceedings under it are criminal in nature and
the jurisprudence is settled that penal statutes should be strictly interpreted
against the state.
 Amplifying on the above argument regarding strict interpretation of
penal statutes, defendant asserts that the spirit of fair play and due process
demand such strict construction in order to give "Fair warning of what the law
intends to do, if a certain line is passed, in language that the common world
will understand." (Justice Holmes, in McBoyle vs. U.S. 283, U.S. 25, L. Ed,
816)
The application of the rule of "casus omisus" does not proceed from the
mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable
certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a
legislative enumeration. In the present case, and for reasons already
mentioned, there has been no such omission. There has only been a
substitution of terms.
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the
only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely
serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in
determining the meaning of penal laws. This has been recognized time and
again by decisions of various courts. (3 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p.
56.) Thus, cases will frequently be found enunciating the principle that the
intent of the legislature will govern (U.S. vs. Corbet, 215, U.S. 233). It is to be
noted that a strict construction should not be permitted to defeat the policy
and purposes of the statute (Ash Sheep Co. vs. U.S. 252 U.S. 159). The
court may consider the spirit and reason of a statute, as in this particular
instance, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction,
injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the law makers (Crawford,
Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 78, p. 294). A Federal District court in the U.S.
has well said:
"The strict construction of a criminal statute does not mean such
construction of it as to deprive it of the meaning intended. Penal statutes
must be construed in the sense which best harmonizes with their intent
and purpose." (U.S. vs. Betteridge, 43 F. Supp. 53, 56, cited in 3
Sutherland Statutory Construction 56.)
As well stated by the Supreme Court of the United States, the language
of criminal statutes, frequently, has been narrowed where the letter includes
situations inconsistent with the legislative plan (U.S. vs. Katz, 271 U.S. 354;
See also Ernest Brunchan, Interpretation of the Written Law [1915] 25 Yale
L.J. 129.)
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is the fact
that the purpose of the statute is to enlarge the officers within its purview.
Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various judges,
such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of
Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the
old statute, are now within its encompass. If such were the evident purpose,
can the Legislature intend to eliminate the justice of the peace within its orbit?
Certainly not, this point is fully explained in the brief of the Solicitor General, to
wit:
"On the other hand, when the legislature eliminated the phrases
"Judge of the First Instance" and "justice of the peace", found in Section
449 of the Revised Administrative Code, and used "judge" in lieu thereof,
the obvious intention was to include in the scope of the term not just one
class of judge but all judges, whether of first instance, justices of the
peace or special courts, such as judges of the Court of Industrial
Relations." . . .
"The weakest link in our judicial system is the justice of the peace
court, and to so construe the law as to allow a judge thereof to engage in
partisan political activities would weaken rather than strengthen the
judiciary. On the other hand, there are cogent reasons found in the
Revised Election Code itself why justices of the peace should be
prohibited from electioneering. Along with justices of the appellate courts
and judges of the Courts of First Instance, they are given authority and
jurisdiction over certain election cases (See Secs. 103, 104, 117-123).
Justices of the peace are authorized to hear and decide inclusion and
exclusion cases and if they are permitted to campaign for candidates for
an elective office the impartiality of their decisions in election cases
would be open to serious doubt. We do not believe that the legislature
had, in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, intended to create such
an unfortunate situation." (pp. 7-8, Appellant's Brief.)
Another factor which fortifies the conclusion reached herein is the fact
that even the administrative or executive department has regarded justices of
the peace within the purview of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
In Traquilino O. Calo, Jr. vs. The Executive Secretary, the Secretary of
Justice, etc. (G. R. No. L-12601), this Court did not give due course to the
petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction against the
respondents, for not setting aside, among others, Administrative Order No.
237, dated March 31, 1957, of the President of the Philippines, dismissing the
petitioner as justice of the peace of Carmen, Agusan. It is worthy of note that
one of the causes of the separation of the petitioner was the fact that he was
found guilty in engaging in electioneering, contrary to the provisions of
the Election Code.
Defendant-appellee calls the attention of this Court to House Bill No.
2676, which was filed on January 25, 1955. In that proposed legislation, under
Section 56, justices of the peace are already expressly included among the
officers enjoined from active political participation. The argument is that with
the filing of the said House Bill, Congress impliedly acknowledged that
existing laws do not prohibit justices of the peace from partisan political
activities.
The argument is unacceptable. To begin with, House Bill No. 2676 was
a proposed amendment to Republic Act No. 180 as a whole and not merely to
section 54 of said Rep. Act No. 180. In other words, House Bill No. 2676 was
a proposed re-codification of the existing election laws at the time that it was
filed. Besides, the proposed amendment, until it has become a law, cannot be
considered to contain or manifest any legislative intent. If the motives,
opinions, and the reasons expressed by the individual members of the
legislature, even in debates, cannot be properly taken into consideration in
ascertaining the meaning of a statute (Crawford, Statutory Construction, Sec.
213, pp. 375-376), fortiori what weight can we give to mere draft of a bill.
On law, reason and public policy, defendant-appellee's contention that
justice of the peace are not covered by the injunction of Section 54 must be
rejected. To accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and
emphatically laid down by the legislature.
Our law-making body has consistently prohibited justices of the peace
from participating in partisan politics. They were prohibited under the old
Election Law since 1907 (Act No. 1582 and Act No. 1709). Likewise, they
were so enjoined by the Revised Administrative Code. Another law which
expressed the prohibition to them was Act No. 3387, and later, Com. Act No.
357.
Lastly, it is observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court
applied the rule of "expressio unius, est exclusio alterius" in arriving at the
conclusion that justices of the peace are not covered by Section 54. Said the
Court of Appeals: "Anyway, guided by the rule of exclusion, otherwise known
as expresio unius est exclusio alterius, it would not be beyond reason to infer
that there was an intention of omitting the term "justice of the peace from
Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. . . ."
The rule has no application. If the legislature had intended to exclude a
justice of the peace from the purview of Section 54, neither the trial court nor
the Court of Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. Indeed, there
appears no reason for the alleged change. Hence, the rule of expresio unius
est exclusio alterius has been erroneously applied (Appellant's Brief, p. 6.)
"Where a statue appears on its face to limit the operation of its
provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them, but no
reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated should not
have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including
them, the maxim expresio unius est exclusio alterius, should not be
invoked." (Blevins vs. Mullally, 135 p. 307, 22 Cal. App. 519.)
 FOR THE ABOVE REASONS, the order of dismissal entered by the
trial court should be set aside and this case is remanded for trial on the
merits.
Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Barrera and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla and Dizon, JJ., took no part.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., is on leave.
|||  (People v. Manantan, G.R. No. L-14129, [July 31, 1962], 115 PHIL 657-671)

