Regalado v. Dela Rama vda. dela Peña, et.al.

FACTS:

Respondents are registered owners of 2 parcels of land with area of 44 ha in Murcia, NegOcc.
Petitioner entered, took possession of, and planted sugar cane without paying rent to respondents.
Respondents discovered such illegal entry, which prompted them to verbally demand from
petitioner to vacate the properties but to no avail.Parties appeared before Brgy. Cansilayan but
failed to arrive at an amicable settlement. Lupon Tagapamayapa issued CtFA; respondents filed a
Complaint for recovery of possession and damages with injunction against petitioner in RTC.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case positing that the action involved recovery of physical possession of the
properties; said Complaint was also filed within 1 year from the date the parties had a
confrontation before the Barangay, thus, the case was one for Ejectment and must be filed with
the proper MTC.

Respondents contended in their Opposition to Motion to Dismiss that the RTC had jurisdiction
over the case because their demand for petitioner to vacate the properties was made during 1995-
1996, which was earlier than the referral of the matter to Barangay Cansilayan.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

RTC - denied Motion to Dismiss; held that it had jurisdiction because the area was 44 ha,
and "it is safe to presume that the value of the same is more than P20,000.00."
- ordered petitioner to turn over the subject properties to respondents.

CA - affirmed the RTC Decision.

ISSUE: WON RTC holds jurisdiction over the case

HELD: NO

Pursuant to RA 7691, the proper MeTC, MTC, or MCTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over
ejectment cases. Moreover, jurisdiction of the MeTC, MTC, and MCTC shall include civil
actions involving title to or possession of real property, or any interest therein where the assessed
value of the property does not exceed P20,000.00 (or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila).
On the other hand, the RTC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions involving title to
or possession of real property, or any interest therein in case the assessed value of the property
exceeds P20,000.00 (or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila).

Jurisdiction is determined not only by the type of action filed but also by the assessed value of
the property. It follows that in accion publiciana and reinvindicatoria, the assessed value of the
real property is a jurisdictional element to determine the court that can take cognizance of the
action.

Nonetheless, the Court agrees with petitioner that while this case is an accion publiciana, there
was no clear showing that the RTC has jurisdiction over it.

As argued by petitioner, the Complaint failed to specify the assessed value of the subject
properties. Thus, it is unclear if the RTC properly acquired jurisdiction, or the MTC has
jurisdiction, over respondents' action.

The RTC took cognizance of the Complaint only on the presumption that the assessed value of
the properties exceeds P20,000.00. Aside from affirming such presumption, the CA, in turn,
declared that the RTC had jurisdiction because the parties stipulated on it. However, jurisdiction
cannot be presumed. It cannot be conferred by the agreement of the parties, or on the erroneous
belief of the court that it had jurisdiction over a case.

Indeed, in the absence of any allegation in the Complaint of the assessed value of the subject
properties, it cannot be determined which court has exclusive original jurisdiction over
respondents' Complaint. Courts cannot simply take judicial notice of the assessed value, or even
market value of the land. Resultantly, for lack of jurisdiction, all proceedings before the RTC,
including its decision, are void, which makes it unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by
petitioner.
 Union Bank of the Philippines v. The Honorable Regional Agrarian Reform Officer

FACTS:

2 lands in contention have areas of 1,083,250 sqm and 260,132 sqm, located in Brgy. Bunggo,
Calamba, Laguna, was duly owned by the Union Bank of the Philippines as petitioner.

Petitioner offered these lands to DAR through the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) arrangement
under Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government wherein after
inspection of properties by DAR and LBP, a just compensation was offered by DAR.

DAR started issuing Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in the name of private
respondents, for the first lot, in which these CLOAS were transferred to RD of Calamba for
registration, while the other lot was transferred to the Republic of the Philippines.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Withdraw VOS on property from CARP Coverage in the land
valuation proceedings pending before the Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD).

There were series of appeals of petitioner to PARAD, DARAB and to Court of Appeals. HTP.

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioner Union Bank insists that the DARAB is expressly granted quasi-judicial powers by EO
229. It posits that the DAR Secretary was "effectively ousted" from jurisdiction because the
CLOAs were issued upon his determination that the properties were subject to CARP and that
the DARAB "cannot share jurisdiction" with the DAR Secretary on the issue of the validity of
the issuance of the CLOAs.

In response, private respondents argue that the classification and identification of landholdings
for CARP coverage, including petitions for lifting of such coverage, are lodged with the DAR
Secretary. Hence, CA correctly upheld the dismissal of the case.

ISSUE:

WON PARAD/DARAB has jurisdiction over petitions for cancellation of CLOAs involving
parties who do not have a tenancy relationship

HELD: NO
The jurisdiction of a court or tribunal over the nature and subject matter of an action is conferred
by law. Section 50 of the CARL and Section 17 of EO No. 229 vested upon the DAR primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, as well as original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. Through EO No. 129-A, the
power to adjudicate agrarian reform cases was transferred to the DARAB, and jurisdiction over
the implementation of agrarian reform was delegated to the DAR regional offices.

In Heirs of Candido Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, we held that consistent with the DARAB Rules
of Procedure, the agrarian reform cases that fall within the jurisdiction of the PARAD and
DARAB are those that involve agrarian disputes. Section 3(d) of the CARL defines an "agrarian
dispute" as any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy,
stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture. Given the technical legal meaning of
the term "agrarian dispute," it follows that not all cases involving agricultural lands automatically
fall within the jurisdiction of the PARAD and DARAB.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint. For the
PARAD and DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must be prima facie showing
that there is a tenurial arrangement or tenancy relationship between the parties. The essential
requisites of a tenancy relationship are key jurisdictional allegations that must appear on the face
of the complaint. These essential requisites are: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant;
(2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent; (4) the purpose is agricultural production;
(5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of harvests.

The records clearly show that the petitions filed by Union Bank with the PARAD did not involve
agrarian disputes. Specifically, Union Bank's petitions failed to sufficiently allege-or even hint
at-any tenurial or agrarian relations that affect the subject parcels of land. In. both petitions,
Union Bank merely alleged that respondents were beneficiaries of the CLOAs. That Union Bank
questions the qualifications of the beneficiaries suggests that the latter were not known to, much
less tenants of, Union Bank prior to the dispute. We therefore agree with the conclusion of the
CA that there was no tenancy relationship between the parties. Consequently, the PARAD did
not have jurisdiction over the case.

Jurisdiction conferred to the DARAB is limited to agrarian disputes, which is subject to the
precondition that there exist tenancy relations between the parties. This delineation applies in
connection with cancellation of the CLOAs.

In Valcurza v. Tamparong, Jr. we stated: “Thus, the DARAB has jurisdiction over cases
involving the cancellation of registered CLO As relating to an agrarian dispute between
landowners and tenants. However, in cases concerning the cancellation of CLOAs that involve
parties who are not agricultural tenants or lessees - cases related to the administrative
implementation of agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations – the jurisdiction is with the DAR,
and not the DARAB”.

Thus, absent a tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents, PARAD/DARAB has no
jurisdiction over the petitions for cancellation of the CLOAs. Union Bank's postulate that there
can be no shared jurisdiction is partially correct; however, jurisdiction in this case properly
pertains to the DAR, to the exclusion of the DARAB.

Dee v. Harvest All Investment Limited, et.al.

FACTS:

Harvest All, et al. are minority shareholders of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc.
(“Alliance”). As per Alliance by-laws, its Annual Stockholders’ Meeting (“ASM”) is held on the
15th of June each year. On 29 May 2015, in a special board meeting of directors, the board
passed a board resolution indefinitely postponing Alliance’s 2015 ASM pending complete
subscription to its Stock Rights Offering (“SRO”) consisting of shares with a total value of Php1
Billion. Such postponement was made to give the Alliance stockholders better representation in
the annual meeting following the completion of subscription of the SRO.

This prompted Harvest All, et al. to file a complaint involving an intra-corporate controversy
against Alliance and its board with the Regional Trial Court ("RTC"), Pasig City. Harvest All, et
al. prayed for the declaration of nullity of the board resolution dated 29 May 2015 which
indefinitely postponed the 2015 ASM. Subsequently, Harvest All, et al. filed an amended
complaint praying that the Alliance board be enjoined from implementing and carrying out the
SRO prior to and as a condition for the holding of the 2015 ASM.

The Clerk of Court of the RTC assessed Harvest All, et al. with filing fees amounting to
Php8,860.00 which they paid.

The Alliance board raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the ground that Harvest All, et al.
failed to pay the correct filing fees. The Alliance board argued that the filing fees should be
Php20 Million, more or less, basing it from the SRO which was valued at Php1 Billion.

The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction due to failure to pay the correct filing
fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reinstated the case but required the payment of filing fees
in the amount of Php20 Million, more or less.

ISSUE:

WON the filing fee in the amount of Php20 Million, more or less, is proper

HELD: NO
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal
action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or
in the Courts of First Instance would depend on the amount of the claim. However, where the
basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the money claim
is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought, this Court has considered
such actions as cases where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money,
and are cognizable exclusively by Courts of First Instance (now Regional Trial Courts).

An intra-corporate controversy may involve a subject matter which is either capable or incapable
of pecuniary estimation. The following rules must be observed:

If the principal remedy sought is for the recovery of sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation.

If the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where
the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief
sought, it is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

The main purpose of the Harvest All, et al.'s complaint and amended complaint was to have
Alliance hold its 2015 ASM on the date set in the corporation's by laws. This does not involve
the recovery of sum of money. Hence, the action is one incapable of pecuniary estimation. The
mere mention of Alliance's impending SRO valued at P1 Billion cannot transform the nature of
Harvest All, et al.'s action to one capable of pecuniary estimation.

If, in the end, a sum of money or anything capable of pecuniary estimation would be recovered
by virtue of Harvest All, et al.’s complaint, then it would simply be the consequence of their
principal action. Clearly therefore, Harvest All, et al.’s action was one incapable of pecuniary
estimation.

While the Court is not unaware that the amendments brought by A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated
October 5, 2016 only came after the filing of the complaint subject of this case, such
amendments may nevertheless be given retroactive effect so as to make them applicable to the
resolution of the instant consolidated petitions as they merely pertained to a procedural rule, i.e.,
Rule 141, and not substantive law.

Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending
and undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and
to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants’ rights may not
preclude their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of
procedural laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected. Nor is the retroactive application of procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable.
The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
It has been held that “a person has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot
insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the
existing rules of procedure.”

In view of the foregoing, Harvest All, et al. should be made to pay the appropriate docket fees in
accordance with the applicable fees provided under Section 7(b)(3), Rule 141 [fees for all other
actions not involving property] of the Revised Rules of Court, in conformity with A.M. No. 04-
02-04-SC dated 05 October 2016. Case is remanded to the RTC for further proceedings.

FE V. RAPSING, TITA C. VILLANUEVA and ANNIE F. APAREJADO, represented by

EDGAR APAREJADO, Petitioners, -versus- HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO R. ABLES, of
RTC-Branch 47, Masbate City; SSGT. EDISON RURAL, CAA JOSE MATU, CAA
MORIE FLORES, CAA GUILLIEN TOPAS, CAA DANDY FLORES, CAA LEONARDO
CALIMUTAN and CAA RENE ROM, Respondents.

G.R. No. 171855, THIRD DIVISION, October 15, 2012, PERALTA, J.

FACTS:

Respondents SSgt. Edison Rural, CAA Jose Matu, CAA Morie Flores, CAA Guillien Topas,
CAA Dandy Flores, CAA Leonardo Calimutan and CAA Rene Rom are members of the Alpha
Company, 22nd Infantry Battalion, 9th Division of the Philippine Army based at Cabangcalan
Detachment, Aroroy, Masbate.

Petitioners, on the other hand, are the widows of Teogenes Rapsing, Teofilo Villanueva and
Edwin Aparejado, who were allegedly killed in cold blood by the respondents. Respondents
alleged that they received information about the presence of armed elements reputed to be New
People's Army partisans in Sitio Gaway-gaway, Barangay Lagta, Baleno, Masbate. Acting on the
information, they coordinated with the Philippine National Police and proceeded to the place.
Thereat, they encountered armed elements which resulted in an intense firefight. When the battle
ceased, seven persons were found sprawled on the ground lifeless. The post-incident report of the
Philippine Army states that a legitimate military operation was conducted and in the course of
which, the victims, armed with high-powered firearms, engaged in a shoot-out with the military.
On the other hand, petitioners complained that there was no encounter that ensued and that the
victims were summarily executed in cold blood by respondents.

Hence, they requested the NBI to conduct investigation. NBI, relying on the statements of the
witnesses who claim that the military massacred helpless and unarmed civilians recommended to
the prosecutor of Masbate to conduct a preliminary investigation against the respondents for the
crime of multiple murder.
Then, before the warrant of arrest of respondents was issued by the RTC Masbate, Judge
advocate general's office of the AFP filed an Omnibus Motion seeking the case against
respondents be transferred to the jurisdiction of the military tribunal, it was granted.

Petitioners then sought reconsideration of the order, but was denied by the RTC. Hence, this
present petition.

ISSUE: Whether the case falls within the RTC’s jurisdiction

RULING: YES. It is an elementary rule of procedural law that jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the case is conferred by law and is determined by the allegations of the complaint
irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted
therein.

In the case at bar, the information states that respondents, "conspiring together and mutually
helping with one another, taking advantage of their superior strength, as elements of the
Philippine Army, armed with their government-issued firearms with intent to kill, by means of
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and shoot the [victims], hitting them on different parts of their bodies, thereby
inflicting upon them multiple gunshot wounds which caused their deaths." Murder is a crime
punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, and is within the
jurisdiction of the RTC. Hence, irrespective of whether the killing was actually justified or not,
jurisdiction to try the crime charged against the respondents has been vested upon the RTC by
law. In view of the provisions of R.A. 7055, the military tribunals cannot exercise jurisdiction
over respondents' case since the offense for which they were charged is not included in the
enumeration of "service-connected offenses or crimes" as provided for under Section 1 thereof.
The said law is very clear that the jurisdiction to try members of the AFP who commit crimes or
offenses covered by the RPC, and which are not service-connected, lies with the civil courts.

JOSE MENDOZA, Petitioner, -versus- NARCISO GERMINO and BENIGNO

GERMINO, Respondents.

G.R. No. 165676, THIRD DIVISION, November 22, 2010, BRION, J.

FACTS:

petitioner filed a complaint with the MTC  of Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija against respondent Narciso
Germino for forcible entry, claiming that they were the registered owners of a five-hectare parcel
of land in Soledad, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija subject property. On his answer, respondent claimed,
among others, that his brother, was the plaintiffs' agricultural lessee and he merely helped the
latter in the cultivation as a member of the immediate farm household. After several
postponements, the plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case to the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), in view of the tenancy issue raised by
respondent Narciso. The MTC issued an order remanding the case to the DARAB for further
proceedings. PARAD found that the respondents were mere usurpers of the subject property, and
ordered the respondents to vacate the subject property, and pay the plaintiffs 500 cavans of palay
as actual damages.

On appeal to DARAB, respondent argued that the case should have been dismissed because the
MTC’s referral to the DARAB was void with the enactment of Republic Act No. 6657. DARAB
affirmed the PARAD decision. CA, however, set aside the DARAB decision and remanded the
case to the MTC for further proceedings.

ISSUE: Whether the DARAB has jurisdiction over the case.

RULING: It is a basic rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, 25
the MTC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful
detainer. Under Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657, as well as Section 34 of Executive Order No. 129-
A, the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine
and adjudicate all agrarian disputes involving the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program, and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.

Based on the allegations and reliefs prayed, it is clear that the action in the MTC was for forcible
entry. Although respondent Narciso averred tenancy as an affirmative and/or special defense in
his answer, this did not automatically divest the MTC of jurisdiction over the complaint. It
continued to have the authority to hear the case precisely to determine whether it had jurisdiction
to dispose of the ejectment suit on its merits. After all, jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or
the theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction
would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant.

LOLOY UNDURAN v. RAMON ABERASTURI

GR No. 181284, 2015-10-20

FACTS:

Petitioners are members of the Miarayon, Lapok, Lirongan, Talaandig Tribal Association
(MILALITTRA), or Talaandig tribe, who claimed to have been living since birth on the land
located at Barangay Miarayon, Talakag, Bukidnon, Mindanao, which they inherited from their
forefathers. Respondents, represented by attorney-in-fact Ramon Aberasturi, claimed to be the
lawful owners and possessor of an unregistered parcel of agricultural land.

On March 3, 2004, respondents filed a Petition for Accion Reivindicatoria, with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction with Damages
before the Regional Trial Court of Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon (RTC).
On March 23, 2004, the rest of the petitioners filed their Motion to Dismiss, alleging that the
RTC had no jurisdiction over the case.

As awardees of a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), petitioners argued that NCIP
has exclusive and original jurisdiction over the case, as the subject matter concerns a dispute and
controversy over an ancestral land/domain of Indigenous Cultural Communities
(ICCs)/Indigenous Peoples (IPs).

On July 1, 2004, the NCIP through Atty. Melanie Pimentel, filed a Motion to Refer the Case to
the Regional Hearing Office-National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (RHO-NCIP),
alleging that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the subject matter.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint.

RULING: In resolving the pivotal issue of which between the RTC and the NCIP has
jurisdiction, the Court considers the principle “that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case
is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint.

In their original complaint for accion reivindicatoria, respondents traced the provenance of their
title to a Chieftain of Talaandig tribe, by virtue of a Deed of Sale. Together with their
predecessor-in-interest, they have religiously paid the real estate taxes and that they have been in
possession of said land in the concept of owners for more than 50 years, even prior to June 12,
1945. They claimed that by means of fraud and stealth, petitioners entered the said land, caused
damages and harassed respondents by indiscriminately firing upon their farm workers. In their
amended complaint for injunction and damages, respondents further alleged that petitioners
harassed, intimidated, threatened, and fired highpowered rifles upon respondents' farm workers
to drive them away from the land, without legal or justifiable reason.

