SALVADOR VS PATRICIA G.R NO.

195834

Facts: This is an action for injunction and quieting of title to determine who owns the property
occupied by the plaintiffs and intervenor, Ciriano C. Mijares.

Additionally, to prevent the defendant Patricia Inc., from evicting the plaintiffs from their
respective improvements along Juan Luna Street, plaintiffs applied for a preliminary injunction
in their Complaint pending the quieting of title on the merits.

The complaint was amended to include different branches of the Metropolitan Trial Courts of
Manila. A Complaint-in-Intervention was filed by the City of Manila as owner of the land
occupied by the plaintiffs. Another Complaint-in-Intervention by Ciriano Mijares was also filed
alleging that he was similarly situated as the other plaintiffs.The RTC rendered judgment in
favor of the petitioners and against Patricia, Inc. On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC's
judgment, and dismissed the complaint. The CA declared that the petitioners were without the
necessary interest, either legal or equitable title, to maintain a suit for quieting of title;

Issue:Whether the CA erred in dismissing the complaint

Ruling:Another noticeable area of stumble for the petitioners related to their having joined two
causes of action, i.e., injunction and quieting of title, despite the first being an ordinary suit and
the latter a special civil action under Rule 63. Section 5, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court disallowed
the joinder. Consequently, the RTC should have severed the causes of action, either upon motion
or motu proprio, and tried them separately, assuming it had jurisdiction over both. Such
severance was pursuant to Section 6, Rule 2 of the Rules of Court,.The refusal of the petitioners
to accept the severance would have led to the dismissal of the case conformably with the
mandate of Section, Rule 17 of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on June 25, 2010 by the Court of
Appeals
G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285               September 11, 2013
UNICAPITAL, INC., UNICAPITAL REALTY, INC., and JAIME J.
MARTINEZ, Petitioners, 
vs.
RAFAEL JOSE CONSING, JR., and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY, BRANCH 168
Facts: On May 3, 1999, Consing, Jr. filed a complaint, denominated as a Complex Action for
Declaratory Relief23 and later amended to Complex Action for Injunctive Relief24 (Consing,
Jr.’s complaint) before the RTC-Pasig City against Unicapital, URI, PBI, Martirez, PBI General
Manager Mariano Martinez (Martinez), Dela Cruz and Does 1-20, docketed as SCA No. 1759. In
his complaint, Consing, Jr. claimed that the incessant demands/recovery efforts made upon him
by Unicapital and PBI to return to them the purchase price they had paid for the subject property
constituted harassment and oppression which severely affected his personal and professional
life.25 He also averred that he was coerced to commit a violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 2226
as Unicapital and PBI, over threats of filing a case against him, kept on forcing him to issue a
post-dated check in the amount sought to be recovered, notwithstanding their knowledge that he
had no funds for the same.27 He further alleged that Unicapital and URI required him to sign
blank deeds of sale and transfers without cancelling the old one sin violation of the laws on land
registration and real estate development. The RTC-Pasig City issued a Resolution holding that
Consing, Jr.’s complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action for tort and damages pursuant to
Article 19 of the Civil Code. The CA rendered a Joint Decision40 holding that no grave abuse of
discretion was committed by the RTC-Pasig City in refusing to dismiss Consing, Jr.'s complaint.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC-Pasig City’s denial of Unicapital, et
al.’s motion to dismiss
Ruling: A careful perusal of his complaint discloses that Consing, Jr. did not seek to hold
Unicapital and PBI, et al. liable for any specific violation of the Corporation Code or the Revised
Securities Act. Rather, he merely sought damages for Unicapital and PBI, et al.’s alleged acts of
making him sign numerous documents and their use of the same against him. In this respect,
Consing, Jr. actually advances an injunction and damages case82 which properly falls under the
jurisdiction of the RTC-Pasig City.83 Therefore, there was no violation of Section 5, Rule 2 of
the Rules, particularly, paragraph (c) thereof. Besides, even on the assumption that there was a
misjoinder of causes of action, still, such defect should not result in the dismissal of Consing,
Jr.’s complaint. Section 6, Rule 2 of the Rules explicitly states that a "misjoinder of causes of
action is not a ground for dismissal of an action" and that "a misjoined cause of action may, on
motion of a party or on the initiative of the court, be severed and proceeded with separately."
ASSOCIATION OF FLOOD VICTIMS and JAIME AGUILAR
HERNANDEZ, Petitioners, 
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ALAY BUHAY COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT
FOUNDATION, INC., and WESLIE TING GATCHALIAN, Respondents.
Facts: petitioners Association of Flood Victims and Jaime Aguilar Hernandez (Hernandez) filed
with this Court a special civil action for certiorari and/or mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court. Petitioners assert that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
issued Minute Resolution No. 12-0859. Furthermore, petitioners pray for the issuance of a writ
of mandamus to compel publication of the COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 12-0859.
Issue:Do the petitioners have the legal capacity to sue?
Ruling: Petitioners do not have legal capacity to sue.
SECTION 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. – Only natural or juridical persons, or
entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action. The term "plaintiff" may refer to the
claiming party, the counter-claimant, the cross-claimant, or the third (fourth, etc.) -party plaintiff.
The term "defendant" may refer to the original defending party, the defendant in a counterclaim,
the cross-defendant, or the third (fourth, etc.) -party defendant.
SECTION 2. Parties in interest. – A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the
name of the real party in interest.
Under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 3, only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law
may be parties in a civil action, which must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest. Article 44 of the Civil Code lists the juridical persons with capacity to sue, thus:
Art. 44. The following are juridical persons:
(1) The State and its political subdivisions;
(2) Other corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law;
their personality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law;
(3) Corporations, partnerships and associations for private interest or purpose to which the law
grants a juridical personality, separate and distinct from that of each shareholder, partner or
member. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court mandates that "[f]acts showing the capacity of a party to
sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity or the
legal existence of an organized association of persons that is made a party, must be averred."
In their petition, it is stated that petitioner Association of Flood Victims "is a non-profit and non-
partisan organization in the process of formal incorporation, the primary purpose of which is for
the benefit of the common or general interest of many flood victims who are so numerous that it
is impracticable to join all as parties," and that petitioner Hernandez "is a Tax Payer and the Lead
Convenor of the Association of Flood Victims."3 Clearly, petitioner Association of Flood
Victims, which is still in the process of incorporation, cannot be considered a juridical person or
an entity authorized by law, which can be a party to a civil action.4

