Spec Pro Digest Compilation

For January 23, 2020

1. Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 163604, May 6, 2005

2. Pacific Bank v. CA, G.R. No. 109373, March 20, 1995
3. Republic v. Sagun, G.R. No. 187567, February 15, 2012
Republic v. CA, supra
Pacific Bank v. CA, supra
4. Natcher v. CA, G.R. No. 133000, October 2, 2001
5. Vda. de Manalo v. CA, G.R. No. 129242, January 16, 2001
6. De Leon v. CA, G.R. No. 128781, August 6, 2002
7. Solivio v. CA, G.R. No. 83484, February 12, 1990
8. Lee v. CA, G.R. No. 118387, October 11, 2001 (SC used concepts such as “cause
of action” in a special proceeding for correction of entries)
9. Lim v. CA, G.R. No. 124715, January 24, 2000 (Obiter: brief review on rules on
jurisdiction over probate proceedings)
10. Vda. De Reyes v. CA, G.R. No. L-47027, January 27, 1989
11. Cease v. CA, G.R. No. L-33172 October 18, 1979
12. Pereira v. CA, G.R. No. L-81147 June 20, 1989
13. Leviste v. CA, G.R. No. L-29184, January 30, 1989
14. Rodriguez v. Borja, G.R. No. L-21993, June 21, 1966
15. Uriarte v. CFI, G.R. Nos. L-21938-39, October 29, 1970
16. Intestate Estate Rosina Marguerite Wolfson, G.R. No. L-28054, June 15, 1972
17. Cuenco v. CA, G.R. No. L-24742, October 26, 1973
18. Fule v. CA, G.R. No. L-40502, November 29, 1976
19. Roberts v. Leonidas, G.R. No. L-55509, April 27, 1984
20. Consolidated Bank v. IAC, G.R. No. 75017, June 3, 1991
21. Jao v. CA, G.R. No. 128314, May 29, 2002

1. Republic v. CA, G.R. No. 163604, May 6, 2005

DOCTRINE:

Scope of special proceedings (Sec. 1, Rule 72)

Distinctions between special proceedings & ordinary civil actions

Special Proceedings - The period to appeal is 30 days and the party appealing must, in
addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal to perfect its
appeal.

Ordinary civil action - the period to appeal is 15 days from notice or decision or final
order appealed from and the appeal is perfected by filing a notice of appeal (Section 3,
Rule 41, Rules of Court).

Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court,

"a civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of
a right, or the prevention of redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding under
Section 3(c) of the same rule is defined as a remedy by which a party seeks to establish
a status, a right or a particular fact (Heirs of Yaptinchay, et al. v. Del Rosario, et al ., G.R.
No. 124320, March 2, 1999).

FACTS:
 1. In "In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse
Clemente P. Jomoc, Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc, petitioner," the Ormoc City,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, by Order of September 29, 1999, granted the
petition on the basis of the Commissioner's Report and accordingly declared the
absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years earlier,
presumptively dead.

RTC: In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, cited
Article 41, par. 2 of the Family Code. Said article provides that for the purpose of
contracting a valid subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a previous
marriage where the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years, the
spouse present must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the
reappearance of the absent spouse.

2. The Republic, through the Offi􏰀ce of the Solicitor General, sought to appeal the
trial court's order by filing a Notice of Appeal.
3. By Order of November 22, 1999, the trial court, noting that no record of appeal
was fi􏰁led and served "as required by and pursuant to Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the present case being a special proceeding,"
disapproved the Notice of Appeal.
4. Republic’s Argument: That the declaration of presumptive death of a person
under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special proceeding or a case of
multiple or separate appeals requiring a record on appeal.

CA (May 5, 2004): Denied the Republic’s petition on procedural and substantive

grounds.

ISSUE: WON a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the
nature of a special proceeding. (NO)

RULING:

NO. A petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the

nature of a Summary Proceedings.

1. By the trial court's citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is gathered that the
petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent spouse declared presumptively
dead had for its purpose her desire to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo,
the petition for that purpose is a "summary proceeding," following the quoted Art.
41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent
marriage, the prior spouses had been absent for four consecutive years and the
spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouses was already
dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an
absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph,
the spouses present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in this
 Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice
to the effect of a reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)

2. Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDING IN THE
FAMILY LAW, contains the following provision, inter alia:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall
apply in all cases provided for in this Codes requiring summary court
proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an expeditious manner without
regard to technical rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

3. There is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required, and is, therefore,
a summary proceeding under the Family Code, not a special proceeding under the
Revised Rules of Court appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal.
It being a summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from the
trial court's order sufficed.
4. Finally, on the alleged procedural 􏰂law in petitioner's petition before the appellate
court. Petitioner's failure to attach to his petition before the appellate court a copy
of the trial court's order denying its motion for reconsideration of the disapproval
of its Notice of Appeal is not necessarily fatal, for the rules of procedure are not to
be applied in a technical sense. Given the issue raised before it by petitioner,
what the appellate court should have done was to direct petitioner to comply with
the rule.
5. WHEREFORE, the assailed May 5, 2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be REMANDED to it for appropriate action
in light of the foregoing discussion.

2. Pacific Banking Corporation v. CA

Facts: In 1985, Pacific Banking Corporation (PaBC) was placed under receivership by the
Central Bank and a Petition for Assistance in the liquidation of PaBC was filed by the
Central Bank, after which creditors filed their claims. Nañagas was appointed as a
liquidator.

(1) PaBC Employees Organization (Union) filed a claim for holiday pay and other
bonuses due them. The RTC ordered payment in its order dated September 13, 1991.
The order was received by Nañagas on September 16, 1991. He filed an MR on October
16, 1991. On December 6, 1991 the judge denied the motion. Such order was received
on December 9, 1991. On December 10, 1991, Nañagas filed a Notice of Appeal and a
Motion for Additional Time to Submit Record on Appeal. On December 23, 1991 another
Notice of Appeal was filed by the OSG in behalf of Nañagas. The judge disallowed the
Notice of Appeal on the ground that it was late i.e., more than 15 days after receipt of
the decision. The Union’s motion for issuance of a Writ of Execution was granted.

(2) Ang Keong Lan and E.J Ang, Int’l (Stockholders) filed a claim for the payment of
investment in the PaBC allegedly in the form of shares of stocks constituting as foreign
foreign exchange capital investment entitled to preference under the Foreign
Investments Law. The RTC ordered payment to the Shareholders on its September 11,
1992 decision which was received by Nañagas on September 16, 1992. On September
30, 1992, Nañagas moved for reconsideration, which was denied by the judge on October
5, 1992. On October 14, 1992, Nañagas filed a Notice of Appeal. This was denied by the
judge on the ground that is was filed without authority of the Central Bank and beyond
15 days.
Petitions for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus were filed before the CA by Nañagas.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Divisions rendered conflicting Rulings.

The Fifth Division held that in the case of the Union, the proceeding before the
court was a special proceeding, thus the period for appealing was 30 days from
the receipt of the order or decision, and since Nañagas’ Notice of Appeal was filed
on the 30th day from receipt of the decision, appeal was brought on time.

On the other hand, the Fourteenth Division held that in the case of the
Stockholders, the proceeding was an ordinary action and the period for appealing
was only 15 days. Since Nañagas’ Notice of appeal was filed only on the 23 rd day
of his receipt of the order appealed from, it was filed late. It dismissed the
petition.

Issue: Whether a petition for liquidation under §29 of R.A. No. 265, otherwise known as
the Central Bank Act is a special proceeding or an ordinary civil action

Ruling:

Special proceeding;

The petitions must be dismissed.

First. As stated in the beginning, the principal question in these cases is whether a
petition for liquidation under §29 of Rep. Act No. 265 is in the nature of a special
proceeding. If it is, then the period of appeal is 30 days and the party appealing must, in
addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a record on appeal in order to
perfect his appeal. Otherwise, if a liquidation proceeding is an ordinary action, the period
of appeal is 15 days from notice of the decision or final order appealed from.

BP Blg. 129 provides:

§39. Appeals. — The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted
from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment or decision
appealed from: Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases the period for
appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed
from.

No record on appeal shall be required to take an appeal. In lieu thereof, the entire
record shall be transmitted with all the pages prominently numbered
consecutively, together with an index of the contents thereof.

This section shall not apply in appeals in special proceedings and in other cases
wherein multiple appeals are allowed under applicable provisions of the Rules of
Court.

The Interim Rules and Guidelines to implement BP Blg. 129 provides:

19. Period of Appeals. —

(a) All appeals, except in habeas corpus cases and in the cases referred to in
paragraph (b) hereof, must be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment, order, resolution or award appealed from.

(b) In appeals in special proceedings in accordance with Rule 109 of the Rules of
Court and other cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeals
shall be thirty (30) days, a record on appeal being required.

We disagree with the foregoing view of the Fourteenth Division. Rule 2 of the Rules of
Court provide:
 §1. Action defined. — Action means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which
the party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong

§2. Special Proceeding Distinguished. — Every other remedy, including one to

establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact, shall be by special
proceeding.

Elucidating the crucial distinction between an ordinary action and a special proceeding,
Chief Justice Moran states:"

Action is the act by which one sues another in a court of justice for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong while
special proceeding is the act by which one seeks to establish the status or right of
a party, or a particular fact. Hence, action is distinguished from special
proceeding in that the former is a formal demand of a right by one against
another, while the latter is but a petition for a declaration of a status, right or fact.
Where a party litigant seeks to recover property from another, his remedy is to
file an action. Where his purpose is to seek the appointment of a guardian for an
insane, his remedy is a special proceeding to establish the fact or status of
insanity calling for an appointment of guardianship.

Considering this distinction, a petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation should

be classified a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. Such petition does not seek
the enforcement or protection of a right nor the prevention or redress of a wrong against
a party. It does not pray for affirmative relief for injury arising from a party's wrongful act
or omission nor state a cause of action that can be enforced against any person.

What it seeks is merely a declaration by the trial court of the corporation's insolvency so
that its creditors may be able to file their claims in the settlement of the corporation's
debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a declaration of the
corporation's debts and obligations. Put in another way, the petition only seeks a
declaration of the corporation's state of insolvency and the concomitant right of creditors
and the order of payment of their claims in the disposition of the corporation's assets.

Contrary to the rulings of the Fourteenth Division, liquidation proceedings do not

resemble petitions for interpleader. For one, an action for interpleader involves claims on
a subject matter against a person who has no interest therein. This is not the case in a
liquidation proceeding where the Liquidator, as representative of the corporation, takes
charge of its assets and liabilities for the benefit of the creditors. He is thus charged with
insuring that the assets of the corporation are paid only to rightful claimants and in the
order of payment provided by law.

Rather, a liquidation proceeding resembles the proceeding for the settlement of state of
deceased persons under Rules 73 to 91 of the Rules of Court. The two have a common
purpose: the determination of all the assets and the payment of all the debts and
liabilities of the insolvent corporation or the estate. The Liquidator and the administrator
or executor are both charged with the assets for the benefit of the claimants. In both
instances, the liability of the corporation and the estate is not disputed. The court's
concern is with the declaration of creditors and their rights and the determination of their
order of payment.