After a perusal of the allegations and prayers in both original and amended complaints, the Court
notes that respondents neither alleged that the parties are members of ICCs/IPs nor that the case
involves a dispute or controversy over ancestral lands/domains of ICC/IPs. Rather, the
allegations in respondents' original complaint make up for an accion reivindicatoria, a civil
action which involves an interest in a real property with an assessed value of P683,760.00, while
the allegations in their amended complaint make out a case for injunction, a civil action which is
incapable of pecuniary estimation. The mere fact that this case involves members of ICCs/IPs
and their ancestral land is not enough to for it to fall under the jurisdiction of the NCIP. Pursuant
to Section 66 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving
rights of ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the same ICC/IP.
When such claims and disputes arise between or among parties who do not belong to the same
ICC/IP, the case shall fall under the jurisdiction of the proper Courts of Justice, instead of the
NCIP. In this case, while most of the petitioners belong to Talaandig Tribe, respondents do not
belong to the same ICC/IP. Thus, the RTC has jurisdiction.
Lamsis vs. Dong-E
FACTS:
 Respondent Margarita Semon Dong-E claims that her family's ownership and occupation of
Lot No. 1 can be traced as far back as 1922 to her late grandfather, Ap-ap. Upon Ap-ap's
death, the property was inherited by his children, including the subject land (lot 1).
 Between 1976 and 1978, Gilbert Semon and his wife Mary Lamsis, allowed his in-laws
Manolo Lamsis and Nancy Lamsis-Kitma, to stay on a portion of Lot No. 1 with their
respective families. They were allowed to erect their houses, introduce improvements, and
plant trees thereon. When Manolo and Nancy died sometime in the 1980s, their children
(petitioners Delfin Lamsis and Agustin Kitma) took possession of certain portions of Lot No.
1. The heirs of Gilbert Semon tolerated the acts of their first cousins.
 Petitioners Delfin and Agustin allegedly began expanding their occupation on the subject
property and selling portions thereof.
 Margarita filed a complaint for recovery of ownership, possession, reconveyance and
damages against all four occupants of Lot No. 1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). The
complaint prayed for the annulment of the sales to Maynard and Jose and for petitioners to
vacate the portions of the property which exceed the areas allowed to them by Margarita.
 RTC found that the evidence preponderates in favor of respondent's long-time possession of
and claim of ownership over the subject property. the sales made by petitioners to Maynard
and Jose was declared void and petitioners were ordered to vacate the property.
 On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the RTC and held that the respondent was able to
discharge her burden in proving her title and interest to the subject property. Hence, the
present petition before the Supreme Court
 For the first time in the entire proceedings of this case, petitioners raise the trial court's
alleged lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter in light of the effectivity of the IPRA at
the time that the complaint was filed in 1998. They maintain that, under the IPRA, it is the
NCIP which has jurisdiction over land disputes involving indigenous cultural communities
and indigenous peoples.
ISSUE: May the petitioners assail the jurisdiction of the RTC for the first time before the
Supreme Court?
RULING:
 As a rule, an objection over subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time of the
proceedings. This is because jurisdiction cannot be waived by the parties or vested by the
agreement of the parties. Jurisdiction is vested by law, which prevails at the time of the filing
of the complaint.
 An exception to this rule has been carved by jurisprudence. In the seminal case of Tijam v.
Sibonghanoy, the Court ruled that the existence of laches will prevent a party from raising
the court's lack of jurisdiction.
 Laches is defined as the "failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it
 is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it."
Wisely, some case have cautioned against applying Tijam, except for the most exceptional
cases where the factual milieu is similar to Tijam.
 In the case at bar, the application of the Tijam doctrine is called for because the presence of
laches cannot be ignored. At the time that the complaint was first filed in 1998, the IPRA was
already in effect but the petitioners never raised the same as a ground for dismissal. It is only
before the Supreme Court, eight years after the filing of the complaint, after the trial court
had already conducted a full-blown trial and rendered a decision on the merits, after the
appellate court had made a thorough review of the records, and after petitioners have twice
encountered adverse decisions from the trial and the appellate courts - that petitioners now
want to expunge all the efforts that have gone into the litigation and resolution of their case
and start all over again.
Tijam v. Sibonghanoy
FACTS:
 Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog filed a collection suit against the spouses Sibonghanoy
in the CFI (now RTC) of Cebu for the recovery of P1,908, exclusive of interests.
 A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect
depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction over cases in which the demand,
exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00
 The Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and, after the same had become final
and executory, issued a writ of execution against the defendants.
 The surety moved to quash the writ on the ground that the same was issued without the
required summary hearing. The trial court denied the motion so the surety appealed to the
Court of Appeals.
 The appeal, however, did not raise the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court to rule on
the matter. The appeal was subsequently denied by the CA.
 Instead of filing a motion for reconsideration pursuant to the approved motion asking for
extension to file an MR, they filed a motion to dismiss.
 Surety argued that the CFI has been divested of its original and exclusive jurisdiction over
cases in which the demand is not more than P2,000.00 because of the passing or RA296,
placing the original and exclusive jurisdiction to inferior courts (MTC).
ISSUE: WoN the Surety is correct in their contention that the CFI has no jurisdiction over the
case.
RULING:
 Their contention is not correct. Considering the facts and circumstances of the present case,
the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea at this late hour for the purpose of
annulling everything done heretofore in the case with its active participation. The action was
 commenced on July 19, 1948, almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to
dismiss on January 12, 1963 raising the question of lack of jurisdiction for the first time.
 A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of (1) estoppel in pais, of (2) estoppel by deed or by record, and of
(3) estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense, is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or
should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a
reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.
 The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

 A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his
opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same
jurisdiction. The question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter of
the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is barred from
such conduct, not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an
adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot be tolerated for reasons of public
policy.
Cudiamat v. Batangas Savings
FACTS:
 Atty. Restituto Cudiamat and his brother Perfecto were the registered co-owners of a parcel
of land in Batangas.
 1979, Perfecto mortgaged the co-owned land without the consent of Restituto. He present a
Special Power of Attorney purportedly executed by the latter.
 Perfecto died in 1990. In June 19, 1991, the property was foreclosed but Restituto contended,
thru a letter to the bank, that he had no participiation therein.
 As Corazon, the widow of Perfecto was evicted from the property, they filed an action to
quiet title Before the RTC of Balayan. The court ruled in favor of Petitioner
 The bank appealed to CA. They contended that RTC has no Jurisdiction over the complaint.
CA ruled in their favor. Hence this present petition
ISSUE: WoN RTC has Jurisdiction over the petition to quiet title.
RULING:
Estoppel bars the bank from raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction of the Balayan RTC. The
operation of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends on whether the lower
court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided
upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such
jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a matter of law, and may not be conferred by the consent
of the parties or by estoppel." However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was
heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction,
the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an
inconsistent position that the lower court had jurisdiction.
In the present case, the Balayan RTC, sitting as a court of general jurisdiction, had jurisdiction
over the complaint for quieting of title filed by petitioners. While it is well-settled that lack of
jurisdiction on the subject matter can be raised at any time and is not lost by estoppel by laches,
the present case is an exception. To compel petitioners to re-file and relitigate their claims before
the Nasugbu RTC when the parties had already been given the opportunity to present their
respective evidence in a full-blown trial before the Balayan RTC which had, in fact, decided
petitioners complaint (about two years before the appellate court rendered the assailed decision)
would be an exercise in futility and would unjustly burden petitioners.
FIRST CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. FORMER SIXTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS, BRANCH 218 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
CITY,** EDUARDO M. SACRIS, and CESAR A. ABILLAR, Respondents.

Facts:

 This is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure seeking to annul, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City

 Petitioner and Abillar convinced private respondent Sacris to invest in their business as
the petitioner corporation needed a fresh equity infusion, particularly in its Rema Tip Top
Division, to make viable its continuous operation.

 The petitioner made a promise of turning such equity into shareholding in the petitioner
corporation. While the conversion of such investment into shareholding was still pending,
respondent Sacris and the petitioner corporation agreed to consider the same as a loan
which shall earn an interest of one percent per month.

 All loans were given by private respondent Sacris to herein private respondent Abillar, as
the latter was then the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of the petitioner
corporation.

 Petitioner failed to convert private respondent Sacris's investment/loan into equity or

shareholding in the petitioner corporation. In its place, petitioner agreed to pay a monthly
interest of 2.5% on the amount of the loan extended to it by private respondent Sacris.
Abillar was ousted from the petitioner corporation.

 Petitioner filed its Answer denying the material allegations stated in the Complaint.
Petitioner denied having liability to private respondent Sacris, as it had no knowledge of
or consent to the purported transactions or dealings that private respondent Sacris may
have had with private respondent Abillar.

 Subsequently, petitioner corporation filed a Third-Party Complaint against private

respondent Abillar alleging that the investment/loan transactions of private respondent
Sacris, the basis of his cause of action against the petitioner corporation, were all entered
into by private respondent Abillar without the knowledge, consent, authority and/or
approval of the petitioner corporation or of the latter's Board of Directors.

 RTC of Quezon City ruled in favour of the private respondents which was affirmed by
the CA.

 Hence, this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the following issues:

 o PUBLIC RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AND ACTED WITHOUT AND/OR IN EXCESS OF THEIR JURISDICTION
IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT [SACRIS'S] CLAIMS OF A
PURPORTED LOAN ARE SUPPORTED BY PREPONDERANCE OF
EVIDENCE, IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER BENEFITED FROM THE
PURPORTED LOAN FROM PRIVATE RESPONDENT [SACRIS], IN NOT
FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT ABILLAR WAS NOT
AUTHORIZED BY PETITIONER TO BORROW MONEY FROM PRIVATE
REPSONDENT SACRIS and IN NOT AWARDING DAMAGES TO
PETITIONER AND IN DISMISSING THE THIRD-PARTY.

 Petitioner further argues that the conclusion made by the RTC of Quezon City and the
appellate court that it benefited from the loans obtained from private respondent Sacris
had no basis in fact and in law. More so, it was grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the RTC of Quezon City and the Court of Appeals to conclude that the alleged loans were
reflected in its financial statements. 

 Private respondents argue that the grounds enumerated by the petitioner corporation for
the allowance of its Petition for Certiorari before this Court clearly call for the review of
the factual findings of the RTC. Private respondents further avow that the petitioner
corporation is simply using the remedy of certiorari provided for under Rule 65 as a
substitute for an ordinary appeal. They claim that certiorari under Rule 65 cannot be used
for the review of the findings of fact and evidence. Neither is it the proper remedy to cure
errors in proceedings nor to correct erroneous conclusions of law or fact. Thus, private
respondents maintain that the petitioner corporation is merely using the remedy
of certiorari as a delaying tool to prevent the Decision of the RTC from immediately
becoming final and executory.

Issue: Whether the RTC had acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction on its decision of the
herein case.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that the findings of the RTC of Quezon City and the appellate court are
supported by evidence, this Court finds no reason to deviate from the heretofore cited rule.

In the case at bar, the findings of the RTC of Quezon City as well as the appellate court are
properly supported by evidence on record. Both courts found that the alleged loans extended to
the petitioner corporation by private respondent Sacris were reflected in the petitioner
corporation's financial statements, particularly in the years 1992-1993, were contrary to the claim
of petitioner corporation. The said financial statements of the petitioner corporation were not the
sole bases used by the RTC of Quezon City and by the appellate court in its findings of liability
against the petitioner corporation. The RTC of Quezon City also took into consideration the
pieces of documentary evidence which likewise became the grounds for its findings that indeed,
private respondent Sacris had extended a loan to petitioner corporation, and that the same was
given to private respondent Abillar, and received by the petitioner corporation. Those pieces of
documentary evidence very well supported the claim of private respondent Sacris that the
petitioner corporation received money from him through Abillar. Thus, petitioner corporation
cannot claim that it never consented to the act of private respondent Abillar of entering into a
loan/investment transaction with private respondent Sacris, for there are documents that would
prove that the money was received by the petitioner corporation, and the latter acknowledged
receipt of said money. The same pieces of evidence likewise confirm the findings of the RTC of
Quezon City that the petitioner corporation benefited from the said transaction; therefore, it
should be held liable for the same amount of its unpaid obligation to private respondent Sacris.

It is a fundamental aphorism in law that a review of facts and evidence is not the province of the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari, which is extra ordinem - beyond the ambit of
appeal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and assess the
evidence of the parties and to weigh the probative value thereof. It does not include an inquiry as
to the correctness of the evaluation of evidence. Any error committed in the evaluation of
evidence is merely an error of judgment that cannot be remedied by certiorari. An error of
judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction. An error of
jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or in excess
of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, which is tantamount to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ
of certiorari. Certiorari will not be issued to cure errors of the trial court in its appreciation of
the evidence of the parties, or its conclusions anchored on the said findings and its conclusions of
law. It is not for this Court to re-examine conflicting evidence, re-evaluate the credibility of the
witnesses or substitute the findings of fact of the court a quo.