Petitioner Association of Flood Victims is an unincorporated association not endowed with a

distinct personality of its own. An unincorporated association, in the absence of an enabling law,
has no juridical personality and thus, cannot sue in the name of the association.5 Such
unincorporated association is not a legal entity distinct from its members. If an association, like
petitioner Association of Flood Victims, has no juridical personality, then all members of the
association must be made parties in the civil action.6 In this case, other than his bare allegation
that he is the lead convenor of the Association of Flood Victims, petitioner Hernandez showed
no proof that he was authorized by said association. Aside from petitioner Hernandez, no other
member was made signatory to the petition. Only petitioner Hernandez signed the Verification
and Sworn Certification Against Forum Shopping,7 stating that he caused the preparation of the
petition. There was no accompanying document showing that the other members of the
Association of Flood Victims authorized petitioner Hernandez to represent them and the
association in the petition.
G.R. No. 176598               July 9, 2014
PETRONIO CLIDORO, DIONISIO CLIDORO, LOLITA CLIDORO, CALIXTO CARD
ANO, JR., LOURDES CLIDORO-LARIN, MATEO CLIDORO and MARLIZA
CLIDORO-DE UNA, Petitioners, 
vs.
AUGUSTO JALMANZAR, GREGORIO CLIDORO, JR., SENECA CLIDORO-
CIOCSON, MONSERAT CLIDORO-QUIDAY, CELESTIAL CLIDORO-BINASA,
APOLLO CLIDORO, ROSALIE CLIDORO-CATOLICO, SOPHIE CLIDORO, and
JOSE CLIDORO, JR., Respondents
Facts: The instant appeal stemmed from a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. T-2275 for
revival of judgment filed by Rizalina Clidoro, et al. against Onofre Clidoro, et al., praying that
the Decisiondated November 13, 1995 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 19831,
which affirmed with modification the RTC Decision dated March 10, 1988 in Civil Case No. T-
98 for partition, berevived and that the corresponding writ of execution be issued. On September
3, 2003, defendants-appellees except Gregoria Clidoro-Palanca, moved to dismiss the said
complaint on the following grounds: "1.) The petition, not being brought up against the real
partiesin-interest, is dismissible for lack of cause of action; 2.) The substitution of the parties
defendant is improper and is not in accordance with the rules; 3.) Even if the decision is ordered
revived, the same cannot be executed since the legal requirements of Rule 69, Section 3 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has not been complied with; and 4.) The Judgment of the
Honorable Court ordering partition is merely interlocutory as it leaves something more to be
done to complete the disposition of the case."After the filing of plaintiffs-appellants'
Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, defendants-appellees' Reply, plaintiffs-
appellants' Rejoinder and defendants-interestedparties' Sur-Rejoinder, the RTC issued the
assailed Order dated December 8, 2003 dismissing the instant complaint for lack of cause of
action. the Court finds the instant complaint to be flawed in form and substance. The suit is not
brought by the real parties-ininterest, thus a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
states no cause of action is proper (Section 1(g), Rule 16).
Respondents then appealed to the CA, and on October 17, 2006, the CA promulgated its
Decision reversing and setting aside the Orders of the RTC, and remanding the case to the RTC
for further proceedings. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the Decision was denied per
Resolution dated February 6, 2007.
Issue: WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONSIDERING
THE RESPONDENTS AS WELL AS THE PETITIONERS AS THE REAL PARTIES-IN-
INTEREST