In G.R. No. 112991 (the case of the Stockholders/Investors), the Liquidator's

notice of appeal was filed on time, having been filed on the 23rd day of receipt of the
order granting the claims of the Stockholders/Investors. However, the Liquidator did not
file a record on appeal with the result that he failed to perfect his appeal. As already
stated, a record on appeal is required under the Interim Rules and Guidelines in special
proceedings and for cases where multiple appeals are allowed. The reason for this is that
the several claims are actually separate ones and a decision or final order with respect to
any claim can be appealed. Necessarily the original record on appeal must remain in the
trial court where other claims may still be pending. Because of the Liquidator's failure to
perfect his appeal, the order granting the claims of the Stockholders/Investors became
final. Consequently. the Fourteenth Division's decision dismissing the Liquidator's Petition
for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus must be affirmed albeit for a different reason.

On the other hand, in G.R. No. 109373 (case of the Labor Union), we find that the
Fifth Division correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari. Prohibition and
Mandamus. As already noted, the Liquidator filed a notice of appeal and a motion for
extension to file a record on appeal on December 10, 1991, i.e., within 30 days of his
receipt of the order granting the Union's claim. Without waiting for the resolution of his
motion for extension, he filed on December 20, 1991 within the extension sought a
record on appeal. Respondent judge thus erred in disallowing the notice on appeal and
denying the Liquidator's motion for extension to file a record on appeal. The Fifth Division
of the Court of Appeals correctly granted the Liquidator's Petition for Certiorari,
Prohibition and Mandamus and its decision should, therefore, be affirmed.

The decision appealed from are affirmed.

3. Republic vs Sagun

FACTS:

● Respondent is the legitimate child of a Chinese father and Filipina mother and was
born on Aug. 8, 1959.
● She did not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority.
● It was only after she got married that she executed an Oath of Allegiance to the
Philippines and such oath was not registered.
● She then applied for a passport which was denied, hence, she filed for a judicial
declaration of her election of Philippine citizenship and asserting that through her
positive acts such as exercising her right to suffrage, she has effectively elected
Philippine citizenship.
● The RTC granted her petition and declared respondent as Filipino citizen. Hence,
the petitioner through OSG filed an appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the special proceeding provided by the rules of court include the relief
sought by the respondent.

RULING:

No. It should be stressed that there is no specific statutory or procedural rule which
authorizes the direct filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine citizenship
before the courts. The special proceeding provided under Section 2, Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court on Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry, merely allows
any interested party to file an action for cancellation or correction of entry in the civil
registry, i.e., election, loss and recovery of citizenship, which is not the relief prayed for
by the respondent.

Be that as it may, even if we set aside this procedural infirmity, still the trial court’s
conclusion that respondent duly elected Philippine citizenship is erroneous since the
records undisputably show that respondent failed to comply with the legal requirements
for a valid election. Specifically, respondent had not executed a sworn statement of her
election of Philippine citizenship. The only documentary evidence submitted by
respondent in support of her claim of alleged election was her oath of allegiance,
executed 12 years after she reached the age of majority, which was unregistered. As
aptly pointed out by the petitioner, even assuming arguendo that respondent’s oath of
allegiance suffices, its execution was not within a reasonable time after respondent
attained the age of majority and was not registered with the nearest civil registry as
required under Section 1 of C.A. No. 625. The phrase "reasonable time" has been
interpreted to mean that the election should be made generally within three (3) years
from reaching the age of majority.27 Moreover, there was no satisfactory explanation
proffered by respondent for the delay and the failure to register with the nearest local
civil registry.

Based on the foregoing circumstances, respondent clearly failed to comply with the
procedural requirements for a valid and effective election of Philippine citizenship.
Respondent cannot assert that the exercise of suffrage and the participation in election
exercises constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship since the law
specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of citizenship by election. The
mere exercise of suffrage, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and
other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship cannot take the place of
election of Philippine citizenship. Hence, respondent cannot now be allowed to seek the
intervention of the court to confer upon her Philippine citizenship when clearly she has
failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. As we held in Ching,28 the prescribed
procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking
process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of
Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Having
failed to comply with the foregoing requirements, respondent’s petition before the trial
court must be denied.

Republic v. CA, supra

Pacific Bank v. CA, supra

4. Natcher v. CA, G.R. No. 133000, October 2, 2001

Doctrine: Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the
decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of
its limited jurisdiction.

Facts:
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a land in
Manila. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his 6 children,
entered into an extra-judicial settlement of Graciana's estate, adjudicating and dividing
among themselves the said land. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share
while each of the children received 1/14 share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No.
11889 was cancelled, TCTs were issued in the name of Graciano and the children.
Further, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of
Real Property with Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided among themselves the land
into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion
of his interest in the land, leaving only 447.60 sqm. Registered under Graciano's name.
Subsequently, the said land was further subdivided into 2 lots – the first, with an area of
80.90 sqm. and the second with an area of 396.70 sqm. Eventually, Graciano sold the
first lot to a third person and retained ownership over the second lot. In 1980, Graciano
married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the
second lot to his wife Patricia to which a TCT was issued in her name. In 1985,
Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his children by his first marriage, as
heirs. In a complaint, private respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death,
Natcher, through fraud, misrepresentation and forgery acquired the TCT making it
appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale, and that their legitimes have been
impaired.
Petitioner‘s Allegations: She was legally married to Graciano in 1980. Thus, under the
law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. That during
Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance, properties to his children,
hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim against Graciano's estate
or against herein petitioner's property.
RTC (Manila): The Deed of Sale is void, being contrary to law. No evidence of
separation of property or a decree of judicial separation of property between them,
spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale; Prohibited donation;
Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however
be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a
compulsory heir of the deceased.
CA: Reversed and set aside RTC‘s ruling. (It is the probate court that has exclusive
jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. Thus the court a quo erred
in regarding the subject property as advance inheritance. What the court should have
done was merely to rule on the validity of the sale and leave the issue on advancement
to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose.)

Issue: Whether or not the RTC (in an action for reconveyance) may adjudicate
matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly
on questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to his heirs.

Held:
No, the RTC trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond
its jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for
the settlement of estate of a deceased person. (Petition DISMISSED)

A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. A civil action may either
be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions, subject
to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action. A special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact.
There lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding. An
action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner
prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies
according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined
as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a
particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required
unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is
granted generally upon an application or motion.

5. VDA. DE MANALO vs. CA

G.R. NO. 129242       January 16, 2001
FACTS:

Troadio Manalo died intestate on February 14, 1992. He was survived by his wife, Pilar S.
Manalo, and his eleven (11) children who are all of legal age.

At the time of his death on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real properties
located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac including a business under the name and
style Manalo's Machine Shop with offices at La Loma, Quezon City and Valenzuela, Metro
Manila.
Herein respondents, who are eight (8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio
Manalo, filed a petition with the respondent RTC of Manila of the judicial settlement of the
estate of their late Troadio Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo
Manalo, as administrator thereof.

The trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing and directing the
publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in Metro Manila, and further directing service by registered mail of the said
order upon the heirs named in the petition at their respective addresses mentioned
therein.

On the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order 'declaring the
whole world in default, except the government," and set the reception of evidence of the
petitioners therein. However, the trial court upon motion of set this order of general
default aside herein petitioners (oppositors therein) who were granted then (10) days
within which to file their opposition to the petition.

Several pleadings were subsequently filed by herein petitioners, through counsel,

culminating in the filling of an Omnibus Motion seeking; (1) to set aside and reconsider
the Order of the trial court which denied the motion for additional extension of time file
opposition; (2) to set for preliminary hearing their affirmative defenses as grounds for
dismissal of the case; (3) to declare that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the persons of the oppositors; and (4) for the immediate inhibition of the presiding judge.

The trial called resolved such issues in the following manner: 1.) admitted the opposition
for the purpose of considering the merits 2.) denied the hearing for such affirmative
defenses are irrelevant and immaterial 3.) declared that the court had jurisdiction 4.)
denied the motion for inhibition 4.) set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment
as regular administrator in the for hearing

The Motion for Reconsideration of the petitioners was denied; hence, they filed a petition
for certiorari, contending that: (1) the venue was improperly laid; (2) the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over their persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was
included in the intestate proceedings; (4) there was absence of earnest efforts toward
compromise among members of the same family; and (5) no certification of non-forum
shopping was attached to the petition
Court of Appeals dismissed; Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition
for review.
Petitioners claim that the petition for letters for administration, settlement and
distribution of estate is actually an ordinary civil action involving members of the same
family and thus should be dismissed under Rule 16 of the ROC on the ground that a
condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with- that is, that there
was failure to aver that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made involving
members of the same family prior to the filing of the petition pursuant to Article 222 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court Appeals erred in upholding the questioned orders of the RTC which
denied their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of
estate
RULING:
NO.

The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and Distribution of

Estate is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the respondents seek
to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. They merely seek to establish the fact of
death of their father and subsequently to be duly recognized as among the heirs of the
said deceased so that they can validly exercise their right to participate in the settlement
and liquidation of the estate of the decedent consistent with the limited and special
jurisdiction of the probate court.
In the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the
character of the relief sought in the complaint shall be controlling. A careful scrutiny of
the petition belies the claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action.  The
said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fact of death and his residence
which are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the
administration of the estate rest. It also contains an enumeration of the names of his
legal heirs including a tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are
sought to be settled in the probate proceedings. In addition, the reliefs prayed for in the
said petition leave no room for doubt as regard the intention to seek judicial settlement
of the estate of their deceased father.
Petitioners may not be allowed to defeat the purpose of the essentially valid petition for
the settlement of the estate of the late Troadio Manalo by raising matters that are
irrelevant and immaterial to the said petition. They may also not validly take refuge
under the provisions of Rule 1, Section 2, of the Rules of Court to justify the invocation of
Article 222 of the Civil Code of the Philippines for the dismissal of the petition for
settlement of the estate of the deceased Troadio Manalo.
Art. 222. No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same family unless
it should appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035
Art. 222 is applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from the term suit that it
refers to an action filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for the
enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. An excerpt from the
Report of the Code Commission unmistakably reveals the intention of the Code
Commission to make that legal provision applicable only to civil actions which are
essentially adversarial and involve members of the same family.

6. De Leon vs CA

TOPIC: Multiple appeals in Spec Pro; Interlocutory orders not appealable

TERESITA DE LEON, ZENAIDA NICOAS, HEIRS OF ANTONIO NICOLAS, v. COURT

OF
APPEALS, HON. PABLO INVENTOR, RAMON NICOLAS
G.R. No. 128781, August 6, 2002

FACTS:

1. Petitioner De Leon was appointed administratrix of the estate of Rafael Nicolas (Sp.
Proc. No. C-1679, “In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Rafael C. Nicolas”). Said case
was consolidated with Sp. Proc No. C-1810. Spouses Rafael and Salud Nicolas (both
deceased) are the parents of Teresita, Estrelita, Antonio, Ramon and Roberto. Antonio
(deceased) is represented by his wife petitioner Zenaida and his other heirs.

2. Private respondent Ramon (oppositor-applicant in the intestate proceedings) filed a

Motion for Collation, claiming that Rafael, during his lifetime had gratuitously given real
properties to his children and Teresita had failed to include them in the estate’s
inventory (at least 7 lots in Polo, Bulacan and Caloocan City given to different children).