Since the issues raised by the petitioner corporation in its Petition for Certiorari are mainly
factual, as it would necessitate an examination and re-evaluation of the evidence on which the
RTC and the appellate court based their Decisions, the Petition should not be given due course.
Thus, the remedy of certiorari will not lie to annul or reverse the Decision of the RTC of Quezon
City dated 28 June 2004, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Settled is the rule that the proper remedy from an adverse decision of the Court of Appeals is an
appeal under Rule 45 and not a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Hence, petitioner could
have raised the Court of Appeals Decision to this Court via an ordinary appeal under Rule 45 of
the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. It should be emphasized that the extraordinary
remedy of certiorari will not lie when there are other remedies available to the
petitioner. Therefore, in availing itself of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, the petitioner
corporation resorted to a wrong mode of appeal.

G.R. No. 164795, April 19, 2017

TGN REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. VILLA TERESA HOMEOWNERS

ASSOCIATION, INC., Respondent.

Facts:
  TGN Realty Corporation owned and developed starting on August 22, 1966 the Villa
Teresa Subdivision. The project soon had many lot buyers who built or bought residential
units thereon. Respondent Villa Teresa Homeowners Association, Inc. (VTHAI) was the
association of the residents and homeowners of the subdivision.

 Respondent made complaint and demand to the petitioner about the enhancement of the
said subdivision but the petitioner failed and refused to meet in evident disregard of the
latter's obligations as the owner and developer of the project.

 VTHAI filed with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) its complaint
for specific performance and for violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957 and P.D.
No. 1216 wherein the petitioner filed its counterclaim.

 HLURB ruled in favour of the respondents which the OP affirmed in toto and was also
adopted by the CA.

 Hence, TGN filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the ff. issues:

- THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED

TO ORDER THE DISMISSAL OF THE SUBJECT COMPLIANT (sic) DESPITE THE CLEAR
SHOWING THAT THE SAID COMPLAINT IS BEREFT OF ANY FACTUAL AND/OR
LEGAL BASIS, IT SIMPLY AFFIRMED THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE OFFICE
OF THE PRESIDENT DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME WERE ISSUED WITHOUT
EVEN EXPLAINING THE FACTS AND LAW UPON WHICH THE SAME WERE BASED
and IT REFUSED TO ORDER THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT FILED UNDER
HLURB CASE NO. REM-C0-03-7-1133 DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAME DID NOT
CONTAIN A CERTIFICATION AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in affirming the decision of OP.

Ruling:

The Court granted the petition of TGN.

Ordinarily, the appeal by petition for review on certiorari should not involve the
consideration and resolution of factual issues. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court limits
the appeal to questions of law because the Court, not being a trier of facts, should not be
expected to re-evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence introduced in the fora below.

A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts. For a question to be one of law, the question must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution of the
issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. Once it is clear
that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of fact.
Thus, the test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such
question by the party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the
issue raised without reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law;
otherwise it is a question of fact.

There may be exceptions to the limitation of the review to question of law, such as the following:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse
of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the CA went beyond the issues
of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;
(7) when the CA's findings are contrary to those by the trial court; (8) when the findings are
conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the
respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; or (11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.

Yet, none of the foregoing exceptions to the limitation applies to this case. As a consequence it
seems foregone that the Court would be justified in now rejecting the appeal of the petitioner,
and in upholding the CA adversely against the petitioner.

But the attention of the Court has been directed to the conflict in the findings on the state of the
development of the project. According to the decision dated September 25, 1998 of the HLURB
arbiter, an ocular inspection of the premises was conducted on March 13, 1998 in order to verify
the status of the development of the project. It was found at the time that "proper development
and maintenance of all subdivision facilities should be undertaken by the owner/developer. And
fencing of unfinished perimeter fence especially those leading to the squatter area. Cleaning of
clogging canal and help the association in maintaining the subdivision a safe, clean and healthy
place to live in (are) the requests of the residents." Being the agency that has acquired the
expertise on the matter in question, the HLURB's findings should be respected.

G.R. No. 162416             January 31, 2006

CHESTER DE JOYA, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE PLACIDO C. MARQUEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 40,
Manila-RTC, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Respondents.
Facts:

 This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition that seeks the Court to nullify and set aside
the warrant of arrest issued by respondent judge against petitioner in Criminal Case No.
03-219952 for violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1689. Petitioner asserts that respondent judge erred in
finding the existence of probable cause that justifies the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against him and his co-accused.

 Manuel Dy Awiten filed a complaint against Mina Tan Hao @ Ma. Gracia Tan Hao and
Victor Ngo y Tan for syndicated estafa. 

 SC finds from the records of Criminal Case No. 03-219952 the following documents to
support the motion of the prosecution for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

 Included in the records is the resolution issued by State Prosecutor Benny Nicdao finding
probable cause to indict petitioner and his other co-accused for syndicated estafa.

Issue: Whether the circumstance in the case warrants the review of SC of the factual finding of
RTC.

Ruling:

The Court ruled that the facts obtaining in this case do not warrant the application of the
exception.

The general rule is that this Court does not review the factual findings of the trial court, which
include the determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest. It is only in
exceptional cases where this Court sets aside the conclusions of the prosecutor and the trial judge
on the existence of probable cause, that is, when it is necessary to prevent the misuse of the
strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration of justice. 

In the present case, it is notable that the resolution issued by State Prosecutor Benny Nicdao
thoroughly explains the bases for his findings that there is probable cause to charge all the
accused with violation of Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code in relation to P.D. No.
1689.

In addition, it may not be amiss to note that petitioner is not entitled to seek relief from this Court
nor from the trial court as he continuously refuses to surrender and submit to the court’s
jurisdiction. Justice Florenz D. Regalado explains the requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction
and how the court acquires such jurisdiction, thus:
x x x Requisites for the exercise of jurisdiction and how the court acquires such jurisdiction:

a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner: This is acquired by the filing of the complaint,
petition or initiatory pleading before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner.

b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent: This is acquired by the voluntary appearance or

submission by the defendant or respondent to the court or by coercive process issued by the court
to him, generally by the service of summons.

c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter: This is conferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction over the
parties, cannot be conferred on the court by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties.

d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case: This is determined and conferred by the pleadings filed
in the case by the parties, or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at times by
their implied consent as by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by
the pleadings, as provided in Sec. 5, Rule 10.

e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject of the litigation). This is
acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the thing in question, thus placing it
in custodia legis, as in attachment or garnishment; or by provision of law which recognizes in the
court the power to deal with the property or subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in
land registration proceedings or suits involving civil status or real property in the Philippines of a
non-resident defendant.

In two cases, the court acquires jurisdiction to try the case, even if it has not acquired
jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident defendant, as long as it has jurisdiction over
the res, as when the action involves the personal status of the plaintiff or property in the
Philippines in which the defendant claims an interest. In such cases, the service of
summons by publication and notice to the defendant is merely to comply with due process
requirements. Under Sec. 133 of the Corporation Code, while a foreign corporation doing
business in the Philippines without a license cannot sue or intervene in any action here, it
may be sued or proceeded against before our courts or administrative tribunals.

Again, there is no exceptional reason in this case to allow petitioner to obtain relief from the
courts without submitting to its jurisdiction. On the contrary, his continued refusal to submit to
the court’s jurisdiction should give this Court more reason to uphold the action of the respondent
judge. The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to place the accused under the custody of the law to
hold him for trial of the charges against him. His evasive stance shows an intent to circumvent
and frustrate the object of this legal process. It should be remembered that he who invokes the
court’s jurisdiction must first submit to its jurisdiction.
 FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR v. REPUBLIC/ IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS v.
REPUBLIC G.R. No. 189434/ G.R. No. 189505, March 12, 2014, Sereno, J.

FACTS:

 in 1972, Ferdinand Marcos formed the Arelma S.A. entity under the laws of Panama and,
opened an account under its name at the brokerage firm of Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. in New York and deposited $2 million.   A class action by the Marcos'
human rights victims resulted in a nearly $2 billion judgment for the "Pimentel class,"
which claimed a right to enforce its judgment by attaching the Arelma assets. The
ownership in Arelma was represented by two bearer share certificates that are held in
escrow by the Philippine National Bank (PNB), after being transferred there in 1990 by
an order of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court.
 The Republic of the Philippines claimed ownership of the Arelma deposit of
approximately $35 million based on its custody of the Arelma shares, but citing claims to
the funds by the Marcos' human rights victims, Merrill Lynch filed an interpleader
motion to request the courts to settle ownership of the funds. Litigation is ongoing in the
United States, as of early March 2011.
 On 25 April 2012, this Court rendered a Decision affirming the 2 April 2009 Decision of
the Sandiganbayan and declaring all the assets of Arelma, S.A., an entity created by the
late Ferdinand E. Marcos, forfeited in favor of the Republic of the Philippines. The anti-
graft court found that the totality of assets and properties acquired by the Marcos spouses
was manifestly and grossly disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials,
and that petitioners were unable to overturn the prima facie presumption of ill-gotten
wealth, pursuant to Section 2 of Republic Act No. (RA) 1379.
 In June 2012, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the New York State Appellate
Court decision a year earlier which held that the case of Swezey (representing the class of
human rights victims) v. Merrill Lynch, et al, cannot proceed without the participation of
the Republic of Philippines, making reference to the Philippines' Supreme Court ruling
that the Arelma assets belonged to the People of the Philippines and should be returned to
them.


ISSUE: WON the Sandiganbayan does not possess territorial jurisdiction over the res or the
Arelma proceeds

Ruling:

We find that the Sandiganbayan did not err in granting the Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, despite the fact that the Arelma account and proceeds are held abroad. To rule
otherwise contravenes the intent of the forfeiture law, and indirectly privileges violators who are
able to hide public assets abroad: beyond the reach of the courts and their recovery by the State.
Forfeiture proceedings, as we have already discussed exhaustively in our Decision, are actions
considered to be in the nature of proceedings in rem or quasi in rem, such that:
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired either (a) by the seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into actual custody of the law; or (b) as a result of the institution of legal
proceedings, in which the power of the court is recognized and made effective. In the latter
condition, the property, though at all times within the potential power of the court, may not be in
the actual custody of said court.

