CHAPTER TEN: Amendment, Revision, Codification
and Repeal
AMENDMENT: Power to Amend
•The legislature has the authority to amend any existing laws,
subject to constitutional requirements.
•Authority to amend is part of the legislative power to enact,
alter and repeal laws.
•The SC in the exercise of its rule-making power or of its
power to interpret the law, has no authority to amend or
change the law, such authority being exclusive to the
legislature.
How amendment effected
Amendment – the change or modification, by deletion,
alteration, of a statute which survives in its amended form.
•The amendment of a statute is effected by the enactment of
an amendatory act modifying or altering some provisions of
a statute either expressly or impliedly.
Express amendment – done by providing in the amendatory
act that specific sections or provisions of a statute be amended
as recited therein or as common indicated, “to read as follows.”
Amendment by implication
•When a part of a prior statute embracing the same subject as
the latter may not be enforced without nullifying the pertinent
provision of the latter in which event, the prior act is deemed
amended or modified to the extent of repugnancy.
•Every statute should be harmonized with other laws on the
same subject, in the absence of a clear inconsistency.
•Legislative intent to amend a prior law on the same subject is
shown by a statement in the later act that any provision of law
that is inconsistent therewith is modified accordingly.
When amendment takes effect: 15 days (same) Art. 2, NCC
How amendment is construed, generally:
•Statute and amendment – read as a whole
•Amendment act is ordinarily construed as if the original
statute has been repealed and a new independent act in the
amended form had been adopted.
•Read in a connection with other sections as if all had been
enacted in the same statute.
•Where an amendment leaves certain portions of an act
unchanged, such portions are continued in force, with the
same meaning and effect they have before the amendment.
•Where an amendatory act provides that an existing statute
shall be amended to read as recited in the amendatory act,
such portions of the existing law as are retained either
literally or substantially, are regarded as a continuation of the
existing law, and not as a new enactment.
Estrada v. Caseda: Where a statute which provides that it shall
be in force for a period of four years after its approval, the four
years is to be counted from the date the original statute was
approved and not from the date the amendatory act was
amended. (Because it only amended the date from 2 to 4
years)
•Amended act is regarded as if the statute has been originally
enacted in its amended form.
Meaning of law changed by amendment
•An amended act should be given a construction different
from the law prior to its amendment, for it is presumed that
the legislature would not have amended it had not it not
wanted to change its meaning.
•Deliberate selection of language in the amendatory act
different from that of the original act indicates that the
legislature intended a change in the law or in its meaning.
Victorias Milling Co. v. SSS: A statutory definition of term
containing a general rule and an exception thereto is amended
by eliminating the exception, the legislative intent is clear that
the term should now include the exception within the scope of
the general rule.
Amendment Operates Prospectively: General Rule: An
amendment will not be construed as having a retroactive effect.
XPN: Unless (1) the contrary is provided or the legislative
intent to give it a retroactive effect is necessarily implied from
the language used and (2) only if no vested right is impaired.
Diu v. Court of Appeals: Statutes relating to procedure in courts
are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time
of their passage.
Effect of Amendment on Vested Rights
•After a statute is amended, the original act continues to be in
force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to the
amendment or to obligations that were contracted under the
prior act and such rights and obligations will continue to be
governed by the law before its amendment.
•Not applied retroactively so as to nullify such rights.
Lahom vs Sebulo: The concept of vested right is a
consequence of the constitutional guarantee that expresses a
present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice
is protected against arbitrary state action; it includes not only
legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also
exemptions from new obligations created after the right has
become vested.
•Rights are considered vested when the right to enjoyment is a
present interest, absolute, unconditional, and perfect or fixed
and irrefutable.
Note: right of action vs. vested right.
Effect of amendment on jurisdiction
•Jurisdiction of a court to try cases is determined by the law in
force at the time the action is instituted.
•Jurisdiction remains with the court until the case is finally
decided therein.
Iburaan v. Labes: Where a court originally obtains and
exercises jurisdiction pursuant to an existing law, such
jurisdiction will not be overturned and impaired by the
subsequent amendment of the law, unless express
prohibitory words or words of similar import are used.
Applies to quasi-judicial bodies
Erectors, Inc v. NLRC: PD 1691 and 1391 vested Labor
Arbiters with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases
involving employer-employee relations, including money claims
arising out of any law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas employment. An overseas worker filed a money
claim against his recruiter, and while the case is pending, EO
797 was enacted, which vested POEA with original and
exclusive jurisdiction over all cases, including money claims,
arising out of law or contract involving Filipino workers for
overseas employment. The court ruled that the labor arbiter
still had the authority to decide the case because EO 797 did
not divest the labor arbiter of his authority to hear and decide
the case filed by the petitioner prior to its effectivity.
•Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
law in force at the time of the commencement of the
action; Laws should only be applied prospectively unless
the legislative intent to give them retroactive effect is
expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the
language used.
Effect of nullity of prior or amendatory act
INVALID PRIOR LAW INVALID SUBSEQUENT
LAW
Where a statute which has Where the amendatory act is
been amended is invalid, declared unconstitutional, it
nothing in effect has been is as if the amendment did
amended; not exist and the original
statute before the attempted
The amendatory act, amendment remains
complete by itself, will be unaffected and in force.
considered as an original or (Government vs. Agoncillo)
independent act.
REVISION AND CODIFICATION
REVISION AMENDMENT
Broadly implies a change Refers to a change that
that alters a basic principle adds, reduces, deletes,
in the Constitution, like without altering the basic
altering the principle of principle involved.
separation of powers or the
system of checks and Affects only the provision
balances. being amended.
There is also a revision if the
change alters the substantial
entirety of the Constitution.
Affects several provisions of
the Constitution.
Lambino vs. Comelec
Purpose: to restate the existing laws into one statute and
simplify complicated provisions, and make the laws on the
subject easily found.
Ex. Revision: RPC; Codification: Labor Code
Construction to harmonize different provisions
•Presumption: author has maintained a consisted philosophy
or position.
•The different provisions of a revised statute or code should
be read and construed together.
•Rule: a code enacted as a single, comprehensive statute, and
is to be considered as such and not as a series of
disconnected articles or provisions.
What is omitted is deemed repealed
•All laws and provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the
revised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless
the statute or code provides otherwise
Reason: revision or codification is, by its very nature and
purpose, intended to be a complete enactment on the subject
and an expression of the whole law thereon, which thereby
indicates intent on the part of the legislature to abrogate
those provisions of the old laws that are not reproduced in
the revised statute or code.
•Possible only if the revised statute or code was intended to
cover the whole subject to is a complete and perfect system
in itself.
Rule: a subsequent statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if
the former revises the whole subject matter of the former
statute.
•When both intent and scope clearly evince the idea of a
repeal, then all parts and provision of the prior act that are
omitted from the revised act are deemed repealed.
Continuation of existing laws
•A codification should be construed as the continuation of the
existing statutes.
•The codifiers did not intend to change the law as it formerly
existed.
•The rearrangement of sections or parts of a statute, or the
placing of portions of what formerly was a single section in
separate sections, does not operate to change the operation,
effect of meaning of the statute, unless the changes are of
such nature as to manifest clearly and unmistakably a
legislative intent to change the former laws.
REPEAL
Power to repeal: Power to repeal a law is as complete as the
power to enact one.
CAN LEGISLATURE ENACT IRREPEALABLE CLAUSE?
NO. The legislature cannot in and of itself enact irrepealable
laws or limit its future legislative acts. Congress possesses the
plenary power or plenary authority, a complete and absolute
power to take action on a particular issue, with no limitations.
Repeal: total or partial, express or implied
•Total repeal – revoked completely.
•Partial – leaves the unaffected portion of a statute in force.
•A particular or specific law, identified by its number of title,
is repealed is an express repeal.
•All other repeals are implied repeals.
•Failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the
intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms
of the new and old laws, the latter situation falls under the
category of an implied repeal.
•The change in the condition and circumstances after the
passage of a law which is necessitated the enactment of a
statute to overcome the difficulties brought about by such
change does not operate to repeal the prior law, nor make the
later statute so inconsistent with the prior act as to repeal it.
Repeal by Implication
•Where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on
the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the
subject, that intention must be given effect.
•There must be a sufficient revelation of the legislative intent
to repeal.
•Intention to repeal must be clear and manifest.
General Rule: the latter act is to be construed as a continuation
not a substitute for the first act so far as the two acts are the
same, from the time of the first enactment.
City of Davao vs. RTC 127383
•Irrepealable laws deprive succeeding legislatures the plenary
power to amend and repeal laws. Legislature cannot bind itself
or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws.
•It cannot declare in advance the intent of the subsequent
legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon
existing statutes.
Two (2) Categories of repeal by implication:
•Provisions of the two acts are on the same subject matter that
are in irreconcilable conflict.
•If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and
is clearly intended as a statute, it will operate to repeal the
earlier law.
Irreconcilable Inconsistency
•Implied repeal brought about by irreconcilable repugnancy
between two laws takes place when the two statutes cover
the same subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and
incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled
or harmonized and both cannot be given effect, once cannot
be enforced without nullifying the other.
•Earlier and later statutes should embrace the same subject
and have the same object.
•It is necessary before such repeal is deemed to exist that is be
shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the
same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with
the former.
Repeal by implication - based on the cardinal rule that in the
science of jurisprudence, two inconsistent laws in one subject
cannot coexist in one jurisdiction.
•There can be no two conflicting laws in the same subject.
•Either reconciled or later repealed the prior law.
• Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant: a later law
repeals a prior law on the subject that is repugnant thereto.
Repeal by reenactment
•Where a statute is a reenactment of the whole subject in
substitution of the previous laws on the matter, the latter
disappears entirely and what is omitted in the reenacted law is
deemed repealed.
REPEALING CLAUSE: “All laws or parts thereof which are
inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly,”
Valdez v. Tuason: “such a clause repeals nothing that would
not be equally repealed without it.”
•Either with or without it, the real question to be determined is
whether the new statute is in fundamental and irreconcilable
conflict with the prior statute on the subject.
Significance of the repealing clause: the presence of such
general repealing clause in a later statute clearly indicates the
legislative intent to repeal all prior inconsistent laws on the
subject matter whether or not the prior law is a special law.
Repeal by implication not favored
•Presumption is against inconsistency or repugnancy and,
accordingly, against implied repeal
•Legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the
subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting
statutes.
•A construction which in effect will repeal a statute altogether
should, if possible, be rejected.
•CONSTRUCTION ONLY IN CASE OF IMPLIED REPEAL
In case of doubt as to whether a later statute has impliedly
repealed a prior law on the same subject, the doubt should be
resolved against implied repeal.
US v. Palacio:
•Repeal by implication are not favored, and will not be decreed
unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended.
•As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with
full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject.
•It is reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it was not
intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to
some matter.
•Unless the repugnancy between the two is not only
irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing
necessarily form the language used, the later act fully
embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the
reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure removed.
•Every effort must be used to make all acts stand and if, by any
reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the later act
will not operate as a repeal of the earlier.
NAPOCOR vs ANGAS: Courts are slow to hold that one
statute has repealed another by implication and they will not
make such adjudication if they can refrain from doing so, or if
they can arrive at another result by any construction which is
just and reasonable.
As between two laws, one passed later prevails
•Later expression of the legislative will.
•Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant.
•Applies even if the later act is made to take effect ahead
of the earlier law.
•As between two acts, the one passed later and going into
effect earlier will prevail over one passed earlier and going
into effect later.
Manila Trading & Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor Union:
•An act passed April 16th and in force April 21st was held to
prevail over an act passed April 9th and in effect July 4th of the
same year.
•And an act going into effect immediately has been held
to prevail over an act passed before but going into effect
later.
•Whenever two statutes of different dates and of contrary
tenor are of equal theoretical application to a particular case,
the statute of later date must prevail, being a later expression
of legislative will.
General law does not repeal special law, generally
•A general law on a subject does not operate to repeal a prior
special law on the same subject, unless it clearly appears that
the legislature has intended by the later general act to modify
or repeal the earlier special law.
•Presumption against implied repeal is stronger when of two
laws, one is special and the other general and this applies
even though the terms of the general act are broad enough to
include the matter covered by the special statute.
•Generalia specialibus non derogant – a general law does
not nullify a specific or special law.
•The legislature considers and makes provision for all the
circumstances of the particular case.
•Reason why a special law prevails over a general law: the
legislature considers and makes provision for all the
circumstances of the particular case.
•General and special laws are read and construed together,
and that repugnancy between them is reconciled by
constituting the special law as an exception to the general
law.
When Special or General law repeals the other
•There is always a partial repeal where the later act is a
special law.
•Intent to repeal the earlier special law where the later general
act provides that all laws or parts thereof which are
inconsistent therewith are repealed or modified accordingly
•If the intention to repeal the special law is clear, then the rule
that the special law will be considered as an exception to the
general law does not apply; what applies is the rule that the
special law is deemed impliedly repealed.
•A general law cannot be construed to have repealed a special
law by mere implication admits an exception.
Effects of Repeal, generally
•Appeal of a statute renders it inoperative as of the date the
repealing the act takes effect.
•Repeal is by no means equivalent to a declaration that the
a repealed statute is invalid from the date of its enactment.
•The repeal of a law does not undo the consequences of the
operation of the statute while in force, unless such result is
directed by express language or by necessary implication,
except as it may affect rights which become vested when the
repealed act was in force.
On Jurisdiction, generally
•Neither the repeal nor the explanation of the law deprives the
court or administrative tribunal of the authority to act on the
pending action and to finally decide it.
General rule: (a) where a court or tribunal has already acquired
and is exercising jurisdiction over a controversy, its jurisdiction
to proceed to final determination of the cause is not affected by
the new legislation repealing the statute which originally
conferred jurisdiction.
Rule: once the court acquires jurisdiction over a controversy,
it shall continue to exercise such jurisdiction until the final
determination of the case and it is not affected by subsequent
legislation vesting jurisdiction over such proceedings in
another tribunal admits of exceptions.
•Repeal or expiration of a statute under which a court or
tribunal originally acquired jurisdiction to try and decide a case,
does not make its decision subsequently rendered thereon null
and void for want of authority, unless otherwise provided.
•In the absence of a legislative intent to the contrary, the
expiration or repeal of a statute does not render legal what,
under the old law, is an illegal transaction, so as to deprive the
court or tribunal of the authority to act on a case involving such
illegal transaction.
•Where a law declares certain importations to be illegal,
subject to forfeiture by the Commissioner of Customs pursuant
to what the latter initiated forfeiture proceedings, the expiration
of the law during the pendency of the proceedings does not
divest the Commissioner of Customs of the jurisdiction to
continue to resolve the case, nor does it have the effect of
making the illegal importation legal or of setting aside the
decision of the commissioner on the matter.
On jurisdiction to try a criminal case