3. The RTC issued an Order directed Ramon to submit pertinent documents for proper
determination if the properties should be collated. A hearing was set with notice to the
present registered owners (the children) to show cause why their properties should not
be collated.

4. Ramon submitted an Amended Motion for Collation with supporting documents

attached. It included two properties not indicated in the original motion.

In November 11, 1194, The Court ordered Teresita to include only certain lots
for Collation. Teresita filed an MR alleging that the properties subject of the Order were
already titled in their names many years prior and that their titles may not be collaterally
attacked in a motion for collation. Said motion was denied on the ground that it was
within the jurisdiction of the court to determine whether the titled properties should be
collated (Sec. 2, Rule 90 – final order of the court concerning questions as to
advancements made shall be binding on the person raising the question and on the heir).

5. Teresita filed an MR for the Order denying the original MR. The RTC issued an Order
requiring Ramon to prove whether the properties were given gratuitously or for a
valuable consideration. The RTC removed Teresita from her position as administratrix on
the ground of conflict of interest considering her claim that she paid a valuable
consideration for the properties transferred to her and are this not subject to collation.
Teresita filed another MR, which was denied.

6. Petitioners filed with the CA a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction.

7. The CA found the petition devoid of merit, ruling that the Order directing the inclusion
of the enumerated properties in the estate had become final for failure to appeal the
order of collation. The appeal from the Order removing petitioner as administratrix,
however, was timely appealed.

CONTENTIONS:

Petitioners claim that the properties were sold to them rather than donated, that the
Order was interlocutory and non-appealable, and that they were deprived of due process.

Private respondent contends that due process was afforded to petitioners when
petitioner resolved the issue of collation after hearing.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Nov. 11, 1994 Order directing the inclusion of the enumerated
properties in the estate was final.

RULING

The petition is partly GRANTED.

NO. The Nov. 11, 1994 Order and all other orders emanating from said Order are merely
provisional or interlocutory, without prejudice to the heirs, administrator or approving
parties to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of
title [side notes: in other words, since interlocutory ra ang Order, any conflicts regarding
title over the properties can be resolved in an ordinary action]. The CA committed an
error in considering the Order as final or binding upon the heirs or third persons who
dispute the inclusion of certain properties.

Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it was ruled in Garcia v. Garcia: the court acquires
jurisdiction over the properties of the deceased has supervision and control over said
properties. The court thus has inherent power to determine the properties
included/excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or person interested in the
properties of a deceased person duly call the courts’ attention to the fact that certain
properties, rights or credits have been left out in the inventory, it is likewise the courts’
duty to hear the observations, with power to determine if such observations should be
attended to or not and if the properties referred to therein belong prima facie to the
intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of
said properties.

A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon
questions of title provisionally. Probate courts have limited jurisdiction and questions of
title can only be settled in a separate action. All the court can do is determine whether
they should be included in the property.

Sec. 2, Rule 90 of the ROC, which provides that the final order shall be binding, is
invoked by the petitioner. The Order of exclusion or inclusion is NOT a final order
and is interlocutory in the sense that it does not settle once and for all the title
to the lots. Sec. 2, Rule 90 should be interpreted in the context of Sec. 1.

The RTC and CA erroneously referred to it as an order of collation when it is nothing more
than order of inclusion. The motion for collation was filled in the early stage of the
intestate proceedings and nothing indicates that the debts have been paid nor the net
remainder determined. In other words, the issue on collation is still premature and the
Order was merely for inclusion. Even assuming that the assailed Order is a collation and
a final order, it would have no force and effect upon the parties. Only a final order is
appealable and a final Order must contain the facts and law on which it is based (Sec.
14, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). The Order in this case does not state the reasons for
ordering collation. Thus, it never could have become final and would be inoperative.

7. CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA, respondents.
FACTS:

This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., who died a
bachelor, without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His
only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the
spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent,
Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
Salustia and her sister, Celedonia, brought up Esteban, Jr. Salustia brought to her
marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo covered by 24
titles) which she had inherited from her mother, but no conjugal property was acquired
during her short-lived marriage to Esteban, Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child,
Esteban, Jr., including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her
sister lived. In due time, the titles of all these properties were transferred in the name of
Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt
Celedonia and some close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his
mother and to help poor but deserving students obtain a college education.
Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February 26,1977 without having set up the
foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do
with Esteban's properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his
estate in a foundation to be named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for
the purpose of helping indigent students in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out
the plan of the deceased.
 Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings
leading to the formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice
of her counsel, filed on March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as
special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. Later, she filed an amended
petition praying that letters of administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole
heir of the deceased; and that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and
accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her.
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition,
she was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. for three reasons: (1)
because the properties of the estate had come from her sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that
she is the decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her as sole heir,
the disposition of the properties of the estate to fund the foundation would be facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her the
sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and
other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA.
DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
Four months later, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr.,
because she too was an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was
denied by the court for. Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on
January 7, 1980 (or one year and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled "Concordia Javellana-
Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for partition, recovery of possession,
ownership and damages.
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No.
13207, in favor of Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.
On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment
pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of the
estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia averred that the
properties of the deceased had already been transferred to, and were in the possession
of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation." The trial court denied her motions
for reconsideration.
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals. On
January 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division, rendered judgment affirming
the decision of the trial court in toto.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil
Case No. 13207 for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate
of Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings were still pending in Branch
23 of the same court.
RULING:
The Court finds the petitioner’s contention meritorious. The Regional Trial
Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action
for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr.
while the probate proceedings for the settlement of said estate are still
pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no orders for the
submission and approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting,
distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the
proceedings.
 It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to
the persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end
to the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties.
The assailed order declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban
Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last
paragraph of the order directed the administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the
estate.
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in RTC Branch 23, Concordia's
motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have
herself (Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her share of the properties of the
deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when the court
denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for review
on certiorari. However, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed more than one year
later, a separate action for the same purpose in Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the
separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate court that has exclusive
jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting
dispositions of a decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with probate proceedings
pending in a co-equal court. As explained in the case of Guilas v. Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga, where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project
of partition executed between her and her father in the proceedings for the settlement of
the estate of her mother:
“The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after
the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to
receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of The probate court, in the
exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution, has power to determine the proportion or
parts to which each distributed is entitled. The power to determine the legality or
illegality of the testamentary provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making
a just and legal distribution of the inheritance. To hold that a separate and independent
action is necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the general tendency of the
jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is further, expensive, dilatory, and
impractical.”
A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the decedent is
exclusively within the range of the administratrix proceedings and can not properly be
made an independent action.
Partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding. As
long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with,
the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated; because a
judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heirs
from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period
therefore has not elapsed. The better practice, however, for the heir who has
not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the
same probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate
or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an
independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may
thus reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate court already final
and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.
However, in cases where the estate proceedings had been closed and terminated
for over three years, the action for annulment of the project of partition is allowed to
continue. Considering that in the instant case, the estate proceedings are still pending,
but nonetheless, Concordia had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said
proceedings, We have opted likewise to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the
interest of justice.
 The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207 setting
aside the probate proceedings in Branch 23 on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and
declaring Concordia Villanueva to be a co-heir of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr.,
ordering the partition of the estate, and requiring the administratrix, Celedonia, to submit
an inventory and accounting of the estate, were improper and officious, to say the least,
for these matters he within the exclusive competence of the probate court.

8. LEE vs. CA (GR No. 118387, October 11, 2001)

FACTS: Lee Tek Sheng sired children but on 2 different mothers. The private
respondents (11 children) are the children from his lawful wife, Keh Shiok Cheng, while
the petitioners (8 children, including Emma Lee) are the children he sired with his
concubine, Tiu Chuan. The private respondents filed 2 separate petitions for the
cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of the petitioners.

FIRST PETITION: On December 2, 1992, the petition against all petitioners, with the
exception of Emma Lee, was filed before the RTC of Manila (SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692)
and later assigned to Branch 47. SECOND PETITION: On February 3, 1993, a similar
petition against Emma Lee was filed before the RTC of Kalookan (SP. PROC. NO. C-16746)
which was assigned to Branch 130. Both petitions sought to cancel and/or correct the
false and erroneous entries in all pertinent records of birth of petitioners by deleting
and/or canceling therein the name of "Keh Shiok Cheng" as their mother, and by
substituting the same with the name "Tiu Chuan", who is allegedly the petitioners' true
birth mother.

The private respondents alleged that they are the legitimate children of spouses Lee Tek
Sheng and Keh Shiok Cheng who were legally married in China. In 1948, their father
facilitated the arrival in the Philippines from China of a young girl named Tiu Chuan. She
was introduced as their new housemaid but she immediately became Lee Tek Sheng's
mistress. As a result of their illicit relations, Tiu Chuan gave birth to petitioners. Unknown
to Keh Shiok Cheng and private respondents, every time Tiu Chuan gave birth to each of
the petitioners, their common father, Lee Tek Sheng, falsified the entries in the records
of birth of petitioners by making it appear that petitioners' mother was Keh Shiok Cheng.
Since the birth of petitioners, it was Tiu Chuan who gave maternal care and guidance to
the petitioners. When Keh Shiok Cheng died, Lee Tek Sheng insisted that the names of all
his children, including those of petitioners', be included in the obituary notice of Keh
Shiok Cheng's death that was to be published in the newspapers. It was this seemingly
irrational act that led to private respondents' discovery of the dishonesty and fraud
perpetrated by their father, Lee Tek Sheng.

Acting on their suspicion, the private respondents requested the NBI to conduct an
investigation into the matter. The NBI prepared a report that pointed out, among others,
the false entries in the records of birth of petitioners. It was this report that prompted
private respondents to file the petitions for cancellation and/or correction of entries in
petitioners' records of birth with the lower courts.

The petitioners filed a motion to dismiss both petitions — SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 and
SP. PROC. NO. C-1674 — on the grounds that:
(1) resort to Rule 108 is improper where the ultimate objective is to assail the legitimacy
and filiation of petitioners;
(2) the petition, which is essentially an action to impugn legitimacy was filed
prematurely; and
(3) the action to impugn has already prescribed.

RTC RULING:
In SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692, motion to dismiss was denied.
Both petitions — SP. PROC. NO. 92-63692 and SP. PROC. NO. C-1674 — were given due
course by Brach 47 and Branch 130.

Petitioners' recourse: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Application for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction to the
Court of Appeals.

CA RULING:
Dismissed the peitioner’s petition and MR.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the resort to Rule 108 is improper.
NOTE: According to the petitioners, private respondents seek to have the entry for
the name of petitioners' mother changed from "Keh Shiok Cheng" to "Tiu Chuan" who is a
completely different person. What private respondents therefore seek is not merely a
correction in name but a declaration that petitioners were not born of Lee Tek Sheng's
legitimate wife, Keh Shiok Cheng, but of his mistress, Tiu Chuan, in effect a
"bastardization of petitioners." Petitioners thus label private respondents' suits before the
lower courts as a collateral attack against their legitimacy in the guise of a Rule 108
proceeding.

RULING: The resort to Rule 108 is proper.

The proceedings are simply aimed at establishing a particular fact, status and/or right.
Stated differently, the thrust of said proceedings was to establish the factual truth
regarding the occurrence of certain events which created or affected the status of
persons and/or otherwise deprived said persons of rights.