The concept of potential jurisdiction over the res, advanced by respondent, is not at all new. As
early as Perkins v. Dizon, deciding a suit against a non-resident, the Court held that in order that
the court may exercise power over the res, it is not necessary that the court should take actual
custody of the property, potential custody thereof being sufficient. There is potential custody
when, from the nature of the action brought, the power of the court over the property is impliedly
recognized by law.

(The Republic's) national interests would be severely prejudiced by a turnover proceeding

because it has asserted a claim of ownership regarding the Arelma assets that rests on several
bases: the Philippine forfeiture law that predated the tenure of President Marcos; evidence
demonstrating that Marcos looted public coffers to amass a personal fortune worth billions of
dollars; findings by the Philippine Supreme Court and Swiss Federal Supreme Court that Marcos
stole related assets from the Republic; and, perhaps most critically, the recent determination by
the Philippine Supreme Court that Marcos pilfered the money that was deposited in the Arelma
brokerage account. Consequently, allowing the federal court judgment against the estate of
Marcos to be executed on property that may rightfully belong to the citizens of the Philippines
could irreparably undermine the Republic's claim to the Arelma assets.

Finally, we take note of the Decision rendered by the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court on 26 June 2012. In Swezey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., the
foreign court agreed with the dismissal of the turnover proceeding against the Arelma assets
initiated by alleged victims of human rights abuses during the Marcos regime. It reasoned that
the Republic was a necessary party, but could not be subject to joinder in light of its assertion of
sovereign immunity:

The Republic's declaration of sovereign immunity in this case is entitled to recognition because it
has a significant interest in allowing its courts to adjudicate the dispute over property that may
have been stolen from its public treasury and transferred to New York through no fault of the
Republic. The high courts of the United States, the Philippines and Switzerland have clearly
explained in decisions related to this case that wresting control over these matters from the
Philippine judicial system would disrupt international comity and reciprocal diplomatic self-
interests.

SUPAPO v. SPOUSES DE JESUS, ET AL.

G.R. No. 198356, April 20, 2015, Brion, J.
Facts:

 The Spouses Supapo filed a complaint for accion publiciana against Roberto and Susan
de Jesus with the MeTC of Caloocan City. The complaint sought to compel the
respondents to vacate a piece of land located in Novaliches, Quezon City, and registered
under petitioners’ name. The land has an assessed value of Php39,980.00. Petitioners did
not reside on the lot but made sure to visit at least twice a year.
 During one of their visits, they saw two houses built on the lot without their knowledge
and permission. They learned that respondents occupied both houses. They demanded the
surrender of the lot by bringing the dispute before the appropriate Lupong
Tagapamayapa. The Lupon issued a certificate to file action for failure of the parties to
settle amicably.
 The Spouses Supapo filed a criminal case against the respondents for violating PD No.
772 (Anti-Squatting Law). The trial court convicted the respondents.
 On appeal, the CA dismissed the case because Congress enacted R.A. No. 8368
repealing the Anti- Squatting Law. Notwithstanding the dismissal, the Spouses Supapo
moved for the execution of the respondents’ civil liability, praying that the latter vacate
the subject lot.
 The RTC granted the motion and issued the writ of execution. Respondents moved to
quash it but the RTC denied their motion.
 They filed with the CA a petition for certiorari. The CA granted it and ruled that with the
repeal of the Anti-Squatting Law, the criminal and civil liabilities of respondents were
extinguished, but it also said that recourse may be had in court by filing the proper action
for recovery of possession. Thus, the Spouses Supapo filed the complaint for accion
publiciana.
 After filing their Answer, the respondents moved to set their affirmative defenses for
preliminary hearing and argued that there is another action pending between the same
parties, the complaint is barred by statute of limitations, and the petitioners’ cause of
action is barred by prior judgment.
 The MeTC denied the motion to set the affirmative defenses for preliminary hearing. The
RTC granted the petition for certiorari of respondents because the action has prescribed
and accion publiciana falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. It likewise
denied the motion for reconsideration of petitioners. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision; hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the MeTC has jurisdiction to try the present case of accion publiciana.
Ruling:
 Yes. Under Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, the jurisdiction of the RTC over actions
involving title to or possession of real property is plenary. RA No. 7691, however,
divested the RTC of a portion of its jurisdiction and granted the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts the exclusive and
 original jurisdiction to hear actions where the assessed value of the property does not
exceed Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), or Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), if the property is located in Metro Manila. In view of these amendments,
jurisdiction over actions involving title to or possession of real property is now
determined by its assessed value. The assessed value of real property is its fair
market value multiplied by the assessment level. It is synonymous to taxable value.
 In this regard, the complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of
the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has jurisdiction over the
action. This is required because the nature of the action and the court with original and
exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the material allegations of the
complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff, and the law in effect when the
action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are entitled to some or all of the
claims asserted therein.[44]
 In the present case, the Spouses Supapo alleged that the assessed value of the subject lot,
located in Metro Manila, is P39,980.00. This is proven by the tax declaration[45] issued by
the Office of the City Assessor of Caloocan. The respondents do not deny the
genuineness and authenticity of this tax declaration.

Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez vs. Director of Lands

G.R. No. 168065/G.R. No. 168070, THIRD DIVISION, September 6, 2017, MARTIRES, J.

Facts
 On 27 December 1974, Geronimo, Josefino, and Rodrigo, all surnamed Saclolo (the
Saclolos) filed before the Regional Trial Court, Naic, Cavite, a joint application for
registration of title over three (3) parcels of land (subject lands), with a total area of
3,752,142 square meters (375.2 hectares) and located at Sitio Sinalam, Bario Sapang,
Ternate, Cavite.
 The Saclolos averred that they had acquired title to the subject lands through purchase
and that together with their predecessors-in-interest, they had been in actual and
exclusive possession, occupation, and cultivation of the subject lands since time
immemorial.
 The government, thru the Director of Lands filed oppositions to the application and
argued that the subject lands are not alienable and disposable because: they are located
within the Calumpang Point Naval Reservation
 Trinidad Diaz-Enriquez (Enriquez) filed a motion for intervention alleging that the
Saclolos had sold to her all their interests and rights over the subject lands
 The RTC ruled that the subject lands are alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain
 The CA declared that the subject lands are all within the Calumpang Point Naval
Resevation
 Aggrieved, the Saclolos and Enriquez moved for reconsideration, but the same was
 denied by the CA

ISSUE

Whether the appellate court may resolve issues which are not raised as errors on appeal (YES)

RULING

As a general rule, only matters assigned as errors in the appeal may be resolved. Section 8,
Rule 51 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 8. Questions that May Be Decided. — No error which does not affect the
jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the
proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely
related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the
court may pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.

The exceptions to this rule have been enumerated in Catholic Bishop of Balanga v.
Court of Appeals:21

[T]he appellate court is accorded a broad discretionary power to waive the lack of proper
assignment of errors and to consider errors not assigned. It is clothed with ample authority
to review rulings even if they are not assigned as errors in the appeal. Inasmuch as the
Court of Appeals may consider grounds other than those touched upon in the decision of the
trial court and uphold the same on the basis of such other grounds, the Court of Appeals may,
with no less authority, reverse the decision of the trial court on the basis of grounds other than
those raised as errors on appeal. We have applied this rule, as a matter of exception, in the
following instances:

1. Grounds not assigned as errors but affecting jurisdiction over the subject matter;
 2. Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but are evidently plain or clerical errors
within contemplation of law;

3. Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but consideration of which is necessary in

arriving at a just decision and complete resolution of the case or to serve the
interest of justice or to avoid dispensing piecemeal justice;

4. Matters not specifically assigned as errors on appeal but raised in the trial court and are
matters of record having some bearing on the issue submitted which the parties failed
to raise or which the lower court ignored;

5. Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but closely related to an error assigned; and

6. Matters not assigned as errors on appeal but upon which the determination of a
question properly assigned, is dependent.22 (citations omitted)

In this case, there is no doubt that the application for registration of title hinges upon the
determination of whether the subject lands are alienable and disposable. Further, this is
consistent with the appellate court's authority to review the totality of the controversy brought
on appeal.
MERCEDITA C. COOMBS, PETITIONER, VS. VICTORIA C. CASTAÑEDA,
VIRGILIO VELOSO SANTOS, SPS. PANCHO & EDITH LEVISTE, BPI FAMILY
SAVINGS BANK AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MUNTINLUPA CITY,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 192353 | 2017-03-18

FACTS:
 Petitioner Coombs narrated that she is the owner of the real property covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 6715 situated on Apitong Street, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa City. That sometime in March 2005, when she tried to pay the real property
tax due relative to the real property covered by TCT No. 6715, she was told that said real
property was no longer listed under her name. She came to know that TCT No. 6715 had
already been cancelled and had been replaced by TCT No. 14115 issued in the name of
Virgilio Veloso Santos (Santos). TCT No. 6715 was ordered cancelled by the RTC in a
Decision dated August 26, 2004, entitled "In Re: Petition for the Issuance of Second
Owner's Duplicate Copy of…[by] Mercedita C. Coombs, represented by her Atty.-in-
Fact Victoria C. Castañeda".
 Coombs asserted that she neither authorized Victoria C. Castañeda (Castañeda) to file
petition for issuance of a second owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 6715 nor asked her
to sell the subject property to herein respondent Santos.
 Santos has already sold the property to herein respondents Pancho and Edith Leviste
(spouses Leviste); that the spouses Leviste executed a real estate mortgage over the
 subject property in favor of herein respondent Bank of the Philippine Islands Family
Savings Bank (BPI Family). Coombs filed the present petition for annulment of judgment
of RTC.
 CA – dismissed; RTC has jurisdiction over all proceedings involving title to real property
and land registration cases. Hence, this petition.
 Petitioner Coombs anchored her prayer for the annulment of the RTC Decision on the
ground that, since the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No. 6715 had never been lost as it
had always been in her custody, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject
matter of LRC Case.

