Kuroda v.

Jalandoni,
G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949

THE FACTS:

Petitioner Shigenori Kuroda, the Commanding General of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the Philippines
during the Japanese occupation, was charged before the Philippine Military Commission of war crimes.
He questioned the constitutionality of E.O. No. 68 that created the National War Crimes Office and
prescribed rules on the trial of accused war criminals. He contended the Philippines is not a signatory to
the Hague Convention on Rules and Regulations covering Land Warfare and therefore he is charged of
crimes not based on law, national and international.

Kuroda challenged the validity of Executive Order 68. His arguments, were as follows:

(1) Executive Order 68 is illegal on the ground that it violates not only the provisions of our constitutional
law but also our local laws.

(2) Military Commission has no Jurisdiction to try him for acts committed in violation of the Hague
Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is not a signatory to the first and signed
the second only in 1947 and, therefore, he is charged with “crime” not based on law, national or
international

THE ISSUE/S:

Whether or not E.O. No. 68 is valid and constitutional?

THE RULING:

YES, E.O. No. 68 valid and constitutional.

Article 2 of our Constitution provides in its section 3, that –

The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy and adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.

In accordance with the generally accepted principle of international law of the present day including the
Hague Convention the Geneva Convention and significant precedents of international jurisprudence
established by the United Nation all those person military or civilian who have been guilty of planning
preparing or waging a war of aggression and of the commission of crimes and offenses consequential and
incidental thereto in violation of the laws and customs of war, of humanity and civilization are held
accountable therefor. Consequently in the promulgation and enforcement of Execution Order No. 68 the
President of the Philippines has acted in conformity with the generally accepted and policies of
international law which are part of the our Constitution.
Petitioner argues that respondent Military Commission has no jurisdiction to try petitioner for acts
committed in violation of the Hague Convention and the Geneva Convention because the Philippines is
not a signatory to the first and signed the second only in 1947. It cannot be denied that the rules and
regulation of the Hague and Geneva conventions form, part of and are wholly based on the generally
accepted principals of international law. In facts these rules and principles were accepted by the two
belligerent nations the United State and Japan who were signatories to the two Convention. Such rule and
principles therefore form part of the law of our nation even if the Philippines was not a signatory to the
conventions embodying them for our Constitution has been deliberately general and extensive in its scope
and is not confined to the recognition of rule and principle of international law as contained in treaties to
which our government may have been or shall be a signatory.

The provision of Article 2 Sec 3 states that “The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national
policy, adopts generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres
to the policy of peace, equality, justice freedom, cooperation and amity with all nations”. Every State is,
by reason of its membership in the family of nations, bound by the generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered to be automatically part of its own laws.
 SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS LANTION
G.R. No. L-139465 , January 18, 2000

THE FACTS:

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Manila Regional Trial Court (RTC). The Department of
Justice received a request from the Department of Foreign Affairs for the extradition of respondent Mark
Jimenez to the U.S. The Grand Jury Indictment. The warrant for his arrest, and other supporting
documents for said extradition were attached along with the request. Charges include:

 Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the US

 Attempt to evade or defeat tax
 Fraud by wire, radio, or television
 False statement or entries
 Election contribution in name of another

The Department of Justice (DOJ), through a designated panel proceeded with the technical evaluation and
assessment of the extradition treaty which they found having matters needed to be addressed.
Respondent, then requested for copies of all the documents included in the extradition request and for
him to be given ample time to assess it. He found it premature to secure him copies prior to the
completion of the evaluation. At that point in time, the DOJ is in the process of evaluating whether the
procedures and requirements under the relevant law (PD 1069 Philippine Extradition Law) and treaty (RP-
US Extradition Treaty) have been complied with by the Requesting Government. Evaluation by the DOJ of
the documents is not a preliminary investigation like in criminal cases making the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of the accused in criminal prosecution inapplicable.

The U.S. requested for the prevention of unauthorized disclosure of the information in the documents.

The department is not in position to hold in abeyance proceedings in connection with an extradition
request, as Philippines is bound to Vienna Convention on law of treaties such that every treaty in force is
binding upon the parties.

Mark Jimenez then filed a petition against the Secretary of Justice. RTC presiding Judge Lantion favored
Jimenez. Secretary of Justice was made to issue a copy of the requested papers, as well as conducting
further proceedings. Thus, this petition is now at bar.

THE ISSUE/S:

Whether or not respondent’s entitlement to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the Philippine Government under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty.
THE RULING:

No. The human rights of person, Filipino or foreigner, and the rights of the accused guaranteed in our
Constitution should take precedence over treaty rights claimed by a contracting state. The duties of the
government to the individual deserve preferential consideration when they collide with its treaty
obligations to the government of another state. This is so although we recognize treaties as a source of
binding obligations under generally accepted principles of international law incorporated in our
Constitution as part of the law of the land.

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals are confronted with situations in
which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of international law and the provisions of the
constitution or statute of a local state. Efforts should be done to harmonize them. In a situation, however,
where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule of international law and
municipal law, jurisprudence dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts. The
doctrine of incorporation decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing, but are not
superior to, national legislative enactments.
 ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957

THE FACTS:

Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No.
1180 entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others, are:

(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others,
from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and

(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business.

Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the
Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and
municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act,
contending that:

It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property
without due process of law.

The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.

The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

THE ISSUE/S:

Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.

THE RULING:

Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw
no conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the
law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall
be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities
enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable
grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”

A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good faith. If a treaty
would be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of
the police power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium
of a treaty.
 Laguna Lake Development Authority v CA
GR No. 110120 , March 16, 1994

THE FACTS:

The LLDA Legal and Technical personnel found that the City Government of Caloocan was maintaining
an open dumpsite at the Camarin area without first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate
(ECC) from the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, as required under Presidential Decree N o. 1586, and clearance from LLDA as
required under Republic Act N o. 4850 and issued a CEASE and DESIST ORDER (CDO) for the City
Government of Caloocan to stop the use of the dumpsite.

THE ISSUE/S:

1. Does the LLDA and its amendatory laws, have the authority to entertain the complaint against
the dumping of garbage in the open dumpsite in Barangay Camarin authorized by the City
Government of Caloocan?

2. Does the LLDA have the power and authority to issue a "cease and desist" order?

THE RULING:

1. YES, LLDA has authority. It must be recognized in this regard that the LLDA, as a specialized
administrative agency, is specifically mandated under Republic Act No. 4850 and its amendatory
law s to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the
development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding provinces of Rizal
and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan with due regard and
adequate provisions for environmental management and control, preservation of the quality of human
life and ecological systems, and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances, deterioration and
pollution. Under such a broad grant and power and authority, the LLDA, by virtue of its special charter,
obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Lake region from the
deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding
areas.