[G.R. No. L-9274. February 1, 1957.]

RUFINO LOPEZ & SONS, INC., petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF

TAX APPEALS, respondent.

Isidro A. Vera and Eulalio F. Legaspi for petitioner.

Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla, Assistant Solicitor General Ramon
L. Avanceña and Solicitor Felicisimo R. Rosete for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. COURT OF TAX APPEALS; JURISDICTION TO REVIEW

DECISIONS OF COLLECTOR OF CUSTOMS; POWER OF COURT TO
CORRECT CLERICAL ERROR IN STATUTE. — Section 7 of Republic Act
No. 1125 specifically provides that the court of Tax Appeals has appellate
jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs. On the other
hand, section 11 of the same Act in lifting the enumerating the persons and
entities who may appeal mentions among others, those affected by a decision
or ruling of the Collector of Customs, and fails to mention the Commissioner
of Customs. While there is really a discrepancy between the two sections, it is
more reasonable and logical to hold that in section 11 of the Act, the
Legislature meant and intended to say, the Commissioner of Customs,
instead of Collector of Customs. If persons affected by a decision of the
Collector of Customs may appeal directly to the Court of Tax Appeals, then
the supervision and control of the Commissioner of Customs over his
Collector of Customs, under the Customs Law found in sections 1137 to 1419
of the Revised Administrative Code, and his right to review their decisions
upon appeal to him by the persons affected by said decision (section 1380,
Id.) would, not only be gravely affected but even destroyed. In thus holding,
the Courts are not exactly indulging in judicial legislation. They are merely
endeavoring to rectify and correct a clearly clerical error in the wording of a
statute, in order to give due course and carry out the evident intention of the
legislature. This the Court should and can validly do.
2. CUSTOMS LAW; APPEAL FROM DECISION OF COLLECTOR OF
CUSTOMS; WHEN AGGRIEVED PARTY MAY RESORT TO COURT. — The
jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Customs to review the decisions of the
Collector of Customs under section 1380 of the Revised Administrative Code
is not concurrent with the Court of Tax Appeals. An appeal to the
Commissioner of Customs is purely administrative; whereas, appeal to the
Court of Tax Appeals is manifestly judicial. And it is a sound rule that before
one resorts to the Courts, the administrative remedy provided by law should
first be exhausted.

DECISION

MONTEMAYOR, J  : p

Petitioner appellant Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc. is appealing from a