ISSUE: W/N the RTC has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: NONE.
 It is doctrinal that jurisdiction over the nature of the action or subject matter is conferred
by law. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 26 [22] vests the RTC with jurisdiction over the
judicial reconstitution of a lost or destroyed owner's duplicate of the certificate of title.
However, the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the subject matter of LRC Case
No. 04-035 was within the RTC's jurisdiction, being a court of general jurisdiction.
 In a long line of cases,[23] the Court has held that the RTC has no jurisdiction when the
certificate sought to be reconstituted was never lost or destroyed but is in fact in the
possession of another person. In other words, the fact of loss of the duplicate certificate is
jurisdictional.
 Thus, petitioner Coombs' mere allegation that the owner's duplicate copy of TCT No.
7615 was never lost and has in fact always been with her gave rise to a prima facie case
of the RTC's lack of jurisdiction over the proceedings in LRC Case No. 04-035. This is
exactly the situation a petition for annulment of judgment aims to remedy.
THE MUNICIPALITY OF TANGKAL, PROVINCE OF LANAO DEL NORTE, Petitioner,
vs. HON. RASAD B. BALINDONG
G.R. No.193340 | 2017-01-11

FACTS:
 The private respondents, heirs of the late Macalabo Alompo, filed a Complaint with
the Shari'a District Court (SDC) of Marawi City (Shari'a District Court) against the
petitioner, Municipality of Tangkal, for recovery of possession and ownership of a
parcel of land with an area of approximately 25 hectares located at Barangay
Banisilon, Tangkal, Lanao del Norte.
 They alleged that Macalabo was the owner of the land, and that in 1962, he entered
into an agreement with the Municipality of Tangkal allowing the latter to "borrow"
the land to pave the way for the construction of the municipal hall and a health center
building. The agreement allegedly imposed a condition upon the Municipality of
Tangkal to pay the value of the land within 35 years, or until 1997; otherwise,
ownership of the land would revert to Macalabo. Private respondents claimed that the
Municipality of Tangkal neither paid the value of the land within the agreed period
nor returned the land to its owner. Thus, they prayed that the land be returned to them
as successors-in-interest of Macalabo.
 The Municipality of Tangkal filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss on the ground of
improper venue and lack of jurisdiction. It argued that since it has no religious
affiliation and represents no cultural or ethnic tribe, it cannot be considered as a
Muslim under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws. Moreover, since the complaint for
recovery of land is a real action, it should have been filed in the appropriate Regional
Trial Court of Lanao del Norte.
 SDC – denied the motion; held that since the mayor of Tangkal, Abdulazis A.M.
Batingolo, is a Muslim, the case "is an action involving Muslims, hence, the court has
original jurisdiction concurrently with that of regular/civil courts." Hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: W/N the SDC has jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: NONE.
 In determining whether the Shari'a District Court has jurisdiction over the case, the
threshold question is whether both parties are Muslims. The only dispute is whether
the requirement is satisfied because the mayor of the defendant municipality is also a
Muslim.
 When Article 143(2)(b) qualifies the conferment of jurisdiction to actions "wherein
the parties involved are Muslims," the word "parties" necessarily refers to the real
parties in interest. In this case, the parties who will be directly benefited or injured are
the private respondents, as real party plaintiffs, and the Municipality of Tangkal, as
the real party defendant.
 It is clear from the title and the averments in the complaint that Mayor Batingolo was
impleaded only in a representative capacity, as chief executive of the local
government of Tangkal. That Mayor Batingolo is a Muslim is therefore irrelevant for
purposes of complying with the jurisdictional requirement that both parties be
Muslims. To satisfy the requirement, it is the real party defendant, the Municipality of
Tangkal, who must be a Muslim. Such a proposition, however, is a legal
impossibility. It is an elementary principle that a municipality has a personality that is
separate and distinct from its mayor, vice-mayor, sanggunian, and other officers
composing it.[38] And under no circumstances can this corporate veil be pierced on
purely religious considerations-as the Shari'a District Court has done-without running
afoul the inviolability of the separation of Church and State enshrined in the
Constitution.
A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, vs. EMMA MONDEJAR, accompanied by her
husband, EFREN MONDEJAR, Respondent.
G.R. No. 200804 | 2014-01-22

FACTS:
 Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under the Rule of Procedure for Small
Claims Cases before the MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent the amount of
P23,111.71 which represented her unpaid water bills.
 In defense, respondent contended that petitioner unilaterally charged her unreasonable
and excessive adjustments far above the average daily water consumption for a household
of only 3 persons. Left unpaid, petitioner disconnected respondent’s water line.
 MTCC – in favor of respondent; petitioner failed to establish with certainty respondent’s
obligation. Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari Rule 65 to the RTC.
 RTC – dismissed the Certiorari; said petition was only filed to circumvent the non-
appealable nature of small claims cases. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioner properly filed the Certiorari to the RTC.

HELD: YES.
 Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule,
the remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately
move for its execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases
does not preclude the aggrieved party from filing a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court since “the extraordinary writ of certiorari is always
available where there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.”
 The Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari. Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does
not give a party unbridled freedom to choose the venue of his action lest he ran afoul of
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Hence, considering that small claims cases are
exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, certiorari petitions
assailing its dispositions should be filed before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts.
 Remanded to the RTC for proper disposition.

JOSE vs ALFUERTO
Facts:

 The dispute involves a parcel of land registered in the name of Rodolfo Chua Sing under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 52594,3Ï‚rνll with an area of 1919 square meters, located in Barangay
San Dionisio, Paraque City. Chua Sing purchased the land in 1991. On April 1, 1999, Chua Sing
leased the property to the petitioner. Their contract of lease was neither notarized nor registered
with the Paraque City Registry of Deeds.
  That the term of this lease shall be FIVE (5) years and renewable for the same period upon
mutual agreement of the parties to commence upon the total eviction of any occupant or
occupants. The LESSOR hereby transfers all its rights and prerogative to evict said occupants in
favor of the LESSEE which shall be responsible for all expenses that may be incurred without
reimbursement from the LESSOR. It is understood however that the LESSOR is hereby waiving,
in favor of the LESSEE any and all damages that may be recovered from the occupants.
Respondents already occupied the property even before the lease contract was executed.

 On April 28, 1999, soon after Chua Sing and the petitioner signed the lease contract, the
petitioner demanded in writing that the respondents vacate the property within 30 days and that
they pay a monthly rental of P1,000.00 until they fully vacate the property.
 The respondents refused to vacate and to pay rent. On October 20, 1999, the petitioner filed an
ejectment case against the respondents before Branch 77 of the Paraque City MeTC, docketed as
Civil Case No. 11344.
 The petitioner also stated that despite his written demand, the respondents failed to vacate the
property without legal justification. He prayed that the court order the respondents; (1) to vacate
the premises; (2) to pay him not less than P41,000.00 a month from May 30,1999 until they
vacate the premises; and (3) to pay him attorneys fees of no less than P50,000.00, and the costs of
suit.
 In their Answer, the respondents likewise pointed out that they have been in possession of the
land long before Chua Sing acquired the property in 1991, and that the lease contract between the
petitioner and Chua Sing does not affect their right to possess the land. The respondents also
presented a Deed of Assignment,14Ï‚rνll dated February 13, 2000, issued by David R. Dulfo in
their favor. They argued that the MeTC had no jurisdiction over the case as the issue deals with
ownership of the land, and sought the dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action and
for lack of jurisdiction. They also filed a counterclaim for actual and moral damages for the filing
of a baseless and malicious suit.
 MeTC resolved the case in the petitioners favor. MeTC held that the respondents had no right to
possess the land and that their occupation was merely by the owners tolerance. It further noted
that the respondents could no longer raise the issue of ownership, as this issue had already been
settled: the respondents previously filed a case for the annulment/cancellation of Chua Sings title
before the RTC, Branch 260, of Paraque City, which ruled that the registered owners title was
genuine and valid. Moreover, the MeTC held that it is not divested of jurisdiction over the case
because of the respondents assertion of ownership of the property. RTC affirmed the MeTC
decision. March 14, 2005, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC and MeTC decisions.
Issue:  whether an action for unlawful detainer is the proper remedy (na wala daw jurisdiction ang
MeTC)
Held:

Unlawful detainer is a summary action for the recovery of possession of real property. This action may be
filed by a lessor, vendor, vendee, or other person against whom the possession of any land or building is
unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any
contract, express or implied. In unlawful detainer, the possession of the defendant was originally legal, as
his possession was permitted by the plaintiff on account of an express or implied contract between them.
However, the defendants possession became illegal when the plaintiff demanded that the defendant vacate
the subject property due to the expiration or termination of the right to possess under the contract, and the
defendant refused to heed such demand. A case for unlawful detainer must be instituted one year from the
unlawful withholding of possession.25ςrνll

The allegations in the complaint determine both the nature of the action and the jurisdiction of the court.
The complaint must specifically allege the facts constituting unlawful detainer. In the absence of these
allegations of facts, an action for unlawful detainer is not the proper remedy and the municipal trial
court or the MeTC does not have jurisdiction over the case.

In this regard, to give the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant or deforciant on the
land, it is necessary that the complaint must sufficiently show such a statement of facts as to bring the
party clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, without resort to parol
testimony, as these proceedings are summary in nature. In short, the jurisdictional facts must appear on
the face of the complaint. When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful
detainer, as where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the
remedy should either be an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.

In giving recognition to the action of forcible entry and detainer the purpose of the law is to protect the
person who in fact has actual possession; and in case of controverted right, it requires the parties to
preserve the status quo until one or the other of them sees fit to invoke the decision of a court of
competent jurisdiction upon the question of ownership. It is obviously just that the person who has first
acquired possession should remain in possession pending the decision; and the parties cannot be
permitted meanwhile to engage in a petty warfare over the possession of the property which is the subject
of dispute. To permit this would be highly dangerous to individual security and disturbing to social order.
Therefore, where a person supposes himself to be the owner of a piece of property and desires to
vindicate his ownership against the party actually in possession, it is incumbent upon him to institute an
action to this end in a court of competent jurisdiction; and he cannot be permitted, by invading the
property and excluding the actual possessor, to place upon the latter the burden of instituting an action to
try the property right.

Republic vs Espinosa
Facts:

 On October 26, 1955, Cadastral Decree No. N-31626 was issued to Valentina Espinosa
(Espinosa). It covered a 28,880-square meter lot located at Lot No. 3599 of Cadastral Record No.
980, Poblacion, Sipalay City, Negros Occidental (property). On June 17, 1976, Espinosa sold the
property to Leonila B. Caliston (Caliston), who was later issued Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T- 911177 on June 29, 1976.