2. YES, pursuant to EO 927 Section 4. While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has
only such powers as are expressly granted to it by law , it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative
agency has also such powers as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its ex press powers. In the
exercise, therefore, of its express powers under its charter as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body
with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region, the authority of the LLDA to issue a
"cease and desist order" is, perforce, implied. NOTE: HOWEVER, writs of mandamus and injunction
are beyond the power of the LLDA to issue.
• Executive Order N o. 927 series of 1983 which provides, thus: Sec. 4. Additional Powers and Functions.
The authority shall have the following powers and functions: (d) Make, alter or modify orders requiring
the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which such
discontinuance must be accomplished

• As a general rule, the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication
Board (PAB), except in cases w here the special law provides for another forum
 LOTUS CASE (1927)
SERIES A, NO. 10

THE FACTS:

A collision occurred on the high seas between a French vessel – Lotus – and a Turkish vessel – Boz-Kourt.
The Boz-Kourt sank and killed eight Turkish nationals on board the Turkish vessel. The 10 survivors of the
Boz-Kourt (including its captain) were taken to Turkey on board the Lotus. In Turkey, the officer on watch
of the Lotus (Demons), and the captain of the Turkish ship were charged with manslaughter. Demons, a
French national, was sentenced to 80 days of imprisonment and a fine. The French government protested,
demanding the release of Demons or the transfer of his case to the French Courts. Turkey and France
agreed to refer this dispute on the jurisdiction to the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ).

France alleged that the flag State of a vessel has exclusive jurisdiction over offences committed on board
the ship in high seas. The Court disagreed. It held that France, as the flag State, did not enjoy exclusive
territorial jurisdiction in the high seas in respect of a collision with a vessel carrying the flag of another
State (paras 71 – 84). The Court held that Turkey and France both have jurisdiction in respect of the whole
incident: in other words, there was concurrent jurisdiction.

THE ISSUE/S:

Did Turkey violate international law when Turkish courts exercised jurisdiction over a crime committed
by a French national, outside Turkey?

THE RULING:

The first principle of the Lotus Case: A State cannot exercise its jurisdiction outside its territory unless an
international treaty or customary law permits it to do so. This is what we called the first principle of the
Lotus Case. The Court held that:

“Now the first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that – failing the
existence of a permissive rule to the contrary – it may not exercise its power in any form in the territory
of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by a State outside
its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom or from a convention.”

The second principle of the Lotus Case: Within its territory, a State may exercise its jurisdiction, in any
matter, even if there is no specific rule of international law permitting it to do so. In these instances, States
have a wide measure of discretion, which is only limited by the prohibitive rules of international law.

The Court held that:

“It does not, however, follow that international law prohibits a State from exercising jurisdiction in its own
territory, in respect of any case which relates to acts which have taken place abroad, and in which it cannot
rely on some permissive rule of international law. Such a view would only be tenable if international law
contained a general prohibition to States to extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of
their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, and if, as an exception to this general
prohibition, it allowed States to do so in certain specific cases. But this is certainly not the case under
international law as it stands at present. Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that
States may not extend the application of their laws and the jurisdiction of their courts to persons, property
and acts outside their territory, it leaves them in this respect a wide measure of discretion, which is only
limited in certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other cases, every State remains free to adopt the
principles which it regards as best and most suitable. This discretion left to States by international law
explains the great variety of rules which they have been able to adopt without objections or complaints
on the part of other States …In these circumstances all that can be required of a State is that it should not
overstep the limits which international law places upon its jurisdiction; within these limits, its title to
exercise jurisdiction rests in its sovereignty.”

This applied to civil and criminal cases. If the existence of a specific rule was a pre-requisite to exercise
jurisdiction, the Court argued, then “it would…in many cases result in paralysing the action of the courts,
owing to the impossibility of citing a universally accepted rule on which to support the exercise of their
[States’] jurisdiction”

The Court based this finding on the sovereign will of States. It held that:

“International law governs relations between independent States. The rules of law binding upon States
therefor emanate from their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted
as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between these co-existing
independent communities or with a view to the achievement of common aims. Restrictions upon the
independence of States cannot therefore be presumed”

The Lotus case gave an important dictum on creating customary international law. France had alleged that
jurisdictional questions on collision cases are rarely heard in criminal cases, because States tend to
prosecute only before the flag State. France argued that this absence of prosecutions points to a positive
rule in customary law on collisions. The Court disagreed and held that, this:

“…would merely show that States had often, in practice, abstained from instituting criminal proceedings,
and not that they recognized themselves as being obliged to do so; for only if such abstention were based
on their being conscious of having a duty to abstain would it be possible to speak of an international
custom. The alleged fact does not allow one to infer that States have been conscious of having such a
duty; on the other hand, as will presently be seen, there are other circumstances calculated to show that
the contrary is true.”
 The Alabama Claims
1862–1872
THE FACTS:

The Alabama claims were a diplomatic dispute between the United States and Great Britain that arose
out of the U.S. Civil War. The peaceful resolution of these claims seven years after the war ended set an
important precedent for solving serious international disputes through arbitration, and laid the
foundation for greatly improved relations between Britain and the United States.

The controversy began when Confederate agents contracted for warships from British boatyards.
Disguised as merchant vessels during their construction in order to circumvent British neutrality laws, the
craft were actually intended as commerce raiders. The most successful of these cruisers was the Alabama,
which was launched on July 29, 1862. It captured 58 Northern merchant ships before it was sunk in June
1864 by a U.S. warship off the coast of France. In addition to the Alabama, other British-built ships in the
Confederate Navy included the Florida, Georgia, Rappahannock, and Shenandoah. Together, they sank
more than 150 Northern ships and impelled much of the U.S. merchant marine to adopt foreign registry.
The damage to Northern shipping would have been even worse had not fervent protests from the U.S.
Government persuaded British and French officials to seize additional ships intended for the Confederacy.
Most famously, on September 3, 1863, the British Government impounded two ironclad, steam-driven
“Laird rams” that Confederate agent James D. Bulloch had surreptitiously arranged to be built at a
shipyard in Liverpool.

The United States demanded compensation from Britain for the damage wrought by the British-built,
Southern-operated commerce raiders, based upon the argument that the British Government, by aiding
the creation of a Confederate Navy, had inadequately followed its neutrality laws. The damages discussed
were enormous. Charles Sumner, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, argued that
British aid to the Confederacy had prolonged the Civil War by 2 years, and indirectly cost the United States
hundreds of millions, or even billions of dollars (the figure Sumner suggested was $2.125 billion). Some
Americans adopted this argument and suggested that Britain should offer Canada to the United States in
compensation. Such proposals were not taken seriously by British statesmen, but they convey the passion
with which some Americans viewed the issue.

