Doctrines:

 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction
has initially been lodged in an administrative body of special competence, such as the DARAB, which has
jurisdiction over agrarian reform cases.
 A tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the tenant to security of tenure; mere failure of a tenant to pay
the landholder’s share does not necessarily give the latter the right to eject the former when there is lack of
deliberate intent on the part of the tenant to pay.

Sta. Ana vs. Carpo, G.R. No. 164340, November 28, 2008.
NACHURA, J.:

FACTS:
The case is a.
 Respondent Leon Carpo (Leon) and his brother, Francisco Carpo are the registered owners of a
parcel of land in Laguna. Out of the whole land, 3.5 hectares was owned by Leon and his wife,
Aurora Carpo. As it was devoted to rice and corn production, it was tenanted by Domingo Pastolero
(Domingo), the husband of Adoracion, who together with their son, Elpidio assumed the tenancy
rights of Domingo when the latter passed away. They however then decided to transfer their
tenancy rights to petitioner Otilia Sta. Ana, and her husband Marciano dela Cruz, for a
consideration of P72,500.
 At the outset, the parties had a harmonious relationship, however this turned sour, thus compelling
the parties to have the DAR to mediate and settle the controversy. Apparently, the respondents
alleged that they agreed with petitioners to increase the lease rentals from 36 to 45 cavans of
palay, and if respondents wanted to repossess the property, the tenants (petitioners) would only
need to pay them P72,500 (which is the same amount they paid to Adoracion). Respondents also
further alleged that despite repeated demands, petitioner refused to pay the actual rentals from
July 1985 to September 1989. Thus because of non-payment, the respondents filed a complaint for
Ejectment and to order the payment of P75,016.00 as unpaid rentals.
 On the other hand, the petitioners denied that there was any agreement to increase the rentals,
claiming that their agreement was still the 36 cavans, once or twice a year depending on the
availability of irrigation water; neither was there also an agreement as to the future surrender of
the land in favor of the respondents. The petitioners further claimed that they did not refuse to pay
rentals, as they sent written and verbal notices to respondents. And because respondents did not
respond, petitioner and her husband were compelled to sell the harvest and deposit the proceeds in
the bank, under a savings account opened under the names of Leon and petitioner’s husband
Marciano. Petitioner claimed that since Marciano was named as a farmer-beneficiary of the land
pursuant to P.D. 27 (or the Emancipation of all tenant farmers - law), they also contended in this
petition that the complaint for ejection be dismissed and that Marciano be declared as owner of the
subject land.
 The PARAD in its decision, ruled in favor of the respondents, and held that since petitioner and
Mariano intentionally defaulted in their payments – it ordered the ejectment of Sta. Ana and
Marciano; to surrender possession/cultivation of the subject land; payment of the unpaid rentals,
as well as, declaring that the subject land as not covered by Presidential Decree No. 27, Republic
Act [No.] 6657, and Executive Order No. 228, thus exempted from the Agrarian Reform coverage.
On appeal to the DARAB, however, it ruled that defendant/petitioners cannot be validly oustered or
ejected as farmer-tenants, as there was no willful or deliberate intent on their part not to pay the
lease rentals. Hence, it ordered the MARO to assist the parties in the proper accounting of lease
rentals, so the parties could reach a payment arrangement.
 Aggrieved by the ruling, the respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which ruled in
their favor and affirmed the rulings of the PARAD. It held that the non-payments of the rentals by
petitioners were motivated by bad faith, hence there was valid grounds to eject the latter.
Moreover, the CA also held that also held that the subject land had already become a residential,
commercial and industrial area based on the vicinity map showing that the land was surrounded by
commercial and industrial establishments.
 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was denied, hence the present petition.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not PARAD and the CA erred in ruling that the subject land had become
residential/industrial/commercial, thus removing it from the coverage of the P.D. No.
27, RA 6657 and EO 228.
2. Whether or not there was valid grounds to eject petitioners from the subject land, in
view of in not coming under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL).

RULING:
1. Yes. The SC held that the PARAD acted without jurisdiction when it held that the subject land was no
longer covered by our agrarian laws because of the retention rights of the respondents. The CA
likewise acted without jurisdiction when it ruled that the land had become non-agricultural based on a
zoning ordinance of 1981—on the strength of a mere vicinity map. These rulings violated the doctrine
By Alena Icao-Anotado pg. 1
Doctrines:
 The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction
has initially been lodged in an administrative body of special competence, such as the DARAB, which has
jurisdiction over agrarian reform cases.
 A tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the tenant to security of tenure; mere failure of a tenant to pay
the landholder’s share does not necessarily give the latter the right to eject the former when there is lack of
deliberate intent on the part of the tenant to pay.

of primary jurisdiction. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a
controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged in an administrative body of special
competence; For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB).

Since there is an established tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents in this case and
in this case, an action for Ejectment for Non-Payment of lease rentals is clearly an agrarian dispute,
cognizable at the initial stage by the PARAD and thereafter by the DARAB. But issues with respect
to the retention rights of the respondents as landowners and the exclusion/exemption of
the subject land from the coverage of agrarian reform are issues not cognizable by the
PARAD and the DARAB, but by the DAR Secretary because, as aforementioned, the same are
Agrarian Law Implementation (ALI) Cases.

Thus, the court precluded itself from ruling on the issue on tenancy and on issues on retention and
exclusion/exemption from agrarian reform coverage, since it is the DAR Secretary which has authority
to rule on that matter and possesses the necessary expertise on the matter.

2. No. Under the Tenancy Law, or Section 37 of Republic Act No. 3844: A tenancy relationship, once
established, entitles the tenant to security of tenure. Thus, petitioner can only be ejected from the
agricultural landholding on grounds provided by law. Since the complainants here are the
respondents, then burden of proof to show the existence of a lawful cause for the ejectment of the
petitioner as an agricultural lessee rests upon the respondents as agricultural lessors. Therefore, as
provided under the law, respondents failed to discharge such burden. The agricultural tenant’s
failure to pay the lease rentals must be willful and deliberate in order to warrant his
dispossession of the land that he tills. Petitioner’s counsel opines that there appears to be no
decision by this Court on the matter; he thus submits that we should use the CA decision in Cabero v.
Caturna. This is not correct. In an En Banc Decision by this Court in Roxas y Cia v. Cabatuando, et al.,
we held that under our law and jurisprudence, mere failure of a tenant to pay the landholder’s
share does not necessarily give the latter the right to eject the former when there is lack of
deliberate intent on the part of the tenant to pay. This ruling has not been overturned.

By Alena Icao-Anotado pg. 2