Secretary of Justice vs Lantion

Doctrine of Incorporation
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTION
G.R. No. L-139465 January 18, 2000
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B. JIMENEZ,
respondents.
Facts:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Department of Justice received a
request from the Department of Foreign Affairs for the extradition of respondent Mark Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury
Indictment. The warrant for his arrest, and other supporting documents for said extradition were attached along with the request.
Charges include:

1. Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US

2. Attempt to evade or defeat tax
3. Fraud by wire, radio, or television
4. False statement or entries
5. Election contribution in name of another

The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and assessment of the
extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed. Respondent, then requested for copies of all the
documents included in the extradition request and for him to be given ample time to assess it. The Secretary of Justice denied
request on the following grounds:

1. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the
process of evaluating whether the procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069 Philippine Extradition
Law) and treaty (RP-US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the
DOJ of the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally guaranteed rights
of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.
2. The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents.
3. The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition request, as Philippines
is bound to Vienna Convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is binding upon the parties.

Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding Judge Lantion favored Jimenez. Secretary of
Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting further proceedings. Thus, this petition is now at
bar.
Issue/s:
Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach
of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US Extradition Treaty.
Discussions:
The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in which there appears to
be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should
be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a
rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts.
The doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing, but are not superior to, national
legislative enactments.
Ruling/s:
No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our Constitution should take
precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the government to the individual deserve preferential
consideration when they collide with its treaty obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize
treaties as a source of binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our
Constitution as part of the law of the land.
 Philip Morris Inc vs Court of Appeals
Doctrine of Incorporation
PHILIP MORRIS, INC. VS COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 91332 July 16, 1993
PHILIP MORRIS, INC., BENSON & HEDGES (CANADA), INC’, AND FABRIQUES OF TABAC REUNIES, S.A
petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND FORTUNE TOBACCO CORPORATION, respondents.

Facts:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, to seek the reversal and setting aside of the following
issuances of the Court of Appeals (CA).
Philip Morris, Inc. and two other petitioners are ascribing whimsical exercise of the faculty conferred upon magistrates by
Section 6, Rule 58 of the Revised Rules of Court when respondent Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction it
earlier had issued against Fortune Tobacco Corporation, from manufacturing and selling “MARK” cigarettes in the local
market. Banking on the thesis that petitioners’ respective symbols “MARK VII”, ‘MARK TEN”, and “MARK”, also for
cigarettes, must be protected against unauthorized appropriation.
All petitioners are not doing business in the Philippines but are suing on an isolated transaction, They Invoked provisions of the
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property. As corporate nationals of member-countries of the
Paris Union, they can sue before Philippine courts for infringement of trademarks, or for unfair competition, without need of
obtaining registration or a license to do business in the Philippines, and without necessity of actually doing business in the
Philippines.

Philip Morris and its subsidiaries filed the complaint for infringement and damages against Fortune Tobacco before the Pasig
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for manufacturing and selling cigarettes bearing the trademark “Mark” which is identical and
confusingly similar to Philip Morris trademarks. The said act was dismissed. Hence, this petition at bar.
Issue/s:
Whether or not there has been an invasion of plaintiffs’ right of property to such trademark or trade name.
Discussions:
Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding the requirement of actual use in the
Philippines must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the apparent clash is being decided by a municipal
tribunal. Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any means imply the
primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine of incorporation as applied in most
countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not superior, to national legislative enactments
Ruling/s:
No. There is no proof that any of petitioner’s products which they seek to protect from any adverse effect of the trademark
applied for by defendant, is in actual use and available for commercial purposes anywhere in the Philippines.

A fundamental principle of Philippine Trademark Law is that actual use in commerce in the Philippines is a pre-requisite to the
acquisition of ownership over a trademark or a trade name.

In view of the explicit representation of petitioners in the complaint that they are not engaged in business in the Philippines, it
inevitably follows that no conceivable damage can be suffered by them not to mention the foremost consideration heretofore
discussed on the absence of their “right” to be protected.
CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondent

G.R. No. 83815 February 22, 1991

FACTS:
 The two petitions in this case sought to declare unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284 issued by then
President Corazon C. Aquino.

 The petitioners alleged that Section 1, 2 and 3 of EO 284 contravenes the provision of Sec. 13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution

 The assailed provisions of EO 284 are as follows:

Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.

Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the excess
position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official hold more than
two positions other than his primary position.

Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary, or
undersecretary, or assistant secretary.

 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, meanwhile, states that:

Section 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall
not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
They shall not, during said tenure, directly or indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by
the Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their
office.

The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the President shall not,
during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the
Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.

 PETITIONERS CONTENTION: EO 284 adds exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other than those
provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only exceptions against holding any other
office or employment in government are those provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The Vice
President (may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article VII: “The Vice-
President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation.”)
and the secretary of justice (as an ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec.
8 of article VIII: “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor
of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.”)

ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is unconstitutional

HELD: Yes. EO 284 is UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The court said, by allowing Cabinet members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries to hold at least two
positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold multiple
offices or employment which is a direct contravention of the express mandate of Article VII, Section 13 of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution
itself.

The explained that the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this constitution” must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those particular instances cited in the constitution itself which are Section 3 of
Article VII (for VP) and Section 8 of Article VIII (for Secretary of Justice).

Thus, the PETITION is GRANTED.

 Javellana vs Executive Secretary
Plebiscite; Comelec; Justiciable Question

JAVELLANA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

G.R. NO. 36142. March 31, 1973
JOSUE JAVELLANA, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
AND THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, respondents.
Facts:

