Consti 1 - Case Digest Compilation

CASE NO.
1Topic:
Understanding the Constitution - Rules in interpretation
Title
: Francisco, et al vs House Speaker, et al.
Citation
: G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003
Facts:
•

Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme CourtChief Justice
Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case was theconstitutionality of the subsequent filing
of a second complaint to controvert the rules ofimpeachment provided for by law.
Issue:
Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide,Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional.
Ruling:NO. It is unconstitutional.
Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure inImpeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representatives are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice HilarioG. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI
of the Constitution. In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever
mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the
legislative,executive or judicial branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy
in thedischarge by each of that part of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign
people.At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully
calibrated by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given
effectwithout destroying their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for
thecontention that the exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset
thesystem of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one
section is not to be allowed to defeat another." Both are integral components.

CASE NO. 2Topic
: Political Question vs Justiciable Controversy
Title
: Santiago vs Guingona
Citation
: G.R. No. 134577 November 18, 1998
Facts:
•

The majority leader informed the body that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority leader
and the Senate President formally recognized him as the minority leader of the Senate.
•

The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo
warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping,unlawfully holding and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader, a position that,according to them, rightfully belonged
to Senator Tatad.

Issues:
Whether or not the Court have jurisdiction over the petition.
Ruling:YES.
The Court has jurisdiction over the petition

.
In Tañada v. Cueno, the Court endeavored to define political question. And we said that "it refers to
those questions which, under theConstitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or
executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the
legality, of a particular measure."In this case, the petitioners try to hew closely to these jurisprudential
parameters. Theyclaim that Section 16 (1), Article VI of the constitution, has not been observed in the
selection of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke the Court's "expanded" judicial power "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction" on the part of respondents. Considering the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is
clear that this Court has jurisdiction over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the
Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or
gravelyabused their discretion in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives.

CASE NO. 3Topic
: Judicial Review based on Expanded Judicial Power
Title
: Bondoc vs Pineda
Citation
: 201 SCRA 792; G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991
Facts:
•

In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc of the NP
were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Pampanga.Pineda was
proclaimed winner.
•

Bondoc filed a protest in the HRET. A decision was reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda.
Congressman Camasura of the LDP voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to
proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
•

On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura received a
letterinforming him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly helping to organize
thePartido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting LDP members in Davao Del Surto
join said political party.
•

On the day of the promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letterinforming the
Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representativesdecided to withdraw
the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura to theHRET.
Issue:
Whether or not the Supreme Court can review and annul the action of the House to change the party's
representation in the HRET to thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in
a pending election contest?
Ruling:
YES.
The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive andlegislative branches
of the Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the President and the Legislature. It
does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of inquiring into the
constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable controversy is
brought before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such action, as in this
case .The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights
against the strong arm of the majority party in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf
to his pleafor relief, nor indifferent to his charge that the House of Representatives had acted with
grave abuse ofdiscretion in removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal. He
calls upon the Court,as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its judicial power and discharge
its duty to protect his rights asthe party aggrieved by the action of the House. The Court must perform
its duty under the Constitution"even when the violator be the highest official of the land or the
Government itself"Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the HRET by the House of
Representativeswas not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's
disposition of the Bondoccase and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his
favor, the action of the House ofRepresentatives is clearly violative of the constitution.

CASE NO. 4Topic
: Philippines as a State
–
National Territory
Title
: Magallona, et al vs Ermita, et al.
Citation
: G.R. No. 187167, August 16, 2011
Facts:
•

This case assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 9522, adjusting the country's archipelagic baselines
and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories. It assails it on two principalgrounds, namely:1.

RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and logically, the reach of the Philippinestate's
sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987 Constitution, embodying theterms of the Treaty
of Paris and ancillary treaties, and2.

RA 9522 opens the country's waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by allvessels and
aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security,contravening the country's nuclear-
free policy, and damaging marine resources, inviolation of relevant constitutional provisions.
I
ssue:
Whether or not RA 9522 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:NO.
RA 9522 does not dismember a large portion of the national territory. It does not discards the pre-
UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties,
successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions.

UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of territory. It is a multilateral treaty
regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones. It is the culmination of decades-
longnegotiations among United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in
the world'soceans and submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States' graduated authority
over a limitedspan of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.The demarcation of the baselines
enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive economic zone,reserving solely to the Philippines the
exploitation of all living and non-living resources within such zone.Such a maritime delineation binds
the international community since the delineation is in strict observanceof UNCLOS III. If the
maritime delineation is contrary to UNCLOS III, the international community willof course reject it
and will refuse to be bound by it. The enactment of UNCLOS III compliant baselines law for the
Philippine archipelago and adjacent areas, as embodied in RA 9522, allows an internationally-
recognized delimitation of the breadth of the Philippines' maritime zones and continental shelf. RA
9522 is therefore a most vital step on the part of the Philippines in safeguarding its maritime zones,
consistent with the Constitution and our national interest.

CASE NO. 5Topic

: Citizenship - Modes of Acquisition: Citizens of the Philippines
Title
: Tecson vs. COMELEC
Citation
: G.R. NO. 161434 Mar. 3, 2004
Facts:
•

Respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, aka FPJ, filed his Presidential candidacy for the2004 national
elections. Petitioner Fornier filed before the COMELEC a petition todisqualify FPJ claiming he is not a
natural born Filipino citizen his parents beingforeigners. His father was a Spanish national, being
the son of a Spanish subject. Whilehis mother was an American citizen.
Issue:
Whether or not FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
Ruling:Yes. FPJ is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Under Article 4 Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution,natural born Filipino citizens are those who are
citizens of the Philippines from birth withouthaving to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship. Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers who elected their
Philippine citizenship when they reachedthe age of majority are also considered natural born Filipino
citizens. FPJ was born in Manila on August 20, 1939 hence the 1935 Constitution would apply to his
case. Under the 1935 Constitution, those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines are
deemed to be Philippine citizens. In the case of FPJ, the petitioners contended that FPJ’s father
was Spanish national being a son of a Spanish subject and his mother was an American citizen.They
also contended that since FPJ was an illegitimate child, assuming his father is proven to bea Filipino
citizen, the Philippine citizenship of his father could not be passed on to him because ofthis
condition.There was no evidence presented a
s to when FPJ’s grandfather was born. Although, his
death certificate identified him to be Filipino, resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and was 84 yearsold
at the time of his death in 1954. With this, we could deduce he was born sometime in 1870 andcoul
d have benefited from the en masse Filipinization in 1902. Therefore, FPJ’s father is a Filipinocitizen.
The 1935 Constitution, which applies to FPJ’s case since he was born in 1939, confers
citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether suchchildren are
legitimate or illegitimate.

CASE NO. 6Topic
Title
: Mo Ya Lim Yao vs Commission on Immigration
Citation
: 41 SCRA 29
Facts:
•

On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippinesas a non-
immigrant. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on March 13, 1961.
•

On the date of her arrival, Asher Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 toundertake, among
others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from thePhilippines on or before the expiration
of her authorized period of stay in the country orwithin the period as in his discretion the
Commissioner of Immigration.
•

After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to February 13,1962. On
January 25, 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao aliasEdilberto Aguinaldo Lim, an
alleged Filipino citizen.
•

Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscateher bond and
order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of herauthorized stay, she brought
an action for injunction with preliminary injunction.
•

The Court of First Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. MoyaLim Yao and
Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
Issue:
Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:YES.
Under Section 15 of CA 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of
the Philippines
under Section 4 of the same law.Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently
naturalized here followsthe Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as
Filipino citizen, providedthat she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4.
Whether the alienwoman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel
provision toSection 16.Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies
during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceeding in order to be
considered asa Filipino citizen. It should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the
same privilege. Every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial oradmin
istrative case. Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides thereinas to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed outagain and again
as the occasion may demand.

CASE NO. 7Topic
Title
: Valles vs. COMELEC
Citation
: 337 SCRA 543, G.R. No. 137000 August 9, 2000
Facts:
•

Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934 in Australia to a Filipino father andan Australian
mother.
•

In 1949, at the age of 15, she left Australia and came to settle in the Philippines. She latermarried a
Filipino and has since then participated in the electoral process not only as avoter but as a candidate.
•

In the May 1998 elections, she ran for Governor but Valles filed a petition for herdisqualification as
candidate on the ground that she is not a Filipino
.
Issue:
Whether or not Rosalind is a Filipino.
Ruling:YES.
She is a Filipino.

The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.In here, the child follows the
nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the place ofhis/her birth, as opposed to the
doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or citizenship onthe basis of place of birth. Rosalind
Ybasco Lopez was born a year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect andat that time, what
served as the Constitution of the Philippines were the principal organic acts bywhich the US governed
the country. These were the Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902, and thePhilippine Autonomy Act of Aug.
29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law. Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines who
were Spanish subjects onApril 11, 1899 and resided therein including their children are deemed to be
Philippine citizens.
Private respondent’s father, Telesforo Ybasco, was born on Jan. 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines Norte.
Thus, under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was deemed to be
aPhilippine citizen. By virtue of the same laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth,
Telesforo’s daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of
the Philippines.The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine Constitution has established the principle
of jus sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship.

CASE NO. 8Topic
Title
: Balgamelo Cabiling, et al vs Commissioner
Citation
: GR No. 183133, July 26, 2010
Facts:
•

Balgamelo Cabiling Ma (Balgamelo), Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr. (Felix, Jr.), ValerianoCabiling Ma
(Valeriano), Lechi Ann Ma (Lechi Ann), Arceli Ma (Arceli), Nicolas Ma(Nicolas), and Isidro Ma
(Isidro) are the children of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, a Taiwanese,and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina.
•

They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in the country for almost sixty 60years. They
spent their whole lives, studied, and received their primary and secondaryeducation in the country.
They do not speak nor understand the Chinese language, havenot set foot in Taiwan, and do not know
any relative of their father. They have not eventraveled abroad, and they have already raised their
respective families in the Philippines.
•

When they were still minors, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their AlienCertificates of
Registration (ACRs). When they reached 21 yrs. old, they claimedPhilippine citizenship in accordance
with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935Constitution.
•

The petitioners took their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, however, they failed tohave the
necessary documents registered in the civil registry. It was only on July 27,2005, or more than thirty
(30) years after they elected Philippine citizenship that they didso.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are Filipino citizens.
Ruling:YES. The petitioners are Filipino citizens.
According to Section 1 of C.A. No. 625, the statutoryformalities of electing Philippine citizenship are:
1) a statement of election under oath, 2) an oathof allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the
Philippines and 3) registration of thestatement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry.

In this case, though the petitioners failed to register their election of Philippine citizenshipin the civil
registry, the court held that it should not defeat the election and negate the permanentfact that they have
a Filipino mother. They are considered to be Filipino citizens upon their electionof such citizenship as
registration is not a mode of acquiring a right. It is just a means of confirmingthe fact that citizenship
has been claimed.The court further held that the lacking requirement may still be complied with subject
tothe imposition of appropriate administrative penalties.

CASE NO. 9Topic
: Citizenship
Title
: Aznar vs COMELEC
Citation
: GR No. 83820, May 25, 1990
Facts:
•

On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmeña filed his certificate ofcandidacy with
the COMELEC for the position of Cebu Governor 1988 local electionswhich he later won.
•

Petitioner Jose B. Aznar, filed with the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification ofOsmeña on the
ground that he is allegedly not a Filipino citizen. Aznar presented thefollowing evidence to show
that Osmena is an American citizen: Application for AlienRegistration of the Bureau of Immigration,
Alien Certificate of Registration, Permit toRe-enter the Philippines, and Immigration Certificate of
Clearance.
•

COMELEC dismissed the petition for disqualification for not having been timely filedand for lack
of sufficient proof that Osmena is not a Filipino citizen.
Issue:
Whether or not Osmeña renounced his Filipino citizenship with the mere possession of an
alien passport.
Ruling:NO. Mere possession of an alien passport is not enough proof of renunciation of
Filipinocitizenship.
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, Aznar failed to present direct proof thatOsmena had lost his
Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63.Among others, these are: (1)
by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing
to an oath of allegiance to support theConstitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence,
Osmeña did not lose his Philippinecitizenship by any of the three mentioned above or by any other
mode of losing Philippinecitizenship.In concluding that Osmena had been naturalized as a citizen of the
USA, Aznar merelyrelied on the fact that Osmena was issued alien certificate of registration and was
given clearanceand permit to re-enter the Philippines by the Commission on Immigration and
Deportation. Aznarassumed that because of the foregoing, Osmena is an American and "being an
American", Osmena"must have taken and sworn to the Oath of Allegiance required by the U.S.
Naturalization Laws.By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that Osmena is
a Filipinoremains. It was incumbent upon Aznar to prove that Osmena had lost his Philippine
citizenshiphowever, he failed to positively establish this fact.

CASE NO. 10Topic
: Citizenship - Foundling
Title
: Llamansares vs COMELEC, et al.
Citation
: G.R. No. 221677-22116700, March 11, 2016
Facts:
•

Grace Poe was born in 1968, found as newborn infant in Jaro, Iloilo. She was legallyadopted by FPJ
and Susan Roces in 1974. She then immigrated to the US in 1991 afterher marriage to Theodore
Llamanzares and later became a naturalized American citizen.
•

She returned to the Philippines because of his father’s deteriorating medical condition
and eventual death. She quit her job in the US and went home to the Philippines for goodto be with her
grieving mother.
•

On July 18, 2006, the BI granted her petition declaring that she had reacquired her Filipino citizenship
under RA 9225. She registered as a voter and obtained a newPhilippine Passport. She renounced her
American citizenship to satisfy the RA 9225 requirements as to Reacquistion of Filipino Citizenship.
•

She ran for President on the May 2016 elections and declared she is a natural-bornFilipino citizen.
Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel hercandidacy on the ground particularly
among others, that she cannot be considered anatural born Filipino citizen since she was a foundling
and that her bioligical parents cannot be proved as Filipinos.
•

COMELEC cancelled her candidacy. Hence, the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not a foundling can be a natural-born Filipino citizen.
Ruling:YES
. A foundling can be a natural-born Filipino

.
There is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-
born Filipino. The burden of proof was on private respondents to
show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. Grace Poe’s admission that she is a foundling did not shift the
burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos,
especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are
Filipinos.
There is high probability that Grace Poe’s parents are Filipinos, as being shown in her physical
features which are typical of Filipinos, aside from the fact that she was found as an infant in
Jaro, Iloilo, amunicipality wherein there is 99% probability that residents there are Filipinos,
consequently providing
99% chance that Poe’s biological parents are Filipinos

.
All of the foregoing evidence would indicate more than ample probability, if not statisticalcertainty,
that petitioner's parents are Filipinos. To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not thevirtually
impossible, as the norm. As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.
Sorsogon President Salvador Estuye filed a petition with COMELEC todisqualify Frivaldo on the
grounds that he was a naturalized citizen of the US.
•

Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized as an American citizen but pleaded that he had
soughtAmerican citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. Frivaldo was
consideredas an enemy of the Government at the time and went to the US seeking refuge and
hisnaturalization is not impressed with voluntariness as he went back after the Marcos Regime
to thecountry. He argues that he reacquired his Philippine citizenship by participating in the election.
•

Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative defenses but the respondentCommission
on Elections decided instead by its Order of January 20, 1988, to set the case forhearing on the merits.
His motion for reconsideration was denied in another Order dated February21, 1988, to which Frivaldo
then filed a motion for certiorari and prohibition to the court.
Issue:
Whether or not Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election.
Ruling:NO.
He was considered a foreigner
.
The Local Government Code section 42 indicates that a candidate forlocal elective office must be a
citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where isrunning.Section 117 of the
Omnibus Election Code provides that a qualified voter must be, among otherqualifications, a citizen of
the Philippines, this being an indispensable requirement for suffrage underArticle V, Section 1, of the
Constitution.If the petitioner really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire
Philippinecitizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country.
Under CA No.63, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization,
or by repatriation.This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in
this countrywhile owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the people of
Sorsogondoes not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment
only to thecitizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by
the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especiallyif they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified.
Obviously, this rule requiresstrict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person
seeks to serve in the Republic of thePhilippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only,
abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelityto any other state.
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CASE NO. 12Topic
: Citizenship - Reacquisition
Title
: Tabasa vs Court of Appeals
Citation
: G.R. NO. 125793, August 29, 2006
Facts:
•

Petitioner Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. When he was 7 yrs. old, his
father became a naturalized citizen of the US and by derivative naturalization he also acquired US
Citizenship.
•

In 1995, petitioner went back to the Philippines and was admitted as a "balikbayan" for one year.
Thereafter, he was arrested and detained by an agent of BID. The Consul General of the U.S.Embassy
in Manila filed a request with the BID to apprehend and deport the petitioner on the ground that a
standing warrant for several federal charges has been issued against him, and that his passport has been
revoked.
•

Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction
and/orTemporary Restraining Order. At the time, when the petitioner filed said petition, he was already
35 years old. While the case was pending, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that hehad
acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with R.A. No. 8171, and that because he is
now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the respondent Bureau.
Issue:
Whether petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171.
Ruling:NO.
Petitioner did not reacquire his Filipino citizenship under RA 8171.

The only persons entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 are the following:a. Filipino women who lost
their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens; and b. Natural-born Filipinos including
their minor children who lost their Philippine citizenship onaccount of political or economic
necessity.The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who
losttheir citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said
natural- born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to
political oreconomic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit
his minorchildren according to the law. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to
recover his natural- born citizenship and automatically
vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or bloodrelationship: the children acquire
the citizenship of their parent(s) who are natural-born Filipinos.To claim the benefit of RA 8171,
however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petitionfor repatriation is filed by the parent.
This is so because a child does not have the legal capacity for all actsof civil life much less the capacity
to undertake a political act like the election of citizenship. On their own,the minor children cannot
apply for repatriation or naturalization separately from their parents.

CASE NO. 13Topic
: Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance
Title
: Mercado vs. Manzano
Citation
: 307 SCRA 630; G.R. No. 135083, May 26, 1999
Facts:
•

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates forVice Mayor of
the City of Makati. The proclamation of Edu Manzano was suspended inview of a pending petition for
his disqualification with allegations that respondent was not a Filipino citizen but an American citizen.
•

On May 7, 1998, COMELEC issued a resolution granting the petition and ordered thecancellation of
the COC of private respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen. Under Section 40(d) of the Local
Government Code, those holding dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective local
position.
•

Pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, of the COMELEC, the board of canvasserstabulated the
votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but suspended the proclamation ofthe winner.
•

Subsequently, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. Respondentopposed
contending that at the time of the Elections, the resolution of the COMELECwas not yet final so that,
effectively, petitioner may not be declared the winner evenassuming that Edu Manzano is disqualified
to run for and hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.
Issue:
Whether or not Respondent Manzano is a Filipino citizen and is he qualified to run for ViceMayor.
Ruling:YES.
Edu Manzano is a Filipino citizen and thus qualified to run for the position of Vice Mayorof Makati
.
The COMELEC held that Manzano acquired US citizenship by operation of the USlaws under the
principle of jus soli. His acquisition of his US citizenship was not voluntary. Hewas issued an alien
certificate of registration. This, however, did not result in the loss of hisPhilippine citizenship since he
did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States. It is anundisputed fact that when Manzano
attained the age of majority, he registered himself as a voter,and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995
and 1998, which effectively renounced his US citizenshipunder American law.Article IV Section 5 of
the Constitution provides that dual allegiance of citizens is inimicalto the national interest and shall be
dealt with by law. Dual citizenship is not dual allegiance assuch dual allegiance and not dual
citizenship shall be dealt with by the law.

CASE NO. 14Topic
: Dual Citizenship and Dual Allegiance
Title
: Jacot vs Dal and COMELEC
Citation
: GR No. 179848, November 27, 2008
Facts:
•

Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him fromrunning for the
position of Vice-Mayor in the 2007 Elections, on the ground that he failedto make a personal
renouncement of US citizenship.
•

He was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of theUS. He sought
to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225.
Issue:
Whether or not Nestor Jacot effectively renounced his US citizenship so as to qualify him to runas a
vice-mayor?
Ruling:NO. Petitioner did not effectively renounce his US citizenship.
Under Section 3 of R.A. No.9225, natural-born Filipino citizens who are already naturalized citizens
of a foreign country musttake the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or
retain their Philippinecitizenship.In this provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but
there
it doesn’t
include an expressed renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation might arise underR.A.
No. 9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship by also reacquiring or retaining hisPhilippine
citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship. Such oath of allegiance is substantiallysimilar to the one
contained in the COC which must be executed by any person who wishes to runfor public office in
Philippine elections.In this case,
the petitioner’s
oath of allegiance to the Philippines made before the LosAngeles PCG and his COC do not
substantially comply with the requirement of a personal andsworn renunciation of foreign citizenship
because these are distinct requirements to be compliedwith for different purposes. The law
categorically requires persons seeking elective public office,who either retained their Philippine
citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal andsworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship before a public officer authorized toadminister an oath simultaneous with or before the
filing of the certificate of candidacy.

CASE NO. 15Topic
: Doctrine of Parens Patriae
Title
: Soriano vs Laguardia
Citation
: G.R. No. 164785, April 29, 2009; 587 SCRA 79
Facts:
•

On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang DatingDaan, aired on
UNTV 37, made obscene remarks against INC.
•

Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavitcomplaintswere lodged by
Jessie L. Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members ofthe Iglesia ni Cristo (INC),
against Soriano in connection with the above broadcast.
•

Respondent Michael M. Sandoval, who felt directly alluded to in petitioner’s remark, was
then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan.
•

The MTRCB found Soriano liable for his utterances and imposed on him a three-monthsuspension
from his program.
Issue:
Whether or not the suspension by the MTRCB is invalid for violation of freedom of religion,speech,
and expression.
Ruling:NO. The suspension is valid and constitutional.
Article 3 of the Constitution provides that “no
law shall be made respecting the establishment of a religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof… and no law
shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the
press…”

In this case, there is nothing in Soriano’s statements expressing religious belief. The fact
that he came out with his statements in a televised bible exposition program does not automatically
accord them the character of religious discourse. Plain and simple insults directed at another person
cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech. Consequently, Soriano’s statement can be
treated as obscene, at least taking into consideration that the program is for general viewership andin a
timeslot that would likely reach even the eyes and ears of children, exposing them to alanguage that is
unacceptable in everyday use. In this sense, the Court finds such utterances notentitled to protection
under the umbrella of freedom of speech. Freedom of religion as well as of speech and expression, like
any other rights, are not absolute. They may be regulated to some extent to serve important public
interests. Arrayed against the freedom of speech is the right of the youth to their moral, spiritual,
intellectual, and social being which the State is constitutionally tasked to promote and protect. As such,
the welfare of the children and the State’s mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae
, constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating TV broadcast.

CASE NO. 16Topic
: Sovereignty and the Theory of Auto-limitation
Title
: Tañada vs Angara
Citation
: G.R. No. 118295, May 2, 1997
Facts:
•

On April 15, 1994, Rizalino Navarro, the Secretary of DTI signed the Final Act Embodying the results
of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations.
•

By signing the Final Act, the Philippines is bound to submit to its respective competent authorities the
WTO Agreements to seek approval. On December 14, 1994, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 97
to ratify the WTO agreement.
•

This is a petition seeking to nullify the ratification of the WTO Agreement.
•

Petitioners question the concurrence of the respondents acting in their capacities as Senators by signing
the said agreement and the constitutionality of the WTO agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not sovereignty can be limited by international laws and treaties.
Ruling: YES. Sovereignty can be limited by international laws and treaties.
While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level,
it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly
or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. One of the oldest and most fundamental rules in
international law is
pacta sunt servanda
-- international agreements must be performed in goodfaith. A state which has contracted valid
international obligations is bound to make in itslegislations such modifications as may be necessary to
ensure the fulfillment of the obligationsundertaken.By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or
restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. Bytheir voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of
their state power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from
a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, livewith coequals, and in pursuit of mutually
covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonlyagree to limit the exercise of their otherwise
absolute rights.The sovereignty of a state therefore cannot in fact and in reality, be considered
absolute.Certain restrictions enter into the picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of
membershipin the family of nations and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations.A portion of
sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the
rationale that the Philippines “adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation,and
amity wit
h all nations.”

