RULE 72- Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules

PATRICIA NATCHER v. CA
G.R. No. 133000/ OCT 2, 2001 / BUENA, J./SPECPRO/AMOR

NATURE Petition for Review

PETITIONERS Patricia Natcher
RESPONDENTS Hon. Court of Appeals and the Heirs of Graciano Del Rosario Leticia Del Rosario,
Emilia Del Rosario-Manangan, Rosalinda Fuentes Llana, Rodolfo Fuentes, Alberto Fuentes, Evelyn Del
Rosario, And Eduardo Del Rosario

SUMMARY. The respondent children of decedent Graciano assails the sale of a parcel of land by the
decedent to his petitioner-wife (their stepmother) during the subsistence of a valid marriage. They
filed civil action for reconveyance and annulment of title against petitioner Natcher. The RTC ruled
that the sale was an advance on her legitime. The respondent-children question the jurisdiction of the
RTC acting as a court of general jurisdiction to pass upon the question of the advancement of property
made by the decedent to his heirs.

DOCTRINE. Under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or
alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court
having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding
on the person raising the questions and on the heir.

FACTS.
• Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land with
an area of 9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered by a TCT. They had six children.
• When Graciana died, Graciano and his children entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana’s
estate adjudicating and dividing amongst themselves the real estate property. Graciano received 8/14
of the share while his six children received 1/14 share each.
• Later on Graciano and his children entered into an Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real
Property with Waiver of Rights where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land. Graciano
then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to
4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Gracianos name. This
447.60 square meter lot was furthermore divided into two lots covered by two separate TCTs. The
first lot was sold to a third person but the second lot was sold to Patricia Natcher (petitioner) who at
the time of the sale was married to Graciano. Graciano died.
• Respondents, Graciano’s children, filed a civil case before the RTC against petitioner Natcher alleging
that upon Gracianos death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation
and forgery, acquired the lot, by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale. Similarly,
herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale,
their legitimes have been impaired.
• Petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married to Graciano on 20 March 1980 and thus, under
the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further alleged that
during Gracianos lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance, properties to his children, hence,
herein private respondents may not anymore claim against Gracianos estate or against herein
petitioners property.
• The RTC rendered a decision holding:
o The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is
prohibited by law and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of
property was agreed upon in the marriage settlements or that there has been decreed a
judicial separation of property between them, the spouses are prohibited from entering
(into) a contract of sale;
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 o The deed of sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally prohibited
by law under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;
o Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be
regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir
of the deceased.
• On appeal the CA held:
o It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of
the estate. The RTC, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance/annulment of title, went
beyond its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person. Thus the RTC erred in regarding the subject
property as an advance inheritance. What the court should have done was merely to rule on
the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on advancement to be resolved in a separate
proceeding instituted for that purpose.
• Aggrieved, petitioner Natcher assails the decision of the CA on a petition for review.

ISSUES & RATIO.

1. WON an RTC, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance and
annulment of title pass upon the question of advancement of property made by the decedent
to his heirs. – NO.

Under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to
have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding
on the person raising the questions and on the heir.

While it may be true that the Rules used the word may, it is nevertheless clear that the same provision
contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings.
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of
authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor
of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 71075 for reconveyance and annulment of
title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under
the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate
court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del
Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.

2. WON there was waiver on the part of the children of the authority of the RTC to rule on
the specific issue of advancement made by Graciano to petitioner Natcher. – NO.

The SC does not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as the six
children of the decedent even assailed the authority of the trial court, acting in its general
jurisdiction, to rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to
petitioner.Same rules apply here.

This Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo and Mendoza vs. Teh that
whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court (then Court of First
Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is not a
jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. It is a procedural question involving a mode of
practice which may be waived. But there was no waiver in this case.

DECISION.
Petition DENIED. CA affirmed.

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 LUISA KHO MONTAÑER, ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAÑER-BARRIOS, AND
RHODORA ELEANOR MONTAÑER-DALUPAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING
DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAÑER, Respondents.

PUNO, C.J.:

Doctrine: a special proceeding, "by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact,"
has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but
no definite adverse party.

FACTS:

On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montañer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montañer, Sr.
at the Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City. Petitioners Alejandro Montañer, Jr.,
Lillibeth Montañer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montañer-Dalupan are their children.4 On May 26,
1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died.5

On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S.
Montañer, both Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties before the Shari’a
District Court alleging that 1) the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim; (2) petitioners are the first
family of the decedent; (3) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent; and (4) Almahleen Liling
S. Montañer is the daughter of the decedent. They prayed, among others, the following: (1) the partition
of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the decedent.
Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the grounds that Shari’a District Court
has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr., because he was a Roman Catholic

At first, the Shari’a District Court dismissed the private respondents’ complaint. The district court held
that Alejandro Montañer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and
distribution of the estate of deceased Muslims. However, on MR, the Shari’a District Court reconsidered
its order of dismissal. The district court allowed private respondents to adduce further evidence. It also
ordered the continuation of trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial
conference.

Hence, petitioner sought recourse before the SC despite the fact that respondent Sharia District has not
rendered a decision yet if it has jurisdiction over the case.

ISSUE:

1) Did the respondent Sharia District Court lack jurisdiction over petitioners who are Roman Catholics
and Non-Muslims. (Civ-Pro issue)

2) Did the respondent Sharia District Court fail to acquire jurisdiction over the estates and properties
of the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. (The contention of the defendants is the prohibition)

RULING:

1) NO. Jurisdiction depends upon the averments in the complaint; not in the answer or motion to
dismiss.

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We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not have jurisdiction
over the case because of an allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss that Montañer, Sr. is not
a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and its subject matter does not depend
upon the defenses set forth in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Note that the determination of the
nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments and character of the relief
sought in the complaint or petition. In this case, although private respondents designated the
pleading filed before the Shari’a District Court as a "Complaint" for judicial partition of
properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim, such as the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death as well
as the allegation that he is a Muslim.

The Shari’a District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a defense
the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. The Shari’a District Court has the authority to hear and
receive evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination that
the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Shari’a District Court determines that the deceased was
not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

2) NO. We reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of
administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special
proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as "a remedy
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." This Court has applied
the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
Muslim. In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate,
the applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as
among the decedent’s heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the
settlement and liquidation of the estate of the decedent. Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact
of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death and, subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling S.
Montañer to be recognized as among his heirs, if such is the case in fact.

Petitioners’ argument that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party defendant
in a civil action applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the deceased is
misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite
adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules
illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which "a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong" necessarily has definite adverse
parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant. On the other hand, a special proceeding, "by
which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact," has one definite party, who
petitions or applies for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse
party. In the case at bar, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any
cause of action. As a special proceeding, the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the
decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, pay its liabilities, and to distribute the
residual to those entitled to the same.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the Shari’a District Court, dated August 22,
2006 and September 21, 2006 respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners. SO ORDERED.

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ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 230751 April 25, 2018
TOPIC: Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death
PONENTE: J. Velasco

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

• Judicial declaration of presumptive death is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a
valid subsequent marriage under Art. 41 of the Family Code.

• Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code involve a presumption of death already established by
law. There is no need to file such petition under said provisions before the court.

FACTS:
1. Estrellita Tadeo-Matias (Petitioner) was married to Wilfredo Matias who was a member of the
Philippine Constabulary and assigned in Araya, Pampanga. They were married on January 7,
1968.