 The Plebiscite Case

1. On March 16, 1967, Congress of the Philippines passed Resolution No. 2, which was amended by Resolution No. 4 of
said body, adopted on June 17, 1969, calling a Convention to propose amendments to the Constitution of the
Philippines.
2. Said Resolution No. 2, as amended, was implemented by Republic Act No. 6132, approved on August 24, 1970,
pursuant to the provisions of which the election of delegates to the said Convention was held on November 10, 1970,
and the 1971 Constitutional Convention began to perform its functions on June 1, 1971.
3. While the Convention was in session on September 21, 1972, the President issued Proclamation No. 1081 placing the
entire Philippines under Martial Law.
4. On November 29, 1972, the Convention approved its Proposed Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines. The
next day, November 30, 1972, the President of the Philippines issued Presidential Decree No. 73, “submitting to the
Filipino people for ratification or rejection the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines proposed by the 1971
Constitutional Convention, and appropriating funds therefor,” as well as setting the plebiscite for said ratification or
rejection of the Proposed Constitution on January 15, 1973.
5. On December 7, 1972, Charito Planas filed a case against the Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of the
Philippines and the Auditor General, to enjoin said “respondents or their agents from implementing Presidential Decree
No. 73, in any manner, until further orders of the Court,” upon the grounds, inter alia, that said Presidential Decree
“has no force and effect as law because the calling … of such plebiscite, the setting of guidelines for the conduct of the
same, the prescription of the ballots to be used and the question to be answered by the voters, and the appropriation of
public funds for the purpose, are, by the Constitution, lodged exclusively in Congress …,” and “there is no proper
submission to the people of said Proposed Constitution set for January 15, 1973, there being no freedom of speech,
press and assembly, and there being no sufficient time to inform the people of the contents thereof.”
6. On December 17, 1972, the President had issued an order temporarily suspending the effects of Proclamation No.
1081, for the purpose of free and open debate on the Proposed Constitution.
7. On December 23, the President announced the postponement of the plebiscite for the ratification or rejection of the
Proposed Constitution. No formal action to this effect was taken until January 7, 1973, when General Order No. 20 was
issued, directing “that the plebiscite scheduled to be held on January 15, 1978, be postponed until further notice.” Said
General Order No. 20, moreover, “suspended in the meantime” the “order of December 17, 1972, temporarily
suspending the effects of Proclamation No. 1081 for purposes of free and open debate on the proposed Constitution.”
8. Because of these events relative to the postponement of the aforementioned plebiscite, the Court deemed it fit to
refrain, for the time being, from deciding the aforementioned cases, for neither the date nor the conditions under which
said plebiscite would be held were known or announced officially. Then, again, Congress was, pursuant to the 1935
Constitution, scheduled to meet in regular session on January 22, 1973, and since the main objection to Presidential
Decree No. 73 was that the President does not have the legislative authority to call a plebiscite and appropriate funds
therefor, which Congress unquestionably could do, particularly in view of the formal postponement of the plebiscite by
the President reportedly after consultation with, among others, the leaders of Congress and the Commission on
Elections the Court deemed it more imperative to defer its final action on these cases.
9. “In the afternoon of January 12, 1973, the petitioners in Case G.R. No. 
L-35948 filed an “urgent motion,” praying
that said case be decided “as soon as possible, preferably not later than January 15, 1973.”
 10. The next day, January 13, 1973, which was a Saturday, the Court issued a resolution requiring the respondents in said
three (3) cases to comment on said “urgent motion” and “manifestation,” “not later than Tuesday noon, January 16,
1973.” Prior thereto, or on January 15, 1973, shortly before noon, the petitioners in said Case G.R. No. L-35948 riled a
“supplemental motion for issuance of restraining order and inclusion of additional respondents,” praying: “… that a
restraining order be issued enjoining and restraining respondent Commission on Elections, as well as the Department
of Local Governments and its head, Secretary Jose Roño; the Department of Agrarian Reforms and its head, Secretary
Conrado Estrella; the National Ratification Coordinating Committee and its Chairman, Guillermo de Vega; their
deputies, subordinates and substitutes, and all other officials and persons who may be assigned such task, from
collecting, certifying, and announcing and reporting to the President or other officials concerned, the so-called
Citizens’ Assemblies referendum results allegedly obtained when they were supposed to have met during the period
comprised between January 10 and January 15, 1973, on the two questions quoted in paragraph 1 of this Supplemental
Urgent Motion.”
11. On the same date January 15, 1973 the Court passed a resolution requiring the respondents in said case G.R. No. L-
35948 to file “file an answer to the said motion not later than 4 P.M., Tuesday, January 16, 1973,” and setting the
motion for hearing “on January 17, 1973, at 9:30 a.m.” While the case was being heard, on the date last mentioned, at
noontime, the Secretary of Justice called on the writer of this opinion and said that, upon instructions of the President,
he (the Secretary of Justice) was delivering to him (the writer) a copy of Proclamation No. 1102, which had just been
signed by the President. Thereupon, the writer returned to the Session Hall and announced to the Court, the parties in
G.R. No. L-35948 inasmuch as the hearing in connection therewith was still going on and the public there present that
the President had, according to information conveyed by the Secretary of Justice, signed said Proclamation No. 1102,
earlier that morning.
 The Ratification Case
1. On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed
this suit against the respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution
not found in the present 1935 Constitution. This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and
registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens and voters similarly situated. Javellana also
alleged that the President had announced the immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet,
respondents including.
2. Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed constitution upon ground
that the President as Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; without
power to approve proposed constitution; without power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the
proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was not a free election, hence null and
void.
3. Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and
proclamation which have the same import and objective.
4. Issues:

1. Whether or not the issue of the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 is a justiciable question.
2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly conforming to the
applicable constitutional and statutory provisions.
3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people.
4. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled for relief.
5. Whether or not the proposed Constitution by the 1971 Constitutional Convention in force.

Rulings:

