Digested Cases in Remedial Law Review (Special Proceedings)

Submitted by:
Maycil Ambag-Atanacio
Refresher

Rule 72

LUISA KHO MONTAÑER, ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAÑER-

BARRIOS, AND RHODORA ELEANOR MONTAÑER-DALUPAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI
CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S.
MONTAÑER, Respondents.

The facts of the case are as follows:

On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died.

He was married to Luisa Kho Montañer, a Roman Catholic. at the Immaculate

Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City. They have children named Alejandro
Montañer, Jr., Lillibeth Montañer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montañer-Dalupan
who are petitioners.

On the other hand, Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S.
Montañer, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties
before the Shari’a District Court who alleged that they are also the heirs of Montañer,
Sr.In the said complaint, they made the following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro
Montañer, Sr. died; (2) the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3) petitioners are
the first family of the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent; (5)
Almahleen Liling S. Montañer is the daughter of the decedent; and (6) the estimated
value of and a list of the properties comprising the estate of the decedent. Private
respondents prayed for the Shari’a District Court to order, among others, the following:
(1) the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an
administrator for the estate of the decedent.

Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds:
(1) the Shari’a District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro
Montañer, Sr., because he was a Roman Catholic; (2) private respondents failed to pay
the correct amount of docket fees; and (3) private respondents’ complaint is barred by
prescription, as it seeks to establish filiation between Almahleen Liling S. Montañer and
the decedent, pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.

The issues are:

 1. Whether or not Shari’a District Court – Marawi City has jurisdiction over
petitioners who are roman catholics and non-muslims.
2. Whether or not Shari’a District Court – Marawi City acquire jurisdiction over
"the estates and properties of the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr." which is not a
natural or juridical person with capacity to be sued.
3. Whether or not Shari’a District Court – Marawi City acquire jurisdiction over
the complaint of private respondents against petitioners due to non-payment of
the filing and docketing fees.

4. Whether or not Shari’a District Court – Marawi committed grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it denied the opposition of
petitioners and then granted the motion for reconsideration of respondents
Liling Disangcopan, Et Al. which was fatally defective for lack of a "notice of
hearing."

 In the case at bar, the Shari’a District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply
because petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim.
The Shari’a District Court has the authority to hear and receive evidence to determine
whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination that the deceased
is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Shari’a District Court determines that the deceased was
not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim. In a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants seek to establish
the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedent’s
heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and
liquidation of the estate of the decedent. Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact
of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death and, subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen
Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.

Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a
party defendant in a civil action applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of
the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse
parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party.

The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules
illustrate this difference.

A civil action, in which "a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a
right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" necessarily has definite adverse parties,
who are either the plaintiff or defendant.
On the other hand, a special proceeding, "by which a party seeks to establish a status,
right, or a particular fact," has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a
declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case
at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause
of action.

As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to
determine all the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities, and to distribute the residual to
those entitled to the same.

Petitioners’ third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired for non-payment
of docket fees, is untenable. Petitioners point to private respondents’ petition in the
proceeding before the court a quo, which contains an allegation estimating the
decedent’s estate as the basis for the conclusion that what private respondents paid as
docket fees was insufficient. Petitioners’ argument essentially involves two aspects: (1)
whether the clerk of court correctly assessed the docket fees; and (2) whether private
respondents paid the correct assessment of the docket fees.

Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees
vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter. If the party filing the case
paid less than the correct amount for the docket fees because that was the amount
assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment lies
with the same clerk of court.

In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of court’s assessment of the
docket fees. Moreover, the records do not include this assessment. There can be no
determination of whether private respondents correctly paid the docket fees without the
clerk of court’s assessment.

As to the fourth issue: that private respondents’ motion for reconsideration before the
Shari’a District Court is defective for lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as the unique
circumstances in the present case constitute an exception to this requirement. The Court
considers that "no party can even claim a vested right in technicalities," and for this
reason, cases should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits rather than on
technicalities.

The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Shari’a District Court of an
opportunity to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of
the estate of a decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a
court to control its process to ensure conformity with the law and justice. To sanction
such a situation simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will result
in a miscarriage of justice.
In probate proceedings, "what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice,
but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard." In the case at bar,
as evident from the Shari’a District Court’s order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners’
counsel received a copy of the motion for reconsideration in question. Petitioners were
certainly not denied an opportunity to study the arguments in the said motion as they
filed an opposition to the same. Since the Shari’a District Court reset the hearing for the
motion for reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the
opportunity to object to the said motion in a hearing. Taken together, these
circumstances show that the purpose for the rules of notice of hearing, procedural
process, was duly observed.

As to the issue of Prescription and Filiation, it is premature. Again, the Shari’a District
Court has not yet determined whether it has jurisdiction to settle the estate of the
decedent. In the event that a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a
decedent is pending, questions regarding heirship, including prescription in relation to
recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said proceeding. The court,
in its capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the
decedent.

In the case at bar, the determination of the heirs of the decedent depends on an
affirmative answer to the question of whether the Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction
over the estate of the decedent.

Principle:

Special Proceeding has no definite adverse party.

ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, PETITIONER, VS. ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER,

VICTORIA S. MEDINA-ADMINISTRATRIX, RESPONDENT.

Facts:

The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter
issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the estate.

Allan Joseph Sheker filed a contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting
to approximately P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land
belonging to the estate of Alice Sheker, and the amount of P275,000.00, as
reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course
of negotiating the sale.
The executrix moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the
grounds that:
(1) the requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court, had not been paid;
(2) petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and (3)
petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not
filed and served personally.

Regional Trial Clourt issued an Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim.

Petitioner's filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied .

The issues are:

(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a certification
against non-forum shopping, failing which such claim should be dismissed?

(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate proceeding be dismissed
for failing to pay the docket fees at the time of its filing thereat?

(c) must a contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because of its
failure to contain a written explanation on the service and filing by registered mail?

No. A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of
the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even
institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's
contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a
certification against non-forum shopping.

On the issue of filing fees, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the
estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim against the estate.

"As [Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court] requires, service and filing of
pleadings must be done personally whenever practicable. The court notes that
in the present case, personal service would not be practicable. Considering the
distance between the Court of Appeals and Donsol, Sorsogon where the
petition was posted, clearly, service by registered mail [sic] would have
entailed considerable time, effort and expense. A written explanation why
service was not done personally might have been superfluous. In any case, as
the rule is so worded with the use of "may", signifying permissiveness, a
violation thereof gives the court discretion whether or not to consider the paper
as not filed. While it is true that procedural rules are necessary to secure an
orderly and speedy administration of justice, rigid application of Section 11,
 Rule 13 may be relaxed in this case in the interest of substantial
justice. (Emphasis and italics supplied)

In the case at bar, the address of respondent's counsel is Lopez, Quezon, while petitioner
Sonia's counsel's is Lucena City. Lopez, Quezon is 83 kilometers away from Lucena City.
Such distance makes personal service impracticable.

This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing
the executor or administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine
each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. The
plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the
deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. The
law strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the
decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its
debts and distribute the residue. (Emphasis supplied)

The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the
requirement of a written explanation for non-personal service, again in the interest of
substantial justice.

Principle:

Provision of the Rules of Court, non-forum shopping, non-personal service and non-
filing of docket fee will not obstruct the determination of estate.

ALFREDO HILADO v. CA, GR No. 164108, 2009-05-08

Facts:

Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, Julita
Campos Benedicto who is the administratrix of his estate, and his only daughter,
Francisca Benedicto-Paulino. There were two pending civil cases against Benedicto were
filed with the RTC of Manila. One is a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration favor of Julita . RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as
administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of
administration in her favor. In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private
respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims
then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.

RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and
appraisal, report pertaining to the estate. She then filed with the Manila RTC a
Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,praying that they be furnished with copies
of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings.
RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners
are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in
the intestate proceedings.

Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the petition and declaring that the
Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in
the intestate proceedings.

Issues:

1. Whether or not lower courts erred in denying them the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto.

Ruling:

Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has
a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or
other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x"

While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from
intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal
interest required of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and immediate,
and not simply contingent and expectant.

The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings
under the Rules of Court not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further
provides that "[i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary
actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings."
notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not
extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The
definition of "intervention" under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent
claims. Even if were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance
with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had
sought before the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.

Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real
or personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to...
recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against the executor or administrator."

Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a
decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their
favor, the estate of the decedent would have already been distributed, or diminished to
the extent that the judgment could no longer be enforced against it.

While there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be
allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided
for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in
the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be
protected.

Petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in connection
with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of the
estate... running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies should
their interests be compromised.

Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate

proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court
processes and pleadings upon them.

We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform
either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the
party... entitled to do so.

Wherefore, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct.

Principle:

The court does not yet determine if there is a collectible in the estate of the decedent.
Thus, contingent claim asks in the intervention is not meritorious. Intervention is
allowed if it is actual, direct and immediate.

Rule 73

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON v. MA. LOURDES BELEN, GR No. 189121, 2013-07-31

Facts:

This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo
Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by Eliseo's common-law wife and daughter.  The petition was
opposed by Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married.  Amelia was
joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon
(Jennifer).

Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother,
Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.

Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the
time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other.  Insisting on the legal
capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo's marriage
to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the
subsistence of the latter's marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito).  To prove her
filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of
Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her
children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by
filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. The petitioners asserted that as shown by his
Death Certificate,Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the
time of his death.  Hence, the petition for settlement of decedent's estate should have
been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City.

RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the
necessary bond.  The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in
Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo's
last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay.

Court of appeals affirms the trial court decision in toto in the 28 November 2008.

It held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband
and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar
Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo's death in 1992.  For purposes
of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseo's estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the
conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court Of Appeals gravely erred in affirming that Eliseo Quiazon was
a resident of Las Piñas and therefore [,] the Petition For Letters of Administration was
properly filed with the [RTC] of Las Piñas

Ruling:

Yes. We find the petition bereft of merit.

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration
of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent
resides at the time of his death.

To further explain, we make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile"
but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the
same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of
a person, actual residence or place of abode.

As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more
than a person's actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for
affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo
was properly laid in Las Piñas City.  It is evident from the records that during his
lifetime. Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas
City.  For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said
city.

Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners' contention that Elise has not
shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who
are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration.

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the
distribution of Eliseo's estate, is deemed to be an interested party.  With the
overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the
petitioners' pounding... on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent's
estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court
of Appeals.  Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of
Eliseo is on good grounds.  It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under
the law, is entitled to her legitime after the debts of the estate are satisfied. Having a
vested right in the distribution of Eliseo's estate as one of his natural children, Elise can
rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.

Principle:

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.

Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship
with the decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.

NICETO G. SALUDO v. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, GR NO. 159507,

2006-04-19

Facts:

Aniceto G. Saludo, Jr. filed a complaint for damages against American express
international (AMEX) with the RTC of Maasin City, Southern Leyte.

He alleges that he is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, and a member of the House of
Representatives and a resident of Ichon, Macrohon, Southern Leyte, Philippines.

The complaint's cause of action stemmed from the alleged wrongful dishonor of
petitioner Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary card issued to his
daughter.

The dishonor of these AMEX credit cards were allegedly unjustified as they resulted
from respondents' unilateral act of suspending petitioner Saludo's account for his failure
to pay its balance.
Petitioner Saludo denied having received the corresponding statement of account. He
was allegedly wrongfully charged for late payment. Hence, his credit card and its
supplementary cards were canceled.

In their answer, AMEX specifically denied the allegations in the complaint. Further,
they raised the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action and improper venue
because none of the parties was a resident of Leyte.

RTC denied the affirmative defenses interposed by respondents. It filed its motion for
reconsideration. However, the same was also denied.

The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting respondents' petition for
certiorari as it found that venue was improperly laid.

The appellate court explained that the action filed by petitioner Saludo against
respondents is governed by Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. The said rule on
venue of personal actions basically provides that personal actions may be commenced
and tried where plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where defendant or
any of the principal defendants resides, at the election of plaintiff.

Venue was improperly laid in the RTC, according to the appellate court, because not one
of the parties was a resident of Southern Leyte.

For purposes of venue, the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical
habitation, or his actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his
legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.

Saludo filed a motion for reconsideration but CA denied the same. Thus, it reaches the
Supreme Court.

Issues:

whether the CA committed reversible error in holding that venue was improperly laid in
the court because not one of the parties were a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of
filing of the complaint.

Ruling:

Yes, the appellate court committed reversible error in finding that petitioner Saludo was
not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the filing of his complaint. The term
"resides" as employed in the rule on venue on personal actions means the place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary, of the plaintiff or the defendant, as
distinguished from "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
when absent, one has the intention of returning.

Petitioner Saludo's complaint for damages against respondents before the court a quo is
a personal action.
The option of plaintiff in personal actions cognizable by the RTC is either the place
where defendant resides or may be found, or the place where plaintiff resides. If plaintiff
opts for the latter, he is limited to that place.

A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an
unlimited time.

Since petitioner Saludo, as congressman or the lone representative of the district of

Southern Leyte, had his residence (or domicile) therein as the term is construed in
relation to election laws, necessarily, he is also deemed to have had his residence therein
for purposes of venue for filing personal actions.