 On January 13, 2003, the State, represented by the Regional Executive Director of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region VI, Iloilo City, through the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Complaint9 for annulment of title and/or reversion
of land with the RTC, Branch 61 of Kabankalan City, Negros Occidental. The State claimed that
 the property is inalienable public land because it fell within a timberland area indicated under
Project No. 27-C, Block C per Land Classification (LC) Map No. 2978, as certified by the
Director of Forestry on January 17, 1986.10

 The spouses Dioscoro and Estrella Escarda (spouses Escarda) intervened, 11 alleging that they
have been occupying the property since 1976 on the belief that it belongs to the State. 12 They
prayed that Caliston be ordered to cease and desist from ejecting them.

 Caliston countered that the property is not timberland. Invoking laches and prescription, she
argued that her title was issued earlier in 1962, while the map shows that the property was
classified only in 1986.14 Caliston also claimed that the spouses Escarda lacked the capacity or
personality to intervene because only the State may initiate an action for reversion. She also
alleged that the spouses Escarda cannot claim a better right as against her because she merely
tolerated their occupancy of the property until their refusal to vacate it. 15 As counterclaim,
Caliston claimed for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses
against the spouses Escarda for the baseless and malicious complaint.

 Trial court ruled in favor of the State and ordered the reversion of the property to the mass of the
public domain. CA rendered a Decision24 dated July 25, 2008 modifying the RTC Decision. It
upheld the validity of OCT No. 191-N and TCT No. 91117 issued in the names of Espinosa and
Caliston, respectively, and affirmed the award of damages, attorney's fees, and expenses of
litigation in favor of Caliston.

Issue: whether the State has sufficiently proved that the property is part of inalienable forest land at the
time Espinosa was granted the cadastral decree and issued a title.

Held:

The State failed to prove that the property was classified as forest land at the time of the grant of the
cadastral decree and issuance of title to Espinosa.

In land registration proceedings, the applicant has the burden of overcoming the presumption of State
ownership. It must establish, through incontrovertible evidence, that the land sought to be registered is
alienable or disposable based on a positive act of the government. 30 Since cadastral proceedings are
governed by the usual rules of practice, procedure, and evidence, a cadastral decree and a certificate of
title are issued only after the applicant proves all the requisite jurisdictional facts-that they are entitled to
the claimed lot, that all parties are heard, and that evidence is considered. 31 As such, the cadastral
decree is a judgment which adjudicates ownership after proving these jurisdictional facts.

The records show, however, that LC Map No. 2978 was not formally offered in evidence. The rules
require that documentary evidence must be formally offered in evidence after the presentation of
testimonial evidence, and it may be done orally, or if allowed by the court, in writing. 41 Due process
requires a formal offer of evidence for the benefit of the adverse party, the trial court, and the appellate
courts.42 This gives the adverse party the opportunity to examine and oppose the admissibility of the
evidence.43 When evidence has not been formally offered, it should not be considered by the court in
arriving at its decision.44 Not having been offered formally, it was error for the trial court to have
considered the survey map. Consequently, it also erred in ordering the reversion of the property to the
mass of the public domain on the basis of the same.
When the case was brought before this court, we reinstated the trial court's decision. We held that the
photocopy of the land classification map cannot be considered in evidence because it is excluded under
the best evidence rule. We emphasized that all parties, including the Government, are bound by the rules
of admissibility and must comply with it- The rules of admissibility must be applied uniformly. The same
rule holds true when the Government is one of the parties. The Government, when it comes to court to
litigate with one of its citizens, must submit to the rules of procedure and its rights and privileges at every
stage of the proceedings are substantially in every respect the same as those of its citizens; it cannot have
a superior advantage. This is so because when a [sovereign] submits itself to the jurisdiction of the court
and participates therein, its claims and rights are justiciable by every other principle and rule applicable
to the claims and rights of the private parties under similar circumstances. Failure to abide by the rules
on admissibility renders the L.C. Map submitted by respondent inadmissible as proof to show that the
subject lot is part of the forest reserve.

Abagatnan vs Sps. Clarito

Facts:

 The petitioners in the case filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer and Damages against
respondents. Notably, the Complaint alleged that prior barangay conciliation proceedings are not
required as a pre-condition for the filing of the case in court, given that not all petitioners are
residents of Roxas City. Specifically, petitioner Jimmy C. Abagatnan resided in Laguna, while
petitioner Jenalyn A. De Leon resided in Pasig City.
 In their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents argued that prior barangay conciliation is a
mandatory requirement that cannot be dispensed with, considering that Jimmy and Jenalyn had
already executed a Special Power of Attomey in favor of their co-petitioner and sister, Josephine
A. Paree, who is a resident of Roxas City. This matter, however, was not made an issue in the
Pre-Trial Order.
  In its Decision, the MTCC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. RTC denied the appeal for
lack of merit. Among others, it held that the lack of barangay conciliation proceedings cannot be
brought on appeal because it was not made an issue in the Pre-Trial Order. CA ruled that the
findings of fact of both the MTCC and the RTC are supported by the evidence on record.
 Nevertheless, the CA granted the Petition and dismissed the petitioners’ Complaint, albeit
without prejudice, for lack of prior referral to the Katarungang Pambarangay.
 It pointed out that majority of petitioners actually resided in Barangay Cogon, Roxas City, while
the two non-residents of Roxas City already executed an SP A in favor of Josephine, whom they
authorized, among others, to enter into an amicable settlement with respondents. Since
respondents also reside in the same barangay, the dispute between the parties is clearly within the
ambit of the Lupon Tagapamayapa’s authority.
 The CA thus concluded that petitioners’ Complaint had been prematurely filed with the MTCC,
as it should have been first brought before the Lupon for mandatory conciliation to accord the
parties the chance for amicable settlement. Petitioners moved for reconsideration, but the CA
denied the motion in its Resolution. As a consequence, petitioners filed the present Petition for
Review on Certiorari before the Court assailing the CA’s Decision and Resolution.
Issue:

Whether the CA correctly dismissed the Complaint for failure to comply with the
prior barangay conciliation requirement under Section 412 of the LGC, despite the fact that not all real
parties in interest resided in the same city or municipality.

Held:

No. It has been held that the express statutory requirement of actual residency in the LGC pertains
specifically to the real parties in interest in the case. Said requirement cannot be construed to apply to the
attorney-in-fact of the party-plaintiff, as doing so would abrogate the meaning of a “real party in interest”
as defined in Section 2, in relation to Section 3, of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

In Banting v. Spouses Maglapuz, the Court has ruled that “the requirement under Section 412 of the
[LGC] that a case be referred for conciliation before the Lupon as a precondition to its filing in court
applies only to those cases where the real parties-in-interest actually reside in the same city or
municipality.”

Here, the Complaint filed before the MTCC specifically alleged that not all the real parties in interest in
the case actually reside in Roxas City, to wit: Jimmy resided in Poblacion, Siniloan, Laguna, while
Jenalyn resided in Brgy. de La Paz, Pasig City.

As such, the lupon has no jurisdiction over their dispute, and prior referral of the case for barangay
conciliation is not a precondition to its filing in court. The lack of barangay conciliation proceedings
cannot be brought on appeal because it was not included in the Pre-Trial Order

Librada Aquino vs Aure

FACTS:
 Aure and E.S. Aure Lending Investors, Inc. (Aure Lending) filed a Complaint for ejectment
against Aquino before the MeTC of QC. They alleged that they acquired the property from
Aquino thru an Absolute deed of sale.
 Aure claimed that after the spouses Aquino received substantial consideration for the sale of
the subject property, they refused to vacate. Aquino countered that the Complaint lacks COA
because Aure and Aure Lending do not have any legal right over the subject property. As
stated in the MOA that accompanied the sale, Aure shall secure a loan in his own name using
the subject property as collateral and turn over the proceeds thereof to the spouses Aquino.
However, even after Aure successfully secured a loan, the spouses Aquino did not benefited
therefrom.
 MeTC ruled in favor of Aquino and dismissed the Complaint for ejectment of Aure and Aure
Lending for non-compliance with the barangay conciliation process, among other grounds.
The MeTC observed that Aure and Aquino are residents of the same barangay but there is no
showing that any attempt has been made to settle the case amicably at the barangay level.
 Aure appealed to the RTC. The RTC affirmed and stressed that the barangay conciliation
process is a conditio sine qua non for the filing of an ejectment complaint involving residents
of the same barangay, and failure to comply therewith constitutes sufficient cause for the
dismissal of the action
 The CA upon appeal, however, reversed the decision of two courts. It held that the failure of
Aure to subject the matter to barangay conciliation is not a jurisdictional flaw and it will not
affect the sufficiency of Aure’s Complaint since Aquino failed to seasonably raise such issue
in her Answer.
1st ISSUE: WoN non-compliance with the barangay conciliation proceedings is a jurisdictional
defect that warrants the dismissal of the complaint.
RULING:
NO. The barangay justice system was established primarily as a means of easing up the
congestion of cases in the judicial courts. This could be accomplished through a proceeding
before the barangay courts which, according to the conceptor of the system, the late Chief Justice
Fred Ruiz Castro, is essentially arbitration in character, and to make it truly effective, it should
also be compulsory. With this primary objective of the barangay justice system in mind, it would
be wholly in keeping with the underlying philosophy of Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise
known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, and the policy behind it would be better served if
an out-of-court settlement of the case is reached voluntarily by the parties.
It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with the requirement of Section 412
of the Local Government Code on barangay conciliation (previously contained in Section 5 of
Presidential Decree No. 1508) is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies -- the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of pre-maturity; and the
controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial determination. The complaint becomes
vulnerable to a motion to dismiss. Nevertheless, the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional
requirement, so that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has
otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the person of the defendant.
2nd ISSUE: WoN petitioners can question the jurisdiction of the MeTC after having submitted
herself voluntarily thereto.
RULING:
NO. There was utter lack of any objection on her part to any deficiency in the complaint which
could oust the MeTC of its jurisdcition. The fact that Aquino raised such objection during the
pre-trial and in her Position Paper is of no moment, for the issue of non-recourse to barangay
mediation proceedings should be impleaded in her Answer.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide only three instances when the court may motu
proprio dismiss the claim, and that is when the pleadings or evidence on the record show that (1)
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) there is another cause of action pending
between the same parties for the same cause; or (3) where the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by a statute of limitations. Thus, it is clear that a court may not motu proprio
dismiss a case on the ground of failure to comply with the requirement for barangay conciliation,
this ground not being among those mentioned for the dismissal by the trial court of a case on its
own initiative.