1. It is a justiciable and a non-political question.

1. To determine whether or not the new constitution is in force depends upon whether or not the said new constitution has
been ratified in accordance with the requirements of the 1935 Constitution. It is well settled that the matter of
ratification of an amendment to the constitution should be settled applying the provisions of the constitution in force at
the time of the alleged ratification of the old constitution.
 2. The issue whether the new constitution proposed has been ratified in accordance with the provisions of Article XV of
the 1935 Constitution is justiciable as jurisprudence here and in the US (from whom we patterned our 1935
Constitution) shall show.
2. The Constitution was not validly ratified as held by six (6) members of the court.
1. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and having the
disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage.
2. The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void. Proceedings
held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in
Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is no means by
which the invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those of the qualified
voters, the proceedings in the Citizen’s Assemblies must be considered null and void.
3. Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void. Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with the
term “votes cast” choices made on ballots – not orally or by raising hands – by the persons taking part in plebiscites.
This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot
System, with its major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and
secrecy in the voting, with the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the
accuracy of the election returns.
4. The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void. The point is
that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the COMELEC and without
complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73. The
procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the returns
filed by the officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of the 1935
Constitution which form part of the fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the
“free, orderly, and honest” expression of the people’s will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is
null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have ratified the revised Constitution
3. No majority vote has been reached by the Court.
1. Four (4) of its members, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that “the people have already
accepted the 1973 Constitution.”
2. Two (2) members of the Court hold that there can be no free expression, and there has even been no expression, by the
people qualified to vote all over the Philippines, of their acceptance or repudiation of the proposed Constitution under
Martial Law. Justice Fernando states that “(I)f it is conceded that the doctrine stated in some American decisions to the
effect that independently of the validity of the ratification, a new Constitution once accepted acquiesced in by the
people must be accorded recognition by the Court, I am not at this stage prepared to state that such doctrine calls for
application in view of the shortness of time that has elapsed and the difficulty of ascertaining what is the mind of the
people in the absence of the freedom of debate that is a concomitant feature of martial law.”
3. Three (3) members of the Court express their lack of knowledge and/or competence to rule on the question. Justices
Makalintal and Castro are joined by Justice Teehankee in their statement that “Under a regime of martial law, with the
free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicle restricted, (they) have no means of knowing, to the point
of judicial certainty, whether the people have accepted the Constitution.”
4. The Court is not prepared to concede that the acts the officers and offices of the Executive Department, in line with
Proclamation No. 1102, connote recognition of or acquiescence to the proposed Constitution.

2. A department of the Government cannot “recognize” its own acts. Recognition normally connotes the acknowledgment
by a party of the acts of another. Individual acts of recognition by members of Congress do not constitute
congressional recognition, unless the members have performed said acts in session duly assembled. This is a well-
established principle of Administrative Law and of the Law of Public Officers. The compliance by the people with the
orders of martial law government does not constitute acquiescence to the proposed Constitution. Neither does the Court
prepared to declare that the people’s inaction as regards Proclamation No. 1102, and their compliance with a number of
Presidential orders, decrees and/or instructions, some or many of which have admittedly had salutary effects, issued
subsequently thereto, amounts to a ratification, adoption or approval of said Proclamation No. 1102. The intimidation
is there, and inaction or obedience of the people, under these conditions, is not necessarily an act of conformity or
acquiescence.
 3. As regards the applicability to these cases of the “enrolled bill” rule, it is well to remember that the same refers to a
document certified to the President for his action under the Constitution by the Senate President and the Speaker of the
House of Reps, and attested to by the respective Secretaries of both Houses, concerning legislative measures approved
by said Houses. Whereas, Proclamation No. 1102 is an act of the President declaring the results of a plebiscite on the
proposed Constitution, an act which Article X of the 1935 Constitution denies the executive department of the
Government.
4. In all other respects and with regard to the other respondent in said case, petitions therein should be given due course,
there being more than prima facie showing that the proposed Constitution has not been ratified in accordance with
Article XV of the 1935 Constitution, either strictly, substantially, or has been acquiesced in by the people or majority
thereof; that said proposed Constitution is not in force and effect; and that the 1935 Constitution is still the
Fundamental Law of the Land, without prejudice to the submission of said proposed Constitution to the people at a
plebiscite for its ratification or rejection in accordance with Articles V, X and XV of the 1935 Constitution and the
provisions of the Revised Election Code in force at the time of such plebiscite.
5. Being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and
effect.
2. Four (4) members of the Court, namely, Justices Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra hold that it is in force by
virtue of the people’s acceptance thereof; 4 members of the Court, namely, Justices Makalintal, Castro, Fernando and
Teehankee cast no vote thereon on the premise stated in their votes on the third question that they could not state with
judicial certainty whether the people have accepted or not accepted the Constitution; and 2 members of the Court,
voted that the Constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention is not in force; with the result, there are
not enough votes to declare that the new Constitution is not in force.