This is because "residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the
intention to remain for an unlimited time" following the definition of the term
"residence" for purposes of election law, petitioner Saludo not only had the intention to
reside in Southern Leyte, but he also had personal presence therein, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention.

The latter element, or his bodily presence as an inhabitant in Southern Leyte, was
sufficient for Saludo to be considered a resident therein for purposes of venue.

The fact then that petitioner Saludo's community tax certificate was issued at Pasay City
is of no moment because granting arguendo that he could be considered a resident
therein, the same does not preclude his having a residence in Southern Leyte for
purposes of venue.

Principle:

A man can have but one domicile for one and the same purpose at any time, but he may
have numerous places of residence.

Rule 74

AVELINA ABARIENTOS REBUSQUILLO [substituted by her heirs, except Emelinda R.

Gualvez] and SALVADOR A. OROSCO, Petitioners,
vs. SPS. DOMINGO and EMELINDA REBUSQUILLO GUALVEZ and the CITY
ASSESSOR OF LEGAZPI CITY, Respondents.

The antecedent facts may be summarized as follows:

On October 26, 2004, petitioners Avelina Abarientos Rebusquillo (Avelina) and

Salvador Orosco (Salvador) filed a Complaint for annulment and revocation of an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication dated December 4, 2001 and a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated February 6, 2002 before the court a quo.
they alleged that Avelina was one of the children of Eulalio Abarientos (Eulalio) and
Victoria Villareal (Victoria). Eulalio died intestate on July 3, 1964, survived by his wife
Victoria, six legitimate children, and one illegitimate child, namely: (1) Avelina
Abarientos-Rebusquillo, petitioner in this case; (2) Fortunata Abarientos-Orosco, the
mother of petitioner Salvador; (3) Rosalino Abarientos; (4) Juan Abarientos; (5)
Feliciano Abarientos; (6) Abraham Abarientos; and (7) Carlos Abarientos. His wife
Victoria eventually died intestate on June 30, 1983.

On his death, Eulalio left behind an untitled parcel of land in Legazpi City consisting of
two thousand eight hundred sixty-nine(2,869) square meters, more or less .

In 2001, Avelina was supposedly made to sign two (2) documents by her daughter
Emelinda Rebusquillo-Gualvez (Emelinda) and her son-in-law Domingo Gualvez
(Domingo), on the pretext that the documents were needed to facilitate the titling of the
lot. It was only in 2003that Avelina realized that what she signed was an Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication and a Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of respondents.

As respondents purportedly ignored her when she tried to talk to them, Avelina sought
the intervention of the RTC to declare null and void the two (2) documents in order to
reinstate TD0141 and so correct the injustice done to the other heirs of Eulalio.

In their answer, respondents admitted that the execution of the Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication and the Deed of Sale was intended to facilitate the titling of the subject
property.

the RTC rendered its Decision annulling the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed
of Absolute Sale executed by Avelina on the grounds that (1) with regard to the Affidavit
of Self-Adjudication, she was not the sole heir of her parents and was not therefore
solely entitled to their estate; and (2) in the case of the Deed of Absolute Sale, Avelina
did not really intend to sell her share in the property as it was only executed to facilitate
the titling of such property.

Assailing the trial court’s decision, respondents interposed an appeal with the CA
arguing that the Deed of Sale cannot be annulled being a public document that has for
its object the creation and transmission of real rights over the immovable subject
property. The fact that Avelina’s testimony was not offered in evidence, so respondents
argued, the signature on the adverted deed remains as concrete proof of her agreement
to its terms. Lastly, respondents contended that the Complaint filed by petitioners
Avelina and Salvador before the RTC is not the proper remedy provided by law for those
compulsory heirs unlawfully deprived of their inheritance.

Pending the resolution of respondents’ appeal, Avelina died intestate on September 1,

2009 leaving behind several living heirs5 including respondent Emelinda.
The Court of appeals granted the appeal and reversed and set aside the Decision of the
RTC. The CA held that the RTC erred in annulling the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication
simply on petitioners’ allegation of the existence of the heirs of Eulalio, considering that
issues on heirship must be made in administration or intestate proceedings, not in an
ordinary civil action. Further, the appellate court observed that the Deed of Absolute
Sale cannot be nullified as it is a notarized document that has in its favor the
presumption of regularity and is entitled to full faith and credit upon its face.

Aggrieved, Avelina as substituted by her heirs except respondent Emelinda, and

petitioner Salvador are now before this Court ascribing reversible error on the part of
the appellate court.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in its Decision.

Yes. We find merit in the instant petition. The Ruling of the RTC is reinstated.

It has indeed been ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special
proceeding, not in an independent civil action. However, this Court had likewise held
that recourse to administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is sanctioned
only if there is a good and compelling reason for such recourse. Hence, the Court had
allowed exceptions to the rule requiring administration proceedings as when the parties
in the civil case already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the
RTC had consequently rendered judgment upon the issues it defined during the pre-
trial.

In the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the
contending parties as the inheritance from Eulalio. It would be more practical, to
dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of
petitioner Avelina as sole heir of Eulalio, especially in light of the fact that respondents
spouses Gualvez admitted in court that they knew for a fact that petitioner Avelina was
not the sole heir of Eulalio and that petitioner Salvador was one of the other living heirs
with rights over the subject land.

As confirmed by the RTC in its Decision, respondents have stipulated and have thereby
admitted the

In light of the admission of respondents’ spouses Gualvez, it is with more reason that a
resort to special proceeding will be but an unnecessary superfluity.

Accordingly, the court a quo had properly rendered judgment on the validity of the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Avelina. As pointed out by the trial court, an
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only proper when the affiant is the sole heir of the
decedent.
As admitted by respondents, Avelina was not the sole heir of Eulalio. In fact, as admitted
by respondents, petitioner Salvador is one of the co-heirs by right of representation of
his mother. Without a doubt, Avelina had perjured herself when she declared in the
affidavit that she is "the only daughter and sole heir of spouses EULALIO ABARIENTOS
AND VICTORIA VILLAREAL." The falsity of this claim renders her act of adjudicating
to herself the inheritance left by her father invalid.

The RTC did not, therefore, err in granting Avelina’s prayer to declare the affidavit null
and void and so correct the wrong she has committed.

In like manner, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Avelina in favor of respondents
was correctly nullified and voided by the RTC. Avelina was not in the right position to
sell and transfer the absolute ownership of the subject property to respondents. As she
was not the sole heir of Eulalio and her Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is void, the subject
property is still subject to partition. Avelina, in fine, did not have the absolute ownership
of the subject property but only an aliquot portion. What she could have transferred to
respondents was only the ownership of such aliquot portion. It is apparent from the
admissions of respondents and the records of this case that Avelina had no intention to
transfer the ownership, of whatever extent, over the property to respondents.

In the present case, the true intention of the parties in the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale is immediately apparent from respondents’ very own Answer to
petitioners’ Complaint. As respondents themselves acknowledge, the purpose of the
Deed of Absolute Sale was simply to "facilitate the titling of the [subject] property," not
to transfer the ownership of the lot to them. Furthermore, respondents concede that
petitioner Salvador remains in possession of the property and that there is no indication
that respondents ever took possession of the subject property after its supposed
purchase. Such failure to take exclusive possession of the subject property or, in the
alternative, to collect rentals from its possessor, is contrary to the principle of ownership
and is a clear badge of simulation that renders the whole transaction void.

Principle:

Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only proper when the affiant is the sole heir of the
decedent.

MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO,, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA

AVELINO, SHARON AVELINO, ANTONIO AVELINO, JR., TRACY AVELINO,
PATRICK MICHAEL AVELINO and MARK ANTHONY AVELINO, Respondents.

The Facts of the case:

Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late Antonio
Avelino, Sr., and his first wife private respondent Angelina Avelino.
The other private respondents, Sharon, Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and Mark Anthony
all surnamed Avelino are likewise compulsory heirs of Avelino, Sr. Sharon, an American,
is the second wife of Avelino, Sr. The other private respondents are siblings of petitioner
Ma. Socorro.

On October 24, 1991, Ma. Socorro filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr.,
who died intestate on April 10, 1989. She asked that she be appointed the administrator
of the estate.

On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings filed their opposition by filing a motion
to convert the said judicial proceedings to an action for judicial partition which
petitioner duly opposed.

On February 16, 1993, public respondent judge granted the Motion to Convert
Proceedings to Action for Judicial Partition, considering that the petitioner is the only
heir not amenable to a simple partition, and all the other compulsory heirs manifested
their desire for an expeditious settlement of the estate of the deceased Antonio Avelino,
Sr.

Ma. Socorro filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the trial court.

the respondent appellate court rendered decision, stating that the "petition is DENIED
DUE COURSE" and accordingly dismissed.

The issue:

Whether CA committed an error of law and gravely abused its discretion in upholding
the trial court's finding that a partition is proper.

Ruling:

No.

When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the
executor so named is incompetent, or refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond
required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially
administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator.

We note that the Court of Appeals found that in this case "the decedent left no debts and
the heirs and legatees are all of age.

Nor can we sustain petitioner's argument that the order of the trial court converting an
action for letters of administration to one for judicial partition has no basis in the Rules
of Court, hence procedurally infirm. The basis for the trial court's order is Section 1,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It provides that in cases where the heirs disagree as to the
partition of the estate and no extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an ordinary
action for partition may be resorted to, as in this case. We have held that where the more
expeditious remedy of partition is available to the heirs, then the heirs or the majority of
them may not be compelled to submit to administration proceedings. The trial court
appropriately converted petitioner's action for letters of administration into a suit for
judicial partition, upon motion of the private respondents. No reversible error may be
attributed to the Court of Appeals when it found the trial court's action procedurally in
order.

Principle:

Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. — If the decedent left

no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their
judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may without
securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by
means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he
may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filled in the office of
the register of deeds. 

SPOUSES GORGONIO BENATIRO and COLUMBA CUYOS-BENATIRO v. HEIRS OF

EVARISTO CUYOS

Facts:

Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos were blessed with nine children,
namely: Francisco, Victoria, Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and
Enrique. On August 28, 1966, Evaristo died leaving six parcels of land located in
Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu, all under the name of Agatona Arrogante.

On July 13, 1971, one of the heirs, Gloria Cuyos-Talian (respondent Gloria) represented
by Atty. Victor Elliot Lepiten (Atty. Lepiten), filed before the now Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Cebu, Branch XI, a petition for Letters of Administration. The petition was
opposed by Gloria's brother, Francisco, who was represented by Atty. Jesus Yray (Atty.
Yray).

In the hearing held on January 30, 1973, both parties together with their respective
counsels appeared. Both counsels manifested that the parties had come to an agreement
to settle their case. The trial court on even date issued an Order 5 appointing Gloria as
administratrix of the estate.
The Report further stated that Columba Cuyos-Benatiro (Columba), one of the heirs,
informed all those present in the conference of her desire to buy the properties of the
estate, to which everybody present agreed, and considered her the buyer. Atty. Taneo
explained that the delay in the submission of the Report was due to the request of
respondent Gloria that she be given enough time to make some consultations on what
was already agreed upon by the majority of the heirs; that it was only on July 11, 1976
that the letter of respondent Gloria was handed to Atty. Taneo, with the information
that respondent Gloria was amenable to what had been agreed upon, provided she be
given the sum of P5,570.00 as her share of the estate, since one of properties of the
estate was mortgaged to her in order to defray their father's hospitalization.

The RTC ruled that the terms and conditions agreed upon by the heirs to be in order, the
same being not contrary to law, said compromise agreement as embodied in the report
of the commissioner is hereby approved. The Court hereby orders the Administratrix to
execute the deed of sale covering all the properties of the estate in favor of Columba
Cuyos Benatiro after the payment to her of the sum of P36,000.00. The said sum of
money shall remain in custodia legis, but after all the claims and administration
expenses and the estate taxes shall have been paid for, the remainder shall, upon order
of the Court, be divided equally among the heirs.11

However, it disapproved the claim of respondent Gloria for the sum of P5,570.00, as the
same had been allegedly disregarded by the heirs present during the conference.

An Order was issued appointed Lope Cuyos (Cuyos) as the new administrator of the
estate, purportedly on the basis of the motion to relieve respondent Gloria, as it
appeared that she was already residing in Central Luzon and her absence was
detrimental to the early termination of the proceedings.

Administrator Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sal over the six parcels of land
constituting the intestate estate of the late Evaristo Cuyos in favor of Columba for a
consideration of the sum of P36,000.00.

The heirs of Evaristo Cuyos, namely: Gloria Cuyos-Talian, Patrocenia Cuyos-Mijares,

Numeriano Cuyos and Enrique Cuyos, represented by their attorney-in-fact, Salud
Cuyos (respondents), allegedly learned that Tax Declaration Nos. 000725, 000728,
000729, 000730, 000731 and 000732, which were all in the name of their late mother
Agatona Arrogante, were canceled and new Tax Declaration Nos., namely, 20-14129, 20-
14130, 20-141131, 20-14132, 2014133 and 20-14134, were issued in Columba's name;
and that later on, Original Certificates of Titles covering the estate of Evaristo Cuyos
were issued in favor of Columba; that some of these parcels of land were subsequently
transferred to the names of spouses Renato C. Benatiro and Rosie M. Benatiro, son and
daughter-in-law, respectively, of petitioners Gorgonio and Columba, for which transfer
certificates of title were subsequently issued; that they subsequently discovered the
existence of the assailed Order dated December 16, 1976 and the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated May 25, 1979.