THE ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the United States should claim direct and collateral damage against Great Britain by
allowing five warships to be constructed, especially the Alabama, knowing that it would eventually enter
into naval service with the Confederacy?
THE RULING:

YES, As early as October 1863, the U.S. minister to Great Britain, Charles Francis Adams, protested that
the British must take responsibility for the damages caused by British-built Confederate raiders, but he
conceded that his government would be willing to submit the matter to arbitration. Amid bombastic U.S.
threats of annexing Canada, Anglo-American misunderstanding was exacerbated after the end of the Civil
War by unsettled disputes over Canadian fisheries and the northwestern boundary. A proposed
settlement in the Johnson-Clarendon Convention was angrily rejected by the United States. To avoid
further deterioration of Anglo-American relations, a joint high commission was set up, and on May 8,
1871, the parties signed the Treaty of Washington, which, by establishing four separate arbitrations,
afforded the most ambitious arbitral undertaking the world had experienced up to that time. In addition,
Great Britain expressed official regret over the matter.

Certain wartime maritime obligations of neutrals, already agreed to in article 6 of the treaty, were outlined
in the principal arbitration of the Alabama claims, meeting at Geneva, as follows: that a neutral
government must use “due diligence” to prevent the fitting out, arming, or equipping, within its
jurisdiction, of any vessel believed to be intended to carry a war against a power with which it was at
peace and to prevent the departure of such a vessel (the substance of this clause was included in article
8 of the 1907 Hague Convention) and that a neutral must not permit its ports or waters to be used as a
base of naval operations for similar purposes. In addition, on Sept. 14, 1872, the tribunal voted
unanimously that Britain was legally liable for direct losses caused by the Alabama and other ships and
awarded the United States damages of $15,500,000 in gold.
 AGUSTIN V. EDU
G.R. No. L-49112 February 2, 1979
THE FACTS:

Herein respondent Romeo Edu in his capacity as Land Transportation Commissioner set forth the
implementing rules and regulations of the said instruction.

Petitioner, Agustin assails the validity of the Letter of Instruction No. 229 which requires an early warning
device to be carried by users of motor vehicles as being violative of the constitutional guarantee of due
process and transgresses the fundamental principle of non-delegation of legislative power.

Petitioner make known that he "is the owner of a Volkswagen Beetle Car, Model 13035, already properly
equipped when it came out from the assembly lines with blinking lights fore and aft, which could very well
serve as an early warning device in case of the emergencies mentioned in Letter of Instructions No. 229,
as amended, as well as the implementing rules and regulations in Administrative Order No. 1 issued by
the land transportation Commission,"

Furthermore, he contends that the law is "one-sided, onerous and patently illegal and immoral because
they will make manufacturers and dealers instant millionaires at the expense of car owners who are
compelled to buy a set of the so-called early warning device at the rate of P 56.00 to P72.00 per set." are
unlawful and unconstitutional and contrary to the precepts of a compassionate New Society [as being]
compulsory and confiscatory on the part of the motorists who could very well provide a practical
alternative road safety device, or a better substitute to the specified set of Early Warning Device (EWD)."

This instruction, signed by President Marcos, aims to prevent accidents on streets and highways, including
expressways or limited access roads caused by the presence of disabled, stalled or parked motor vehicles
without appropriate early warning devices. The hazards posed by these disabled vehicles are recognized
by international bodies concerned with traffic safety. The Philippines is a signatory of the 1968 Vienna
Convention on Road Signs and Signals and the United Nations Organizations and the said Vienna
Convention was ratified by the Philippine Government under PD 207.

THE ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the LOI 229 is invalid and violated constitutional guarantees of due process.

THE RULING:

NO. The assailed Letter of Instruction was a valid exercise of police power and there was no unlawful
delegation of legislative power on the part of the respondent. As identified, police power is a state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare. In this case, the particular exercise of police power was clearly intended to promote
public safety.

It cannot be disputed that the Declaration of Principle found in the Constitution possesses relevance: “The
Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the nation.”
Thus, as impressed in the 1968 Vienna Convention it is not for this country to repudiate a commitment to
which it had pledged its word. Our country’s word was resembled in our own act of legislative ratification
of the said Hague and Vienna Conventions thru P.D. No. 207 .

The concept of Pacta sunt servanda stands in the way of such an attitude which is, moreover, at war with
the principle of international morality.

Petition dismissed.
 ANGLO NORWEGIAN FISHERIES CASE (1951)

THE FACTS:

The United Kingdom requested the court to decide if Norway had used a legally acceptable method in
drawing the baseline from which it measured its territorial sea. The United Kingdom argued that
customary international law did not allow the length of a baseline drawn across a bay to be longer than
ten miles. Norway argued that its delimitation method was consistent with general principles of
international law.

The Court was asked to decide, amongst others, the validity, under international law, of the methods used
to delimit Norway’s territorial sea/ fisheries zone.

However, interestingly, Norway was clear that it was not claiming an exception to the rule (i.e. that its
practice was not contrary to international law). It emphasized that its practice – even if it was a deviation
from the general practice – was in conformity with international law (see page 21).

“In its (Norway’s) view, these rules of international law take into account the diversity of facts and,
therefore, concede that the drawing of base-lines must be adapted to the special conditions obtaining in
different regions. In its view, the system of delimitation applied in 1935, a system characterized by the
use of straight lines, does not therefore infringe the general law; it is an adaptation rendered necessary
by local conditions. ”

The Court held that the fact that this consistent and sufficiently long practice took place without any
objection to the practice from other States (until the time of dispute) indicated that these States did not
consider the Norwegian system to be “contrary to international law”.

“The notoriety of the facts, the general toleration of the international community, Great Britain’s position
in the North Sea, her own interest in the question, and her prolonged abstention would in any case
warrant Norway’s enforcement of her system against the United Kingdom. The Court is thus led to
conclude that the method of straight lines, established in the Norwegian system, was imposed by the
peculiar geography of the Norwegian coast; that even before the dispute arose, this method had been
consolidated by a consistent and sufficiently long practice, in the face of which the attitude of
governments bears witness to the fact that they did not consider it to be contrary to international law.”

THE ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the methods used to delimit Norway’s territorial sea/ fisheries zone is valid?

THE RULING:

“In these circumstances the Court deems it necessary to point out that although the ten-mile rule has
been adopted by certain States both in their national law and in their treaties and conventions, and
although certain arbitral decisions have applied it as between these States, other States have adopted a
different limit. Consequently, the ten-mile rule has not acquired the authority of a general rule of
international law.”
The Court in its judgment held that even if a customary law rule existed on the aforementioned ten-mile
rule,

“…the ten-mile rule would appear to be inapplicable as against Norway inasmuch as she has always
opposed any attempt to apply it to the Norwegian coast.”

In this case, the Court appears to support the idea that an existing customary law rule would not apply to
a State if (1) it objected to the application of the rule to itself (2) at the initial stages and (3) in a consistent
manner. The Anglo Norwegian Fisheries Case, thus, supports the Asylum Case (Peru vs Colombia) in
articulating what we now call the persistent objector rule.

The Court held that the 10-mile rule did not form a part of the general law and, in any event, could not
bind Norway because of the latter’s objections. Next, the Court inquired whether the Norwegian system
of delimitation was nevertheless contrary to international law. To do so, the Court relied on state practice
once more.

“The general toleration of foreign States with regard to the Norwegian practice is an unchallenged fact.
For a period of more than sixty years the United Kingdom Government itself in no way contested it… The
Court notes that in respect of a situation which could only be strengthened with the passage of time, the
United Kingdom Government refrained from formulating reservations.”

The Court alluded to the relationship between national and international law in delimitation of maritime
boundaries. In delimitation cases, States “must be allowed the latitude necessary in order to be able to
adapt its delimitation to practical needs and local requirements…” The Court would also consider
“…certain economic interests peculiar to a region, the reality and importance of which are clearly
evidenced by a long usage.” However, while the act of delimitation can be undertaken by the State, its
legal validity depends on international law.

“The delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect; it cannot be dependent merely upon
the will of the coastal State as expressed in its municipal law. Although it is true that the act of delimitation
is necessarily a unilateral act, because only the coastal State is competent to undertake it, the validity of
the delimitation with regard to other States depends upon international law. (p. 20)”

“In fact, the two international court of justice cases which appear to support the persistent objector rule
both arose in circumstances where the new rule itself was in substantial doubt. Thus, it was significantly
easier for the objector to maintain its status. No case is cited for a circumstance in which the objector
effectively maintained its status after the rule became well accepted in international law. In fact, it is
unlikely that such a status can be maintained din light of the realities of the international legal system.
This is certainly the plight that befell the US, The UK and Japan in the law of the sea. Their objections to
expanded coastal state jurisdiction were ultimately to no avail, and they have been forced to accede to
12-mile territorial seas and the 200-mile exclusive economic zone. “
 Lo Ching vs. Archbishop of Manila

THE FACTS:

That on august 30, 1940, the archbishop of Manila through the bank of the Philippine Islands leased a
farm to Lo and So Yun Ching Chong Co, with Nos. 1095 with 1101 R. located at de la Calle Hidalgo Manila,
under a monthly income of 500 by the end of three years counting from the first of September 1940,
extendable to two years. The tenants took the property and made it into a hotel.

Moreover, on February 1942. The Japanese army echoed the tenants of the property and delivered the
latter to German Otto Schulze who worked until January 1945 at the advent of the liberation army.

On February 1945, tenant reoccupied the property and paid the monthly rental fee. Before the end of
August, the landlord required the tenants to vacate the property, however, they refused.

Further, on September 8, 1945 filed for an application for eviction in the Municipal Court of Manila. On
October 8, 1945, it ordered the tenants to vacate the property and pay its monthly rent of P625 from the
first September 1945 and damages in the amount of 500 and legal expenses.

The appellant contend that they are entitled to occupy the property for three full years. The occupation
must be effective, and continuous material. Which should not be deprived of the use and enjoyment of
the property and the appellant are entitled to deduct that period of three years, all the time that no longer
have the lease available to the Japanese.

THE ISSUE/S:

Whether or not, the occupation and seizure of private lands was allowed by the Hague convention?

THE RULING:

No, the Hague Convention of 1907 does not allow an occupying army to seize private property in the
territory invaded. In contrast, states that: “Family honor and rights, the lives of persons and private
property, as well as religious convictions and practice, must be respected. Hence, Private property cannot
be confiscated.

The farm is not even used as army barracks. And there is no evidence there is no evidence that it was
seized by military necessity, what can be deduced that the Japanese soldiers disposed of the property,
not in the legitimate exercise the authority of an occupying army but spurred on by the uncontrolled and
desire to take over other people.
 VICTOR BOROVSKY vs. THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION
G.R. No. L-4352 September 28, 1951

THE FACTS:

Victor A. Borovsky, the petitioner, claims to be a stateless citizen, born in Shanghai, China, of Russian
parentage. He came to the Philippines in 1936 and had resided therein ever since, if the period of his
detention be included.

On June 24, 1946, by order of the Commissioner of immigration of the Philippines the petitioner was
arrested for investigation as to his past activities. Following his arrest, a warrant for deportation was
issued by the Deportation Board, which is said to have been found him an undesirable alien, a vagrant
and habitual drunkard.

In May, 1947, the petitioner was put on board a ship which took him to Shanghai, but he was not allowed
to land there because he was not a national of China and was not provided with an entry visa. He was
therefore brought back to Manila and was confined to the new Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa until
December 8, 1947, when he was granted provisional release by the President through Secretary of Justice
for a period of six months. Before the expiration of that period, namely, on March 20, 1948, the
Commissioner of Immigration caused his re-arrest and he has been in confinement in the above-
mentioned prison ever since.

In his return to the writ, the Solicitor General in behalf of the respondents alleges that the Commissioner
of Immigration "has availed of every opportunity presented to carry out the deportation order as shown
by the fact that when the petitioner was enjoying his provisional release after the unsuccessful attempt
to deport him to Shanghai, China, he was again re-arrested and flown to Cebu for the purpose of placing
him on board a Russian vessel which he has called at the port, with a view to carrying out the deportation
order issued against him, but said deportation was not carried out for the reason that the captain of the
said boat refused to take on board the herein petitioner on the ground that he had no permission from
the Russian government to take on board the petitioner." It is further alleged that "the immigration
officials have taken steps regarding the disposition of those foreigners subject to deportation while
awaiting availability of transportation or arrangements to the place where they may be sent."

Over two years having elapsed since the decision aforesaid was promulgated, the Government has not
found ways and means of removing the petitioner out of the country, and none are insight, although, it
should be in justice to the deportation authorities, it was through no fault of theirs that no ship or country
would take the petitioner

THE ISSUE:

Whether or not too long detention of the petitioner was valid?

THE RULING:

Under section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 any alien who enters this country "without
inspection and admission by the immigration authorities at a designated point of entry" is subject to
deportation within five years.

"It must be admitted that temporary detention is a necessary step in the process of exclusion or expulsion
of undesirable aliens and that pending arrangements for his deportation, the Government has the right
to hold the undesirable alien under confinement for a reasonable length of time. However, under
established precedents, too long a detention may justify the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

"The meaning of "reasonable time" depends upon the circumstances, specially the difficulties of obtaining
a passport, the availability of transportation, the diplomatic arrangements concerned and the efforts
displayed to send the deportee away. Considering that this Government desires to expel the alien, and
does not relish keeping him at the people's expense, we must presume it is making efforts to carry out
the decree of exclusion by the highest officer of the land. On top of this presumption assurances were
made during the oral argument that the Government is really trying to expedite the expulsion of this
petitioner. On the other hand, the record fails to show how long he has been under confinement since
the last time he was apprehended. Neither does he indicate neglected opportunities to send him abroad.
And unless it is shown that the deportee is being indefinitely imprisoned under the pretense of awaiting
a chance for deportation or unless the Government admits that it cannot deport him or unless the
detainee is being held for too long a period our courts will not interfere.