CASE NO. 17Topic
: Doctrine of Non-Suability of the State
Title
: Tan vs. Director of Forestry
Citation
: G.R. No. L-24548. October 27, 1983
Facts:
•

Bureau of Forestry initiated a public bidding on a certain tract of public forest land wherein petitioner
submitted his bid application. Questions were raised on the wisdom of the forest land to be declared as
a forest reserve or continue with the public bidding to open the said area for timber exploitation under
license and regulation.
•

On April 15, 1963,
petitioner was awarded the timber license by the Director of Forestry without the approval of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources.
•

On March 9, 1964, the Secretary acting on a case filed by another bidder against the petitioner,
promulgated an order declaring the license issued to the petitioner void abinitio. Petitioner filed for
motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Secretary.Thus, petitioner filed a case in court.
•

Petitioner claims that the respondent unlawfully acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, and/or
with grave abuse of discretion by revoking a valid and existing timber
license without just cause, and in eﬀect, impaired the obligation of contracts. Petitioner
prays for declaring the orders of the Secretary, as well as all his acts and those of theDirector of
Forestry implementing said orders, null and void. He is also asking for therespondent to pay him for
pecuniary damage, moral and exemplary damages, andattorney's fees and costs.
•

The respondent filed a motion to dismiss and one of their grounds was that the State isimmune from
suit without its consent. The court decided in favor of the respondent.
Issues:
Whether or not the petitioner’s action in court is a suit against the State
and should be dismissed.
Ruling:YES.
The petitioner failed to note that his action is a suit against the State which, under theDoctrine of State
Immunity, the case cannot prosper unless the State gives its consent to be sued.This rule cannot be
circumvented by directing the action against the officers of the State insteadof against the State itself
which is clearly demonstrated on this case. Based on the facts presented,it was shown that the suit filed
by the respondent really affects the property rights, or interests ofthe State and not merely those of the
officers of the State, like the government losing its timberresources and the request of the petitioner for
monetary claims for damages. This being the case, petitioner's suit cannot prosper and suit should be
dismissed.

CASE NO. 18Topic
Title
: Mobile Philippines Inc. vs Customs Arrastre Service
Citation
: 18 SCRA 1120; G.R. No. L-23139, December 17, 1966
Facts:
•

Four cases of rotary drill parts were shipped from abroad consigned to Mobil Philippines.It was
discharged to the custody of the Customs Arrastre Service, the unit of the Bureauof Customs then
handling arrastre operations therein. The Customs Arrastre Service laterdelivered to the broker of
the consignee three cases only.
•

Petitioner filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila against the Customs ArrastreService and
the BOC to recover the value of the undelivered case plus other damages.
•

The respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that not being persons under thelaw, they
cannot be sued.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents can invoke state immunity.
Ruling:YES.
The fact that a non-corporate government entity performs a function proprietary in naturedoes not
necessarily result in its being suable. If said non-governmental function is undertaken asan incident to
its governmental function, there is no waiver thereby of the sovereign immunityfrom suit extended to
such government entity.The Bureau of Customs is part of the Department of Finance with no
personality of its ownapart from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental,
that of assessingand collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs
duties, fees,charges, fines and penalties. To this function, arrastre service is a necessary incident.

CASE NO. 19Topic
Title
: National Airports Corp vs Teodoro
Citation
: 91 Phil 203; G.R. No. L-5122, April 30, 1952
Facts:
•

The National Airports Corporation was organized under RA No. 224, which expresslymade the
provisions of the Corporation Law applicable to the said corporation. It wasabolished by EO No.
365 and in its place the Civil Aeronautics Administration wascreated. Before the abolition, the PAL
paid to the National Airports Corporation P65,245as fees for landing and parking for the period up to
and including July 31, 1948. Thesefees are said to have been due and payable to the Capitol
Subdivision, Inc., who ownedthe land used by the National Airports Corporation as airport. The owner
commenced anaction in the court against the PAL.
•

PAL countered with a third-party complaint against the National Airports Corporation,which by that
time had been dissolved, and served summons on the Civil AeronauticsAdministration. PAL alleged
that it had paid to the National Airports Corporation the feesclaimed by the Capitol Subdivision, Inc.
•

The Solicitor General, after answering the third party complaint, filed a motion to dismisson the ground
that the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the thirdparty complaint, first,
because the National Airports Corporation “has lost its juridical personality,” and,
second, because agency of the Republic of the Philippines, unincorporated and not possessing juridical
personality under the law, is incapable of suing and being sued.
Issue:
Whether or not the Civil Aeronautics Administration can be subject to the suit.
Ruling:YES.
The Supreme Court ruled that the Civil Aeronautics Administration comes under thecategory of a
private entity. Although not a corporate body, it was created not to maintain anecessary function of
government, but to run what is essentially a business. Even if revenues isnot its prime objective but
rather the promotion of travel and the convenience of the traveling public. It is engaged in an enterprise
which, far from being the exclusive prerogative of state, may,more than the construction of public
roads, be undertaken by private concerns.In the light of a well-established precedents, and as a matter
of simple justice to the partieswho dealt with the National Airports Corporation on the faith of equality
in the enforcement oftheir mutual commitments, the Civil Aeronautics Administration may not, and
should not, claimfor itself the privileges and immunities of the sovereign state.

CASE NO. 20Topic
Title
: China National Machinery & Equipment vs Sta. Maria
Citation
: GR No. 185572, April 24, 2012
Facts:
•

Petitioner CNMEG was designated by the Republic of China as its prime contractor forthe Northrail
project of the Republic of the Philippines. They entered into a ContractAgreement with the North
Luzon Railways Corporation for the construction of the said project. A subsequent loan agreement was
also contracted between the Philippinegovernment and the EXIM bank as part of the MOU executed
between the Philippinegovernment and China wherein they agreed to finance the project.

•

Respondents filed a complaint for Annulment of Contract against CNMEG together withthe
government agencies involved with the project. They alleged that the contractagreement and the loan
agreement was unconstitutional.
•

Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss citing the trial court did not have jurisdiction as it isimmune from
suit. The RTC denied their motion and was concurred by the CA. Hence,this instant petition for
Review on certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not CNMEG is entitled to immunity from suit.
Ruling:NO.
The court explained the doctrine of state immunity based on the newer restrictive theorywhich the
Philippines adheres to. The immunity of the state is recognized only with regards to public acts or acts
jure imperii of a state, but not with regards to private acts or acts jure gestionis.Simply put, acts
governmental in nature are immune from suits however commercial, private, and proprietary acts are
not covered in this doctrine.Since the Philippines adheres to this restrictive theory, the petitioner have
to ascertain thelegal acts they performed with the various government agencies is governmental in
nature.However, a thorough examination of the facts would show that CNMEG, although being
declaredas the prime contractor by the Republic of China, is engaged in proprietary activity. For one,
itwas CNMEG who initiated the undertaking of the Northrail project and not the Chinesegovernment as
confirmed by the Chinese ambassador. Second, the loan agreement entered into byEXIM bank and
the Philippine government contained an express waiver of authority.Thus, piecing together the contents
and tenor of the Contract Agreement, the statement ofthe Chinese Ambassador, and the loan agreement
would reveal the desire of CNMEG to constructthe project in pursuit of a purely commercial activity
performed in the ordinary course of its business. Even though assuming that CNMEG was performing
a governmental function, it doesnot automatically immune from suit. Immunity from suit is determined
by the character of theobjects for which the entity was organized.
CASE NO. 21Topic

Title
: Professional Video, Inc., vs. TESDA
Citation
: G.R. No. 155504, June 26, 2009
Facts:
•

TESDA’s conducted two (2) public biddings for the printing and encoding of PVC cards
but it resulted to failed biddings. Because of this the PBAC recommended that TESDAenter into a
negotiated contract with PROVI, entity engaged in the sale of hightechnology equipment, information
technology products and broadcast devices, includingthe supply of plastic card printing and security
facilities.
•

On December 29, 1999, TESDA and PROVI signed and executed their contract ofservice for the
provision of goods and services in the printing and encoding of PVCcards. TESDA would in return pay
PROVI Php 39,475,00 within fifteen (15) days after
TESDA’s acceptance of the contracted goods and services. However, TESDA paid
PROVI only P3,739,500.00, leaving an outstanding balance of P35,735,500.00.
•

PROVI filed a complaint for sum of money with damages against TESDA. The RTCgranted PR
OVI’s prayer and issued a writ of preliminary attachment against the
properties of TESDA not exempt from execution in the amount of P35, 000,000.00.
•

TESDA responded by filing a Motion to Discharge/Quash the Writ of Attachment,arguing mainly that
public funds cannot be the subject of garnishment. The RTC denied
TESDA’s motion. Hence, the petition.

Issue:
Whether or not TESDA can invoke the doctrine of immunity from suit.
Ruling:YES.
TESDA replaced and absorbed the National Manpower and Youth Council, the Bureau ofTechnical
and Vocational Education and the personnel and functions pertaining to technical-vocational education
in the regional offices of the Department of Education, Culture and Sportsand the apprenticeship
program of the Bureau of Local Employment of the DOLE. Thus, TESDAis an unincorporated
instrumentality of the government operating under its own charter.Under these terms, both
constitutional and statutory, we do not believe that the role andstatus of TESDA can seriously be
contested: it is an unincorporated instrumentality of thegovernment, directly attached to the DOLE
through the participation of the Secretary of Labor asits Chairman, for the performance of
governmental functions. As an unincorporatedinstrumentality operating under a specific charter, it is
equipped with both express and implied powers, and all State immunities fully apply to it.TESDA, as
an agency of the State, cannot be sued without its consent.
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CASE NO. 22Topic
: Doctrine of Non-Suability of the State - Can LGUs be sued?
Title
: Municipality of San Fernando vs Judge Firme
Citation
: 195 SCRA 692; G.R. No. L-52179, April 8, 1991
Facts:
•

A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney owned by the Estate of Macario Nieveras, a gravel
and sand truck owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck ofthe Municipality of San
Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig. Due to theimpact, several passengers of the jeepney
including Laureano Baniña Sr. died and fourothers suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
•

On December 11, 1966, the private respondents instituted a compliant for damagesagainst the Estate of
Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver,respectively, of the passenger jeepney.
However, the aforesaid defendants filed a ThirdParty Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of
a dump truck of petitioner.

•

Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of actionand non-
suability of the State.

Issue:
Whether or not the Municipality of San Fernando may be sued.
Ruling:NO.
The doctrine of non-suability of the State is expressly provided for in Article XVI, Section 3 of
theConstitution, to wit: "the State may not be sued without its consent."Stated in simple parlance, the
general rule is that the State may not be sued except when it givesconsent to be sued. Consent takes the
form of express or implied consent.Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The
standing consent of theState to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising from contracts
is found in Act No. 3083.A special law may be passed to enable a person to sue the government for an
alleged quasi-delict.Suability depends on the consent of the state to be sued, liability on the applicable
law and theestablished facts. The circumstance that a state is suable does not necessarily mean that it is
liable; on theother hand, it can never be held liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not
conceded by themere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does waive its
sovereign immunity, itis only giving the plaintiff the chance to prove, if it can, that the defendant is
liable.Is the municipality liable for the torts committed by its employee? The test of liability of
themunicipality depends on whether or not the driver, acting in behalf of the municipality, is
performinggovernmental or proprietary functions.

CASE NO. 23Topic
Title
: USA vs. Guinto
Citation
: 182 SCRA 644
Facts:
•

On February 24, 1986, the Western Pacific Contracting Office, Okinawa Area Exchange, U.S.Air
Force, solicited bids for such contracts through its contracting officer, James F. Shaw. Amongthose that
submitted their bids were the private respondents.
•

The bidding was won by Ramon Dizon, over the objection of the private respondents, whoclaimed that
he had made a bid for four facilities, including the Civil Engineering Area, whichwas not included in
the invitation to bid.
•

The private respondents complained to the Philippine Area Exchange (PHAX). The latter,through its
representatives petitioners Reeves and Shouse, explained that the Civil Engineeringconcession had not
been awarded to Dizon as a result of the February 24
th
solicitation. Dizon wasalready operating this concession and the expiration of the contract had been
extended. Privaterespondents filed a case to compel PHAX to cancel the award to Dizon, to conduct a
rebidding,and by a writ of preliminary injunction to continue operation of concessions pending
litigation
•

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the action was in effect a suit against theUnited
States of America, which had not waived its non-suability. The individual defendant, asofficial
employees of the US Air Force, were also immune from suit.
•

Trial court denied the petition on the basis that the Court's attention is called by the
relationship between the plaintiffs as well as the defendants, including the US Government, in that
prior to the bidding or solicitation in question, there was a binding contract between the plaintiffs as
well asthe defendants, including the US Government.
Issue:
•

Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit.
Ruling:NO.
The petitioner is not immune from suit.

The rule that a state may not be sued without itsconsent, now expressed in Article XVI, Section 3, of
the 1987 Constitution, is one of the generallyaccepted principles of international law that we have
adopted as part of the law of our land underArticle II, Section 2.Even without such affirmation, we
would still be bound by the generally accepted principles of international law under the doctrine
of incorporation. Under this doctrine,
as accepted by most states, such principles are deemed incorporated in the law of every civilized
state as acondition and consequence of its membership in the society of nations. Upon its admission to
suchsociety, the state is automatically obligated to comply with these principles in its relations
withother states.The consent of the state to be sued may be manifested expressly or impliedly.
Expressconsent may be embodied in a general law or a special law. Consent is implied when the
stateenters a contract or it itself commences litigation.

CASE NO. 24Topic:
Doctrine of Non-Suability of the State
Title:
Republic of Indonesia vs Vinzon
Citation:
GR No. 54705, June 26, 2003
Facts:
•

Petitioner, Republic of Indonesia, represented by its Counsellor, entered into aMaintenance of
Agreement with respondent Vinzon, stating that the latter shall maintain
specified equipment at the former’s Embassy and the Wisma Duta, official residence of
petitioner Ambassador Soeratmin.
•

Before the expiration of said agreement, the incoming Chief of Administration, MinisterCounsellor
Kasim, found respondent’s work and services unsatisfactory. Hence, the
Indonesian Embassy terminated the agreement.
•

Respondent claims that the termination was arbitrary and unlawful and filed a complaintagainst
petitioners. In turn, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss, alleging that theRepublic of Indonesia, as a
foreign sovereign State, has sovereign immunity from suitand cannot be sued as party-defendant in the
Philippines, that Ambassador Soeratmin andMinister Counsellor Kasim are diplomatic agents and
therefore enjoy diplomaticimmunity.
•

Respondent filed an Opposition alleging that the Republic of Indonesia has expressly
waived its immunity from suit. The trial court denied herein petitioner’s Motion and was
brought up to the Court of Appeals. The petition was again denied by the CA as well as
petitioner’s following motion for reconsideration. Hence, this case was brought to the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
•

Whether or not the Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunityfrom suit.
Ruling:YES.
The Republic of Indonesia can invoke the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit. By the principle
of the sovereign equality of States, as expressed in the maxim
“par in parem non habet
imperium
,” all states are sovereign equals and cannot a
ssert jurisdiction over one another, for acontrary attitude would unduly vex the peace of nations.
Subject to restrictive theory, it holds thatthe immunity of the sovereign is recognized only regarding
public acts or acts
jure imperii
, asopposed to private acts or acts
jure gestionis
.There is no dispute that the establishment of a diplomatic mission is an act
jure imperii
, itsestablishment encompasses its maintenance and upkeep and clearly a pursuit of a sovereignactivity.
Further, the existence alone, of a paragraph in a contract stating that any legal actionarising out of an
agreement shall be settled according to the laws of the Philippines and by aspecified court of the
Philippines, is not necessarily a waiver of sovereign immunity from suit.

CASE NO. 25Topic:
Title:
USA vs Ruiz
Citation:
136 SCRA 487
Facts:
•

The United States of America had a naval base in Subic, Zambales. The base was one ofthose provided
in the Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines and the US.
•

Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US for the construction ofwharves in
said base that was wrongly awarded to another group.
•

For this reason, a suit for specific performance was filed by him against the US.
Issue:
•

Whether or not the United States Naval Base may be able to invoke state immunity.
Ruling:YES.
The traditional rule of State immunity exempts a state from being sued in the courts ofanother state
without its consent or waiver. This rule is a necessary consequence of the principlesof independence
and equality of states. However, the rules of international law are not petrified;they are constantly
developing and evolving. And because the activities of states have multiplied,it has been necessary to
distinguish them
—
between sovereign and governmental acts and private,commercial, and proprietary acts. The result is
that state immunity now extends only to sovereignand governmental acts.The restrictive application of
state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise outof commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign, its commercial activities, or economic affairs.A state may be said to have descended to the
level of an individual and can thus be deemed to havetacitly given its consent to be sued only when it
enters business contracts. It does not apply wherethe contract relates the exercise of its sovereign
function. In this case, the projects are an
integral part of the naval base which is devoted to the defense of both the US and the Philippines,indisp
utably a function of the government of the highest order; they are not utilized for nordedicated to
commercial or business purposes.

CASE NO. 26Topic:
Title:
Amigable vs Cuenca
Citation:
43 SCRA 360
Facts:
•

Victoria Amigable, the appellant herein, is the registered owner of Lot No. 639 of theBanilad Estate in
Cebu City. Without prior expropriation or negotiated sale, thegovernment used a portion of said lot,
with an area of 6,167 square meters, for theconstruction of the Mango and Gorordo Avenues.
•

Amigable filed a complaint against the Republic of the Philippines and Nicolas Cuenca,in his capacity
as Commissioner of Public Highways, for the recovery of ownership and possession the land plus
damages.
•

The trial court rendered its decision holding that it had no jurisdiction over the plaintiff'scause of action
for the recovery of possession and ownership of the portion of her lot inquestion on the ground that the
government cannot be sued without its consent.
•

Accordingly, the complaint was dismissed. Unable to secure a reconsideration, the plaintiff appealed to
the Court of Appeals, which subsequently certified the case to theSC, there being no question of fact
involved.
Issue:
•

Whether or not the appellant may properly sue the government.
Ruling:YES.
Where the government takes away property from a private landowner for public use withoutgoing
through the legal process of expropriation or negotiated sale, the aggrieved party
may properly maintain a suit against the government without thereby violating the doctrine ofgovernme
ntal immunity from suit without its consent.The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot
serve as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice on a citizen.It is not too much to say that when the
government takes any property for public use, whichis conditioned upon the payment of just
compensation, to be judicially ascertained, it makesmanifest that it submits to the jurisdiction of a
court. There is no thought then that the doctrine ofimmunity from suit could still be appropriately
invoked.Considering that no annotation in favor of the government appears at the back of hercertificate
of title and that she has not executed any deed of conveyance of any portion of her lotto the
government, the appellant remains the owner of the whole lot. As registered owner, shecould bring an
action to recover possession of the portion of land in question at anytime because possession is one of
the attributes of ownership

CASE NO. 27Topic:
Title:
Department of Agriculture vs NLRC
Citation:
G.R. No. 104296, March 29, 1996
Facts:
•

Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered a contract forsecurity
services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity.
•

On September 13, 1990, several guards of Sultan Security Agency filed a complaint forunderpayment
of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shiftdifferential pay, holiday
pay, and overtime pay, as well as damages.
•

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding petitioner and Sultan Security Agency jointly liable for
the claims of the complainant security guards. The Department ofAgriculture and the security agency
did not appeal and made the decision final andexecutory.
•

The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution, 5 commanding the City Sheriff to enforceand execute the
judgment against the property of the two respondents.
•

A petition for injunction, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary writ ofinjunction, was
led by the petitioner with the NLRC and contended that the Labor Arbiterhas no jurisdiction over them
and that the decision should be null and void.
•

The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waivedits immunity
from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency.
Issue:
•

Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State is applicable?
Ruling:NO.
The DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a governmentalentity when
it entered the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in
character. The claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims. Act No.3083
gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed claim involving liability arisingfrom
contract, express or implied. Pursuant, however, to Commonwealth Act 327, as amended byPD 1145,
the money claim must first be brought to the Commission on Audit.The Supreme Court granted the
petition of the petitioner. The writ of execution directedagainst the property of the Department of
Agriculture is nullified, and the public respondents arehereby enjoined permanently from doing,
issuing and implementing any and all writs of executionissued pursuant to the decision rendered by
the Labor Arbiter against said petitioner.

CASE NO. 28Topic:
State Principles and Policies - Adherence to International Law (Incorporation Clause)
Title:
Kuroda vs Jalandoni
Citation:
83 Phil 171, March 26, 1949
Facts:
•

Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda was a former Japanese Lt. General and CommandingGeneral of the
Japanese Imperial Forces from 1943 to 1944 in the Philippines. He wastried before the Philippine
Military Commission for War Crimes and other atrocitiescommitted against military and civilians.
The military commission was established underExecutive Order 68.
•

Petitioner assails the validity of EO 68 arguing it is unconstitutional. Hence, the MilitaryCommission
did not have the jurisdiction to try him on the grounds that the Philippines isnot a signatory to
the Hague Convention (War Crimes).
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 68 is constitutional.
Ruling:YES.
EO 68 is constitutional hence the Military Commission has jurisdiction to try Kuroda. EO68 was
enacted by the President in accordance with Sec. 3, Art. 2 of the Constitution whichrenounces war as
an instrument of national policy.It is in accordance with generally accepted principles of international
law including theHague Convention, the Geneva Convention, and other international jurisprudence
established bythe UN. This includes the principle that all persons, military or civilian, who are guilty of
planning, preparing, waging a war of aggression, and other similar offenses in violation of laws
and customsof war. The Philippines may not be a signatory to the 2 conventions at that time but the
rules andregulations of both are wholly based on the generally accepted principles of international
lawwhich the Philippines adheres to.

CASE NO. 29Topic:
State Principles and Policies - Adherence to International Law (Incorporation Clause)
Title:
Philip-Morris vs. CA
Citation:
G.R. No. 91332, July 16, 1993
Facts:
•

Petitioner Philip Morris Inc. is a corporation organized under the laws of the US and is theregistered
owner of the trademark MARK VII for cigarettes. Benson and Hedges (Canada),a subsidiary of Philip
Morris, is the registered owner of the trademark MARK TEN forcigarettes. Another subsidiary of
Philip Morris, the Swiss Company Fabriques de TabacReunies, is the assignee of the trademark LARK.
Fortune Tobacco Corporation, a companyorganized in the Philippines, manufactures and sells
cigarettes using the trademark MARK.
•

Petitioner filed a complaint for trademark infringement and damages against FortuneTobacco
Corporation which was dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners went on appeal to
the CA but CA affirmed the trial court’s decision. The CA found that MARK VII, MARK
TEN and LARK do not qualify as well-known marks entitled to protection even withoutthe benefit of
actual use in the local market and that the similarities in the trademarks inquestion are insufficient as to
cause deception or confusion tantamount to infringement.
•

With the motion for reconsideration denied in the CA, the petitioners filed a petition forreview with the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent committed trademark infringement against petitioners.
Ruling:NO.
A trademark is any distinctive word, name, symbol, emblem, sign, or device, or anycombination
thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant on his goods to identify anddistinguish them
from those manufactured, sold, or dealt in by others. Inarguably, trademarkdeserves protection.
It is for this reason that the petitioner’s recourse for their entitlement to enforce
trademark rights in this country and the right to sue for trademark infringement in Philippine courtsand
be accorded protection against unauthorized use of the Philippine-registered trademarks
isunderstandable.Philippines adherence to the Paris Convention obligates the country to honor and
enforceits provisions, however, this does not automatically entitle petitioners to the protection of their
trademark in our country without actual use of the marks in local commerce and trade because
any protection accorded must be made subject to the limitations of Philippine laws.Under the doctrine
of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given equal standing, not
superior, to national legislative enactments. The fact that internationallaw has been made part of the
law of the land does not imply the primacy of international law overnational law in the municipal
sphere.

CASE NO. 30Topic:
State Principles and Policies - Conflict of Municipal Law vs International Law
Title:
Ichong vs Hernandez
Citation:
101 Phil 1155, May 31, 1957
Facts:
•

RA No. 1180 known as, “An Act to Regulate Retail Business” was enacted which nationalizes the
retail trade business by prohibiting against aliens, as well as associations, partnerships orcorporations
the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from engaging directly or
indirectly in the retail trade with the exception of aliens who are already engaged in said business on
May 15, 1954 as well as U.S. citizens and juridical entities. It also prohibits against the establishment
or opening by aliens already engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail
business. Aliens are required to present registration to the proper authorities a verified statement
concerning their businesses.
•

Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships adversely affected by the law, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that
said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under
him, particularly city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner contends
among others, that the law denies alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their
liberty and property without due process of law.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 1180 is constitutional.
Ruling:
YES, it is constitutional. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
oflaw, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Section 1, Article III, 1987
Constitution)The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, aswell as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It does not demand absolute equality among
residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances
and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is no
t infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it
applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction
between those who fall within such class and those who do not.The Court held that the disputed law
was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance
and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control. The
enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State,thru which and by which it
protects its own personality and insures its security and future. The law does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between
alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because
the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the
occupation and reasonably protects their privilege.