It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule
108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a
particular fact. The petitions filed by private respondents for the correction of entries in
the petitioners' records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or
biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given
birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners' contention
that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the
prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok
Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter's children. There is nothing to
impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.

In the leading case of Republic vs. Valencia, we affirmed the decision of Branch XI of the
then CFI of Cebu City ordering the correction in the nationality and civil status of
petitioner's minor children as stated in their records of birth from "Chinese" to "Filipino",
and "legitimate" to "illegitimate", respectively. Although recognizing that the changes or
corrections sought to be effected are not mere clerical errors of a harmless or innocuous
nature, this Court, sitting en banc, held therein that even substantial errors in a civil
register may be corrected and the true facts established provided the parties aggrieved
by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. In the said case,
we also laid down the rule that a proceeding for correction and/or cancellation of entries
in the civil register under Rule 108 ceases to be summary in nature and takes on the
characteristics of an appropriate adversary proceeding when all the procedural
requirements under Rule 108 are complied with.

To the mind of the Court of Appeals, the proceedings taken in both petitions for
cancellation and/or correction of entries in the records of birth of petitioners in the lower
courts are appropriate adversary proceedings. We agree.

The petitioners assert, however, that making the proceedings adversarial does not give
trial courts the license to go beyond the ambit of Rule 108 which is limited to those
corrections contemplated by Article 412 of the New Civil Code or mere clerical errors of a
harmless or innocuous nature. The petitioners point to the case of Labayo-Rowe vs.
Republic, which is of a later date than Republic vs. Valencia. Far from petitioners' theory,
this Court's ruling in Labayo-Rowe vs. Republic does not exclude recourse to Rule 108 of
the Revised Rules of Court to effect substantial changes or corrections in entries of the
civil register. The only requisite is that the proceedings under Rule 108 be an appropriate
adversary proceeding as contra-distinguished from a summary proceeding. Thus:

"If the purpose of the petition [for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the
civil register] is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or
obvious to the understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue
an order for the correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed,
changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well
as sex, are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed
after appropriate adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues
involved. Changes which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are
substantial in character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending
upon the nature of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may
be affected by the entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted
to prove the allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted x x
x."33 (Emphasis supplied.)

It is true that in special proceedings formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed
with, and the remedy granted upon mere application or motion. But this is not always the
case, as when the statute expressly provides. Hence, a special proceeding is not always
summary. One only has to take a look at the procedure outlined in Rule 108 to see that
what is contemplated therein is not a summary proceeding per se. Rule 108 requires
publication of the petition three (3) times, i.e., once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks (Sec.4). The Rule also requires inclusion as parties of all persons who claim any
interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction (Sec. 3). The civil
registrar and any person in interest are also required to file their opposition, if any, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such
notice (Sec. 5). Last, but not the least, although the court may make orders expediting
the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue
an order granting the same (Sec. 7).

Thus, we find no reason to depart from our ruling in Republic vs. Valencia, that Rule 108,
when all the procedural requirements thereunder are followed, is the appropriate
adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil
register.

Secondly, it is important to note that Article 412 uses both the terms "corrected" and
"changed". In its ordinary sense, to correct means to make or set right"; "to remove the
faults or errors from" while to change means "to replace something with something else
of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute". The provision neither
qualifies as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected nor does it distinguish on the
basis of the effect that the correction or change may have. Hence, it is proper to
conclude that all entries in the civil register may be changed or corrected under Article
412.

Thirdly, Republic Act No. 904847 which was passed by Congress on February 8, 2001
substantially amended Article 412 of the New Civil Code, to wit:

"SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First

Name or Nickname. — No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a
judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or
nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil
registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its
implementing rules and regulations.

The above law speaks clearly. Clerical or typographical errors in entries of the civil
register are now to be corrected and changed without need of a judicial order and by the
city or municipal civil registrar or consul general. The obvious effect is to remove from
the ambit of Rule 108 the correction or changing of such errors in entries of the civil
register. Hence, what is left for the scope of operation of Rule 108 are substantial
changes and corrections in entries of the civil register.

9. LIM VS. CA
(G.R. No. 124715 January 24, 2000)

FACTS:

Petitioner Rufina Luy Lim is the surviving spouse of the late Pastor Y. Lim whose estate is
the subject of probate proceedings in Special Proceedings.Private respondents Auto
Truck Corporation, Alliance Marketing Corporation, Speed Distributing, Inc., Active
Distributing, Inc. and Action Company are corporations formed, organized and existing
under Philippine laws and which owned real properties covered under the Torrens
system.

Pastor Y. Lim died intestate. Herein petitioner, as surviving spouse and duly represented
by her nephew George Luy, filed a joint petition  for the administration of the estate of
Pastor Y. Lim. Private respondent corporations, whose properties were included in the
inventory of the estate of Pastor Y. Lim, then filed a motion  for the lifting of lis
pendens and motion for exclusion of certain properties from the estate of the decedent.

RTC granted respondents’ twin motions, but was later on set aside reinstating the
annotation of lis pendens. The probate court appointed Rufina Lim as special
administrator and Miguel Lim and Lawyer Donald Lee, as co-special administrators of the
estate of Pastor Y. Lim, after which letters of administration were accordingly issued.
Acting on an ex parte motion filed by petitioner, the probate court ordered banks to
produce and submit records of the savings/current accounts/time deposits and other
deposits in the names of Pastor Lim and/or corporations above-mentioned.

Private respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari , with an urgent prayer for a
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction, before the CA questioning the orders of
the RTC, sitting as a probate court, which the CA granted. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC acted without jurisdiction in issuing the orders and had no
authority, as probate court, to demand the production of bank accounts in the name of
the private respondent corporations—YES

RULING:

Aside from ruling on the merits of the case, the Supreme Court reviewed the rules on
jurisdiction over probate proceedings.

Under Republic Act 7691, which introduced amendments to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
the determination of which court exercises jurisdiction over matters of probate depends
upon the gross value of the estate of the decedent. The pertinent provisions are:
 ● Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
jurisdiction:

(4) In all matters of probate, both testate and intestate, where the gross value of
the estate exceeds One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in probate
matters in Metro Manila, where such gross value exceeds Two Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P200,000);

● Sec. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases. — Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:

Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate
and intestate, including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where
the value of the personal property, estate or amount of the demand does not
exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) or, in Metro Manila where such
personal property, estate or amount of the demand does not exceed Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P200,000), exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs, the amount of which must be
specifically alleged, Provided, that interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's,
litigation expenses and costs shall be included in the determination of the filing
fees, Provided further, that where there are several claims or causes of actions
between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the
amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of
action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same or
different transactions; xxx

In Pastor, Jr. vs CA, the Court ruled: As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous
matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of
determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory
of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action to resolve title.

In Morales vs CFI: All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good;
but if there is, then the parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort
to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because
the probate court cannot do so.

Where the parcels of land are registered in the name of private respondent corporations,
the jurisprudence pronounced in BOLISAY vs., ALCID is of great essence and finds
applicability: If a property covered by Torrens title is involved, the presumptive
conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong
compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the
owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an
appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the
property itself is in the persons named in the title.

Inasmuch as the real properties included in the inventory of the estate of the Late Pastor
Y. Lim are in the possession of and are registered in the name of private respondent
corporations, which under the law possess a personality separate and distinct from their
stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction,
the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of private respondents should
stand undisturbed.

While it may be true that the Regional Trial Court, acting in a restricted capacity and
exercising limited jurisdiction as a probate court, is competent to issue orders involving
inclusion or exclusion of certain properties in the inventory of the estate of the decedent,
and to adjudge, albeit, provisionally the question of title over properties, it is no less true
that such authority conferred upon by law and reinforced by jurisprudence, should be
exercised judiciously, with due regard and caution to the peculiar circumstances of each
individual case.

DOCTRINE/S:

a) Jurisdiction over matters of probate

Jurisdiction over matters of probate depends upon the gross value of the estate of the
decedent (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980)

RTC:

Outside Metro Manila - Gross value of the estate exceeds One Hundred Thousand
Pesos (P100,000)

Metro Manila - Gross value exceeds Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000)

MTC:

Outside Metro Manila - does not exceed One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000)

Metro Manila - does not exceed Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000)

b) Authority of the probate court over issues of ownership

General Rule: Probate court may provisionally pass upon title to certain properties for
the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included
in the inventory. This ruling of the probate court is subject to the final decision in a
separate action to resolve title.

Reason: Regional Trial Court, acting as a probate court, exercises limited jurisdiction.

Exceptions:

1) The claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property consent,
expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court for
adjudgment; or

2) The interests of third persons are not thereby prejudiced.

10. Vda. De Reyes vs CA

Doctrine
● Extrajudicial partition, oral, binding amongst parties but not to 3rd persons
o The requirement in Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their
object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights
 over immovable property must appear in a public instrument is only for
convenience and not for validity or enforceability as between the parties
themselves.
o Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, held that the requirement that a
partition be put in a public document and registered has for its purpose the
protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs
themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as
constructive notice to others. It follows then that the intrinsic validity of
partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play
when there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. Where
no such rights are involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter
into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from
those provided by law. There is nothing in said section from which it can be
inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to the validity
of the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid.
o it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition among heirs or
renunciation of an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of
real property for the reason that it does not involve transfer of property from
one to the other, but rather a confirmation or ratification of title or right of
property by the heir renouncing in favor of another heir accepting and
receiving the inheritance
Facts
● Gavino Reyes owned a parcel of land and sought registration of said property,
however until his death in 1921 - the title was not issued to him. His son Marcelo
Reyes became administrator of the property and continued the registration
proceedings.
● Subsequently, the property was subject to a subdivision plan and was earmarked by
each heir. Two parcels of which were owned by Rafael Reyes, Sr.
● After 20 years from the death of Gavino, the OCT for the whole property was issued.
● Rafael Sr. sold one of the two parcels to Dalmacio but did not specifiy which lot.
● The heirs of Gavino executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate based on
said subdivision plan. The OCT was cancelled and several TCTs covering the lots
were issued in th name of the respective heirs/representatives.
● Plaintiff Rafael Jr. (son of Rafael) filed a case for recovery of the lot against
Dalmacio (Defendant). The latter however stated that they are the lawful owners
having bought the property from Rafael.
● The trial court ordered the restitution of the said property to the Petitioner based on
the following
o There is no evidence that Gavino entered into any written agreement of
partition based on the subdivision plan
o There is no identity as to the exact lot which was sold by Rafael Sr. to the
Defendant
● The CA ruled otherwise stating that there was indeed a subdivision plan and
jurisprudence dictates that an oral extrajudicial partition can be valid and binding
and that the mere wording of "that which I have inherited from my father" (yung
minana sakin ng aking ama) is specific to indicate that the lot sold was the one
Rafael Sr. Inherited.
Issue
● Whether or not the extrajudicial partition was valid
 
Ruling
● Yes. The extrajudicial partition, even if orally made was valid. The requirement in
Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation,
transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable
property must appear in a public instrument is only for convenience and not for
validity or enforceability as between the parties themselves. There is no law that
requires partition among heirs to be in writing to be valid.
● Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, held that the requirement that a partition
be put in a public document and registered has for its purpose the protection of
 creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs themselves against tardy
claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It
follows then that the intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed
formalities does not come into play when there are no creditors or the rights of
creditors are not affected. Where no such rights are involved, it is competent for the
heirs of an estate to enter into an agreement for distribution in a manner and upon
a plan different from those provided by law. There is nothing in said section from
which it can be inferred that a writing or other formality is an essential requisite to
the validity of the partition. Accordingly, an oral partition is valid.
● it is not covered by the Statute of Frauds: partition among heirs or renunciation of
an inheritance by some of them is not exactly a conveyance of real property for the
reason that it does not involve transfer of property from one to the other, but rather
a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property by the heir renouncing in
favor of another heir accepting and receiving the inheritance

11. CEASE vs. CA

G.R. No. L-33172 October 18, 1979

ERNESTO CEASE, CECILIA CEASE, MARION CEASE, TERESA CEASE-LACEBAL and the F.L.
CEASE PLANTATION CO., INC. as Trustee of properties of the defunct TIAONG MILLING &
PLANTATION CO., petitioners,

vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, (Special Seventh Division), HON. MANOLO L. MADDELA,

Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Quezon, BENJAMIN CEASE and FLORENCE
CEASE, respondents.