•Once a jurisdiction to try a criminal case is acquired, that
jurisdiction remains with the court until the case is finally
determined.
•A subsequent statute amending or repealing a prior act under
which the court acquired jurisdiction over the case with the
effect of removing the courts’ jurisdiction may not operate to
oust jurisdiction that has already attached.
On actions, pending or otherwise
•Rule: repeal of a statute defeats all actions and proceedings,
including those, which are still pending, which arose out of
or are based on said statute.
•The court must conform its decision to the law then existing
and may, therefore, reverse a judgment which was correct
when pronounced in the subordinate tribunal, if it appears
that pending appeal a statute which was necessary to support
the judgment of the lower court has been withdrawn by an
absolute repeal.
On vested rights
•Repeal of a statute does not destroy or impair rights that
accrued and became vested under the statute before
its repeal.
•The statute should not be construed so as to affect the rights
which have vested under the old law then in force, or as
requiring the abatement of actions instituted for the
enforcement of such rights.
•Rights accrued and vested while a statute is in
force ordinarily survive its repeal.
•The constitution forbids the state from impairing, by
enactment or repeal of a law, vested rights or the obligations
of contract, except in the legitimate exercise of police power.
Buyco v. PNB: Where a statute gives holders of backpay
certificates the right to use said certificates to pay their
obligations to government financial institutions, the repeal of
the law disallowing such payment will not deprive holders
thereof whose rights become vested under the old law of the
right to use the certificates to pay their obligations to such
financial institutions.
On contracts
•Where a contract is entered into by the parties on the basis of
the law then obtaining, the repeal or amendment of said law
will not affect the terms of the contract nor impair the right
of the parties thereunder.
Effects of repeal of tax laws
•Rule favoring a prospective construction of statutes is
applicable to statutes which repeal tax laws.
•Such statute is not made retroactive, a tax assessed before
the repeal is collectible afterwards according to the law in force
when the assessment or levy was made.
Effect of repeal and reenactment
•Simultaneous repeal and reenactment of a statute does not
affect the rights and liabilities which have accrued under the
original statute, since the reenactment neutralizes the repeal
and continues the law in force without interruption.
•The repeal of a penal law, under which a person is charged
with violation thereof and its simultaneous reenactment
penalizing the same act done by him under the old law, will
not preclude the accused’s prosecution, nor deprive the court
of the jurisdiction to try and convict him.
Effect of repeal of penal laws
•Where the repeal is absolute, so that the crime no longer
exists, prosecution of the person charged under the old law
cannot be had and the action should be dismissed.
•Where the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the
act which was penalized by a prior law ceases to be criminal
under the new law, the previous offense is obliterated.
•That a total repeal deprives the courts of jurisdiction to try,
convict, and sentence, persons, charged with violations of the
old law prior to the repeal.
•Repeal of a statute which provides an indispensable element
in the commission of a crime as defined in the RPC likewise
operates to deprive the court of the authority to decide the
case, rule rests on the same principle as that concerning the
effect of a repeal of a penal law without qualification.
Reason: the repeal of a penal law without disqualification is
a legislative act of rendering legal what is previously decreed
as illegal, so that the person who committed it is as if he
never committed an offence
Exception: where the repealing act reenacts the statute and
penalizes the same act previously penalized under the
repealed law, the act committed before reenactment continues
to be a crime, and pending cases are not thereby affected.
•Where the repealing act contains a saving clause providing
that pending actions shall not be affected, the latter will
continue to be prosecuted in accordance with the old law.
Distinction as to effect of repeal and expiration of law
•In absolute repeal, the crime is obliterated and the stigma of
conviction of an accused for violation of the penal law before
its repeal is erased.
Effect of repeal of municipal charter
•The repeal of a charter destroys all offices under it, and puts
an end to the functions of the incumbents.
•The conversation of a municipality into a city by the passage
of a charter or a statute to that effect has the effect of
abolishing all municipal offices then existing under the old
municipality offices then the existing under the old municipality,
save those exempted in the charter itself.
Repeal or nullity of repealing law, effect of
•When a law which expressly repeals a prior law is itself
repealed, the law first repealed shall not thereby revived
unless expressly so provided
•Where a repealing statute is declared unconstitutional, it will
have no effect of repealing the former statute, the former or
old statute continues to remain in force
H. Special over General
• Rule regarding conflicting provisions of the same statute
Manila Railroad Co. vs. Collector of Customs: Manila Railroad
uses dust shields on all its railway wagons. The Insular
Collector of Customs imposed 40% tax based on Par. 141 of
the 1909 Tariff Law (Manufactures of wool not otherwise
provided for, 40% ad valorem) while the CFI overruled that it
should be classified as a “detached part” and subject to only
10% tax pursuant to Par. 197 of the same law (Vehicles for use
on railways and tramways, and detached parts thereof, 10% ad
valorem). The Court ruled that the trial court in CFI is correct. It
is the general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes
or duties not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import
of the language used. In every case of doubt, such statutes are
construed most strongly against the Government and in favor
of the citizen, because burdens are not to be imposed, nor
presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly
and clearly import. 2 fundamental considerations which guide
the way out of the legal dilemma: (1st) by taking into account
the purpose of the article and then acknowledging that it is in
reality used as a detached part or railways vehicles. (2nd)
paragraph 141 is a general provision while paragraph 197 is a
special provision. Where there is in the same statute a
particular enactment and also a general one which is
embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be
operative, and the general enactment must be taken to effect
only such cases within its general language as are not within
the provisions of the particular enactment.
Almeda vs. Florentino, 15 SCRA 514: Both parties claim title to
the position of Secretary to the Municipal Board of Pasay City.
On 6/18/1960, RA 2709 amended Sec. 12 of RA 183 adding a
new provision in par. 2 which states: “The Vice-Mayor shall
appoint all the employees of the Board who may be suspended
or removed in accordance with law, and shall approve the
payroll of the said employees.” Sec. 14(1) RA 183 in turn
provides: The Board shall have a secretary who shall be
appointed by it to serve during the term of office of the
members thereof xxx. On the strength of Sec.12 (2) RA 2709,
the VM of Pasay City appointed Almeda (appellant) as
Secretary on 1/1/1964 but the Board refused to recognize him
the very next day and in turn appointed Julian Florentino to the
position, under Sec. 14 of the City Charter. The issue now is
which law should be applied, the amendatory RA 2709 or the
original charter, RA 183 Sec. 14? The Court ruled that there is
nothing in RA 2709 that indicates any intention on the part of
the legislature to repeal, alter, or modify in any way the
provisions of section 14 of RA 183. The preamble on Sec. 1 of
RA 2709 expressly recites that it is an amendment to section
12 of the Pasay charter, and no other. Because REPEAL by
implication are not favored, unless it is manifest that the
legislature so intended; and since courts are duty bound to
adopt a construction that will give effect to every part of a
statute, if at all possible, following the maxim "ut magis valeat
quam pereat" (that construction sought which gives effect to
the whole of the statute - its every word), there is no alternative
but to interpret the charter as the lower court has done i.e.
limiting the power of VM under Sec. 12 (as amended) to the
appointment of all the employees of the Board other than the
Secretary, who is to be appointed by the Board itself, as
specifically prescribed by Section 14.
• Rule regarding conflicting provisions of different statutes?
Laxamana vs. Baltazar (GR L-5995, 19 September 1952)
Facts: VM Jose T. Slazar was suspended in 1952 and
assumed office as mayor by virtue of section 2195 of the
Revised Administrative Code. However, the provincial
governor, acting under section 21 (a) of the Revised Election
Code (RA 180), with the consent of the provincial board
appointed Jose L. Laxamana, as mayor of Sexmoan, who
immediately took the corresponding official oath.
The two statutory provisions read as follows:
SEC. 2195 RAC: xxx Upon the occasion of the absence,
suspension, or other temporary disability of the Mayor, his
duties shall be discharged by the Vice-Mayor, or if there be no
Vice-Mayor, by the councilor who at the last general election
received the highest number of votes.
SEC. 21 RA 180: (a) xxx Whenever a temporary vacancy in
any elective local office occurs, the same shall be filled by
appointment by the President if it is a provincial or city office,
and by the provincial governor, with the consent of the
Provincial Board, if it is a municipal office.
Issue: Whether Laxamana has the right to assume office.