resolution of the Court of Tax Appeals dismissing its appeal from a decision of
the Collector of Customs for the Port of Manila, assessing additional fees on
petitioner for a certain importation of wire netting. The facts are simple and
undisputed. Lopez & Sons imported hexagonal wire netting from Hamburg,
Germany. The Manila Collector of Customs assessed the corresponding
customs duties on the importation on the basis of consular and supplier
invoices. Said customs duties were paid and the shipments were released.
Subsequently, however, the Collector reassessed the dollar value of the cost
and freight of said wire netting and as a result of the reassessment, additional
customs duties in the amount of P1,966.59 were levied and imposed upon
petitioner. Failing to secure a reconsideration of the reassessment and levy of
additional customs duties, Lopez & Sons appealed to the COurt of Tax
Appeals. Acting upon a motion to dismiss the appeal, filed by the Solicitor
General on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, the Tax Court, by its resolution of
May 23, 1955, dismissed the appeal on the ground that it had no jurisdiction
to review decisions of the Collector of Customs of Manila, citing section 7
of Republic Act No. 1125, creating said tax court. From said resolution of
dismissal, Lopez & Sons appealed to us, seeking reversal of said resolution of
dismissal.
 For purposes of reference, we are reproducing section 7 Republic Act
No. 1125, relied upon by the Tax Court of the Solicitor General, as well as
Section 11 of the same Act invoked by the petitioner:
"SEC. 7. Jurisdiction. — The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise
exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided
—
"(1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases
involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees
or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or her matters
arising under the National Internal Revenue Code other law or part of
law administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
"(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving
liability for customs duties, fees or other money charges, seizure,
detention or release of property affected; fines, forfeitures or other
penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the
Customs Law or other law or part of law administered the Bureau of
Customs; and
"(3) Decisions of provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals
cases involving the assessment and taxation of real property other
matters arising under the Assessment Law, including rules and
regulations relative thereto."
xxx xxx xxx
"SEC. 11. Who may appeal; effect of appeal. — Any person,
association or corporation adversely affected by a decision or ruling the
Collector of Internal Revenue, the Collector of Customs or provincial or
city Board of Assessment Appeals may file an appeal in the Court of Tax
Appeals within thirty days after the receipt of such decision or ruling.
"No appeal taken to the Court of Tax Appeals from the decision
the Collector of Internal Revenue or the Collector of Customs shall
suspend the payment, levy, distraint, and/or sale of any property of the
taxpayer for the satisfaction of his tax liability as provided by existing
law: Provided, however, That when in the opinion of the Court the
collection by the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Commissioner of
Customs may jeopardize the interests of the Government and/or the
taxpayer the Court at any stage of the proceeding may suspend the said
collection and require the taxpayer either to deposit the amount claimed
or to file a surety bond for not more than double the amount with the
Court." (Emphasis supplied.)
There is really a discrepancy between Sections 7 and 11 above
reproduced. Section 7 provides that the Court of Tax Appeals has exclusive
appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal decisions of the Collector of Internal
Revenue, decisions of the Commissioner of Customs and decisions of
provincial or city Board of Assessment Appeals on cases mentioned in said
section. On the other hand, section 11 of the same Republic Act in listing and
enumerating the persons and entities who may appeal as well as the effect of
said appeal, mentions those affected by a decision or ruling of the Collector of
Internal Revenue, the Collector of Customs or any provincial or City Board of
Assessment Appeals, and fails to mention the Commissioner of Customs.
Taken literally, a person affected by a decision of the Collector of Customs
may appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals; and since no mention is made about
decisions of the Commissioner of Customs, a person affected by said
decision may not appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals. However, section 7 of
the Act above reproduced specifically provides that the Court of Tax Appeals
has appellate jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of
Customs. That legal provision conferring appellate jurisdiction on the Court of
Tax Appeals to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs would be
empty, meaningless, and unenforceable because under Section 11, no
person affected by the decision of the Commissioner of Customs may appeal
to the Tax Court. These two meaningless, and unenforceable because under
Section 11, should be harmonized and reconciled if possible, in order to give
effect to the whole Act.
We are in entire accord with the Tax Court and the Solicitor General
that a clerical error was committed in section 11, mentioning therein the
Collector of Customs. It should be, as it was meant to be, the Commissioner
of Customs. There are several reasons in support of this view. Under the
Customs Law, found in sections 1137 to 1419 of the Revised Administrative
Code, the Commissioner of Customs (Insular Collector of Customs) is the
Chief of the Bureau of Customs and has jurisdiction over the whole country as
regards the enforcement of the Customs Law, whereas, there are about
sixteen Collectors of Customs for the sixteen collection districts and principal
ports of entry into which the Philippines has been divided. These Collectors of
Customs are subordinates of the Commissioner of Customs over whom he
has supervision and control (section 1152, Revised Administrative Code).
Pursuant to said supervision and control, under section 1405 of the Revised
Administrative Code, when any new or unsettled question shall be determined
by the Collector of Customs, he shall, if the matter is not otherwise carried
upon for review in ordinary course, notify the Commissioner of his decision,
submitting an adequate statement of acts involved. What is more important is
the provision of section 1380, which we reproduce below:
"SEC. 1380. Review by Commissioner. — The person aggrieved
by the decision of the Collector of customs in any matter presented upon
protest or by his action in any case of seizure may, within fifteen days
after notification in writing by the collector of his action or decision, give
written notice to the collector signifying his desire to have the matter
reviewed by the Commissioner.
 "Thereupon, the Collector of Customs shall forthwith transmit all
the papers in the cause to the Commissioner, who shall approve, modify,
or reverse the action of his subordinate and shall take such steps and
make such order or orders as may be necessary to give effect to his
decision."
Under this section, any person affected or aggrieved by the decision of
the Collector of Customs may appeal the decision to the Commissioner of
Customs. From all this, it is clear if we followed the literal meaning and
wording of section 11 of Republic Act No. 1125, in the sense that persons
affected by a decision of the Collector of Customs may appeal directly to the
Court of Tax Appeals, then the supervision and control of the Commissioner
of Customs over his Collector of Customs, and his right to review their
decisions upon appeal to him by the persons affected by said decision would,
not only be gravely affected, but even destroyed. We cannot believe that was
the intention of the Legislature in passing Republic Act No. 1125. It is more
reasonable and logical to hold that in Section 11 of the Act, the Legislature
meant and intended to say, the Commissioner of Customs, instead of
Collector of Customs in the first paragraph and the first part of the second
paragraph of said section. In thus holding, the Courts are not exactly indulging
in judicial legislation. They are merely endeavoring to rectify and correct a
clearly clerical error in the wording of a statute, in order to give due course
and carry out the evident intention of the Legislature. This the Courts should
and can validly do. Under the rules of statutory construction, it is not the letter
but rather the spirit of the law and intention of the Legislature that is important
and which matters. When the interpretation of a statute according to the exact
and literal import of its words would lead to absurd or mischievous results, or
would contravene the clear purposes of the Legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary,
the letter of the law. Statutes may be extended to cover cases not within the
literal meaning of the terms, for that which is clearly within the intention of the
Legislature in enacting the law is as much within the statute as if it were within
the letter. Here the error (clerical and misprint) is plain and obvious. It is within
the province of the courts to collect, said error. This is not to correct the act of
the Legislature, but rather to carry out and give due course to the true
intention of said Legislature. (Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd edition, pp.
66-67; 157-158.).
Furthermore, section 11 of Republic Act 1125 may well be regarded as
a mere complement or implementation of section 7. Since section 7 provides
that the Tax Court has jurisdiction to review by appeal, decisions of the
Collector of Internal Revenue, decisions of the Commissioner of Customs,
and decisions of provincial or city Boards of Assessment Appeals, so section
11 naturally provides that persons adversely affected by said decisions may
appeal to the Tax Court. However, in enumerating the governmental bodies or
agencies rendering said decisions that may be appealed, it erroneously listed
the Coleceor instead of the Commissioner of Customs. The error is plain.
As a matter of fact, the Court of Tax Appeals in its resolution of
dismissal of May 23, 1955 cites in support thereof a resolution promulgated by
it on January 22, 1955 in C.T.A. Case No. 17, entitled "Acting Collector of
Customs vs. Acting Commissioner of Customs", wherein it said:
"The phrase 'Collector of Customs' appearing in the above-
mentioned provision (section 11) of Republic Act No. 1125 should clearly
an oversight on the part of Congress. It should read 'Commissioner of
Customs' to make the provision conform with section 7 of the said
Republic Act and section 1380 of the Revised Administrative Code."
Petitioner contends that the literal meaning of Section 11 of Republic
Act No. 1125 should be adopted in the sense that the Court of Tax Appeals
has concurrent jurisdiction with the Commissioner of Customs over appeals
from decisions of Collectors of Customs, so that a person adversely affected
by a decision of a Collector of Customs is given the choice of appealing the
said decision either to the Commissioner of Customs or to the Courts of Tax
Appeals. We find this contention untenable. In the first place, the two
remedies suggested are entirely different, one from the other; an appeal to the
Commissioner of Customs is purely administrative, whereas, appeal to the
Court of Tax Appeal is manifestly judicial. And it is a sound rule that before
one resorts to the Courts, the administrative remedy provided by law should
first be exhausted. In the second place, the two remedies suggested by the
petitioner would result in confusion because a person adversely affected by a
decision of a Collector of Customs could not be sure where to seek the
remedy, whether with the Commissioner of Customs or with the Court of Tax
Appeals, and it might even be difficult for him to decide because, if he took the
appeal directly to the Tax Court, that would ordinarily cut off his remedy
before the Commissioner of Customs for the reason that, should the Court of
Tax Appeals decide against him, he may not appeal said decision to the
Commissioner of Customs because the Commissioner as an administrative
officer may not review the decision of the Court. On the other hand, if the
person affected by a decision of a Collector of Customs took his appeal to the
Commissioner of Customs, and there receives an adverse decision, he may
yet appeal therefrom to the Court of Tax Appeals. In the third place, even if
the person affected by an adverse ruling of the Collector of Customs took his
appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals, as advocated by counsel for the
petitioner, under the literal meaning of section 11, the Tax Court may refuse to
entertain said appeal, as was done in the present case, on the ground that
under section 7 of Republic Act No. 1125, it had no jurisdiction to review a
 decision of the Collector of Customs, section 7 clearly limiting its appellate
jurisdiction to review decisions of the Commissioner of Customs.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that under the law, particularly, the
Customs Law and Republic Act No. 1125, the Court of Tax Appeals has no
jurisdiction to review by appeal, decisions of the Collector of Customs. The
appealed order of dismissal is hereby affirmed, with costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador;
Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.
 (Rufino Lopez & Sons, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, G.R. No. L-9274,
|||