CASE NO. 31Topic:
State Principles and Policies - Conflict of Municipal Law vs International Law
Title:
Gonzales vs Hechanova
Citation:
9 SCRA 230
Facts:
•

The Philippines entered into two executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of
rice without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the National Economic
Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice.
•

Then Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the importation of 67,000 tons of rice from
abroad to the detriment of our local planters.
•

Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association assailed the
executive agreements. Gonzales averred that Hechanova is without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction”, because
RA 3452 prohibits the importation of

rice and corn by “the Rice and Corn Administration or any other government agency.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 3452 can prevail over the 2 Executive Agreements?
Ruling:YES.
In case of conflict between international law and municipal law, efforts should first be exerted to
harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted
with proper regard for the generally accepted principles of international law in observance of the
incorporation clause. In a situation, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made
between a rule of international law and a municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law
should be upheld by the municipal courts, for the reason that such courts are organs of municipal law
and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances.In other words, our Constitution authorizes the
nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the fundamental law, but, also, when it runs
counter to an act of Congress.

CASE NO. 32Topic:
State Principles and Policies - Separation of Church and State
Title:
Ebralinag vs Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu
Citation:
251 SCRA 569
Facts:
•

The petitioners were expelled from their classes by the public school authorities in Cebu for refusing to
salute the flag, sing the national anthem and recite the patriotic pledge as required by RA 1265 (An Act
making flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions) and by DO No. 8 (Rules and
Regulations for Conducting the Flag Ceremony in All Educational Institutions) of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports(DECS) making the flag ceremony compulsory in all educational
institutions.
•

Jehovah's Witnesses admitted that they taught their children not to salute the flag, sing the national
anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for they believe that those are "acts ofworship" or "religious
devotion" which they "cannot conscientiously give to anyone orany thing except God". They consider
the flag as an image or idol representing the State.They think the action of the local authorities in
compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends constitutional limitations on the State's power and
invades the sphere of the intellect and spirit which the Constitution protect against official control.
Issue:
Whether or not the school children who are members of a religious sect may be expelled from school
for disobedience of RA 1265 and DO No. 8.
Ruling:NO.

Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority and the amplest
protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The sole
justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious freedom is the existence of a
grave and present danger of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety,
public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest, that the State has a right and duty to
prevent." Absent such a threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not
justified. The Court is not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses from saluting the flag,
singing the national anthem and reciting the patriotic pledge, will shake up our part of the globe and
suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in and unimbued with reverence for theflag,
patriotism, love of country and admiration for national heroes". Expelling or banning the petitioners
from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation that this Court had feared in Gerona.
Forcing a small religious group, through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that
violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of country or respect for dully
constituted authorities.

CASE NO. 33Topic:
State Principles and Policies - Separation of Church and State

Title:
Ymbong vs Ochoa
Citation:
G.R. No. 294819, April 8, 2014
Facts:
•

Despite calls to withhold support, R.A. No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
•

Petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds: The RH Law
violates the right to life of the unborn, the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous
products, and to religious freedom, equal protection clause, involuntary servitude, among others.
•

While the petitioners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that
the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the"compelling state interest test" to
justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.
•
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional.
Issue:
Whether or not the RH law is unconstitutional.
Ruling:NO.
The Court does not find the RH Law unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to
medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care
services, methods, devices, and supplies.However, the religious freedom of some sectors of society
cannot be trampled upon
in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom
is a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.In conformity with the
principle of separation of Church and State, one religious groupcannot be allowed to impose its beliefs
on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leavesenough room for diversity and pluralism. As
such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may continue to reign
as we exist alongside each other.

CASE NO. 34Topic:
Legislative Department - Reserved lawmaking power
Title:
Santiago vs. COMELEC
Citation:
270 SCRA 106 (1997)
Facts:
•

Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of People’s Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and
Action (PIRMA), filed with COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits
of elective officials, through People’s Initiative.
•

He based this petition on Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of
the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the Constitution. Subsequently the
COMELEC issued an order directing the publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and
thereafter set the case for hearing.
•

The petitioners Senator Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin petition rising the
several arguments, such as the following:
(1) The constitutional provision on people’s initiative to amend the constitution can only be
implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed;
(2) That R.A. 6735 does not sufficeas an enabling law on people’s initiative on the Constitution, unlike
in the other modes of initiative.
Issue:
Whether or not RA No. 6735 is sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by people’s
initiative.
Ruling:NO.
RA No. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Under
the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to amend. The people are not
accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution"
through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions."
The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed"
denotes that RA No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Also, while the law
provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no
subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is
initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No.6735 were intended to fully provide
for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a
subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values,
the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important
than the initiative on national and local laws.

CASE NO. 35Topic:

Legislative Department
–
On Party-List
Title:
Barangay Association for National Advancement (BANAT) vs COMELEC
Citation:
G.R. 179271, April 21, 2009
Facts:
•

On 27 June 2002, Baranggay Association for National Advancement and Transparency(BANAT) filed
before the National Board of Canvassers (NBC) a petition to proclaim the full number of party list
representatives provided by the Constitution. However, the recommendation of the head of the legal
group of COMELEC’s national board ofcanvassers to declare the petition moot and academic was
approved by the COMELEC en banc.
•

BANAT filed for petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the resolution of COMELEC to their
petition to proclaim the full number of party list representatives provided by the Constitution.
•

The COMELEC, sitting as the NBC, promulgated a resolution proclaiming thirteen (13) parties
as winners in the party-list elections in May 2007. The COMELEC announced that,upon completion of
the canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the total number of seats of each winning party,
organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans Federation Party v. COMELEC formula.
•

Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through Action,Cooperation and
Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher) asked theCOMELEC, acting as NBC, to
reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula. COMELEC denied the consideration.
•

Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher filed for certiorari with mandamus and prohibition assailing the
resolution of the COMELEC in its decision to use the Veterans formula.
Issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional?
4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-listelections?
If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-listelections?

Ruling:
(1) Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 mandates the filling up of the entire 20% allocation of party-
list representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in paragraph 1, Sec 5 of Art VI, left the
determination of the number of the members of the House of Representatives to Congress. The 20%
allocation of party-list representatives is merely a ceiling; party-listrepresentatives cannot be more then
20% of the members of the House of Representatives.
(2) No. We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional seats, the continued operation of the two
percent threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second clauseof Sec 11(b)
of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two percent threshold makesit mathematically
impossible to achieve the maximum number of available party-list seats when the available party-list
seat exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent threshold in the distribution of the
additional seats frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that 20% of the members of the
House of Representatives shall consist of party-list representatives. We therefore strike down the two
percent threshold only in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as found in the second
clause of Sec 11 (b) of RA 7941. The two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Sec 5 (2), Art VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interestsin the House of Representatives.”
(3) No. Neither the Constitution nor RA 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the
party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political
parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. However, by voteof 8-7, the
Court decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating
in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

CASE NO. 36Topic:
–
On Party-List
Title:
Atong Paglaum, Inc. vs COMELEC
Citation:
G.R. No. 2003766, April 2, 2013
Facts:
•

In a Resolution dated 5 December 2012, the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the COMELEC Second
Division's resolution to grant Partido ng Bayan ng Bida's (PBB) registration and accreditation as a
political party in the National Capital Region. However, PBB was denied participation in the 13
May 2013 party-list elections because PBB does not represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector; PBB failed to apply for registration as a party-list group; and PBB failed to
establish its track record as an organization that seeks to up lift the lives of the "marginalized and
underrepresented." 20 SDHCac
•

These 13 petitioners (ASIN, Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI,ALONA, ALAM,
KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) were not able to secure a mandatory injunction from this
Court. The COMELEC, on 7 January 2013 issued Resolution No. 9604, 21 and excluded the names of
these 13 petitioners in the printing of the official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
•

Pursuant to paragraph 2 22 of Resolution No. 9513, the COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary
evidentiary hearings to determine whether the groups and organizations that filed manifestations of
intent to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections have continually complied with the
requirements of R.A. No. 7941 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC (Ang
Bagong Bayani).
•

The 39 petitioners were able to secure a mandatory injunction from this Court, directing the
COMELEC to include the names of these 39 petitioners in the printing of the
official ballot for the 13 May 2013 party-list elections. Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
Issue:
Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
Ruling:NO.
The COMELEC did not committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 party-list
elections.The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani and
BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the COMELEC as the Supreme
Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some principles established in the two cases.
The new guidelines are as follows: In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following
parameters:

Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: national parties or organizations,
regional parties or organizations, and sectoral parties or organizations.
National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to organize
along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented” sector.
Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the party-list system
and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or not, that
fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list elections only through its
sectoral wing that can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
independent sectoral party, and is linked to a political party through a coalition.
Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking

in“well-defined political constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains to the
special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are “marginalized and underrepresented”
include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,handicapped, veterans,
and overseas workers.
The sectors that lack “well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the elderly, women,
and the youth.

The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined political constituencies,” either must
belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their respective sectors.
The nominees of national and regional parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such
parties or organizations. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not
be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee
who remains qualified
CASE NO. 37Topic:

House of Representatives
–
Residence Requirement
Title:
Marcos vs. COMELEC
Citation:
September 18, 1995
Facts:
•

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her COC for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte on March 8, 1995. On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification with the COMELEC alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos
lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates to the House of representative.
He prayed that an order be issued declaring petitioner disqualified and canceling the certificate of
candidacy.
•

On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the
entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended COC.
•

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected COC with the COMELEC's Head Office in
Intramuros, Manila on March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009
was likewise filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the
entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation" which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her
domicile or residence.
•

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the
results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections
in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a
second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she
obtains the highest number of votes.
•

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming
winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based
on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged
that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received
by Respondent Montejo.
•

On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the
First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner
comes to this court for relief.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for
a period of one year at the time of the May 8, 1995 elections.

Ruling:YES.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting down the
word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement.
The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent
confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte
instead of her period of residence in the First District, which was "since childhood" in the
space provided.
These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned

resolution, albeit with a different interpretation.
For instance, when herein petitioner announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make
her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that
petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City.
Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District, which was Tolosa, Leyte,
a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy In support of its asseveration
that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the
COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when
studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in
Manila."
The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought
to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the
Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter.
Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San
Miguel, Manila where she registered as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the
Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she
had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences indifferent
places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various
purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other
things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the
assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood
up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies
in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual)
residence and domicile for election law purposes.

CASE NO. 38 Topic:
–
Residence Requirement
Title:
Aquino vs. COMELEC
Citation:
G.R. No. 120265, Sept. 18, 1995
Facts:
•

Petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his COC for the position of Representative for the new Second
Legislative District of Makati City.
•

Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the LAKAS-NUCD-
UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A. Aquino on the
ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman.
•

A day after said petition for disqualification was filed, petitioner filed another COC amending the
certificate dated March 20, 1995. This time, petitioner stated in Item 8 of his certificate that he had
resided in the constituency where he sought to be elected for one (1)year and thirteen (13) days.
•

Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held. In Makati City where three (3) candidates vied for
the congressional seat in the Second District, petitioner garnered thirty eight thousand five hundred
forty seven (38,547) votes as against another candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained thirty five
thousand nine hundred ten (35,910) votes.
•

On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum
to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration
of the COMELEC's Second Division resolution dated May 6,1995 and a 2nd Urgent Motion Ad
Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.
•

On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to Resolve
Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he manifested his
intention to raise, among others, the issue of whether of not the determination of the qualifications of
petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC finding of non- compliance with the residency requirement of one year
against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws.
Ruling:NO.
The COMELEC finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year against the
petitioner is not contrary to evidence and to applicable laws. In order that petitioner could qualify as a
candidate for Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter "must prove that he has
established not just residence but domicile of choice.

The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives should be a
resident of the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (1) year prior to the
elections. Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction. Clearly, the
place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he
may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, his domicile, is that to which
the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposesof election law. There is nothing
wrong with the practice of establishing residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements,
this nonetheless defeats the essence of representation, which is to place through the assent of voters
those most cognizant and sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the
period of residency mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by
individuals who have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been
domiciled in the same area either by origin or by choice. Clearly it indicated not only that he was a
resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that he was a resident of the same for
52 years immediately preceding that election. At the time, his certificate indicated that he was also a
registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of
both of his parents Benigno and Aurora. Thus, from data furnished by petitioner himself to the
COMELEC at various times during his political career, what stands consistently
clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record up to the time of filing of his most recent
certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac. The property ownership is not
and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to bevoted upon, the fact that petitioner himself
claims that he has other residences in Metro Manilacoupled with the short length of time he claims to
be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati(and the fact of his stated domicile in Tarlac) "indicate
that the sole purpose of (petitioner) intransferring his physical residence" is not to acquire a new
residence or domicile "but only to qualify as a candidate for Representative of the Second District of
Makati City." The absence of clear and positive proof showing a successful abandonment of domicile
under the conditions stated above, the lack of identification
—
sentimental, actual or otherwise
—
with the area, andthe suspicious circumstances under which the lease agreement was effected all belie
petitioner'sclaim of residency for the period required by the Constitution, in the Second District of
Makati.

CASE NO. 39Topic:
–
Quorum
Title:
Avelino vs. Cuenco
Citation:
83 Phil 17
Facts:
•

In a session of the Senate, Tanada’s request to deliver a speech to formulate charges against then
Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership of the Senate President followed by his
supporters, they deliberately tried to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. Before
Senator Tañada could deliver his privilege speech to formulate charges against the incumbent Senate
President, the petitioner, motu propio adjourned the session of the Senate and walked out with his
followers.
•

Senator Cabili request to made the following incidents into a record:
o

The deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President
Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to
paralyze the functions of the Senate.
o

Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz suggested that respondent be designated to preside over the
session which suggestion was carried unanimously.
o

The respondent, Senator Mariano Cuenco, thereupon took the Chair.
•

Gregorio Abad was appointed Acting Secretary upon motion of Senator Arranz, because the Assistance
Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner when the latter abandoned the
session.
•

Senator Tañada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver
his privilege speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution No. 68
and submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.
•

The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto proceeding, asked the court to declare him the
rightful Senate President and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco,contending that the latter had not
been validly elected because twelve members did not constitute a quorum
– the majority required of the 24-member Senate.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction on subject matter.
2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 and 68 was validly approved.
3. Whether or not the petitioner be granted to declare him the rightful President of thePhilippines
Senate and oust respondent.

Rulings:
The Supreme Court held that they cannot take cognizance of the case. The court will be against the
doctrine of separation of powers.
In view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant
to the Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor
taken over, by the judiciary.
The court will not interfere in this case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the
Senators themselves who are at liberty at anytime to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. If,
as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his
remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall
—
not in the Supreme Court.
Yes, it was validly constituted, supposing that the Court has jurisdiction.
When the Constitution declares that a majority of “each House” shall constitute a quorum, “the House:
does not mean “all” the members.
Even a majority of all the members constitute “the House”. There is a difference between a majority of
“the House”, the latter requiring less number than the first.
Therefore an absolute majority of all the members of the Senate less one, constitutes constitutional
majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
The Court found it injudicious to declare the petitioner as the rightful President of the Senate, since the
office depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the rule of the Senate about
tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that majority. At any session
hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising from the
divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all concerned, the said twelve senators
who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond
the shadow of a doubt.

CASE NO. 40Topic:
–
Rules of Proceedings
Title:
Arroyo vs. de Venecia
Citation:
G.R. No. 127255, Aug. 14, 1997
Facts:
•

A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of Representatives,
charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners claim are constitutionally
mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the Constitution.
•

The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain amendments.
A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing provisions of the House
and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted its report to the House. During the
interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a
roll call, the Chair declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep.
Arroyo’s interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chair declared: “There being none, approved.” At the same time the Chair was saying
this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, “What is that…Mr. Speaker?” The Chair and
Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to the
Majority Leader’s motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then already been
declared by the Chair.
•

On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill
was signed into law by President Ramos.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 8240 is invalid because it was passed in violation of the rules of the House.
Ruling:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to revocation,
modification, or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are primarily
procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be waived or
disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to them does not have the
effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members has agreed to a particular measure.
But this is subject to qualification. Where the construction
to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body, the question presented is
necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to question in a case where private rights are
involved.

In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who, instead of
seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court. The matter complained of
concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which the Court should not be concerned.
The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from
questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep. Arroyo’s earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had
already been defeated, as the roll call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum
cannot be raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of
delaying the business of the House.

CASE NO. 41Topic:
–
Discipline of Members
Title:
Osmena vs. Pendatun
Citation:
109 Phil 863
Facts:
•

Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr. delivered a speech entitled “A Message to Garcia”where he made
“serious imputations of bribery against the President”
.
•

House Resolution No. 59 was passed. It provided that a special committee composed of 15
congressmen be formed to investigate and evaluate if the petitioner did commit disorderly conduct
when he gave his speech.
•

Congressman Sergio Osmeña, Jr., submitted to this Court a verified petition for "declaratory relief,
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction" against Congressman Salapida K. Pendatun
and fourteen other congressmen in their capacity as members of the Special Committee created by
House Resolution No. 59.
•

The special committee, through House Resolution 175, submitted their answer, they found Osmeña
guilty and then suspended him (for 15 mos.)
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is exempt from disciplinary action by virtue of parliamentary immunity.
Ruling:
NO. Although section 15, Article VI of our Constitution stipulates that "for any speech or debate"in
Congress, the Senators or Members of the House of Representative "shall not be questioned in
any other place,” the Rules of the House which petitioner himself has invoked (Rule XVII, sec. 7),
recognize the House's power to hold a member responsible "for words spoken in debate."
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity whose purpose "is to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success" for "it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech, and that he should be
protected from the resentment of everyone it may offend." It guarantees the legislator complete
freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the
courts or any other forum outside of the Congressional Hall. But it does not protect him from
responsibility before the legislative body itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the
latter disorderly or unbecoming a member.

CASE NO. 42Topic:

–
Discipline of Members
Title:
Santiago vs. Sandiganbayan
Citation:
G.R. No. 128055, April 19, 2001
Facts:
•

The case arose from complaints filed by a group of employees of the Commission of Immigration and
Deportation against petitioner, then CID Commissioner, for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. In Oct 1988, Santiago approved the application for legalization of the stay of
about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith. Two other criminal cases,
one for violation of the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for libel, were also filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
•

Pursuant to the information filed with the Sandiganbayan, Presiding Justice Francis E. Garchitorena
issued an order for the arrest of petitioner. Petitioner posted a cash bail without need for physical
appearance as she was then recuperating from injuries sustained in a vehicular accident.
TheSandiganbayan granted her provisional liberty until her physical condition would warrant
her physical appearance in court. After a long series of appeals and court battles between Santiago
andSandiganbayan, in 1995 the latter moved for the suspension of Santiago from office who
wasalready a senator by then,. Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate president (Maceda) to
suspendSantiago from office for 90 days.

Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan can validly order the suspension of a member of the Senate.
Ruling:
The doctrine of separation of powers by itself may not be deemed to have effectively excluded
members ofCongress from RA No. 3019 nor from its sanctions. The maxim simply recognizes each of
the three co-equal and independent, albeit coordinate, branches of the government
—
the Legislative, the Executive andthe Judiciary
—
has exclusive prerogatives and cognizance within its own sphere of influence andeffectively prevents
one branch from unduly intruding into the internal affairs of either branch.It would appear, indeed, to
be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an order of suspension upondetermination of the validity of
the information filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficientin form and substance, the
court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter of course, and thereseems to be "no ifs and
buts about it. In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayanmerely adhered to
the clear and unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which theCourt has, more
than once, upheld Sandiganbayan's authority to decree the suspension of public officialsand employees
indicted before it. Section 13 of RA No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concernedmust be
suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has been
charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word “office” would indicate that it applies to any
office
which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the office under which he stands
accused.Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has been decided by the
FirstDivision of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The
Court, nevertheless,deems it appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the significant
issue raised by petitioner.

CASE NO. 43Topic:

–
Journal Entry Rule vs. Enrolled Bill Theory
Title:
Astorga vs. Villegas
Citation:
56 SCRA 714
Facts:
•

House Bill 9266 was filed and passed on the third reading without amendments in the House of the
Representatives. It was then sent to the Senate for concurrence, and referred to a committee headed by
Senator Roxas, who then made minor amendment upon its approval. Senator Arturo Tolentino also
introduced substantial amendments during the second reading on the Senate. It was approved
considering the amendments of Roxas has been acted upon. The printed copies were then certified and
attested by the Secretary and Speaker of the House, Secretary of Senate and Senate President, and
lastly signed by the President of the Philippines which became the R.A. 4065.
•

An error was discovered later that the Bill passed was not the one approved by Senate. This caused the
withdrawal of signatures of both the Senate President and the President and declared the R.A. 4065
invalid.
•

Respondent Antonio Villegas, Mayor of Manila, recalled 5 police force assigned to petitioner
Vice Mayor Hermino Astorga following the invalidation of RA 4065. Astorgafiled petition compelling
the respondent and other officials to comply with RA 4065.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 4065 became a valid in consideration with the Journal Entry Rule.
Ruling:NO.
RA 4065 is declared not to have been duly enacted and therefore did not become to law.The Court
stated that the function of an attestation is not of approval. The signature made by both houses is a
mere authentication to signify to the Chief Executive that the enrolled bill was approved by the
Congress. Section 313 of Act 190, as amended by Act No. 2210 states that the proceedings of the
Philippine Commission may be proved by the journals of those bodies of either house, and it shall be
conclusive proof of the provisions of such acts and its due enactment. It is the approval by Congress
and not the signatures of the presiding officers that is essential. However,in the case at bar, upon
discovering that there is an error in the bill passed, Senate President and President withdrew their
signatures as this might bring mischievous consequences not intended by the law-making body. The
journal of the proceedings of each House is required by the Constitution. The Court asked to inquire
whether the bill signed is the same as the bill approved by the Congress. The journal discloses that the
substantial amendments approved by the Senate were not incorporated in the printed text sent to the
president. Hence, the bill did not become a law.

CASE NO. 44Topic:
–
Journal Entry Rule vs. Enrolled Bill Theory
Title:
Morales vs. Subido
Citation:
27 SCRA 131
Facts:
•

Morales has served as captain in the police department of a city for at least three years but does
not possess a bachelor's degree, is qualified for appointment as chief of police. Morales was the chief
of detective bureau of the Manila Police Department and holds the rank of lieutenant colonel. He began
his career in 1934 as patrolman and gradually rose to his present position. Upon the resignation of the
former Chief, Morales was designated acting chief of police of Manila and, at the same time, given
a provisional appointment to the same position by the mayor of Manila. Subido approved
the designation of the petitioner but rejected his appointment for "failure to meet the minimum
educational and civil service eligibility requirements for the said position." Instead, the respondent
certified other persons as qualified for the post. Subido invoked Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966.
•

Nowhere in the cited provision is it provided that a person “who has served the police department of
acity …” can be qualified for said office.
•

Morales argued that the above version was the one which was actually approved by Congress but when the bill
emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the insertion of the
phrase" or has served as chief of police with exemplary record." Morales went on to support his case by
producing copies of certified photostatic copy of a memorandum which according to him was signed by
an employee in the Senate bill division and can be found attached to the page proofs of the then bill being
deliberated upon.
Issue:
Whether or not the court must look upon the history of the bill, thereby inquiring upon the journals,to
look searchingly into the matter.
Ruling:
NO. The enrolled Act in the office of the legislative secretary of the President of the Philippines shows
that Section 10 is exactly as it is in the statute as officially published in slip form by the Bureau of
Printing. The court cannot go behind the enrolled Act to discover what really happened.The respect due
to the other branches of the Government demands that the court act upon the faith and credit of what
the officers of the said branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise,
the court would be cast in the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what did
happen in the labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative
process. The court is not of course to be understood as holding that in all cases the journals must yield
to the enrolled bill. To be sure there are certain matters which the Constitution expressly requires must
be entered on the journal of each house. To what extent the validity of a legislative act may be
affected by a failure to have such matters entered on the journal, is a question which the SC can decide
upon but is not currently being confronted in the case at bar hence the SC does not now decide. All the
SC holds is that with respect to matters not expressly required to be entered on the journal, the enrolled
bill prevails in the event of any discrepancy.

CASE NO. 45Topic:
–
Privilege of Speech and Debate
Title:
Trillanes vs. Oscar Pimentel
Citation:
G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008
Facts:
•

Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup d’etatin relation to the “Oakwood Incident.” In the
2007 elections, he won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term commencing at noon on June30, 2007.
•

Petitioner now asks the Court that he be allowed to attend all official functions of the Senate,alleging
mainly that his case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is still pending resolution whereas that
in the Jalosjos case, there was already conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not Trillanes’ election as Senator provides legal justification to allow him to work and
serve his mandate as Senator.
Ruling:
NO. It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody for purposes of the
administration of justice. No less than the Constitution provides:
“All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.”

The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal action.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner’s application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether
ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court’s judgment of
conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional liberty.
This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage
of the criminal action." Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-
defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like
Jalosjos.

CASE NO. 46Topic:
Powers of Congress - General Plenary Powers
Title:
League of Cities vs COMELEC
Citation:
G.R. No. 176951, Nov 18, 2008
Facts:
•

Supreme Court en banc, struck down the Subject 16 of the Cityhood Laws for violating Section10,
Article X of the Constitution. Respondents filed a petition for reconsideration which was denied by the
Honorable Court. A second motion for reconsideration was also denied until on the 18th of November
2008, the judgement became final and executory.
•

The Court then on the 19th of December 2009, unprecedentedly reversed its decision upholding the
constitutionally of the Cityhood Laws.
Issue:
Whether or not the court could reverse the decision it already rendered.
Ruling:
YES. The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. Under
the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the
unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of
equity and fair play. In short, the operative fact doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the
unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself. Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to
the present case, the Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X
of the Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the
declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by the “new cities” or their
issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective. This does not
mean that the Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain void. Only the effects of the implementation of
these unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play to innocent people
who may have relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Court’s declaration of
their unconstitutionality.

CASE NO. 47Topic:
Powers of Congress - Doctrine of Non-Delegation of Legislative Powers
Title:
U.S. vs Ang Tang Ho
Citation:
43 Phil 1
Facts:
•

At its special session of 1919, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868, entitled "An Act
Penalizing the Monopoly And Holding Of, And Speculation In, Palay, Rice, And Corn Under
Extraordinary Circumstances
”
, regulating the distribution and sale thereof, anda uthorizing the Governor-General, with the consent of
the Council of State, to issue the necessary rules and regulations.
•

The Governor-General issued a proclamation fixing the price at which rice should be sold.
•

A complaint was filed against the defendant, Ang Tang Ho, charging him with the sale of rice at an
excessive price when he sold to Pedro Trinidad, one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P.80),
which is a price greater than that fixed by EO No. 53 of the Governor-General,under the authority of
Section 1 of Act No. 2868.
•

Upon this charge, he was tried, found guilty and sentenced to five months' imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P500, from which he appealed to this court, claiming that the lower court erred in finding EO
No. 53 of 1919, to be of any force and effect, in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged, and
in imposing the sentence.
Issue:
Whether or not the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 2868 delegation to the Governor-Generala
valid delegation of power?
Ruling:NO.
The said Act constituted an invalid delegation of power since the said Act authorized the Governor-
General to promulgate laws and not merely rules and regulations to effect the law. The said Act was
not complete when it left the legislature as it failed to specify what conditions theGovernor-
General shall issue the proclamation as the said Act states “for any cause”. It also failed to define
“extraordinary rise” that such proclamation by the Governor -General aims to prevent. Lastly, the said
Act authorized the promulgation of temporary rules and emergency measures by the Governor-General.
It must be conceded that, after the passage of Act No. 2868, and before any rules and regulations were
promulgated by the Governor-General, a dealer in rice could sell it at any price,even at a peso per
"ganta," and that he would not commit a crime, because there would be no law fixing the price of rice,
and the sale of it at any price would not be a crime. In the absence of a proclamation, it was not a
crime to sell rice at any price. Hence, it must follow that, if the defendant committed a crime, it was
because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. There was no act of the Legislature making it a
crime to sell rice at any price, and without the proclamation, the sale of it at any price was to a crime.

CASE NO. 48Topic:
Title:
Eastern Shipping Lines vs. POEA
Citation:
166 SCRA 533
Facts:
•

The petitioner challenges the decision of POEA on the principal ground that it had no jurisdiction over
the case of Vitaliano Saco as he was not an overseas worker.
•

Vitaliano Saco was Chief Officer of the M/V Eastern Polaris when he was killed in an accidentin
Tokyo, Japan. His widow sued for damages under EO No. 797 and Memorandum
Circular No. 2 of the POEA. The petitioner, as owner of the vessel, argued that the complaint was
cognizable not by the POEA but by the SSS and should have been filed against the State Insurance
Fund. The POEA nevertheless assumed jurisdiction and after considering the position papers of the
parties ruled in favor of the complainant.
•

The petitioner argues that the deceased employee should be likened to the employees of the Philippine
Air Lines who, although working abroad in its international flights, are not considered overseas
workers.
•

Moreover, the petitioner questions the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 2 itself as violitative of
the principle of non-delegation of legislative power. It contends that no authority had been given
the POEA to promulgate the said regulation; and even with such authorization,the regulation represents
an exercise of legislative discretion which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
Issue
:
Whether Memorandum Circular No. 2 violated the principle of non-delegation of legislative power.
Ruling:NO.
There was no principle violated. The authority to issue the said regulation is clearly provided in Section
4(a) of EO No. 797. “The governing Board of the Administration (POEA), as
hereunder provided shall promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to govern the exercise of
the adjudicatory functions of the Administration (POEA).”
It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What
can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be.
The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature.This prerogative cannot be
abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate. The reasons given above for the delegation
of legislative powers in general are particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the
proliferation of specialized activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has
found it more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue rules to
carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the “power of subordinate legislation.”

CASE NO. 49Topic:
Title:
Pelaez vs Auditor-General
Citation:
15 SCRA 569
Facts:
•

From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964 the President of the Philippines issued executive orders
to create thirty-three municipalities pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Public
funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the implementation of said executive orders.
•

Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for prohibition
with preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It seeks to restrain from the respondent or any
person acting in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in implementation of
the executive orders aforementioned.
Issue:
Whether or not the executive orders are invalid, upon the ground that the President does not have the
authority to create municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative department.
Ruling:
Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:
“The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus or offices,
exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and
take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”

The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to interfere in the exercise
of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the executive departments, bureaus,
or offices of the national government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by
the Constitution to the Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. Such control does not
include the authority to either abolish an executive department or bureau, or to create a new
one. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the
constitutional mandate above quoted, it also gives the President more power than what was vested in
him by the Constitution. The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab initio
and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the municipalities referred to.

CASE NO. 50Topic:
Powers of Congress - Delegation of Emergency Powers
Title:
David vs Arroyo
Citation:
G.R. No. 171396, May 31, 2006
Facts:
•

During the celebration of People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of national
emergency. The President also issued General Order (G.O.) No. 5 implementing PP 1017. The
President stated that over the past months, elements in political opposition have conspired with extreme
left represented by NDF- CCP- NPA and military adventurists, which caused her to declare such
order.The President considered aims to oust the President and take- over reigns of government as clear
and present danger.
•

On March 3, President Arroyo lifted PP 1017. Solicitor General argued that the basis of declaring PP
1017 was that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in
determining the necessity of calling out the AFP. However, despite the contentions of the Solicitor
General, the Magdalo group indicted the Oakwood mutiny and called to wear red bands on their left
arms to show disgust.
•

At the same time Oplan Hackle I was discovered, which constitutes plans of bombings and attacks on
PMA Alumni Homecoming in Baguio, the same event where the President was invited. The next
morning after the alumni homecoming celebration, a bomb was found inside the campus.
•

Succeeding this announcement was the arrest of Randy David, a Filipino journalist and UP professor
due to a mistake of fact that he was actually involved in the street rallies. Seizure of Daily Tribune,
Malaya and Abante-- all local news publication, took place which, according to the PNP, was meant to
show a strong presence to tell the media outlets not to connive or do anything that would help rebels
in bringing down the government.
Issue:1.

Whether or not the issuance of Presidential Proclamation PP 1017 is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
NO.
Respondents claim that such petition is moot and academic based on the issuance of PP 1017, but the
Court rejects such contention. A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable
controversy. In this case, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017
which calls for military aid. Most people then equate it to martial law, but such case is different
wherein the basis then was the 1973 Constitution. Under the present 1987 Constitution, the President
may summon armed forces to aid him in supporting lawless violence. The President's declaration of
state rebellion was merely an act declaring a status or conduction of a public moment of interest. State
of national emergency, however, is the prerogative of the President. Her exercise of emergency powers
such as the taking over of privately owned utility requires delegation from the Congress, which is
entirely different from the martial law
.

CASE NO. 51Topic:
Powers of Congress - Test of Valid Delegation
Title:
ABAKADA Guro vs. Purisima
Citation:
G.R No. 166715, August 14, 2008
Facts:
•

Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for
prohibition on May 27, 2005. They question the constitutionality of Sections 4, 5and 6 of R.A. No.
9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT
on importation of goods, and Section 6 imposes a10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of
properties.
•

Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it constitutes abandonment by Congress of its
exclusive authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section 28(2) of the 1987Philippine
Constitution.
•

Mounting budget deficit, revenue generation, inadequate fiscal allocation for education,increased
emoluments for health workers, and wider coverage for full value-added tax benefits
–
these are the reasons why Republic Act No. 9337 (R.A. No. 9337) was enacted.
•

The President signed into law the consolidated House and Senate versions as Republic Act9337. Before
the law was to take effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
government from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions for certiorari and prohibition
questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
•

Among others, Petitioners contend that Sections 4, 5, and 6 of R.A. No. 9337 constitute an undue
delegation of legislative power, in violation of Article VI, Section 28(2) of theConstitution.
Issue:
Whether or not there is an undue delegation of legislative power?
Ruling:NO.

In every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is
valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out,
or implemented by the delegate;41 and (b) fixes a standard
—
the limits of which are sufficiently determinate and determinable
—
to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. A sufficient standard is one
which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the
public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be
effected. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate,
who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
A distinction has rightfully been made between delegation of power to make the laws which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, which constitutionally may not be done, and
delegation of authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the
law, to which no valid objection can be made. The case before the Court is not a delegation of
legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and
administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has made the operation
of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the
entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the
executive. No discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is
the fact that the word shall is used in the common proviso. The use of the word shall connote a
mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea
of discretion. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says,
and courts have no choice but to see to it that the mandate is obeyed. There is no undue delegation of
legislative power but only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is constitutionally
permissible. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what
job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex economy that
is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.

CASE NO. 52Topic:
–
On Pork Barrel Issue
Title:
Belgica vs Exec. Secretary
Citation:
G.R. No. 208566, Nov. 19, 2013
Facts:
•

Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members of the
Congress. It underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel” to the latest
“Priority Development Assistance Fund” or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in
the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
•

The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain cabinet members
may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided that the request for
realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.
•

Presidential Pork Barrel. The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the
GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a) the Malampaya Funds, from
the Malampaya Gas Project and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of
PAGCOR.
•

Pork Barrel Scam Controversy. Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of
corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade,
the corruption in the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been
helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-government
organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being used in legit existing
projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then conducted by the Commission on
Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes of Luy et al.
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various petitions before the
Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel system.
Issue:
Whether or not the Congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.
Ruling:NO.
The Congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional because it violates the following principles:
Separation of Powers and Non-delegability of Legislative Power. As a rule, the budgeting power lies in
Congress. It regulates the release of funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand,
implements the laws
–
this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law
but under the pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted,
the legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to
–
a clear act of implementing the law they enacted
–
a violation of the principle of separation of powers. As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power
in Congress alone. The Constitution does grant the people legislative power but only insofar as the
processes of referendum and initiative are concerned. That being, legislative power cannot be delegated
by Congress for it cannot delegate further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.

CASE NO. 53Topic:
–
On DAP issue
Title:
Araullo vs Exec. Secretary
Citation:
GR. No. 209287, July 1, 2014 and Feb. 3, 2015
Facts:
•

When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed the sluggish growth of the
economy. The World Bank advised that the economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary
Florencio “Butch” Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration Program
(DAP).
•

The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government projects. DAP enables the
Executive to realign funds from slow moving projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next
year’s appropriation. So, what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project is
being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds allotted therefor will be withdrawn
by the Executive. Once withdrawn, these funds are declared as “savings” by the Executive and said
funds will then be re allotted to other priority projects.
•

Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the General Appropriations Act
(GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby appropriations made by Congress in the GAA.
•

This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong Alyansang Makabayan, and several
other concerned citizens to file various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the
DAP. Among their contentions was: DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional
rule which provides that “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.”

Issues:
1.Whether or not the DAP violates the principle “no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law” (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Con
stitution).2.

Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as impoundments by the executive.

Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.

Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is constitutional.
Ruling:
1.

NO.
The DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. DAP was merely
a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing
government spending. As such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1),
Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn from the Treasury otherwise,
an appropriation made by law would have been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for
by the GAA, were merely being realigned via the DAP

NO.
There is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of funds refers to the
President’s power to refuse to spend appropriations or to retain or deduct appropriations for
whatever reason. Impoundment is actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an
unmanageable national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, there’s no
impoundment in the case at bar because what’s involved in the DAP was the transfer of funds.

NO.
The transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It is true that the President (and even the
heads of the other branches of the government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of
funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made “within their respective offices”.
Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentations may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated
because funds appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the Legislative and
other non-Executive agencies.
Further, transfers “within their respective offices” also contemplate realignment of funds to an existing
project in the GAA. Under the DAP, even though some projects were within the Executive, these
projects are non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were appropriated to them
in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be legitimate,they are still non-existent under the
GAA because they were not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is
unconstitutional and is without legal basis.
These DAP transfers are not “savings” contrary to what was being declared by the Executive. Under
the definition of “savings” in the GAA, savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an
excess in the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued, or finally
abandoned. The GAA does not refer to “savings” as funds withdrawn from a slow moving project.
Thus, since the statutory definition of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis
at all for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of the fiscal year. But under
the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn from certain projects in the middle of the year and then
being declared as “savings” by the Executive particularly by the DBM.

NO.
Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money source for the DAP because under
the law, such funds may only be used if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect
that the revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no such certification was
secured before unprogrammed funds were used.

CASE NO. 54Topic:
–
Riders and Doctrine of
Title:
Guingona vs. Carague
Citation:
G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991
Facts:
•
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt
service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the
General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
•

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending
Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended
(Re: Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget Process in Order to
Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society,"and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act
Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its
Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The
Purpose."
•

The petition seeks the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of
P.D. No. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service
under the 1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.
•

Respondents contend that the petition involves a pure political question which is the repeal or
amendment of said laws addressed to the judgment, wisdom and patriotism of the legislative body and
not this Court.
Issues:
1. Whether or not P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 are now inoperative as a result of the
ouster of President Marcos, after the adoption of the 1987 Constitution.
2. Whether or not the said decrees are inconsistent with Section 24 of Article VI of theConstitution.
Ruling:
1.

NO.
The transitory provision of the Constitution (Section 3, Article XVIII) has precisely been adopted by
its framers to preserve the social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be
recognized. Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the
Constitution or are otherwise amended, repealed, or revoked. An examination of the aforecited
presidential decrees show the clear intent that the amounts needed to cover the payment of the principal
and interest on all foreign loans, including those guaranteed by the national government, should be
made available when they shall become
due precisely without the necessity of periodic enactments of separate laws appropriating funds
therefore, since both the periods and necessities are incapable of determination in advance.

2.

NO.
The argument of petitioners that the said presidential decrees did not meet the requirement and are
therefore inconsistent with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI of the Constitution whichrequires, among
others, that "all appropriations, x x x bills authorizing increase of public debt"must be passed by
Congress and approved by the President is untenable. The automatic appropriation provides the
flexibility for the effective execution of debt management policies. First, for example, it enables the
Government to take advantage of a favorable turn of market conditions. Second, the automatic
appropriation obviates the serious difficulties in debt servicing arising from any deviation from what
has been previously programmed. The annual debt service estimates, which are usually made one year
in advance, are based on a mathematical set or matrix or, in layman's parlance, ‘basket’ of foreign
exchange and interest rate assumptions which may significantly differ from actual rates not even in
proportion to changes on the basis of the assumptions. Absent an automatic appropriation clause, the
Philippine Government has to await and depend upon Congressional action, which by the time this
comes, may no longer be responsive to the intended conditions which in the mean time may have
already drastically changed. In the meantime, also, delayed payments and ar rear ages may have
supervened, only to worsen our debt service-to-total expenditure ratio in the budgetdue to penalties
and/or demand for immediate-payment even before due dates.

CASE NO. 55Topic:
–
One Subject and Title
Title:
Tobias vs. Abalos
Citation:
G.R. No. L-114783, Dec. 8, 1994
Facts:
•

As taxpayers and residents of Mandaluyong, petitioners assail the constitutionality of RA No.
7675 otherwise known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as City of Mandaluyong
”
Prior to the enactment of the statute, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to one legislative district.
Congressman Ronaldo Zamora sponsored the bill and signed by pres. Fidel Ramos becoming RA No.
7675. A plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The turnout of the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the
voting population: 18,621 voted “yes” while 7,911 voted “no”. Thus,
RA 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Issue:
Whether or not RA No 7675 specifically Art VIII Sec 49 thereof is unconstitutional.
Ruling: NO.
The court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of the “one city-one representative” proviso
in the Constitution stating that each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or
each province, shall have at least one representative” (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).
Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is
not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a
natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. As to the contention that
the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the
Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI,Section 5(1), as a forquoted, shows that
the present limit of 250 members is not absolute with the phrase “unless otherwise provided by law.”
As to the contention that Section 49 of RA No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts, it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted
the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which
pertains to itself.
CASE NO. 56Topic:

–
Three Readings Rule
Title:
Tolentino vs Secretary of Finance
Citation:
235 SCRA 630
Facts:
•

RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen the
tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal
Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on
various grounds.
•

Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives but
is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did not pass three readings on
separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24and 26(2) of the Constitution,
respectively.
Issue:
Whether or not RA 7716 is unconstitutional for having “originated” from the Senate, and not the
House of Representatives.
Ruling:NO.
The enactment of SB. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate proposed an amendment to
a House revenue bill by enacting its own version of a revenue bill. On at least two occasions during the
Eighth Congress, the Senate passed its own version of revenue bills, which, in consolidation with
House bills earlier passed, became the enrolled bills. Thus, the enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only
instance in which the Senate, in the exercise of its power to propose amendments to bills required to
originate in the House, passed its own version of a House revenue measure. It is noteworthy that, in the
case of SB. No. 1630, petitioners Tolentino and Roco, as members of the Senate, voted to approve it on
second and third readings.The history of this provision does not support this contention. The supposed
indicia of constitutional intent are nothing but the relics of an unsuccessful attempt to limit the power
of the Senate. Considering the defeat of the proposal, the power of the Senate to propose amendments
must be understood to be full, plenary and complete "as on other Bills." Thus, because revenue bills are
required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the Senate cannot enact revenue
measures of its own without such bills. After a revenue bill is passed and sent over to it by the
House, however, the Senate certainly can pass its own version on the same subject matter.This follows
from the coequality of the two chambers of Congress.

CASE NO. 57Topic:
–
Presidential Veto
Title:
Bolinao Electronics Corp. vs. Valencia
Citation:
11 SCRA 486
Facts:
•

This is an original petition for prohibition, mandatory injunction with preliminary injunction filed by
the Bolinao Electronics Corporation, Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc. And Monserrat
Broadcasting System, Inc., owners and operators of radio and television stations enumerated therein,
against respondents Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Acting Chief of the Radio
Control Division. Later the Republic of the Philippines, as operator of the Philippine Broadcasting
Service, sought and was allowed to intervene in this case, said interveners having been granted a
construction permit to install and operate a television station in Manila.
•

Petitioners’ applications for renewal of their station licenses were denied because it should be
filed two months before the expiration of the license. Pursuant to Section 3 of Act 3846, as amended by
Republic Act 584, on the powers and duties of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications
(formerly Commerce and Communications), he may approve or disapprove any application for renewal
of station or operator license, provided, however, That no application for renewal shall be is approved
without giving the licensee a hearing.
•

Thus, the notices of hearing were sent by respondents to petitioners. Clearly, the intention of the
investigation is to find out whether there is ground to disapprove the applications for renewal.
According to petitioner however, the violation has ceased to exist when the act of late filing was
condoned or pardoned by respondents by the issuance of the circular dated July24, 1962.The lone
reason given for the investigation of petitioners' applications, i.e., late filing thereof, is therefore no
longer tenable. The violation, in legal effect, ceased to exist and, hence, there is no reason nor need for
the present investigation. They were summoned by Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for
operating even after their permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBN’s continued
operation sans license and their continuing operation had caused damage to his department.
Issue:
Whether or not the President can veto a condition attached to an appropriation in the appropriation bill.
Ruling:
Under the Constitution, the President has the power to veto any particular item or items of an
appropriation bill. However, when a provision of an appropriation bill affects one or more items of the
same, the President cannot veto the provision without at the same time vetoing the particular item or
items to which it relates. (Art. VI, Sec. 20) It may be observed from the wordings of the Appropriations
Act that the amount appropriated for the operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service was made
subject to the condition that the same shall not be used or expended for operation of television stations
in Luzon where there are already existing commercial television stations. This gives rise to the question
of whether the President may legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the
appropriation bill. But this is not a novel question. A little effort to research on the subject would have
yielded enough authority to guide action on the matter. For, in the leading case of State vs.Holder 2 it
was already declared that such action by the Chief Executive was illegal. This ruling, that the
executive's veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been
adhered to in subsequent cases. If the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no
effect whatsoever, and the restriction imposed by the appropriation bill,therefore, remains. Any
expenditure made by the intervenor PBS, for the purpose of installing or operating a television station
in Manila, where there are already television stations in operation,would be in violation of the express
condition for the release of the appropriation and,consequently, null and void. It is not difficult to see
that even if it were able to prove its right to operate on Channel 9, said intervenor would not have been
entitled to reimbursement of its illegal expenditures.

CASE NO. 58Topic:
–
Presidential Veto
Title:
PHILCONSA vs. Enriquez
Citation:
G.R. No. 113105, Aug. 19, 1994
Facts:
•

HB No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and approved by
both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and limitations on
certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the President. It also
authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the “pork barrels” allotted to them
and to realign their respective operating budgets. Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and
enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution,Congress presented the said bill to the President for
consideration and approval.
•

On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have become
RA 7663, entitled “An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the
Philippines From January One To December Thirty One, Nineteen Hundred And Ninety-Four, And For
Other Purposes” (GAA of 1994).
On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of
the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:
1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that “this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly done
through the 1994 GAA.” And that “appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or
domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of P.D.
No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4,Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the Administrative Code
of1987.
2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of
revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges(SUC’s)
3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs
Law (R.A. No. 6675).
5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP of
the Special Provision No. 2 on the “Use of Fund,” which requires the prior approval of the Congress
for the release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provision No. 3
on the “Specific Prohibition” which states that the said Modernization Fund “shall not be used for
payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored
personnel carriers”
5. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to
augment pension and gratuity funds.
7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court,Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a)for the
Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights,
(CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU’S) and (f) State Universities and
Colleges (SUC’s) are constitutional
2. Whether or not the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the
automatic appropriation of funds therefore is constitutional?
Ruling:
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative
process(Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7).
There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The burden shifts on
those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the Constitution. The
vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177
(Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the
court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations
law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the President
vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government agencies. If some
government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a revolving fund for
that purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the
special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the “one fund policy” (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for
the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359
for the Department of Budget and Management’s Procur ement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is
unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the
subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it
specifies how the said item shall be expended — 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly
comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an
“appropriate” provision. Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on
purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without
also vetoing the said item (Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia,11 SCRA 486 [1964]).
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the “use of Fund” for the AFP modernization program
that the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an
exercise of the “congressional or legislative veto.” However the case at bench is not the proper
occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions
Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds. Therefore, being
“inappropriate” provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly vetoed.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of

the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is
violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts
(Art. III, Sec.10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself. The veto of said special
provision is therefore valid. The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to
augment the pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits
System is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in thelanguage used in the challenged
Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended todeny to the President the right to defer or
reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if
such is the intention, the appropriation law isnot the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention
must be embodied and manifested inanother law considering that it abrades the powers of the
Commander-in-Chief and there are
existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU’s to be amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to appropriationsto the
Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there is less basis tocomplain
when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to guidelines he will issue.Until the
guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are proper or inappropriate.
Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take “necessary and propersteps”
to carry into execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]).
Thesesteps are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.

CASE NO. 59Topic:
–
Legislative Inquiry
Title:
Senate vs. Ermita
Citation:
G.R. No. 169777 Apr. 20, 2006
Facts:
•

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing
E.O. 464 “Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on
Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries
in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes”. Petitioners pray for its
declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
•

In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those
employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines(AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
•

The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for
them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of
massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wiretapping, and the role of military in the so-called
“Gloria gate Scandal”.

Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O.
464,Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent
of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.
Issue:
Whether or not Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated inSection 2(b)
to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and
constitutional.
Ruling:
NO. Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, is unconstitutional. The
enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege.The
doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of
necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an
exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be
of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid
of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it
must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of
E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for information without
need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere expedient
of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
frustrated.

CASE NO. 60Topic:
–
Legislative Inquiry
Title:
Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon
Citation:
G.R. No. L-89914; November 20, 1991
Facts:
•

The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee (Committee on Accountability of Public Officers) started its
investigation on the sale of the equity of Romualdez to Lopa Group. The SRBC looked into
the possible violation of the law in the case with regard to RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act).

The petitioners, Bengzon et.al, filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged
sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine
(39) corporations. He contended that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee acted in excess of its
jurisdiction and legislative purpose.
Issue:
Whether the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry has a valid legislative purpose
.
Ruling:NO.
The court held that the investigation made was not in aid of legislation because the speech given by
Sen. Enrile didn’t contain suggestion of contemplated legislation but merely pointed to the need to
determine whether the relatives of Pres. Aquino, particularly Mr. Ricardo Lopa, had violated the law.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically provided for in Sec.1 of the
Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the
implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the
formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the
Constitution in Congress and/or in the Senate alone.

