“SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS CASE DIGESTS”
S.Y. 2019-2020 one person or persons against another or other in a court of justice in
I. Rules of Special Proceedings (Rule 72, Rules of Court)
1. Vda. De Manalo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129242
(2001)
Vda. De Manalo vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 129242, 16 January 2001
De Leon, Jr., J.:
FACTS:
Troadio Manalo died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was
survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo, and his eleven children, who are
all of legal age. At the time of his death, Troadio Manalo left several
real properties including a business under the name and style
Manalo's Machine Shop.
The eight of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo
filed a petition with the respondent RTC of the judicial settlement of
the estate of their late father and for the appointment of their brother,
Romeo Manalo, as administrator thereof.
The trial court issued an order and set the reception of
evidence of the petitioners therein. However, the trial court upon
motion of set this order of general default aside herein petitioners
(oppositors therein) who were granted then 10 days within which to
file their opposition to the petition. Several pleadings were
subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel, culminating
in the filling of an Omnibus Motion.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the motion for the outright dismissal of the
petition for judicial settlement of estate aver that earnest efforts
toward a compromise involving members of the same family have
been made.
RULING/S:
The petition was denied for lack of merit. Petitioners may not
validly take refuge under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the
Rules of Court to justify the invocation of Article 222 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for settlement of the
estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo inasmuch as the latter
provision is clear enough.
This is clear from the term 'suit' that it refers to an action by
which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords him for
the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right, whether at law
or in equity.
2. Natcher vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 133000 (2001)
Natcher vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 133000, 2 October 2001
Buena, J.:
FACTS:
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were
registered owners of a parcel of land. Upon the death of Graciana in
1951, Graciano, together with his six children entered into an
extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate. They adjudicated and
divided among themselves the real property. Under the agreement:
Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children received
1/14share of the said property. The heirs executed and forged an
"Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with
Waiver of Rights" wherein they subdivided among themselves the
parcel of land.
Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a
portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square
meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's
name. The land was further subdivided into two separate lots.
Graciano sold the 1st lot to a third person but retained ownership over
the 2nd lot. Graciano married petitioner Patricia Natcher, and sold the
2nd lot to Natcher, a title was issued under her name.
Graciano died leaving his 6 children and Natcher as heirs. A
civil case was filed a complaint before the RTC by the 6 children. After
trial, RTC rendered a decision holding the Deed of Sale as prohibited
by law and thus, a complete nullity. On appeal, the CA reversed and
set aside the lower court‘s decision.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the RTC, acting as a court of general
jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance annulment of title with
damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of
a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of
property made by the decedent to any of the heirs.

RULING/S:
NO. CA decision is AFFIRMED. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special
proceedings, in this wise:
"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for
the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or
redress of a wrong.
"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are
government by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject to
specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
"XXX
"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact."
There lies a marked distinction between an action and a special
proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of
justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. On the
other hand, the term "special proceeding" may be defined as an
application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or
a particular fact.
3. Reyes vs. Sotero, G.R. No. 167405 (2006)
Reyes vs. Sotero
G.R. No. 167405, 16 February 2006
Ynares-Santiago, J.:
FACTS:
Respondent Chichioco filed a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration and settlement of estate of the late Elena
Lising claiming that she was the niece and heir of Lising who died
intestate. Respondent claims that real and personal properties were
allegedly in the possession of petitioner Ana Joyce S. Reyes, a
grandniece of the deceased.
Petitioner Reyes filed an Opposition to the petition, claiming
that she was an adopted child of Lising and the latter‘s husband and
asserting that the petition be dismissed since she was the only heir of
Lising who passed away without leaving any debts.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Supplement to the Opposition
attaching thereto the certification of her adoption from the local civil
registrar‘s office that the adoption decree was registered therein and
also a copy of a Judicial Form and a certification issued by the clerk of
court that the decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-
Tarlac.
Respondents filed a Comment to the opposition stating that
reasonable doubts have been cast on Petitioner‘s claim that she was
legally adopted due allegedly to certain ―badges of fraud.‖
The appellate court refused to dismiss the proceeding because
it was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove before the trial court
that she was indeed adopted by the Delos Santos spouse since,
―imputations of irregularities permeating the adoption decree render
its authenticity under a cloud of doubt.‖
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petitioner had to prove the validity of her
adoption due to imputations of irregularities.
RULING/S:
No. Petitioner need not prove her legal adoption by any
evidence other than those which she had already presented before the
trial court.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated. As such, the certifications issued by the local
civil registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of petitioner‘s
adoption which are entered in the records kept under their official
custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These
certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioner‘s adoption by the
Delos Santos spouses until contradicted or overcome by sufficient
evidence. Mere ―imputations of irregularities‖ will not cast a ―cloud of
doubt‖ on the adoption decree since the certifications and its contents
are presumed valid until proof to the contrary is offered.
4. Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, G.R. No. 139868 (2006)
Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon
G.R. No. 139868, 8 June 2006
Austria-Martinez, J.:

FACTS:
Two American citizens have resided in the Philippines. They
have an adopted daughter. The wife died and left a will where she left
her entire estate to her husband. 2 years after the wife's death, the
husband married a Candelaria. 4 years after, Richard died and left a
will where he left his entire estate to Candelaria except for some of his
shares in a company which he left to his adopted daughter. Audrey‘s
will was admitted to probate in CFI Rizal. Inventory was taken on
their conjugal properties. Ancheta, as the administrator, filed for a
partition of the first wife's estate. The will was also admitted in a court
in her native land (Maryland).
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the properties in issue should be governed by
the law where the property is situated.
2. Whether or not the decree of distribution may still be annulled.
RULING/S:
1. Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the law where
the property is situated. However, since the first wife is a
foreign national, the intrinsic validity of her will is governed by
her national law. The national law of the person who made the
will shall regulate whose succession is in consideration
whatever the nature of the property and regardless of the
country where the property maybe found (Art 16 CC). The first
wife's properties may be found in the Philipppines, however
the successional rights over those properties are governed by
the national law of the testator.
2. A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests
the title to the land of the estate in the distributees, which, if
erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it
becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in
rem. However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of
distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of
jurisdiction or fraud.
Petitioner‘s failure to proficiently manage the
distribution of Audrey‘s estate according to the terms of her
will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to
extrinsic fraud.
5. Domingo vs. Landicho, G.R. No. 170015 (2007)
Domingo vs. Landicho
G.R. No. 170015, 29 August 2007
Carpio Morales, J.:
FACTS:
Crisologo Domingo filed with the RTC an application for
registration of certain parcels of land, which he supposedly purchased
from one Genoveva Manlapit in 1948, and has since been in
continuous, open, public, adverse and uninterrupted possession
thereof in the concept of an owner.
Severino and Raymundo Landicho, Julian Abello, Marta de
Sagun and Editha G. Sarmiento subsequently filed an
Answer/Opposition to Domingo‗s application, claiming, among other
things, that they have been the ones in open, continuous, adverse and
actual possession and cultivation of the lots in the concept of owners
and have even been paying real estate taxes thereon.
The RTC approved Domingo‗s application for registration. On
appeal by Landicho, et al., the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside
the RTC Decision and dismissed Domingo‗s application for
registration of land title. Petitioner Domingo filed a motion for
reconsideration with the Court of Appeals which was subsequently
denied by said court.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Domingo is entitled to the registration of the
lots in question pursuant to Section 14, sub pars. (1) and (4) of P.D.
1529.
RULING/S:
Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 provides that to be entitled of a
land, the applicant must prove that: (a) the land applied for forms part
of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain
and (b) he has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of
ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State, and unless it has been
shown that they have been reclassified by the State as alienable or
disposable to a private person, they remain part of the inalienable
public domain.
 To prove that a land is alienable, an applicant must II. Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons (Rules 73-90,
conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of government, Rules of Court)
such as presidential proclamation or an executive order, or
administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands 1. Maloles II vs. Phillips, G.R. No. 133359 (2000)
investigator or a legislative act or statute.
Maloles II vs. Phillips
G.R. No. 133359, 31 January 2000
XXXXX Mendoza, J.:

FACTS:
On July 20, 1995, Dr. Arturo de Santos, Filipino and a resident
of Makati City, filed a petition for probate of his will 1 in the RTC. He
alleged that he had no compulsory heirs; that he had named in his will
as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that
he disposed by his will his properties with an approximate value of not
less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the
custody of the named executrix, private respondent Pacita de los
Reyes Phillips.
Petitioner Octavio S. Maloles II filed a motion for intervention
claiming that, as the only child of Alicia de Santos (testator‘s sister)
and Octavio L. Maloles, Sr., he was the sole full-blooded nephew and
nearest of kin of Dr. De Santos. He likewise alleged that he was a
creditor of the testator. Petitioner thus prayed for the reconsideration
of the order allowing the will and the issuance of letters of
administration in his name.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr.
Arturo de Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose the petition for
issuance of letters testamentary filed by the respondent.