[February 1, 1957], 100 PHIL 850-858)

h. Noscitur A Sociis - Finding the context

Legal Definition of noscitur a sociis

: a doctrine or rule of construction: the meaning of an unclear or ambiguous word

(as in a statute or contract) should be determined by considering the words with
which it is associated in the context

History and Etymology for noscitur a sociis

Latin, it is known by its associates

[G.R. No. L-68709. July 19, 1985.]

NAPOLEON E. SANCIANGCO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

JOSE A. ROÑO, Minister, Ministry of Local Government; THE
SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD OF OZAMIZ CITY; THE
HONORABLE BENJAMIN A. FUENTES, Vice Mayor of Ozamiz
City and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Ozamiz City; THE HONORABLE ANTONIO G. CABALLERO,
JESUS S. ANONAT, MANUEL T. CORTES, IRENE S.
LUANSING, REMEDIOS J. RAMIRO, DOMINADOR B. BORJE,
FILOMENO L. ROMERO, FLORENCIO L. GARCIA, and HARRY
S. OAMINAL, Members, Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz
City, respondents.

Abraham F . Sarmiento and Mariano Sarmiento for petitioner.

 The Solicitor General for respondents.

DECISION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J  : p

The sole issue for determination in this Petition for Certiorari,

Prohibition and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and or Restraining
Order is whether or not an appointive member of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod, who ran for the position of Mambabatas Pambansa in the
elections of May 14, 1984, should be considered as resigned or on forced
leave of absence upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy.  cdphil

The resolution of the controversy hinges on the construction to be given

to Section 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697, which provides as follows:
Sec. 13. Effects of filing of certificate of candidacy.
(1) Any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active officers and members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines and the Integrated National Police, as well as officials
and employees of government-owned and government-controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries, shall ipso facto cease in office or
position as of the time he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided,
however, That the Prime Minister, the Deputy Prime Minister, the
Members of the Cabinet, and the Deputy Ministers shall continue in the
offices they presently hold notwithstanding the filing of their certificates
of candidacy.
(2) Governors, mayors, members of the various sanggunians or
barangay officials shall, upon filing certificate of candidacy
be considered on forced leave of absence from office. (Emphasis ours)
Petitioner was elected Barangay Captain of Barangay Sta. Cruz,
Ozamiz City, in the May 17, 1982 Barangay elections. Later, he was elected
President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamiz City by
the Board of Directors of the said Association. As the President of the
Association, petitioner was appointed by the President of the Philippines as a
member of the City's Sangguniang Panlungsod.
On March 27, 1984, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the
May 14, 1984 Batasan Pambansa elections for Misamis Occidental under the
banner of the Mindanao Alliance. He was not successful in the said election.
Invoking Section 13(2), Article 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 (supra),
petitioner informed respondent Vice-Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes, Presiding
Officer of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, that he was resuming his duties as
member of that body. The matter was elevated to respondent Minister of
Local Government Jose A. Roño, who ruled that since petitioner is an
appointive official, he is deemed to have resigned from his appointive position
upon the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy.
Petitioner impugns said ruling on the ground that since Section 13(2)
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 makes no distinction between elective and
appointive officials, the legislative intent is clear that even appointive
Barangay officials are deemed also covered by the said provision.  LLjur

There is no question that petitioner holds a public appointive position.

He was appointed by the President as a member of the City's Sangguniang
Panlungsod by virtue of his having been elected President of the Association
of Barangay Councils. This was pursuant to Section 3, paragraph 1 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 51 (An Act Providing for the elective or Appointive Positions in
Various Local Governments and for Other Purposes), which provides that:
"Sec. 3. Cities. — There shall be in each city such elective local
officials as provided in their respective charters, including the city mayor,
the city vice-mayor, and the elective members of the sangguniang
panglungsod, all of whom shall be elected by the qualified voters in the
city. In addition thereto, there shall be appointive sangguniang
panglungsod members consisting of the president of the city association
of barangay councils, the president of the city federation of the
kabataang barangay, and one representative each from the agricultural
and industrial labor sectors who shall be appointed by the
president (Prime Minister) whenever, as determined by the sangguniang
panglungsod, said sectors are of sufficient number in the city to warrant
representation. (Emphasis ours)
The appointive character of petitioner's position was reiterated in
Section 173 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), reading as
follows:
"Sec. 173. Composition and Compensation. — (1) the
sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall be
composed of the vice-mayor, as presiding officer, the elected
sangguniang panlungsod members, and the members who may be
appointed by the President of the Philippines consisting of the
presidents of the Katipunan panlungsod ng mga barangay and the
Kabataang barangay city federation." (Emphasis supplied)
Since petitioner is unquestionably an appointive member of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City, he is deemed to have ipso
facto ceased to be such member when he filed his certificate of candidacy for
the May 14, 1984 Batasan elections.
 Petitioner avers, however, that the fact that he is merely an appointive
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City "is really of no
moment since subsection 2, Section 13, B.P. 697, makes no distinction
between elective and appointive officials, and at any rate, legislative intent
makes clear that appointive officials are deemed covered by the provision."  LibLex

Although it may be that Section 13(2), B.P. Blg. 697, admits of more

than one construction, taking into consideration the nature of the positions of
the officials enumerated therein, namely, governors, mayors, members of the
various sanggunians or barangay officials, the legislative intent to distinguish
between elective positions in section 13(2), as contrasted to appointive
positions in section 13(1) under the all-encompassing clause reading "any
person holding public appointive office or position," is clear. It is a rule of
statutory construction that "when the language of a particular section of a
statute admits of more than one construction, that construction which gives
effect to the evident purpose and object sought to be attained by the
enactment of the statute as a whole, must be followed." 1 "A statute's clauses
and phrases should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but
the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of
any of its parts. 2
The legislative intent to cover public appointive officials in subsection
(1), and officials mentioned in subsection (2) which should be construed to
refer to local elective officials, can be gleaned from the proceedings of the
Batasan Pambansa recorded as follows:
"Mr. Valdez: . . . May I go to paragraph 2 of Sec. 16, Mr. Speaker which
says:
"Any local elective officials, including an elected
barangay official shall ipso facto cease in his office or
position as at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy,
unless otherwise provided by law.' (later amended and is
now Subsection 2 of sec. 13)
Now, do the words 'local elective official' refer to the office
or to an incumbent who has been elected, not appointed?
Mr. Albano. Paragraph 2 cover selective official; paragraph 1 covers
appointive officials. So, if he is an appointive local official,
he would fall under paragraph (1) because it says: 'Any
person holding appointive office or position.' It does not
distinguish if it is appointive or elective position.
Mr. Valdez. In other words, Mr. Speaker, do I get the distinguished
sponsor correctly that an appointed mayor but holding an
elective position is not within the comprehension of this
section or this paragraph?
 Mr. Albano. No, Mr. Speaker, that would refer to paragraph 2. What
maybe the Gentleman's contemplation is: Suppose a
person is appointed to the position of a mayor, will he be
covered under paragraph 1 and should be cease to hold
office upon filing his Certificate of Candidacy?
Mr. Valdez. Yes.
Mr. Albano. I would say, yes, he would fall under paragraph 1. But if he
is an elective local official he would fall under paragraph 2.
Mr. Valdez. In other words, this is a description of the mode and manner
by which the occupant is brought to the office.
Mr. Albano. Yes.
Mr. Valdez. . . . not the description of the office itself.
Mr. Albano. No. Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Valdez. I see. Now we come to the other portion which refers to
elected barangay official. Why is it that the provision
isolates the nature of the official of the barangay who had
been elected, not appointed, is he supposed to be within
the purview of paragraph 2?
Mr. Albano. No. Mr. Speaker, I will call the Gentleman's attention to
paragraph 1: 'Any person holding a public appointive office
or position . . .' I presume and I assume that the office in
the barangay council is still contemplated in the
words 'appointive office.'
Mr. Valdez. Under paragraph 1?
Mr. Albano. Yes, Mr. Speaker." 3 (Emphasis supplied)
Nor do we perceive any violation of the equal protection clause, as
petitioner contends, since Section 13 of B.P. Blg. 697 applies alike to all
persons subject to such legislation under like circumstances and conditions.
Neither can petitioner justifiably contend that he was removed from office
without due process of law since it was of his own choice that he ran for a
seat in the Batasan Pambansa. The consequence that followed his
unsuccessful attempt at the elections arose from law.
It goes without saying that although petitioner, by filing his certificate of
candidacy for the Batasan Pambansa ceased, ipso facto, to be an appointive
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, he remains an elective Barangay
Captain from which position he may be considered as having been on "forced
leave of absence." He also continues as President of the Association of
Barangay Councils but will need a reappointment by the President, as
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ozamiz City as the law speaks of
"members who may be appointed by the President."
WHEREFORE, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent officials, the Writs prayed for are denied, and this Petition is
hereby ordered dismissed. No costs.  LexLib

SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C .J ., Makasiar, Abad Santos, Plana, Escolin, Relova,
Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ ., concur.
Teehankee, J ., dissents in a separate opinion.
Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ ., no part.