2. On September 15, 1979, Wilfredo left their conjugal home at San Miguel, Tarlac City in order
to serve his duties. He was never seen or heard from again and has never made contact with
any of his or Petitioner’s relatives. Petitioner constantly sought updates from the Philippine
Constabulary regarding the whereabouts of her husband to no avail.

3. After 3 decades of waiting, Petitioner sought for a claim of death benefits under P.D. 1638 from
the Philippine Veteran’s Affair Office (PVAO) of the AFP. One of its requirements is a judicial
declaration of presumptive death.

4. RTC: Affirmed Petitioner and declared Petitioner’s husband presumptively dead under Art. 41
of the Family Code.

5. CA: Reversed RTC ruling since Art. 41only allows such declaration in cases of remarriage
which Petitioner did not seek.

ISSUE(S): Whether Petitioner can validly be granted the judicial declaration of presumptive death.

HELD: No. Petitioner erred in filing for judicial declaration of presumptive death which is not a viable
suit.

RATIO:
• Article 41 of the FC involves that presumption of death established therein is only applicable
for the
purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage.

• The RTC erred in considering said petition because it was not filed for the purpose of
remarriage under the FC but Art. 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absence still lives,
he
shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for those of succession. The absentee shall not be
presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of five years shall
be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened

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 Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the
estate
among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who
has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four
years;
(3) a person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four years.

• Since Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, an action
brought exclusively to declare a person presumptively dead under either of the said articles
actually presents no actual controversy that a court could decide. The presumption in the said
articles is already established by law. In short, the petition is not authorized by law.

• It is unnecessary for Petitioner to file for judicial declaration of presumptive death to claim
death benefits from the PVAO or the AFP. What is only required is evidence of the claimant
that the concerned soldier had been missing for a number of years and or under the
circumstance prescribed under Art. 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.

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GR No. 198680, July 8, 2013
HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON,
CICERO YPON, WILSON YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEÑALOSA,
PETITIONERS, vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS:
On July 29, 2010, the Ypons filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and
Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso
Ponteras Ricaforte. In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon (Magdaleno)
died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968

Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of SelfAdjudication and
caused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title,
leading to their subsequent transfer in his name.

In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced
by: (a) his certificate of Live Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a
certified true copy of his passport.
Further, by way of affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause
of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to state a cause of action; and (c) the case
is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that the
petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.

DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:

(1) RTC-Toledo: dismissed the case for lack of cause of action.
The Court also denied their motion for reconsideration due to the counsel’s failure to
state the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of
Compliance was issued.
Direct to the Supreme Court (pure questions of law)

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on the ground that the subject
complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper

RULING:
Yes, it was proper.

General Rule

The rule is that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the
corresponding special proceeding—precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for
cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the same. In the case of Heirs of
Teofilo Gabatan v. CA, the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the
determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper
special proceeding for such purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of
ownership and/or possession, as in this case.

The trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason
that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.

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Exception

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the
determination of heirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when
the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court
and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the
RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon, or when a special proceeding
had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence,
cannot be re-opened.

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to
exist.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same
fails to state a cause of action, a court cannot disregard decisions material to the
proper appreciation of the questions before it.25 Thus, concordant with applicable
jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action
for recovery of ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246
was altogether proper. In this light, it must be pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling
on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out and
determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement
should therefore be devoid of any legal effect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 is
hereby AFFIRMED, without prejudice to any subsequent proceeding to determine the
lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights concomitant therewith

Other notes (Remedial law related):

1. Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of
another. It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the
allegations in the complaint. In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient
cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff
would be entitled to the relief prayed for. Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient
basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed,
regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.

2. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court, a civil action is defined
as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or
the prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a
party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear
that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as
the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

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 Heirs of Gabatan v CA

TOPIC: Proof of filiation of illegitimate children

FACTS:
• The respondent alleges that she is the sole owner of a land located in Cagayan de Oro City which she
inherited from her mother, Hermogena, the only child of Juan Gabatan and his wife, Laureana Clarito.
• Respondent alleged that upon the death of Juan Gabatan, his land was entrusted to his brother,
Teofilo Gabatan (Teofilo), and Teofilo’s wife, Rita Gabatan, for administration.
• It was also claimed that prior to her death Hermogena demanded for the return of the land but to
no avail. After Hermogena’s death, respondent also did the same but petitioners refused to heed the
numerous demands to surrender the subject property.
• Petitioners denied that respondent’s mother Hermogena was the daughter of Juan Gabatan with
Laureana Clarito and that Hermogena or respondent is the rightful heir of Juan Gabatan. They
further contend that Juan Gabatan died single in 1934 and without any issue and that Juan was
survived by one brother and two sisters, namely: Teofilo (petitioners’ predecessor-in-interest),
Macaria and Justa.
• These siblings and/or their heirs, inherited the subject land from Juan Gabatan and have been in
actual, physical, open, public, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof in the
concept of owners for more than fifty (50) years and enjoyed the fruits of the improvements thereon,
to the exclusion of the whole world including respondent.
• October 20, 1995 = the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent
• CA affirmed such decision declaring that respondent’s claim of filiation with Juan Gabatan was
sufficiently established during trial.
o The proof was a Deed of Absolute Sale on July 30, 1966 containing such declaration which was
signed by Teofilo and the latter’s nearest relatives by consanguinity, is a tangible proof that they
acknowledged Hermogena’s status as the daughter of Juan Gabatan.
o Teofilo formally recognized Hermogena’s right to heirship from Juan Gabatan which ultimately
passed on to respondent.
o
ISSUE: W/N Hermogena Clareto "GABATAN" is the child and sole heir of Juan Gabatan;

HELD: No.
• Our laws dictate that the best evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth appearing
the Civil Register, or an authentic document or a final judgment – in the absence of these,
any proof that the child enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child
– only in the absence of these two classes of evidence is the anyone allowed to present other
porrof admissible under the Rules of Court of the proof of paternity and filiation

The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil
action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding.

To prove the relationship of respondent’s mother to Juan Gabatan, our laws dictate that the best
evidence of such familial tie was the record of birth appearing in the Civil Register, or an authentic
document or a final judgment. In the absence of these, respondent should have presented proof that her
mother enjoyed the continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Only in the absence of
these two classes of evidence is the respondent allowed to present other proof admissible under the
Rules of Court of her mother’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.

However, respondent’s mother’s (Hermogena’s) birth certificate, which would have been the best
evidence of Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan, was never offered as evidence at the RTC.

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Neither did respondent present any authentic document or final judgment categorically evidencing
Hermogena’s relationship to Juan Gabatan.

Respondent relied on the testimony of her witnesses but none of these witnesses had personal
knowledge of the fact of marriage of Juan to Laureana or the fact of birth of Hermogena to Juan and
Laureana. They were not yet born or were very young when Juan supposedly married Laureana or when
Hermogena was born and they all admitted that none of them were present at Juan and Laureana’s
wedding or Hermogena’s birth. These witnesses based their testimony on what they had been told by,
or heard from, others as young children. Their testimonies were, in a word, hearsay.

Aside from the testimonies of respondent’s witnesses, both the RTC and the CA relied heavily on a
photocopy of a Deed of Absolute Sale presented by respondent and which appeared to be signed by the
siblings and the heirs of the siblings of Juan Gabatan.

However, the admission of this Deed of Absolute Sale, including its contents and the signatures therein,
as competent evidence was vigorously and repeatedly objected to by petitioners’ counsel for being a
mere photocopy and not being properly authenticated. After a close scrutiny of the said photocopy of
the Deed of Absolute Sale, the Court cannot uphold the admissibility of the same.

Under the best evidence rule, when the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence
shall be admissible other than the original document itself. Although the best evidence rule admits of
exceptions and there are instances where the presentation of secondary evidence would be allowed,
such as when the original is lost or the original is a public record, the basis for the presentation of
secondary evidence must still be established. Thus, in Department of Education Culture and Sports v.
Del Rosario, we held that a party must first satisfactorily explain the loss of the best or primary evidence
before he can resort to secondary evidence. A party must first present to the court proof of loss or other
satisfactory explanation for non-production of the original instrument.

In the case at bar, a perusal of the transcript of the testimony of Felicisima Nagac Pacana (who identified
the photocopy of the Deed of Absolute Sale) plainly shows that she gave no testimony regarding the
whereabouts of the original, whether it was lost or whether it was recorded in any public office.

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 G.R. No. 157912, December 13, 2007

ALAN JOSEPH A. SHEKER, PETITIONER,

VS.
ESTATE OF ALICE O. SHEKER, VICTORIA S. MEDINA-ADMINISTRATRIX, RESPONDENT

Facts:

Victoria S. Medina is the duly appointed administratrix of the estate of Alice O. Sheker, which is pending
adjudication before the RTC of Iligan City. Alan Joseph Sheker filed a money claim against the estate, a
continent claim for agent’s commission due him amounting to approximately P206,250.00 in the event
of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate, and the amount of P275,000.00, as
reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating
the sale of said realties. Victoria moved to dismiss the money claim, on the following grounds: 1) the
requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2)
petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach
a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally.

Issue:

Must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a certification against non-forum
shopping, failing which such claim should be dismissed?
.
The Ruling:

The petition is imbued with merit. However, it must be emphasized that petitioner’s contention that
rules in ordinary actions are only supplementary to rules in special proceedings is not entirely correct.

Section 2, Rule 72, Part II of the same Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. – In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided
for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the Rules of Court govern special proceedings; but
in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part I of the Rules governing ordinary civil
actions shall be applicable to special proceedings, as far as practicable. The word “practicable” is defined
as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished⁠1. This means
that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings
as much as possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings.
Nowhere in the Rules of Court does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable
or merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification
of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written explanation for non-
personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not
in any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such as the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person as in the present case.

Thus, the principal question in the present case is: did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner’s contingent
money claim against respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a certification
against non-forum shopping?

The Court rules in the affirmative.

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The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory
pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an
initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing
of the petition for allowance of the decedent’s will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims
against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their
respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions. ⁠

Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors’ claims to be
recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate.

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent’s estate;
more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere
contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner’s contingent money claim, not being an initiatory
pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6
dated January 15, 2003 and April 9, 2003, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional
Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 6, is hereby DIRECTED to give due course and take appropriate action
on petitioner’s money claim in accordance with Rule 82 of the Rules of Court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

12
Case Title: Hilado vs CA, GR No. 164108 May 8, 2009

Facts: Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000; survived by his wife, private respondent
Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-
Paulino two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners.
Julita Campos Benedicto filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor which
was granted by the RTC of Manila. The value of the assets of the decedent is P5 Million, "net of liabilities."
In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among the liabilities,
the above-mentioned two pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.
RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and appraisal report
pertaining to the estate. Then, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex
Abundanti Cautela, praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to
the intestate proceedings.
RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not
interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate
proceedings.
Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue/s:
1. WON creditors whose credit is based on contingent claim have the right to participate in the
settlement proceeding by way of intervention under Rule 19.
2. WON petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of the deceased, are entitled to
copies of all the processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceeding.
Ruling:
#1
Notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to
creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of "intervention"
under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.
Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so
situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of
the court x x x" While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from
intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required
of an intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and
expectant."
#2
In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person
interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings,
but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those
proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners,
they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly
provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the
estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected.
Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is an
eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon
13
them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and
disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied.
Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all
"interested parties" the petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to such notice. The instances
when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to
the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b)
of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or
to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for
the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue.
After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the
pending cases filed by the petitioners.

14
RULE 73- Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,

vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.

G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013

FACTS

Elise Quiazon is the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and his common-law wife Ma. Lourdes Belen. When
Eliseo died intestate, Elise represented by her mother, Lourdes, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration before the RTC of Las Piñas City in order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent
the dissipation of its value. She likewise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s
estate. Amelia Quiazon, to whom Eliseo was married, together with her two children, filed an
Opposition/Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue asserting that Eliseo was a resident of
Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners
averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s
estate.

RTC rendered a decision directing the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the
necessary bond. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals.
In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo
and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in
1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld
the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not Las Pinas City was the proper venue.

2. Whether or not Elise is qualified to be administrator of the estate.

HELD:

1. YES. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of
the estate of a decedent should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at
the time of his death:

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance now
Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any
province in which he had estate.

The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or
when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.

15
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where the statute uses word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases
make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing
venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other
words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a
place and actual stay thereat. Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one
and the same meaning. As thus defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing
more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity
and consistency.

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the
ruling of the RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas
City. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road,
Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be
laid in the said city.

2. Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is
deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to
prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the administration
of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the
Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is
on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to
her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied.Having a vested right in the distribution of
Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party
within the purview of the law.

16
 ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. L-24742
October 26, 1973
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals

FACTS:

Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two minor sons,
residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children
from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance
(CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in
Cebu and Quezon City. The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife
(widow), filed a petition with CFI Rizal (Quezon City) for the probate of the last will and testament,
where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but
the said court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon City shall have acted on
the probate proceedings. CFI Cebu, in effect deferred to the probate proceedings in the Quezon City
court. Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon City, on ground of lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction
over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Lourdes filed special civil action of
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent CA. CA favored Lourdes holding
that CFI Cebu had first acquired jurisdiction.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition against Quezon City court ordering it
to refrain from proceeding with the testate proceedings.
2. Whether or not CFI Quezon City acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking
cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI
Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate
proceedings.

HELD:

1. Yes. The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the
Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its
orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the last will and testament of the deceased
and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's
wish.

Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The residence of the decent or the location of his estate
is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. Conversely, such court,
may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented in
another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving
widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that
the decedent died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and
hold the petition before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it
the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged last will. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was
that if the will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline
to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and

17
 improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other
courts.
2. No. Under the facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the
Quezon City court. Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without
jurisdiction in taking cognizance of and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1,
the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction
to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule
only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court undisputably had at least equal and coordinate
jurisdiction over the estate.
NOTE (additional info):
• Opposition to jurisdiction of trial court in settlement proceedings should be by appeal: Under Rule 73,
section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the
basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the
first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile therein — with the
deference in comity duly given by the Cebu court — could not be contested except by appeal from said
court in the original case except when want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
• When proceedings for settlement of estate will not be annulled even if court had improper venue: the
mischievous effect in the administration of justice" of considering the question of residence as affecting
the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over again the
same proceedings before another court of the same rank in another province is too obvious to require
comment. It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be
executrix of the decedent's last will and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her
rights under the rule on venue and the law on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time,
money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu court everytime she has an important
matter of the estate to take up with the probate court.

18
ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 230751 April 25, 2018
TOPIC: Judicial Declaration of Presumptive Death
PONENTE: J. Velasco

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

• Judicial declaration of presumptive death is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a
valid subsequent marriage under Art. 41 of the Family Code.

• Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code involve a presumption of death already established by
law. There is no need to file such petition under said provisions before the court.

FACTS:
6. Estrellita Tadeo-Matias (Petitioner) was married to Wilfredo Matias who was a member of the
Philippine Constabulary and assigned in Araya, Pampanga. They were married on January 7,
1968.

7. On September 15, 1979, Wilfredo left their conjugal home at San Miguel, Tarlac City in order
to serve his duties. He was never seen or heard from again and has never made contact with
any of his or Petitioner’s relatives. Petitioner constantly sought updates from the Philippine
Constabulary regarding the whereabouts of her husband to no avail.

8. After 3 decades of waiting, Petitioner sought for a claim of death benefits under P.D. 1638 from
the Philippine Veteran’s Affair Office (PVAO) of the AFP. One of its requirements is a judicial
declaration of presumptive death.

9. RTC: Affirmed Petitioner and declared Petitioner’s husband presumptively dead under Art. 41
of the Family Code.

10. CA: Reversed RTC ruling since Art. 41only allows such declaration in cases of remarriage
which Petitioner did not seek.

ISSUE(S): Whether Petitioner can validly be granted the judicial declaration of presumptive death.

HELD: No. Petitioner erred in filing for judicial declaration of presumptive death which is not a viable
suit.

RATIO:
• Article 41 of the FC involves that presumption of death established therein is only applicable
for the
purpose of contracting a valid subsequent marriage.

• The RTC erred in considering said petition because it was not filed for the purpose of
remarriage under the FC but Art. 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absence still lives,
he
shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for those of succession. The absentee shall not be
presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of five years shall
be sufficient in order that his succession may be opened

19
 Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the
estate
among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who
has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four
years;
(3) a person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four years.

• Since Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence, an action
brought exclusively to declare a person presumptively dead under either of the said articles
actually presents no actual controversy that a court could decide. The presumption in the said
articles is already established by law. In short, the petition is not authorized by law.

• It is unnecessary for Petitioner to file for judicial declaration of presumptive death to claim
death benefits from the PVAO or the AFP. What is only required is evidence of the claimant
that the concerned soldier had been missing for a number of years and or under the
circumstance prescribed under Art. 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.

20
RULE 74- Summary Settlement of Estate

BUTIONG VS. PLAZO G.R. NO. 187524 AUGUST 5, 2015

FACTS:

Rifioza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his children with his first wife, respondents Plazo
and Alaras, as well as several properties including a resort covered by TCT, and a family home, both
located in Batangas.

In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of
Possession respondents alleged that sometime in March 1991, they discovered that their co-heirs,
Pedro’s second wife, Benita and other children, had sold the subject properties to petitioners, spouses
Villafria and Butiong, now deceased and substituted by their son, Dr. Ruel, without their knowledge and
consent. When confronted about the sale, Benita acknowledged the same, showing respondents a
document she believed evidenced receipt of her share in the sale, which, however, did not refer to any
sort of sale but to a previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank. The document actually
evidenced receipt from Banco Silangan releasing her and her late husband’s indebtedness therefrom.
Upon inquiry, the RD of Nasugbu informed respondents that he has no record of any transaction
involving the subject properties, giving them certified true copies of the titles to the same. When
respondents went to the subject properties, they discovered that 4 out of the 8 cottages in the resort
had been demolished. They were not, however, able to enter as the premises were padlocked.

Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a notice of an extra-judicial settlement of
estate of their late father was published in a tabloid called Balita. Because of this, They caused the
annotation of their adverse claims over the subject properties before the RD of Nasugbu and filed their
complaint praying, among others, for the annulment of all documents conveying the subject properties
to the petitioners and certificates of title issued pursuant thereto.

In their Answer, petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the ground of lack of personal
knowledge and good faith in acquiring the subject properties. In the course of his testimony during trial,
petitioner Francisco further contended that what they purchased was only the resort. He also presented
an Extra-Judicial Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and Sale which
provides, among others, that respondents' co-heirs sold the family home to the spouses Bondoc for Pl
million as well as a Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners for ₱650, 000.00.

➢ RTC: Nullified the transfer of the subject properties to petitioners and spouses Bondoc due to
irregularities in the Documents of conveyance offered by petitioners. Also, it is observed by the court
that the documents were never presented to the Office of the RD for registration and that the
properties are still in the names of Pedro and Benita.

o Declared null – Extra-Judicial Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiation and Waiver of

Rights and Sale
o Ordering Defendants to vacate its premises and to deliver possession
o Declared the plaintiffs and defendant heirs in the Amended Complaint to be the legitimate
heirs of decedent

➢ CA: Affirmed RTC’s judgment

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a MR raising the RTC’s lack of jurisdiction. It was alleged that when the
Complaint for Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession was filed, there
was yet no settlement of Pedro's estate, determination as to the nature thereof, nor was there an

21
identification of the number of legitimate heirs. As such, the TC ruled on the settlement of the intestate
estate of Pedro in its ordinary· jurisdiction when the action filed was for Judicial Partition.

Considering that the instant action is really one for settlement of intestate estate, the trial court, sitting
merely in its probate jurisdiction, exceeded its jurisdiction when it ruled upon the issues of forgery and
ownership. Thus, petitioner argued that. Said ruling is void and has no effect for having been rendered
without jurisdiction. The MR was denied by the appellate court.

ISSUE: W/N THE RTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE?

RULING: YES, It is elementary that' the active participation of a party in a case pending against him
before a court is tantamount to recognition of that court's jurisdiction and willingness to abide by the
resolution of the case which will bar said party from later on impugning the court’s jurisdiction. In fine,
under the circumstances obtaining in this case the Petitioners are estopped from assailing the Court a
quo 's lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner asserts that while the complaint filed by respondents was captioned as "Judicial Partition
with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession," the allegations therein show that the cause of
action is actually one for settlement of estate of decedent Pedro.

Considering that settlement of estate is a special proceeding cognizable by a probate court of limited
jurisdiction while judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession are ordinary civil
actions cognizable by a court of general jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in
entertaining the latter while it was sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction. This is in view of the
prohibition found in the Rules on the joiner of special civil actions and ordinary civil actions.

Thus, petitioner argued that the ruling of the trial court is void and has no effect for having been
rendered in without jurisdiction. The petition is bereft of merit. It is true that some of respondents'
causes of action pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and
the nature and extent of their interests thereon may fall under an action for settlement of estate.

However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of the suit,
the allegations therein, and the relief’s prayed for, the action, is clearly one for judicial partition with
annulment of title and recovery of possession.

Under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691), amending Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the RTC
shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation
is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Since the action herein was not merely for partition and
recovery of ownership but also for annulment of title and documents, the action is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and thus cognizable by the RTC.

Hence, considering that the trial court clearly had jurisdiction in rendering its decision, the instant
petition for annulment of judgment must necessarily fail. Indeed, a judgment which has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable, hence, may no longer be modified in any respect except
to correct clerical errors or mistakes, all the issues between the parties being deemed resolved and
laid to rest.

It is a fundamental principle in our judicial system and essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be, not through
a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict. Exceptions to the immutability of final
judgment are allowed only under the most extraordinary of circumstances.

22
 SPOUSES BENATIRO vs HEIRS OF CUYOS

G.R. No. 161220 July 30, 2008

FACTS:

Spouses Evaristo Cuyos and Agatona Arrogante Cuyos had nine children, namely: Francisco, Victoria,
Columba, Lope, Salud, Gloria, Patrocenia, Numeriano, and Enrique. On August 28, 1966, Evaristo died
leaving six parcels of land located in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu.

Before the CFI, after filing a petition to have herself appointed administrator, and after filing an
opposition thereto, Gloria & Fransisco, assisted by their corresponding counsels, agreed to have Gloria
appointed as administratrix of the estate & letters of administration of the estate of the late Evaristo
Cuyos were issued in favor of Mrs. Gloria Cuyos Talian after posting a nominal bond of P1,000.00. The
Clerk of Court, Atty. Taneo was appointed to act as Commissioner to effect the agreement of the parties
and to prepare the project of partition. In his Commissioner’s report dated July 29, 1976, Atty. Taneo
stated that he issued subpoenae supplemented by telegrams to all the heirs to cause their appearance
on February 28 and 29, 1976 in Tapilon, Daanbantayan, Cebu, where the properties are located, for a
conference or meeting to arrive at an agreement; that out of the nine heirs, only respondents Gloria,
Salud and Enrique Cuyos failed to attend. He reported that those who were present agreed not to
partition the properties of the estate but instead agreed to first sell it for the sum of P40,000.00 & divide
the proceeds equally. Columba bought the properties. The CFI appointed Lope Cuyos (Cuyos) as the
new administrator of the estate based on Gloria’s absence & change of residence. The Court ordered the
Administratrix to execute the deed of sale afterthe payment of the sum ofP36,000 which shall remain
in custodia legis, then divided among the heirs after payment of necessary taxes.

Cuyos executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over the six parcels of land in favor of Columba for a
consideration of the sum of P36,000.00. Original Certificates of Titles were issued in favor of the latter.

In Feb 1998, Gloria, Patrocenia , Numeriano, Enrique & Salud filed with the CA a petition for annulment
of the order of the CFI of Cebu, alleging that the CFI’s order was null and void and of no effect, the same
being based on a Commissioner's Report, which was patently false and irregular; that such report
practically deprived them of due process in claiming their share of their father's estate, clearly showing
that extrinsic fraud caused them to be deprived of their property.

The CA granted the petition and declared the CFI order & the Certificates of Title issued in the name of
Columba Cuyos-Benatiro null & void, hence this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

WON extrinsic fraud existed in the case at bar serving as a sufficient ground to annul the CFI’s order.

HELD:

The Court held that the CFI;s order should be annulled not on the ground of extrinsic fraud, as there is
no sufficient evidence to hold Atty. Taneo or any of the heirs guilty of fraud, but on the ground that the
assailed order is void for lack of due process.

Section 2 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court provides that: Grounds for annulment of judgment. — The
annulment may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

However, jurisprudence recognizes denial of due process as additional ground therefor.

23
The veracity of Atty. Taneo’s report was doubtful. There was no evidence showing that the heirs indeed
convened for the purpose of arriving at an agreement regarding the estate properties, since they were
not even required to sign anything to show their attendance of the alleged meeting. The Commissioner's
Report, which embodied the alleged agreement of the heirs, did not bear the signatures of the alleged
attendees to show their consent and conformity thereto. It was imperative that all the heirs must be
present in the conference and be heard to afford them the opportunity to protect their interests. The
CFI adopted and approved the Report despite the absence of the signatures of all the heirs showing
conformity thereto. The CFI's order based on a void Commissioner's Report, is a void judgment for lack
of due process.

The CFI's order being null and void may be assailed anytime, the respondents' right to due process is
the paramount consideration in annulling the assailed order. An action to declare the nullity of a void
judgment does not prescribe. Since the CFI judgment is void, it has no legal and binding effect, force or
efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is non-existent. Hence, the execution of the Deed of
Sale by Lope in favor of Columba pursuant to said void judgment, the issuance of titles pursuant to said
Deed of Sale, and the subsequent transfers are void ab initio.

The petition was denied

24
 CUA vs. VARGAS G.R. No. 156536 October 31, 2006 Rule 74, Extrajudicial Settlement

FACTS:

A parcel of residential land was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. A notarized Extra Judicial
Settlement Among Heirs was executed by and among the heirs, partitioning and adjudicating unto
themselves the lot in question and was published for 3 weeks. An Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs
with Sale was again executed by and among the same heirs over the same property and also with the
same sharings. Only 5 of the 9 heirs signed the document and their respective shares were sold to Joseph
Cua, petitioner herein.

After knowing of such sale to petitioner, Gloria Vargas tried to redeem the property. When the offer to
redeem was refused, Gloria Vargas and her children filed a case for annulment of Extra Judicial
Settlement and Legal Redemption of the lot with the MTC. The MTC dismissed the complaint, declaring
the Deed of Extra Judicial Settlement among Heirs with Sale valid and binding. The RTC affirmed the
MTC decision.

The CA reversed the ruling of both lower courts, declaring that the Extra Judicial Settlement Among
Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale were void and without any legal effect.
The CA held that, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the extrajudicial settlement made
by the other co-heirs is not binding upon respondents considering the latter never participated in it nor
did they ever signify their consent to the same.

Petitioner argued among others, that the acquisition by petitioner of the subject property subsequent
to the extrajudicial partition was valid because the partition was duly published. The publication of the
same constitutes due notice to respondents and signifies their implied acquiescence thereon.
Respondents are therefore estopped from denying the validity of the partition and sale at this late stage.
Considering that the partition was valid, respondents no longer have the right to redeem the property.

ISSUE:

Whether heirs are deemed constructively notified and bound, regardless of their failure to participate
therein, by an extrajudicial settlement and partition of estate when the extrajudicial settlement and
partition has been duly published.

RULING:
The petition lacks merit.

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states,
however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be
bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement
and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed
of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed
as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement
among heirs.

The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no
knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The
requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive
heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent’s estate.

25
Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made
without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned.

This is not to say, though, that respondents’ co-heirs cannot validly sell their hereditary rights to third
persons even before the partition of the estate. The heirs who actually participated in the execution of
the extrajudicial settlements, which included the sale to petitioner of their pro indiviso shares in the
subject property, are bound by the same.

Nevertheless, respondents are given the right to redeem these shares pursuant to Article 1088 of the
Civil Code. The right to redeem was never lost because respondents were never notified in writing of
the actual sale by their co-heirs. Based on the provision, there is a need for written notice to start the
period of redemption, thus:

Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-
heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale,
provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of the
sale by the vendor.

It bears emphasis that the period of one month shall be reckoned from the time that a co-heir is notified
in writing by the vendor of the actual sale. Written notice is indispensable and mandatory, actual
knowledge of the sale acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding. It cannot
be counted from the time advance notice is given of an impending or contemplated sale. The law gives
the co-heir thirty days from the time written notice of the actual sale within which to make up his or
her mind and decide to repurchase or effect the redemption.

It should be kept in mind that the obligation to serve written notice devolves upon the vendor co-heirs
because the latter are in the best position to know the other co-owners who, under the law, must be
notified of the sale.

Considering, therefore, that respondents’ co-heirs failed to comply with this requirement, there is no
legal impediment to allowing respondents to redeem the shares sold to petitioner.

26
 SPOUSES DOMINGO v. ROCES
G.R. No.147468
April 9, 2003

DOCTRINE

The annotation at the title of a property pursuant to Rule 74, Sec. 4 is not confined to the heirs or original
distributes of the estate properties.

Facts:

1. Cesar and Lilia Roces were owners of two contiguous parcels of land. In 1962, the GSIS caused
the annotation of an adverse claim on their titles, alleging that the spouses had mortgaged the
same to it. Later on, when the titles were to be surrendered to GSIS, the spouses failed to do so,
and the GSIS had such title duplicates in their possession declared null and void.

2. Cesar Roces died intestate. He was survived by his widow and their children.

3. In 1992, a certain Reynaldo Montinola, a nephew of Lilia Roces, executed an affidavit of self-
adjudication over the subject properties. A year later, he filed a petition against GSIS for the
cancellation of the title which was in the possession of GSIS. GSIS lost the case, and it’s titles were
cancelled, and ownership awarded to Montinola.

4. Later in the same year, Montinola sold the property in favor of the Petitioners, the Domingo
Spouses. Such sale was subject to the provision of Section 4 of Rule 74:

“Subject to the provision of Sec. 4, Rule 74 of the RoC with respect to the inheritance left by the
deceased Sps. Cesar Roces and Lilia Montinola”

5. Now came the Defendants Roces siblings. They alleged that the affidavit of selfadjudication
Montinola executed was null and void for Lilia Roces was not even dead. Because of this, the sale
of the property was done without authority, and therefore null and void as well.

6. But the Domingo Spouses, the buyers, contended that despite the annotation of the provision of
Rule 74, they were buyers in good faith, and by that very fact, in addition to the siblings’ being in
estoppel and guilty of laches, the sale was valid.
Issue:

Could the sale have been valid, in light of a fact that the Spouses Domingo were not covered by the Rule
74 annotation? (AKA: Were the spouses buyers in good faith?) Were the respondents guilty of laches
and estoppel?

Held:

1. Rule 74 clearly covers transfers of real property to any person.

27
2. Contrary to petitioner's’ contention, the effects of this provision are not confined to the heirs or
original distributes of the estate properties;
3. As the provision provides, such effects affect any transferee of the property. There is no doubt
the Spouses Domingo were covered by ―any transferee
4. Therefore, buyers of real property the title of which contains an annotation pursuant to Section
4, Rule 74 cannot be considered innocent purchasers for value;
5. The presence of an irregularity in the title which excites or arouses suspicion should prompt the
buyer to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor;
6. This the spouses did not do, and hence cannot at all be considered buyers in good faith.
7. As to the claim that the respondents were guilty of laches and estoppel, it is untenable.
8. Estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or
declined to assert it.
9. In the case at bar, only four months elapsed from the time respondents discovered Montinolas
fraudulent acts, sometime in May 1993, to the time they filed their complaint on September 6,
1993. This relatively short span of time can hardly be called unreasonable, especially considering
that respondents used this period of time to investigate the transfers of the property

28
RULE 75- Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary

Manahan vs Manahan

SYLLABUS

1. WILL; PROBATE OF WILL. — The appellant was not entitled to notification of the order admitting the
will to probate, inasmuch as she was not an interested party, not having filed an opposition to the
petition for the probate thereof. Her allegation that she had the status of an heir, being the decedent’s
sister, did not confer upon her the right to be notified in view of the fact that the testatrix died leaving
a will in which the appellant has not been instituted heir. Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did
not acquire any successional right.

2. ID.; ID.; AUTHENTICATION AND PROBATE. — In the phraseology of the procedural law there is no
essential difference between the authentication of a will and the probate thereof. The words
authentication and probate are synomymous in this case. All the law requires is that the competent
court declare that in the execution of the will the essential external formalities have been complied with
and that, in view thereof, the document, as a will, is valid and effective in the eyes of the law.

3. ID.; ID.; CONCLUSIVE CHARACTER OF THE DECREE OF PROBATE. — The decree admitting a will to
probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it cannot be impugned on any of the
grounds authorized by law, except that of a fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceeding.

4. ID.; ID.; PROCEEDINGS "IN REM." — The proceedings followed in a testamentary case being in rem,
the decree admitting the will to probate was effective and conclusive against the appellant, in
accordance with section 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

5. ID.; ID.; INTERLOCUTORY ORDER. — The appellant could not appeal from the trial court’s order
denying her motion for reconsideration and a new trial in view of the fact that said order was
interlocutory in character.

FACTS:

The trial court appointed the herein petitioner executrix with a bond of P1,000, and likewise appointed
the committee on claims and appraisal, whereupon the testamentary proceedings followed the usual
course.

One year and seven months later, that is, on May 11, 1932, to be exact, the appellant herein filed a
motion for reconsideration and a new trial, praying that the order admitting the will to probate be
vacated and the authenticated will declared null and void ab initio.

In this instance, the appellant assigns seven (7) alleged errors as committed by the trial court. Instead
of discussing them one by one, we believe that, essentially, her claim narrows down to the following:

(1) That she was an interested party in the testamentary proceedings and, as such, was entitled
to and should have been notified of the probate of the will;

(2) that the court, did not really probate the will limited itself to decreeing its authentication; and

(3) that the will is null and void ab initio on the ground that the external formalities prescribed
by the Code of Civil Procedure have not been complied with in the execution thereof.

The appellant’s first contention is obviously unfounded and untenable.

29
She was not entitled to notification of the probate of the will and neither had she the right to expect it,
inasmuch as she was not an interested party, not having filed an opposition to the petition for the
probate thereof. Her allegation that she had the status of an heir, being the deceased’s sister, did
not confer on her the right to be notified on the ground that the testatrix died leaving a will in
which the appellant has not been instituted heir. Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did
not acquire any successional right.

The second contention is puerile. The court really decreed the authentication and probate of the will in
question, which is the only pronouncement required of the trial court by the law in order that the will
may be considered valid and duly executed in accordance with the law. In the phraseology of the
procedural law, there is no essential difference between the authentication of a will and the probate
thereof. The words authentication and probate are synonymous in this case. All the law requires
is that the competent court declare that in the execution of the will the essential external formalities
have been complied with and that, in view thereof, the document, as a will, is valid and effective in the
eyes of the law.

The last contention of the appellant may be refuted merely by stating that, once a will has been
authenticated and admitted to probate, questions relative to the validity thereof can no more be
raised on appeal. The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof
and it cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any
separate or independent action or proceeding.

NOTE: RULE 75 Section 1- No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and
allowed in a proper court. Subject to the right of appeal, the allowance of a will is conclusive as to its
due execution.

30
GARCIA vs SANTOS

FACTS: When Consuelo Garcia died, she left behind several personal and real properties. Herein
petitioners, namely Caralino, Ricardo, Ronaldo, Carmela, Melissa and Gerard (all surnamed Tanchanco)
grandchildren of the decedent petitioned the RTC of Pasay City for the settlement of the intestate estate
of their grandmother. Wherein they alleged that the decedent’s properties are in the possession of one
Natividad Garcia-Santos, their aunt. They also allege that Natividad had also been misappropriating and
dissipating disputed properties. Natividad alleges that Consuelo did not die intestate and that she left
behind a last will and testament which she had already filed for probate in the RTC of Pasay City. The
existence of the last will and testament is also corroborated by the lawyers, Atty. Tantuico, Lallana,
Paras and Marapao. The Tanchanco’s allege that the will was produced through fraud, intimidation, and
deceit because it was not written in English the language normally employed by decedent to converse
and communicate, moreover said will did not conform to the provisions of article 805 of the Civil Code,
and thus fatally defective. The Tanchanco’s pray that the will be processed intestate instead and
disallowed probate.

ISSUES: Whether or not the will should be allowed probate

RULING: An examination of Consuelo’s will shows that it had complied with the formalities required by
the law. Except that the attestation clause failed to indicate the total number of pages upon which the
will was written. The rule stands that omissions which can be supplied by an examination of the will
itself, without need of resorting to extrinsic evidence will not be fatal and corresponding would not
obstruct the allowance to probate of the will being assailed. However those omissions which cannot be
supplied except by evidence aliunde would result in the invalidation of the attestation clause and
ultimately, of the will itself. In the instant case the attestation clause indisputably omitted to mention
the number of pages comprising the will. Nevertheless, the acknowledgement portion of the will
supplied the omission by stating that the will has five pages. Undoubtedly such substantially complied
with article 809 of the Civil Code. Mere reading and observation of the will, without resorting to other
extrinsic evidence yields the conclusion that there are actually five pages even if the said information
was not provided in the attestation clause. In any case, the CA declared that there was substantial
compliance with directives of Article 805 of the Civil Code. Also the Tanchanco’s failed to prove that the
will was executed through force or under duress, or that the signature of the testator was produced
through fraud. Considering the foregoing the will should be allowed probate.

Nuguid vs Nuguid, No. L-23445, June 23, 1966; 17 SCRA 449

Facts: Rosario died without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate
parents – Felix and Paz, and 6 brothers and sisters.

Remedios, one of the sister filed in court a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario instituting the
former as the sole, universal heir of all her properties. She prayed that said will be admitted to probate
and that letter of administration be issued to her.

Felix and Paz opposed to the probate of the will on the ground that by the institution of Remedios as
universal heir of the deceased, oppositors – who are compulsory heirs in the direct ascending line –
were illegally preterited and that in consequence, the institution is void.

31
Article 854 provides that preterition of one, some or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir.

Petitioners contention is that the present is a case of ineffective disinheritance rather than one of
preterition drawing the conclusion that Article 854 does not apply in the case at bar.

Issue: WON the institution of one of the sister of the deceased as the sole, universal heir preterited the
compulsory heirs.

Held: Yes. Where the deceased left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate, but she left forced heirs
in the direct ascending line – her parents, and her holographic will does not explicitly disinherit them
but simply omits their names altogether, the case is one of preterition of the parents, not a case of
ineffective disinheritance.

Preterition “consists in the omission in the testator’s will of the forced heirs or anyone of them, either
because they are not mentioned therein, or, through mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor
are expressly disinherited”. Disinheritance, in turn, “is a testamentary disposition depriving any
compulsory heir of his share in the legitime for a cause authorized by law”.

Where the one sentence will institutes the petitioner as the sole, universal heir and preterits the parents
of the testatrix, and it contains no specific legacies or bequests, such universal institution of petitioner,
by itself, is void. And intestate succession ensues.

In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX BALANAY,
JR., Petitioner, v. HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao
Branch VI; AVELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN, Respondents.

FACTS:

Leodegaria Julian, in her will, partitioned her paraphernal as well as all the conjugal properties as if they
were all owned by her, disposing of her husband’s one-half share, and providing that the properties
should not be divided during her husband’s lifetime but should remain intact and that the legitimes
should be paid in cash to be satisfied out of the fruits of the properties. Thereafter, Felix Balanay, Jr.
filed a petition for the approval of his mother’s will which was opposed by the husband and some of her

32
children. During the pendency of the probate proceedings petitioner submitted to the court a document
"Conformation (sic) of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" showing his father’s conformity
to the testamentary distribution, renouncing his hereditary rights in favor of his children in deference
to the memory of his wife. The Court denied the opposition, set for hearing the probate of the will and
gave effect to the affidavit and conformity of the surviving spouse. Meanwhile, a certain Atty. David
Montaña, Sr. allegedly, in behalf of the petitioner, moved to dismiss the probate proceedings and
requested authority to proceed by intestate proceedings on the ground that the will was void. Such
motion was granted by the probate court and dismissed the petition for probate and converted the
testate proceeding to intestate proceedings Subsequently, the court appointed the branch clerk as
special administrator, and notice to creditors was issued and published in the Davao Star. Petitioner
impugned the order of dismissal by filing a Motion for Reconsideration claiming that Atty. Montaña had
no authority to ask for the dismissal of the petition for allowance of will and that the court erred in
declaring the will void before resolving the question of its formal validity. However, it was opposed by
the oppositors. The lower court denied such motion and declared that the will was void based on its
own independent assessment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a preterited spouses in a testamentary will renders such will intrinsically void

HELD:
NO. Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, the preterition of the compulsory heir in the direct line,
whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

Thus, the preterition of the parents annuls the institution of the sister of the testatrix, and
renders the will intrinsically void; and if there are no legacies and devices, total intestacy results.

However, in this case, the preterition of the surviving spouse does not produce intestacy nor
render the will intrinsically void, especially if the preterited spouse signified his conformity to his wife’s
will and renounced his hereditary rights.

SOFIA J. NEPOMUCENO vs. CA, RUFINA GOMEZ, OSCAR JUGO ANG, CARMELITA JUGO

FACTS

In 1974, Martin Jugo died and left a last Will and Testament. In said Will, the testator named petitioner
as executor of his estate. It is clearly stated in the Will that the testator was legally married to a certain
Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, Oscar and Carmelita, but since 1952, he had
been estranged from his lawful wife and had been living with petitioner as husband and wife. In fact

33
testator and petitioner were married before a Justice of the Peace. The testator devised to his forced
heirs, his legal wife and children, his entire estate, and the free portion thereof to petitioner.

Petitioner filed a petition for the probate of the will and asked for the issuance to her of letters
testamentary. Private respondents filed an opposition. Lower court denied the probate of the Will.
Petitioner appealed to respondent court, which set aside lower court’s decision. Respondent court
declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void pursuant
to Article 739 in relation with Article 1028 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.

ISSUE

Whether or not respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction in passing upon the intrinsic validity
of the testamentary provision in favor of petitioner

RATIO DECIDENDI

The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it
went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner
null and void.

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination
and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not absolute. Given exceptional
circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass
upon certain provisions of the Will.

In Nuguid v. Nuguid, the testator instituted the petitioner as universal heir and completely preterited
her surviving forced heirs. A will of this nature, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, would
be null and void. Separate proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provisions
would be superfluous.

Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even
before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. There is no dispute over the extrinsic validity of
the Will. Both parties agree it was executed with all the formalities required by law and that the testator
had the mental capacity to execute his Will.

The only issue, therefore, is the jurisdiction of the respondent court to declare the testamentary
provision in favor of the petitioner as null and void.

We sustain the respondent court's jurisdiction. As stated in Nuguid v. Nuguid, litigation will be
protracted; probability exists that the case will come up once again before us on the same issue of the
intrinsic validity or nullity of the will.

We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to the proper court
in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a will, the court does not
ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions.

Article 739 of the Civil Code provides:

The following donations shall be void:

(1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the
donation;

34
 (2) Those made between persons found guilty of the same criminal offense, in consideration
thereof;

(3) Those made to a public officer or his wife, descendants and ascendants, by reason of his office.

Article 1028 of the Civil Code provides:

The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to
testamentary provisions.

Nepomuceno contends that she acted in good faith for 22 years in the belief that she was legally married
to the testator.

The records do not sustain a finding of innocence or good faith. As argued by the private respondents:
1) will expressly admits on its face the relationship between testator and petitioner, the devisee; and 2)
petitioner herself initiated the presentation of evidence on her alleged ignorance of the true civil status
of the testator, which led private respondents to present contrary evidence. Instead of limiting herself
to proving the extrinsic validity of the will, it was petitioner who opted to present evidence on her
alleged good faith in marrying the testator. Clearly, the good faith of petitioner was by option of the
parties made a decisive issue right at the inception of the case. Confronted by the situation, the trial
court had to make a ruling on the question.

Moreover, the prohibition in Article 739 of the Civil Code is against the making of a donation between
persons who are living in adultery or concubinage. It is the donation which becomes void. The giver
cannot give even assuming that the recipient may receive. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the
legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had
been living in concubinage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.

NUFABLE vs. NUFABLE

Esdras Nufable, who owned an untitled parcel of land, died on August 9, 1965. He was survived by his
children Angel, Generosa, Vilflor and Marcelo. In June 1996, the settlement of estate of the late Esdras
was approved and, as therein stated, the heirs have agreed that the untitled parcel of land remains

35
undivided for community ownership. However, two months earlier from said approval, Angel and wife
mortgaged the entire parcel of land to DBP until it was foreclosed in 1973. Later, in 1980, Nelson, the
son of Angel, purchased the same lot from DBP. Generosa, Vilflor and Marcelo then filed an action to
annul fraudulent transactions, to quiet title and to recover damages. The Court of Appeals ruled that
plaintiffs are rightful co-owners of the subject property and entitled to possession of 3/4 southern
portion thereof and Nelson to 1/4 portion.

Hence in issue is the relevance of the approved Settlement of Estate on the ownership of Nelson of the
land purchased from DBP.
When Esdras died in 1965, his heirs acquired successional rights over the property. Hence, Angel and
wife had no rights to morttgage the entire property. The fact that DBP succeeded in consolidating
ownership over the same in its name does not terminate the existing co-ownership. It merely held that
¾ portion thereof in trust for the private respondents. And when Nelson purchased the said property,
he merely stepped into the shoes of DBP and acquired whatever rights and obligations appertaining
thereto.

CIVIL LAW; MODES OF ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP; TESTAMENTARY SUCCESSION; SETTLEMENT OF

ESTATE AS AGREED BY THE HEIRS; APPROVALOF PROBATE COURT ONLY FOR VALIDITY THEREOF.
— The Settlement of Estate submitted by the heirs of the late Esdras Nufable provides that they agreed
“(T)hat the parcel land situated in Poblacion Manjuyod, Negros Oriental remains undivided for
community ownership but respecting conditions imposed therein (sic) in the will.” Further, they have
no objection as to the manner of disposition of their share made by the testator, the expenses of the
proceeding and that they have already taken possession of their respective shares in accordance with
the will.” Verily, it was the heirs of the late Esdras Nufable who agreed among themselves on the
disposition of their shares. The probate court simply approved the agreement among the heirs which
approval was necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedent’s estate.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; SUCCESSIONAL RIGHTS; ACQUIRED UPON DEATH OF THE DECEDENT. — The late
Esdras Nufable died on August 9, 1965. When the entire property located at Manjuyod was mortgaged
on March 15, 1966 by his son Angel Custodio with DBP, the other heirs of Esdras — namely: Generosa,
Vilfor and Marcelo — had already acquired successional rights over the said property. This is so
because of the principle contained in Article 777 of the Civil Code to the effect that the rights to the
succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent. Accordingly, for the purpose of
transmission of rights, it does not matter whether the Last Will and Testament of the late Esdras Nufable
was admitted on March 30, 1966 or thereafter or that the Settlement of Estate was approved on June 6,
1966 or months later. It is to be noted that the probated will of the late Esdras Nufable specifically
referred to the subject property in stating that “the land situated in the Poblacion Manjuyod, Negros
Oriental, should not be divided because this must remain in common for them, but it is necessary to
allow anyone of them brothers and sisters to construct a house therein.”
It was therefor the will of the decedent that the subject property should remain undivided, although the
restriction should not exceed twenty (20) years pursuant to Article 870 of the Civil Code. Thus, when
Angel Nufable and his spouse mortgaged the subject property to DBP on March 15, 1966, they had no
right to mortgage the entire property.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF HEIR AS CO-OWNER; RIGHTS AND LIMITATION THEREOF. — Angel’s right
over the subject property was limited only to ¼ pro indiviso share. As co-owner of the subject property,
Angel’s right to sell, assign or mortgage is limited to that portion that may be allotted to him upon
termination of the co-ownership. Well-entrenched is the rule that a co-owner can only alienate his pro
indiviso share in the co-owned property. Article 493 of the Civil Code spells out the rights of co-owners
over a co-owned property. Pursuant to said Article, a co-owner shall have full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto. He has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment. As a mere part owner, he cannot alienate the shares

36
of the other co-owners. The prohibition is premised on the elementary rule that “no one can give what
he does not have.” Moreover, respondents stipulated that they were not aware of the mortgage by
petitioners of the subject property. This being the case, a co-owner does not lose his part ownership of
a co-owned property when his share is mortgaged by another co-owner without the former’s
knowledge and consent as in the case at bar. It has likewise been ruled that the mortgage of the
inherited property is not binding against co-heirs who never benefitted.

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHERE RIGHT IS TRANSMITTED TO ANOTHER WITHOUT AUTHORITY, TRUST
IS ESTABLISHED FOR THE SAME. — When the subject property was mortgaged by Angel Custodio, he
had no right to mortgage the entire property but only with respect to his 1/4 pro indiviso share as the
property was subject to the successional rights of the other heirs of the late Esdras. In case of
foreclosure, a sale would result in the transmission of title to the buyer which is feasible only if the seller
can be in a position to convey ownership of the things sold. And in one case, it was held that a
foreclosure would be ineffective, unless the mortgagor has title to the property to be foreclosed.
Therefore, as regards the remaining 3/4 pro indiviso share, the same was held in trust for the party
rightfully entitled thereto, who are the private respondents herein. Pursuant to Article 1451 of the Civil
Code, when land passes by succession to any person and he causes the legal title to be put in the name
of another, a trust is established by implication of law for the benefit of the true owner.

Likewise, under Article 1456 of the same Code, if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
person from whom the property comes. Thus, the fact that DBP succeeded in consolidating ownership
over the subject property in its name does not terminate the existing co-ownership. Registration of
property is not a means of acquiring ownership. When the subject property was sold to and
consolidated in the name of DBP, it being the winning bidder in the public auction, DBP merely held the
¾ portion in trust for the private respondents. When petitioner Nelson purchased the said property,
he merely steeped into the shoes of DBP and acquired whatever rights and obligations appertain
thereto.

37