GR: Only properties in the name of the decedent may be settled; EXC

Doctrine:

A rich store of jurisprudence has established the rule known as the doctrine of
disregarding or piercing the veil of corporate fiction. Generally, a corporation is invested
by law with a personality separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it as
well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related. By virtue of this
attribute, a corporation may not, generally, be made to answer for acts or liabilities of its
stockholders or those of the legal entities to which it may be connected, and vice versa.
This separate and distinct personality is, however, merely a fiction created by law for
convenience and to promote the ends of justice. For this reason, it may not be used or
invoked for ends subversive of the policy and purpose behind its creation or which could
not have been intended by law to which it owes its being. This is particularly true where
the fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, defend
crime, confuse legitimate legal or judicial issues, perpetrate deception or otherwise
circumvent the law. This is likewise true where the corporate entity is being used as an
alter ego, adjunct, or business conduit for the sole benefit of the stockholders or of
another corporate entity. In any of these cases, the notion of corporate entity will be
pierced or disregarded, and the corporation will be treated merely as an association of
persons or, where there are two corporations, they will be merged as one, the one being
merely regarded as part or the instrumentality of the other.
An indubitable deduction from the findings of the trial court cannot but lead to the
conclusion that the business of the corporation is largely, if not wholly, the personal
venture of Forrest L. Cease and is thus considered part of the latter’s estate.

Facts:

1. Sometime in June 1908, one Forrest L. Cease common predecessor in interest of

the parties together with five (5) other American citizens organized the Tiaong
Milling and Plantation Company and in the course of its corporate existence the
company acquired various properties but at the same time all the other original
incorporators were bought out by Forrest L. Cease together with his children
2. The charter of the company lapsed in June 1958; but whether there were steps to
liquidate it, the record is silent; on 13 August 1959, Forrest L. Cease died and by
extrajudicial partition of his shares, among the children, this was disposed of on
19 October 1959; it was here where the trouble among them came to arise
because it would appear that Benjamin and Florence wanted an actual division
while the other children wanted reincorporation; and proceeding on that, these
other children Ernesto, Teresita and Cecilia and aforementioned other stockholder
Bonifacia Tirante proceeded to incorporate themselves into the F.L. Cease
Plantation Company and registered it with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on 9 December, 1959; 
3. Benjamin and Florence for their part initiated a Special Proceeding No. 3893 of the
Court of First Instance of Tayabas for the settlement of the estate of Forest L.
Cease
4. one month afterwards on 19 May 1960 they filed Civil Case No. 6326 against
Ernesto, Teresita and Cecilia Cease together with Bonifacia Tirante asking that the
Tiaong Milling and Plantation Corporation be declared Identical to F.L. Cease and
that its properties be divided among his children as his intestate heirs; this Civil
Case was resisted by aforestated defendants and notwithstanding efforts of the
plaintiffs to have the properties placed under receivership
5. On the eve of the expiry of the three (3) year period provided by the law for the
liquidation of corporations, the board of liquidators of Tiaong Milling executed an
assignment and conveyance of properties and trust agreement in favor of F.L.
Cease Plantation Co. Inc. as trustee of the Tiaong Milling and Plantation Co
6. Thus two (2) proceedings pending in the Court of First Instance of Quezon namely
Civil Case No. 6326 and Special Proceeding No. 3893 but both of these were
assigned to the Honorable Respondent Judge Manolo L. Maddela p. 43 and the
case was finally heard and submitted upon stipulation of facts pp, 34-110, rollo;
and trial Judge by decision dated 27 December 1969 held for the plaintiffs
Benjamin and Florence declaring in part that the assets or properties of the
defunct Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company now appearing under the name of
F.L. Cease Plantation Company as Trustee, is the estate also of the deceased
Forrest L. Cease and ordered divided, share and share alike, among his six
children the plaintiffs and the defendants in accordance with Rule 69, Rules of
Court;

Issues:

1. W/N there was an irregular and arbitrary termination and dismissal of the special
proceedings for judicial administration simultaneously ordered in the lower court's
decision in Civil Case No. 6326 adjudicating the partition of the estate, without
categorically resolving the opposition to the petition for administration
2. W/N the properties of the Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company forms part of the
estate of the deceased Forrest L. Cease.
Ruling:

1. No. The propriety of the dismissal and termination of the special proceedings for
judicial administration must be affirmed in spite of its rendition in another related
case in view of the established jurisprudence which favors partition when judicial
administration become, unnecessary. Judicial rulings consistently hold the view
that where partition is possible, either judicial or extrajudicial, the estate should
not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling
reason. When the estate has no creditors or pending obligations to be paid, the
beneficiaries in interest are not bound to submit the property to judicial
administration which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment of
an administrator by the court, especially when judicial administration is
unnecessary and superfluous. 

Where the estate has no debts, recourse may be had to an administration

proceeding only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for
partition. Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should
not be burdened with an administration proceeding without good and compelling
reasons. (Intestate Estate of Mercado vs. Magtibay, 96 Phil. 383)
In the records of this case, We find no indication of any indebtedness of the
estate. No creditor has come up to charge the estate within the two-year period
after the death of Forrest L. Cease, hence, the presumption under Section 1, Rule
74 that the estate is free from creditors must apply. Neither has the status of the
parties as legal heirs, much less that of respondents, been raised as an issue.
Besides, extant in the records is the stipulation of the parties to submit the
pleadings and contents of the administration proceedings for the cognizance of
the trial judge in adjudicating the civil case for partition (Respondents' Brief, p, 20,
rollo). As respondents observe, the parties in both cases are the same, so are the
properties involved; that actual division is the primary objective in both actions;
the theory and defense of the respective parties are likewise common; and that
both cases have been assigned to the same respondent judge. We feel that the
unifying effect of the foregoing circumstances invites the wholesome exception to
the structures of procedural rule, thus allowing, instead, room for judicial
flexibility. Respondent judge's dismissal of the administration proceedings then, is
a judicious move, appreciable in today's need for effective and speedy
administration of justice. There being ample reason to support the dismissal of
the special proceedings in this appealed case, We cannot see in the records any
compelling reason why it may not be dismissed just the same even if considered
in a separate action. This is inevitably certain specially when the subject property
has already been found appropriate for partition, thus reducing the petition for
administration to a mere unnecessary solicitation.

2. Yes. It must be remembered that when Tiaong Milling adduced its defense and
raised the issue of ownership, its corporate existence already terminated through
the expiration of its charter. It is clear in Section 77 of Act No. 1459 (Corporation
Law) that upon the expiration of the charter period, the corporation ceases to
exist and is dissolved ipso facto except for purposes connected with the winding
up and liquidation. The provision allows a three year, period from expiration of the
charter within which the entity gradually settles and closes its affairs, disposes
and convey its property and to divide its capital stock, but not for the purpose of
continuing the business for which it was established. At this terminal stage of its
existence, Tiaong Milling may no longer persist to maintain adverse title and
ownership of the corporate assets as against the prospective distributees when at
this time it merely holds the property in trust, its assertion of ownership is not
only a legal contradiction, but more so, to allow it to maintain adverse interest
would certainly thwart the very purpose of liquidation and the final distribute loll
of the assets to the proper, parties.
Petitioners argue that no evidence has been found to support the conclusion that the
registered properties of Tiaong Milling are also properties of the estate of Forrest
L. Cease; that on the contrary, said properties are registered under Act No. 496 in
the name of Tiaong Milling as lawful owner and possessor for the last 50 years of
its corporate existence.

We do not agree. In reposing ownership to the estate of Forrest L. Cease, the trial court
indeed found strong support, one that is based on a well-entrenched principle of
law. In sustaining respondents' theory of "merger of Forrest L. Cease and The
Tiaong Milling as one personality", or that "the company is only the business
conduit and alter ego of the deceased Forrest L. Cease and the registered
properties of Tiaong Milling are actually properties of Forrest L. Cease and should
be divided equally, share and share alike among his six children, ... ", the trial
court did aptly apply the familiar exception to the general rule by disregarding the
legal fiction of distinct and separate corporate personality and regarding the
corporation and the individual member one and the same. In shredding the
fictitious corporate veil, the trial judge narrated the undisputed factual premise,
thus:

While the records showed that originally its incorporators were aliens,
friends or third-parties in relation of one to another, in the course of its
existence, it developed into a close family corporation. The Board of
Directors and stockholders belong to one family the head of which Forrest
L. Cease always retained the majority stocks and hence the control and
management of its affairs. In fact, during the reconstruction of its records
in 1947 before the Security and Exchange Commission only 9 nominal
shares out of 300 appears in the name of his 3 eldest children then and
another person close to them. It is likewise noteworthy to observe that as
his children increase or perhaps become of age, he continued distributing
his shares among them adding Florence, Teresa and Marion until at the
time of his death only 190 were left to his name. Definitely, only the
members of his family benefited from the Corporation.
The accounts of the corporation and therefore its operation, as well as that
of the family appears to be indistinguishable and apparently joined
together. As admitted by the defendants (Manifestation of Compliance with
Order of March 7, 1963 [Exhibit "21"] the corporation 'never' had any
account with any banking institution or if any account was carried in a
bank on its behalf, it was in the name of Mr. Forrest L. Cease. In brief, the
operation of the Corporation is merged with those of the majority
stockholders, the latter using the former as his instrumentality and for the
exclusive benefits of all his family. From the foregoing indication,
therefore, there is truth in plaintiff's allegation that the corporation is only
a business conduit of his father and an extension of his personality, they
are one and the same thing. Thus, the assets of the corporation are also
the estate of Forrest L. Cease, the father of the parties herein who are all
legitimate children of full blood.
A rich store of jurisprudence has established the rule known as the doctrine of
disregarding or piercing the veil of corporate fiction. Generally, a corporation is invested
by law with a personality separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it as
well as from that of any other legal entity to which it may be related. By virtue of this
attribute, a corporation may not, generally, be made to answer for acts or liabilities of its
stockholders or those of the legal entities to which it may be connected, and vice
versa.  This separate and distinct personality is, however, merely a fiction created by law
for convenience and to promote the ends of justice. For this reason, it may not be used
or invoked for ends subversive of the policy and purpose behind its creation or which
could not have been intended by law to which it owes its being. This is particularly true
where the fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud,
defend crime, confuse legitimate legal or judicial issues, perpetrate deception or
otherwise circumvent the law. This is likewise true where the corporate entity is being
used as an alter ego, adjunct, or business conduit for the sole benefit of the stockholders
or of another corporate entity. In any of these cases, the notion of corporate entity will be
pierced or disregarded, and the corporation will be treated merely as an association of
persons or, where there are two corporations, they will be merged as one, the one being
merely regarded as part or the instrumentality of the other.
An indubitable deduction from the findings of the trial court cannot but lead to the
conclusion that the business of the corporation is largely, if not wholly, the personal
venture of Forrest L. Cease. There is not even a shadow of a showing that his children
were subscribers or purchasers of the stocks they own. Their participation as nominal
shareholders emanated solely from Forrest L. Cease's gratuitous dole out of his own
shares to the benefit of his children and ultimately his family.
Were we sustain the theory of petitioners that the trial court acted in excess of
jurisdiction or abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in deciding Civil Case
No. 6326 as a case for partition when the defendant therein, Tiaong Milling and
Plantation Company, Inc. as registered owner asserted ownership of the assets and
properties involved in the litigation, which theory must necessarily be based on the
assumption that said assets and properties of Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company,
Inc. now appearing under the name of F. L. Cease Plantation Company as Trustee are
distinct and separate from the estate of Forrest L. Cease to which petitioners and
respondents as legal heirs of said Forrest L. Cease are equally entitled share and share
alike, then that legal fiction of separate corporate personality shall have been used to
delay and ultimately deprive and defraud the respondents of their successional rights to
the estate of their deceased father. For Tiaong Milling and Plantation Company shall have
been able to extend its corporate existence beyond the period of its charter which lapsed
in June, 1958 under the guise and cover of F. L, Cease Plantation Company, Inc. as
Trustee which would be against the law, and as Trustee shall have been able to use the
assets and properties for the benefit of the petitioners, to the great prejudice and
defraudation. of private respondents. Hence, it becomes necessary and imperative to
pierce that corporate veil.

12. Pereira vs CA

Facts:
Andres de Guzman Pereira passed away without a will. He was survived by his
legitimate spouse of ten months, Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita.
Rita instituted before RTC, Special Proceeding No. RTC-BSP-83-4 for the issuance
of letters of administration in her favor pertaining to the estate of the deceased Andres
de Guzman Pereira. In her verified petition, private respondent alleged the following: that
she and Victoria Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that the
deceased left no will; that there are no creditors of the deceased; that the deceased left
several properties. The Regional Trial Court, appointed Rita Pereira Nagac administratrix
of the intestate estate of Andres de Guzman Pereira. Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where there are
no debts left by the decedent

Ruling:
 No, the administration proceedings instituted by private respondent was
unnecessary because there is no compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial
administration of the estate of the deceased.
The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator,
in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no will, or in case
he had left one, should he fail to name an executor therein. An exception to this rule is
established in Section 1 of Rule 74. Under this exception, when all the heirs are of lawful
age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition
the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the
appointment of an administrator.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the
heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or
obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for
partition. What constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the
estate of a deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors will
depend on the circumstances of each case.
In the case at bar. There are only two surviving heirs, a wife of ten months and a sister,
both of age. The parties admit that there are no debts of the deceased to be paid. What
is at once apparent is that these two heirs are not in good terms. The only conceivable
reason why private respondent seeks appointment as administratrix is for her to obtain
possession of the alleged properties of the deceased for her own purposes, since these
properties are presently in the hands of petitioner who supposedly disposed of them
fraudulently. We, therefore, hold that the court below before which the administration
proceedings are pending was not justified in issuing letters of administration, there being
no good reason for burdening the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman Pereira with
the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding.

13. LEVISTE VS CA

Facts: Petitioner is a practicing attorney who was engaged on a contingent fee basis. He
entered into a written agreement with the private respondent, Rosa del Rosario to
appear as her counsel in a petition for probate of the holographic will of Maxima Reserva.

It was agreed that his contingent fee would be 35% of the property that Rosa may
receive upon probate.

Later on, Leviste received a letter from Del Rosario informing him that she was
terminating his services as her counsel due to "conflicting interest." This consisted,
according to the letter, in petitioner's moral obligation to protect the interest of his
brother-in-law, Gaudencio M. Llanes, whom Del Rosario and the other parties in the
probate proceeding intended to eject as lessee of the property which was bequeathed to
Del Rosario under the will.

Petitioner filed a motion to intervene to protect his rights. Trial court denied his motion
because he did not file a claim for attorney’s fees nor recorded his attorney’s lien.

Petitioner filed a "Formal Statement of Claim for Attorney's Fees and Recording of
Attorney's Lien, which was noted in the court's order.

Although the order denying his motion to intervene had become final, petitioner
continued to receive copies of the court's orders, as well the pleadings of the other
parties in the case. He also continued to file pleadings. The case was submitted for
decision without the respondents' evidence.
Thereafter, Del Rosario and Rita Banu, the special administratrix-legatee, filed a "Motion
to Withdraw Petition for Probate" alleging that Del Rosario waived her rights to the devise
in her favor and agreed that the De Guzman brothers and sisters who opposed her
petition for probate, shall inherit all the properties left by the decedent.

Trial court denied the motion to withdraw.

Subsequently, the court disallowed the will holding that the legal requirements for its
validity were not satisfied.

The petitioner filed an appeal bond, notice of appeal, and record on appeal. The private
respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that petitioner was not a
party in interest.

The petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss his appeal, claiming that he has a direct
and material interest in the decision sought to be reviewed. He also asked that he be
substituted as party-petitioner, in lieu of his former client, Ms. Del Rosario. Trial court
dismissed his motion for substitution.

He filed a petition for mandamus in CA. CA dismissed the petition stating that petitioner
did not appear to be the proper party to appeal the decision.

Petitioner cited Article 1052 to support his claim, to wit:

ART. 1052. If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice of his own creditors, the
latter may petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir.

ISSUE: Whether or not Leviste, in order to collect his fees, can prosecute an appeal
despite disallowance of the will by the probate court

HELD: No.

Article 1052 of the Civil Code does not apply to this case. That legal provision protects
the creditor of a repudiating heir. Petitioner is not a creditor of Rosa del Rosario. The
payment of his fees is contingent and dependent upon the successful probate of the
holographic will. Since the petition for probate was dismissed by the lower court, the
contingency did not occur. Attorney Leviste is not entitled to his fee.

Furthermore, Article 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir. Rosa del Rosario is not
a legal heir of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Upon the dismissal of her petition for probate
of the decedent's will, she lost her right to inherit any part of the latter's estate. There is
nothing for the petitioner to accept in her name.

The contract (for contingent attorney's fees) neither gives, nor purports to give, to the
appellee (lawyer) any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her (client’s) aforesaid
share in the conjugal partnership. The amount thereof is simply a basis for the
computation of said fees.

The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for mandamus, for while it is
true that, as contended by the petitioner, public policy favors the probate of a will, it
does not necessarily follow that every will that is presented for probate, should be
allowed. The law lays down procedures which should be observed and requisites that
should be satisfied before a will may be probated. Those procedures and requirements
were not followed in this case resulting in the disallowance of the will. There being no
valid will, the motion to withdraw the probate petition was inconsequential.

Petitioner was not a party to the probate proceeding in the lower court. He had no direct
interest in the probate of the will. His only interest in the estate is an indirect interest as
former counsel for a prospective heir. One who is only indirectly interested in a will may
not interfere in its probate.
DOCTRINE: While it is true that, as contended by the petitioner, public policy favors the
probate of a will, it does not necessarily follow that every will that is presented for
probate, should be allowed. The law lays down procedures which should be observed and
requisites that should be satisfied before a will may be probated.

14. ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., petitioners,

vs.
HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch
III,
ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA JACALAN, respondents.

Facts: When Fr. Celestino Rodriguez died in the city of Manila, Apolonia Pangilinan and
Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and
testament of the decedent. Petitioners Maria and Angela Rodriguez filed a petition for
leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will but was later on withdrawn.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the CFI of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate or Fr. Rodriguez alleging that the decedent was a resident of Parañaque,
Rizal and died without leaving a will, and praying that Maria be appointed as
Administratrix. Later that day, Apolonia and Adelaida filed a petition for probation of the
will delivered by them, stipulating that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Parañaque, Rizal, that
he was a parish priest of the church in Hagonoy, Bulacan for 33 years until his death,
that he was buried in Parañaque and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon
City and Bulacan.

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the special proceeding on the ground that the CFI of
Bulacan has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate since the intestate
proceedings was filed earlier. Apolonia and Adelaida contend that the CFI of Bulacan had
already acquired jurisdiction of the case upon delivery by them of the will the week
before. The CFI denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that a difference of a few
hours did not entitle one proceeding to preference over the other.

Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners Rodriguez came to court for a writ of
certiorari and prohibition to the CFI of Bulacan for its refusal to grant their motion, relying
on Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court which provides " x x x The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to
the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, as far as it depends
on the place of residence or the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be
contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original
case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record."

Issue: Whether or not the CFI of Bulacan has jurisdiction over the case

Ruling: Affirmative.

The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery
thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for
its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court
could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and
issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule
76, of the Revised Rules of Court (Section 3, Rule 77, of the old Rules):

SEC. 3. Court to appoint time for proving will. Notice thereof to be published. —

When a will is delivered to, or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed in, the
Court having jurisdiction, such Court shall fix a time and place for proving the will
when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and shall cause
notice of such time and place to be published three (3) weeks successively,
 previous to the time appointed, in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.

But no newspaper publication shall be made where the petition for probate has
been filed by the testator himself.

The use of the disjunctive in the words "when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the
allowance of a will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit
therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed.
Where the petition for probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is
deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered. Since the testament of Fr.
Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to the Court of Bulacan on March 4, while
petitioners initiated intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal only on
March 12, eight days later, the precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of the Bulacan court
is incontestable.

But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule 76 (old Rule 77) speaks of a will being
delivered to "the Court having jurisdiction," and in the case at bar the Bulacan court did
not have it because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal province. We can not disregard
Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as parish priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan (1930-1963);
but even if we do so, and consider that he retained throughout some animus
revertendi to the place of his birth in Parañaque, Rizal, that detail would not imply that
the Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions, the power to settle
decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all courts of first instance, and the domicile
of the testator only affects the venue but not the jurisdiction of the Court (In re Kaw
Singco, 74 Phil. 239; Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484; Bernabe vs. Vergara, 73 Phil. 676).
Neither party denies that the late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or that he left personal
property in Hagonoy, province of Bulacan (t.s.n. p. 46, hearing of June 11, 1963, Annex
"H", Petition, Rec., p. 48). That is sufficient in the case before us.

The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead
of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule
75) of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins that:

The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. (Sec. 1)

This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate. Of them only one could be of proper venue,
yet the rule grants precedence to that Court whose jurisdiction is first invoked, without
taking venue into account.