Held: Yes. The contemporaneous construction placed upon
the statute by the executive officers charged with its execution
deserves great weight in the courts. When a general and a
particular provisions are inconsistent; the latter is paramount to
the former. In other words, section 2195 referring particularly to
vacancy in the office of mayor, must prevail over the general
terms of section 21(a) as to vacancies of municipal (local)
offices. Otherwise stated, section 2195 may be deemed an
exception to or qualification of the latter. "Where one statute
deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals with a
part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should
be harmonized if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter
will prevail, regardless of whether it was passed prior to the
general statute." It is a canon of statutory construction that a
later statute, general in its terms and not expressly repealing a
prior special statute, will ordinarily not affect the special
provisions of such earlier statute.
Butuan Sawmill vs. City of Butuan (GR L-21516, 29 April 1966)
Facts: Butuan Sawmill, Inc. was granted a legislative franchise
under RA 399 for an electric light, heat and power system at
Butuan and Cabadbaran, Agusan,and was also issued a
certificate of public convenience and necessity by the Public
Service Commission on 18 March 1954. The City of Butuan
issued Ordinances numbered 11, 131 and148 imposing a 2%
tax on the gross sales or receipts of any business operated in
the city. Butuan Sawmill, Inc. questioned the validity of the
taxing ordinance which is deemed to have impaired the
obligation of contract thereby depriving the Petitioner of
property without due process of law. On the other hand,
Respondent maintained that it was vested with the “power to
provide for the levy and collection of taxes for general and
special purposes” as stipulated in its charter which was
granted in 1950.
Issue: WON the City of Butuan can be authorized to tax the
franchised Butuan Sawmill.
Held: No. The Local Autonomy Act did not authorize the City
of Butuan to tax the franchised business of the petitioner. The
inclusion of the franchised business of Butuan Sawmill, Inc. by
the City of Butuan within the coverage of the questioned taxing
ordinances is beyond the broad power of taxation of the city
under its charter; nor can the power therein granted be taken
as an authority delegated to the city to amend or alter the
franchise, since its charter did not expressly nor specifically
provide any such power. Be it noted that the franchise was
granted by act of the legislature in 1949 while the city's charter
was approved in 1950. Where there are two statutes, the
earlier special and the later general (the terms of the general
broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special)
the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a
presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining
an exception to the general, one as a general law of the land,
the other as the law of a particular case.
Basilia Arayata vs. Joya, 51 Phil 654
Cecilio Joya was leasing six friar lots which he inherited from
his deceased parents. He then later married Basilia Arayata in
1906 and while married to her, Cecilio purchased the lots he
had been leasing, on installments, from the Government, under
Act No. 1120. During the course of his lifetime from the time he
purchased the lands, these lots were conveyed to other people
including the wife (plaintiff) and Florentino Joya (defendant)
who became an administrator of the estate of the deceased. All
the conveyances were approved by the Director of Lands and
noted in the proper registry book. Cecilio died before fully
paying the Government for the lands. His widow, herein
petitioner, was ruled to own only one-half of the lot based on
the Civil Code provision on conjugal property. The court then
sought to deliver the property to Florentino for liquidation and
distribution. Petitioner claimed that under Act 1120, Sec. 16,
the widow receives all deeds of her deceased spouse upon
compliance with requirements of the law.
ISSUE: Whether the Civil Code provision on conjugal property
prevails or Act 1120’s full conveyance of the property to the
widow prevails.
HELD: The provisions of the Civil Code referring to conjugal
property cannot be applied in this case, as was done by the
trial court, because the law regulating the acquisition,
disposition, and transmission of rights to the friar lands
acquired by the Insular Government, lays down rules in conflict
with the aforesaid provisions of the Civil Code; and as the said
Code is of a general character, while Act No. 1120 is a special
law, the latter should prevail.
• Rule in case of conflict between a special provision of a
general law and a general provision of a special law:
City of Manila vs. Teotico, 2 SCRA 267
Facts: On 1/27/1958, at about 8PM, Genaro N. Teotico, was
about to board a jeepney, he fell inside an uncovered and
unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to
the fall, he suffered several injuries in the different parts of his
body and was brought to a hospital for treatment. He filed with
the CFI of Manila, a complaint (which was, subsequently,
amended) for damages against the City of Manila, its city
mayor, engineer, CHO, treasurer and chief of police. The CFI
dismissed the complaint and on appeal was affirmed by the CA
under Article 2189 of the Civil Code. City of Manila maintains
that the former provision should prevail over the latter, because
RA 409, is a special law, intended exclusively for the City of
Manila, whereas the Civil Code is a general law, applicable to
the entire Philippines.
Issue: WON the applicable law is RA 409.
Held: No. The Court ruled that it is true that, insofar as its
territorial application is concerned, RA 409 is a special law and
the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject
matter of the provisions above quoted, Sec. 4 of RA 409
establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of
Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or property arising
from the failure of city officers to enforce the provisions of said
Act or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence of the
city Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or
attempting to enforce said provisions." Article 2189 of the
Civil Code on the other hand, constitutes a particular
prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities liable
for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person
by reason" specifically "of the defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under
their control or supervision." In other words, said Sec. 4 refers
to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the
object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to
"defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is
based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said
Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
David vs. Comelec, 271 SCRA 90
Sec. 1 of RA 6679 - term of barangay officials is 5 years.
RA 7160 Sec 43 (c) - term of office of brgy. officials is 3 years.
There being a clear inconsistency between the two laws, the
later law fixing the term barangay officials at 3 years shall
prevail. Legis posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. The
rationale is simple: a later law repeals an earlier one because it
is the later legislative will. It is to be presumed that lawmakers
knew the older law and intended to change it. In enacting the
older law, the legislators could not have known the newer one
and hence could not have intended to change what they did
not know. Under Article 7 of the Civil Code, laws are repealed
only by subsequent ones and not the other way around.
I. External Aids
• Origin of the state
56. US vs. De Guzman
Indeed it is a general rule of statutory construction that courts
may take judicial notice of the original and history of the
statutes which they are called upon to construe and administer,
and of the facts which affect their derivation, validity and
operation. Where the meaning of a statute or any statutory
provision is not plain, a court is warranted in availing itself of all
legitimate aids to ascertain the true intention; and among them
are some extraneous facts. The object sought to be
accomplished exercises a potent influence in determining the
meaning of not only the principal but also the minor provisions
of a statute. To ascertain it fully the court will be greatly
assisted by knowing, and it is permitted to consider, the
mischief intended to be removed or suppressed, or the
necessity of any kind which induced the enactment. If the
statute has been in force for a long period it may be useful to
know what was the contemporary construction; its practical
construction; the sense of the legal profession in regard to it;
the course and usages of business which it will affect.
• Legislative debates
57. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila vs. SSC
Petitioners argued that they should be exempted from the
Social Security Legislation law because they are a church.
SSS argued that it does not violate their rights and it is for the
benefit of a member regardless if he is an “employee” or not.
The portion of RA1161 has been deleted by RA 1792 (intent to
include churches). The law is intended for the protection of
said employees against the hazards of disability, sickness, old
age and death in line with the constitutional mandate to
promote social justice to insure the well-being and economic
security of all the people.
• Contemporaneous acts of the legislature
58. David vs. Comelec, 271 SCRA 90, Supra
In enacting the general appropriations act of 1997, 33
Congress appropriated the amount of P400 million to cover
expenses for the holding of barangay elections this year.
Likewise, under Sec. 7 of RA 8189, Congress ordained that a
general registration of voters shall be held" immediately after
the barangay elections in 1997." These are clear and express
contemporaneous statements of Congress that barangay