Moreover, by its Constitution (Art. II, sec. 3) the Philippines "adopts the generally accepted principles of
international law as part of the law of Nation." And in a resolution entitled "Universal Declaration of
Human Rights" and approved by the General Assembly of the United Nations of which the Philippines is a
member, at its plenary meeting on December 10, 1948, the right to life and liberty and all other
fundamental rights as applied to all human beings were proclaimed. lt was there resolved that "All human
beings are born free and equal in degree and rights" (Art. 1); that "Everyone is entitled to all the rights
and freedom set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, nationality or social origin, property, birth, or other status
(Art. 2) ; that "Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts
violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law" (Art. 8); that "No one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile" (Art. 9)
 HILAO v. ESTATE OF MARCOS

THE FACTS:
During Ferdinand Marcos' tenure as President of the Philippines, up to 10,000 people in the
Philippines were allegedly tortured, summarily executed or disappeared at the hands of military
intelligence personnel acting pursuant to martial law declared by Marcos in 1971. Military
intelligence allegedly operated under the authority of Marcos, General Fabian Ver, and Imee
Marcos-Manotoc (Ferdinand Marcos' daughter).
Defendant Estate of Ferdinand Marcos ("the Estate") appeals from the district court's order preliminarily
enjoining the Estate from transferring, secreting or dissipating the Estate's assets pendente lite. On this
interlocutory appeal, the Estate also challenges the district court's subject matter jurisdiction under the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and Alien Tort Act, claims that the plaintiffs do not state a cause of
action, and contends that any cause of action abated upon Marcos' death. We have jurisdiction and affirm.

Marcos, his family, Ver and others loyal to Marcos fled to Hawaii in February 1986. One month later,
several lawsuits were filed against Marcos, Ver, and/or Imee Marcos-Manotoc, claiming that the plaintiffs
had been arrested and tortured, or were the families of people arrested, tortured, and executed between
1971 and 1986.

All actions were dismissed by district courts on the "act of state" defense; we reversed and remanded in
an unpublished decision. The Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation then consolidated all cases in the
District of Hawaii on September 5, 1990. The case was certified as a class action on April 8, 1991, and a
consolidated amended complaint naming the Estate as a defendant was filed on behalf of the class.

THE ISSUE/S:

Whether or not, the class action filed is with merit?

THE RULING:

YES, Default was entered against Imee Marcos-Manotoc in 1986 in Trajano v. Marcos, one of the individual
cases consolidated in this action. In 1991, Marcos-Manotoc moved to set aside the default and moved to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Act and immunity under the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act. The motions were denied, and judgment was entered against Marcos-
Manotoc. We affirmed on appeal.

On November 1, 1991, the plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction to prevent the Estate from
transferring or secreting any assets in order to preserve the possibility of collecting a judgment. The Estate
had earlier been enjoined from transferring or secreting assets in an action brought by the Republic of the
Philippines against Ferdinand Marcos. That preliminary injunction had been appealed, and was affirmed.
See Republic of Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir.1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1035,
109 S.Ct. 1933, 104 L.Ed.2d 404 (1989). When the preliminary injunction in that case was dissolved due to
a settlement, the plaintiffs in this action immediately sought the continuation of that injunction. The
district court granted the motion.
Pending this interlocutory appeal of the preliminary injunction, trial on liability proceeded. On September
24, 1992, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of the class and the individually-named plaintiffs (except for
plaintiff Wilson Madayag). The Estate's motion for JNOV was denied, and judgment was entered in favor
of the prevailing plaintiffs. The preliminary injunction was modified on November 16, 1993, to set forth
the jury verdict on liability, to compel the legal representatives of the Estate to fully and completely
answer plaintiffs' interrogatories regarding the assets of the estate, to name the Swiss banks at which the
Marcos had deposited monies as representatives of the Estate, and to permit the plaintiffs to take
discovery regarding these assets.

The district court had jurisdiction over Hilao's cause of action. Hilao's claims were neither barred by the
statute of limitations nor abated by Marcos' death. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
certifying the class. The challenged evidentiary rulings of the district court were not in error. The district
court properly held Marcos liable for human rights abuses which occurred and which he knew about and
failed to use his power to prevent. The jury instructions on the Torture Victim Protection Act and on
proximate cause were not erroneous. The award of exemplary damages against the Estate was allowed
under Philippine law and the Estate's due-process rights were not violated in either the determination of
those damages or of compensatory damages. The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.
 Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association
of the Philippines vs Duque
G.R. No. 173034 October 9, 2007
THE FACTS:

Petition for certiorari seeking to nullify the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) of E.O. 51
(Milk Code). Petitioner claims that the RIRR is not valid as it contains provisions that are not constitutional
and go beyond what it is supposed to implement. Milk Code was issued by President Cory Aquino under
the Freedom Constitution on Oct.1986. One of the preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the
law seeks to give effect to Art 11 of the Int’l Code of Marketing and Breastmilk Substitutes (ICBMS), a code
adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA). From 1982-2006, The WHA also adopted severe
resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be supported, hence, it should be ensured that
nutrition and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 2006, the DOH issued the
assailed RIRR.

THE ISSUE/S:

Whether or not, the DOH acted w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction and in violation of the Constitution by promulgating the RIRR.

THE RULING:

No, for WHA Resolutions. The Court ruled that DOH failed to establish that the provisions pertinent WHA
resolutions are customary int’l law that may be deemed part of the law of the land. For an int’l rule to be
considered as customary law, it must be established that such rule is being followed by states because
they consider it as obligatory to comply with such rules (opinion juris). The WHO resolutions, although
signed by most of the member states, were enforced or practiced by at least a majority of member states.
Unlike the ICBMS whereby legislature enacted most of the provisions into the law via the Milk Code, the
WHA Resolutions (specifically providing for exclusive breastfeeding from 0-6 months, breastfeeding up to
24 Months and absolutely prohibiting ads for breastmilk substitutes) have not been adopted as domestic
law nor are they followed in our country as well. The Filipinos have the option of how to take care of their
babies as they see fit. WHA Resolutions may be classified as SOFT LAW – non-binding norms, principles
and practices that influence state behavior. Soft law is not part of int’l law.

Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the
Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-
respondent since respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive
agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986
by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the
preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health
Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition
and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes. In 1990, the Philippines ratified the
International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said instrument provides that State
Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all
segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of breastfeeding. On
May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take effect on July 7, 2006.
 Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft Case

THE FACTS:

Pursuant to the treaty of Versailles, liquidation of property of German nationals, Poland ordered the
liquidation of property owned by the plaintiff company in Warsaw (former Russian territory acquired by
Poland). The company claimed that Poland could not be considered as possessing de jure the territory
designated as Congress Poland (formerly Russian) as long as the boundaries of this territory had not been
fixed, so that the territory belonged in law to Russia.

THE ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Poland could be considered having a de jure territory?

THE RULING:

YES. There is no doubt that Poland exists as a State exercising sovereignty over the Russian and Austrian
parts of Poland. It is unnecessary to dwell upon the subtle distinction between recognition de jure and
recognition de facto. The recognition of a State is not a constitutive element but merely declarative. The
state exists by itself (par lui meme) and the recognition is nothing else than a declaration of existence. In
order to say that a state exists and can be recognized as such it is enough that its territory has a sufficient
consistency, even though its boundaries have not yet been accurately defined.

Recognition plays a fundamental role in relation to the affirmation of the international subjectivity of the
State. In a contemporary international society, characterized by an interdependence among its actors in
constant growth, the effective capacity to take part in international relations is increasingly an indicator
of the full effectiveness of the State, making internal sovereignty, classically understood as the power of
control their own population within their own territory, is not the only criterion to define a state entity.

For this reason, the entire political-territorial organization that obtains long recognition by the
international community is considered a State and, as a consequence, participates as a member of
international organizations, concludes treaties, receives and sends diplomatic representatives, that is, a
fully-fledged entity. engaged in international life. As soon as the legal nature of the entities that obtain
only partial recognition of the international community is discussed, the cases of Palestine and Kosovo
are automatically remembered, it can not be denied that recognition plays a crucial role in shaping the
consensus among the actors of the region. international ordering.

In short, neither the realistic theses (which are linked more to the declarative theory) nor the anti-realist
theses (background of the constitutive theory) could establish the ultimate argument, capable of making
one prevail over the other. Milano, finally, clarifies that an anti-realist approach reveals itself more in tune
with the reality of contemporary international law and is more useful to understand the role of
international law in the processes of State formation.

The inter-war period was especially fertile in the debates about the emergence of new States and in the
different reactions of the international community in harboring them to the strict role of international
subjectivity. The analysis, necessarily, is not limited to recognition by pre-existing states, but also
investigates how international courts, organizations and conventions deal with the issue, and how they
help crystallize an understanding of what a territorial community should present so you can receive the
seal of statehood.

The first instrument analyzed is the Report of the Commission of Jurists on the Aaland Islands, dating from
1920. More specifically, in the section of the Report that dealt with the independence of Finland, the
recognition of the Finnish State was mentioned, stating that the various recognitions granted "not enough
to prove that Finland, from that point on, became a sovereign State ...". The Report still shows that, "for
a considerable period of time, the conditions required for the formation of the sovereign State did not
exist".

In fact, the Jurist Commission, even accepting the legal value of the recognition as an evidence, did not
consider that the act of recognition had conclusive character of the existence of a State. On the contrary,
the Commission refers to the "conditions required for the formation of a sovereign State".

Following the same logic, the German-Polish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal affirmed, in reference to the
existence of the new State of Poland, in 1929 that, following the opinion of the "great majority" of
internationalists, the recognition of a State is not constitutive, but merely declarative. The State exists by
itself and recognition is nothing more than a declaration of its existence, recognized by the States that
emanate it.
 REPUBLIC VS SANDIGANBAYAN
GR No. 104768, 2003-07-21

THE FACTS:

President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 ("EO No. 1") creating the Presidential
Commission on Good Government ("PCGG"). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all... ill-gotten
wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates. EO No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power "(a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary
in order to accomplish and carry out the purposes of this... order" and the power "(h) to promulgate such
rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order." Accordingly, the PCGG,
through its then Chairman Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board ("AFP Board") tasked to
investigate reports of... unexplained wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active
service or retired. On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution on its findings and recommendation
on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas.

Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan St.,
La Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of
3,327 square meters.

Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command, Philippine Army, stationed
at Camp Eldridge, Los Baños, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent. That
respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged house... of Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay
Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and kisses respondent.
That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the residence of Elizabeth Dimaano with
four (4) attached cases filled with money and... owned by Ramas.

Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 ("RA No.
1379") against Ramas.

The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army until
1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine Army,
assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to

Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry, found reasonable ground to believe
that respondents have violated RA No. 1379.[6] The Amended Complaint prayed for, among others, the
forfeiture of respondents' properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State.

Sandiganbayan, however, hinted that the re-setting was without prejudice to any action that private
respondents might take under the circumstances.
Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino.[9] The Court held in
Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by reason
of mere position... held without a showing that they are "subordinates" of former President Marcos.

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:

 The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court in
Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[10] and Republic v. Migrino[11] which involve the same issues.
 No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was conducted against
Ramas and Dimaano.
 The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against him.
 There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.

THE ISSUE/S:

Whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution during
the interregnum

THE RULING:

Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("Declaration") remained in effect during the interregnum.

We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the interregnum.
However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the Declaration
remained in effect during the interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme law
because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the abrogation
of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no... municipal law higher than the
directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could not
invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill of
Rights during the interregnum

To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum
would render void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government
("PCGG") before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration... orders, which direct the
freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere executive issuance without judicial action,
would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.

During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound by
no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights
because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon... the adoption of the Freedom
Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights
of the Freedom Constitution.

Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the interregnum,
absent a constitutional provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly
render all sequestration orders void during the interregnum.
Nevertheless, even during the interregnum the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant
and the Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility
for the State's good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1)
of the Covenant requires each signatory State "to respect... and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant." Under Article 17(1)
of the Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that "[n]o one shall be... subjected
to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence."

The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that "[n]o one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the interregnum.
Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the Covenant or
the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here.

Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973 Constitution. As the de jure government, the
revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for the State's good faith compliance with its
treaty obligations under international law.

However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. As admitted by
petitioner's witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus:

The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se,[53] and they
are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the records of this case
to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may... warrant, and referring this case to
the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax liability of respondent
Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.
 LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR BETTER PHILIPPINES VS. AQUINO
G.R. No. 73748 73972 May 22, 1986

THE FACTS:

That on February 25, 1986, President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and
Vice President Laurel were taking power.

On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing the basis of the Aquino government
assumption of power by stating that the “new government was installed through a direct exercise of the
power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines.”

Petitioners alleged that the Aquino government is illegal because it was not established pursuant to the
1973 Constitution.

THE ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

THE RULING:

Petitioners have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. The holding that
petitioners did not have standing followed from the finding that they did not have a cause of action.

The legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics
where only the people are the judge. And the people have made the judgment; they have accepted the
government of President Corazon C. Aquino which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is
not merely a de facto government but is in fact and law a de jure government. Moreover, the community
of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the present government.

In order that the citizen’s actions may be allowed a party must show that he personally has suffered some
actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favourable action.

The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the provisional It was the people that made
the judgement and accepted the new government. Thus, the Supreme Court held its legitimacy.
 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
376 U.S. 398 (1964)
THE FACTS:

Respondent American commodity broker contracted with a Cuban corporation largely owned by United
States residents to buy Cuban sugar. Thereafter, subsequent to the United States Government's reduction
of the Cuban sugar quota, the Cuban Government expropriated the corporation's property and rights. To
secure consent for shipment of the sugar, the broker, by a new contract, agreed to make payment for the
sugar to a Cuban instrumentality which thereafter assigned the bills of lading to petitioner, another Cuban
instrumentality, and petitioner instructed its agent in New York to deliver to the broker the bills of lading
and sight draft in return for payment. The broker accepted the documents, received payment for the sugar
from its customer, but refused to deliver the proceeds to petitioner's agent.