RULING/S:
No. Even if petitioner is the nearest next of kin of Dr. De
Santos, he cannot be considered an ―heir‖ of the testator. It is a
fundamental rule of testamentary succession that one who has no
compulsory or forced heirs may dispose of his entire estate by will.
Thus, Article 842 of the Civil Code provides:

“One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all

his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having
capacity to succeed.”
 “One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate
provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code
with regard to the legitimate of said heirs.”
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, does not have any right to
intervene in the settlement proceedings based on his allegation that he
is a creditor of the deceased.
2. Rodriguez, et. al. vs. Borja, et. al, G.R. No. 180906
Rodriguez, et. al. vs. Borja, et. Al.
G.R. No. L-21993, 21 June 1966
Reyes, J.B.L., J.:
FACTS:
In this case, there were 2 proceedings. First was an intestate
proceeding instituted meaning, a proceeding to settle the estate of a
deceased person who died without a will. But subsequently, a will was
found and again another proceeding was instituted, this time, testate
proceeding wherein the estate of the deceased person is settled if that
person has left a will. We are confronted here of 2 proceedings, one
was instituted ahead of the other.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not either proceeding may be preferred.
RULING/S:
Yes. As long as there is a will, even if that will is found later
and even if the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a person
with a will is filed later, that should be preferred. The will should be
probated. The will should be given effect as much as possible in order
to give effect to the wishes of the testator. The wishes of the testator
must be given such preference first. Probate of the will is needed in
order to determine whether or not the will was indeed valid, whether
or not the will was executed in observance with the formalities
required by law and whether or not the testator executed it with a
sound mind.
If later on in the probate proceeding, the will is found not to
have validly executed, then intestate proceeding can be applied. But
first, proceed to testate.
3. Cortes vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117417 (2000)
Cortes vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 117417, 21 September 2000
Buena, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner Menandro A. Reselva, private respondent
(petitioner in this petition) Milagros R. Cortes, and Florante Reselva
are brothers and sister and children - heirs of the late spouses Teodoro
T. Reselva and Lucrecia Aguirre Reselva, who died on April 11, 1989
and May 13, 1987, respectively. During their lifetime, they acquired a
property particularly a house and lot consisting of 100 square meters,
more or less. As can be gleaned from the records, Lucrecia Aguirre
Reselva died ahead of Teodoro T. Reselva. The latter executed a
holographic will which was probated in this case on July 31, 1991, with
Milagros R. Cortes, as the appointed Executrix. After having been
appointed and qualified as Executrix, she filed a motion before
respondent probate court praying that Menandro A. Reselva, the
occupant of the property, be ordered to vacate the property and turn
over to said Executrix the possession thereof. This is the motion which
the respondent court granted in the assailed order of October 18,
1993.
In the Appellate Court, the Regional Trial Court's order was set
aside for having been issued beyond the latter's limited jurisdiction as
a probate court.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not probate court is competent to decide the
question of ownership.
RULING/S:
Yes. The case at bar falls squarely under Rule 73, Section 2 of
the Revised Rules of Court, thus:
"RULE 73
"SEC. 2. Where estate upon dissolution of marriage. - When
the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or wife,
the community property shall be inventoried, administered,
and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses
have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the
testate or intestate proceedings of either."

Consequently, this case should be returned to the probate
court for the liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Teodoro and
Lucrecia Reselva prior to the settlement of the estate of Teodoro.
In the present case, private respondent Menandro A. Reselva,
who refused to vacate the house and lot being eyed as part of the
estate of the late Teodoro T. Reselva, cannot be considered an "outside
party" for he is one of the three compulsory heirs of the former. As
such, he is very much involved in the settlement of Teodoro's estate.
By way of exception to the above-mentioned rule, "when the parties
are all heirs of the decedent, it is optional upon them to submit to the
probate court the question of title to property." Here, the probate
court is competent to decide the question of ownership. More so,
when the opposing parties belong to the poor stratum of society and a
separate action would be most expensive and inexpedient.
4. G.R. No. 211153, February 28, 2018 Amparo S. Cruz;
Ernesto Halili; Alicia H. Florencio; Donald Halili; Editha H.
Rivera; Ernesto Halili, Jr.; And Julito Halili, Petitioners, V.
Angelito S. Cruz, Concepcion S. Cruz, Serafin S. Cruz, And
Vicente S. Cruz, Respondents.
Cruz, et. al. v. Cruz, et.al.
G.R. No. 211153, 28 February 2018
Del Castillo, J.:
FACTS:
In an Amended Complaint filed on April 6, 1999, respondents
Angelito S. Cruz, Concepcion S. Cruz. (Concepcion), and Serafin S.
Cruz alleged that they - together with their siblings, petitioner Amparo
S. Cruz (Amparo) and Antonia Cruz (Antonia) inherited a 940-square-
meter parcel of land (the subject property) from their late parents,
spouses Felix and Felisa Cruz, which land was covered by Original
Certificate of Title, that on July 31, 1986, the parties executed a deed
of extrajudicial settlement of estate covering the subject property, on
the agreement that each heir was to receive an equal portion of the
subject property as mandated by law; that in 1998, when the subject
property was being subdivided and the subdivision survey plan was
shown to respondents, they discovered that Antonia was allocated two
lots, as against one (1) each for the respondents; that Antonia's
allocation of two lots contravened the agreement among the heirs that
they would receive equal shares in the subject property; that Amparo
and Antonia were able to perpetrate the fraud by inducing Concepcion
- who was illiterate - to sign the deed of extrajudicial settlement of
estate, which was written in the English language, without previously
reading and explaining the contents thereof to the latter; that Amparo
and Antonia fraudulently took advantage of Concepcion's ignorance
and mental weakness, deceiving and cajoling her into signing the deed
of extrajudicial settlement, to her damage and injury; and that
Antonia passed away, but left as her heirs herein petitioners Ernesto
Halili, Alicia H. Florencio, Donald Halili, Editha H. Rivera, Ernesto
Halili, Jr. and Julito Halili, who are in possession of the two lots
allocated to Antonia. Respondents thus parayed that after due
hearing, judgment shall be rendered.
RTC dismissed the Complaint. Respondents appealed before
the CA, which completely reversed and set aside the RTC's judgment
and the parties' deed of extrajudicial settlement.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the respondents'
cause of action for annulment has not prescribed, and that it ignored
contemporaneous and subsequent acts of respondents indicating the
absence of fraud or vitiation of consent in the execution of the deed of
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Felix Cruz.
RULING/S:
The Court denied the Petition.
Under the law, "[t]he children of the deceased shall always
inherit from him in their own right, dividing the inheritance in equal
shares." In this case, two of Concepcion's co-heirs renounced their
shares in the subject property; their shares therefore accrued to the
remaining co-heirs, in equal shares as well.
Thus, while the CA was correct in ruling in favor of Concepcion
and setting aside the subject deed of extrajudicial settlement, it erred
in appreciating and ruling that the case involved fraud - thus applying
the four-year prescriptive period - when it should have simply held
that the action for the declaration of nullity of the defective deed of
extrajudicial settlement does not prescribe, under the circumstances,
given that the same was a total nullity. Clearly, the issue of literacy is
relevant to the extent that Concepcion was effectively deprived of her
true inheritance, and not so much that she was defrauded.
XXXXX
III. Summary Settlement of Estates (Rule 74, Rules of
Court)
1. Cua vs Vargas GR No. 156536 (2006)
Cua vs Vargas
GR No. 156536, 21 October 2006
Azcuna, J.:
FACTS:
A parcel of residential land was left behind by the late Paulina
Vargas. A notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was
executed by and among the heirs, partitioning and adjudicating unto
themselves the lot in question and was published for 3 weeks.
An Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale was again
executed by and among the same heirs over the same property and
also with the same sharings. Only 5 of the 9 heirs signed the document
and their respective shares were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein.
After knowing of such sale to petitioner, Gloria Vargas tried to
redeem the property. When the offer to redeem was refused, Gloria
Vargas and her children filed a case for annulment of Extra Judicial
Settlement and Legal Redemption of the lot with the MTC.
The MTC dismissed the complaint, declaring the Deed of Extra
Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale valid and binding. The
RTC affirmed the MTC decision, but the CA reversed the ruling of
both lower courts.
Petitioner argued among others, that the acquisition by
petitioner of the subject property subsequent to the extrajudicial
partition was valid because the partition was duly published.
Considering that the partition was valid, respondents no longer have
the right to redeem the property.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the heirs are deemed constructively notified
and bound, regardless of their failure to participate therein, by an
extrajudicial settlement and partition of estate when the extrajudicial
settlement and partition has been duly published.
RULING/S:
The petition lacks merit. The procedure outlined in Section 1 of
Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however,
that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an
extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a
notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement
and/or partition is agreed upon, and not after such an agreement has
already been executed as what happened in the instant case with the
publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.
The publication of the settlement does not constitute
constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take
part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The
requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors
and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in
the decedent‘s estate.
Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind
respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and
consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned. Considering,
therefore, that respondents‘ co-heirs failed to comply with this
requirement, there is no legal impediment to allowing respondents to
redeem the shares sold to petitioner.
2. Cruz vs. Cristobal, G.R. No. 140422 (2006)
Cruz vs. Cristobal
G.R. No. 140422, 7 August 2006
Chico-Nazario, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners claim that they are the legitimate children of
Buenaventura Cristobal during his first marriage to Ignacia Cristobal.
On the other hand, private respondents are also the children of
Buenaventura Cristobal resulting from his second marriage to Donata
Enriquez. On 18 June 1926, Buenaventura Cristobal purchased a
parcel of land with an area of 535 square meters. Sometime in the year
1930, Buenaventura Cristobal died intestate. More than six decades
later, petitioners learned that private respondents had executed an
extrajudicial partition of the subject property and transferred its title
to their names.
A Complaint for Annulment of Title and Damages was filed
before the RTC by petitioners against private respondents to recover
their alleged pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. To prove
their filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal, the
baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and the late Socorro were
presented. In the case of Mercedes who was born on 31 January 1909,
she produced a certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar attesting to the fact that records of birth for the years 1901,
1909, 1932 to 1939, 1940, 1943, and 1948 were all destroyed due to
ordinary wear and tear.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a judgment
dismissing the case, ruling that petitioners failed to prove their
filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal.
On appeal, the CA ruled that they were able to prove their
filiation with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal thru ―other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws,‖ but affirmed the
ruling of the trial court.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not petitioners were able to prove their filiation
with the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal.
2. Whether or not the petitioners are bound by the Deed of
Partition of the subject property executed by the private
respondents.
RULING/S:
1. Yes. In relation to Article 172 of the Family code, ―Any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and Special Laws,‖ may
consist of the child‘s baptismal certificate, a judicial admission,
a family bible in which the child‘s name has been entered,
common reputation respecting the child‘s pedigree, admission
by silence, the testimony of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
of admission under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. In the
present case, the baptismal certificates of Elisa, Anselmo, and
the late Socorro were presented. Baptismal certificate is one of
the acceptable documentary evidence to prove filiation in
accordance with the Rules of Court and jurisprudence.
2. No. Section 1, Rule 74 of the ROC provides that the fact of the
extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in
a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided in
the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement
shall be binding upon any person who has not participated
therein or had no notice thereof. In this case, since the estate
of the deceased Buenaventura Cristobal is composed solely of
the subject property, the partition thereof by the private
respondents already amounts to an extrajudicial settlement of
Buenaventura Cristobal‘s estate.
3. G.R. No. 187524 August 5, 2015 SPOUSES MARIA
BUTIONG and VILLAFRlA, DR. RUEL B. SPOUSES MARIA
FRANCISCO substituted by VILLAFRIA, Petitioners, vs. MA.
GRACIA RINOZA PLAZO and MA. FE RINOZA ALARAS,
Respondents.
Sps. Butiong, et.al. substituted by Villafria vs. Plazo and Alaras
G.R. No. 187524, 5 August 2015
Peralta, J.:
FACTS:
On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving
several heirs, including his children with his first wife the respondents
leaving several properties to them. Thereafter, a complaint for judicial
partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession was
filed by the respondents alleging that they discovered that their co-
heirs sold the properties to the petitioners, who were now deceased
and duly represented by their son, without their consent.
The respondents also learned of a notice of an extra-judicial
settlement of estate of their late father was published in a tabloid
called Balita. Because of this, they caused the annotation of their
adverse claims over the subject properties before the Register of
Deeds and filed the said complaint.
The petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the
ground of lack of personal knowledge and good faith in acquiring the
subject properties. Petitioner Francisco further contended that what
they purchased was only the resort. He also presented an Extra-
Judicial Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of
Rights and Sale which provides that respondents‘ co-heirs sold the
family home to the spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for Pl
million as well as a Deed of Sale whereby Benita sold the resort to
petitioners.
The trial court nullified the transfer of the subject Properties to
petitioners and spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in the Documents
of conveyance offered by petitioners as well as the circumstances
Surrounding the execution of the same. CA affirmed.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the petition is for partition or for settlement of
estate.
RULING/S:
The court held that the complaint filed by the respondents was
for judicial partition. It is true that some of respondents‘ causes of
action pertaining to the properties left behind by the decedent Pedro,
his known heirs, and the nature and extent of their interests thereon
may fall under an action for settlement of estate. However, a complete
reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on the nature
of the suit, the allegations therein, and the relief‘s prayed for, the
action, is clearly one for judicial partition with annulment of title and
recovery of possession.
In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was
not disputed, that Pedro died without a will, leaving his estate without
any ending obligations. Thus, contrary to petitioner‘s contention,
respondents were under no legal obligation to submit the subject
properties of the estate of a special proceeding for settlement of
intestate estate, and are, in fact, encouraged to have the same
partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially.
4. G.R. No. 199885 JESUSA DUJALI BUOT, Petitioner vs.
ROQUE RASAY DUJALI, Respondent
Buot vs. Dujali
G.R. No. 199885, 2 October 2017
Jardeleza, J.:
FACTS:
Buot filed before the RTC a petition for letters of
administration of the estate of deceased Gregorio Dujali (Gregorio).
Buot alleged that she was a surviving heir of Gregorio who died
intestate. She also claimed that since Gregorio‘s death, there had been
no effort to settle his estate. And that Dujali purportedly continued to
manage and control the properties to the exclusion of all the other
heirs. Buot further alleged that Dujali for no justifiable reason denied
her request to settle the estate. Thus, Buot asked that: (1) an
administrator be appointed to preserve Gregorio‘s estate; (2) a final
inventory of the properties be made; (3) the heirs be established; and
(4) the net estate be ordered distributed in accordance with law
among the legal heirs.
Dujali filed an opposition with motion to dismiss. According to
Dujali, when an estate has no debts, recourse to administration
proceedings is allowed only when there are good and compelling
reasons. Where an action for partition (whether in or out of court) is
possible, the estate should not be burdened with an administration
proceeding.
Buot maintains that heirs are not precluded from instituting a
petition for administration if they do not, for good reason, wish to
pursue an ordinary action for partition. In her case, she claims that
there are good reasons justifying her recourse to administration
proceedings: (1) the Amended Extrajudicial Settlement did not cover
the entire estate; (2) there has been no effort to partition the property;
(3) Dujali seeks to challenge Buot‘ s status as an heir; (4) other heirs
have been deprived of the properties of the estate; and (5) other heirs,
particularly Constancia Dujali and Marilou Dujali, have already
manifested that they are amenable to the appointment of an
administrator.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not petition for letters of administration filed by
Buot be granted.
RULING/S:
No. Buot‘s allegation that the extrajudicial settlement in this
case did not cover Gregorio‘s entire estate is, by no means, a sufficient
reason to order the administration of the estate. Whether the
extrajudicial settlement did in fact cover the entire estate and whether
an extrajudicial settlement that does not cover the entire estate may
be considered valid do not automatically create a compelling reason to
order the administration of the estate. As to Buot‘s other allegations,
the Court found that none of these allegations actually prevent the
filing of an ordinary action for partition.
An action for partition is also the proper venue to ascertain
Buot‘s entitlement to participate in the proceedings as an heir. Not
only would it allow for the full ventilation of the issues as to the
properties that ought to be included in the partition and the true heirs
entitled to receive their portions of the estate, it is also the appropriate
forum to litigate questions of fact that may be necessary to ascertain if
partition is proper and who may participate in the proceedings.
When a person dies intestate, his or her estate may generally
be subject to judicial administration proceedings. There are, however,
several exceptions. If the deceased left no will and no debts and the
heirs are all of age, the heirs may divide the estate among themselves
without judicial administration. The heirs may do so extrajudicially
through a public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds.
In case of disagreement, they also have the option to file an action for
partition. Section 1 of Rule 74, however, does not prevent the heirs
from instituting administration proceedings if they have good reasons
for choosing not to file an action for partition.
5. G.R. No. L-48840 December 29, 1943 ERNESTO M.
GUEVARA, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. ROSARIO GUEVARA
and her husband PEDRO BUISON, respondent-appellees.
Guevara vs. Guevara
G.R. No. L-48840, 29 December 1943
Ozaeta, J.:
FACTS:
Victorino Guevara executed a will in 1931 wherein he made
various bequests t his wife, stepchildren, wife in the 2nd marriage. He
has a legitimate son Ernesto and a natural daughter Rosario. Therein,
he acknowledged Rosario as his natural daughter.
In 1933, Victorino died but his last will was never presented for
probate nor was there any settlement proceeding initiated. It appeared
that only his son Ernest possessed the land which he adjudicated to
himself. While Rosario who had the will in her custody, did nothing to
invoke the acknowledgment, as well as the devise given to her.
Subsequently, Rosario filed an action for the recovery of her
legitime from Ernesto, a portion of a large parcel of land invoking the
acknowledgment contained in the will and based on the assumption
that the decedent died intestate because his will was not probated. She
alleged that the disposition in favor of Ernesto should be disregarded.
The lower court and the Court of Appeals sustained Rosario's
theory.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the probate of a will can be dispensed with.
RULING/S:
No. Rosario's contention violates procedural law and
considered an attempt to circumvent the last will and testament of the
decedent. The presentation of a will to the court for probate is
mandatory and its allowance is essential and indispensable to its
efficacy. Suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy for
without probate, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will
may be rendered nugatory.
XXXXX
IV. Probate of Wills (Rules 75-77, Rules of Court)
1. Nittscher vs. Nittscher, G.R. No. 160530 (2007)
Nittscher vs. Nittscher
G.R. No. 160530, 20 November 2007
Quisumbing, J.:
FACTS:
Dr. Werner Karl Johann Nittscher filed with the RTC a petition
for the probate of his holographic will and for the issuance of letters
testamentary to herein respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Nogales. the
probate court issued an order allowing the said holographic will. On
September 26, 1994, Dr. Nittscher died. Hence, Atty. Nogales filed a
petition for letters testamentary for the administration of the estate of
the deceased. Dr. Nittscher‘s surviving spouse Cynthia V. Nittscher,
she moved for the dismissal of the said petition. However, the court
petitioner‘s motion to dismiss, and granted respondent‘s petition for
the issuance of letters testamentary. Motion for reconsideration
denied for lack of merit. On appeal, the CA dismissed the case.
Cynthia contends that Nogales petition lacked a certification
against forum shopping. She adds, the RTC has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter because Dr. Werner was allegedly not a resident of
the Philippines.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Cynthia‘s contentions are correct.
RULING/S:
No. Revised Circular No. 28-91 and Administrative Circular
No. 04-94 of the Court require a certification against forum-shopping
for all initiatory pleadings filed in court. However, in this case, the
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary is not an initiatory
pleading, but a mere continuation of the original petition for the
probate of Dr. Nittscher‘s will. Hence, respondent‘s failure to include a
certification against forum-shopping in his petition for the issuance of
letters testamentary is not a ground for outright dismissal of the said
petition.
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or
 letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he
is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of any province in which
he had estate. …
In this case, the RTC and the Court of Appeals are one in their
finding that Dr. Nittscher was a resident of Las Piñas, Metro Manila at
the time of his death. Hence, applying the aforequoted rule, Dr.
Nittscher correctly filed in the RTC of Makati City, which then covered
Las Piñas, Metro Manila, the petition for the probate of his will and
for the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent.
Furthermore, Dr. Nittscher asked for the allowance of his own
will. In this connection, Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court states:
SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified
by mail or personally. – …
If the testator asks for the allowance of his own will, notice
shall be sent only to his compulsory heirs.
In this case, records show that petitioner, with whom Dr.
Nittscher had no child, and Dr. Nittscher‘s children from his previous
marriage were all duly notified, by registered mail, of the probate
proceedings. Petitioner even appeared in court to oppose respondent‘s
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary and she also filed a
motion to dismiss the said petition. She likewise filed a motion for
reconsideration of the issuance of the letters testamentary and of the
denial of her motion to dismiss. Petitioner was accorded every
opportunity to defend her cause. Therefore, petitioner‘s allegation that
she was denied due process in the probate proceedings is without
basis.
XXXXX
V. Letters Testamentary and of Administration (Rules 78-
79, Rules of Court)
1. Maloles II vs. Phillips, G.R. No. 129505 (2000)
Maloles II vs. Phillips
G.R. No. 129505, 31 January 2000
Mendoza, J.:
FACTS:
In 1995, Dr. Arturo De Los Santos filed a petition for probate
of his will. He declared that he has no compulsory heirs and that he is
naming as sole devisee and legatee the Arturo de Santos Foundation,
Inc. (ASF). The names executrix is Pacita De Los Reyes Phillips. The
petition was filed in RTC Makati Branch 61. Judge Fernando Gorospe
of said court determined that Arturo is of sound mind and was not
acting in duress when he signed his last will and testament and so
Branch 61 allowed the last will and testament on February 16, 1996.
Ten day from the allowance, Arturo died. Thereafter, Pacita, as
executrix, filed a motion for the issue of letters of testamentary with
Branch 61. She however withdrew the motion but later on refiled it
with RTC Makati Branch 65.
Meanwhile, a certain Octavio Maloles II filed a motion for
intervention with Branch 61 claiming that as a next kin (him being the
full blooded nephew of Arturo) he should be appointed as the
administrator of the estate and that he is an heir.
Judge Abad Santos of Branch 65 issued an order transferring
the motion filed by Pacita to Branch 61. Judge Santos ratiocinated that
since the probate proceeding started in Branch 61, then it should be
the same court which should hear Pacita‘s motion. Branch 61 however
refused to consolidate and referred the case back to Branch 65. Branch
65 subsequently consolidated the case per refusal of branch 61.
Eventually, Branch 65 allowed the motion for intervention filed by
Octavio.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Maloles is a compulsory heir (him being the
sole full-blooded nephew).
RULING/S:
No. Under the law, compulsory heirs are limited to the
testator‘s —
 1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their
legitimate parents and ascendants;
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants,
with respect to their legitimate children and descendants;
3. The widow or widower;
4. Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal
fiction;
5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287 of the
Civil Code.
Petitioner, as nephew of the testator, is not a compulsory heir
who may have been preterited in the testator‘s will. Since the testator
instituted or named an executor in his will, it is incumbent upon the
Court to respect the desires of the testator. Only if the appointed
executor is incompetent, refuses the trust, or fails to give bond may
the court appoint other persons to administer the estate. None of
these circumstances is present in this case.
2. Edgar San Luis vs. San Luis, G.R. Nos. 133743 and 134029
(2007)
Edgar San Luis vs. San Luis
G.R. Nos. 133743 and 134029, 6 February 2007
Ynares-Santiago, J.:
FACTS:
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of
Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of
the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted
three marriages. The first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March
17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila,
Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo. The second marriage was with Merry Lee
Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias; and Felicidad San Luis, then
surnamed Sagalongos, with whom he had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.
Respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimo‘s estate. On
December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Thereafter, the heirs of Virginia Sulit filed a motion to dismiss
on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of
action. But the trial court issued an order denying the two motions to
dismiss.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition
for letters of administration. It held that at the time of his death,
Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a resident of the
Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City.
The CA reversed and set aside the orders of the trial court, and
hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the letter of administration was filed in the
proper venue.
RULING/S:
Yes. Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the
petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should
be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province ―in which he
resides at the time of his death.‖
In the instant case, while petitioners established that
Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that
he also maintained residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to
the time of his death. In the foregoing, it was found that Felicisimo
was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject
petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional
Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At
that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the
Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which had
territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati
City as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. Thus, the
subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City.
3. Avelino vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115181 (2000)
Avelino vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 115181, 31 March 2000
Quisumbing, J.:

FACTS:
Petitioner Maria Socorro Avelino is a daughter and compulsory
heir of the late Antonio Avelino, Sr., and his first wife private
respondent Angelina Avelino. The other private respondents, Sharon,
Antonio Jr., Tracy, Patrick and Mark Anthony all surnamed Avelino
are likewise compulsory heirs of Avelino, Sr. Sharon, an American, is
the second wife of Avelino Sr. The other private respondents are
siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro.
The records reveal that on October 24, 1991, Ma. Socorro filed
before the Regional Trial Court a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration of the estate of Antonio Avelino, Sr., who died intestate
on April 10, 1989. She asked that she be appointed the administrator
of the estate.
On December 3, 1992, Angelina, and the siblings filed their
opposition by filing a motion to convert the said judicial proceedings
to an action for judicial partition which petitioner duly opposed. The
Public respondent judge ruled in their favor.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied
in an Order. Ma. Socorro then filed before the Court of Appeals, a
petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus alleging grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of the trial court.
The respondent appellate court rendered the assailed decision,
stating that the "petition is DENIED DUE COURSE" and accordingly
dismissed. Petitioner duly moved for reconsideration, but it was
denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not respondent appellate court committed an error
of law and gravely abused its discretion in upholding the trial court's
finding that a partition is proper.
RULING/S:
No. The Court found that a complete inventory of the estate
may be done during the partition proceedings, especially since the
estate has no debts. Hence, the Court of Appeals committed no
reversible error when it ruled that the lower court did not err in
converting petitioner's action for letters of administration into an
action for judicial partition.
Nor can the Court sustain petitioner's argument that the order
of the trial court converting an action for letters of administration to
one for judicial partition has no basis in the Rules of Court, hence
procedurally infirm. The basis for the trial court's order is Section 1,
Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. It provides that in cases where the heirs
disagree as to the partition of the estate and no extrajudicial
settlement is possible, then an ordinary action for partition may be
resorted to, as in this case.
Thus, no reversible error may be attributed to the Court of
Appeals when it found the trial court's action procedurally in order.
4. G.R. No. 209651 November 26, 2014 MARCELO
INVESTMENT AND MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, and
THE HEIRS OF EDWARD T. MARCELO, NAMELY,
KATHERINE J. MARCELO, ANNA MELINDA J. MARCELO
REVILLA, and JOHN STEVEN J. MARCELO, Petitioners,
vs.
JOSE T. MARCELO, JR., Respondent.
MIMC vs. Marcelo, Jr.
G.R. No. 209651, 26 November 2014
Perez, J.:
FACTS:
On 24 August 1987, decedent Jose, Sr. died intestate. He was
survived by his four compulsory heirs: (1) Edward, (2) George, (3)
Helen and (4) respondent Jose, Jr. Initially, petitioner Marcelo
Investment and Management Corporation (MIMCO) filed a Petition
for the issuance of Letters of Administration of the estate of Jose, Sr.
before the RTC. Pending issuance of letters of administration, the RTC
appointed Helen and Jose, Jr. as special administrators. However,
Edward was the one appointed as regular administrator.
A project of partition was submitted, Edward manifested that
oppositor Jose T. Marcelo, Jr. had already expressed his conformity to
the Liquidation of the Inventory of the Estate of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr.,
as of July 26, 2000, as evidenced by his signature therein. He
therefore prays that the said document which bears the conformity of
all four (4) compulsory heirs of Jose P. Marcelo, Sr. be approved. RTC
approved the proposed partition. However, the distribution was
deferred pending submission of proof of payment of estate taxes. At
this stage, Edward died. Wasting no time, Jose, Jr. moved to revive
the intestate proceedings involving his father‘s estate, and moved for
his appointment as new regular administrator thereof, which was
approved by the RTC. Petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration and now moved for the appointment instead of
George as administrator of Jose, Sr.‘s estate.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the appointment of a regular administrator is
still necessary at this liquidation, partition and distribution
stage of the intestate proceedings involving Jose, Sr.‘s estate.
2. Whether or not Jose Jr.‘s previous non-appointment as regular
administrator of Jose, Sr.‘s estate bars his present
appointment as such even in lieu of Edward who is now dead.
RULING/S:
1. Yes. The settlement of Jose, Sr.‘s estate is not yet through and
complete albeit it is at the liquidation, partition and
distribution stage. Rule 90 of the Rules of Court provides for
the Distribution and Partition of the Estate. The rule provides
in pertinent part: SECTION 1. When order for distribution of
residue made. – x x x No distribution shall be allowed until
payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or
provided for, unless the distributes, or any of them, give a
bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court
directs. x x x The inheritance tax is an obligation of the estate,
indirectly the heirs.
2. Yes. Undoubtedly, there has been a declaration that Jose, Jr. is
unfit and unsuitable to administer his father‘s estate. Section 1,
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides for the general
disqualification of those who wish to serve as administrator.
Who are incompetent to serve as executors or administrators.
– No person is competent to serve as executor or administrator
who: (a) Is a minor; (b) Is not a resident of the Philippines;
and (c) Is in the opinion of the court unfit to execute the duties
of the trust by reason of drunkenness, improvidence, or want
of understanding or integrity, or by reason of conviction of an
offense involving moral turpitude.
XXXXX
VI. Special Administrator (Rule 80, Rules of Court)
1. Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo vs. Lacuata-Gabriel,
G.R. No. 162934 (2005)
Heirs of Belinda Dahlia A. Castillo vs. Lacuata-Gabriel
G.R. No. 162934, 11 November 2005
Callejo, Sr., J.:
FACTS:
On January 25, 1989, Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel, wife of Lorenzo
B. Almoradie, died, leaving behind a sizable inheritance. A little over a
month after, Crisanta‘s mother, Crisanta Santiago Vda. de Yanga,
commenced an intestate proceeding before the RTC. She alleged,
among others, that to her knowledge, her daughter died intestate
leaving an estate with an estimated net value of P1,500,000.00 and
that such estate was being managed by her wastrel and incompetent
son-in-law, Lorenzo, and by two other equally incompetent persons.
She prayed that letters of administration be issued to her son,
Mariano Yanga, Jr., also the brother of the deceased, and that she be
awarded her share of the estate of her daughter after due hearing.
However, the RTC appointed Lorenzo as administrator.
On October 16, 1989, one Belinda Dahlia Y. Almoradie Castillo,
claiming to be the only legitimate child of Lorenzo and Crisanta, filed
a motion for intervention. Resolution on this motion was, however,
held in abeyance pending some incidents in the CA.
On November 3, 1989, Roberto Y. Gabriel, the legally adopted
son of Crisanta Y. Gabriel, filed before the RTC of Malabon City a
petition for probate of an alleged will and for the issuance of letters
testamentary in his favor. He alleged that he discovered his mother's
will on October 25, 1989 in which he was instituted as the sole heir of
the testatrix, and designated as alternate executor for the named
executor therein, Francisco S. Yanga, a brother of Crisanta, who had
predeceased the latter sometime in 1985 or 1986.
On June 2, 1990, Belinda Castillo died.
The two (2) special proceedings were consolidated. The
probate court appointed Roberto Y. Gabriel as special administrator of
his mother's estate.
On May 23, 2001, the heirs of Belinda, namely, Bena Jean,
Daniel, Melchor, Michael, and Danibel, all surnamed Castillo, filed a
Motion10 praying that they be substituted as party-litigants in lieu of
their late mother Belinda, who died in 1990.
 On April 16, 2001, Roberto Gabriel died. His widow, Dolores L.
Gabriel, filed a "Manifestation and Motion" where she informed the
probate court of her husband's death and prayed that she be admitted
as substitute in place of her late husband, and be appointed as
administratix of the estate of Crisanta Gabriel as well.
On August 14, 2001, the heirs of Belinda opposed Dolores'
manifestation and motion. They averred that Dolores was not Crisanta
Gabriel's next of kin, let alone the lawful wife of the late Roberto.
On December 5, 2001, the lower court appointed Dolores as
special administratrix upon a bond of P200,000.00. The probate
court merely noted the motion for substitution filed by the heirs of
Belinda, stating that they were ―mere strangers to the case‖ and that
their cause could better be ventilated in a separate proceeding. The
probate court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Belinda‘s
heirs in its Order.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling against the petitioners
and dismissing their petition.
RULING/S:
The ruling of the CA is correct. The Court has repeatedly held
that the appointment of a special administrator lies in the sound
discretion of the probate court.
A special administrator is a representative of a decedent
appointed by the probate court to care for and preserve his estate until
an executor or general administrator is appointed.
The probate court has ample jurisdiction to appoint
respondent as special administratrix. The deceased Crisanta Yanga-
Gabriel left a document purporting to be her will where her adopted
son, Roberto, was named as the sole heir of all her properties.
However, pending probate of the will, Roberto died leaving his widow,
the respondent herein, as his sole heir. Thus, the respondent has
much stake in Crisanta's estate in case the latter's will is allowed
probate.
2. G.R. No. 187879 July 5, 2010 DALISAY E.
OCAMPO, VINCE E. OCAMPO, MELINDA CARLA E.
OCAMPO, and LEONARDO E. OCAMPO, JR., Petitioners, vs.
RENATO M. OCAMPO and ERLINDA M. OCAMPO,
Respondents.
Ocampo, et.al. vs. Ocampo and Ocampo
G.R. No. 187879, 5 July 2010
Nachura, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioners Dalisay et al. are the surviving wife and the
children of Leonardo. Leonardo, together with his siblings Renato and
Erlinda (Respondents), jointly controlled, managed, and administered
the estate of their parents, Spouses Ocampo. Under such
circumstance, Leonardo had been receiving his share consisting of 1/3
of the total income generated from the properties of the estate.
Subsequently, Leonardo died and he was survived by his wife and the
children (Petitioners Dalisay). When Leonardo died, respondents took
possession, control and management of the properties to the exclusion
of petitioners and the petitioners no longer received the 1/3 portion of
Leonardo.
Petitioners then initiated a petition for intestate proceedings in
the RTC. Respondents, in their counter-petition, prayed that they be
appointed as special joint administrators of the estate of their parents.
RTC granted respondents‘ counter-petition. Petitioners in their
Comment prayed that, in order to avoid further delay, letters of
administration to serve as joint administrators of the subject estate be
issued to respondents and Dalisay. RTC appointed Dalisay and Renato
as special joint administrators of the estate of the deceased spouses.
But RTC later revoked the appointed of Dalisay as co-special
administratix and substituted her with Erlinda. Petitioners filed a
Motion to Terminate or Revoke the Special Administration. RTC
granted this and revoked and terminated the appointment of Reanto
and Erlinda as joint special administrators and appointed Melinda as
regular administratix.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court before the CA. CA ruled that RTC gravely abused its
discretion in revoking redpondent‘s appointment as joint special
administrators, and for appointing Melinda as regular administratrix
without conducting a formal hearing to determine her competency to
assume such role. Hence, this instant petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not it was proper for the RTC to revoke the
appointment of respondents as joint special administrators.
2. Whether or not it was proper for the RTC to appoint Melinda
as regular administrator.

RULING/S:
1. Yes. Selection or removal of special administrators is not
governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal of
regular administrator. The probate court may appoint or
remove special administrators based on grounds other than
those enumerated in the Rules at its discretion. Selection or
removal of special administrators is at the discretion of the
court as long as the discretion is exercised without grave abuse,
and is based on reason, equity, justice, and legal principles,
interference by higher courts is unwarranted. Indeed, even if
special administrators had already been appointed, once the
probate court finds the appointees no longer entitled to its
confidence, it is justified in withdrawing the appointment and
giving no valid effect thereto.
In this case, the RTC revoked respondents‘
appointment as special administrators for failing to post their
administrators‘ bond and to submit an inventory and
accounting as required of them, tantamount to failing to
comply with its lawful orders. Hence, the revocation of
respondents‘ appointment as Special Administrator was
proper.
2. No. Sec. 1 to 6 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court contains the
provision for the determination of the person to be appointed
as regular administrator. But in this case, the capacity,
competency, and legality of Melinda‘s appointment as such
was not properly objected to by respondents despite being the
next of kin to the decedent spouses, and was not threshed out
by the RTC acting as probate court in accordance with the
above mentioned Rules. Hence, Melinda‘s appointment as a
regular administrator was not proper.
Melinda‘s appointment is supposed to be revoked.
However, having in mind the objective of facilitating the
settlement of the estate of Vicente and Maxima and posting of
bond by Melinda, with a view to putting an end to the
squabbles of the heirs, Melinda‘s appointment should be
converted into one of special administration.
3. G.R. No. 140929 May 26, 2005 MARGARITO R.
JAMERO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE ACHILLES L.
MELICOR, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Tagbilaran City, Branch 4, ATTY. ALBERTO
BAUTISTA, in his capacity as the appointed SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR, and ERNESTO R. JAMERO, respondent.
Jamero vs. Melicor
G.R. No. 140929, 26 May 2005
Austria-Martinez, J.:
FACTS:
Petitioner filed Special Proceedings No. 1618 for the
Administration and Settlement of the Estate of his deceased mother
Consuelo Jamero with the Regional Trial Court. Private respondent
Ernesto R. Jamero, a brother of petitioner, opposed the latter's
petition for appointment as regular administrator of the estate.
Upon motion of private respondent Ernesto and over the
objections of petitioner, the respondent courtnappointed Atty. Alberto
Bautista as special administrator pending the appointment of a
regular administrator. Petitioner received said Order on December 11,
1998 and filed a motion for reconsideration on December 28, 1998,
the last day of the 15-day reglementary period, that is, December 26,
1998, falling on a Saturday during which, according to petitioner, the
Bureau of Post Office held no office. The court a quo denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration in its Order dated February 26,
1999 which petitioner received on March 4, 1999.
On April 21, 1999, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with
the CA, which the latter denied for being late by three (3) days.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was once again
denied by the CA for lack of merit. Hence, the present Petition for
Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner against Judge Achilles L.
Melicor, Atty. Bautista and, this time, including oppositor Ernesto R.
Jamero
Petitioner pointed out that the issue on the timeliness of the
filing of the Petition for Certiorari with the CA has now become moot
and academic in view of A.M. Circular No. 00-2-03-SC which took
effect on September 1, 2000, amending Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, to wit:
SEC. 4. When and where petition filed. 'The petition shall be
filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment,
order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or
new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or
not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of
the denial of said motion.
 ...
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in dismissing CA-G.R. SP No.
53020 for having been filed out of time;
2. Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the appointment of
special administrator is discretionary to the appointing court
and that being an interlocutory order, the same is not
appealable nor subject to certiorari; and
3. Whether or not the appointment of a special administrator is
in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
RULING/S:
1. The Court finds merit to the claim of petitioner that A.M.
Circular No. 00-2-03-SC, further amending Section 4, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court, should be given retroactive effect.
The Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner with the
CA should now be considered as having been filed within the
reglementary period provided under said circular. Petitioner
would have had sixty days from March 4, 1999 or until May 3,
1999 within which to file his petition in the CA. The Petition
for Certiorari was filed on April 21, 1999.
However, far from rendering the petition in CA-G.R. SP
No. 53020 moot and academic, as claimed by petitioner, the
third issue will have to be passed upon by the CA in the
Petition for Certiorari filed with it.
2. As to the second issue, suffice it to be stated that indeed, the
appointment of a special administrator is interlocutory,
discretionary on the part of the RTC and non-appealable.
However, it may be subject of certiorari if it can be shown that
the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion or lack of or in
excess of jurisdiction.
It is for this reason that the third issue, as already
stated, will have to be considered and passed upon by the CA.
XXXXX
VII. Executors and Administrators (Rules 81-85, Rules of
Court)
1. G.R. No. L-6829 December 29, 1954 Intestate Estate of
RUFINA MERCADO, deceased. CATALINA JAVIER,
petitioner-appellee, vs. EULOGIO MAGTIBAY and
SOLEDAD MAGTIBAY DE HERNANDEZ, respondents-
appellants.
Javier vs. Magtibay and De Hernandez
G.R. No. L-6829, 29 December 1954
Reyes, A., J.:
FACTS:
It appears that Rufina Mercado died intestate on September
20, 1949, survived by her second husband Eulogio Magtibay, her only
living daughter Catalina Javier and the descendants of her two
deceased daughters — all three daughters being of the first marriage.
Shortly after Rufina‘s death, these heirs made an extrajudicial
partition of her properties. But alleging that there were some
properties not included in the partition, one of the heirs, the said
Catalina Javier, on August 15, 1952, petitioned the court for letters of
administration and the appointment of herself as administratrix. The
other heirs opposed the petition on the ground that there was no
necessity for subjecting the estate to judicial administration since,
according to them, the decedent left no debts, all her properties had
already been partitioned and the heirs were all of age or represented
by a guardian. But the Court overruled the opposition and granted the
petition. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not what remain of the estate be subjected to an
administration proceeding despite the opposition of the majority of
the heirs.
RULING/S:
Yes. The rule is that where administration proceedings is
unnecessary because estate has no debts and the more expeditious
remedy by partition is available, the heirs or the majority of them may
not be compelled to submit the estate to such proceeding.
Withholding the inheritance from the heirs by subjecting it to
an administration proceeding for no useful purpose, would only
unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being wasted or squandered as
not infrequently happens.
There appearing to be no good reason for burdening the estate
of the deceased Rufina Mercado with the costs and expenses of an
administration proceeding, not justified in issuing letters of
administration. With this ruling, it is no longer necessary to decide
which, as between the appellee Catalina Javier and the widower
Eulogio Magtibay, should be preferred in the appointment of an
administrator.
2. Gr No. 167979 ,March 16, 2006 Wilson S. Uy, As Judicial
Administrator Of The Intestate Estate Of The Deceased Jose
K. C. Uy, Petitioner, Vs. The Hon. Court Of Appeals, Hon.
Anastacio C. Rufon, As Presiding Judge Of Branch 52, Of
The Regional Trial Court, Sixth Judicial Region, Sitting At
Bacolod City, And Johnny K. H. Uy, Respondents.
Uy vs. CA and Rufon
G.R. No. 167979, 16 March 2006
Ynares-Santiago, J.:
FACTS:
The facts of the case show that Jose K.C. Uy died intestate on
August 20, 1996 and is survived by his spouse, Sy Iok Ing Uy, and his
five children, namely, Lilian S. Uy, Lilly S. Uy, Livian S. Uy-Garcia ,
Lilen S. Uy and Wilson S. Uy (Petitioner).
A Special Proceedings was instituted and Lilia Hofileña was
appointed as special administrator of the estate of the deceased.
Petitioner moved to reconsider the order appointing Lilia Hofileña as
special administrator with prayer that letters of administration be
issued to him instead.
Judge Ramon B. Posadas revoked Lilia Hofileña's appointment
as special administrator and denied her petition to be appointed as
regular administrator. Meanwhile, letters of administration were
granted to petitioner, who took his oath of office as administrator.
Johnny K. H. Uy (Private Respondent) filed a motion to
intervene, praying that he be appointed as administrator of the estate
in lieu of petitioner. He alleged that he is the brother and a creditor of
the deceased, and has knowledge of the properties that should be
included in the estate.
The trial court initially denied private respondent's motion to
intervene, but on March 16, 2000, it reconsidered its earlier order and
appointed private respondent as co-administrator of the estate.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner then moved that private respondent bring into the
estate properties belonging to the deceased, which motion was
granted by the trial court. Not satisfied with the compliance of private
respondent, petitioner reiterated his motion for removal of the former
as co-administrator, but the same was denied as the trial court found
no cogent reason to remove private respondent as co-administrator.
Thereafter, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals by way of a
petition for certiorari which however, dismissed the petition.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, this
petition
ISSUE/S:
1. Whether the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in
appointing private respondent as co-administrator to the
estate of the deceased.
2. Whether the Court of Appeals deprived petitioner of his
constitutional right to due process and his right to petition the
government for redress of grievances by not addressing the
issues raised before it.
RULING/S:
The petition is without merit.
1. Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the
appointment of co-administrators has been upheld for various
reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and
perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; (2)
where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or
factions be represented in the management of the estate of the
deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any
cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; (4) to
have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to
work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; and (5)
when a person entitled to the administration of an estate
desires to have another competent person associated with him
in the office.
Thus, petitioner's argument that the trial court cannot
re-open the issue of the appointment of an administrator
without removing the incumbent administrator is erroneous.
2. The foregoing discussion renders moot the second issue raised
by petitioner. We see no cogent reason to set aside the
 findings of the Court of Appeals, because its findings of fact is
conclusive and binding on the parties and not subject to review
by this Court, unless the case falls under any of the exceptions
to the rule.
3. [G.R. No. 183053 : June 15, 2010]
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF
CRISTINA AGUINALDO-SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY
III, PETITIONER, VS. ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY,
RESPONDENT.
Suntay III vs. Cojuangco-Suntay
G.R. No. 183053, 15 June 2010
Nachura, J.:
The petition has no merit for the reason that both petitioner
and respondent are qualified to act as administrator over the estate of
the decedent. The court ruled that there shall be a joint administration
by both of them of their grandmother‘s estate. The rule under Section
6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, listing the order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator of an estate, is not absolute for it
depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case.
Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies
in the sound discretion of the trial court.
Hence, the attendant facts and circumstances of this case
necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both petitioner and
respondent of their grandmother‘s estate.
XXXXX

FACTS:
On 1990, the decedent, Cristina, who is married to Dr.
Federico, died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio I, predeceased
both spouses. At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her
husband and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner and
respondent. During his lifetime, Emilio I has three children, namely:
herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II. However, his
marriage was subsequently annulled which led him to had two
children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita, by two different
woman. Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III and Nenita, they
were brought up and were adopted by the spouses Federico and
Cristina and were acknowledged as natural children of Emilio I.
Meanwhile, respondent and her siblings lived with their mother
separately from their father and paternal grandparents.
Respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration in her favor but was opposed by Federico. After a failed
attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico
filed a Manifestation nominating his adopted son, Emilio III.
However, in the course of proceedings, Federico died. Trial court
appointed Emilio III as administrator however it was reversed by the
Court of Appeals. Hence, the instant petition.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Emilio III is better qualified to act as
administrator of the decedent‘s estate.

RULING/S:
 VIII. Claims against the Estate (Rule 86, Rules of Court)
1. Sps. Suria vs. Heirs of Brigido Tomolin, G.R. No. 157483
(2007)
Sps. Suria vs. Heirs of Brigido Tomolin
G.R. No. 157483, 21 June 2007
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.:
FACTS:
Brigido M. Tomolin was the owner of Lot No. 6098 consisting
of 22,820 square meters. It was registered in his name under Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-1981 of the Registry of Deeds of
Agusan del Norte.
Tomolin sold the lot to Carlos Suria, petitioner, for
₱228,200.00, as shown by a Deed of Absolute Sale of a Parcel of Land.
Consequently, TCT No. T-1981 was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT
No. T-12112 was issued in petitioner‘s name. After the sale, Carlos
Suria and his wife Juanita, also a petitioner, had the lot subdivided
into several parcels. Thus, TCT No. T-12112 in the name of petitioner
Carlos Suria was cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT Nos. T-12949,
12950, 12951, and 12952 were all issued in the names of petitioners.
Tomolin filed with the Regional Trial Court, Agusan del Sur a
Complaint for Annulment of the Deed of Absolute Sale of a Parcel of
Land and Cancellation of TCT No. T-12112 with Prayer for a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction against petitioners. The complaint alleges,
among others, that Tomolin, then seriously ill, was inveigled by
petitioners into signing the contract of sale and that they did not pay
him the amount of ₱228,200.00.
Tomolin filed with the trial court an amended complaint. But
the next day, Tomolin died. He was survived by his nieces, namely:
Damiana Tomolin Perez, Caridad Tomolin Soria, Lucresia Tomolin
Declaro, and Lolita Tomolin Espina. Counsel for Tomolin filed with
the trial court a Notice of Substitution of a Party pursuant to Section
16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The trial
court issued an Order allowing the substitution of the late Tomolin by
his heirs, herein respondents.
Petitioners filed several motions, which were all denied by the
trial court. Thereupon, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a
Petition for Certiorari. In its Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the
trial court‘s judgment allowing the substitution of the late Tomolin.
RULING/S:
The petition must fail. In Gonzales v. Philippine Amusement
and Gaming Corporation, the Court reiterated its long-settled ruling
in Bonilla v. Barcena on how to determine whether an action survives
or not, thus:
The question as to whether an action survives or not depends
on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the
causes of action which survive, the wrong complained [of]
affects primarily and principally property and property rights,
the injuries to the person being merely incidental, while in the
causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained of
is to the person, the property and rights of property affected
being incidental.
There can be no dispute that Tomolin‘s complaint affects
primarily and principally property and property rights. Clearly, the
action survives his death. Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in
affirming the trial court‘s judgment allowing the substitution of the
late Tomolin.
2. Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Republic-Asahi
Glass Corporation, G.R. No. 147561 (2006)
Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc. vs. Republic-Asahi Glass
Corporation
G.R. No. 147561, 22 June 2006
Panganiban, C.J.:
FACTS:
Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation (Asahi) entered into a
contract with Jose D. Santos, Jr., the proprietor of JDS Construction
(JDS), for the constructions of roadways and a drainage system in
Asahi‘s compound. Asahi was to pay JDS P5,300,000.00 for the
construction, which was supposed to be completed by JDS within 240
days.
To guarantee the faithful and satisfactory performance of its
undertakings, JDS shall post a performance bond of P795,000. JDS
executed solidarily with Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. (Stronghold)
the Performance Bond.
During the construction, Asahi called the attention of JDS to
the alarmingly slow pace of the construction, which resulted in the
fear that the construction will not be finished within the stipulated
240-day period. However, said reminders went unheeded by JDS.
Dissatisfied with the progress of the work undertaken by JDS,
Asahi extrajudicially rescinded the contract. Because of the rescission,
Asahi had to hire another contractor to finish the project, incurring an
additional P3,256,847.00.
Asahi then sent a letter to SICI filing its claim under the
performance bond, but the letter went unheeded.
Asahi eventually filed a complaint against JDS and Stronghold
for damages. However, Jose D. Santos, Jr. had already died and JDS
Construction was no longer at its registered address, with its
whereabouts unknown.
In its defense, on July 10, 1991, Stronghold maintains that
Asahi‘s money claims against it and JDS have been extinguished by
the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the death of Santos can be a defense of
Stronghold and its liability under the performance bond be
automatically extinguished.
RULING/S:
No. As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the
debtor does not extinguish the obligation. Obligations are
transmissible to the hairs, except when the transmission is prevented
by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the
obligation. Only obligations that are personal or are identified with the
persons themselves are extinguished by death.
In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or
obligations Santos had under his contracts with respondent were not
intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law.
Hence, his death did not result in the extinguishment of those
obligations or liabilities.
XXXXX
IX. Payment of the Debts of the Estate Sales, Mortgages
and other Encumbrances of the Property of Decedent
Distribution and Partition of the Estate (Rules 88-90 Rules
of Court)
1. Vda. De Gurrea vs. Suplico, G.R. No. 144320 (2006)
Vda. De Gurrea vs. Suplico
G.R. No. 144320, 26 April 2006
Austria-Martinez, J.:
FACTS:
The case involves an annulment of title over a parcel of land
located in San Juan, Metro Manila, which was originally owned by
Rosalina Gurrea, who transferred the ownership of the same to
Adelina Gurrea.
The latter continued to be the owner of the lot until her death.
Thereafter, Special Proceedings No. 7815 was instituted to have the
will which she executed during her lifetime probated for the purpose
of settling her estate.
Ricardo Gurrea, an heir of Adelina Gurrea, filed an opposition
to the probate of will and was duly represented by his counsel Atty.
Enrique Suplico. The consideration for such representation involves a
contingent fee of 20% of whatever maybe due the latter, be it real or
personal property.
The heirs of Adelina Gurrea arrived at an amicable settlement,
thereafter Ricardo Gurrea withdrew his opposition and the heirs drew
up a project of partition, the result of which transferred the ownership
of subject San Juan Lot to Ricardo Gurrea along with several other
properties.
As payment for his services, Atty, Suplico was offered the San
Juan lot of which the latter accepted, a deed of transfer of rights was
duly executed, notarized and was registered with the register of deeds
of San Juan.
Petitioners contend that no evidence was presented to show
that the probate court issued an order declaring Special Proceedings
No. 7185 closed and terminated. In addition, when the Transfer of
Rights and Interest in favor of respondents was notarized on August
20, 1975, the title over the subject lot was still in the name of Adelina
Gurrea and that said title was transferred only in the name of Ricardo
in October 7, 1980.
On these bases, petitioners conclude that at the time the
Transfer of Rights and Interest was authorized, there is no dispute
that the subject property still formed part of the estate of Adelina
Gurrea and was, therefore, still the subject of litigation. Hence, the
transfer of rights and interest over the subject property in favor of
Atty. Suplico (respondent) is null and void.

ISSUE/S:
1. Whether or not the probate proceedings have already been
closed and terminated when the subject lot was transferred to
Atty. Suplicio.
2. Whether or not the status of the transfer of rights and interest
in case the probate proceedings have not yet been closed is null
and void.

RULING/S:
1. No. The rule is that as long as the order for the distribution of
the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings
cannot be deemed closed and terminated.
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under
administration only after the payment of all the debts and the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the
same.
In the present case, while subject lot was assigned as
Ricardo‘s share in the project of partition executed by the heirs
of Adelina Gurrea, the title over the subject lot was still in the
name of the latter and was not yet conveyed to Ricardo when
the Transfer of Rights and Interest was executed.

2. Yes. Having been established that the subject property was still
the object of litigation at the time the subject deed of Transfer
of Rights and Interest was executed, the assignment of rights
and interest over the subject property in favor of respondents
is null and void for being violative of the provisions of Article
1491 of the Civil Code which expressly prohibits lawyers from
acquiring property or rights which may be the object of any
litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession.

XXXXX

END.