CRISANTA ALCARAZ MIGUEL V. JERRY D. MONTANEZ,

G.R. NO. 191336, JANUARY 25, 2012

FACTS:

On February 1, 2001, respondent Jerry Montanez (Montanez) secured a loan of One Hundred
FortyThree Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty-Four Pesos (P143,864.00), payable in one (1) year, or
until February 1, 2002, from the petitioner. The respondent gave as collateral therefor his house
and lot located at Block 39 Lot 39 Phase 3, Palmera Spring, Bagumbong, Caloocan City.

Due to the respondent's failure to pay the loan, the petitioner filed a complaint against the
respondent before the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay San Jose, Rodriguez, Rizal. The
parties entered into a Kasunduang Pag-aayos wherein the respondent agreed to pay his loan in
installments in the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) per month, and in the event the
house and lot given as collateral is sold, the respondent would settle the balance of the loan in
full. However, the respondent still failed to pay, and on December 13, 2004, the Lupong
Tagapamayapa issued a certification to file action in court in favor of the petitioner.

On April 7, 2005, the petitioner filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Makati
City, Branch 66, a complaint for Collection of Sum of Money. In his Answer with Counterclaim,
[3] the respondent raised the defense of improper venue considering that the petitioner was a
resident of Bagumbong, Caloocan City while he lived in San Mateo, Rizal.

ISSUE: Whether or not a complaint for sum of money is the proper remedy for the petitioner,
notwithstanding the Kasunduang Pag-aayos
RULING:

YES. The petitioner contends that the CA erred in ruling that she should have followed the
procedure for enforcement of the amicable settlement as provided in the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, instead of filing a collection case. The petitioner points out that the cause of
action did not arise from the Kasunduang Pag-aayos but on the respondent's breach of the
original loan agreement.

This Court agrees with the petitioner. It is true that an amicable settlement reached at the
barangay conciliation proceedings, like the Kasunduang Pag-aayos in this case, is binding
between the contracting parties and, upon its perfection, is immediately executory insofar as it is
not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public order and public policy. This is in accord
with the broad precept of Article 2037 of the Civil Code, viz: A compromise has upon the parties
the effect and authority of res judicata; but there shall be no execution except in compliance with
a judicial compromise.

Being a by-product of mutual concessions and good faith of the parties, an amicable settlement
has the force and effect of res judicata even if not judicially approved It transcends being a mere
contract binding only upon the parties thereto, and is akin to a judgment that is subject to
execution in accordance with the Rules. Thus, under Section 417 of the Local Government Code,
such amicable settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by execution by the Barangay
Lupon within six (6) months from the date of settlement, or by filing an action to enforce such
settlement in the appropriate city or municipal court, if beyond the six-month period.

Under the first remedy, the proceedings are covered by the Local Government Code and the
Katarungang Pambarangay Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Punong Barangay is called
upon during the hearing to determine solely the fact of non-compliance of the terms of the
settlement and to give the defaulting party another chance at voluntarily complying with his
obligation under the settlement. Under the second remedy, the proceedings are governed by the
Rules of Court, as amended. The cause of action is the amicable settlement itself, which, by
operation of law, has the force and effect of a final judgment.

IRENE SANTE AND REYNALDO SANTE vs.

HON. EDILBERTO T. CLARAVALL, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 60,
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, and VITA N. KALASHIAN

G.R. No. 173915        |       February 22, 2010

FACTS:
Respondent alleged that while she was inside the P.S. of Natividad, Pangasinan, petitioner Irene
uttered words, "How many rounds of sex did you have last night with your boss, Bert? You
fuckin’ bitch!" Bert refers to Albert Gacusan, one of respondent’s personal SGs detained at the
said station and who is a suspect in the killing of petitioners’ relative. Petitioners also allegedly
went around Natividad, telling people that she is protecting and cuddling the suspects in the
aforesaid killing.

Respondent then filed at Baguio RTC a complaint for damages against petitioners, praying that
petitioners be held liable to pay moral damages in the amount of ₱300,000.00; ₱50,000.00 as
exemplary damages; ₱50,000.00 attorney’s fees; ₱20,000.00 litigation expenses; and costs of
suit.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that it was the MTCC and not the RTC of
Baguio, that had jurisdiction over the case. They argued that the amount of the claim for moral
damages was not more than the jurisdictional amount of ₱300,000.00, because the claim for
exemplary damages should be excluded in computing the total claim.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

RTC - denied the motion to dismiss by petitioners.

- held that the total claim of respondent amounted to ₱420,000.00 which was above the
jurisdictional amount for MTCCs outside Metro Manila.

Respondent filed an Amended Complaint increasing the claim for moral damages from
₱300,000.00 to ₱1,000,000.00.

CA - annulled and set aside the ruling of the RTC.

- civil case for damages is ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
- case clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the MTCC as the allegations show that
plaintiff was seeking to recover moral damages in the amount of ₱300,000.00, which
amount was well within the jurisdictional amount of the MTCC.

ISSUE: Did the RTC acquire jurisdiction over the case?

ARGUMENTS:

Petitioner - complaint falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the MTCC because the claim
for moral damages, ₱300,000.00 in the complaint, is the main action. Exemplary
damages being discretionary should not be included in the computation of the
jurisdictional amount. And having no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
 case, RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it allowed the amendment of
the complaint to increase the claim for moral damages to confer jurisdiction.

Respondent - the totality of the claim for damages, including all the other damages alleged
and prayed in the complaint, such as atty’s fees and litigation expenses, should be
included in determining jurisdiction. The total claim being ₱420,000.00, the RTC
has jurisdiction over the complaint.

RULING: YES.

Based on Section 19(8) of BP 129, Section 5 of RA 7691, Supreme Court Circular No. 21-99,
and OCA Circular No. 65-2004, there is no question that at the time of the filing of the complaint
on April 5, 2004, MTCC’s jurisdictional amount has been adjusted to ₱300,000.00.

Administrative Circular No. 09-94 states that the exclusion of the term "damages of whatever
kind" in determining the jurisdictional amount applies to cases where the damages are
merely incidental to or a consequence of the main cause of action. However, in cases where
the claim for damages is the main cause of action, or one of the causes of action, the amount of
such claim shall be considered in determining the jurisdiction of the court.

The instant case is for the recovery of damages for the alleged malicious acts of petitioners. The
complaint sought an award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees and
litigation expenses. It is settled that jurisdiction is conferred by law based on the facts alleged in
the complaint since the latter comprises a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff’s causes of action. It is clear, based on the allegations of the complaint, that
respondent’s main action is for damages. Hence, the other forms of damages being claimed by
respondent, e.g., exemplary damages, atty’s fees and litigation expenses, are not merely
incidental to or consequences of the main action but constitute the primary relief prayed for in
the complaint.

Considering that the total amount of damages claimed was ₱420,000.00, the Court of
Appeals was correct in ruling that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case.

We find no error on CA in affirming RTC’s order allowing the amendment from 300k to 1M.
While it is basic that an amendment cannot be allowed when the court has no jurisdiction and
the purpose of the amendment is to confer jurisdiction on the court, RTC clearly had jurisdiction
over the original complaint and amendment of the complaint was then still a matter of right.

[G.R. NO. 174414 : March 14, 2008]

ELMER F. GOMEZ, Petitioner, v. MA. LITA A. MONTALBAN, Respondent.

Facts:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse (1) the Order1 dated 20 June 2006 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 13, which granted herein respondent Ma.
Lita A. Montalban's Petition for Relief from Judgment and dismissed Civil Case No. 29,717-03
for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner filed a Complaint with the RTC for a sum of money, damages and payment of
attorney's fees against respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 29,717-03.

The Petitioner is trying to collect a loan from the respondent amounting to 40,000+ interest.

The RTC ruled in favour of Gomez to wherein Montalban filed a Petition for Relief from
Judgment6 alleging that there was no effective service of summons upon her since there was no
personal service of the same.

Respondent also claimed that RTC had no jurisdiction as the principal amount being claimed by
petitioner was only P40,000.00, an amount falling within the jurisdiction of the MTC.

The RTC granted Gomez’s Petition for Relief. Hence, this present petition filed directly before
the SC.

The Petitioner raised the issue on Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over
this case for sum of money, damages and attorney's fees where the principal amount of the
obligation is P40,000.00 but the amount of the demand per allegation of the complaint
is P238,000.00, for the consideration of SC

Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over this case for sum of money,
damages and attorney's fees where the principal amount of the obligation is P40,000.00 but the
amount of the demand per allegation of the complaint is P238,000.00

Ruling:

The Court gleans from the foregoing that petitioner's cause of action is the respondent's violation
of their loan agreement. In that loan agreement, respondent expressly agreed to pay the principal
amount of the loan, plus 15% monthly interest. Consequently, petitioner is claiming and praying
for in his Complaint the total amount of P238,000.00, already inclusive of the interest on the loan
which had accrued from 1998. Since the interest on the loan is a primary and inseparable
component of the cause of action, not merely incidental thereto, and already determinable at the
time of filing of the Complaint, it must be included in the determination of which court has the
jurisdiction over petitioner's case. Using as basis the P238,000.00 amount being claimed by
petitioner from respondent for payment of the principal loan and interest, this Court finds that it
is well within the jurisdictional amount fixed by law for RTCs. To this Court, it is irrelevant that
during the course of the trial, it was proven that respondent is only liable to petitioner for the
amount of P40,000.00 representing the principal amount of the loan; P57,000.00 as interest
thereon at the rate of 24% per annum reckoned from 26 August 1998 until the present;
and P15,000.00 as attorney's fees. Contrary to respondent's contention, jurisdiction can neither be
made to depend on the amount ultimately substantiated in the course of the trial or proceedings
nor be affected by proof showing that the claimant is entitled to recover a sum in excess of the
jurisdictional amount fixed by law. Jurisdiction is determined by the cause of action as alleged in
the complaint and not by the amount ultimately substantiated and awarded.

Basic as a hornbook principle is that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is
conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a
concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The
nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined
based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether
or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The
averments in the complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be
consulted. Once vested by the allegations in the complaint, jurisdiction also remains vested
irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein.