Doctrines:


Doctrines:
 A special proceeding as “a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact”; In a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to
be duly recognized as among the decedent’s heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and
liquidation of the estate of the decedent.
 Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party.

Montañer vs. Shari’a District Court, G.R. No. 174975, January 20, 2009
PUNO, C.J.:

FACTS:
This case is a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition which sought to set aside the orders of the Shari’a District Court of
Marawi. The facts of the case were as follows:
 In August 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montañer married Alejandro Montañer, Sr. in Catholic rites in Cubao, Quezon
City, thus they had children, who are the other petitioners in this case, namely: Alejandro Montañer, Jr., Lillibeth
Montañer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montañer-Dalupan. But when Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died in May 1995,
private respondents, Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S. Montañer, both Muslims, filed a
“Complaint” for the judicial partition of properties of Alejandro Sr., before the Shari’a District Court on August 19,
2005. The complaint was entitled “Almahleen Liling S. Montañer and Liling M. Disangcopan v. the Estates and
Properties of Late Alejandro Montañer, Sr., Luisa Kho Montañer, Lillibeth K. Montañer, Alejandro Kho Montañer,
Jr., and Rhodora Eleanor K. Montañer,” and docketed as “Special Civil Action No. 7-05.”
 So the respondents alleged in their complaint that Alejandro Sr. was a Muslim, and that they were the first family
of the decedent, and that Liling was the first wife/widow of Alejandro Sr. and Almahleen was their daughter. And
so they prayed for the partition of the properties of the decedent in recognition of their rights as heirs of
Alejandro.
 Consequently, petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss and alleged that the Shari’a District Court had no jurisdiction
over the estate of the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr., because he was Catholic, among other issues. The Motion to
Dismiss was granted by the Shari’a District Court, so this prompted respondents to file a Motion for
Reconsideration. The petitioners thereafter opposed the Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied by
the Shari’a District Court. So the petitioners sought recourse before the Supreme Court.
 Petitioners filed this petition before the Supreme Court and raised several issues, namely that the Shari’a District
Court of Marawi lacked jurisdiction over the case for the following reasons and issues:
1. The respondent Court lacked jurisdiction over the Settlement of the Estate of the deceased because the latter
is not a Muslim.
2. Respondent Court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the the estate and properties of the deceased
because the estate of the decedent, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. was not a natural or juridical person
and therefore did not have the capacity to be sued.
3. Respondent Court also did not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint because private respondents failed to
pay the filing and docketing fees.
 Petitioners further also argue that the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction because:
4. The respondent court’s grant of the respondents’ motion for reconsideration was fatally defective since it
lacked a “notice of hearing”.
5. The respondent court set the case for trial when it was evident that Almalheen Liling Montañer’s cause of
action to seek recognition as an heir or daughter of the deceased has already prescribed.
Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the petition has merit based on the abovementioned issues?

RULING:
NO.
1. The Court ruled that jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and its subject matter does not depend
upon the defenses set forth in an answer or a motion to dismiss. In the case at bar, the Shari’a District Court is
not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the deceased is not
a Muslim.

2. As to the second issue, the Court explained here that petitioner’s argument that the proceeding before the Shari’a
District Court is an “ordinary civil action” against a deceased person, is an erroneous understanding of the
proceeding filed before the court. The Court attributed the confusion before the proceeding Shari’a District Court,
because the parties were designated as “plaintiffs” or “defendants” and the case was denominated as a “special
civil action.” However, the proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special
proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as “a remedy by
which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.” In a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, what the applicants seek is to establish the fact of
death of the decedent and later be duly recognized as among the decedent’s heirs, which would allow them to
exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent. In this case, the
respondents indeed sought to establish the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death and, subsequently, for
Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as among his heirs.

The court held that petitioner’s argument that the decedent or his estate was prohibited from being a party
defendant in a special civil action, and thus applicable to a special proceeding-- was erroneous or misplaced.
Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse
party. The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this
Case Digest by: Alena Icao-Anotado pg. 1
Doctrines:

difference. A civil action, in which “a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong” necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or
defendant. On the other hand, a special proceeding, “by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a
particular fact,” has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular
fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is
not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the
estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities, and to distribute
the residual to those entitled to the same.

3. As to the lack of payment of docket fees, the SC held that if the party filing the case paid less than the correct
amount for the docket fees because that was the amount assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of
making a deficiency assessment lies with the same clerk of court—the lower court concerned will not automatically
lose jurisdiction, because of a party’s reliance on the clerk of court’s insufficient assessment of the docket fees.

4. As to the argument of the petitioners that the motion for reconsideration was defective for lack of notice of
hearing, the Supreme Court has upheld a liberal construction specifically of the rules of notice of hearing in cases
where “a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice. This is especially if a party
successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its
face or from the recitals contained therein”; To sanction a situation denying the Shari’a District Court of an
opportunity to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent
alleged to be a Muslim because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a miscarriage of justice.

Moreover, the SC held that a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing must be applied in this case,
because the rights of petitioners were not affected. In probate proceedings, what the law prohibits is not the
absence of a previous notice of hearing, but the absolute lack thereof and thus the lack of opportunity to be
heard. In this case, the petitioners were able to receive a copy of the motion for reconsideration in question. Thus
they were indeed not denied an opportunity to be heard, as they were even able to object to the motion.

5. Lastly, as to petitioner’s argument regarding the right of Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as among
the heirs of decedent, the SC held that said issue was yet premature because the Shari’a District Court has not
yet determined whether it has jurisdiction to settle the estate of the decedent. Where there is a special
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a decedent that is pending, questions regarding heirship, including
prescription in relation to recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said proceeding.

Thus in view of the foregoing, the Supreme Court moved to deny the petition and affirm the orders of the Shari’a
District Court.

Case Digest by: Alena Icao-Anotado pg. 2