Respondents filed a complaint against petitioner Gorgonio Benatiro before the

Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) of the Department of
Justice, which dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. 14

On July 18, 2003, the CA granted the petition and annulled the CFI order. The SP Proc.
Case No. 24-BN is hereby ordered reopened and proceedings thereon be continued. 18

Thus, the CA ruled that the Certificates of Titles obtained by herein petitioners were
procured fraudulently; that the initial transfer of the properties to Columba Cuyos-
Benatiro by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by Lope Cuyos was clearly
defective, since the compromise agreement which served as the basis of the Deed of
Absolute Sale was void and had no legal effect.

The CA found that the copy of the Deed of Sale was not even furnished the trial court
nor was said money placed under custodia legis as agreed upon; that the Certification
dated December 9, 1998 issued by the Clerk of Court of Cebu indicated that the case had
not yet been terminated and that the last Order in the special proceeding was the
appointment of Lope Cuyos as the new administrator of the estate; thus, the transfer of
the parcels of land, which included the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale,
cancellation of Tax Declarations and the issuance of new Tax Declarations and Transfer
Certificates of Title, all in favor of petitioners, were tainted with fraud. Consequently,
the CA concluded that the compromise agreement, the certificates of title and the
transfers made by petitioners through fraud cannot be made a legal basis of their
ownership over the properties, since to do so would result in enriching them at the
expense of the respondents; and that it was also evident that the fraud attendant in this
case was one of extrinsic fraud, since respondents were denied the opportunity to fully
litigate their case because of the scheme utilized by petitioners to assert their claim.

Issues:

Whether or not annulment of order under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court was a proper
remedy where the aggrieved party had other appropriate remedies, such as new trial,
appeal, or petition for relief, which they failed to take through their own fault.

Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts when it annulled the 24
year old Commissioner's Report of the Clerk of Court - an official act which enjoys a
strong presumption of regularity - based merely on belated allegations of irregularities
in the performance of said official act.

Whether or not upon the facts as found by the Court of Appeals in this case, extrinsic
fraud existed which is a sufficient ground to annul the lower court's order under Rule 47
of the Rules of Court.20
We rule in the negative.

We find that the CA correctly annulled the CFI Order dated December 16, 1976, we find
that it should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsic fraud, as there is no sufficient
evidence to hold Atty. Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground that
the assailed order is void for lack of due process.

It bears stressing that the purpose of the conference was for the heirs to arrive at a
compromise agreement over the estate of Evaristo Cuyos. Thus, it was imperative that
all the heirs must be present in the conference and be heard to afford them the
opportunity to protect their interests. Considering that no separate instrument of
conveyance was executed among the heirs embodying their alleged agreement, it was
necessary that the Report be signed by the heirs to prove that a conference among the
heirs was indeed held, and that they conformed to the agreement stated in the Report.

Petitioners point out that the Commissioner was an officer of the court and a
disinterested party and that, under Rule 133, Section 3(m) of the Rules on Evidence,
there is a presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.

While, under the general rule, it is to be presumed that everything done by an officer in
connection with the performance of an official act in the line of his duty was legally
done, such presumption may be overcome by evidence to the contrary. We find the
instances mentioned by the CA, such as absence of the names of the persons present in
the conference, absence of the signatures of the heirs in the Commissioner's Report, as
well as absence of evidence showing that respondents were notified of the conference, to
be competent proofs of irregularity that rebut the presumption.

Thus, we find no reversible error committed by the CA in ruling that the conference was
not held accordingly and in annulling the assailed order of the CFI.

We also find nothing in the records that would show that the heirs were called to a
hearing to validate the Report. The CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the
absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing conformity thereto. The CFI adopted
the Report despite the statement therein that only six out of the nine heirs attended the
conference, thus, effectively depriving the other heirs of their chance to be heard. The
CFI's action was tantamount to a violation of the constitutional guarantee that no
person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. We find that the
assailed Order dated December 16, 1976, which approved a void Commissioner's Report,
is a void judgment for lack of due process.

Considering that the assailed Order is a void judgment for lack of due process of law, it
is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or of any obligation.

Consequently, the compromise agreement and the Order approving it must be declared
null and void and set aside.
We find no merit in petitioners' claim that respondents are barred from assailing the
judgment after the lapse of 24 years from its finality on ground of laches and estoppel.

The principle of laches or "stale demands" ordains that the failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due
diligence could or should have been done earlier, or the negligence or omission to assert
a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert
it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

Finally, considering that the assailed CFI judgment is void, it has no legal and binding
effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent.
Hence, the execution of the Deed of Sale by Lope in favor of Columba pursuant to said
void judgment, the issuance of titles pursuant to said Deed of Sale, and the subsequent
transfers are void ab initio. No reversible error was thus committed by the CA in
annulling the judgment.

Principle:

There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case
is to be determined according to its particular circumstances. The question of laches is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court and, being an equitable doctrine, its
application is controlled by equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice
or perpetrate fraud and injustice. It is the better rule that courts, under the principle of
equity, will not be guided or bound strictly by the statute of limitations or the doctrine of
laches when to be so, a manifest wrong or injustice would result.

EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR AND HEIR OF

THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF MIGUELITA CHING-PACIOLES, Petitioners,
vs.
MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING, Respondent.

Facts:

Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the people he
leaves behind. For in death, a person’s estate remains, providing a fertile ground for
discords that break the familial bonds. Before us is another case that illustrates such
reality. Here, a husband and a mother of the deceased are locked in an acrimonious
dispute over the estate of their loved one.

On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated
value of ₱10.5 million, stock investments worth ₱518,783.00, bank deposits amounting
to ₱6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her husband,
petitioner herein, and their two minor children.
On August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition for the settlement
of Miguelita’s estate. He prayed that (a) letters of administration be issued in his name,
and (b) that the net residue of the estate be divided among the compulsory heirs.

Miguelita’s mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an opposition,

specifically to petitioner’s prayer for the issuance of letters of administration on the
grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an
administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of
"paraphernal properties." Respondent prayed that the letters of administration be
issued to her instead. Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her appointment as special
administratrix.

Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging that the latter has no
direct and material interest in the estate, she not being a compulsory heir, and that he,
being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be appointed as administrator
under the law.7

Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she
gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them "would
undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of business
partners."8

In her omnibus motion dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her son Emmanuel

Ching to act as special administrator.

On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and
Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the estate. Both were issued letters of
administration after taking their oath and posting the requisite bond.

Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila Standard on September 12,
19, and 26, 1994. However, no claims were filed against the estate within the period set
by the Revised Rules of Court.

Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita’s estate.

Emmanuel did not submit an inventory.

On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as
the only compulsory heirs of Miguelita.

On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion praying,
among others, that an Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2)
partition and distribution of the estate among the declared heirs; and 3) payment of
attorney’s fees.
Respondent opposed petitioner’s motion on the ground that the partition and
distribution of the estate is "premature and precipitate," considering that there is yet no
determination "whether the properties specified in the inventory are conjugal,
paraphernal or owned in a joint venture." Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of
Miguelita’s estate as an "heir and co-owner." Thus, she prayed that a hearing be
scheduled.

the intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and attorney’s fees but denied
petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed
"premature."

Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking to

annul and set aside the intestate court’s Order dated January 17, 1996 and Resolution
dated May 7, 1996 which denied petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of the
estate for being premature, indicating that it (intestate court) will first resolve
respondent’s claim of ownership.

The Appellate Court ruled:

"Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in entertaining private respondent’s unsupported claim of ownership against
the estate. In fact, there is no indication that the probate court has already made a
finding of title or ownership. It is inevitable that in probate proceedings, questions of
collation or of advancement are involved for these are matters which can be passed upon
in the course of the proceedings. The probate court in exercising its prerogative to
schedule a hearing, to inquire into the propriety of private respondent’s claim, is being
extremely cautious in determining the composition of the estate. This act is not tainted
with an iota of grave abuse of discretion."

Issues:

May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of
ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate?

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a
probate court relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and
probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the determination of
questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this
rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction.

A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate

court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine
whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. In such situations the
adjudication is merely incidental and provisional.
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction
of the intestate court to conduct a hearing on respondent’s claim. Such reliance is
misplaced. Under the said principle, the key consideration is that the purpose of the
intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of ownership is merely
to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. The facts of
this case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.

First, the inventory was not disputed.

And second, Emmanuel, respondent’s son and representative in the settlement of

Miguelita’s estate, did not submit his own inventory. His mandate, as co-administrator,
is "to submit within three (3) months after his appointment a true inventory and
appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased which have come into his
possession or knowledge." He could have submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom
those properties which respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he did not
endeavor to submit one shows that he acquiesced with petitioner’s

Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general

jurisdiction. The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her
adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita's estate.

At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish or deprive
respondent of whatever rights or properties she believes or considers to be rightfully
hers. We reiterate that the question of ownership of properties alleged to be part of the
estate must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction.

Principle:

The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which
must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional
trial court.

ALABAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 156021 September 23, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the decision
sought to be annulled was rendered and, thus, they could not have availed of the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment and other
appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling of the CA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioners were made parties in the proceedings
Ruling:

Petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become
parties to the probate proceedings.

Thus, it has been held that a proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that
with the corresponding publication of the petition the court’s jurisdiction extends to all
persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent.
Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they
eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of
hearing.

On the other hand, according to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to
known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator.

Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate
heirs who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. 
Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or
to personally notify them of the same.

Principle:

Notification are cured by the publication of the notice.

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON v. MA. LOURDES BELEN, GR No. 189121, 2013-07-31

Facts:

This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo
Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by Eliseo's common-law wife and daughter.  The petition was
opposed by Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married.  Amelia was
joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon
(Jennifer).

Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother,
Ma. Lourdes Belen (Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.

Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the
time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other.  Insisting on the legal
capacity of Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo's marriage
to Amelia by claiming that it was bigamous for having been contracted during the
subsistence of the latter's marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito).  To prove her
filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters... of
Administration her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her
children, Jenneth and Jennifer, opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by
filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss. The petitioners asserted that as shown by his
Death Certificate,Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at the
time of his death.  Hence, the petition for settlement of decedent's estate should have
been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City.

RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the
necessary bond.  The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in
Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo's
last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay.

Court of appeals affirms the trial court decision in toto in the 28 November 2008.

It held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband
and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar
Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo's death in 1992.  For purposes
of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseo's estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the
conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in affirming that Eliseo Quiazon was
a resident of Las Piñas and therefore [,] the petition for letters of administration was
properly filed with the [RTC] of Las Piñas

Ruling:

Yes. We find the petition bereft of merit.

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration
of the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent
resides at the time of his death.

To further explain, we make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile"
but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the
same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or
understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of
a person, actual residence or place of abode.

As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more
than a person's actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with
continuity and consistency.

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for
affirming the ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo
was properly laid in Las Piñas City.  It is evident from the records that during his
lifetime. Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas
City.  For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said
city.

Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners' contention that Elise has not
shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who
are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration

Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship
with the decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the
distribution of Eliseo's estate, is deemed to be an interested party.  With the
overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the
petitioners' pounding... on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent's
estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court
of Appeals.  Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of
Eliseo is on good grounds.  It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under
the law, is entitled to her legitime after the debts of the estate are satisfied. Having a
vested right in the distribution of Eliseo's estate as one of his natural children, Elise can
rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.

Principle:

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.

Rule 80:
Gerardo Tan vs Gedorio

Facts:

Upon the death of Gerardo Tan on Oct. 14, 2000, private respondents Rogelo Lim Suga
and Helen Tan Racoma, who were claiming to be the children of the decedent moved for
the appointment of their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo Lim as special administrator. This
was opposed by the petitioner Vilma Tan, Jake Tan and Geraldine Tan, claiming that
none of the respondents can be appointed since they are not residing in the country, that
Romualdo does not have the same competence as Vilma Tan who was already acting as
the de facto administratrix of the estate, and that the nearest of kin, being the legitmate
children, is preferred in the choice of administrator (claiming that the respondent were
illegitmate children).However, upon failure of Vilma to follow a court directive to
account for the income of the estate, the court granted Romualdo's appointment as
special administrator. Court of Appeals denied the petition .

Issue:

Whether or not the court violated Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court in their selection
of a special administrator.

Ruling:

The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers
to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the
appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not
appealable.
If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference , they should
pursue the appointment of a regular administrator and put to an end the delay which
necessitated the appointment of a special administrator.

Principle:
the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator as provided in the
afore-quoted provision does not apply to the selection of a special administrator. The
preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to the
appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as
the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not
appealable

Rule 83:

THELMA M. ARANAS v. TERESITA V. MERCADO, GR No. 156407, 2014-01-15

Facts:

Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his
second wife, Teresita V. Mercado (Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V.
Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V. Mercado, and
Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage, namely:
respondent Franklin L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).

Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate
shares in Mervir Realty Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation
Corporation (Cebu Emerson).

On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition
for the appointment of Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio's estate.
The RTC granted the petition considering that there was no opposition.

As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio on

December 14, 1992 for the consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in the
inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had "left no real properties but only
personal properties"

Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the
inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be
examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma's motion .

On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8, 1993.

On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under
oath on the inventory, and that she (Thelma) be allowed 30 days within which to file a
formal opposition to or comment on the inventory and the supporting documents
Teresita had submitted.

On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to
present evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the court to resolve the
motion for approval of the inventory.

On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of
court to examine Teresita on the inventory.

After 8 years, the RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding that the
inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included.

Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
approve the inventory, and in ordering her as administrator to include real properties
that had been transferred to Mervir Realty, Teresita, joined by her four children and her
stepson Franklin assailed the adverse orders of the RTC by petition for certiorari.

the Court of Appeals partly granted the petition .

Issue:

Did the Court erred in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory
notwithstanding that such properties had been either transferred by sale or exchanged
for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?

Ruling:

Yes. The CA is not correct. And the appeal is meritorious.

Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be
granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and
willing to serve when the person dies intestate.

The usage of the word all in Section 1, demands the inclusion of all the real and personal
properties of the decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified by the
phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies that the
properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in her
possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true
inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be
excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the possession of another
person or entity.

Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the
important purpose of resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement to the
heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every compulsory heir and the surviving
spouse, herein Teresita herself, to "bring into the mass of the estate any property or
right which he (or she) may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the
latter, by way of donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed
in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account of the partition.

Principles:

The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate
of the decedent is "to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the
liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable
distribution

The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for
purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the
administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional unless the interested
parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement,
or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the
rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral... to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of
the status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the conjugal or
exclusive property of the deceased spouse.

HEIRS OF JOSE SY BANG, HEIRS OF JULIAN SY and OSCAR SY vs. ROLANDO SY

G.R. No. 114217/ G.R. No. 150797 October 13, 2009

FACTS:

On May 28, 1980, respondent Rolando Sy filed a Complaint for Partition against
spouses Jose Sy Bang and Iluminada Tan, spouses Julian Sy and Rosa Tan, Zenaida Sy,
Ma. Emma Sy, Oscar Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy, Bartolome Sy,
Florecita Sy, Lourdes Sy, Julieta Sy, Rosita Ferrera-Sy, and Renato Sy before the then
Court of First Instance of Quezon.
Respondents Rolando Sy, Rosalino Sy, Lucio Sy, Enrique Sy, Rosauro Sy, Bartolome Sy,
Julieta Sy, Lourdes Sy, and Florecita Sy are the children of Sy Bang by his second
marriage to respondent Rosita Ferrera-Sy, while petitioners Jose Sy Bang, Julian Sy and
Oscar Sy are the children of Sy Bang from his first marriage to Ba Nga, and petitioners
Zenaida Tan and Ma. Emma Sy are the children of petitioner spouses Jose Sy Bang and
Iluminada Tan.

Sy Bang died intestate in 1971, leaving behind real and personal properties, including
several businesses. During an out-of-court conference between petitioners and
respondents, it was agreed that the management, supervision or administration of the
common properties and/or the entire estate of the deceased Sy Bang shall be placed
temporarily in the hands of petitioner Jose Sy Bang, as trustee, with authority to
delegate some of his functions to any of petitioners or private respondents. Thus, the
function or duty of bookkeeper was delegated by Jose Sy Bang to his co-petitioner Julian
Sy, and the duty or function of management and operation of the business of cinema of
the common ownership was delegated by petitioner Jose Sy Bang to respondent
Rosauro Sy. Herein petitioners and respondents also agreed that the income of the three
cinema houses, namely, Long Life, SBS and Sy-Co Theaters, shall exclusively pertain to
respondents for their support and sustenance, pending the termination of Civil Case, for
Judicial Partition, and the income from the vast parts of the entire estate and other
businesses of their common father, to pertain exclusively to petitioners. Hence, since the
year 1980, private respondents, through respondent Rosauro Sy, had taken charge of
the operation and management of the three cinema houses, with the income derived
therefrom evenly divided among themselves for their support and maintenance.

On June 16, 1982, petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings and for Inhibition,
alleging, among others, that the Judge had patently shown partiality in favor of their co-
defendants in the case. This motion was denied on August 16, 1982.11 Thereafter,
petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition and for Inhibition (Disqualification) and
Mandamus with Restraining Order with the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 60957.
The Petition for Prohibition and for Inhibition was denied, and the Petition for
Mandamus with Restraining Order was Noted.

On August 17, 1982, the Judge issued two Orders: (1) in the first Order, Mrs. Lucita L.
Sarmiento was appointed as Receiver, and petitioners’ Motion for New Trial and/or
Reconsideration, dated July 9, 1982 and their Supplemental Motion, dated July 12,
1982, were denied for lack of merit; and (2) in the second Order, the Judge ordered the
immediate cancellation of the lis pendens annotated at the back of the certificates of title
in the names of Bartolome Sy, Rosalino Sy and Rolando Sy.

On August 18, 1982, the trial court approved the bond posted by the receiver, Mrs.
Lucita L. Sarmiento, Bartolome Sy, Rolando Sy and Rosalino Sy. While the Petition for
Mandamus with Restraining Order was pending before the First Division of the
Supreme Court, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the
Supreme Court.

A Temporary Restraining Order was issued, to enjoin the Judge from taking any action
and, likewise, restraining the effectivity of and compliance with the Resolution.

Thereafter, an Urgent Manifestation and Motion was filed by Mrs. Lucita L. Sarmiento,
the appointed receiver, which was opposed by petitioners on September 24, 1982.

The CA also upheld the judge’s appointment of a receiver, saying that the judge did so
after both parties had presented their evidence and upon verified petition filed by
respondents, and in order to preserve the properties under litigation. Further, the CA
found proper the order to cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of
title in the names of Rosalino, Rolando and Bartolome.

Rosita Ferrera-Sy filed a Motion for Payment of Widow’s Allowance. She alleged that
her deceased husband, Sy Bang, left an extensive estate. The properties of the estate
were found by the trial court to be their conjugal properties

Issue:

Whether or not the settlement of estate should effect the payment of widow’s allowance.

Ruling:

the settlement of the estate that should effect the payment of widow’s allowance
considering that the properties of the estate are within its jurisdiction, to the exclusion
of all other courts. In emphasizing the limited jurisdiction of the guardianship court,
this Court has pronounced that: Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and
limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of the property of the ward found
to be embezzled, concealed, or conveyed.

In a categorical language of this Court, only in extreme cases, where property clearly
belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has been already judicially decided, may
the court direct its delivery to the guardian. In effect, there can only be delivery or
return of the embezzled, concealed or conveyed property of the ward, where the right or
title of said ward is clear and undisputable. However, where title to any property said to
be embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, x x x the determination of said title
or right whether in favor of the persons said to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed
the property must be determined in a separate ordinary action and not in a
guardianship proceedings.

Principle:

The distribution of the residue of the estate of the deceased incompetent is a function
pertaining properly, not to the guardianship proceedings, but to another proceeding in
which the heirs are at liberty to initiate.

Rule 86
 UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
EDMUND SANTIBAÑEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAÑEZ ARIOLA, respondents.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M.
Santibañez entered into a loan agreement3 in the amount of ₱128,000.00. The amount
was intended for the payment of the purchase price of one (1) unit Ford 6600
Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund,
executed a promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal
annual amortizations of ₱43,745.96 due on May 31, 1981 and every May 31st thereafter
up to May 31, 1985.

On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement, time
in the amount of ₱123,156.00. Again, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a
promissory note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory
note, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement5 for the loan dated December
13, 1980.

Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will. Subsequently a

testate proceeding commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City, Edmund, as one of the
heirs, was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the decedent.

During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his
sister Florence Santibañez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement wherein they agreed to
divide between themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2)
tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them was to assume the
indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the tractor respectively
taken by them.

A Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities was executed by and between

FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among
others, assigned all its assets and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.

Demand letters for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of
the Philippines (UBP) to Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to
pay. Thus, on the petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money against the heirs of
Efraim Santibañez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati City. Summonses
were issued against both, but the one intended for Edmund was not served since he was
in the United States and there was no information on his address or the date of his
return to the Philippines. Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to respondent
Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer and alleged that
the loan documents did not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that
the joint agreement signed by her and her brother Edmund was not approved by the
probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under the
joint agreement.

The trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint for lack of merit. The
decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:

The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the
probate court before which the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibañez was pending,
as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation incurred by the said decedent.

The trial court also found that the Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs,
Edmund and Florence, on July 22, 1981, was, in effect, a partition of the estate of the
decedent. However, the said agreement was void, considering that it had not been
approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid partition until after the
will has been probated. The trial court further declared that petitioner failed to prove
that it was the now defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had
assigned its assets and liabilities. The court also agreed to the contention of respondent
Florence S. Ariola that the list of assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union
Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedent’s account. Ruling that
the joint agreement executed by the heirs was null and void, the trial court held that the
petitioner’s cause of action against respondent Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.

The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that the
petitioner should have filed its claim with the probate court as provided under Sections 1
and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It further held that the partition made in the
agreement was null and void, since no valid partition may be had until after the will has
been probated. According to the CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the holographic will
covered the subject properties (tractors) in generic terms when the deceased referred to
them as "all other properties." Moreover, the active participation of respondent Florence
S. Ariola in the case did not amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision.

Issue:

The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the partition in the
Agreement executed by the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs’ assumption of the
indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether the petitioner can hold the heirs
liable on the obligation of the deceased.1awphi1.nét

Ruling:
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to
determine all the properties of the deceased, to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered. The said
court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the
estate.

In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until
after the will has been probated:

In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will
has been probated. The law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it,
because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right
of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The
authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity
of the testator and the compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of a will.

This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same
properties embraced in the will. In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibañez,
left a holographic will  which contained, inter alia, the provision which reads as follows:

(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after
my demise, shall be distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately
preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.

We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing

provision embracing all the properties left by the decedent which might have escaped
his mind at that time he was making his will, and other properties he may acquire
thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any
partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement
executed by Edmund and Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is
invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution, there was already a pending
proceeding for the probate of their late father’s holographic will covering the said
tractors.

It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over
all the properties of the deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in
any way without the probate court’s approval is tantamount to divesting it with
jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow. Every act intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should
purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.

Thus, in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the nature of an extra-
judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and the heirs
cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is
within the jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of the
decedent.

In the instant case, there is no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were
the only heirs of the decedent. When it was executed, the probate of the will was still
pending before the court and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of the
decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto
themselves the three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other
possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim against the estate of the
deceased.

The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs’ assumption of the
indebtedness of the decedent is binding.

We rule in the negative.

Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto "have agreed
to divide between themselves and take possession and use the above-described chattel
and each of them to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as
herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp." The assumption
of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall
take possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made
dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the
indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive. The partition
being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It
follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.

The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent.l^vvphi1.net The
petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibañez, should have thus filed
its money claim with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the
Revised Rules of Court, which provides:

Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence
S. Ariola accountable for any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary
evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the continuing guaranty
agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibañez and his son
Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most,
it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory
notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses Edmund may have as
against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the person of
Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
The petitioner’s personality to file the complaint is wanting. Consequently, it failed to
establish its cause of action.

We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not sufficiently shown
that it is the successor-in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the
FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities. The petitioner in its complaint alleged that "by
virtue of the Deed of Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and between First
Countryside Credit Corporation and Union Bank of the Philippines…"However, the
documentary evidence clearly reflects that the parties in the deed of assignment with
assumption of liabilities were the FCCC, and the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank,
with the conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can the petitioner’s
participation therein as a party be found. Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial
evidence was presented during trial to show that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is
now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines. As the trial court declared in its
decision:

Principle:

Judicial notice does not apply here. "The power to take judicial notice is to [be]
exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that the requisite notoriety
exists; and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative." (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).

Rule 87:

RIOFERIO V. CA
G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004

Facts:

On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City
leaving several personal and real properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan City and
Kalookan City. He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza P. Orfinada, whom he
married on July 11, 1960 and with whom he had seven children who are the herein
respondents.

Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his
paramour, Teodora Rioferio and their children.

On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada,

legitimate children of Alfonso, discovered that on June 29, 1995, petitioner Teodora
Rioferio and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a
Deceased Person with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent
located in Dagupan City.
On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for the
Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with
Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Titles.
Petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint interposing the defense that the
property subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial settlement pertained to the
properties originally belonging to the parents of Teodora Riofero and that the titles
thereof were delivered to her as an advance inheritance but the decedent had managed
to register them in his name.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the heirs have legal standing to prosecute the rights belonging
to the deceased subsequent to the commencement of the administration proceedings

Ruling:

YES. Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt
have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance
with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code “that (t)he rights to succession
are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.” The provision in turn is
the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent
and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or
others by his will or by operation of law.
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs
may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed.
The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to
represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from
representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an
administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the
situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been
instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed.

Principle:

Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two

exceptions,
1. If the executor or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit; and
2. When the administrator is alleged to have participated in the act complained of
and he is made a party defendant.
A property fraudulently registered in favor of another (like
when paramour registered a land owned by decedent in her favor) still forms part of the
estate of the decedent.