There are two other reasons that militate against the success of petitioners. One is that
their commencing intestate proceedings in Rizal, after they learned of the delivery of the
decedent's will to the Court of Bulacan, was in bad faith, patently done with a view to
divesting the latter court of the precedence awarded it by the Rules. Certainly the order
of priority established in Rule 73 (old Rule 75) was not designed to convert the
settlement of decedent's estates into a race between applicants, with the administration
of the properties as the price for the fleetest.

The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary
or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid
operative will. Says Article 960 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

ART. 960. Legal or intestate succession takes place:

(1) If a person dies without a will, or with a void will, or one which has
subsequently lost its validity;
 (2) When the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property
belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place only with
respect to the property in which the testator has not disposed;

(3) If the suspensive condition attached to the institution of heir does not happen
or is not fulfilled, or if the heir dies before the testator, or repudiates the
inheritance, there being no substitution, and no right of accretion takes place;

(4) When the heir instituted is incapable of succeeding, except in cases provided
in this Code.

Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final decision as
to the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form
of pre-established action". The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus
proceed while the probate of the purported will of Father Rodriguez is pending.

We rule that the Bulacan Court of First Instance was entitled to priority in the settlement
of the estate in question, and that in refusing to dismiss the probate. proceedings, said
court did not commit any abuse of discretion. It is the proceedings in the Rizal Court that
should be discontinued.

15. Uriarte v. CFI

Facts

On Nov 6, 1961, Petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed with CFI Negros petition for the
settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan (SP No. 6344) alleging that, as a natural son
of the latter, he was his sole heir. Previously, in same court, during the lifetime of Don
Juan, Vicente had instituted Civil Case No. 6142 for his compulsory acknowledgment as
natural son which is still pending. PNB was appointed as special administrator, however,
record discloses, that, PNB never actually qualified.

On Dec 19, 1961, Higinio Uriarte, a nephew of decedent, filed an opposition claiming
the deceased had "executed a Last Will and Testament in Spain, and a duly
authenticated copy has already been requested to be submitted to the Court upon
receipt thereof and also questioned Vicente's capacity and interest to commence the
intestate proceeding.

On Aug 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, also a nephew, commenced SP No. 51396
in the Manila CFI for the probate of alleged last will and also filed in Negros CFI, a motion
to dismiss SP 6344 on the grounds that since there is a will, there was no legal basis to
proceed with the intestate proceedings, and Vicente, who is not acknowledged had no
legal personality and interest to initiate intestate proceedings. A copy of the Petition for
Probate and of the alleged Will were attached to the Motion to Dismiss.

Vicente opposed such motion, contending that, Negros CFI was first to take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the decedent, thus it had acquired
exclusive jurisdiction over same to the exclusion of other courts.

On Apr 15, 1963, Vicente filed an Omnibus Motion in SP No. 51396 CFI Manila, asking
for leave to intervene; dismissal of the petition and the annulment of the proceedings.
This motion was denied by said court.

On Apr 19, 1963, Negros CFI dismissed the SP No. 6344, citing that the proper thing
for Vicente to do would be to intervene in the testate estate proceedings CFI Manila,
instead of maintaining an independent action, for his supposed interest in the estate,
pending the final decision of the action for compulsory acknowledgment.

Vicente’s motion for reconsideration of said order was denied so he proceeded to file
his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal on questions of law. Before the
said record on appeal was approved, Vicente filed a petition for certiorari before the SC
on Oct 3, 1963, which is tantamount to abandoning his appeal. In order to give way to
the certiorari, the record on appeal filed was disapproved.

Issues

WON Manila CFI is the proper venue for the settlement of estate of Don Juan Uriarte.

Ruling

NO.

Don Juan is an inhabitant of a foreign country Spain, so the CFI (now RTC) in Negros
or Manila where he left property may take cognizance of settlement of his estate whether
intestate or testate. In this case, it was Negros CFI who first took cognizance of the
settlement of the estate, thus should have exercised jurisdiction to the exclusion of all
other courts.

Zamacona should have submitted to Negros CFI probate of the will in a separate
special or in an appropriate motion for probate in the already pending intestate
proceeding. Probate of the will is mandatory, therefore takes precedence over intestate
proceedings. Thus, if in the course of the intestate proceedings, it is found out that the
decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the will should replace the
intestate proceedings even if at that stage, an administrator had already been appointed,
who is then required to render a final account and turn over the estate in his possession
to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without
prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding
shall continue as an intestacy.

When Higinio filed an opposition to Vicente’s petition, Negros CFI was informed that
the decedent had left a will in Spain. When Zamacona, filed his motion to dismiss SP
6344 in Negros CFI, he knew before filing the petition for probate with Manila CFI that
there was already a special proceeding pending in the Negros for the settlement of the
estate of the same decedent.

However, It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely

a waiveable procedural defect, and in this case, Court held that Vicente has waived the
right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. He knew of the
existence of a will when an opposition was filed his initial petition in 1961. But, it was
only on Apr 15, 1963 that he filed with Manila CFI in SP 51396 an Omnibus motion asking
for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings thus
enabling the Manila CFI not only to appoint an administrator with the will annexed but
also to admit said will to probate on Oct 31, 1962. Court is not inclined to annul
proceedings regularly made in a lower court even if it was not the proper venue, if the
result would be be having the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar
jurisdiction.
 16. Intestate Estate of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson

"Under Section 1 of Rule 73, Rules of Court, 'the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estates of the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of
all other courts.' Pursuant to this provision, therefore all questions concerning the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson should be filed
before Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance, then presided over by former
Judge, now Justice of the Court of Appeals, Manuel Barcelona, where Special Proceedings
No. 63866 for the settlement of the testate estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite
Wolfson was filed and is still pending."

Facts: Rosina Wolfson died on September 14, 1965 in San Francisco California. She left a
will and codicils executed in accordance with the laws of California, naming Wells Fargo
Bank as its sole executor. The will was duly probated by a California Court. Wells Fargo
then appointed several lawyers as its attorney-in-fact with authority to file ancillary
administration proceedings for the estate of Rosina and to act as administrator/s. Among
them was Atty. Arturo del Rosario. Unaware that Rosina died with a will, Atty. Manuel
Macias (petitioner-appelant) filed on January 10, 1966 in behalf of Ricardo Vito Cruz a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration in his favor over the estate of the
late Rosina in the Philippines. This was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 63866 (SP No.
866) and assigned to Branch VIII presided by Judge Barcelona. Thus, Ricardo was
appointed as Special Administrator for Rosina’s estate. On August 13, 1966 Atty. Arturo
del Rosario filed a petition in SP No. 866 praying for the conversion of the intestate
proceeding into a petition for the probate of Rosina’s will and codicils, in as much as
Rosina left a will duly probated abroad.

However, on October 25, 1966 Atty. Macias, in his own behalf and without informing his
client Ricardo Vito Cruz, filed a similar but separate and independent petition docketed
as Special Proceeding No. 67302 (SP No. 302) assigned to Branch VI then presided by
Judge Cloribel, alleging that he has a legal interest in Rosina’s estate and praying for the
probate of her will as well as his appointment as special administrator. Thus, Atty. Macias
was appointed as special administrator. An opposition was filed by Atty. Arturo del
Rosario on the ground that Rosina’s estate is already the subject of SP No. 866 before
Branch VIII filed by Atty. Macias himself. Likewise, Ricardo Vito Cruz filed a motion to
dismiss said petition on the ground that the two proceedings would only delay and
complicate matters. In reply, Atty. Macias contended that the grounds advanced by
Ricardo Vito Cruz and Atty. Arturo del Rosario were not legal grounds for the dismissal of
SP No. 302 and that he was seeking his own appointment as regular, not ancillary
administrator of Rosina’s estate based on his interest.

In an order dated December 23, 1966, Judge Cloribel ordered the transfer of SP No. 302
to Branch VIII. Ricardo Vito Cruz filed an opposition claiming that he does not agree to
the Consolidation of SP No. 302 and SP No. 866, and praying that SP No. 302 be
dismissed outright, otherwise, a violation of the prohibition against multiplicity of suits
would occur. The cases were nevertheless consolidated.

On February 13, 1967, Judge Barlcelona of Branch VIII ordered the dismissal of SP No.
302. The motion for reconsideration of Atty. Macias was denied, thus he filed a notice of
appeal.

Issue: W/N the dismissal of SP No. 302 was proper (in view of a similar but independent
SP pending before another court)

Ruling:
Affirmative; Only last May 30, 1972, in Macias vs. Uy Kim, et al., we reiterated the rule
that "Under Section 1 of Rule 73, Rules of Court, 'the court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estates of the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of
all other courts.' Pursuant to this provision, therefore all questions concerning the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite Wolfson should be filed
before Branch VIII of the Manila Court of First Instance, then presided over by former
Judge, now Justice of the Court of Appeals, Manuel Barcelona, where Special Proceedings
No. 63866 for the settlement of the testate estate of the deceased Rosina Marguerite
Wolfson was filed and is still pending."

Paraphrasing the jurisprudence on this score, the salutary purpose of the rule is to
prevent confusion and delay. It is not inserted in the law for the benefit of the parties
litigant but in the public interest for the better administration of justice, for which reason
the parties have no control over it. Consequently, every challenge to the validity of the
will, any objection to its authentication, every demand or claim by any heir, legatee or
party in interest in intestate or testate succession must be acted upon and decided
within the same special proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same judge
having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate should take cognizance of the
question raised, for he will be called upon to distribute or adjudicate the property to the
interested parties. We stressed that the main function of a probate court is to settle and
liquidate the estates of the deceased either summarily or through the process of
administration; and towards this end the probate court has to determine who the heirs
are and their respective shares in the net assets of the estate.  Section 1 of Rule 73,
speaking as it does of "settlement of the estates of the deceased," applies equally to
both testate and intestate proceedings. And the conversion of an intestate proceeding
into a testate one is "entirely a matter of form and lies within the sound discretion of the
court." 

It is thus patent that the second petition filed on October 25, 1966 by petitioner-
appellant was about nine (9) months subsequent to the first petition he filed in behalf of
appellee Ricardo Vito Cruz, now docketed as Special Proceedings No. 63866 and over two
months after Arthur del Rosario filed on August 13, 1966 his petition to convert Special
Proceedings No. 63866 from intestate to testate.

As above recounted, petitioner-appellant, on January 21, 1967, filed his opposition to the
petition of Atty. Arturo del Rosario for his appointment as ancillary administrator in
Special Proceedings No. 63866 of Rosina's estate, on the ground that del Rosario lacks
legal interest, while he, petitioner-appellant, has legal interest and represents the bigger
interest in Rosina's estate and therefore should be appointed regular administrator.

Hence, the appealed orders dated February 20 and April 22, 1967 (Annexes "19" & "26",
pp. 132-142, ROA) of the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII dismissing Special Proceedings
No. 67302 after the same was transferred from Branch VI to Branch VIII and consolidated
with Special Proceedings No. 63866 pursuant to the order date February 11, 1967 (Annex
"17", pp. 127-128, ROA), should be sustained.