CASE NO. 61Topic:
–
Legislative Inquiry
Title:
Standard Charter vs Senate
Citation:
G.R. No. 167173, Dec 27, 2007
Facts:
•

SCB Phil Branch had criminal and civil charges against them before the courts in Metro Manila for
selling unregistered foreign securities in violation of Securities Regulation Code(RA 8799).
•

Enrile, in his privileged speech, urged the Senate to immediately conduct an inquiry in aid of
legislation, to prevent the occurrences of a similar fraudulent in the future. The respondent Committee
then set an initial hearing to investigate, in aid of legislation thereto.
•
SCB stressed that there were cases allegedly involving the same issues subject of legislative inquiry,
thus posting a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent Committee to continue with the inquiry.
Issue:
Whether the respondent Committee, by aid of legislation, would encroach upon the judicial powers
vested solely in the courts who took cognizance of the foregoing cases.
Ruling:YES.
The unmistakable objective of the investigation, as set forth in the resolution, as initiated in the
privileged speech of Senate President Enrile, was simply "to denounce the illegal practices committed
by a foreign bank in selling unregistered foreign securities xxx", and at the conclusion of the said
speech "to immediately conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, to prevent the occurrence of a similar
fraudulent in the future."The intent of legislative inquiries is to arrive at a policy determination, which
may or may not be enacted into law. Except only when it exercises the power to punish for contempt,
the committees of the Senate or the House of Representatives cannot penalize violators even there is
overwhelmingly evidence of criminal culpability. Other than proposing or initiating amendatory or
remedial legislation, respondent Committee can only recommend measures to address or remedy
whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the investigation, although it may include in its Report
a recommendation for criminal indictment of persons who may appear liable. At best,the
recommendation, along with the evidence, contained in such Report would only be
persuasive, but it is still up to the prosecutorial agencies and the courts to determine the liabilities of the
offender.

CASE NO. 62Topic:
–
Legislative Inquiry
Title:
Arnault vs. Nazareno
Citation:
87 Phil 29
Facts:
•

In the latter part of October 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress
Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000
and P500,000, respectively. P1,000,000 was paid for the first sum and P 500,000 to the second sum
both to Ernest H. Burt, a non-resident American, thru his two attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, as
represented by Jean L. Arnault, for both estates respectively. However, Ernest H. Burt was not the
original owner of the estate. He bought the first from San Juan de Dios Hospital and the second from
the Philippine Trust Company. In both instances, Burt was not able to pay the necessary amount of
money to complete his payments. As such, his contract with said owners were cancelled.
•

On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and delivered the Tambobong
Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an absolute deed of sale inconsideration of the sum of
P750,000. The Philippine Government then, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board
of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Philippine National Bank, from which the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two
estates in the latter part of October 1949,as stated at the outset.
•

On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which created a special committee to
investigate the transactions surrounding the estates. The special committee created by the resolution
called and examined various witnesses, among the most important of whom was Jean L. Arnault. An
intriguing question which the committee sought to resolve was the apparent irregularity of the
Government’s paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the
two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October 1949. The committee
sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense of
the Government.

Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the
afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H.
Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating P1,500,000;
and that on the same occasion he drew on said account two checks; one for P500,000, which he
transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc.,with the Philippine National Bank, and
another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed.
•

It was the desire of the committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000that gave
rise to the present case. As Arnault resisted to name the recipient of the money, the senate then
approved a resolution that cited him for contempt. It is this resolution which brought him to jail and is
being contested in this petition.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the Senate has the power to punish Arnault for contempt for refusing to reveal the
name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000.
2. Whether or not the Senate lacks authority to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period
of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950.
3. Whether or not the privilege against self-incrimination protects the petitioner from being questioned.
Ruling:
1.
YES.
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a
legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer aany
question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary
to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate,or to expel a member;
and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material
or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. The materiality of the question must be
determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any
proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative
action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum of the information to be
gathered because of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single
question.
2.
NO.

Senate is a continuing body, and which does not cease to exist upon the periodical dissolution of the
Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the
Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted
as in the present case. Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds,i.e.,
abuse their power and keep the witness in prison for life. If proper limitations are disregarded,Court is
always open to those whose rights might thus be transgressed.
3.
NO.
Court is satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, which is the name of that
person to whom witness gave the P440,000, were obviously false. His insistent
claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the name, he would incriminate himself,
necessarily implied that he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave P440,000 to
a person to him unknown. “Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to
testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable.”
Since according to the witness, himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to
a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, Court found no basis
upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him.

CASE NO. 63Topic:
–
Legislative Inquiry
Title:
Gudani vs. Senga
Citation:
G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006
Facts:
•

The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud and
the surfacing of the “Hello Garci” tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the executive
department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without her
consent.
•

AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al
from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval. However, the two
appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a directive has been given to them.
•

As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and
the time-honored principle of the “Chain of Command.” Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected
before the General Court Martial proceedings for willfully violating an order of a superior officer.
Issue:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP preventing
them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.
Ruling:
YES.
The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as commander-
in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under
military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the appearance
before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to
compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons to testify before it may be
compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders
have the force of the law of the land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute. SC ruled in
Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior consent on executive
officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In doing so, the Court
recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed that the privilege must be
formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the President to prevent military
officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive privilege, but on the Chief
Executive’s power as commander-in- chief to control the actions and speech of members of the armed
forces. The President’s prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations
as in executive privilege. The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief,
to authorize the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier
disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is
nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.

CASE NO. 64Topic:
–
Legislative Inquiry
Title:
Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigation
Citation:
G.R. No. 180643
Facts:
•

On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a
contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of $329,481,290
(approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the People’s Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal.
•

In the September 18, 2007 hearing, Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials
and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
NEDA. Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon.
He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs. and during which he admitted that
Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project.
He further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe.
•

However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking “executive privilege”. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:

(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
•

He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate
vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest
and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.
Issue:
Whether or not the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by
executive privilege.
Ruling:YES.
The communications are covered by executive privilege. The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive
officials and employees to follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws,
and jurisprudence,including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to
legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of executive
privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings. The claim of executive
privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually
committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under
our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to
these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1. The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable

presidential power.”
2. The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close advisor of the President
or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in “operational proximity” with the
President.
3. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by
a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought “likely contains important evidence”
and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground
that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions “fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials” necessary in “her executive and policy
decision-making process” and, that “the information sought to be disclosed might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the People’s Republic of China.”
Simply put, the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters
relating to diplomacy or foreign relations. Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the
communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications
privilege.
First, the communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable power” of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter
into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized
in Philippine jurisprudence.
Second, the communications are “received” by a close advisor of the President. Under the “operational
proximity” test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyo’s
cabinet.
And third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioner’s claim of executive Privilege
violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern. We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all.
But petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he
was questioned foreleven (11) hours. Not only that, but he also expressly manifested his willingness to
answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim
of executive privilege. The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation.
Section 7 of Article III provides: The right of the people to information on matters of public concern
shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, aswell as to government research data used as basis for policy development,
shall be afforded the citizen,subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

CASE NO. 65Topic:
–
Legislative Inquiry
Title:
Calida vs Trillanes
Citation:
G.R. No. 240873, September 3, 2019
Facts:
This Court resolves a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by Solicitor General Jose C. Calida,
Milagros O. Calida, Josef Calida, Michelle Calida, and Mark Jorel Calida. They pray that Antonio
Trillanes IV, then a sitting Senator, be permanently prohibited from conducting a legislative inquiry
into their alleged conflict of interest on government contracts awarded to their security services
company. They also pray for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction. Petitioners claim that Proposed Senate Resolution No. 760 does not contain any intended
legislation. Instead, it merely calls for an investigation on any conflict of interest regarding the award
of government contracts to Vigilant Investigative and Security Agency, Inc., a company owned by
petitioner Calida and his family. They likewise claim that respondent Trillanes acted without authority
in issuing invitations to the resource persons, as the invitations were sent out without the Senate body's
approval of the proposed resolution. Furthermore, petitioners insist that the investigation is clearly
intended merely to target and humiliate them. Thus, they pray that respondent Trillanes, as the chair of
the Senate Committee on Civil Service, Government Reorganization, and Professional Regulation
(Committee on Civil Service), be prohibited from conducting a legislative inquiry against them.
Issue:
Whether or not the investigation is in aid of legislation.
Ruling:YES.
Although this case became moot since respondent Trillanes has reached the end of his two-year term as
Senator.The legislative power to conduct investigations in aid of legislation is conferred by Article VI,
Section 21of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: SECTION 21. The Senate or the House
of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.The rights of persons appearing in or affected by
such inquiries shall be respected.
While this power is not found in the present Constitution's precursors, this Court in Arnault
v. Nazareno clarified that such power did not need textual grant as it was implied and essential to the
legislative function.

Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative
functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information —
which is not infrequently true — recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has
shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is
volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain
what is needed. Nonetheless, despite the constitutional grant, the power of both the House
of Representatives and the Senate to conduct investigations in aid of legislation is not absolute. Citing
Watkins v. United States,this Court in Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee emphasized that
"no inquiry is an end itself." It explained that an investigation in aid of legislation must comply with
the rules of procedure of each House of Congress, and must not violate the individual rights enshrined
in the Bill of Rights. In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations, this Court explained further that a legislative inquiry must prove to be in aid of
legislation and not for other purposes, pronouncing that "Congress is neither a law enforcement nor a
trial agency." It declared: No matter how noble the intentions of respondent Committees are, they
cannot assume the power reposed upon our prosecutorial bodies and courts. The determination of who
is/are liable for a crime or illegal activity, the investigation of the role played by each official, the
determination of who should be haled to court for prosecution and the task of coming up with
conclusions and finding of facts regarding anomalies, especially the determination of criminal guilt, are
not functions of the Senate. Congress is neither a law enforcement nor a trial agency. Moreover, it bears
stressing that no inquiry is an end in itself; it
must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the Congress, i.e., legislation.
Investigations conducted solely to gather incriminatory evidence and "punish" those investigated are
indefensible. There is no Congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure. Additionally,
legislative inquiry must respect the individual rights of the persons invited to or affected by the
legislative inquiry or investigation. Hence, the power of legislative inquiry must be carefully balanced
with the private rights of those affected. A person's right against self-incrimination and to due process
cannot be swept aside in favor of the purported public need of a legislative inquiry.

CASE NO. 66Topic:
–
Legislative Inquiry
Title:

Balag vs Senate

Citation:
GR No. 234608, July 3, 2018
Facts:
This is a case of petition for certiorari and prohibition with a prayer of an issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction seeking to annul, set aside and enjoin
implementation of the Senate P.S. Resolution No. 504 and October 18, 2017 Order of
Complaint by the Senate Committee on Public Order and Dangerous Drugs filed by Arvin R. Balag
(petitioner) against the Senate of the Philippines, et. al. (respondent). On September 17, 2017, a first-
year law student from the University of Santo Tomas named Horacio Castillo III, allegedly died due to
hazing-related activities conducted by the Aegis Juris Fraternity. On September 20, 2017, the senate
released Senate Resolution No. 504 entitled “a Resolution Directing the Appropriate Senate
Committees to Conduct an Inquiry, In Aid of Legislation, into the Recent Death of Horacio Castillo III
Allegedly due to Hazing-Related Activities” filed by Sen. Paolo Benigno Aquino IV. When the
petitioner attended the hearing dated on October 18, 2017, Sen. Grace Poe asked the petitioner if he
was the president of Aegis Juris Fraternity however, the petitioner refused to answer and invoked his
right to self-incrimination. Sen. Panfilo Lacson reminded that it was just a “simple question” to invoke
self -incrimination and warned the petitioner that he may be cited in contempt, but the petitioner still
refused to answer. According to Sen. Grace Poe, the petitioner’s signature appeared on the document
for the application of the Aegis Juris Fraternity in the organizational sheet submitted in the school
administration and it was indicated therein that the petitioner was the President, yet he still refuses to
answer the simple question asked. The petitioner was then cited in contempt and was ordered to place
in detention under the Senate Sergeant at Arms’ supervision after the senate hearing. Sen. Panfilo
Lacson gave the petitioner a chance to purge out of contempt, however, the petitioner still refused to
answer and invoked his right to self-incrimination. When the petitioner was asked of the question of
whose decision it was to bring the victim to the hospital, the petitioner submitted a plea to lift his
contempt and stated that he was a member of the Aegis Juris Fraternity, however, he does not know
who the president was because he was enrolled at another university at the time of the incident. The
question asked before his plea was again repeated and the petitioner invoked again his right to self-
incrimination.
Issue:
Whether or not the Senate Committee acted with grave abuse of discretion in conducting the
legislative inquiry and citing the petitioner in contempt.

Ruling:YES.
However, the court denied the petition for being moot and academic. In the present case, the Court
finds that there is no more justiciable controversy to be decided up since in its resolution dated
December 12, 2017, the Court ordered in the interim the immediate release of
petitioner pending resolution of the instant petition. Thus, petitioner was no longer detained under
the Senate's authority. However, the court still resolved the case despite being moot and academic. The
court ruled that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt of the Senate during
inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry. The court
stated that the interests of the Senate and the witnesses appearing in its legislative inquiry should
be balanced. The Senate can continuously and effectively exercise its power of contempt during the
legislative inquiry against recalcitrant witnesses, even during recess. Such power can be exercised by
the Senate immediately when the witness performs a contemptuous act, subject to its own rules and the
constitutional rights of the said witness. However, during recess, the Senate will be prevented from
effectively conducting legislative hearings. But the Senate may still
exercise its power of contempt during legislative hearings while on recess provided that the period of
imprisonment shall only last until the termination of the legislative inquiry upon the approval or
disapproval of the Committee Report. Thus, the Senate's inherent power of contempt is still potent and
compelling even during its recess. At the same time, the rights of the persons appearing are respected
because their detention shall not be indefinite.

CASE NO. 67Topic:
–
Executive Immunity
Title:

Estrada vs. Desierto

Citation:

G.R. No. 146710-15, Mar. 2, 2001

Facts:
•

After the sharp descent from power of Chavit Singson, he went on air and accused the petitioner of
receiving millions of pesos from Jueteng lords. Calls for resignation filled the air and former allies and
members of the President’s administration started resigning one by one.
•

In a session on November 13, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of Impeachment signed by
115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House to the Senate. The impeachment
trial formally opened which is the start of the dramatic fall from power of the President, which is most
evident in the EDSA Dos rally.
•

On January 20, the President submitted two letters - one signifying his leave from the Palace and the
other signifying his inability to exercise his powers pursuant to Section 11, Article VII of the
Constitution. Thereafter, Arroyo took oath as President of the Philippines.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the petitioner resigned as President.
2. Whether or not the impeachment proceedings bar the petitioner from resigning.
Ruling:
1. For a resignation to be legally valid, there must be an intent to resign, and the intent must be coupled
by acts of relinquishment which may be oral or written, express or implied, for as long as the
resignation is clear. In the press release containing his final statement, he acknowledged the oath-taking
of Arroyo as President; he emphasized he was leaving the Palace without the mention of any inability
and intent of reassumption; he expressed his gratitude to the people; he assured will not shirk from any
future challenge that may come ahead in the same service of the country. This is of high-grade
evidence of his intent to resign.
2. Petitioner’s contention that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that,

under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning is not affirmed by the Court. The exact nature of
an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo that it is an administrative
proceeding, it cannot be considered pending at the time petitioner resigned because the process already
broke down when most of the senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the
public and private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of
Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There was, in effect, no
impeachment case pending against the petitioner when he resigned.

CASE NO. 68Topic:
–
Executive Privilege
Title:

Almonte et. Al. vs. Vasquez

Citation:

G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995
Facts:

•

The case is a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to annul the subpoena duces tecumand
orders issued by respondent Ombudsman, requiring petitioners Neria Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief
accountant and record custodian of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to
produce “all documents relating to Personal Services Funds for the year 1988 and all
evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB for 1988” and to enjoin him from
enforcing his orders.
An anonymous and unsigned letter purportedly written by an employeeof the EIIB, was sent to the
Secretary of Finance, with copies furnished to several government offices, including the Office of the
Ombudsman. In the letter were allegations as to the misuse of funds from the savings of unfulfilled
plantilla positions, among other forms of corruption and abuse of power.
•

As a response to the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte denied allegations. Petitioner Perez also
denied the issue for the savings realized from the implementation of E.O. No. 127, since the DBM only
allotted for the remaining 947 personnel, and that the disbursement of funds for the plantilla positions
for overt and covert personnel had been cleared by COA.
•

Jose F. Sano, the Graft Investigation Officer of the Ombudsman’s office found their responses
unsatisfactory; therefore he asked for authority to conduct an investigation. Anticipating the grant of
his request, he issued a subpoena to petitioners, compelling them to submit their counter-affidavits and
the affidavits of their witnesses, as well as subpoena duces tecum to the chief of the
EIIB’s Accounting Division, ordering him to bring “all documents relating to Personal Service Funds
for the year 1988 and all evidence, such as vouchers (salary) for the whole plantilla of EIIB
for 1988.”

Issue:
Whether or not an Ombudsman can oblige the petitioners by virtue of subpoena duces tecum to
provided ocuments relating to personal service and salary vouchers of EIIB employers.
Ruling:YES.
A government privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets bearing on military, diplomatic
and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public interest of such paramount importance as in
and of itself transcending the individual interests of a private citizen, even though,consequently thereof,
the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights. In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or
diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the personnel of
the EIIB. EIIB's function is the gathering and evaluation of intelligence reports and information
regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy, such as, but not limited to,
economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently, while in cases which
involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine the circumstances of the case that there is
reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military matters without
compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for privilege resting on other considerations.

CASE NO. 69Topic:
–
Prohibitions
Title:

Civil Liberties Union vs. Exec. Sec.

Citation:

194 SCRA 317
Facts:
•

Petitioners Ignacio Lacsina, Luis Mauricio, Antonio Quintos and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83896
and Juan T. David for petitioners in 83815. Both petitions were consolidated and are being resolved
jointly as both seek a declaration of the unconstitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 issued by
President Corazon C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.
•

Executive Order No. 284, according to the petitioners allows members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries to hold other than government offices or positions in addition
to their primary positions. The pertinent provisions of EO 284 is as follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member, undersecretary or assistant secretary or other appointive officials of the
Executive Department may in addition to his primary position, hold not more than two positions in the
government and government corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.
Section 2: If they hold more positions more than what is required in section 1, they must relinquish the
excess position in favor of the subordinate official who is next in rank, but in no case shall any official
hold more than two positions other than his primary position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the members of the boards of such corporation should either be a secretary,
or undersecretary, or assistant secretary.
The petitioners are challenging EO 284’s constitutionality because it adds exceptions to Section 13 of

Article VII other than those provided in the constitution. According to the petitioners, the only
exceptions against holding any other office or employment in government are those provided in the
Constitution namely:
1. The Vice President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Section 3 par.2 of Article
VII.
2. The secretary of justice is an ex-officio member ofthe Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8 of
article VIII.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet
members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive
officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB.
2.Whether or not the prohibition apply to positions held in ex officio capacity.

Ruling:
1. NO. The intent of the framers of the Constitution was to impose a stricter prohibition on the President and his
official family in so far as holding other offices or employment in the government or elsewhere is
concerned. Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding
of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public
officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13,
Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their
deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless
otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. While all other appointive officials in the civil service are
allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed
by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section
7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public
officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to
the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. The phrase
"unless otherwise provided in this Constitution" must be given a literal interpretation to refer only to
those particular instances cited in the Constitution itself, to wit: the Vice-President being appointed as a
member of the Cabinet under Section 3, par. (2),Article VII; or acting as President in those instances
provided under Section 7, pars. (2) and (3),Article VII; and the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio
member of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
2.

The prohibition against holding dual or multiple offices or employment under Section 13, Article VII
of the Constitution must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive
officials specified therein without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity as provided by law
and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office. The reason is that these posts do not
comprise "any other office" within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition but are properly
an imposition of additional duties and functions on said officials. The term ex-officio means "from
office; by virtue of office." Ex-officio likewise denotes an "act done in an official character, or as a
consequence of office, and without any other appointment o rauthority than that conferred by the
office." The additional duties must not only be closely related to but must be required by the official's
primary functions. If the functions required to be performedare merely incidental, remotely related,
inconsistent, incompatible, or otherwise alien to the primary function of a cabinet official,
such additional functions would fall under the purview of"any other office" prohibited by the
Constitution.

CASE NO. 70Topic:
–
Prohibitions
Title:

Public Interest Center vs Elma

Citation:

GR No. 138965, June 30, 2006
Facts:
Elma was appointed as Chairman of the PCGG on 30 October 1998. Thereafter, during his tenure as
PCGG Chairman, he was appointed as Chief Presidential Legal Counsel (CPLC). He accepted the
second appointment but waived any renumeration that he may receive as CPLC. Petitioner questions
Elma's concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC. They contend that the appointments
contravene Section 13, Article VII and Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution.
Petitioners also maintained that respondent Elma was holding incompatible offices. He also claimed
that it is Section 7, par. 2, Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution that should be applied in his case. This
provision, according to him, would allow a public officer to hold multiple positions if (1) the law
allows the concurrent appointment of the said official; and (2) the primary function of either position
allows such concurrent appointment. Since there exists a close relation between the two positions and
there is no incompatibility between them, the primary functions of either position would allow
respondent Elma's concurrent appointments to both positions. He further added that the appointment of
the CPLC among incumbent public officials is an accepted practice.
Issue:
Whether or not the concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional, for
being incompatible offices.
Ruling:
The ruling that the concurrent appointments as PCGG Chairman and CPLC are unconstitutional, for
being incompatible offices, does not render both appointments void. Following the common-law rule
on incompatibility of offices, respondent Elma had, in effect, vacated his first office as PCGG
Chairman when he accepted the second office as CPLC.

CASE NO. 71 Topic:
Executive Department
–
Executive Power
Title:

Marcos vs. Manglapus

Citation:

177 SCRA 668 and 178 SCRA 760
Facts:
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent
“people power” revolution and was forced into exile. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to
return to the Philippines to die. But President Corazon Aquino, considering the dire consequences to
the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions
and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the
return of Marcos and his family. Aquino barred Marcos from returning due to possible threats &
following supervening events: failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by Marcos leaders, Channel 7
taken over by rebels & loyalists plan of Marcoses to return w/ mercenaries aboard a chartered plane of
a Lebanese arms dealer, Honasan’s failed coup, communist insurgency movements, secessionist
movements in Mindanao, devastated economy because of accumulated foreign debt, and plunder of
nation by Marcos & cronies. Marcos filed for a petition of mandamus and prohibition to order the
respondents to issue them their travel documents and prevent the implementation of President Aquino’s
decision to bar Marcos from returning in the Philippines.
Petitioner questions Aquino’s power to bar his return in the country. He also questioned the claim of
the President that the decision was made in the interest of national security, public safety and health.
Petitioner also claimed that the President acted outside her jurisdiction. According to the Marcoses,
such act deprives them of their right to life, liberty, property without due process and equal protection
of the laws. They also said that it deprives them of their right to travel which according to Section 6,
Article 3 of the constitution, may only be impaired by a court order.
Issue:
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President Aquino may
prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.
Ruling:
"It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines
to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's country, a distinct right
under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the
right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave the country,
and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the
"right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other hand, the
Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence and the right
to be free to leave any country, including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws
protecting the national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights of others.
However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate
to construe the limitations to the right to return to one’s country in the same context as those pertaining
to the liberty of abode and the right to travel. The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and
the right to travel, but it is a well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a
generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution as part of the law of the
land. The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in
determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare. President Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return
of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after the Marcos
regime. The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting their return to the
Philippines.