Rule 89
PAHAMOTANG VS PNB
FACTS:

The late Agustin then executed several mortgages and later sale of the properties with
the PNB and Arguna respectively without making a valid notification with the legal
heirs. The heirs later questioned the validity of the transactions prejudicial to them. The
trial court declared the real estate mortgage and the sale void. The decision was reversed
by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE:
 
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the trial court.

RULING: 

No. In the present case, the appellate court makes a mistake in applying laches against
petitioners.

Petitioners were totally unaware of the plan of Agustin to mortgage and sell the estate
properties. There is no indication that mortgagor PNB and vendee Arguna had notified
petitioners of the contracts they had executed with Agustin.

It is not clear from the decision of the appellate court when petitioners actually learned
of the existence of said orders of the intestate court.

The Court of Appeals cannot simply impute laches against them in the absent of any
indication of the point in time when petitioners acquired knowledge of those orders.

In the present case, the appellate court erred in appreciating laches against petitioners.
The element of delay in questioning the subject orders of the intestate court is sorely
lacking. Petitioners were totally unaware of the plan of Agustin to mortgage and sell the
estate properties. There is no indication that mortgagor PNB and vendee Arguna had
notified petitioners of the contracts they had executed with Agustin. Although
petitioners finally obtained knowledge of the subject petitions filed by their father, and
eventually challenged the July 18, 1973, October 19, 1974, February 25, 1980 and
January 7, 1981 orders of the intestate court, it is not clear from the challenged decision
of the appellate court when they (petitioners) actually learned of the existence of said
orders of the intestate court. Absent any indication of the point in time when petitioners
acquired knowledge of those orders, their alleged delay in impugning the validity thereof
certainly cannot be established. And the Court of Appeals cannot simply impute laches
against them.
Principle:

Laches is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting

the presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined the
right.16 The essential elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or
of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made
and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's
rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and
having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice
on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he
bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded
to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.

Rule 90:

RICARDO S. SILVERIO v. CA

Facts:

The instant controversy stemmed from the settlement of estate of the deceased Beatriz
Silverio. After her death, her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate
proceeding for the settlement of her estate.

On November 16, 2004, during the pendency of the case, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a
petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the subject estate. On
November 22, 2004, Edmundo S. Silverio also filed a comment/opposition for the
removal of Ricardo C.

Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate and for the appointment of a new
administrator.

the RTC issued an Order granting the petition and removing Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as
administrator of the estate, while appointing Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as the new
administrator.

On January 26, 2005, Nelia S. Silverio-Dee filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
Order dated January 3, 2005, as well as all other related orders.

On February 4, 2005, Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an Order
Prohibiting Any Person to Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties Involved in the
Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz Silverio, Without Authority from this Honorable
Court. On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order affirming its Order dated
January 3, 2005 and denying private respondent's motion for reconsideration. In the
Omnibus Order, the RTC also authorized Ricardo Silverio, Jr. as administrator of the
subject estate.
From the Order dated December 12, 2005, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the RTC in an Order dated October 31, 2006. In
the same order, the RTC also allowed the sale of various properties of the intestate
estate of the late Beatriz

Silverio to partially settle estate taxes, penalties, interests and other charges due
thereon. Among the properties authorized to be sold was the one located at No. 3 Intsia
Road, Forbes Park, Makati City.

On January 6, 2006, Nelia Silverio-Dee filed a Notice of Appeal dated January 5, 2006
from the Order dated December 12, 2005 while the Record on Appeal dated January 20,
2006 was filed on January 23, 2006.

On October 23, 2006, Ricardo Silverio, Jr. filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal and for
Issuance of a Writ of Execution against the appeal of Nelia Silverio-Dee on the ground
that the Record on Appeal was filed ten (10) days beyond the reglementary period
pursuant to Section 3, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

on April 2, 2007, the RTC issued an Order denying the appeal on the ground that it was
not perfected within the reglementary period. The RTC further issued a writ of execution
for the enforcement of the Order dated May 31, 2005 against private respondent to
vacate the premises of the property private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition (With Prayer for TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) dated May 2,
2007 with the CA.

On May 4, 2007, the CA issued the assailed Resolution granting the prayer for the
issuance of a TRO. In issuing the TRO, the CA ruled that the Notice of Appeal was filed
within the reglementary period provided by the Rules of Court applying the "fresh rule
period" enunciated in Neypes v. Court of Appeals

Afterwards, on July 6, 2007, the CA issued the assailed decision granting the petition of
private respondent.

Issues:

Thus, the question posed is whether the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 is an
interlocutory order.

Ruling:

This petition is meritorious.

The denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a complaint is

not an interlocutory order, however, but a final order as it puts an end to the particular
matter resolved, or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of, and nothing is left
for... the trial court to do other than to execute the order.

Not being an interlocutory order, an order denying a motion for reconsideration of an

order of dismissal of a complaint is effectively an appeal of the order of dismissal itself.
If the proscription against appealing an order denying a motion for reconsideration is
applied to any order, then there would have been no need to specifically mention in both
above-quoted sections of the Rules "final orders or judgments" as subject to appeal. In
other words from the entire provisions of Rule 39 and 41, there can be no mistaking that
what is proscribed is to appeal from a denial of a motion for reconsideration of an
interlocutory order.

Additionally, it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground
for the appeal of the interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment
itself. The interlocutory order generally cannot be appealed separately from the
judgment. It is only when such interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be
resorted to.

In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on
the ground that it ordered her to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3
Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. On that aspect the order is not a final
determination of the case or of the issue of distribution of the shares of the heirs in the
estate or their rights therein. It must be borne in mind that until the estate is
partitioned, each heir only has an inchoate right to the properties of the estate, such that
no heir may lay claim on a particular property.

Verily, once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the court, the
properties included therein are under the control of the intestate court. And not even the
administrator may take possession of any property that is part of the estate without the
prior authority of the Court.

In the instant case, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly
secured from Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She,
therefore, never had any real interest in the specific property located at No. 3 Intsia
Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. As such, the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be
considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an appeal.

Thus, private respondent employed the wrong mode of appeal by filing a Notice of
Appeal with the RTC. Hence, for employing the improper mode of appeal, the case
should have been dismissed.

The implication of such improper appeal is that the notice of appeal did not toll the
reglementary period for the filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the proper
remedy in the instant case. This means that private respondent has now lost her remedy
of appeal.

Principle:

An interlocutory order, as opposed to a final order.

A final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a
particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined by the court, while an interlocutory order is one
which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon.

CORAZON M. GREGORIO, vs. ATTY. JOSE R. MADARANG

Facts:

Casimiro V. Madarang, Sr. (Casimiro, Sr. or the decedent) died intestate on June 3,
1995, leaving real and personal properties with an estimated value of ₱200,000.00.1 He
was survived by his wife Dolores and their five children, namely Casimiro, Jr., Jose,
Ramiro, Vicente and Corazon.

In the intestate proceedings filed by the couple’s son Jose which was lodged before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 57, Dolores was appointed as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Casimiro, Sr.2

Dolores submitted an Inventory Report listing the properties of the decedent’s estate.
Jose filed his Comment on the Report, alleging that it omitted six lots including Lot 829-
B-4-B located in Cebu City which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 125429.

A hearing was thus conducted to determine whether the six lots formed part of the
estate of the decedent.

Dolores and her children, except Jose who suggested that the former be referred to as
"oppositors," questioned the RTC order of inclusion of the six lots via motion for
reconsideration during the pendency of which motion the court appointed herein
petitioner Corazon as co-administratrix of her mother Dolores.

As Dolores and her co-oppositors alleged that the six lots had been transferred during
the lifetime of the decedent, they were ordered to submit their affidavits, in lieu of oral
testimony, to support the allegation. Only herein respondent Vicente complied. In his
Affidavit, Vicente declared that one of the six lots, Lot 829-B-4-B, was conveyed to him
by a Deed of Donation executed in August 1992 by his parents Dolores and Casimiro, Sr.

The RTC, by Order of January 20, 2003,7 thus modified its April 5, 2002 Order as
follows:

Of the six lots directed included in the inventory, Lot 829 B-4-B should be excluded.

Court of Appeals affirms the RTC order of exclusion of the questioned lot.

Hence, the present petition for review filed by the oppositors-herein petitioners.
Casimiro, Jr. having died during the pendency of the case, he was substituted by his wife
petitioner Estrelita and co-petitioners children Consuelo, Casimiro IV, and Jane
Margaret.
Petitioners contend that since the only issue for consideration by the appellate court was
the merit of Jose’s "Motion to Withdraw Petition," it exceeded its jurisdiction when it
passed upon the merits of Jose’s appeal from the RTC order excluding Lot 829-B-4-B
from the Inventory.

Issue:

Whether or not the probate court act on question of ownership.

Ruling:

NO. The appellate court did not thus err in passing on the said issue.

While a probate court, being of special and limited jurisdiction, cannot act on questions
of title and ownership, it can, for purposes of inclusion or exclusion in the inventory of
properties of a decedent, make a provisional determination of ownership, without
prejudice to a final determination through a separate action in a court of general
jurisdiction.

The facts obtaining in the present case, however, do not call for the probate court to
make a provisional determination of ownership of Lot 829-B-4-B. It bears stress that
the question is one of collation or advancement by the decedent to an heir over which
the question of title and ownership can be passed upon by a probate court.

By express provision of law then, Lot 829-B-4-B, which was alleged to have been
donated by the decedent and his wife to their son-respondent Vicente, should not be
excluded from the inventory of the properties of the decedent.

Principle:

Article 1061 of the Civil Code expressly provides:

Article 1061. Every compulsory heir, who succeeds with other compulsory heirs,
must bring into the mass of the estate  any property or right which he may have received
from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of
each heir and in the account of partition. (underscoring supplied)

In relation to which, Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Questions as to advancement to be determined. – Questions as to advancement

made, or alleged to have been made, by the deceased to any heir may be heard and
determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final
order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on
the heir. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
 REYES-MESUGAS V. REYES

FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent are the siblings (children of Lourdes Aquino Reyes and Pedro
N. Reyes). Lourdes died intestate, leaving to her heirs, among others, three parcels of
land, including a lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 24475.
Respondent filed a petition for settlement of the estate of Lourdes, praying for his
appointment as administrator due to alleged irregularities and fraudulent transactions
by the other heirs. Petitioner, her father Pedro and Arturo, a sibling of the petitioner,
opposed the petition.

A compromise agreement was entered into by the parties whereby the estate of Lourdes
was partitioned. A decision was rendered by the RTC pursuant to the said compromise
agreement. (Pertinent info in the compromise).

Improvements found in the land (2 residential houses) belong to petitioner and Antonio
Reyes (current occupants).

Proceeds from the bakery store shall be shared by Antonio and Pedro Reyes.
Expenses for the partition shall be equally shared by parties.

Petitioner filed a motion to cancel lis pendens annotation for TCT No. 24475 in the RTC
in view of the finality of judgment in the settlement of the estate.

Petitioner argued that the settlement of the estate proceeding had terminated;  hence,
the annotation of lis pendens could already be cancelled since it had served its purpose.

Respondent opposed the motion and claimed that the parties, in addition to the
compromise agreement, executed “side agreements” which had yet to be fulfilled.
One such agreement was executed between petitioner and respondent granting
respondent a one-meter right of way on the lot covered by TCT No. 24475.

However, petitioner refused to give the right of way and threatened to build a concrete
structure to prevent access.
 
RTC Denied motion to cancel lis pendens for lack of merit (unnecessary; there were
reasons for maintaining it due to petitioner’s noncompliance with the compromise
agreement)
 
ISSUE: 

Whether the side agreement pertaining to the right of way was a valid additional
agreement to the compromised agreement previously approved by the probate court.
 
Ruling:

 NO.

A compromise agreement waives the right to appeal.

A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions,
avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. Once submitted to the court
and stamped with judicial approval, it becomes more than a mere private contract
binding upon the parties; having the sanction of the court and entered as its
determination of the controversy, it has the force and effect of any judgment.

Consequently, a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise agreement is

immediately executory as there is no appeal from such judgment. When both parties
enter into an agreement to end a pending litigation and request that a decision be
rendered approving said agreement, such action constitutes an implied waiver of the
right to appeal against the said decision.
 
The side agreement (right of way) was outside the jurisdiction of the rtc acting as
probate court.

Moreover, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled when the annotation is not necessary
to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded. The compromise agreement
did not mention the grant of a right of way to respondent.  Any agreement other than the
judicially approved compromise agreement between the parties was outside the limited
jurisdiction of the probate court.

Thus, any other agreement entered into by the petitioner and respondent with regard to
a grant of a right of way was not within the jurisdiction of the RTC acting as a probate
court. Therefore, there was no reason for the RTC not to cancel the notice of lis
pendens on TCT No. 24475 as respondent had no right which needed to be
protected. Any alleged right arising from the “side agreement” on the right of way can be
fully protected by filing an ordinary action for specific performance in a court of general
jurisdiction.
 
Principles:
Settled is the rule that a probate court is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction – it acts on
matters pertaining to the estate but never on the rights to property arising from the
contract, and approves contracts entered into for and on behalf of the estate or the heirs
to it but this is by fiat of the Rules of Court.
Any agreement other than the judicially approved compromise agreement between the
parties was outside the limited jurisdiction of the probate court.