Separate Opinions
TEEHANKEE, J ., dissenting:

There is no question petitioner is an elected barangay official. He was

elected barangay captain of his barangay. He was furthermore elected
President of the Association of Barangay Councils (ABC) of Ozamis City, and
as such, he was entitled to be appointed, ex-oficio, as he was in fact
appointed by the President as member of the sangguniang panglungsod. The
appointment became functus oficio upon its exercise and petitioner's
assumption of the office. cdasia

Under Section 13(2) of B.P. Blg. 697 governing the 1984 election for
the Batasan Pambansa, petitioner as member of the said sanggunian should
be considered as having gone "on forced leave of absence from office" upon
his filing of his certificate of candidacy and running (unsuccessfully) for a seat
to the Batasan Pambansa, like similarly situated governors and mayors. The
letter and spirit of the Act support petitioner's position. As the decision itself
points out, he rightfully remains as barangay captain and president of the
ABC. As president of the ABC, petitioner should be held as merely having
been on forced leave of absence from the ex oficio position of sangguniang
member to which he held an appointment. He has correctly submitted that the
law makes no distinction between elective or appointive sanggunian
members. The basic position of barangay captain and ABC president held by
him are essentially elective. He cannot fall under Section 13(1) of the Act
which refers to purely appointive officials, including active officers and
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and officials and employees
of government-owned and-controlled corporations, under the statutory
construction rule of noscitur a sociis.
|||  (Sanciangco v. Roño, G.R. No. L-68709, [July 19, 1985], 222 PHIL 181-189)

[G.R. No. L-39419. April 12, 1982.]

MAPALAD AISPORNA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF

APPEALS and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.

SYNOPSIS

Petitioner, wife of a duly licensed insurance agent, was charged for

violation of the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act having
acted as agent in the solicitation for insurance in favor of Eugenio Isidro for
and in behalf of Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. without having first secured
a certificate of authority to act as such agent from the office of the Insurance
Commission. The evidence disclosed at the trial was that petitioner merely left
a note on top of her husband's desk informing the latter of Isidro's intention to
renew his policy. The trial court found appellant guilty as charged. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals construing the first paragraph of Section 189
independent from the two succeeding paragraphs, affirmed the judgment of
conviction and held that the receipt of compensation for the issuance of an
insurance policy is not an essential element for a violation of the first
paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act. Hence, the present recourse.
The Supreme Court held that receipt of compensation by the agent is
an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of Section 189; that
considering the failure in the information to allege said element a conviction of
the accused could not be sustained based on the well-settled jurisprudence
 that to warrant conviction every element of the crime must be alleged and
proved.
Judgment appealed from reversed and accused acquitted of the crime
charged.

SYLLABUS

1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION;

LEGISLATIVE INTENT ASCERTAINED FROM A CONSIDERATION OF THE
STATUTE AS A WHOLE; CASE AT BAR. — The definition of an insurance
agent as found in the second paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define
the word "agent" mentioned in the first and second paragraphs of the
aforesaid section. More significantly, in its second paragraph, it is explicitly
provided that the definition of an insurance agent is within the intent of Section
189. Hence — "Any person who for compensation . . . shall be an insurance
agent within the intent of this section, . . .." Patently, the definition of an
insurance agent under the second paragraph holds true with respect to the
agent mentioned in the other two paragraphs of the said section. The second
paragraph of Section 189 is a definition and interpretative clause intended to
qualify the term "agent'' mentioned in both the first and third paragraphs of the
aforesaid section. Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second
paragraph to the agent mentioned in the first and second paragraphs would
give harmony to the aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative
intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The
particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and
isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce
harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and give
effect to all its provisions whenever possible. The meaning of the law, it must
be borne in mind, is not to be extracted from any single part, portion or section
or from isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences but from a general
consideration or view of the act as a whole. Every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context. This means that every part of the
statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient
to the general intent of the whole enactment, not separately and
independently. More importantly, the doctrine of associated words (Noscitur a
Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a statement is
ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true
meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company in
which it is found or with which it is associated.
 2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CONVICTION WARRANTED IF
EVERY ELEMENT OF THE CRIME ALLEGED AND PROVED. —
Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second
paragraph it also applicable to the agent mentioned in the first paragraph, to
receive a compensation by the agent is an essential element for a violation of
the first paragraph of the aforesaid section. The appellate court has
established ultimately that the petitioner-accused did not receive any
compensation for the issuance of the insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro.
Nevertheless, the accused was convicted by the appellate court for, according
to the latter, the receipt of compensation for issuing an insurance policy is not
an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of Section 189 of
the Insurance Act. We rule otherwise. Under the Texas Penal Code 1911,
Article 689, making it a misdemeanor for any person for direct or indirect
compensation to solicit insurance without a certificate of authority to act as an
insurance agent, an information, failing to allege that the solicitor was to
receive compensation either directly or indirectly, charges no offense. In the
case of Bolen vs. Stake, the provision of Section 3750, Snyder's Complied
Laws of Oklahoma 1909 is intended to penalize persons only who acted as
insurance solicitors without license, and while acting in such capacity
negotiated and concluded insurance contracts for compensation. It most be
noted that the information, in the case at bar, does not allege that the
negotiation of an insurance contract by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was
one for compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a
conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in Our
jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be
alleged and proved.