Petitioner brought this action for conversion of the bills of lading to recover payment from the broker and
to enjoin from exercising dominion over the proceeds a receiver who had been appointed by a state court
to protect the New York assets of the corporation. The District Court concluded that the corporation's
property interest in the sugar was subject to Cuba's territorial jurisdiction, and acknowledged the "act of
state" doctrine, which precludes judicial inquiry in this country respecting the public acts of a recognized
foreign sovereign power committed within its own territory. The court nevertheless rendered summary
judgment against the petitioner, ruling that the act of state doctrine was inapplicable when the
questioned act violated international law, which the District Court found had been the case here. The
Court of Appeals affirmed, additionally relying upon two State Department letters which it took as
evidencing willingness by the Executive Branch to a judicial testing of the validity of the expropriation.

THE ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the propriety of the taking was not governed by New York law?

THE RULING:

The privilege of resorting to United States courts being available to a recognized sovereign power not at
war with the United States, and not being dependent upon reciprocity of treatment, petitioner has access
to the federal courts.

The propriety of the taking was not governed by New York law, since the sugar itself was expropriated.

This suit is not incognizable in American courts as being one to enforce the "public" acts of a foreign state,
since the expropriation law here involved had been fully executed within Cuba.

The Government's uncontested assertion that the two State Department letters expressed only the then
wish of the Department to avoid commenting on the litigation, obviates the need for this Court to pass
upon the "Bernstein exception" to the act of state doctrine, under which a court may respond to a
representation by the Executive Branch that, in particular circumstances, it does not oppose judicial
consideration of the foreign state's act.
The scope of the act of state doctrine must be determined according to federal law.

The act of state doctrine applies and is desirable with regard to a foreign expropriation even though the
expropriation allegedly violates customary international law.

(a) Disagreement exists as to relevant standards of international law concerning a State's responsibility
toward aliens.
(b) The political branch can more effectively deal with expropriation than can the Judicial Branch.
(c) Conflicts between the Judicial and Executive Branches could hardly be avoided were the judiciary to
adjudicate with respect to the validity of expropriations. Even if the combination alleged in this case of
retaliation, discrimination, and inadequate compensation made the expropriation here violative of
international law, a judicial determination to that effect would still be unwise as involving potential
conflict with or embarrassment to the Executive Branch in later litigation. A foreign country's status as a
plaintiff does not make the act of state doctrine inapplicable.
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS V. GREGORIO PERFECTO
G. R. No. L – 18463, October 4, 1922
THE FACTS:

That on September 7, 1920, Gregorio Perfecto published an editorial for the newspaper La Nacion, about
the loss of documents in the Senate. The said documents were records of witness testimonies regarding
the investigation of Oil Companies.

The Philippine Senate deemed the editorial of Mr. Perfecto to be libellous and in direct violation of Article
256 of the Spanish Penal Code, which states, "Any person who, by word, deed, or writing, shall defame,
abuse, or insult any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority, while engaged in the performance
of official duties, or by reason of such performance, provided that the offensive minister or person, or the
offensive writing be not addressed to him, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor,".

Defendant argued whether Article 256 is still in force with the new American occupation. Defendant was
found guilty in the municipal court and also in the Court of First Instance of Manila.

THE ISSUE/S:

Whether or not Mr. Gregorio Perfecto violated Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code

THE RULING:

No. It is a general principle that whenever there is acquisition of new territory, the previous political
relations are totally abrogated, although some laws from the Spanish Penal Code are still used in force, it
was only done so because of convenience. However, with the new American occupation all laws that are
inconsistent with the democratic nature of the new government are displaced without the need for any
declaration.

Article 256 is a law that is monarchical in nature, aiming to protect ministers of the crown and persons of
authority as representatives of the king of Spain, upholding said officials as higher from the general
population and protecting them from contemptuous or dissatisfied statement from the public. It is
completely against the nature and the spirit of the American System of Government which states that
every man is a sovereign, a ruler and a freeman, and has equal right with every other man.
 Vilas vs City of Manila
42 Phil 935 April 3, 1911
THE FACTS

Prior to the incorporation of the City of Manila under the Republic Act No. 183, petitioners Vilas, Trigas
and Aguado, were all creditors of the City of Manila prior to the cession of the Philippines from Spain to
the US thru the Treaty of Paris (December 10, 1898). After the incorporation, Vilas brought an action to
recover the sum of money owed to him by the city.

The City of Manila that incurred the debts has changed its sovereignty after the cession of the Philippines
to the US by the Treaty of Paris and its contention now is founded on the theory that by virtue of the Act
No. 183 its liability has been extinguished. The Philippine Supreme Court denied relief, holding that the
present municipality is a totally different corporate entity, and in no way liable for the debts of the Spanish
municipality In dismissing the Trigas case, the CFI suggested that Trigas may have a “claim against the
Crown of Spain which received which has received from the United States payment for that done by the
plaintiff” The petitioners appealed to the US Supreme Court.

THE ISSUE:

Whether or not the Municipality is liable for obligations incurred prior to cession?

THE RULING:

YES. It is a general rule of public law that whenever political jurisdiction and legislative power over any
territory are transferred from one nation or sovereign to another, the municipal laws of the country --
that is, laws which are intended for the protection of private rights -- continue in force until abrogated or
changed by the new government or sovereign. By the cession, public property passes from one
government to the other, but private property remains as before, and with it those municipal laws which
are designed to secure its peaceful use and enjoyment.

As a matter of course, all laws, ordinances, and regulations in conflict with the political character,
institutions, and constitution of the new government are at once displaced. Thus, upon a cession of
political jurisdiction and legislative power to the United States, the laws of the country in support of an
established religion, or abridging the freedom of the press, or authorizing cruel and unusual punishments,
and the like, would at once cease to be of obligatory force without any declaration to that effect, and the
laws of the country on other subjects would necessarily be superseded by existing laws of the new
government upon the same matters.

With respect to other laws affecting the possession, use, and transfer of property, and designed to secure
good order and peace in the community and promote its health and prosperity, which are strictly of a
municipal character, the rule is general that a change of government leaves them in force until, by direct
action of the new government, they are altered or repealed.
 THE HOLY SEE vs. THE HON. ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO
G.R. No. 101949 December 1, 1994

THE FACTS:

This petition arose from a controversy over a parcel of land consisting of 6,000 square meters located in
the Municipality of Paranaque registered in the name of petitioner. Said lot was contiguous with two other
lots registered in the name of the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC).

Petitioner is the Holy See who exercises sovereignty over the Vatican City in Rome, Italy, and is
represented in the Philippines by the Papal Nuncio; Private respondent, Starbright Sales Enterprises, Inc.,
is a domestic corporation engaged in the real estate business.

The three lots were sold to Ramon Licup, through Msgr. Domingo A. Cirilos, Jr., acting as agent to the
sellers. Later, Licup assigned his rights to the sale to private respondent.