Rule 91:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.

REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ROXAS CITY, ELIZABETH LEE, and PACITA YU-LEE,

The Facts:

In March 1936, Lee Liong, a Chinese citizen, bought Lot No. 398 from Vicenta Arcenas,
Francisco, Carmen Ramon, Mercedes, Concepcion, Mariano, Jose, and Manuel, all
surnamed Dinglasan. Lot No. 398, with an area of 1,574 square meters, is located at the
corner of Roxas Avenue and Pavia Street in Roxas City. In February 1944, Lee Liong
died intestate and was survived by his widow Ang Chia, and his sons Lee Bing Hoo and
Lee Bun Ting. On 30 June 1947, the surviving heirs of Lee Liong extrajudicially settled
the estate of the deceased and partitioned among themselves Lot No. 398. When Lee
Bing Hoo and Lee Bun Ting died, Lot No. 398 was transferred by succession to their
respective wives, Elizabeth Lee (Elizabeth) and Pacita Yu-Lee (Pacita).

On 7 September 1993, Elizabeth and Pacita (private respondents) filed a petition for
reconstitution of title of Lot No. 398 because the records of the Register of Deeds, Roxas
City were burned during the war. On 3 October 2001, the Court held that the trial court’s
order of reconstitution was void for lack of factual support because it was based merely
on the plan and technical description approved by the Land Registration Authority.

Meanwhile, on 26 January 1995, petitioner Republic of the Philippines (petitioner),

through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Roxas City a Complaint for Reversion of Title against private respondents and the
Register of Deeds of Roxas City, praying that (1) the sale of Lot No. 398 to Lee Liong be
set aside for being null and void ab initio; and (2) Lot No. 398 be reverted to the public
domain for the State’s disposal in accordance with law.

In their Answer, private respondents invoked as affirmative defenses: (1) prescription;

(2) private ownership of Lot No. 398; and (3) Lee Liong’s being a buyer in good faith
and for value. Furthermore, private respondents claimed that as Filipino citizens, they
are qualified to acquire Lot No. 398 by succession.

The Register of Deeds of Roxas City did not file an answer.

On 7 May 1996, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the reversion of Lot No. 398
to the State.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dated 12 July 2002, reversing the
trial court’s decision and declaring private respondents as the absolute and lawful
owners of Lot No. 398. Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the Court of
Appeals denied in its Resolution8 dated 9 May 2003.

Issue:

Petitioner raises the lone issue that:

The Court of Appeals gravely erred when it reversed and set aside the appealed decision
and declared private respondents the absolute and lawful owners and possessors of lot
no. 398 of Roxas City cadastre considering that Lee Liong, who is an alien, and thus,
constitutionally prohibited to own real property in the Philippines, acquired no right or
title over subject lot which he could have transmitted by succession to private
respondents’ predecessors-in-interest.

The Ruling of the Court:

The petition is without merit.

In this case, upon the death of the original vendee who was a Chinese citizen, his widow
and two sons extrajudicially settled his estate, including Lot No. 398. When the two sons
died, Lot No. 398 was transferred by succession to their respective spouses, herein
private respondents who are Filipino citizens.

Although ownership of the land cannot revert to the original sellers, because of the
doctrine of pari delicto, the Solicitor General may initiate an action for reversion or
escheat of the land to the State, subject to other defenses, as hereafter set forth.

In this case, subsequent circumstances militate against escheat proceedings because the
land is now in the hands of Filipinos. The original vendee, Lee Liong, has since died and
the land has been inherited by his heirs and subsequently their heirs, petitioners herein
[Elizabeth Lee and Pacita Yu Lee]. Petitioners are Filipino citizens, a fact the Solicitor
General does not dispute.

Thus, the Court has ruled consistently that where a Filipino citizen sells land to an alien
who later sells the land to a Filipino, the invalidity of the first transfer is corrected by the
subsequent sale to a citizen. Similarly, where the alien who buys the land subsequently
acquires Philippine citizenship, the sale was validated since the purpose of the
constitutional ban to limit land ownership to Filipinos has been achieved. In short, the
law disregards the constitutional disqualification of the buyer to hold land if the land is
subsequently transferred to a qualified party, or the buyer himself becomes a qualified
party.15 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, since Lot No. 398 has already been transferred to private respondents who are
Filipino citizens, the prior invalid sale to Lee Liong can no longer be assailed. Hence,
reversion proceedings will no longer prosper since the land is now in the hands of
Filipino citizens.

Principle:

The constitutional proscription on alien ownership of lands of the public or private

domain was intended to protect lands from falling in the hands of non-Filipinos. In this
case, however, there would be no more public policy violated since the land is in the
hands of Filipinos qualified to acquire and own such land. "If land is invalidly
transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen,
the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is
rendered valid." Thus, the subsequent transfer of the property to qualified Filipinos may
no longer be impugned on the basis of invalidity of the initial transfer. The objective of
the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.

Rule 93

LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI v. PABALE, GR No. 151243, 2008-04-30

Facts:

The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, upheld the validity of the Deed of
Absolute Sale, dated 20 February 1984, executed by Nelly S. Nave (Nave) in favor of
siblings Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roiler and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale (the Pabale
siblings) over a piece of land (subject property) in Calamba, Laguna, covered byTransfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-3317 (27604); and, thus, reversed and set aside the
Decision,[4] dated 2 December 1997, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City,
Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C.

The 2 December 1997 Decision of the RTC declared null and void the two sales
agreements involving the subject property entered into by Nave with different parties,
namely, Sesinando M. Fernando (Fernando) and the Pabale siblings; and ordered the
reconveyance of the subject property to Alamayri, as Nave's successor-in-interest.

[Fernando] alleged that on January 3, 1984, a handwritten "Kasunduan Sa

Pagbibilihan" (Contract to Sell) was entered into by and between him and [Nave]
involving said parcel of land. However, [Nave] reneged on their agreement when the
latter refused to accept the partial down payment he tendered to her as previously
agreed because she did not want to sell her property to him anymore.

When she was informed that it was for the sale of her property in Calamba, Laguna
covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604), she immediately returned to [Fernando] the said
piece of paper and at the same time repudiating the same and (2) she already sold the
property in good faith to Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all surnamed
Pabale [the Pabale siblings] on February 20, 1984 after the complaint was filed against
her but before she received a copy thereof. She alleged that [Fernando] has no cause of
action against her as he is suing for and in behalf of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation
who is not a party to the alleged Contract to Sell.

[Nave] died on December 9, 1992.  On September 20, 1993, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo,
[Nave's] sole heir, she being an orphan and childless, executed an Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication pertaining to his inherited properties from [Nave].

On January 9, 1997, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a motion seeking the court's
permission for his substitution for the late defendant Nelly in the instant case.  Not long
after the parties submitted their respective pre-trial briefs, a motion for substitution was
filed by Lolita R. Alamayre (sic) [Alamayri] alleging that since the subject property was
sold to her by Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale, she
should be substituted in his stead.

On July 29, 1997, the court a quo issued an Order declaring that it cannot make a ruling
as to the conflicting claims of [Alamayri] and Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo.

The Pabale siblings intervened as appellants in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 averring that the
RTC erred in declaring in its 2 December 1997 Decision that the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated 20 February 1984 executed by Nave in their favor was null and void on the ground
that Nave was found incompetent since the year 1980.

The Court of Appeals granted the appeals of S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation and the
Pabale siblings. Alamayri sought reconsideration of the afore-quoted Decision of the
appellate court.

Alamayri argued that since Nave was already judicially determined to be an incompetent
since 1980, then all contracts she subsequently entered into should be declared null and
void, including the Deed of Sale, dated 20 February 1984, which she executed over the
subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings.

Issue:

Court of Appeals erred in holding that the finding that nelly s. nave was incompetent in
Special Proceeding No. 146-86-c and cannot retroactively affect the validity of the deed
of sale.

Ruling:

Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted upon or
decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment."

The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main rules which may be stated as
follows: (1) The judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits
concludes the parties and their privies to the litigation and constitutes a bar to a new
action or suit... involving the same cause of action either before the same or any other
tribunal; and (2) Any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily
involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in which a
judgment or decree is rendered on the... merits is conclusively settled by the judgment
therein and cannot again be litigated between the parties and their privies whether or
not the claims or demands, purposes, or subject matters of the two suits are the same.
These two main rules mark the distinction between the principles governing the two
typical cases in which a judgment may operate as evidence conclusiveness of judgment
has no application to the instant Petition since there is no identity of parties and issues
between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C.SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C
was a petition filed with the RTC by Atty. Gesmundo for the appointment of a guardian
over the person and estate of his late wife Nave alleging her incompetence.

A guardian may be appointed by the RTC over the person and estate of a minor or an
incompetent, the latter being described as a person "suffering the penalty of civil
interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to
read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals,
and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and
other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage
their property, becoming thereby an easy... prey for deceit and exploitation."

The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for appointment of a guardian is to

determine, first, whether a person is indeed a minor or an incompetent who has no
capacity to care for himself and/or his properties and, second, who is most qualified to
be appointed as his guardian.

It is significant to note that the rules do not necessitate that creditors of the minor or
incompetent be likewise identified and notified.

Hence, it cannot be presumed that the Pabale siblings were given notice and actually
took part in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.  They are not Nave's relatives, nor are they the
ones caring for her. Although the rules allow the RTC to direct the giving of other
general or special notices of the hearings, it was not established that the RTC actually
did so in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.

Neither is there identity of issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No.
675-84-C that may bar the latter, by conclusiveness of judgment, from ruling on Nave's
competency in 1984, when she executed the Deed of Sale over the subject property in
favor the Pabale siblings.

While both cases involve a determination of Nave's incompetency, it must be established

at two separate times, one in 1984 and the other in 1986. A finding that she was
incompetent in 1986 does not automatically mean that she was so in 1984.

Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person who has not previously been declared
incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as the contrary be not
proved; that is, that at the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy, insane, or out
of his mind.

Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to be mentally incapacitated only in 1986,
when the RTC started hearing SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C; and she was not judicially
declared an incompetent until 22 June 1988 when a Decision in said case was rendered
by the RTC, resulting in the appointment of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her guardian.
Thus, prior to 1986, Nave is still presumed to be capacitated and competent to enter into
contracts such as the Deed of Sale over the subject property, which she executed in favor
of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984.

All there being no identity of parties and issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and
Civil Case No. 675-84-C, the 22 June 1988 Decision in the former on Nave's
incompetency by the year 1986 should not bar, by conclusiveness of judgment, a finding
in the latter case that

Nave still had capacity and was competent when she executed on 20 February 1984 the
Deed of Sale over the subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings.

Principles:

A petition for appointment of a guardian is a special proceeding, without the usual

parties

Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 93 of the Rules of Court, though, require that the petition
contain the names, ages, and residences of relatives of the supposed minor or
incompetent and those having him in their care, so that those residing within the same
province as the minor or incompetent can be notified of the time and place of the
hearing on the petition.

Vancil vs. Belmes

Facts:

Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a US Navy serviceman who died in
1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two children named Valerie and Vincent by his
common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.

Bonifacia obtained a favorable court decision appointing her as legal and judicial
guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie and Vincent.

Helen submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating

that she had already filed a similar petition for guardianship before the RTC of Pagadian
City. Helen followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and
Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of
and exercising parental authority over the subject minors at Dumingag, Zamboanga del
Sur where they are permanently residing. She also states that at the time the petition
was filed, Bonifacia was a resident of Colorado, U.S.A., being a naturalized American
citizen.
The trial court rejected and denied Helen’s motion to remove and/or to disqualify
Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. The CA reversed the RTC decision. 

Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time the case reached the Supreme
Court, the issue revolved around the guardianship of Vincent.

Issue: 

Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian?

Ruling:

Respondent Helen Belmes, being the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential
right over that of petitioner  Bonifacia to be his guardian. Article 211 of the
Family Code provides:

"Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father’s decision shall
prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary. xxx."

Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, Helen has the corresponding

natural and legal right to his custody.

"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that ‘the right of
parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to
parenthood,’ a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent
one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the
nature of the parental relationship." (Sagala-Eslao vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 317
[1997])

Bonifacia contends that she is more qualified as guardian of Vincent.

Bonifacia’s claim to be the guardian of said minor can only be realized by way of
substitute parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family Code, thus:

"Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute parental
authority shall be exercised by the surviving grandparent. xxx."

Bonifacia, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority only

in case of death, absence or unsuitability of Helen. Considering that Helen is very much
alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent,   Bonifacia  has to
prove, in asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian, Helen’s unsuitability. Bonifacia,
however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that Helen is not suited to be
the guardian of Vincent.  Bonifacia merely insists that Helen is morally unfit as guardian
of Valerie considering that her live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But Valerie,
being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.

Even assuming that Helen is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still Bonifacia cannot
qualify as a substitute guardian. She is an American citizen and a resident of Colorado.
Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and obligations required
of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of discharging the
duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely delegate those
duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian.

Principle:
There is nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as
administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no
statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the responsibilities
of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much
difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing administrators and guardians who
are not personally subject to their jurisdiction. Notwithstanding that there is no
statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to the appointment of persons as
administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to the jurisdiction of
our courts here. 