Ruling: With the foregoing in mind, it is understandable that there would be instances where the
parties in the original case and in the subsequent action for revival of judgment would not be
exactly the same. The mere fact that the names appearing as parties in the the complaint for
revival of judgment are different from the names of the parties in the original case would not
necessarily mean that theyare not the real parties-in-interest. What is important is that, as
provided in Section 1, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, they are "the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit."Definitely, as the prevailing parties in the previous case for partition, the plaintiffs in the
case for revival of judgment would be benefited by the enforcement of the decision in the
partition case.Moreover, it would appear that petitioners are mistaken in alleging that
respondents are not the real parties-in-interest. Verily, the trial court erred in dismissing the
complaint for revival of judgment on the ground of lack of, or failure to state a cause of action.
The allegations in the complaint, regarding the parties' interest in having the decision in the
partition case executed or implemented, sufficiently state a cause of action. The question of
whether respondents were the real partiesin-interest who had the right to seek execution of the
final and executory judgment in the partition case should have been threshed out in a full-blown
trial.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October
17, 2006, and its Resolution dated February 6, 2007 in CA-G.R. No. 82209, are hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.
RMMPSTS VS SEC.REYES G.R. No. 180771
Facts:Petitioners Resident Marine Mammals allegedly bring their case in their personal capacity,
alleging that they stand to benefit or be injured from the judgment on the issues. The human
petitioners implead themselves in a representative capacity "as legal guardians of the lesser life-
forms and as responsible stewards of God's Creations."1 They use Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.2 as
basis for their claim, asserting their right to enforce international and domestic environmental
laws enacted for their benefit under the concept of stipulation pour autrui.3 As the
representatives of Resident Marine Mammals, the human petitioners assert that they have the
obligation to build awareness among the affected residents of Tañon Strait as well as to protect
the environment, especially in light of the government's failure, as primary steward, to do its
duty under the doctrine of public trust.
Issue:Do the petitioners have the legal standing to sue?
Ruling: Rule 3, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, in part, provides:
SECTION 1. Who may be parties; plaintiff and defendant. - Only natural or juridical persons, or
entities authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
The Rules provide that parties may only be natural or juridical persons or entities that may be
authorized by statute to be parties in a civil action.
Petitioners in G.R. No. 180771 implicitly suggest that we amend, rather than simply construe,
the provisions of the Rules of Court as well as substantive law to accommodate Resident Marine
Mammals or animals. This we cannot do. When a court allows guardianship as a basis of
representation, animals are considered as similarly situated as individuals who have enforceable
rights but, for a legitimate reason (e.g., cognitive disability), are unable to bring suit for
themselves. They are also similar to entities that by their very nature are incapable of speaking
for themselves (e.g., corporations, states, and others).

In our jurisdiction, persons and entities are recognized both in law and the Rules of Court as
having standing to sue and, therefore, may be properly represented as real parties in interest. The
same cannot be said about animals.
Perhaps it is time to revisit the ruling in Oposa v. Factoran.
That case was significant in that, at that time, there was need to call attention to environmental
concerns in light of emerging international legal principles. While "intergenerational
responsibility" is a noble principle, it should not be used to obtain judgments that would preclude
future generations from making their own assessment based on their actual concerns. The present
generation must restrain itself from assuming that it can speak best for those who will exist at a
different time, under a different set of circumstances. In essence, the unbridled resort to
representative suit will inevitably result in preventing future generations from protecting their
own rights and pursuing their own interests and decisions. It reduces the autonomy of our
children and our children 's children. Even before they are born, we again restricted their ability
to make their own arguments.
It is my opinion that, at best, the use of the Oposa doctrine in environmental cases should be
allowed only when a) there is a clear legal basis for the representative suit; b) there are actual
concerns based squarely upon an existing legal right; c) there is no possibility of any
countervailing interests existing within the population represented or those that are yet to be
born; and d) there is an absolute necessity for such standing because there is a threat of
catastrophe so imminent that an immediate protective measure is necessary. Better still, in the
light of its costs and risks, we abandon the precedent all together
The danger in invoking Oposa v. Factoran to justify all kinds of environmental claims lies in its
potential to diminish the value of legitimate environmental rights. Extending the application of
"real party in interest" to the Resident Marine Mammals, or animals in general, through a judicial
pronouncement will potentially result in allowing petitions based on mere concern rather than an
actual enforcement of a right. It is impossible for animals to tell humans what their concerns are.
At best, humans can only surmise the extent of injury inflicted, if there be any. Petitions
invoking a right and seeking legal redress before this court cannot be a product of guesswork,
and representatives have the responsibility to ensure that they bring "reasonably cogent, rational,
scientific, well-founded arguments"26 on behalf of those they represent.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote:(a) to DISMISS G.R. No. 180771 for lack of standing

MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN

Associate Justice