officials shall be elected this May, in accordance with Sec. 43-c
of RA 7160.
I. Presumptions
• In favor of validity of Legislative acts
59. NHA vs. Reyes, 125 SCRA 245 (expropriation issue)
One of the basic postulates in constitutional law is the
presumption of validity of legislative or executive acts.
• In favor of beneficial operation of statutes
60. Paat vs. CA, 265 SCRA 167
Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be
achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they
should be given such construction as will advance the object,
suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.
"WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the
remaining forest resources of the country for the benefit
and welfare of the present and future generations of
Filipinos;
J. Repeals
• Rule on retroactivity of repeals
Tac-an vs. CA 137 SCRA 803
FACTS: Tac-an, a lawyer engaged by Acopiados accused of
frustrated murder and theft of cattle (all acquitted), executed a
deed of Quitclaim for a parcel of land as payment for his
service. The Acopiados retracted. Tac-an filed a case and CFI
ruled in his favor. On appeal, the decision was adverse to him.
CA citing that the deed was null and void pursuant to Sec 145
& 146 of ACM&S. Hence, this petition. He argues that the
Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu was repealed on
June 19, 1965 by RA 4252, hence the approval of the
Provincial Governor became unnecessary. When the Deed of
Quitclaim was executed, when the approval by the Provincial
Governor was given and when the approval was revoked,
Sections 145 and 146 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao
and Sulu were in full force and effect and since they were
substantive in nature the repealing statute cannot be given
retroactive effect.
• Implied Repeals
Villegas vs. Subido (GR L-31711, 30 September 1997)
•Repeals by duplication are not favored and will not be so
declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended.
•A subsequent statute, general in character as to its terms and
application, is not to be construed as repealing a special or
specific enactment, unless the legislative purpose to do so is
manifest. This is so even if the provisions of the latter are
sufficiently comprehensive to include what was set forth in the
special act.
K. Interpretation of Specific Types of Statutes
Tax Law
• How are tax refunds construed?
La Carlota Sugar Central vs. Jimenez
Central imported fertilizers and was imposed 17% tax and now
claiming for a refund pursuant to Sec. 2 of RA 601, as
amended by RA 1357. The law is clear that imported fertilizers
are exempt from the payment of the 17% tax only if the same
were imported by planters or farmers directly or through their
cooperatives. Directly as interpreted, "without anything
intervening". Here Central acted as an agent. N/A to them.
Rule: the exempting provision is to be construed liberally in
favor of the taxing authority and strictly against exemption from
tax liability, the result being that statutory provisions for the
refund of taxes are strictly construed in favor of the State and
against the taxpayer.
• Who has the burden of proof in tax cases?
CIR vs. CA (GR 115349, 18 April 1997)
WON ADMU’s work is subject to 3% Tax. The Court takes this
occasion to reiterate the hornbook doctrine in the interpretation
of tax laws that "(a) statute will not be construed as imposing a
tax unless it does so clearly, expressly, and unambiguously. A
tax cannot be imposed without clear and express words for
that purpose. Accordingly, the general rule of requiring
adherence to the letter in construing statutes applies with
peculiar strictness to tax laws and the provisions of a taxing act
are not to be extended by implication." Parenthetically, in
answering the question of who is subject to tax statutes, it is
basics that "in case of doubt, such statutes are to be construed
most strongly against the government and in favor of the
subjects or citizens because burdens are not to be imposed
nor presumed to be imposed beyond what statutes expressly
and clearly import.
SEC. 20 OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE;
APPLICATION; EXEMPTION; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT
BAR.
Mactan Cebu (MCIAA) vs. Marcos
"The power to tax involves the power to destroy." Verily,
taxation is a destructive power which interferes with the
personal and property for the support of the government.
Accordingly, tax statutes must be construed strictly against the
government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer. But since
taxes are what we pay for civilized society, or are the lifeblood
of the nation, the law frowns against exemptions from taxation
and statutes granting tax exemptions are thus construed
strictissimi juris (according to the strictest interpretation of the
law) against the taxpayers and liberally in favor of the taxing
authority. A claim of exemption from tax payment must be
clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain to be
mistaken. Elsewise stated, taxation is the rule, exemption
therefrom is the exception. However, if the grantee of the
exemption is a political subdivision or instrumentality, the rigid
rule of construction does not apply because the practical effect
of the exemption is merely to reduce the amount of money that
has to be handled by the government in the course of its
operations.
•Tax Sales construed
Serfino vs. CA (GR L-40858, 15 September 1987)
•Strict adherence to the statutes governing tax sales is
imperative not only for the protection of the taxpayers, but also
to allay any possible suspicion of collusion between the buyer
and the public officials called upon to enforce such laws. Notice
of sale to the delinquent land owners and to the public in
general is an essential and indispensable requirement of law,
the non-fulfillment of which initiates the sale.
Labor Laws
• Rule on Construction of Labor Laws
Manahan vs. ECC (GR L-44899, 22 April 1981)
Facts: Nazario Manahan, Jr. died of “Enteric Fever” (typhoid
fever) while employed as classroom teacher in Las Piñas
Municipal High School on May 8, 1975. The deceased was in
perfect health when he entered government service in 1969. In
the course of his employment in 1974, he was treated for
epigastric pain. He succumbed to enteric fever in May 1975.
Thus, the widowed wife filed a claim with the GSIS for death
benefit under PD 626. GSIS denied the claim saying that the
cause of his death is not an “occupational disease”. The wife
appealed to the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC),
which affirmed the decision of the GSIS. Hence, this appeal.
SC applied the provisions of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act, as amended, on passing upon petitioner’s claim. The
illness that claimed the life of the deceased may had its onset
before 10 December 1974, thus, his action accrued before 10
December 1974. Still, In any case, and case of doubt, the
same should be resolved in favor of the worker, and that social
legislations (like the Workmen’s Compensation Act and the
Labor Code) should be liberally construed to attain their
laudable objective, i.e., to give relief to the workman and/or his
dependents in the event that the former should die or sustain
an injury.
Villavert vs. ECC (GR L-48605, 14 December 1981)
Facts: The petitioner, Domna N. Villavert, is the mother of the
late Marcelino N. Villavert who died of acute hemorrhagic
pancreatitis on December 12, 1975 employed as a Code
Verifier in the Philippine Constabulary. She filed a claim for
income benefits for the death of her son under P.D. No. 626 as
amended with the Government Service Insurance System on
March 18, 1976. The said claim was denied by the GSIS on
the ground that acute hemorrhagic pancreatitis is not an
occupational disease and that the petitioner had failed to show
that there was a causal connection between the fatal ailment of
Marcelino N. Villavert and the nature of his employment. The
Supreme Court in this case ruled in favor of the petitioner and
ordered GSIS to pay the petitioner benefits amounting to
P6,000.00
•It should be noted that Article 4 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines, as amended, provides that "All doubts in the
implementation and interpretation of this Code, including its
implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of
labor."
Del Rosario & Sons vs. NLRC (GR L-64204, 31 May 1985)
Petitioner contended that complainants have no cause of
action against it due to absence of employer-employee
relationship between them. When petitioner entered into a
Contract of Services with the Security Agency and the latter
hired complainants to work as guards for the former, petitioner
became an indirect employer of respondents-complainants
pursuant to the unequivocal terms of Articles 106 and 107 of
the Labor Code, as amended:
Art. 106. Contractor or subcontractor - In the event that the
contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his
employees in accordance with this Code, the employer shall be
jointly and severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor
to such employees to the extent of the work performed under
the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to
employees directly employed by him.
Art. 107. Indirect employer. —The provisions of the
immediately preceding Article shall likewise apply to any
person, partnership, association or corporation which, not
being an employer, contracts with an independent contractor
for the performance of any work, task, job or project.
Insurance
•Rule in the interpretation of insurance provisions
Ty. First National Surety (GR L-16138, 29 April 1961)
General Rule: Obscure words or stipulations should be
interpreted against the person who caused the obscurity, and
the ones which caused the obscurity.
While the Court sympathizes with the plaintiff or his employer,
for whose benefit the policies were issued, the Court can not
go beyond the clear and express conditions of the insurance
policies, all of which define partial disability as loss of either