  "The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority over the persons of
their common children. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present
shall continue exercising parental authority. Only in case of the parents’ death, absence
or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the
surviving grandparent."

Rule 97:

DINAH B. TONOG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR V. DAGUIMOL, respondents.

The pertinent facts are:

On September 23, 1989, petitioner Dinah B. Tonog gave birth 2 to Gardin Faith Belarde
Tonog, her illegitimate daughter with private respondent Edgar V. Daguimol. Petitioner
was then a nursing student while private respondent was a licensed physician. They
cohabited for a time and lived with private respondent’s parents and sister in the latter’s
house in Quezon City where the infant, Gardin Faith, was a welcome addition to the
family.

A year after the birth of Gardin Faith, petitioner left for the United States of America
where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin Faith was left in the care of her
father (private respondent herein) and paternal grandparents.

On January 10, 1992, private respondent filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin
Faith, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053, in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On March 9, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment appointing private respondent as
legal guardian of the minor, Gardin Faith.

Petitioner avers that she learned of the judgment of the trial court rendered in Sp. Proc.
No. Q-92-11053 only on April 1, 1992. Accordingly, on May 27, 1992, she filed a petition
for relief from judgment. In a resolution dated September 15, 1992, the trial court set
aside its original judgment and allowed petitioner to file her opposition to private
respondent’s petition. The latter, in turn, filed a motion for reconsideration. In a related
incident, petitioner filed on October 4, 1993, a motion to remand custody of Gardin
Faith to her.

On November 18, 1994, the trial court issued a resolution denying private respondent’s
motion for reconsideration and granting petitioner’s motion for custody of their child,
Gardin. Petitioner moved for immediate execution of the said resolution.

Due to the adverse turn of events, private respondent filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35971, questioning the
actuations of the trial court. On March 21, 1995, the appellate court dismissed the
petition on the ground of lack of merit.

Issue:

Whether or not the mother may be deprived of the temporary custody of her child below
7 years old?

Ruling:

Yes. For these reasons, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is
below seven years of age for "compelling reasons." Instances of unsuitability are neglect,
abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction,
maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness.  If older
than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not
bound by that choice. The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the child’s
preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody
may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person.  
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor,
Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial
court have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who
should have final custody of the minor. Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said
minor as the controlling factor, we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing
her father (private respondent herein) to retain in the meantime parental custody over
her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and
thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had
apparently formed an attachment.

Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be
properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court.  It should be
recalled that in a petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We
are not in the best position to assess the parties’ respective merits vis-à-vis their
opposing claims for custody. Yet another sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the
minor, Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her
preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent should have
the custody over her person.

Principle:

A word of caution: our pronouncement here should not be interpreted to imply a

preference toward the father (herein private respondent) relative to the final custody of
the minor, Gardin Faith. Nor should it be taken to mean as a
statement against petitioner’s fitness to have final custody of her said minor daughter.
It shall be only understood that, for the present and until finally adjudged, temporary
custody of the subject minor should remain with her father, the private respondent
herein pending final judgment of the trial court in Sp. Proc. No. Q-92-11053.

In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-
being of the child. n arriving at its decision as to whom custody of the minor should be
given, the court must take into account the respective resources and social and moral
situations of the contending parents.

Adoption

IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM; IN RE:

PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM (G.R. Nos.
168992-93 May 21, 2009 FIRST DIVISION)

Facts:

Petitioner is an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim

(Lim). They were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were
entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of
their own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to make it appear that they were
the children’s parents. The children were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and Michael
Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old when brought to the clinic of
petitioner. She was born on 15 March 1977. Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban
brought him to petitioner’s clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983.

The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their own. They sent the
children to exclusive schools. They used the surname “Lim” in all their school records
and documents. Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December
2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.

Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of the amnesty given

under Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552) to those individuals who simulated the birth of
a child. Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of
Michelle and Michael before the trial court. At the time of the filing of the petitions for
adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already married, while Michael was 18 years
and seven months old.

Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as evidenced by their
Affidavits of Consent. Michael also gave his consent to his adoption as shown in his
Affidavit of Consent. Petitioner’s husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of
Consent for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned child and the whereabouts of her
natural parents were unknown. The DSWD issued a similar Certification for Michael.
The trial court rendered judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled that
since petitioner had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with her
new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
 
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.

RULING:

No. It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner had
already remarried. She filed the petitions by herself, without being joined by her
husband Olario. We have no other recourse but to affirm the trial court’s decision
denying the petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section 7,
Article III of RA 8552 reads:

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. – The following may adopt:

            xxxx
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other.
 
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one spouse adopts the illegitimate
son/daughter of the other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by the spouses.

The use of the word “shall” in the above-quoted provision means that joint adoption by
the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of joint
parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted
is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to require the spouses to
adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony between the spouses.

The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having remarried at the
time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly adopt. Since the petitions for
adoption were filed only by petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the
trial court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.

Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions enumerated in Section 7.
First, the children to be adopted are not the legitimate children of petitioner or of her
husband Olario.
Second, the children are not the illegitimate children of petitioner.
And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each other.

The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in his Affidavit of
Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements that Olario must comply being
an American citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552
such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of
the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least three
continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain
such residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in
his own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the
latter’s adopted child. None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the
trial.

These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s qualification to adopt

cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The children or adoptees are not
relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario.
Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
 DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN v. REPUBLIC, GR NO. 164948, 2006-06-27

Facts:

Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America (USA), of Filipino
parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of minors
Elaine Dizon Ramos,Elma Dizon Ramos,and Eugene Dizon Ramos

The minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner's brother, and Amelia
Ramos.

Landingin alleged that when Manuel died their biological mother, Amelia, went to Italy,
re-married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no longer
communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time
she left up to the institution of the adoption. Petitioner desires to adopt the children; the
minors have given their written consent to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as
shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own who are
already married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives alone
in her own home in Guam, USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a
restaurant server.

Mariano Ramos, who earns substantial income, signified his willingness and
commitment to support the minors while in petitioner's custody.

The court ordered the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) to
conduct a case study.

The petitioner testified in her behalf.  She also presented Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the
adoptees, to testify on the written consent executed by her and her siblings.

Since her petition was unopposed, petitioner was allowed to present her evidence ex
parte

On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer II of the DSWD, Field
Office III, Tarlac, submitted a Child Study Report, with the following recommendation:

Minors' surviving parent, the mother has voluntarily consented to their adoption by the
paternal aunt, Diwata Landingin this is in view of her inability to provide the parental
care, guidance and support they need.  An Affidavit of Consent was executed by the
mother which is hereto attached.

The three minors subject for adoption have also expressed their willingness to be
adopted recommended that minors Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and Eugene D.
Ramos be adopted by their maternal aunt Diwata Landingin.

However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness and offer in evidence the
voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to
present any documentary evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the adoption.
The court, finding merit in the petition for adoption, rendered a decision granting said
petition

The OSG appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals.

The CA rendered a decision reversing the ruling of the RTC.  It held that petitioner failed
to adduce in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos, the children's natural
mother.

Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari

Issues:

(a) whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent of
their biological mother, Amelia Ramos;

(b) whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly executed by the petitioner-
adopter's children sufficiently complies with the law; and

(c) whether or not petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees

Ruling:

1. He is not entitled to adopt.

Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a
decree of adoption.  Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his
consent must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and
re-established in adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written
consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.

2. As the alleged written consent of petitioner's legitimate children did not comply
with the afore-cited law, the same can at best be treated by the Rules as a private
document whose authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the
document executed or written; or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature
or handwriting of the makers.

Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate
the written consent of her legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.

Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows
that the financial capacity of prospective parents should also be carefully evaluated and
considered.  Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to support the would-be
adopted child or children, in keeping with the means of the family.

3. It is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle the

financial aspect of rearing the three children in the US.  She only has a part-time
job, and she is rather of age.  While petitioner claims that she has the financial
support and backing of her children and siblings, the OSG is correct in stating
that the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the adopter, as adoption
only creates a legal relation between the former and the latter.  Moreover, the
 records do not prove nor support petitioner's allegation that her siblings and her
children are financially able and that they are willing to support the minors
herein.

Principles:

Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not
such an abandonment. To dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment
must be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.

IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY ASTORGA GARCIA

HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.

The facts are undisputed.

On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition 1 to adopt
his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein, among
others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; 2 that her mother is Gemma Astorga
Garcia; that Stephanie has been using her mother’s middle name and surname; and that
he is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s
middle name Astorga be changed to "Garcia," her mother’s surname, and that her
surname "Garcia" be changed to "Catindig," his surname.

On March 23, 2001, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision granting the adoption.

On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification and/or reconsideration
praying that Stephanie should be allowed to use the surname of her natural mother
(GARCIA) as her middle name.

On May 28, 2001, the trial court denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration holding
that there is no law or jurisprudence allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name.

Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving Stephanie of a middle name as
a consequence of adoption because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child
from having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent; (2) it is customary
for every Filipino to have as middle name the surname of the mother; (3) the middle
name or initial is a part of the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best
interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper name should not be
violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the middle name "Garcia" (her mother’s
surname) avoids the stigma of her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of "Garcia" as
her middle name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), agrees with petitioner
that Stephanie should be permitted to use, as her middle name, the surname of her
natural mother for the following reasons:

First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanie’s filiation with her natural
mother because under Article 189 of the Family Code, she remains to be an intestate
heir of the latter. Thus, to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future,
her relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother should be
maintained.

Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name. What the law does not prohibit, it allows.

Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name, which is ordinarily the
surname of the mother. This custom has been recognized by the Civil Code and Family
Code. In fact, the Family Law Committees agreed that "the initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so that the second name,
if any, will be before the surname of the mother." 7

Issue:

May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name?

Yes. since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate child adopted by her natural father,
like Stephanie, to use, as middle name her mother’s surname, we find no reason why she
should not be allowed to do so.

The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or proper name and (2)
the surname or family name. The given or proper name is that which is given to the
individual at birth or at baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The
surname or family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs and is
continued from parent to child. The given name may be freely selected by the parents for
the child, but the surname to which the child is entitled is fixed by law. 9

Law Is Silent As To The Use Of Middle Name –

As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle
name. Even Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255,
otherwise known as "An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The Surname Of
Their Father," is silent as to what middle name a child may use.

The middle name or the mother’s surname is only considered in Article 375(1), quoted
above, in case there is identity of names and surnames between ascendants and
descendants, in which case, the middle name or the mother’s surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may use. Article
365 of the Civil Code merely provides that "an adopted child shall bear the surname of
the adopter." Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the legal effects of
adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:

"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be a legitimate child of the

adopters and both shall acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the surname of
the adopters;

The Underlying Intent of Adoption Is In Favor of the Adopted Child –

Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether related or not to the
adopter, possess in general, the rights accorded to a legitimate child. It is a juridical act,
a proceeding in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to that
which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. The modern trend is to consider
adoption not merely as an act to establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but
also as an act which endows the child with a legitimate status. This was, indeed,
confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State Party to the Convention of the
Rights of the Child initiated by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption
is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent is
geared to favor the adopted child. Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the
"Domestic Adoption Act of 1998," secures these rights and privileges for the adopted.

One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed to be a legitimate child of
the adopter for all intents and purposes pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code and
Section 17 Article V of RA 8552.

Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it follows that Stephanie is entitled to
all the rights provided by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any kind,
including the right to bear the surname of her father and her mother, as discussed
above. This is consistent with the intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family
Law Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that the initial or
surname of the mother should immediately precede the surname of the father.

Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanie’s continued use of her mother’s
surname (Garcia) as her middle name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be
noted that Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18, Article V of RA 8552 (law
on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her biological
parent. Hence, Stephanie can well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural
mother in the future.

Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are living together in the house
built by petitioner for them at 390 Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner
provides for all their needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father.
She calls them "Mama" and "Papa". Indeed, they are one normal happy family. Hence,
to allow Stephanie to use her mother’s surname as her middle name will not only
sustain her continued loving relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the
stigma of her illegitimacy.

Liberal Construction of Adoption Statutes In Favor Of Adoption –

It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, should be liberally
construed to carry out the beneficent purposes of adoption. The interests and welfare of
the adopted child are of primary and paramount consideration, hence, every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
objectives of the law.

This provision, according to the Code Commission, "is necessary so that it may tip the
scales in favor of right and justice when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen
the determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may apparently be
authorized by some way of interpreting the law.

Principle:

For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the designation by which he is
known and called in the community in which he lives and is best known. It is defined as
the word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other
individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for the convenience of
the world at large addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him. It is both of
personal as well as public interest that every person must have a name.

LAHOM VS SIBULO
G.R. No. 143989  July 14, 2003

FACTS:

A childless couple adopted the wife's nephew and brought him up as their own. In 1972,
the trial court granted the petition for adoption, and ordered the Civil Registrar to
change the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom. Mrs. Lahom commenced a
petition to rescind the decree of adoption, in which she averred, that, despite the her
pleas and that of her husband, their adopted son refused to use their surname Lahom
and continue to use Sibulo in all his dealing and activities.  Prior to the institution of the
case, in 1998, RA No. 8552 went into effect. The new statute deleted from the law the
right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption (Section 19 of Article VI).
These turn of events revealing Jose's callous indifference, ingratitude and lack of care
and concern prompted Lahom to file a petition in Court in December 1999 to rescind the
decree of adoption previously issued way back on May 5, 1972. When Lahom filed said
petition there was already a new law on adoption, specifically R.A. 8552 also known as
the Domestic Adoption Act passed on March 22,1998, wherein it was provided that:
"Adoption, being in the interest of the child, shall not be subject to rescission by the
adopter(s). However the adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided in
Article 919 of the Civil Code" (Section 19).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject adoption still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8552, and if in the affirmative, whether or not the adopter’s action
prescribed.

RULING:

Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. The controversy should be resolved in the light of the law
governing at the time the petition was filed. In this case, it was months after the
effectivity of RA 8552 that Lahom filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption
granted in 1972. By then the new law had already abrogated and repealed the right of
the adopter under the Civil Code and the family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. So
the rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by Lahom after RA 8552 had
come into force, could no longer be pursued.

Besides, even before the passage of RA8552, an action to set aside the adoption is
subject to the five year bar rule under Rule 100 of the Rules of Court and that the
adopter would lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that period.
The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a condition that could not fulfill
the requirements of a vested right entitled to protection. Rights are considered vested
when the right to the enjoyment is a present interest, absolute, unconditional and
perfect or fixed and irrefutable. The concept of a "vested right" is a consequence of the
constitutional guarantee of due process that expresses a present fixed interest which in
right reason and natural justice is protected against arbitrary state action. While
adoption has often been referred to in the context of a "right", it is not naturally innate
or fundamental but rather a right merely created by statute. It is more of a privilege that
is governed by the state's determination on what it may deem to be for the best interest
and welfare of the child. Matters relating to adoption, including the withdrawal of the
right of the adopter to nullify the adoption decree, are subject to State regulation.
Concomitantly, a right of action given by a statute may be taken away at any time before
it has been exercised.
But an adopter, while barred from severing the legal ties of adoption, can always for
valid reasons cause the forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an
undeserving child, like denying him his legitime, and by will and testament, may
expressly exclude him from having a share in the disposable portion of his estate.

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

JEANY-VI G. KIANI, Petitioner,
vs.
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and DEPORTATION (BID); EDGARDO CABRERA,
ELISEO EXCONDE and JOSE VALE, JR.,

On June 19, 2002, Javed Kiani, a British national but a Pakistani by birth reported to
the Rodriguez, Rizal Police Station that his friends, Iqbal Singh and Balbir Singh, had
been forcibly taken by four (4) armed men from their residence at Balita, Rodriguez,
Rizal. A couple of days later, then Commissioner Andrea D. Domingo of the Bureau of
Immigration and Deportation (BID) issued Mission Order No. ADD-02-203 based on
Executive Order No. 287 of former President Joseph Estrada. In said Order, appropriate
officers of the Bureau were directed to conduct verification/validation of the admission
status and activities of Javed Kiani, and, if found to have violated the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, to immediately place him under arrest. Per
records of the BID, Javed Kiani was married to a Filipina, Jeany-Vi Kiani, on July 27,
1988. He was admitted as an immigrant and was issued a permanent resident visa on
March 17, 1993.

A week later, on June 27, 2002, Javed Kiani was arrested at Felicidad Village,
Montalban, Rizal. The arresting officers, Eduardo Cabrera, Eliseo Exconde and Jose
Vale, Jr., operatives of the Bureau of Intelligence of the BID, relied on information from
Iqbal and Balbir Singh, who pointed to Javed Kiani as the one who had furnished them
with fake Alien Certificate Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate Registration
(ICR). Apparently, the forms used were not official BID forms.6

On July 1, 2002, the BID Prosecutor filed a Charge Sheet against "Javed Kiani alias
Ahmad Singh" before the Board of Special Inquiry (BSI) for violation of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended, particularly Section 37(a)(7) and Section 45
thereof. The case was docketed as D.C. No. ADD-02-080. The Charge Sheet reads:

On the same day, July 1, 2002, the Board of Commissioners (BOC) conducted a
summary proceeding and issued a Summary Deportation Order revoking the visa issued
to Javed Kiani.

The next day, July 2, 2002, Javed Kiani’s wife, Jeany-Vi, filed a Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus for and in behalf of her husband before the RTC of Manila, naming the
BID and its intelligence officers as Respondents. She prayed that the court issue a writ of
habeas corpus directing respondents to produce the person of Javed Kiani before it "in
the soonest time possible and to show the cause or legal justification for the latter’s
detention and imprisonment, if any; and for such other or further reliefs as may be
deemed just and equitable under the premises." She further alleged that her husband
had intervened in the arrest of Iqbal and Balbir Singh, and that the arresting officers
resented such intervention. She insisted that the arrest and detention of her husband
were bereft of factual and legal basis, since at the time, no deportation order had yet
been issued against him. Citing the ruling of this Court in Board of Commissioners v.
Dela Rosa,11 she alleged that the Mission Order issued by the Immigration
Commissioner was void. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 02-103935. Javed Kiani
had been detained at the BID Detention Center, Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro
Manila since July 3, 2002.

On July 18, 2002, the RTC issued an Ordergranting bail for Javed Kiani on a bond of
₱50,000.00, and ordered respondent BID Intelligence Officers to file their return on the
writ. The respondents complied, and alleged in their return that Javed Kiani had already
been charged before the BOC and ordered deported; hence, the petition had become
moot and academic. They refused to release Kiani although the bond had already been
posted. Instead, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
an Omnibus Motion for the reconsideration of the Order on the following grounds: (1)
under Section 37(9)(e) of Commonwealth Act 613, as amended, it is the Commissioner
of Immigration, and not the court, who has authority to grant bail in a deportation
proceeding; (2) the court has no authority to grant the petition considering that Javed
Kiani was lawfully charged with violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
amended, before the BSI; and (3) the BOC has subsequently issued a Summary
Deportation Order.

On October 28, 2002, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion and setting aside its
July 18, 2002 Order. In dismissing the petition, it ruled that Jeany-Vi was barred from
questioning the legality of the arrest and detention of her husband, following the filing
of the Charge Sheet with the BSI; as such, there was no justification for the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus. It declared that, as gleaned from the return of the writ filed by the
respondents, Javed Kiani was lawfully charged with violation of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940, as amended; hence, the Summary Deportation Order issued
by the BOC was valid.

The RTC also ruled that the proper remedy of Javed Kiani from the Summary
Deportation Order of the BOC was to file a petition for review with the CA under Rule 43
of the Rules of Court (and not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before it), as it had
no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and reverse the Summary Deportation Order issued
by the BOC.
On May 8, 2003 the CA rendered judgment dismissing the appeal.

On November 21, 2003, the appellate court resolved to deny the motion.

The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: (1) whether petitioner engaged in
forum shopping; and (2) whether the CA erred in (a) holding that the Petition for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus before the RTC was not the proper remedy of petitioner; (b)
upholding the validity of the Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC; and (c)
declaring that such Order had become final and executory.

Yes, we agree with the contention of the OSG that the petitioner indulged in forum
shopping. Forum shopping is the institution of two or more actions or proceedings
grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other court would make
a favorable disposition. Section 6, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a
petition for review on certiorari must contain a sworn certification against forum
shopping as provided in the last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 42 of said Rules, to wit:

The petitioner shall also submit together with the petition a certification under oath that
he has not theretofore commenced any other action involving the same issues in the
Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals or different divisions thereof, or any other tribunal
or agency; if there is such other action or proceeding, he must state the status of the
same; and if he should thereafter learn that a similar action or proceeding has been filed
or is pending before the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or different divisions
thereof, or any other tribunal or agency, he undertakes to promptly inform the aforesaid
courts and other tribunal or agency thereof within five (5) days therefrom.lawphil.net

In this case, petitioner seeks not only the reversal of the Order of the RTC dismissing her
Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed in behalf of her husband (where it was also
declared that he had been legally deported), as well as the decision of the CA affirming
the RTC’s Order; she also prays that the Court render judgment nullifying the Summary
Deportation Order of the BOC and order her husband’s release from detention.
However, Javed Kiani himself, during the pendency of this case, filed an Omnibus
Motion Ad Cautelam with the BID, seeking the same reliefs, which his wife prayed for in
this case. By filing said motion, Javed Kiani sought to preempt the decision of this
Court. Petitioner and her husband even failed to inform the Court of the filing of such
motion, and did so only after the OSG had already informed the Court of such petition,
and after petitioner had been ordered to reply to the Comment of the OSG.

In this case, when petitioner filed her Petition for Habeas Corpus with the RTC in behalf
of her husband, a Charge Sheet had already been filed against him for violation of
Section 37(a)(7) and Section 45 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended.
The filing of the Charge Sheet before the BSI cured whatever irregularities or infirmities
were attendant to his arrest. The remedy of petitioner was to file a motion for the
dismissal of the Charge Sheet and the Mission Order of the Immigration Commissioner,
not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus before the RTC. The RTC had no authority to
nullify the Mission Order issued by the Immigration Commissioner, much less set aside
the arrest of Javed Kiani.

Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his
detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would
be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas
corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged
before any court. The term "court" includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation
Board of the Bureau of Immigration.

The CA acted in accord with jurisprudence when it affirmed the ruling of the RTC
declaring that it had no jurisdiction over petitioner’s plea to set aside the Summary
Deportation Order issued by the BOC against her husband Javed Kiani. Under Section
8, Chapter 3, Title I, Book III of Executive Order No. 292, the power to deport aliens is
vested on the President of the Philippines, subject to the requirements of due process.
The Immigration Commissioner is vested with authority to deport aliens under Section
37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. Thus, a party aggrieved by a
Deportation Order issued by the BOC is proscribed from assailing said Order in the RTC
even via a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Conformably with ruling of the Court in
Domingo v. Scheer, such party may file a motion for the reconsideration thereof before
the BOC. The Court ruled therein that "there is no law or rule which provides that a
Summary Deportation Order issued by the BOC in the exercise of its authority becomes
final after one year from its issuance, or that the aggrieved party is barred from filing a
motion for a reconsideration of any order or decision of the BOC." The Court, likewise,
declared that in deportation proceedings, the Rules of Court may be applied in a
suppletory manner and that the aggrieved party may file a motion for reconsideration of
a decision or final order under Rule 37 of said Rules.

In this case, the petitioner did not file any motion with the BOC for reconsideration of
the Summary Deportation Order or appeal therefrom; neither did she appeal to the
Secretary of Justice or to the Office of the President or file a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.

This rule, however, is not applicable in this case. What the petitioner assailed before the
RTC was a Summary Deportation Order of the BOC, not a BOC decision based on the
recommendation of the BSI after due hearing as mandated by Rule IX of the said Rules
of Procedure.

Principle:

Habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the
trial court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The
writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised
relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is
addressed to the question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any
reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other
remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances.
Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly course of
trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ
where exceptional circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas
corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and
irregularities not involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of
the trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty
must be preserved, and not destroyed. It has also been held that where restraint is under
legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void,
are not grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not
illegal.33

MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES v. LORAN S.D. ABANILLA, GR NO.

162734, 2006-08-29

Facts:

Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner Marie Antonette Abigail C.
Salientes are the parents of the minor Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with
Marie Antonette's parents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes.
Due to in-laws problems,private respondent suggested to his wife that they transfer to
their own house, but Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left the house of the
Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son.

Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as the representative of his son, filed a
Petition for Habeas Corpus and Custody,[3] docketed as Special Proceedings No. 03-
004 before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. OnJanuary 23, 2003, the trial...
directed to produce and bring before this Court the body of

Consequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, but the
same was dismissed.

The appellate court held that the trial court was still about to conduct a full inquiry, in a
summary proceeding, on the cause of the minor's detention and the matter of his
custody. The Court of Appeals ruled thus: a writ of habeas corpus is available against
any person who restrains the minor's right to see his father and vice versa

As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the assailed January 23, 2003 Order of
the trial court did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely
directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why they are restraining
his liberty was an interlocutory order precedent to the trial court's full inquiry into the
issue of custody, which was still pending before it.

The aggrieved party must show that the court gravely abused its discretion in issuing...
the interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent upon petitioners to show
that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order.

Issue:

Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is unavailable against the mother who, under the
law, has the right of custody of the minor they insist there was no illegal or involuntary
restraint of the minor by his own mother. There was no need for the mother to show
cause and explain the custody of her very own child

Ruling:

Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him.

unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care and custody, among
others, of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount consideration.

Principles:

Respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over
their son and consequently joint custody.

Although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated
by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are
still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondent's cause
of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition.

Go vs. Ramos G.R. No. 167569 Sept. 4, 2009

OCTOBER 16, 2017

FACTS:

These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis
T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of
Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable
alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmy’s
personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so. To prove his
contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmy’s citizenship as “FChinese.”

Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmy’s birth certificate that his parents,
Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only
the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were
typewritten. He also averred that in September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through
stealth, machination and scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with
the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, was able to procure a
Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs.

ISSUE:

Can the bailbond cancellation be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus?

RULING:

No. A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding
governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to
determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ
cannot be issued.

Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his
detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would
be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas
corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged
before any court. The term “court” in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of
governmental agencies authorized to order the person’s confinement, like the
Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. Likewise, the cancellation of his bail
cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the
Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the
Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail
even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.