LAGMAN VS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Caveat: This digest only dwells on the issue of justiciability.
Please also read Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
REPRESENTATIVES EDCEL C. LAGMAN, TOMASITO S. VILLARIN, GARY C. ALEJANO,
EMMANUEL A. BILLONES, AND TEDDY BRAWNER BAGUILAT, JR. VS. HON. SALVADOR C.
MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; HON. DELFIN N. LORENZANA, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEF’ENSE AND MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR; AND GEN.
EDUARDO ANO, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
MARTIAL LAW IMPLEMENTOR
G.R. NO. 231658
JULY 4, 2017
FACTS: On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring Martial Law in
the whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus therein. On May
25, the president submitted a written report to Congress on the factual basis of the Martial Law declaration (as
required by the Constitution).
The main basis of the declaration was the attack of the Maute terrorist group in Marawi City. According to the
report, the Maute group is an affiliate of ISIS which is aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in Marawi City
(and might spread its control in all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the ongoing rebellion and lawless
violence that has plagued Mindanao for decades.

Proclamation 216 is now assailed by several petitioners:

LAGMAN PETITION
Representatives Edcel C. Lagman, Tomasito s. Villarin, Gary C. Alejano, Emmanuel A. Billones, and Teddy
Brawner Baguilat, Jr. filed this petition to assail the President’s declaration of Martial Law.

Its main contention is that, the president’s declaration has no sufficient and factual basis – arguing that acts of
terrorism are not equated with rebellion or invasion. Lagman also contends that the seeming affiliation with
ISIS is only mere propaganda, designed to create an appearance of capability for the Maute group.

The petition also cited several facts in the president’s report which was refuted by several media networks and
news articles because they turned out to be false or untrue. Among these was the report about the attack on
Amai Pakpak Hospital, the ransack of the Landbank of the Philippines, and the burning of several schools.
CULLAMAT PETITION
The Cullamat Petition on the other hand avers that the president fails to show any acts of rebellion and invasion
outside Marawi City. Hence, the declaration of Martial Law for the whole island of Mindanao has no sufficient
basis. Cullamat also reiterated the false facts in the president’s report, as pointed out in the Lagman petition.

MOHAMAD PETITION
The Mohamad Petition also avers that the power to declare Martial Law is a remedy of last resort. It contends
that the extraordinary powers of the President should be dispensed sequentially, i.e., first, the power to call out
the armed forces; second, the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus; and finally, the power
to declare martial law.

OSG’S CONSOLIDATED COMMENT

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) contends that the court should only review Proclamation 216 under
the lens of grave abuse of discretion, and not on the correctness of facts.

The OSG also further argues that the sufficiency of the factual basis should be examined based on the
facts/information that were available to the president at the time he made the determination. Doing otherwise
will impose an impossible standard on the president’s exercise of discretion.

ISSUES:

1. WON the petition is reviewable by the court under Section 18, Article VII.
2. WON the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis [of] the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent of the actual actions that have been
taken by Congress jointly or separately.
3. WON the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of graduated powers granted the
President as Commander-in-Chief, namely (1) calling out powers, (2) suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus, and (3) declaration of martial law.
4. WON there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus.
HELD:

1.) YES. The only requisite to challenge the validity of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and declaration of martial law is that the petitioner should be a citizen. He need not even be a taxpayer.
2.) YES. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to the Court to
determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. This is completely independent from Congress’ duty to review.
It is meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible abuse by the President in the exercise of his
power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on
the ground of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or
suspension, such a revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

The Court is not allowed to “undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.” On the other hand,
Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the
declaration. Unlike the Court, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve into the accuracy of the
facts presented before it.

The Court’s review power is only passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition “in an appropriate
proceeding” by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress’ review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may
be activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made.

The court held that it can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and independently from, the power
to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does not deprive or
deny the Court of its power to review.

3.) NO. The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President’s decision pertaining to which
extraordinary power should he use to avail in a given set of facts or conditions. To do so would be tantamount
to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement on the prerogative that solely, at
least initially, lies with the President.
The sequence of “graduated powers” does not refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order which the
Commander-in-Chief must follow. This so-called “graduation of powers” does not dictate or restrict the manner
by which the President decides which power to choose.

4.) YES. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court considers
only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the declaration.
The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to the facts and
information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation.

The Court held that the President, in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show
that actual rebellion exists. The President only has to ascertain if there is probable cause for a declaration of
Martial Law and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.

The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on the internet, with neither
the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof.

As the Court has consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus without
any probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted.

The alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along with these alleged
false data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual rebellion exists.