hand by amputation through the bones of the wrist." There was
no such amputation in the case. All that was found by the trial
court, which is not disputed on appeal, was that the physical
injuries "caused temporary total disability of plaintiff's left
hand." Note that the disability of plaintiff's hand was merely
temporary, having been caused by fracture of the index, the
middle and the fourth fingers of the left hand. The agreement
contained in the insurance policies is the law between the
parties. As the terms of the policies are clear, express and
specific that only amputation of the left hand should be
considered as a loss thereof, an interpretation that would
include the mere fracture or other temporary disability not
covered by the policies would certainly be unwarranted.
•Ambiguous provision interpreted against insurer
Qua Chee Gan vs. Law Union and Rock Insurance
Facts: The appellant is barred by waiver (estoppel) to claim
violation of the so-called fire hydrants warranty, for the reason
that knowing fully all that the number of hydrants demanded
therein never existed from the very beginning, the appellant
nevertheless issued the policies in question subject to such
warranty, and received the corresponding premiums. The Court
agreed. Where the insurer, at the time of the issuance of a
policy of insurance, has knowledge of existing facts which, if
insisted on, would invalidate the contract from its very
inception, such knowledge constitutes a waiver of conditions in
the contract inconsistent with the facts, and the insurer is
estopped thereafter from asserting the breach of such
conditions. The law is charitable enough to assume, in the
absence of any showing to the contrary, that an insurance
company intends to executed a valid contract in return for the
premium received; and when the policy contains a condition
which renders it voidable at its inception, and this result is
known to the insurer, it will be presumed to have intended to
waive the conditions and to execute a binding contract, rather
than to have deceived the insured into thinking he is insured
when in fact he is not, and to have taken his money without
consideration.
•Well known rule that ambiguities or obscurities must be strictly
interpreted against the party that caused them. [contracts of
adhesion (prepared na daan) especially insurance, it’s take it
or leave it. You don’t have a hand in the preparation. Hence,
the ambiguity must be construed against them (since you are
already at a disadvantage]
Corporate Law
•Rule on the interpretation of Corporate Law provisions?
Home insurance vs. Eastern Shipping Lines
Where a contract which is entered into by a foreign corporation
without complying with the local requirements of doing
business is rendered void either by the express terms of a
statute or by statutory construction, a subsequent compliance
with the statute by the corporation will not enable it to maintain
an action on the contract. But where the statute merely
prohibits the maintenance of a suit on such contract (without
expressly declaring the contract "void"), it was held that a
failure to comply with the statute rendered the contract
voidable and not void, and compliance at any time before suit
was sufficient. The court said: 'The contract upon which this
suit was brought, having been entered into in this state when
appellant was not permitted to transact business in this state,
is in violation of the plain provisions of the statute, and is
therefore null and void, and no action can be maintained
thereon at any time, even if the corporation shall, at some time
after the making of the contract, qualify itself to transact
business in this state by a compliance with our laws in
reference to foreign corporations that desire to engage in
business here.
Naturalization Laws
•Rule on the construction of Naturalization Laws
Co vs. Republic (GR L-12150, 26 May 1960)
• Naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly
construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.
• The trial court erred in granting the petition for naturalization.
Lee Cho @ Sem Lee vs. Republic (GR L- 12408, 12/28/1959)
• Naturalization Law should be strictly construed in order that
its laudable and nationalistic purpose may be fully fulfille.
• Petitioner in this case has failed to qualify to become a
Filipino citizen and so his petition should be denied.
Agrarian Reform Laws
• Rule on the construction of Agrarian Reform Laws
Guerrero vs. Ca
cessante ratio legis, cessat ipsa lex - the reason for a law
ceasing, the law itself ceases.
Issue: WON there is a tenancy relationship exists between the
parties.
Held: Petition was dismissed for lack of merit. CA’s decision
was affirmed. The law defines "agricultural tenancy" as the
physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture,
belonging to or legally possessed by another for the purpose of
production through the labor of the former and of the members
of his immediate farm household in consideration of which the
former agrees to share the harvest with the latter or to pay a
price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or
in both (Section 3, Republic Act 1199, The Agricultural tenancy
Act, as amended.)
"share tenancy" exists whenever two persons agree on a joint
undertaking for agricultural production wherein one party
furnishes the land and the other his labor, with either or both
contributing any one or several of the items of production, the
tenant cultivating the land with the aid of labor available from
members of his immediate farm household, and the produce
thereof to be divided between the landholder and the tenant in
proportion to their respective contributions (Sec. 4, RA 1199;
Sec. 166(25) RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform Code).
In contrast, a farmhand or agricultural laborer is "any
agricultural salary or piece worker but is not limited to a
farmworker of a particular farm employer unless this Code
expressly provides otherwise, and any individual whose work
has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, a
current agrarian dispute or an unfair labor practice and who
has not obtained a substantially equivalent and regular
employment" (Sec. 166(15) RA 3844, Agricultural Land Reform
Code).
It is important to note that the Agricultural Tenancy Act (RA
1199) and the Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA 3844) have
not been entirely repealed by the Code of Agrarian Reform (RA
6389) even if the same have been substantially modified by the
latter.
However, even assuming such an abrogation of the law, the
rule that the repeal of a statute defeats all actions pending
under the repealed statute is a mere general principle. Among
the established exceptions are when vested rights are affected
and obligations of contract are impaired. (Aisporna vs. CA)
The respondent's right as a share tenant does not end with the
abolition of share tenancy. As the law seeks to "uplift the
farmers from poverty, ignorance and stagnation to make them
dignified, self-reliant, strong and responsible citizens ... active
participants in nation-building", agricultural share tenants are
given the right to leasehold tenancy as a first step towards the
ultimate status of owner-cultivator, a goal sought to be
achieved by the government program of land reform.
It is true that leasehold tenancy for coconut lands and sugar
lands has not yet been implemented. The policy makers of the
government are still studying the feasibility of its application
and the consequences of its implementation. Legislation still
has to be enacted. Nonetheless, wherever it may be
implemented, the eventual goal of having strong and
independent farmers working on lands which they own
remains. The petitioners' arguments which would use the
enactment of the Agrarian Reform Code as the basis for
setting back or eliminating the tenurial rights of the tenant have
no merit.
Rules of Court
•Rule on the construction of the provisions of Rules of Court
Bello vs. CA (GR L-38161, 29 March 1974)
Facts: Petitioners (spouses Bello) were convicted and
sentenced for estafa before the City Court of Pasay appealed
to the CFI but was the Prosecution filed a "petition to dismiss
appeal" on the ground that since the case was within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the city court and CFI, and the trial in
the city court had been duly recorded, the appeal should have
been taken directly to the CA as provided by Sec. 87 of the
Judiciary Act, RA 296 (amended). CFI did find that the appeal
should have been taken directly to the CA but ordered the
dismissal of the appeal and remand of the records to the city
court "for execution of judgment." Petitioners were not notified
of the dismissal. Although CA recognized that the CFI may
have exercised its inherent powers to direct appeal to CA, it
held that Petitioners did not implead the CFI as “principal party
respondent” and thus it could not “grant any relief at all even
on the assumption that Petitioners can be said to deserve
some equities”
Issue: Whether the formal impleading of the CFI which issued
the challenged order of dismissal was indispensable.
Held: No. It is readily seen from the cited Rule that the court of
first instance or presiding judge who issued the challenged
order or decision is but a nominal party, the real parties in
interest being "the person or persons interested in sustaining
the proceedings in the court" and who are charged with the
duty of appearing and defending the challenged act both "in
their own behalf and in behalf of the court or judge affected by
the proceedings." Hence, the formal impleading of the CFI
which issued the challenged order of dismissal was not
indispensable and could be "overlooked in the interest of
speedy adjudication." The Court has in many cases involving
the construction of statutes always cautioned against
"narrowly" interpreting a statute "as to defeat the purpose of
the legislator" and stressed that "it is of the essence of judicial
duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable
result (of injustice or absurdity) and that therefore "a literal
interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to
absurd results". In the construction of its own Rules of Court,
this Court is all the more so bound to liberally construe them to
avoid injustice, discrimination and unfairness and to supply the
void — that is certainly within the spirit and purpose of the Rule
to eliminate repugnancy and inconsistency — by holding as it
does now that CFI are equally bound as the higher courts not
to dismiss misdirected appeals timely made but to certify them
to the proper appellate court.
Expropriation laws
City of Manila vs. Chinese Community of Manila
Facts: The city of Manila presented a petition in the CFI,
praying that certain lands be expropriated for the purpose of
constructing a public improvement namely, the extension of
Rizal Avenue. The defendant, the Chinese Community of
Manila, alleged that it was unnecessary because other routes
were available, which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's
purposes, at much less expense and without disturbing the
resting places of the dead. The CFI ruled that there was no
necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in
question, and absolved each and all of the defendants from all
liability under the complaint. SC ruled otherwise. The exercise
of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or
by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private
rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority must be
strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals
with greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the constitution
and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of
inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and,
for greater public purposes, appropriates the land of an
individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law
should not be enlarged by doubtly interpretation.
The statutory power of taking property from the owner without
his consent is one of the most delicate exercise of government
authority. It is to be watched with jealous scrutiny. Important as
the power may be to the government, the inviolable sanctity
which all free constitutions attach to the right of property of the
citizens, constrains the strict observance of the substantial
provisions of the law which are prescribed as modes of the
exercise of the power, and to protect it from abuse. Not only
must the authority of municipal corporations to take property be
expressly conferred and the use for which it is taken specified,
but the power, with all constitutional limitations and directions
for its exercise, must be strictly pursued.
Election of Laws
Villanueva vs. Comelec (GR L-54718, 4 December 1985)
Facts: Petitioner filed a COC for Vice-Mayor of Dolores for the
Jan 30 elections in substitution for Mendoza, who withdrew
candidacy with an UNSWORN letter in his own handwriting,
upon filing on January 4. Petitioner won in the election with a
margin of 452 votes (3,112 votes as against his opponent
Lirio's 2,660 votes) but Comelec disregarded all his votes and
proclaimed Lirio as the winner on the presumption that
Petitioner’s candidacy was not duly approved by Comelec
because the petitioner's name does not appear in their certified
list of candidates. Villanueva filed a petition for the annulment
of the proclamation but was dismissed by COMELEC on the
grounds that Mendoza’s unsworn withdrawal had no legal
effect, and that assuming it was effective, Petitioner’s
candidacy was not valid since Mendoza did not withdraw after
January 4, citing the pertinent legal provisions, as follows:
The 1978 Election Code provides:
SEC. 27 — No COC duly filed shall be considered withdrawn
unless the candidate files with the office which received the
certificate or with the Commission a sworn statement of
withdrawal.
There is absolutely no vagueness or ambiguity of the above
provision, as to the need of a sworn statement of withdrawal or
cancellation of a duly filed COC. That the withdrawal of
Mendoza's COC was not made under oath is not disputed. As
such, the withdrawal produces no legal effect for failure to
comply with the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law.
Mendoza, thus, for all legal intents and purposes, remained to
be a candidate for VM of Dolores, Quezon, up to 1/30/1980,
the date of the elections, as correctly ruled by the COMELEC.
Even assuming that the questioned withdrawal is effective,
under a liberal construction of the law as invoked by petitioner,
which should not be the case when the terms of the statute are
clear and unmistakable, still petitioner may not derive comfort
therefrom for Mendoza's withdrawal was made on Jan 4, 1980,
on the very last day for filing COC. Substitution of a candidate
by reason of withdrawal is proper only when such withdrawal is
made after the last day for filing of COC. This is as, likewise,
clearly provided by Section 28 of the 1978 Election Code: If,
after the last day for filing COC, a candidate with a COC duly
filed should withdraw, any voter qualified for the office may file
his COC for the office for which the candidate who has
withdrawn was a candidate on or before midday of election.
While it may be true as persistently pointed out by Petitioner
that a COC duly filed may be withdrawn or cancelled at any
time before the day of election, it does not necessarily follow
that such withdrawn or cancelled COC may be the subject of
substitution by another's COC. For substitution to take place,
the withdrawal must be effected after the last day for filing of
COC. If the withdrawal was made prior to or on the said last
day, as what happened in this case, substitution is not allowed.
Hence, the person filing a COC is filing said certificate in his
own right, not as a substitute candidate, and the filing to make
the COC valid must not be after the last day for filing ordinary
COC, which is January 4, 1980. Villanueva was, therefore, not
a candidate, either in substitution of Mendoza or in his own
right, as he filed his COC on January 25, 1980, long after the
last day for filing of COC. Whatever votes may have been cast
in his favor are necessarily considered stray votes. [Section
155 (15), Election Code] There is thus no legal basis for the
annulment of respondent Lirio's proclamation as vice-mayor.
SC ruled that COMELEC did not commit any error in issuing
Resolution Nos. 9192 and 9885. The petition is DISMISSED.
However: in SCRA dated 12/4/1985, the Court finds merit in
the reconsideration prayed for. Election Law; Will of the
electorate respected and should not be defeated by technical
defects.
Wills
•Rule on the interpretation of wills
In RE Tampoy (GR L-14322, 25 February 1960)
Facts: This concerns the probate of a document purported to
be the last will and testament of Petronila Tampoy. The trial
court denied the petition on the ground that the first page of the
will does not bear the thumb mark of the testatrix. Petitioner
alleged that although the first page of the will does not bear the
thumb mark of the testatrix, she however expressed her true
intention to give the property to her whose claims remain
undisputed. She wishes to emphasize that no one has filed any
opposition to the probate of the will and that while the first page
does not bear the thumb mark of the testatrix, the second
however bears her thumb mark and both pages were signed
by the 3 testimonial witnesses who also testified and
manifested to the court that the document expresses the true
and voluntary will of the deceased.
Issue: Whether the trial Court erred in denying the petition.
Held: No. The contention cannot be sustained as it runs
counter to the express provision of the law. Thus, Section 618
of Act 190, as amended, requires that the testator sign the will
and each and every page in the presence of the witnesses,
and that the latter sign the will and each and every page
thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other, which
requirement should be expressed in the attestation clause.
This requirement is mandatory, for failure to comply with it is
fatal to the validity of the will. "Statutes prescribing the
formalities to be observed in the execution of wills are very
strictly construed. A will must be executed in accordance with
the statutory requirements; otherwise it is entirely void.' All
these requirements stand as of equal importance and must be
observed, and courts cannot supply the defective execution of
a will. No power or discretion is vested in them, either to super
add other conditions or dispense with those enumerated in the
statutes.
Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it
is otherwise provided.(Same effectivity date for amendment)
Article 3. Ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith. (2)
Article 4. Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided. (3)
Article 5. Acts executed against the provisions of mandatory
or prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law itself
authorizes their validity. (4a)
Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary
to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. (4a)
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and
their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary. David vs Comelec
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall
govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall
be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. (5a)
Article 1686. In default of a special stipulation, the custom of
the place shall be observed with regard to the kind of repairs
on urban property for which the lessor shall be liable. In case
of doubt it is understood that the repairs are chargeable
against him.
Gambling: Article 2013. A game of chance is that which
depends more on chance or hazard than or skill or ability. For
the purposes of the following articles, in case of doubt a game
is deemed to be one of chance.
Article 4. All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of
the provisions of this Code, including its implementing rules
and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.