CASE NO. 72Topic:
–
Executive Power
Title:

Biraogo, et al vs. Phil Truth Commission

Citation:

GR No. 192935, December 7, 2010
Facts:
After a month in office, President Benigno Aquino III issued EO No. 1 on July 30, 2010 creating the
Philippine Truth Commission (PTC). The PTC was tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding
investigation of reported cases of graft and corruption involving third level public officers during the
administration of Aquino's predecessor Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. All it can do is gather, collect, and
assess evidence of graft and corruption and thereafter submit its findings and make recommendations
to the Office of the President, Congress, and the Ombudsman. It cannot impose criminal, civil
or administrative penalties or sanctions. Private citizen Louis Biraogo and a group of congressmen led
by Lakas Kampi CMD chairman Rep. Edcel Lagman filed in the Supreme Court separate petitions for
certiorari and prohibition assailing the constitutionality of EO No. 1 based on their belief that the
creation of the PTC constitutes usurpation of the legislative power to create public office, threatens the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman, and violates the equal protection clause of the
Philippine Constitution for specifically targeting certain officials of the Arroyo administration.
Biraogo, the petitioner, asserts that the Truth Commission is a public office and not merely an adjunct
body of the Office of the President. Thus, in order that the President may create a public office he must
be empowered by the Constitution, a statute or an authorization vested in him by law and such power
cannot be presumed. The petitioner adds that the President is only authorized by law (Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of1987) to reorganize his office, thus, his cannot serve as the basis for the
creation of the PTC.
Issue:
1. Whether the president can create public office such as the PTC without usurping the powers of
Congress.
2. Whether the purpose of the PTC transgresses the constitutional guarantee of equal protection of
the laws.
Ruling:
1. The President has the authority to create the PTC, not a public office. Majority of the members of the
Supreme Court rejected the justification of the Solicitor General (OSG) that the creation of the PTC
finds basis on the president’s power of control over all executive offices. The Decision stressed that
“control” is essentially the power to alter, modify, nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former with that of the
latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power to create public offices. The
majority also rejected the OSG’s claim that the E.O. finds basis under sec. 31 of the Administrative
Code, which authorizes the president to restructure the Office of the President. Clearly, “restructure”
under the said provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation or abolition of offices by reason
of economy or redundancy.
This presupposes an already existing office. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less
envisioned in said provision.

2. The majority members of the Supreme Court held that E.O. 1 should be struck down as violative of
the equal protection clause. Laying down a long line of precedents, the ponencia reiterated that
equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The purpose of the equal protection clause is
to secure every person against intentional and arbitrary discrimination.The Decision stressed that the
clear mandate of the PTC is to investigate and find out the truth “concerning the reported cases of graft
and corruption during the previous administration” only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of
the questioned executive order. The Arroyo administration, according to the ponencia, is just a member
of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation gave the majority an impression that the PTC is
just being used “as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution” and that E.O.1 is only
an “adventure in partisan hostility.” While the Court recognized that the creation of the PTC was
inspired with noble intentions, the ponencia nonetheless reminded the government of the ethical
principle that “the end does not justifythe means.” It emphatically closed by stressing that the search for the
truth must be within constitutional bounds, for “ours is still a government of laws and not of men.”

CASE NO. 73Topic:
–
Executive Power
Title:

Pichay vs Office of Deputy Exe. Secretary for Legal Affairs

Citation:

GR. No. 196425, July 24, 2012
Facts:
On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12)
creating the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate
or hear administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption, among others, against
presidential appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the President. However, on
November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13),
abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly established Investigative and Adjudicatory
Division (IAD). On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the
IAD-ODESLA a complaint affidavit for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr.,
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), as well as
the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees (BOT), which arose from the purchase by
the LWUA of 445,377 shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc. Petitioner, along with the other
members of the BOT of LWUA, was required to submit their respective written explanations and in
compliance, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the complaint as a case involving the same transaction
was already pending before the Office of the Ombudsman.
Issue:
Whether or not EO No. 13 violates the equal protection clause insofar as limiting the IAD-ODESLA’s
investigation only to presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in the government.
Ruling:NO.
The equal protection of the laws is a guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from
the government. It is embraced under the due process concept and simply requires that, in the
application of the law, “all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed.” The equal protection clause, however, is not absolute but
subject to reasonable classification so that aggrupation bearing substantial distinctions may be treated
differently from each other. There are substantial distinctions that set apart presidential appointees
occupying upper-level positions in government from non-presidential appointees and those that occupy
the lower positions in government. In Salumbides v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court ruled on the
substantial distinctions between elective and appointive public officials: The former occupy their office
by virtue of the mandate of the electorate,with a definite term and may be removed only upon stringent
conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation
thereto by an appointing authority. Some hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to
security of tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

CASE NO. 74Topic:
–
MARCOS BURIAL
Title:

Ocampo, et al vs Enriquez, et al

Citation:

G.R. No. 225973, Nov. 8, 2016
Facts:
During the campaign period for the 2016 Presidential Election, then candidate Rodrigo R. Duterte
publicly announced that he would allow the burial former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the
Libingan ng MgaBayani ("LNMB"). Duterte won the May 9, 2016 elections. On August 7, 2016,
Defense Secretary Delfin N. Lorenzana issued a Memorandum to AFP Chief of Staff General Ricardo
R. Visaya regarding the interment of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos at the Libinganng Mga
Bayani. On August 9, 2016, AFP Rear Admiral Ernesto C. Enriquez issued a directive to the Philippine
Army on the Funeral Honors and Service for President Marcos. Dissatisfied with the foregoing
issuance, the petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition and Petition for Mandamus and
Prohibition with the Court.
Issue:
1. ) Whether respondents Defense Secretary and AFP Rear Admiral committed grave abuse of
discretion when they issued the assailed memorandum and directive in compliance with the verbal
order of President Duterte to implement his election campaign promise to have the remains of Marcos
interred at the LNMB
2. ) Whether the issuance and implementation of the assailed memorandum and directive violated the
Constitution, and domestic and international laws
3. ) Whether historical facts, laws enacted to recover ill-gotten wealth from the Marcoses and their
cronies, and the pronouncements of the Court on the Marcos regime have nullified his entitlement as a
soldier and former President to interment at the LNMB
4.) Whether the Marcos family is deemed to have waived the burial of the remains of former President
Marcos at the LNMB after they entered into an agreement with the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines as to the conditions and procedures by which his remains shall be brought back to and
interred in the Philippines

Ruling:
The President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in accordance with the Constitution, the law
or jurisprudence. As the OSG logically reasoned out, while the Constitution is a product of our
collective history as a people, its entirety should not be interpreted as providing guiding principles to
just about anything remotely related to the Martial Law period such as the proposed Marcos burial at
the LNMB. Tañada v. Angara already ruled that the provisions in Article II of the Constitution are not
self-executing.
By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a “declaration of principles and state policies.” The
counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution is called the “basic political creed of the nation”
by Dean Vicente Sinco. These principles in Article II are not intended to be self-executing principles
ready for enforcement through the courts. They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the
exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws.

CASE NO. 75Topic:
–
Power of Control
Title:

Lacson-Magallanes Co. Inc vs Pano

Citation:

21 SCRA 895
Facts:
Jose Magallanes was permitted to use and occupy a land used for pasture in Davao. The said land was a
forest zone which was later declared as an agricultural zone. Magallanes then ceded his rights to
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. (LMC) of which he is a co-owner. Jose Paño was a farmer who asserted
his claim over the same piece of land. The Director of Lands denied Paño’s request. The Secretary of
Agriculture likewise denied his petition hence it was elevated to the Office of the President. Executive
Secretary Juan Pajo ruled in favor of Paño. LMC averred that the earlier decision of the Secretary of
Agriculture is already conclusive hence beyond appeal. He also averred that the decision of the
Executive Secretary is an undue delegation of power. The Constitution, LMC asserts, does not contain
any provision whereby the presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary.
It is argued that it is the constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.
Issue:
Whether the power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary.
Ruling:YES.
It is true that as a rule, the President must exercise his constitutional powers in person. However,
the president may delegate certain powers to the Executive Secretary at his discretion. The president m
ay delegate powers which are not required by the Constitution for him to perform personally. The
reason for this allowance is the fact that the resident is not expected to perform in person all the
multifarious executive and administrative functions. The office of the Executive Secretary is an
auxiliary unit which assists the President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that “under our
constitutional setup the Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the
President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order” that the Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue. The act of
the Executive Secretary, acting as the alter ego of the President, shall remain valid until reversed,
disapproved, or reprobated by the President. In this case, no reprobation was made hence the decision
granting the land to Paño cannot be reversed.

CASE NO. 76Topic:
–
Control of Executive Departments
Title:

Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora

Citation:

G.R. No. 142801-802, July 10, 2001
Facts:
The Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) was created as part of the structural
organization of the Ministry of Finance through the issuance of Executive Order No. 127 by
formerPresident Corazon Aquino. The EIIB was tasked to evaluate intelligence reports, gather
evidence on illegalactivities affecting the national economy and aid in the prosecution of cases;
coordinate with externalagencies in monitoring financial and economic activities of persons or entities
which may adversely affectnational financial interest; provide for the guidelines in the conduct of
intelligence and investigationoperations; and perform such other appropriate functions. The EIIB was
assigned to primarily conduct anti-smuggling operations in areas outside the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of Customs by virtue of MemorandumOrder No. 225 issued by former president Aquino.

Subsequently, former President Joseph Estrada issued Executive Order No. 191 ordering
thedeactivation of the EIIB and the transfer of its functions to the Bureau of Customs and the
NationalBureau of Investigation on the ground that: the designated functions of the EIIB are also
being performed by the other existing agencies of the government; and that there is a need to
constantlymonitor the overlapping of functions among these agencies. Executive Order No. 196 was
issuedcreating the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force Aduana. He also issued Executive Order
No.223 whereby all EIIB personnel occupying positions specified therein were separated from
theservice pursuant to a bona fide reorganization resulting to abolition, redundancy, merger, division,or
consolidation of positions.Aggrieved, petitioners filed the present case invok
ing the court’s power of
judicial review ofExecutive Order Nos. 191 and 223. Petitioners contend that the issuance of the said
executiveorders is: (a) a violation of their right to security of tenure; (b) tainted with bad faith as they
werenot actually intended to make the bureaucracy more efficient but to give way to Task Force
Aduanathe functions of which are essentially and substantially the same as that of
EIIB; and (c) ausurpation of the power of Congress to decide whether or not to abolish the EIIB.On the
other hand, the Solicitor General maintains that: (a) the President enjoys the totality of theexecutive
power provided under Sections 1 and 7, Article VII of the Constitution, thus, he has theauthority to
issue Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223; (b) the said executive orders were issued inthe interest of
national economy, to avoid duplicity of work and to streamline the functions of the bureaucracy; and
(c) the EIIB was only deactivated and not abolished.
Issues:
1.

Whether or not the President has the authority to carry out reorganization in any branch oragency of the
executive department.2.

Whether or not the reorganization in this case is valid.
Ruling:
1.

YES.
The President is empowered by the Administrative Code to validly reorganize his officeeven without
congressional authority in order to achieve economy and efficiency.The general rule has always been
that the power to abolish a public office is lodged withthe legislature. This proceeds from the legal
precept that the power to create includes
the power to destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or byauthority of
law. Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by
the same legislature that brought it into existence. The exception is that, as
far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the President’s
power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certainlaws may
grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.In the whereas clause of Executive
Order No. 191, former President Estrada anchored hisauthority to deactivate EIIB on Section 77 of
Republic Act 8745, the General AppropriationsAct for fiscal year 1999. It
provides:Sec. 77. Organized Changes. Unless otherwise provided by law or directed by thePresident of
the Philippines, no changes in key positions or organizational units in anydepartment or agency shall be
authorized in their respective organizational structures andfunded from appropriations provided by this
Act.The Supreme Court said that the above provision recognizes the authority of the Presidentto effect
organizational changes in the department or agency under the executivestructure. Such a ruling further
finds support in Section 78 of Republic Act No. 8760. Underthis law, the heads of departments,
bureaus, offices and agencies and other entities in theExecutive Branch are mandated to conduct actual
streamlining and productivity improvementin agency organization and operation shall be effected
pursuant to Circulars or Orders issuedfor the purpose by the Office of the President.Under Section 31,
Book III of Executive Order No. 292, the Administrative Code of 1987,the President, subject to the
policy in the Executive Office and in order toachieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have
the continuing authority to reorganizethe administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this
purpose, he may transferthe functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President.
The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of Finance.
It falls under the Office of thePresident. Hence, it is subject to the Pr
esident’s continuing authority to reorganize.
2.

YES.
The reorganization is valid.The Solicitor General invoked the distinction between deactivation and
abolition. Todeactivate means to render inactive or ineffective or to break up by discharging or
reassigning personnel, while to abolish means to do away with, to annul, abrogate or destroy
completely.Abolition denotes an intention to do away with the office wholly and permanently. Whilein
abolition, the office ceases to exist, the same is not true in deactivation where the officecontinues to
exist, albeit remaining dormant or inoperative. Deactivation and abolition
are both reorganization measures. As far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executivedepartment is
concerned, the
President’s power of control may justify him to inactivate the

function of a particular office or certain law may grant him the broad authority to carry
outreorganization measure.An examination of the pertinent Executive Orders shows that the
deactivation of EIIB andthe creation of Task Force Aduana were done in good faith. It was not for the
purpose ofremoving the EIIB employees, but to achieve the ultimate purpose of E.O. No. 191, which
iseconomy. While Task Force Aduana was created to take the place of EIIB, its creation doesnot entail
expense to the government.Firstly, there is no employment of new personnel to man the Task Force.
E.O. No. 196 provides that the technical, administrative and special staffs
of EIIB are to be composed of people who are already in the public service, they being employees of ot
her existingagencies. Secondly, the thrust of E.O. No. 196 is to have a small group of military men
underthe direct control and supervision of the President as base of the
government’s anti
-smugglingcampaign. The idea is to encourage the utilization of personnel, facilities and resources of
thealready existing departments instead of maintaining an independent office with a whole set
of personnel and facilities. And thirdly, it is evident from the yearly budget appropriation
of thegovernment that the creation of the Task Force Aduana was especially intended to lessen
EIIB’s expenses.
Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursuedin good
faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for
the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal orseparation
actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. If the abolition, which isnothing else but a
separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeatsecurity of tenure, otherwise
not in good faith, no valid abolition takes and whatever abolitiois done, is void ab initio. There is an
invalid abolition as where there is merely a change ofnomenclature of positions, or where claims of
economy are belied by the existence of amplefunds.
In the present case, petitioners’ right to security of tenure is not violate because th
eabolition of EIIB within the competence of a legitimate body is done in good faith and suffersfrom no
infirmity. Valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of theincumbents.Hence, the
petition was denied for lack of merit.

CASE NO. 77Topic:
–

Power of General Supervision over LGU’s

Title:

Dadole vs. COA

Citation:

G.R. No. 125350, December 3, 2002
Facts:
In 1986, the RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly allowances ofP1,260
each through the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of the said
city. In 1991, Mandaue City increased the amount to P1,500 for each judge.
On March 15, 1994, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued the disputed Local
Budget Circular No. 55 (LBC 55) which provided that: In the light of the authority granted to the local
government units under the Local Government Code to provide for additional allowances and other
benefits to national government officials and employees assigned in their locality, such additional
allowances in the form of honorarium at rates not exceeding P1,000.00 in provinces and cities and
P700.00 in municipalities may be granted.
There being no statutory basis to grant additional allowance to judges in excess of P1,000.00
chargeable against the local government units where they are stationed, this Commission finds no
substantial grounds or cogent reason to disturb the decision of the City Auditor, Mandaue City
,disallowing in audit the allowances in question. Accordingly, the above-captioned appeal of the MTC
and RTC Judges of Mandaue City, insofar as the same is not covered by Circular Letter No.91-7, is
hereby dismissed for lack of merit. On November 27, 1995, Executive Judge Mercedes Gozo-Dadole,
for and on behalf of the petitioner judges, filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision
of the COA. In a resolution dated May 28, 1996, the COA denied the motion.
Issue:
Whether LBC 55 of the DBM is void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President and for
not having been published and whether the yearly appropriation ordinance enacted by the City of
Mandaue that provides for additional allowances to judges contravenes the annual appropriation laws
enacted by Congress.
Ruling:
On the first issue, the court declared LBC 55 to be null and void. Although our Constitution guarantees
autonomy to local government units, the exercise of local autonomy remains subject to the power of
control by Congress and the power of supervision by the President. Section 4 of Article X of the 1987
Philippine Constitution provides that: Sec.4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments.
This provision (Section 4 of Article X of the 1987 Philippine Constitution) has been interpreted to
exclude the power of control. In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to
fulfill them, the former may take such action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their
duties. Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set
aside what a subordinate officer has done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.
"In a more recent case, Drilon v. Lim, the difference between control and supervision was further
delineated. Officers in control lay down the rules in the performance or accomplishment of an
act. If these rules are not followed, they may, in their discretion, order the act undone or redone by their
subordinates or even decide to do it themselves. On the other hand, supervision does not cover such
authority. Supervising officials merely see to it that the rules are followed, but they themselves do not
lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not
observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not
prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see
to it that the rules are followed. Under our present system of government, executive power is vested in
the President. The members of the Cabinet and other executive officials are merely alter-egos. As such,
they are subject to the power of control of the President, at whose will and behest they can be removed
from office; or their actions and decisions changed, suspended or reversed. In contrast, the heads
of political subdivisions are elected by the people. Their sovereign powers emanate from the electorate,
to whom they are directly accountable. By constitutional fiat, they are subject to the President's
supervision only, not control, so long as their acts are exercised within the sphere of their legitimate
powers. By the same token, the President may not withhold or alter any authority or power given them
by the Constitution and the law. Clearly then, the President can only interfere in the affairs and
activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted contrary to law. This is
the scope of the President's supervisory powers over local government units. Hence, the President or
any of his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government
unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President
or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local
affairs of a local government unit is a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy
and separation of powers of the executive and legislative departments in governing municipal
corporations. Furthermore, LBC 55 is void on account of its lack of publication, It has come to our
knowledge that DBM-CCC No. 10 has been re-issued in its entirety and submitted for publication in
the Official Gazette per letter to the National Printing Office dated March 9, 1999. Would the
subsequent publication thereof cure the defect and retroact to the time that the above-mentioned items
were disallowed in audit? The answer is in the negative, precisely because publication is required as a
condition precedent to the effectivity of a law to inform the public of the contents of the law or rules
and regulations before their rights and interests are affected by the same. From the time the COA
disallowed the expenses in audit up to the filing of herein petition the subject circular remained in legal
limbo due to its non-publication. As was stated in Tañada v.Tuvera, "prior publication of laws before
they become effective cannot be dispensed with, for the reason that it would deny the public knowledge
of the laws that are supposed to govern it."

CASE NO. 78Topic:
–
Can the President remove the Deputy Ombudsman?
Title:

Gonzales vs Office of the President

Citation:

GR. No. 196231
Facts:
A formal charge for Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery extortion and physical injuries)
was filed before PNP-NCR against Manila Police District Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando
Mendoza and four others. Private complainant, Christian M. Kalaw, before the Office of the City
Prosecutor, filed a similar charge. While said cases were still pending, the Office of the Regional
Director of the National Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the request of petitioner
Gonzales III, all relevant documents and evidence in relation to said case to the Office of the
Deputy Ombudsman for appropriate administrative adjudication. Subsequently a case for Grave
Misconduct was lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers in the Office
of the Ombudsman. Meanwhile, the case filed before the Office of the city Prosecutor was dismissed
upon a finding that the material allegations made by the complainant had not been substantiated
"by any evidence at all to warrant the indictment of respondents of the offenses charged." Similarly, the
Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a Resolution recommending the dismissal without prejudice
of the administrative case against the same police officers, for failure of the complainant to appear
in three (3) consecutive hearings despite due notice. However, upon the recommendation of petitioner
Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers guilty of
Grave Misconduct was approved by the Ombudsman. Mendoza and his colleagues filed for a motion
for reconsideration which was forwarded to Ombudsman Gutierrez for final approval, in whose office
it remained pending for final review and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a bus-load of foreign
tourists on that fateful day of August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have himself reinstated in the
police service. In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident, which ended in the tragic murder of
eight HongKong Chinese nationals, the injury of seven others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando
Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of government officials prompted the creation of the
Incident Investigation and Review Committee (IIRC). It was tasked to determine accountability for the
incident through the conduct of public hearings and executive sessions. The IIRC found Deputy
Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and inexcusable negligence and gross violation of their own
rules of procedure by allowing Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to languish for more than nine
(9) months without any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman prescribed rules to resolve
motions for reconsideration in administrative disciplinary cases within five (5) days from submission.
The inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated
the desperate resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner was dismissed from service. Hence the petition.

Issue:
Whether the Office of the President has jurisdiction to exercise administrative disciplinary power over
a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the constitutionally created Office of the
Ombudsman.
Ruling:
YES. The Ombudsman's administrative disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor is not exclusive. While the Ombudsman's authority to discipline administratively is
extensive and covers all government officials, whether appointive or elective, with the exception only
of those officials removable by impeachment such authority is by no means exclusive. Petitioners
cannot insist that they should be solely and directly subject to the disciplinary authority of the
Ombudsman. For, while Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over
all government officials, Section 8(2), on the other hand, grants the President express power of removal
over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special Prosecutor. A harmonious construction of these two
apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770 leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress had
intended the Ombudsman and the President to exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction
over petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably, the manifest
intent of Congress in enacting both provisions - Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same Organic Act
was to provide for an external authority, through the person of the President, that would exercise the
power of administrative discipline over the Deputy Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the
least diminishing the constitutional and plenary authority of the Ombudsman over all government
officials and employees. Such legislative design is simply a measure of "check and balance" intended
to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try
to protect one another from administrative liabilities.
CASE NO. 79Topic:
–
Limitations to Appointment Power
Title:

De Castro vs JBC

Citation:

G.R. No. 191002, March 17, 2010
Facts:
On March 17, 2010, the Court promulgated its decision granting the petition in A.M. No. 10-2-5-SC
and, accordingly, directing the Judicial and Bar Council:
(1) To resume its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancy to be created by the
compulsory retirement of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno by May 17, 2010;
(2) To prepare the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice;
(3) To submitto the incumbent President the short list of nominees for the position of Chief Justice on
or before May 17,2010; and
(4) To continue its proceedings for the nomination of candidates to fill the vacancies in the Judiciary and submit to
the President the short list of nominees corresponding thereto in accordance with this decision.
Motions for reconsideration were herein filed by the petitioners with the aversion that a plain reading
of Section 15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not lead to an interpretation that exempts
judicial appointments from the express ban on midnight appointments.
Issue:
Whether judicial appointments are exempted from the ban on midnight appointments stated
under Section15, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling:YES.
We deny the motions for reconsideration for lack of merit, for all the matters being thereby raised and
argued, not being new, have all been resolved by the decision of March 17, 2010. Section 15, Article
VII does not apply to appointments in the Judiciary. The decision of March 17, 2010 has fittingly
observed: Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the
appointment of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done so. That such
specification was not done only reveals that the prohibition against the President or Acting President
making appointments within two months before the next presidential elections and up to the end of the
President’s or Acting President’s term does not refer to the Members of the Supreme Court.

We cannot allow the meaning of the Constitution to be stretched to any unintended point in order to
suit the purpose of any quarter.

CASE NO. 80Topic:
–
Ad Interim or Recess Appointments vs Regular
Title:

Matibag vs. Benipayo

Citation:

G.R. No. 149036
Facts:
On February 1999, petitioner Matibag was appointed Acting Director IV of the Comelec’s EID by
then Comelec Chairperson Harriet Demetriou in a temporary capacity. On March 2001, respondent
Benipayo was appointed Comelec Chairman together with other commissioners in an ad
interim appointment. While on such ad interim appointment, respondent Benipayo in his capacity as
Chairman issued a Memorandum address transferring petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner
requested Benipayo to reconsider her relief as Director IV of the EID and her reassignment to the Law
Department. She cited Civil Service Commission Memorandum
Circular No. 7 dated April 10, 2001, reminding heads of government offices that "transfer and detail of
employees are prohibited during the election period. Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration
on April 18, 2001, citing COMELEC Resolution No. 3300 dated November 6,2000, exempting
Comelec from the coverage of the said Memo Circular. Petitioner appealed the denial of her request for
reconsideration to the COMELEC en banc. She also filed an administrative and criminal complaint
with the Law Department against Benipayo, alleging that her reassignment violated Section 261 (h) of
the Omnibus Election Code, COMELEC Resolution No. 3258, Civil Service Memorandum Circular
No. 07, s. 001, and other pertinent administrative and civil service laws, rules and regulations. During
the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the
instant petition questioning the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason, as Chairman and Commissioners of the COMELEC, respectively. Petitioner claims that the ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason violate the constitutional provisions on the
independence of the COMELEC.
Issue:
Whether or not the assumption of office by Benipayo, Borra and Tuason on the basis of the ad interim
appointments issued by the President amounts to a temporary appointment prohibited by Section 1(2),
Article IX-C of the Constitution.
Ruling:
An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is
subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments does not alter its permanent character.
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim appointment permanent in character by making it effective
until disapproved by the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of Congress. In
the instant case, the President did in fact appoint permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the
COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and
Tuason were extended permanent appointments during the recess of Congress. They were not
appointed or designated in a temporary or acting capacity, unlike Commissioner Haydee Yorac in
Brillantes vs. Yorac and Solicitor General Felix Bautista in Nacionalista Party vs. Bautista. The ad
interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason are expressly allowed by the Constitution which
authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress, to make appointments that take effect
immediately. While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC "shall be independent", this
provision should be harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad interim appointments. To hold
that the independence of the COMELEC requires the Commission on Appointments to first confirm ad
interim appointees before the appointees can assume office will negate the President’s power to make
ad interim appointments. This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to give meaning and
effect to every provision of the law. It will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of the
Constitution

CASE NO. 81Topic:
–
Pardon distinguished from Amnesty
Title:

Barroquinto vs. Fernandez

Citation:

82 Phil 642
Facts:
Petitioners Norberto Jimenez and Loreto Barrioquinto were charged with the crime of murder. As the
latter had not yet been arrested the case proceeded against the former, and he was sentenced to life
imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became
aware of the Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged
with an act penalized under the Revised Penal Code in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or
against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and committed during the period from
December 8, 1941, to the date when particular area of the Philippines where the offense was actually
committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation.