DECISION

DE CASTRO, * J  : p

In this petition for certiorari, petitioner-accused Aisporna seeks the

reversal of the decision dated August 14, 1974 1 in CA-G.R. No. 13243-CR
entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff-appellee, vs. Mapalad Aisporna,
defendant-appellant" of respondent Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of
the City Court of Cabanatuan 2 rendered on August 2, 1971 which found the
petitioner guilty for having violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act (Act No.
2427, as amended) and sentenced her to pay a fine of P500.00 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
 Petitioner Aisporna was charged in the City Court of Cabanatuan for
violation of Section 189 of the Insurance Act on November 21, 1970 in an
information 3 which reads as follows:
"That on or before the 21st day of June, 1969, in the City of
Cabanatuan, Republic of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously act as agent in the solicitation or
procurement of an application for insurance by soliciting therefor the
application of one Eugenio S. Isidro, for and in behalf of Perla Compania
de Seguros, Inc., a duly organized insurance company, registered under
the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in the issuance of a
Broad Personal Accident Policy No. 28PI-RSA 0001 in the amount not
exceeding FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) dated June 21, 1969,
without said accused having first secured a certificate of authority to act
as such agent from the office of the Insurance Commissioner, Republic
of the Philippines.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."
The facts, 4 as found by the respondent Court of Appeals are quoted
hereunder:
"IT RESULTING: That there is no debate that since 7 March,
1969 and as of 21 June, 1969, appellant's husband, Rodolfo S. Aisporna
was duly licensed by Insurance Commission as agent to Perla
Compania de Seguros, with license to expire on 30 June, 1970, Exh. C;
on that date, at Cabanatuan City, Personal Accident Policy, Exh. D was
issued by Perla thru its authorized representative, Rodolfo S. Aisporna,
for a period of twelve (12) months with beneficiary as Ana M. Isidro, and
for P5,000.00; apparently, insured died by violence during lifetime of
policy, and for reasons not explained in record, present information was
filed by Fiscal, with assistance of private prosecutor, charging wife of
Rodolfo with violation of Sec. 189 of Insurance Law for having, wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously acted,
'as agent in the solicitation for insurance by soliciting therefore the
application of one Eugenio S. Isidro for and in behalf of Perla
Compaña de Seguros, . . . without said accused having first
secured a certificate of authority to act as such agent from the
office of the Insurance Commission, Republic of the Philippines.'
and in the trial, People presented evidence that was hardly
disputed, that aforementioned policy was issued with active
participation of appellant wife of Rodolfo, against which appellant in
her defense sought to show that being the wife of true agent,
Rodolfo, she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and that
policy was merely a renewal and was issued because Isidro had
called by telephone to renew, and at that time, her husband,
 Rodolfo, was absent and so she left a note on top of her husband's
desk to renew . . ."
Consequently, the trial court found herein petitioner guilty as charged.
On appeal, the trial court's decision was affirmed by the respondent appellate
court finding the petitioner guilty of a violation of the first paragraph of Section
189 of the Insurance Act. Hence, this present recourse was filed on October
22, 1974. 5
In its resolution of October 28, 1974, 6 this Court resolved, without
giving due course to this instant petition, to require the respondent to
comment on the aforesaid petition. In the comment 7 filed on December 20,
1974, the respondent, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,
submitted that petitioner may not be considered as having violated Section
189 of the Insurance Act. 8 On April 3, 1975, petitioner submitted his
Brief 9 while the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondent, filed a
manifestation 10 in lieu of a Brief on May 3, 1975 reiterating his stand that the
petitioner has not violated Section 189 of the Insurance Act.
In seeking reversal of the judgment of conviction, petitioner assigns the
following errors 11 allegedly committed by the appellate court:
"1. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FINDING THAT RECEIPT OF COMPENSATION IS NOT AN
ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE CRIME DEFINED BY THE FIRST
PARAGRAPH OF SECTION 189 OF THE INSURANCE ACT.
"2. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
GIVING DUE WEIGHT TO EXHIBITS F, F-1, TO F-17, INCLUSIVE
SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH PETITIONER'S GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
"3. THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
ACQUITTING HEREIN PETITIONER."
We find the petition meritorious.
The main issue raised is whether or not a person can be convicted of
having violated the first paragraph of Section 189 of the Insurance Act without
reference to the second paragraph of the same section. In other words, it is
necessary to determine whether or not the agent mentioned in the first
paragraph of the aforesaid section is governed by the definition of an
insurance agent found on its second paragraph.
The pertinent provision of Section 189 of the Insurance Act reads as
follows:
"No insurance company doing business within the Philippine
Islands, nor any agent thereof, shall pay any commission or other
compensation to any person for services in obtaining new insurance,
 unless such person shall have first procured from the Insurance
Commissioner a certificate of authority to act as an agent of such
company as hereinafter provided. No person shall act as agent,
subagent, or broker in the solicitation of procurement of applications for
insurance, or receive for services in obtaining new insurance, any
commission or other compensation from any insurance company doing
business in the Philippine Islands, or agent thereof, without first
procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance
Commissioner, which must be renewed annually on the first day of
January, or within six months thereafter. Such certificate shall be issued
by the Insurance Commissioner only upon the written application of
persons desiring such authority, such application being approved and
countersigned by the company such person desires to represent, and
shall be upon a form approved by the Insurance Commissioner, giving
such information as he may require. The Insurance Commissioner shall
have the right to refuse to issue or renew and to revoke any such
certificate in his discretion. No such certificate shall be valid, however, in
any event after the first day of July of the year following the issuing of
such certificate. Renewal certificates may be issued upon the application
of the company.
"Any person who for compensation solicits or obtains insurance
on behalf of any insurance company, or transmits for a person other than
himself an application for a policy of insurance to or from such company
or offers or assumes to act in the negotiating of such insurance, shall be
an insurance agent within the intent of this section, and shall thereby
become liable to all the duties, requirements, liabilities, and penalties to
which an agent of such company is subject.
"Any person or company violating the provisions of this section
shall be fined in the sum of five hundred pesos. On the conviction of any
person acting as agent, subagent, or broker, of the commission of any
offense connected with the business of insurance, the Insurance