Article 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or

the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the
Philippines. (n)

Article 9. No judge or court shall decline to render judgment by

reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the laws. (6)

Article 10. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application

of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right
and justice to prevail. Salvacion vs BSP

Article 1702. In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor
contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent
living for the laborer.

On Natural Persons: Article 43. If there is a doubt, as between

two or more persons who are called to succeed each other, as
to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of one
prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of
proof, it is presumed that they died at the same time and there
shall be no transmission of rights from one to the other.

On Liquidation of the Conjugal Partnership: Article 189. In

case of doubt, the partnership property shall be divided
between the different partnerships in proportion to the duration
of each and to the property belonging to the respective
spouses.

The Family and the Institution: Article 220. In case of doubt, all
presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every
intendment of law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage,
the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of
children, the community of property during marriage, the
authority of parents over their children, and the validity of
defense for any member of the family in case of unlawful
aggression.

On Funerals: Article 307. The funeral shall be in accordance

with the expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of
such expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall
determine the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the
funeral shall be decided upon by the person obliged to make
arrangements for the same, after consulting the other
members of the family.

On Wills: Article 788. If a testamentary disposition admits of

different interpretations, in case of doubt, that interpretation by
which the disposition is to be operative shall be preferred.

On Contracts: Article 1370. If the terms of a contract are

clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting
parties, the literal meaning of its stipulations shall control.

If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of

the parties, the latter shall prevail over the former.

Special Provisions for the Lease of Urban Lands: Article

1603. In case of doubt, a contract purporting to be a sale with
right to repurchase shall be construed as an equitable
mortgage.