Jimenez decided to submit his case to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission presided by the respondents
herein, and the other petitioner Loreto Barrioquinto, who had then been already apprehended, did the
same. The Amnesty Commission returned the cases of the petitioners to the CFI-Zamboanga, without
deciding whether or not they are entitled to the benefits of the said Amnesty Proclamation, on the
ground that inasmuch as neither Barrioquinto nor Jimenez have admitted having committed the
offense, because Barrioquinto alleged that it was Hipolito Tolentino who shot and killed the
victim,they cannot invoke the benefits of amnesty.
Issue:
Whether or not admission of guilt is necessary in an amnesty.
Ruling:NO.
The respondents failed to differentiate between amnesty and pardon. In order to entitle a person to the
benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or
sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege
the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused,
shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation.
Hence, it is not correct to say that “invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of a plea of
confession and avoidance.”

CASE NO. 82Topic:
–
Pardon distinguished from Amnesty
Title:

Vera vs. People

Citation:

7 SCRA 152, January 31, 1963
Facts:
In the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Vera and others were charged with the complex crime of
kidnapping with murder of Amadeo Lozanes, alias Azarcon. Upon their motion, invoking
the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation of the President, series of 1946, the case was referred to the
Eighth Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, which actually tried it. During the hearing, none of the
petitioners-defendants admitted having committed the crime charged. In fact Gaudencio Vera, the only
defendant who took the witness stand instead of admitting the killing of the deceased Lozañes
categorically denied it. Hence, the Amnesty Commission held that it could not take cognizance of the
case on the ground that the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation could be invoked only by defendants
in a criminal case who admitting the commission of the crime, plead that said commission was in
pursuance of the resistance movement and perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the
Japanese occupation. Consequently, the Commission ordered that the case be remanded to the court of
origin for trial.
Issue:
Whether or not Vera and others can avail the benefit of Amnesty without admission of guilt.
Ruling:
Petitioners contend that to be entitled to the benefits of Amnesty Proclamation No. 8, it is not necessary
for them to admit the commission of the crime charged, citing in support of their submission the cases
of (Barrioquinto, et al. vs. Fernandez, et al), (Provincial Fiscal of Ilocos Norte v. De los Santos, et al.)
and (Viray v. Amnesty Commission, et al.) to the effect that "in order to entitle a person to the benefits
of Amnesty Proclamation (No. 8), it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent or sine
qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which he is charged, and allege the
amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows
that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty Proclamation. But said cases have
been superseded and deemed overruled by the subsequent cases of (People v. Llanita,et al) and (People
v. Guillermo, et al) wherein the court held that — It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act,
or seek forgiveness for an act which, according to him, he has not committed. Amnesty presupposes
the commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains that he has not committed a crime, he
cannot have any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty proclamation imposes certain conditions, as in this
case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of such conditions. The invocation of
amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the
allegations against him but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved,
would being the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation.

CASE NO. 83Topic:
–
Effect of Pardon
Title:

Monsanto vs. Factoran

Citation:

G.R. No. 78239, Feb. 9, 1989
Facts:
The Sandiganbayan convicted Monsanto (then assistant treasurer of Calbayog City) of the complex
crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents. Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court
which subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for reconsideration but while said
motion was pending, she was extended by then President Marcos absolute pardon which she
accepted. By reason of said pardon, Monsanto wrote the Calbayog City Treasurer requesting that she
be restored to her former post as Assistant City Treasurer. As referred, the Finance Ministry ruled that
petitioner may be reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment not earlier than
the date she was extended the absolute pardon. Seeking reconsideration, Monsanto wrote that the full
pardon bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies that her service in the government has
never been interrupted and therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date of her
preventive suspension.
Monsanto’s basic theory is that the general rules on pardon cannot apply to her case by reason of
the fact that she was extended executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal in this
Court. When pardon was issued before the final verdict of guilt, it was an acquittal because there was
no offense to speak of. In effect, the President has declared her not guilty of the crime charged and has
accordingly dismissed the same.
Issue:
Whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute pardon by the Chief Executive is
entitled to reinstatement to her former position without need of a new appointment.
Ruling:NO.
The public officer, who is granted pardon, cannot be reinstated to her former position. But she can
apply for reappointment and undergo the usual procedure for a new appointment. Monsanto had been
convicted of the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced of
prision correccional as minimum, and of prision mayor as maximum. The penalty of prision mayor
carries the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification
and perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, enforceable during the term of the prin
cipal penalty. The penalty of prision correccional carries, as one of its accessory penalties, suspension
from public office.
Philippine jurisprudence on the subject has been largely influenced by American case law. Pardon is
defined as "an act of grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of the laws, which
exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he
has committed. It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the
individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court. A pardon is a
deed, to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance.

CASE NO. 84Topic:
–
Effect of Violation of The Terms of Pardon
Title:

Torres vs Director of Bureau of Prisons

Citation:

G.R. No. 122338, Dec. 29, 1995
Facts:
This case is an original petition for habeas corpus filed on behalf of the petitioner Wilfredo Torres.
Sometime before 1979 petitioner was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Manila of the crime of
estafa (two counts) and was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of from eleven (11) years, ten (10)
months and twenty-two (22) days to thirty-eight (38) years, nine (9) months an done (1) day, and to pay
an indemnity of P127,728.75. These convictions were affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The maximum
sentence would expire on 2 November 2000. On 18 April 1979, a conditional pardon was granted to the
petitioner by the President of the Philippines on condition that petitioner would “not again violate any
of the penal laws of the Philippines. Should this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in
the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently
released from confinement.
On 21 May 1986, the Board of Pardons and Parole (the “Board”) resolved to recommend to the
President the cancellation of the conditional pardon granted to the petitioner. In making its
recommendation to the President, the Board relied upon the decisions of this Court in Tesoro vs.
Director of Prisons (68 Phil. 154 [1939]) and Espuelas vs. Provincial Warden of Bohol (108 Phil.356
[1960]). The evidence before the Board showed that on 22 March 1982 and 24 June 1982, petitioner
had been charged with twenty counts of estafa. On 4 June 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice
wrote to the President of the Philippines informing her of the Resolution of the Board recommending
cancellation of the conditional
pardon previously granted to petitioner. On 8 September 1986, the President cancelled the conditional
pardon of the petitioner. On 10 October 1986, the respondent Minister of Justice issued “by authority
of the President” an Order of Arrest and Recommitment against petitioner. The petitioner was
accordingly arrested and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
Issue:
Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before Torres
can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and
accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.

Ruling:
The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon
are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.The determination of the occurrence
of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper consequences of such breach, may be either a
purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative
Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a conditional
pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Pena lCode. Where the President opts to proceed under
Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent
crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order that a convict
may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon. Because due process is not semper et
ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned convict had already been accorded
judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for which he was conditionally pardoned,
Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code is not afflicted with a constitutional vice. In proceeding
against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached
the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (1) to proceed against him
under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code; or (2) to proceed against him under Article 159
of the RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon a convict who
“having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the conditions of
such pardon.” Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under Section 64 of the
Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the President’s executive prerogative and is
not subject to judicial scrutiny.

CASE NO. 85Topic:
–
Calling Out Power, Declaration of State of Rebellion
Title:

Lacson vs. Perez

Citation:
May 10, 2001
Facts:
President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as
well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR.
Warrantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the “rebellion” were thereafter effected.
Petitioner filed for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for the
issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. Petitioners assail the
declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners
furthermore pray that the appropriate court, wherein the information against them were filed,would
desist arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also contend that they are
allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful restraint being that hold departure
orders were issued against them.
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless arrests and hold departure
ordersallegedly effected by the same.
Ruling:
President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6, 2006, accordingly the
instant petition has been rendered moot and academic. Respondents have declared that the Justice
Department and the police authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all
acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion in suppressing the
rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38.
Petitioner’s prayer for mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time because an individual
warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, providing for
preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, providing for the period in which a
warrantlessly arrested person must be delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer
responsible for such may be penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no legal
ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not prejudicial to claim of
damagesunder Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners were neither assailing the validity of the subject
hold departure orders, nor were they expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future.
To declare the hold departure orders, null and void ab initio must be made in the proper proceedings
initiated for that purpose. Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their
undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and all persons acting
in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners without the required judicial warrants for
all acts committed in relation to or in connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacañang.

CASE NO. 86Topic:

–
Military Powers
Title:

Fortun vs GMA

Citation:

GR. No. 190293, March 20, 2012
Facts:
On November 23, 2009, heavily armed men believed led by the ruling Ampatuan family of
Maguindanao gunned down and buried under shoveled dirt 57 innocent civilians. In response to this carnage,
President Arroyo issued on November 24, 2009 PP 1946 declaring a state of emergency in
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City. On December 4, 2009, President Arroyo issued PP
1959 declaring martial law and suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in Maguindanao
except for identified areas of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. On December 6, 2009, President
Arroyo submitted her report to Congress. On December 9, 2009, Congress convened in joint session to
review the validity of the President’s action. But two days later, or on December 12, 2009, before
Congress could act, the President issued PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus.
Issue:
Whether the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the privilege of the writ
in Maguindanao,render the issues moot and academic.
Ruling:YES.
the issuance of PP 1963, lifting martial law and restoring the [privilege of the] writ in Maguindanao,
rendered the issues moot and academic. Prudence and respect for the co-equal departments of the
government dictate that the Court should be cautious in entertaining actions that assail the
constitutionality of the acts of the Executive or the Legislative department. The issue of
constitutionality, said the Court in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, must be the
very issue of the case, that the resolution of such issue is unavoidable. The issue of the constitutionality
of Proclamation 1959 is not unavoidable. President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law
and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the joint houses of Congress could
fulfill their automatic duty to review and validate or invalidate the same. Under the 1987 Constitution
the President and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim martial law
or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially,
but in a sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation or the suspension, only the
Congress can maintain the same based on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power
that the President does not have. Consequently, although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme
Court the power to review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension in a proper suit,
it is implicit that the Court must allow Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic rather
than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty to defend the Constitution through such
review should the Supreme Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the
President’s proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ of habeas corpus is first a political
question in the hands of Congress before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court. Here,
President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint houses of Congress, which had in fact
convened, could act on the same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become moot and the
Court has nothing to review. The lifting of martial law and restoration of the privilege of the writ
of habeascorpus in Maguindanao was a supervening event that obliterated any justiciable controversy.
Since President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus in just eight days, they have not been meaningfully implemented. The military
did not take over the operation and control of local government units in Maguindanao. The President
did not issue any law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be enacted
by Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been reported. Those who were arrested during the
period were either released or promptly charged in court. Indeed, no petition for habeas corpus had
been filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those eight days. The point is that the President
intended by her action to address an uprising in a relatively small and sparsely populated province. In
her judgment, the rebellion was localized and swiftly disintegrated in the face of a determined and
amply armed government presence.
CASE NO. 87Topic:

–
Constitutionality of Martial Law in Mindanao
Title:

Lagman vs Medialdea

Citation:

G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017
Facts:
On May 23, 2017, President Rodrigo Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring Martial Law in
the whole island of Mindanao and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus therein.
On May 25, the president submitted a written report to Congress on the factual basis of the Martial Law
declaration (as required by the Constitution). The main basis of the declaration was the attack of the
Maute terrorist group in Marawi City. According to the report, the Maute group is an affiliate of
ISIS which is aiming to establish an Islamic caliphate in Marawi City (and might spread its control
in all the other parts of Mindanao). It also cited the on going rebellion and lawless violence that has
plagued Mindanao for decades. Proclamation 216 is now assailed by several petitioners.
Issue:
1. ) Whether the petition is reviewable by the court under Section 18, Article VII
2. ) Whether the power of this Court to review the sufficiency of the factual basis [of] the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is independent of the actual
actions that have been taken by Congress jointly or separately
3. ) Whether the power of judicial review by this Court involves the calibration of graduated powers
granted the President as Commander-in-Chief, namely (1) calling out powers, (2) suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and (3) declaration of martial law.
4.) Whether there were sufficient factual [basis] for the proclamation of martial law or the suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
Ruling:
1. ) YES. The only requisite to challenge the validity of the suspension of the privilege of the writ
ofhabeas corpus and declaration of martial law is that the petitioner should be a citizen. He need not
even be a taxpayer.
2.) YES. A plain reading of Section 18, Article VII reveals that it specifically grants authority to the
Court to determine the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial law or suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. This is completely independent from Congress’ duty to
review. It is meant to provide an additional safeguard against possible abuse by the President in the
exercise of his power to declare martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.The
Court may strike down the presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen on the ground
of lack of sufficient factual basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the proclamation or
suspension, such a revocation shall not be set aside by the President.

The Court is not allowed to “undertake an independent investigation beyond the pleadings.” On the
other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only data available prior to, but likewise events
supervening the declaration. Unlike the Court, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve
into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.
The Court’s review power is only passive; it is only initiated by the filing of a petition “in anappropriate proceeding”
by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress’ review mechanism is automatic in the sense that it may be
activated by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or suspension was made. The court held
that it can simultaneously exercise its power of review with, and independently from, the power
to revoke by Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the part of Congress does not
deprive or deny the Court of its power to review.
3.) NO. The power of judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President’s decision pertaining
to which extraordinary power should he use to avail in a given set of facts or conditions. To do so
would be tantamount to an incursion into the exclusive domain of the Executive and an infringement
on the prerogative that solely, at least initially, lies with the President. The sequence of “graduated
powers” does not refer to a sequence, arrangement, or order which the Commander-in-Chief must
follow. This so-called “graduation of powers” does not dictate or restrict the manner by which
the President decides which power to choose.
4.) YES. In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or suspension, the Court
considers only the information and data available to the President prior to or at the time of the
declaration.The determination by the Court of the sufficiency of factual basis must be limited only to
the facts and information mentioned in the Report and Proclamation.The Court held that the President,
in issuing Proclamation No. 216, had sufficient factual bases tending to show that actual rebellion
exists. The President only has to ascertain if there is probable cause for a declaration of Martial Law
and the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
The petitioners’ counter-evidence were derived solely from unverified news articles on the internet,
with neither the authors nor the sources shown to have affirmed the contents thereof. As the Court has
consistently ruled, news articles are hearsay evidence, twice removed, and are thus without any
probative value, unless offered for a purpose other than proving the truth of the matter asserted. The
alleged false and/or inaccurate statements are just pieces and parcels of the Report; along with these
alleged false data is an arsenal of other independent facts showing that more likely than not, actual
rebellion exists.

CASE NO. 88Topic:
–
Diplomatic Power
Title:

Nicolas vs Romulo

Citation:

GR No. 175888, February 11, 2009
Facts:
Respondent Lance Corporal (L/CPL) Daniel Smith is a member of the United States Armed Forces. He
was charged with the crime of rape committed against a Filipina, petitioner herein, sometime on
November 1,2005 and was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape in the RTC of
Makati. The court ordered Smith detained at the Makati City Jail until further orders. On December 29,
2006, however, defendant Smith was taken out of the Makati jail by a contingent of Philippine law
enforcement agents, purportedly acting under orders of the Department of the Interior and Local
Government, and brought to a facility for detention under the control of the United States
government, provided for under new agreements between the Philippines and the United States, referre
d to as the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 19, 2006 which states: The Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America agree that, in
accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between our two nations, Lance Corporal
Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine Corps, be returned to U.S. military custody at the U.S. Embassy
in Manila. And the Romulo-Kenney Agreement of December 22, 2006 which states:The Department of
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Philippines and the Embassy of the United States of America
agree that, in accordance with the Visiting Forces Agreement signed between the two nations, upon
transfer of Lance Corporal Daniel J. Smith, United States Marine Corps, from the Makati City Jail,
he will be detained at the first floor, Rowe (JUSMAG) Building, U.S. Embassy Compound in a room
of approximately 10 x 12 square feet. He will be guarded round the clock by U.S. military personnel.
The Philippine police and jail authorities, under the direct supervision of the Philippine Department of
Interior and Local Government(DILG) will have access to the place of detention to ensure the United
States is in compliance with the terms of the VFA. Petitioner Jovito Salonga, et al. challenged the
validity of the said agreements contending that the Philippines should have custody of Smith because,
first of all, the VFA is void and unconstitutional since it violates Art. XVlll, Sec. 25 of the constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not the VFA is constitutional and the Romulo-Kenney Agreements in accordance with
the provisions of the VFA itself.

Ruling:
The SC ruled The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of the Philippines and the
United States, entered on February 10, 1998, is constitutional, but the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of
December 19 and 22, 2006 are DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA.
VFA is Constitutional. The SC ruled that “the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine Senate and
has been recognized as a treaty by the United States,” and “the fact that (it) was not submitted for
advice and consent of the United States does not detract from its status as a binding international
agreement or treaty recognized by the said State.”
Section 25, Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution provides that “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities
shall not be allowed in the Philippines except under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and, when
the Congress so requires, ratified by a majority of the votes cast by the people in a national referendum
held for that purpose, and recognized as a treaty by the other contracting State.”

The issue, the Court said, is “whether or not the presence of the US Armed Forces in Philippine
territory pursuant to the VFA is allowed ‘under a treaty duly concurred in by the Senate and recognized
as a treaty by the other contracting State.’” “It is,” the Court ruled. “The VFA, which is the instrument
agreed upon to provide for the joint RP-US military exercises, is simply an implementing agreement
to the main RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty,” the Court held. The RP -US Mutual Defense Treaty of
August 30, 1951 was signed and duly ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and
the United States Senate. The Court however ruled that “the Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December
19 and 22, 2006, which are agreements on the detention of the accused in the United States Embassy,
are not in accord with the VFA itself because such detention is not “by Philippine authorities.”
Article V, Section 10 of the VFA provides that the confinement or detention by Philippine authorities
of the United States personnel shall be carried out in facilities agreed on by appropriate Philippines and
United States authorities.

CASE NO. 89Topic:
–
Diplomatic Power
Title:

Bayan vs. Zamora

Citation:

G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000
Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others, the possible
elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a series of conferences and
negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13, 1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos
approved the VFA, which was respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador
Thomas Hubbard.Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998, and on May 27, 1999, the
senate approved it by 2/3 votes. Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the
1987 constitution is applicable and not Section 21, Article VII. Following the argument of the
petitioner, under the provision cited, the “foreign military bases, troops, or facilities” may be allowed
in the Philippines unless the following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a national
referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress, and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so that, what is requires
for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence in by at least two-thirds of all the members
of the senate.
Issue:
Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25, Article XVIII of the
Constitution?
Ruling:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign military bases,
troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain extent and in a limited sense, however,
the provisions of section 21, Article VII will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole
purpose of determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the senate.
The Constitution, makes no distinction between “transient” and “permanent.” We find nothing in
Section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to be stationed or placed permanently
in the Philippines. It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a treaty.

CASE NO. 90Topic:
–
Deportation of Undesirable Aliens
Title:

Go Tek vs. Deportation Board

Citation:

79 SCRA 17
Facts:
The Board, composed of Manuel A. Concordia, Arturo A. Alafriz and Manuel V. Reyes, in its
resolution of April 21, 1964 denied Go Teks motion. The Board reasoned out that a conviction is not a
prerequisite before the State my exercise its rights to deport an undesirable alien and that the Board
is only a fact-
finding body whose function is to make a report and recommendation to the President in whom is
lodged the exclusive power to deport an alien or a deportation proceeding. In view of the denial of his
motion to quash, Go Tek on June 10, 1964, filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila a prohibition
action against the Board. On July 8, 1964, the court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining
the board from hearing Go Tek's case. After hearing, the trial court (Judge Federico C. Alikpala
presiding) in its decision of 31, 1964 granted the writ prohibition and the Board to desist from taking
cognizance of the Go Tek. The court, citing the said obiter dictum in the Qua Chee Gan case, held that
mere ion of forged dollar checks is not a ground for deportation under the Immigration Law; that under
section 37(3) of the law before an alien may be deported for having been convicted and sentenced to
imprisonment for a term of one year or more for a crime involving moral turpitude a conviction is and
that since Go Tek had not been convicted of the offense punished in article 168, the deportation was
premature.The Board appealed to this Court on the ground that the decision is contrary to law. The
Solicitor General contends that the trial court erred in assuming that the President may deport
undesirable aliens only to grounds enumerated by law; in holding that mere possession of forged dollar
checks is not a ground for deportation and that a criminal conviction is necessary, and in not finding
that the Board has jurisdiction over Go Tek's case.The parties stipulated that the Deportation Board is
an of the President of the Philippines charged with the investigation of undesirable aliens and to report
and recommend proper action on the basis of its findings therein."
Issue:
Whether or not the Deportation Board can entertain a deportation proceeding based on a ground not
specified in Section 37 of the Immigration Law and although the alien has not yet been convicted of the
offense imputed to him.

Ruling:YES.
A thorough comprehension of the President's power to deport aliens may show the baselessness of the
instant prohibition action of Go Tek. The President's power to deport aliens and the investigation of
aliens subject to deportation are provided for in the following provisions of the Revised Administrative
Code:SEC. 69. Deportation of subject of foreign power. A subject of a foreign power residing in the
Philippine Islands shall not be deported expelled or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his
own country by the Governor-General except upon prior investigator, conducted by said Executive or
his authorized agent, of the ground upon which such action is contemplated. In such case the person
concerned shall he informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowednot less than
three days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or
counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to cross-examine the opposingwitnesses.On the
other hand, section 37 of the Immigration Law Provides that certain aliens may be arrested upon
thewarrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the
purpose anddeported upon the Commissioner's warrant - "after a determination by the Board of
Commissioners of theexistence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien."So, under
existing law; the deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected (1) by order of the President,after
due investigation, pursuant to section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code and (2) by
theCommissioner of Immigration upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners under section
37 ofthe immigration Law.The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco
vs. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be exercise by the Chief
Executive "when he deems suchaction necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation
CASE NO. 91Topic:

–
Fiscal Autonomy
Title:

GSIS vs Heirs of Caballero

Citation:

G.R. No. 158090, Oct. 4, 2010
Facts:
Respondent Fernando C. Caballero (Fernando) was the registered owner of a residential lot situated at
Rizal Street, Mlang, Cotabato. On the said lot, respondent built a residential/commercial building
consisting of two (2) stories. In his complaint, Fernando alleged that there were irregularities in the
conduct of the bidding. CMTC misrepresented itself to be wholly owned by Filipino citizens. It
misrepresented its working capital. Its representative Carmelita Ang Hao had no prior authority from
its board of directors in an appropriate board resolution to participate in the bidding. Fernando further
alleged that the GSIS allowed CMTC to bid despite knowledge that said corporation has no authority to
do so. After trial, the RTC, in its Decision dated September 27, 1994, ruled in favor of petitioner and
dismissed the complaint.
In the same decision, the trial court granted petitioner's counter claim and directed Fernando to pay
petitioner the rentals paid by CMTC in the amount of ₱249,800.00. The foregoing amount was
collected by Fernando from the CMTC and represents payment, which was not turned over to
petitioner, which was entitled to receive the rent from the date of the consolidation of its ownership
over the subject property. Aggrieved by the Decision, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal. The CA,
in its Decision dated December17, 2002, affirmed the decision of the RTC with the modification that
the portion of the judgment ordering Fernando to pay rentals in the amount of ₱249,800.00, in favor of
petitioner, be deleted.

Issue:
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals committed an error of law in holding that
GSIS'counterclaim rentals collected by private respondent from Carmelita Mercantile Trading
Corporation is in the nature of a permissive counterclaim which required the payment by GSIS of
docket fees before the trialcourt can acquire jurisdiction over said counterclaim.
Ruling:
The Court ruled that the provision in the Charter of the GSIS, i.e., Section 39 of Republic Act No.
8291,which exempts it from "all taxes, assessments, fees, charges or duties of all kinds," cannot operate
to exemptit from the payment of legal fees. This was because, unlike the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions,
whichempowered Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the rules of the Supreme Court concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure, the 1987 Constitution removed this power from Congress.
Hence, the SupremeCourt now has the sole authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice,
and procedure in allcourts.Congress could not have carved out an exemption for the GSIS from the
payment of legal fees without
transgressing another equally important institutional safeguard of the Court's independence − fiscal
autonomy. Fiscal autonomy recognizes the power and authority of the Court to levy, assess and collect
fees,including legal fees. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141 have two basic components, the
JudiciaryDevelopment Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (SAJF). The laws
which

established the JDF and the SAJF expressly declare the identical purpose of these funds to "guarantee
theindependence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy." Legal fees
therefore donot only constitute a vital source of the Court's financial resources but also comprise an
essential elementof the Court's fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees
granted by Congress togovernment-owned or controlled corporations and local government units will
necessarily reduce the JDFand the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it
impairs the Court's guaranteedfiscal autonomy and erodes its independence.

CASE NO. 92Topic:
Judiciary Department
–
Judicial Power
Title:

Garcia vs Board of Investments

Citation:

191 SCRA 288
Facts:
Former Bataan Petrochemical Corporation (BPC), now Luzon Petrochemical Corporation, formed by a
group of Taiwanese investors, was granted by the BOI it has its plant site for the products “naphta
cracker”and “naphta” to be based in Bataan. In February 1989, one year after the BPC began its
production in Bataan, the corporation applied to the BOI to have its plant site transferred from Bataan
to Batangas. Despite vigorous opposition from petitioner Cong. Enrique Garcia and others, the BOI
granted private respondent BPC’s application, stating that the investors have the final choice as to
where to have their plant site because they are the ones who risk capital for the project.
Issue:
Whether the BOI committed a grave abuse of discretion in yielding to the application of the investors
without considering the national interest.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court found the BOI to have committed grave abuse of discretion in this case, and
ordered the original application of the BPC to have its plant site in Bataan and the product naphta as
feedstock maintained .The ponente, Justice Gutierrez, Jr., first stated the Court’s judicial power to settle
actual controversies as provided for by Section 1 of Article VIII in our 1987 Constitution before he
wrote the reasons as to how the Court arrived to its conclusion. He mentioned that nothing is shown to
justify the BOI’s action in letting the investors decide on an issue which, if handled by our own
government, could have been very beneficial to the State, as he remembered the word of a great
Filipino leader, to wit: “he would not mind having a government run like hell by Filipinos than one
subservient to foreign dictation”.

CASE NO. 93Topic:
–
How Judicial Review is Exercised
Title:

PACU vs. Sec. of Education

Citation:

97 Phil. 806
Facts:
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality of Act
No.2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to regulate
the ownership of private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that a permit should first
be secured from the Secretary of Education before a person may be granted the right to own and
operate a private school. This also gives the Secretary of Education the discretion to ascertain standards
that must be followed by private schools. It also provides that the Secretary of Education can and may
ban certain textbooks from being used in schools. PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and
operate a school is guaranteed by the Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental
approval or permit before such person could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous
restraint, a practice abhorrent to our system of law and government. PACU also avers that such power
granted to the Secretary of Education is an undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue
delegation because the law did not specify the basis or the standard upon which the Secretary must
exercise said discretion; that the power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship.
Issue:
Whether or not Act No, 2706 as amended is unconstitutional.
Ruling: NO.
In the first place, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show that it suffered any
injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to him by the said law.
Second, the State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The
Constitution provides for state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates certain
fundamental objectives of all education to wit, the development of moral character, personal discipline,
civic conscience and vocational efficiency, and instruction in the duties of citizenship. The State
control of private education was intended by the organic law. Third, the State has the power to ban
illegal textbooks or those that are offensive to Filipino morals. This is still part of the power of control
and regulation by the State over all schools.

CASE NO. 94Topic:

–
How Judicial Review is Exercised
Title:

Dumlao vs. COMELEC

Citation:

95 SCRA 392
Facts:
The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has
filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forth coming elections of January
30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the Bar who, as
such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo
Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo. Petitioner
Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg.52 as
discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said
Section 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution
and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any
of the elective officials enumerated in section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement
benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the
same elective local office from which he has retired.
Issue:
Whether or not there is an actual controversy, and the petitioners is the proper party of the case.
Ruling:
Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa
Blg.52, quoted earlier, as being contrary to the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution,
and seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC from implementing said provision. Yet, Dumlao has not
been adversely affected by the application of that provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's
disqualification has been filed before the COMELEC. There is no ruling of that constitutional body
on the matter, which this Court is being asked to review on Certiorari. His is a question posed in the
abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to be
rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record. Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the
primary jurisdiction of respondent COMELEC. The long-standing rule has been that "the person who
impugns the validity of a statute must have a personaland substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of itsenforcement" (People vs. Vera, supra).In the case
of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their Petition, that Igot is said
to be a candidate for Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied that neither one has been convicted nor
charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor disqualified from being candidates for local elective
positions. Neither one of them has been called to have been adversely affected by the operation of the
statutory provisions they assail as unconstitutional theirs is a generated grievance. They have
no personal nor substantial interest at stake. In the absence of any litigate interest, they can
claim no locus standi in seeking judicial redress.

CASE NO. 95Topic:
–
Legal Standing
Title:

Joya vs PCGG
Citation:

G.R. No. 96541, August 24, 1993
Facts:
Petitioners are artists (Joya, Nakpil, Armida Siguion Reyna, Malang, Ang Kiu Kok, Polotan,
Kasilag,Almario, et. al). They seek to enjoin the PCGG from proceeding with the Auction Sale
by Christies of New York of Old Masters Paintings and 18th and 19th century silverware seized from
Malacanang during people power. They claim that the items are part of protected cultural properties
and part of Filipino cultural heritage and hence cannot be disposed. They contend that the items are
public properties collectively owned by Filipinos. They allege that some of the items were in
fact donated by private persons, and that the real ownership of the paintings belongs to the foundation
or corporations, only that the public has been given the chance to view and appreciate the items
on exhibit. The PCGG wrote to President Aquino to request authority for the consignment agreement
between the Philippines and Christies. COA however made an audit and found that the agreement was
of doubtful legality, and that it was highly disadvantageous to the Philippines. The Director of National
Museum issued a certification that the items were not part of protected cultural properties. President
Cory also approved it. The sale proceeded earning $13M.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi
Ruling:NO.
The rule is that before the court may inquire into any matter, the question must be raised by the proper
party, there must be an actual case or controversy, that the question must be raised at the
earliest possible opportunity and that the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be
necessary to the determination of the case itself.The courts will exercise its power of judicial review
only if the case is brought before it by a party who has legal standing. Legal Standing means a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as the
result of governmental act. Interest means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved. Moreover, it must be personal
and not based on a desire to vindicate the constitutional right of some third or unrelated party. It is not a
taxpayer’s suit. A taxpayer’s suit can only prosper if the governmental acts being questioned involve
disbursement of public funds upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds for the purpose of
administering an unconstitutional act constitutes misapplication of funds, which may be enjoined at the
instance of a taxpayer.

CASE NO. 96Topic:
–
The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity
Title:

Umali vs. Guingona
Citation:

G.R. NO. 131124, March 21, 1999
Facts:
Osmundo Umali, petitioner, was appointed Regional Director of Bureau of Internal Revenue by Pres.
Fidel V. Ramos. He assigned him in Manila, November 19, 1993 to March 15, 1994 and Makati,
March 16, 1994 to August 4, 194. On August 1 1994, President Ramos received a confidential
memorandum against the petitioner for alleged violations of internal revenue laws, rules
and regulations during his incumbency as Regional Director, more particularly the following
malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance. Upon receipt of the said confidential memorandum, former
President authorized the issuance of an Order for the preventive suspension of the petitioner and
immediately referred the Complaint against the latter to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and
Corruption (PCAGC), for investigation. Petitioner was duly informed of the charges against him. And
was directed him to send his answer, copies of Statement of Assets, and Liabilities for the past three (3)
years, and Personal Data Sheet. Initial hearing was set on August 25, 1994, at 2:00 p.m., at the PCAGC
Office. On August 23, the petitioner filed his require answer. After evaluating the evidence on record,
the PCAGC issued its Resolution of September 23, 1994, finding an prima facie evidence to support
six (6) of the twelve (12) charges against petitioner. On October 6, 1994, acting upon the
recommendation of the PCAGC, then Pres. Ramos issued Administrative Order No. 152 dismissing
petitioner from the service, with forfeiture of retirement and all benefits under the law.
Issues:
1. Whether or not AO No. 152 violated petitioner’s right to security of tenure.
2. Whether or not the petitioner was denied of due process in the issuance of AO No. 152.
3. Whether or not the PCAGC is a validly constituted government agency and whether or not
the petitioner can raise the issue of constitutionality belatedly in its motion for reconsideration of the
trial court’s decision.
4. Whether or not the ombudsman’s resolution dismissing the charges against the petitioner is still
basis for the petitioner’s dismissal with forfeiture of benefits as ruled in AO No. 152.

Ruling:
1.
NO.
Neither can it be said that there was a violation of what petitioner asserts as his securityof tenure. The
petitioner claimed that as a Regional Director of Bureau of Internal Revenue he is CESO eligible
entitled to security of tenure however it is anemic of evidentiary support. But it was fatal that he
couldn’t provide sufficient evidence on this matter.
2. NO. The Court of Appeals ruled correctly on the first three issues to be sure, petitioner was not
denied the right to due processes before the PCAGC. Records show that the petitioner filed his answer
and other pleadings with respect to these alleged violations of internal revenue laws and regulations
and he attended the hearings before the investigatory body.
3. The constitutionality of PCAGC was only posed by the petitioner in his motion for reconsideration
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati. It is too late to raise the said issue fort he first time at such
late stage of proceedings below.
4. The administrative action against petitioner was taken prior to the institution of the criminal case.
Administrative Order No. 152 were based on the results of investigation conducted by the PCAGC and
not on the criminal charges before the ombudsman.
Note:
The petition is dismissible because the issue raised by the petitioner does not constitute any valid legal
basis for overturning the findings and conclusions by the Court of Appeals. However, considering
antecedent facts and circumstances, the Court has decided to consider the dismissal and because the
Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue is no longer interested in pursuing the case. Finally,
the Solicitor General has no more basis to enact AO No.152. Wherefore, in the light of foregoing
effective and substantive supervening events, and in the exercise of its equity powers, the Court hereby
GRANTS the petition. Accordingly, AO No. 152 is considered lifted and petitioner can be allowed to
retire with full benefits.

CASE NO. 97Topic:
–
The decision on the constitutional question must be determinative of the case itself
Title:

Hacienda Luisita vs Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
Citation:

G.R. No. 171101, 22 November 2011
Facts:
In 1988, RA 6657 or the CARP law was passed. It is a program aimed at redistributing public
and private agricultural lands to farmers and farm workers who are landless. One of the lands
covered by this law is the Hacienda Luisita, a 6,443-hectare mixed agricultural-industrial-residential
expanse straddling several municipalities of Tarlac. Hacienda Luisita was bought in 1958 from the
Spanish owners by the Tarlac Development Corporation (TADECO), which is owned and/or controlled
by Jose Cojuanco Sr., Group. Back in 1980, the Martial Law administration filed an expropriation suit
against TADECO to surrender the Hacienda to the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (now DAR) so
that the land can be distributed to the farmers at cost. The RTC rendered judgment ordering TADECO
to surrender Hacienda Luisita to the MAR.
In 1988, the OSG moved to dismiss the government’s case against TADECO. The CA dismissed
it, but the dismissal was subject to the condition that TADECO shall obtain the approval of FWB (farm
worker beneficiaries) to the SDP (Stock Distribution Plan) and to ensure its implementation. Sec 31 of
the CARP Law allows either land transfer or stock transfer as two alternative modes in distributing
land ownership to the FWBs. Since the stock distribution scheme is the preferred option of TADECO,
it organized a spin-off corporation, the Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI), as vehicle to facilitate stock
acquisition by the farmers. After conducting a follow-up referendum and revision of terms of the Stock
Distribution Option Agreement (SDOA) proposed by TADECO, the Presidential Agrarian Reform
Council (PARC), led by then DAR Secretary Miriam Santiago, approved the SDP of TADECO/HLI
through Resolution 89-12-2 dated Nov 21, 1989. From 1989 to 2005, the HLI claimed to have extended
those benefits to the farm workers. Such claim was subsequently contested by two groups representing
the interests of the farmers – the HLI Supervisory Group and the AMBALA. In 2003, each of them
wrote letter petitions before the DAR asking for the renegotiation of terms and/or revocation of the
SDOA. They claimed that they haven’t received those benefits in full, that HLI violated the terms, and
that their lives haven’t really improved contrary to the promise and rationale of the SDOA.The DAR
created a Special Task Force to attend to the issues and to review the terms of the SDOA and the
Resolution 89-12-2. Adopting the report and the recommendations of the Task Force, the DAR Sec
recommended to the PARC (1) the revocation of Resolution 89-12-2 and (2) the acquisition of
Hacienda Luisita through compulsory acquisition scheme. Consequently, the PARC revoked the SDP
of TADECO/HLI and subjected those lands covered by the SDP to the mandated land acquisition
scheme under the CARP law. These acts of the PARC was assailed by HLI via Rule 65. On the other
hand, FARM, an intervenor, asks for the invalidation of Sec. 31 of RA 6657, insofar as it affords the
corporation, as a mode of CARP compliance, to resort to stock transfer in lieu of outright agricultural
land transfer. For FARM, this modality of distribution is an anomaly to be annulled for being
inconsistent with the basic concept of agrarian reform ingrained in Sec. 4,Art. XIII of the Constitution.
Issue:
1. Whether or not petitioners for the revocation/nullification of SDOA (herein respondents)are real
party-in-interests.
2. Whether or not Section 31 of RA 6657 is constitutional
Ruling:
YES. The Supreme Court held that Supervisory Group, AMBALA and their respective leaders arereal
parties-in-interest.The SDOA identifies the “SDP qualified beneficiaries” as “the farm workers who
appears in the annual payroll, inclusive of the permanent and seasonal employees, who are regularly or
periodically employed by HLI.” Galang and the Supervisory group who were admittedly employed by
HLI comes within the definition of real party-in-interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court,
as one benefited or injured by the judgment in a suit, and thus, entitled to sue. Assuming arguendo that
they are not regular farm workers, Article XIII of the Constitution categorized them as “other farm
workers” entitled to “receive a just share of the fruits” of the land.
In this issue on constitutionality of Section 31 of RA 6657, FARM seeks to invalidate the

said provision of the law because it allows corporations to use stock distribution as its mode of
distribution or transfer instead of an outright agricultural land transfer, which they believe impairs the
fundamental right of farmers and farm workers envisioned under Section 4, Article XIII of the
Constitution. HLI counters this matter by saying that agrarian reform is not only about transfer of land
ownership to farmers and other qualified beneficiaries. Accordingly, the challenge on the
constitutionality of Section 31 of RA 6657 and its counterpart provision in EO 229 failed. The essential
requisites for the exercise of its power of judicial review include the following: (1) There is an actual
case or controversy (2) That the constitutional question is raised at the earliest possible opportunity by
the proper party or one with locus standi; and (3) The issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case. [Garcia vs.Executive Secretary, 415 SCRA 44 (2009)]
The Supreme Court reasoned that the reason it failed was because of failure of the intervenors to
question its constitutionality in the earliest opportunity, and instead, slept on their rights and received
benefits derived from the same. As early as November 21, 1989 when PARC approved the SDP of
Hacienda Luisita or at least within a reasonable time thereafter, its members received benefits from the
SDP without so much protest. It was only on December 4, 2003 or 14 years after approval of the SDP
via PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2 dated November 21, 1989 that said plan and approving resolution
was sought to be revoked. Furthermore, AMBALA did NOT question the constitutionality of said
provision but focused on the flaws and gaps in the subsequent implementation of the SDP. Even the
public respondent Sol. Gen. did not question it, and such question was only raised on May 3, 2007
when it filed its Supplemental Comment with the Court. It has been stressed by the Supreme Court that
the question on constitutionality will not passed upon by the Court unless it is raised at the first or
earliest possible opportunity by the proper party. In terms of the lis mota of the case, the invalidity of
the provision was not alleged, but rather it is the alleged application in the SDP that is flawed was
raised. The Supreme Court also noted that Section 5 of RA 9700 superseded Section 31 of RA 6657
vis-à-vis the stock distribution component of said provision, where Section 5 of RA 9700 provides:
“That after June 30, 2009, the mode of acquisition shall be limited to voluntary offer to sell and
Compulsory acquisition.” Thus, stock distribution is no longer an available option under existing
law. The issue has become moot and academic.The law is clear – farmers and regular farmworkers
have a right to OWN DIRECTLY OR COLLECTIVELY THE LANDS THEY TILL. The basic law
allows two modes of land distribution — direct and indirect ownership. No language is found in the
1987 Constitution that disqualifies or prohibits corporations or cooperatives of farmers from being the
legal entity through which collective ownership can be exercised. The term “collectively” is said to
allow indirect ownership of land and not just outright agricultural land transfer. This is in recognition
of the fact that land reform may become successful even if it is done through the medium of juridical
entities composed of farmers.
The SC believed that Sec. 31 of RA 6657 is NOT inconsistent with the State’s commitment to farmers
and farmworkers to advance their interests under the policy of social justice. This is believed to be the
modality of the legislature for collective ownership by which the imperatives of social justice may be
approximated, if not achieved. Also as contended by FARM that stock certificates do not equate to land
ownership, still, the Corporation Code is clear that the FWB becomes a stockholder who acquires an
equitable interest in the assets of the corporation, which includes the agricultural lands. A share of
stock typifies an aliquot part of the corporation’s property, or right to share in its proceeds to the extent
when distributed according to law and equity and that its holder is not the owner of any part of the
capital of the corporation. However, the FWBs will ultimately own the agricultural lands owned by the
corporation when the latter is eventually dissolved and liquidated.

CASE NO. 98Topic:
–
Is the Drugs Law prohibiting Plea bargaining a usurpation of the rule-making power of the Supreme
Court?
Title:

Salvador Estipona, Jr. vs Hon. Lobrigo
Citation:

G.R. No. 226679, Aug.15, 2017
Facts:
Petitioner Estipona, Jr. was charged with violation of Section 11 of RA 9165. Estipona filed a Motion
to Allow the Accused to Enter into a Plea-Bargaining Agreement, praying to withdraw his not guilty
plea and, instead, to enter a plea of guilty for violation of Section 12 (NOTE: should have been Section
15?) of the same law, with a penalty of rehabilitation in view of his being a first-time offender and the
minimal quantity of the dangerous drug seized in his possession. It was argued that Section 23 of RA
9165 which prohibits plea bargaining in all violations of said law violates the rule-making authority of
the Supreme Court under Section 5(5), Article VIII ofthe 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional as it encroached upon the power of the Supreme
Court to promulgate rules of procedure.
Ruling:YES.
The Supreme Court held that the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure is now
their exclusive domain and no longer shared with the Executive and Legislative departments. The
Court further held that the separation of powers among the three co-equal branches of our government
has erected an impregnable wall that keeps the power to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and
procedure within the sole province of this Court. The other branches trespass upon this prerogative if
they enact laws or issue orders that effectively repeal, alter or modify any of the procedural rules
promulgated by the Court. The court’s discretion to amend, repeal or even establish new rules of
procedure, to the exclusion of the legislative and
executive branches of government. To reiterate, the Court’s authority to promulgate rules on pleading,
practice, and procedure is exclusive and one of the safeguards of our institutional independence.

CASE NO. 99Topic:
–
Does the Ombudsman have power over judges?
Title:

Maceda vs. Vasquez
Citation:

221 SCRA 464
Facts:
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of
Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman:
(1) the Order dated September 18, 1991, denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court
filed by petitioner; and
(2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and directing

petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting evidences.
Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this Court's
ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his
official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme Court. Furthermore, the
investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the Supreme Court's constitutional
duty of supervision over all inferior courts.
Issue:
Whether or not the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the
Court's power of administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the
doctrine of separation of powers.
Ruling:
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals
down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only the Supreme Court
that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws and take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No
other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers
granted to it by the Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate
of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their
personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.Thus, the Ombudsman should
first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for determination of whether said
certificates reflected the true status of his pending caseload, as the Court has the necessary records to
make such a determination. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of
government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by
public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge
or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on
said complaint and refer the same to this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee
had acted within the scope of their administrative duties.WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to dismiss the complaint filed by public respondent
Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same to this Court for appropriate action.

CASE NO. 100Topic:

–
Can the Supreme Court review the action of the JBC?
Title:

Jardeliza vs Sereno
Citation:

G.R. No. 213181, Aug. 19, 2014
Facts:
The present case begins from the compulsory retirement of Associate Justice Roberto Abad(Associate
Justice Abad) last May 22, 2014. Before his retirement, on March 6, 2014, in accordance with its rules,
the JBC announced the opening for application or recommendation for the said vacated position. On
March 14, 2014, the JBC received a letter from Dean Danilo Concepcion of the University of the
Philippines nominating petitioner Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the
Republic, for the said position. Upon acceptance of the nomination, Jardeleza was included in the
names of candidates, as well as in the schedule of public interviews. It appears from the averments in
the petition that on June 16 and 17, 2014, Jardeleza received telephone calls from former Court of
Appeals Associate Justice and incumbent JBC member, Aurora Santiago Lagman (Justice Lagman),
who informed him that during the meetings held on June 5 and 16, 2014, Chief Justice and JBC ex-
officio Chairperson, Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno), manifested that she would be
invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-0094 against him. Jardeleza was then directed to "make himself
available" before the JBC on June 30,2014, during which he would be informed of the objections to his
integrity. Consequently, Jardeleza filed a letter-petition praying that the Court, in the exercise of its
constitutional power of supervision over the JBC, issue an order:
1) directing the JBC to give him at least five (5) working days written notice of any hearing of the JBC
to which he would be summoned; and the said notice to contain the sworn specifications of the
chargesa gainst him by his oppositors, the sworn statements of supporting witnesses, if any, and copies
of documents in support of the charges; and notice and sworn statements shall be made part of
the public record of the JBC;
2) allowing him to cross-examine his oppositors and supporting witnesses, if any, and the cross-
examination to be conducted in public, under the same conditions that attend the public interviews held
for all applicants;
3) directing the JBC to reset the hearing scheduled on June 30, 2014 to another date;
and 4) directing the JBC to disallow Chief Justice Sereno from participating in the voting on June
30,2014 or at any adjournment thereof where such vote would be taken for the nominees for the
position vacated by Associate Justice Abad.
During the June 30, 2014, meeting of the JBC, sans Jardeleza, incumbent Associate Justice Antonio T.
Carpio (Associate Justice Carpio) appeared as a resource person to shed light on a classified legal
memorandum (legal memorandum) that would clarify the objection to Jardeleza’s integrity as posed
by Chief Justice Sereno.
According to the JBC, Chief Justice Sereno questioned Jardeleza’s ability to discharge the duties of his
office as shown in a confidential legal memorandum over his handling of an international arbitration
case for the government. Later,

Jardeleza was directed to one of the Court’s ante -rooms where Department of Justice Secretary Leila
M. De Lima (Secretary De Lima) informed him that Associate Justice Carpio
appeared before the JBC and disclosed confidential information which, to Chief Justice Sereno,charact
erized his integrity as dubious.
Perceptibly based on the aforementioned resolution’s declaration as to his availment of a remedy

in law, Jardeleza filed the present petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), seeking to compel the
JBC to include him in the list of nominees for Supreme Court Associate Justice vice Associate Justice
Abad, on the grounds that the JBC and Chief Justice Sereno acted in grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient
number of votes to qualify for the position.
Issue:
Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in caseswhere an
objection or opposition to an application is raised.
Ruling:YES.
While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not automatically denigrate an
applicant’s entitlement to due process. The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature
of JBC proceedings. Notwithstanding being “a class of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain
oneself is availing. In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance
of due process neither contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This holding is not
an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of
due process supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently
denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer
understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and
capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the
rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the same, to hear the side
of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test that an exercise of
discretion must surmount is that of soundness. Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that
Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position
of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose from the violation by the JBC of its own rules of
procedure and the basic tenets of due process.True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but
this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due
process

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CASE NO.

The Court has jurisdiction over the petition

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Whether or not a foundling can be a natural-born Filipino citizen.

. A foundling can be a natural-born Filipino

99% chance that Poe’s biological parents are Filipinos

CASE NO. 21Topic

RA 3452 prohibits the importation of

State Principles and Policies - Separation of Church and State

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4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?

Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized and underrepresented” or lacking

CASE NO. 37Topic:

These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned

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CASE NO. 42Topic:

CASE NO. 43Topic:

Whether or not the Congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.

CASE NO. 56Topic:

3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.

7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court,Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress.

Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of

1. The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable

Whether or not the investigation is in aid of legislation.

2. Petitioner’s contention that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation that,

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Whether the power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary.

CASE NO. 87Topic:

c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.

CASE NO. 91Topic:

Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi

2. Whether or not Section 31 of RA 6657 is constitutional

In this issue on constitutionality of Section 31 of RA 6657, FARM seeks to invalidate the

(2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and directing

Perceptibly based on the aforementioned resolution’s declaration as to his availment of a remedy

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