In view of the refusal of the squatters to vacate the lots sold to private respondent, a dispute arose as to
who of the parties has the responsibility of evicting and clearing the land of squatters. Complicating the
relations of the parties was the sale by petitioner of Lot 5-A to Tropicana Properties and Development
Corporation (Tropicana).

private respondent filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 61, Makati, Metro Manila for
annulment of the sale of the three parcels of land, and specific performance and damages against
petitioner, represented by the Papal Nuncio, and three other defendants: namely, Msgr. Domingo A.
Cirilos, Jr., the PRC and Tropicana

the trial court issued an order denying, among others, petitioner’s motion to dismiss after finding that
petitioner “shed off [its] sovereign immunity by entering into the business contract in question” Petitioner
forthwith elevated the matter to us. In its petition, petitioner invokes the privilege of sovereign immunity
only on its own behalf and on behalf of its official representative, the Papal Nuncio.

THE ISSUE:

Whether or not the Holy See is immune from suit insofar as its business relations regarding selling a lot?

THE RULING:

The Republic of the Philippines has accorded the Holy See the status of a foreign sovereign. The Holy See,
through its Ambassador, the Papal Nuncio, has had diplomatic representations with the Philippine
government since 1957 (Rollo, p. 87). This appears to be the universal practice in international relations.

There are two conflicting concepts of sovereign immunity, each widely held and firmly established.
According to the classical or absolute theory, a sovereign cannot, without its consent, be made a
respondent in the courts of another sovereign. According to the newer or restrictive theory, the immunity
of the sovereign is recognized only with regard to public acts or acts jure imperii of a state, but not with
regard to private acts or acts jure gestionis
If the act is in pursuit of a sovereign activity, or an incident thereof, then it is an act jure imperii, especially
when it is not undertaken for gain or profit.

In the case at bench, if petitioner has bought and sold lands in the ordinary course of a real estate business,
surely the said transaction can be categorized as an act jure gestionis. However, petitioner has denied
that the acquisition and subsequent disposal of Lot 5-A were made for profit but claimed that it acquired
said property for the site of its mission or the Apostolic Nunciature in the Philippines. Private respondent
failed to dispute said claim.

Lot 5-A was acquired by petitioner as a donation from the Archdiocese of Manila. The donation was made
not for commercial purpose, but for the use of petitioner to construct thereon the official place of
residence of the Papal Nuncio. The right of a foreign sovereign to acquire property, real or personal, in a
receiving state, necessary for the creation and maintenance of its diplomatic mission, is recognized in the
1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (Arts. 20-22). This treaty was concurred in by the
Philippine Senate and entered into force in the Philippines on November 15, 1965.

Private respondent can ask the Philippine government, through the Foreign Office, to espouse its claims
against the Holy See. Its first task is to persuade the Philippine government to take up with the Holy See
the validity of its claims. Of course, the Foreign Office shall first make a determination of the impact of its
espousal on the relations between the Philippine government and the Holy See (Young, Remedies of
Private Claimants Against Foreign States, Selected Readings on Protection by Law of Private Foreign
Investments 905, 919 [1964]). Once the Philippine government decides to espouse the claim, the latter
ceases to be a private cause.

Private respondent is not left without any legal remedy for the redress of its grievances. Under both Public
International Law and Transnational Law, a person who feels aggrieved by the acts of a foreign sovereign
can ask his own government to espouse his cause through diplomatic channels.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is GRANTED and the complaint in Civil Case No. 90-183 against
petitioner is DISMISSED.
 Underhill VS Hernandez
168 U.S. 250 (1897)
THE FACTS:

Hernandez was in command of a revolutionary army in Venezuela when an engagement took place with
the government forces which resulted in the defeat of the latter, and the occupation of Bolivar by the
former. Underhill was living in Bolivar, where he had constructed a waterworks system for the city under
a contract with the government, and carried on a machinery repair business. He applied for a passport to
leave the city, which was refused by Hernandez with a view to coerce him to operate his waterworks and
his repair works for the benefit of the community and the revolutionary forces. Subsequently a passport
was given him.

claimed had ceased to be the legitimate government. The principal parties to this conflict were those who
recognized Palacio as their head, and those who followed the leadership of Crespo. General Hernandez
belonged to the anti-administration party and commanded its forces in the vicinity of Ciudad Bolivar. On
the 8th of August, 1892, an engagement took place between the armies of the two parties at Buena Vista,
some seven miles from Bolivar, in which the troops under Hernandez prevailed, and on the 13th of August,
Hernandez entered Bolivar and assumed command of the city. All of the local officials had in the meantime
left, and the vacant positions were filled by General Hernandez, who from that date, and during the period
of the transactions complained of, was the civil and military chief of the city and district. In October, the
party in revolt had achieved success generally, taking possession of the capital of Venezuela October 6,
and on October 23, 1892, the "Crespo government," so called, was formally recognized as the legitimate
government of Venezuela by the United States.

George F. Underhill was a citizen of the United States, who had constructed a waterworks system for the
City of Bolivar under a contract with the government, and was engaged in supplying the place with water,
and he also carried on a machinery repair business. Some time after the entry of General Hernandez,
Underhill applied to him, as the officer in command, for a passport to leave the city. Hernandez refused
this request, and requests made by others in Underhill's behalf, until October 18, when a passport was
given, and Underhill left the country.

This action was brought to recover damages for the detention caused by reason of the refusal to grant
the passport, for the alleged confinement of Underhill to his own house, and for certain alleged assaults
and affronts by the soldiers of Hernandez' army.

THE ISSUE/S:

Whether or not, acts of defendant were those of a military commander, representing a de facto
government in the prosecution of a war?

THE RULING:

The cause was tried in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of New York, and on
the conclusion of plaintiff's case, the circuit court ruled that, upon the facts, plaintiff was not entitled to
recover, and directed.
a verdict for defendant on the ground that

"because the acts of defendant were those of a military commander, representing a de facto government
in the prosecution of a war, he was not civilly responsible therefor."

Judgment having been rendered for defendant, the case was taken to the circuit court of appeals, and by
that court affirmed upon the ground

"that the acts of the defendant were the acts of the government of Venezuela, and as such are not
properly the subject of adjudication in the courts of another government."

Thereupon the cause was brought to this Court on certiorari.

The revolutionary government under which Hernandez was acting was recognized by the United States as
the legitimate government of Venezuela. Subsequently Underhill sued Hernandez in .the Circuit Court for
the Second Circuit to recover damages caused by the refusal to grant the passport, for alleged
confinement of him to his own house, and for alleged assaults and affronts by Hernandez' soldiers.
Judgment being rendered for defendant, the case was taken to the circuit court of appeals, where the
judgment was affirmed, the court holding "that the acts of the defendant were the acts of Venezuela, and
as such are not properly the subject of adjudication in the courts of another government." Held that the
circuit court of appeals was justified in that conclusion.
 DIGEST CASES
ON PUBLIC
INTERNATIONA
L LAW
SUBMITTED BY: BLANCA MICA USON CAPATI
SUBMITTED TO: ATTY. VICTOR TULALIAN