Commissioner shall immediately revoke the certificate of authority issued
to him and no such certificate shall thereafter be issued to such
convicted person."
A careful perusal of the above-quoted provision shows that the first
paragraph thereof prohibits a person from acting as agent, subagent or broker
in the solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance without first
procuring a certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance Commissioner,
while its second paragraph defines who is an insurance agent within the intent
of this section and, finally, the third paragraph thereof prescribes the penalty
to be imposed for its violation.
The respondent appellate court ruled that the petitioner is prosecuted
not under the second paragraph of Section 189 of the aforesaid Act but under
its first paragraph. Thus —
 ". . . it can no longer be denied that it was appellant's most active
endeavors that resulted in issuance of policy to Isidro, she was there and
then acting as agent, and received the pay therefor - her defense that
she was only acting as helper of her husband can no longer be
sustained, neither her point that she received no compensation for
issuance of the policy because
'any person who for compensation solicits or obtains
insurance on behalf of any insurance company or transmits for a
person other than himself an application for a policy of insurance
to or from such company or offers or assumes to act in the
negotiating of such insurance, shall be an insurance agent within
the intent of this section, and shall thereby become liable to all the
duties, requirements, liabilities, and penalties, to which an agent
of such company is subject.' paragraph 2, Sec. 189, Insurance
Law,
now it is true that information does not even allege that she had
obtained the insurance,
'for compensation'
which is the gist of the offense in Section 189 of the Insurance
Law in its 2nd paragraph, but what appellant apparently overlooks is that
she is prosecuted not under the 2nd but under the 1st paragraph of Sec.
189 wherein it is provided that,
'No person shall act as agent, subagent, or broker, in the
solicitation or procurement of applications for insurance, or
receive for services in obtaining new insurance any commission
or other compensation from any insurance company doing
business in the Philippine Island, or agent thereof, without first
procuring a certificate of authority to act from the insurance
commissioner, which must be renewed annually on the first day of
January, or within six months thereafter.'
therefore, there was no technical defect in the wording of the
charge, so that Errors 2 and 4 must be overruled." 12
From the above-mentioned ruling, the respondent appellate court
seems to imply that the definition of an insurance agent under the second
paragraph of Section 189 is not applicable to the insurance agent mentioned
in the first paragraph. Parenthetically, the respondent court concludes that
under the second paragraph of Section 189, a person is an insurance agent if
he solicits and obtains an insurance for compensation, but, in its first
paragraph, there is no necessity that a person solicits an insurance for
compensation in order to be called an insurance agent.
 We find this to be a reversible error. As correctly pointed out by the
Solicitor General, the definition of an insurance agent as found in the second
paragraph of Section 189 is intended to define the word "agent" mentioned in
the first and second paragraphs of the aforesaid section. More significantly, in
its second paragraph, it is explicitly provided that the definition of an insurance
agent is within the intent of Section 189. Hence —
"Any person who for compensation . . . shall be an insurance
agent within the intent of this section, . . ."
Patently, the definition of an insurance agent under the second paragraph
holds true with respect to the agent mentioned in the other two paragraphs of
the said section. The second paragraph of Section 189 is a definition and
interpretative clause intended to qualify the term "agent" mentioned in both
the first and third paragraphs of the aforesaid section.
Applying the definition of an insurance agent in the second paragraph
to the agent mentioned in the first and second paragraphs would give
harmony to the aforesaid three paragraphs of Section 189. Legislative intent
must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The
particular words, clauses and phrases should not be studied as detached and
isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce
harmonious whole. 13 A statute must be so construed as to harmonize and
give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. 14 The meaning of the law, it
must be borne in mind, is not to be extracted from any single part, portion or
section or from isolated words and phrases, clauses or sentences but from a
general consideration or view of the act as a whole. 15 Every part of the
statute must be interpreted with reference to the context. This means that
every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and
kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment, not separately
and independently. 16 More importantly, the doctrine of associated words
(Noscitur a Sociis) provides that where a particular word or phrase in a
statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings,
its true meaning may be made clear and specific by considering the company
in which it is found or with which it is associated. 17
Considering that the definition of an insurance agent as found in the
second paragraph is also applicable to the agent mentioned in the first
paragraph, to receive a compensation by the agent is an essential element for
a violation of the first paragraph of the aforesaid section. The appellate court
has established ultimately that the petitioner-accused did not receive any
compensation for the issuance of the insurance policy of Eugenio Isidro.
Nevertheless, the accused was convicted by the appellate court for, according
to the latter, the receipt of compensation for issuing an insurance policy is not
 an essential element for a violation of the first paragraph of Section 189 of
the Insurance Act.
We rule otherwise. Under the Texas Penal Code 1911, Article 689,
making it a misdemeanor for any person for direct or indirect compensation to
solicit insurance without a certificate of authority to act as an insurance agent,
an information, failing to allege that the solicitor was to receive compensation
either directly or indirectly, charges no offense. 18 In the case of
Bolen vs. Stake, 19 the provision of Section 3750, Snyder's Compiled Laws of
Oklahoma 1909 is intended to penalize persons only who acted as insurance
solicitors without license, and while acting in such capacity negotiated and
concluded insurance contracts for compensation. It must be noted that the
information, in the case at bar, does not allege that the negotiation of an
insurance contract by the accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for
compensation. This allegation is essential, and having been omitted, a
conviction of the accused could not be sustained. It is well-settled in our
jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every element of the crime must be
alleged and proved. 20
After going over the records of this case, We are fully convinced, as the
Solicitor General maintains, that accused did not violate Section 189 of
the Insurance Act.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed and the
accused is acquitted of the crime charged, with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Acting C.J., Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and Melencio-
Herrera, JJ., concur.
Plana, J., took no part.
 (Aisporna v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-39419, [April 12, 1982], 198 PHIL
|||

838-849)