Petitioner-appellant insists that after ordering its consolidation with Special Proceedings
No. 63866, the Presiding Judge of Branch VIII has no authority to dismiss Special
Proceedings No. 67302 and should hear jointly said Special Proceedings No. 67302 and
Special Proceedings No. 63866.
Generally, consolidation and joint hearing of the two cases would have been proper if
they do not involve settlement of the estate of a decedent, which is covered by a special
provision of the Rules of Court, namely Section 1 of Rule 73, the specific command of
which should be obeyed. At any rate, motions for consolidation are addressed to the
sound discretion of the court; and we do not find that the trial judge gravely abused his
discretion in reconsidering the prior order for the consolidation of the two special
proceedings for the settlement of the same estate and dismissing Special Proceedings
No. 67302, to warrant the exercise of Our supervisory authority over the lower court
which has wide discretion in this regard.   As a matter of fact, the Honorable Presiding
Judge of Branch VIII exercised sound discretion in directing the dismissal of Special
Proceedings No. 67302. The trial court is not precluded from dismissing one case after
ordering the consolidation and joint hearing of the two cases; because under Section 1 of
Rule 31, after ordering consolidation, the court "may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay."
As stated by the trial court in its order dated April 22, 1967 -
... Moreover, even if there was a consolidation, this Court, perforce, had to dismiss
the instant proceedings, otherwise there will be multiplicity of suits.
... It needs no elaboration that a court can never be deprived of its power to
dismiss a case pending before it if the subject-matter of such case is the same as
the subject-matter of another case also pending before it. As this Court had
pointed out in the order sought to be reconsidered, the filing of Special
Proceedings No. 67302 violated that basic and elementary rule on multiplicity of
suits which must be avoided. There is no difference between the two proceedings.
Both refer to the Philippine estate of the late Rosina Marguerite Wolfson of which
a special administrator has been appointed to temporarily administer this estate
pending the appointment of a regular administrator. Although Special Proceedings
No. 63866 is entitled "Re Intestate Estate of Rosina Marguerite Wolfson, etc.", the
fact remains that the hearing on the allowance of the last will and codicils left by
the decedent was already terminated in said proceedings and, in fact, petitioner
Macias participated therein. If such will and codicils are allowed to probate, all
that would be needed is to change the title of said proceedings from Intestate to
Testate. Special Proceedings No. 67302 (the instant proceedings), therefore, is of
no moment and would serve no purpose.
The record that in Special Proceedings No. 63866, petitioner Macias not only
participated but presented evidence supporting the admission to probate the
decedent's will and codicils thereto. In the same Special Proceedings No. 63866,
Macias also participated by opposing the appointment of Ricardo Vito Cruz as
regular administrator and proposing his own appointment to the position. Viewed
in this light, the Court sees no reason to proceed with Special Proceedings No.
67302. If petitioner Macias wants to be the administrator, he can do so by
applying, as in fact he has, in Special Proceedings No. 63866.
As hinted in the aforequoted portion of the appealed order of April 22, 1967, if petitioner-
appellant wants to be appointed as regular administrator, he can file his petition therefor,
as he in fact did, in Special Proceedings No. 63866.
Even if it were true that appellee Vito Cruz intends to suppress, as claimed by petitioner-
appellant, Julian's memorandum to his sister Rosina wherein Julian expressed the hope
that Rosina will deliver at her convenience to petitioner-appellant the sum of P500.00
minus taxes, such a design cannot prevent him from presenting the said memorandum in
Special Proceedings No. 63866, a copy of which he apparently possesses because he
attached the same as Appendix "A" to his brief.
It should be noted from his said memorandum that the late Julian Wolfson expressly
hoped that his sister will deliver to petitioner-appellant at her convenience only the
comparatively meager sum of P500.00, the lowest accorded to his former employees by
the late Julian A. Wolfson, who expressed the same hope that Rosina at her convenience
will deliver to three of his employees P10,000 each and to two remaining employees
Pl,000.00 each, less taxes. It is likewise significant that the deceased Julian Wolfson
preferred to leave his last instructions to Ricardo Vito Cruz, his accountant, and not to
petitioner-appellant, an experienced lawyer of long standing and Julian's former assistant
for several years in his law firm. Considering these circumstances, the unusual interest
on the part of petitioner-appellant in insisting in filing a separate probate proceeding and
in seeking his own appointment as administrator of Rosina's estate is rather curious, to
say the least.
 A respectable and self-respecting member of the Bar would consider indelicate such an
act and would restrain his hand in being too officious under the circumstance. He would
not institute several actions to protect his interest, when one suit will suffice, thus
minimizing the clogging of the dockets of the courts.
Petitioner-appellant's pretension that he was not aware of the petition filed on August 13,
1966 by Atty. Arturo del Rosario for the probate of the will and codicils of Rosina in the
same Special Proceedings No. 63866, even if true, does not justify his initiating another
proceeding for the same purpose, separate from and independent of Special Proceedings
No. 63866. In this connection, his pretense cannot be believed; because he was the one
who filed on January 10, 1966, Special Proceedings No. 63866 in behalf of appellee
Ricardo Vito Cruz whose appointment as official administrator he secured and whose
appointment as regular administrator he prayed for. Upon knowing of the existence of
Rosina's will and codicils, petitioner-appellee would reasonably be expected to examine
and study the records of Special Proceedings No. 63866 long before filed on October 25,
1966 his separate petition for probate of the same will and codicils assigned to Branch VI,
and consequently he must have necessarily discovered the existence in the record of
Special Proceedings No. 63866 the petition for probate filed by Atty. Arturo del Rosario.
Because such a petition would nullify his obvious desire to have a hand in the
administration of Rosina's estate through his former client, appellee Ricardo Vito Cruz,
feigning ignorance of the petition of Atty. Arturo del Rosario, he filed a separate
independent petition for probate which is docketed as Special Proceedings No. 67302
hoping thereby to preserve the chances of his claim being recognized by the court and of
being appointed regular administrator, instead of filing the same petition in special
Proceedings No. 63866 for the conversion of the said proceedings from intestate to
testate. This act on his part reveals a motive that is hardly flattering to him as a member
of the bar and as an officer of the court.

The decision appealed from is affirmed.

17. Cuenco vs CA

o The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts

FACTS:

Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two
minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu.
On 5 March 1964, Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for
Letters of Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the
senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and
Quezon City.

While the petition was still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second
wife, filed a petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where
she was named executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI
Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI
Quezon shall have acted on the probate proceedings.

Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied.

Quezon City court Ruling: admitted to probate the late senator's last will and testament

Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to probate
and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof, respondents filed a special civil action
of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction with respondent Court of Appeals
to bar the Rizal court from proceeding with case.

Upon appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.

ISSUEs:

o Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition against Quezon City
court ordering it to refrain from proceeding with the testate proceedings
o Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference
to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings

HELD:

1. Yes. The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition
against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and
annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate
of the last will and testament of the deceased and appointing petitioner-widow as
executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's wish. Under Rule
73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of
jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely of venue. Conversely, such court,
may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been
presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and
resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and that the allegation of the
intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate may be actually false,
may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in
abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for
probate of the decedent's alleged last will. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if
the will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely
decline to take cognizance of Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown
to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court,
to the exclusion of all other courts.

2. No. Under the facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the
intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court. Necessarily, neither could the
Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must
first take cognizance over the estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to
exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do. Furthermore, as is
undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court
indisputably had at least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.

On Venue and Jurisdiction

Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

The residence of the decent or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction
over the subject matter but merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it would affect the
prompt administration of justice.

The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take cognizance of the
settlement of the estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all
other courts.

18. Fule vs CA
FACTS :

Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of
Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other
places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." Virginia G. Fule filed with the CFI
of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of
administration (Sp. Proc. No. 27-C ) and at the same time, she moved ex parte for her
appointment as special administratrix over the estate. Judge Malvar granted the motion.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia,

therefore, prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of
Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing. While this
reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed
a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, that her
appointment was obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete
misrepresentations.

Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular

Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental petition modified the original
petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado
G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First District of Laguna and
his last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna;.

Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the
petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was
improperly laid. Preciosa B. Garcia argued, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on the
Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the court was not possessed at the beginning
because the original petition was deficient.

Judge Malvar ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order,
denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule and
admitting the supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to allege in her original
petition for letters of administration in the place of residence of the decedent at the time
of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted
to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by praying to be
appointed as special and regular administratrix of the estate.

During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before Judge
Malvar, Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that
his residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her part, Preciosa B. Garcia
presented the residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that three months
before his death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also testified that
Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he
was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.

Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari
and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the CA, (CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP) to
annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the CFI of Laguna.

Court of Appeals annulled the proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-
C of the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.Denied of their
motion for reconsideration.

Virginia G. Fule filed appeal by certiorari.

But, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of Appeals,
Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed a petition for letters of administration before the CFI
of Rizal, Quezon City (Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738) over the same intestate estate of Amado G.
Garcia.

VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari with temporary
restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge
Ernani Cruz Paño from further acting in the case. A restraining order was issued

Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property
owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and
personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court."

Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement
and improper laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or
residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba,
Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the
contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death certificate presented
by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last
residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon
City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that
Amado G. Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna.

ISSUE :

Whether the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was
improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna ?

- Whether or not the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia was
Quezon City or Calamba, Laguna ?

HELD :
Petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are
hereby denied.

YES, the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly
laid in the CFI of Calamba, Laguna because, the last place of residence of the deceased
Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at
Calamba, Laguna. The death certificate of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in
evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last
place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.
Deceased's residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the
Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney.; the Deed of Donation; and certificates of
titles covering parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado
G. Garcia's last place of residence was at Quezon City.

Thus, the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration was improperly
laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. But, the objection to improper
venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When
improper venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In this
case, in asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia
did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court
of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to alternative
remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of
the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.

Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court
of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is
an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he
had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction
assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of
the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record."

With particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules
of Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the existence of
jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary facts,
such as death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the existence, and situs if
need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of the person who
seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of
death of the intestate and his last residence within the country are foundation facts upon
which all subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the
intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in
the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration. 3

The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the clause
"so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the
estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule indicates: "Settlement
of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. It could not have been intended to
define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained
in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing;
jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over
the subject matter "existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began."
That power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the
manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are
cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the
procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it
legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that the
judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain
it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong
presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties.

The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction
over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Because
of the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the country, the Rules of Court,
however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A
fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will,
and issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction
over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that
the Revised Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a
deceased person shall be settled as "venue."

What does the term "resides" mean?

The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule
73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. As generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term
"inhabitant."

In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular
sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence
or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,
while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it
one's domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary.

19. Roberts vs Leonidas

FACTS:

● Edward Grimm was an American resident and died on Nov. 27, 1977.
● He was survived by his second wife with their two children and his two other
children in his first marriage.
● He executed two wills in California, disposing of his properties inside and outside
the Philippines respectively.
● The two wills were presented for probate by his first wife and was then admitted
by the court with knowledge of the pending intestate petition filed in Manila.
 ● 2 weeks later, his second wife and 2 children and his first wife and other 2
children entered into a compromise agreement in Utah.
● Ethel then, one of his daughters on his first marriage was named special
administratrix in the intestate proceeding filed in Manila on which his second wife
filed an opposition and motion to dismiss based on the pending testate
proceeding in Utah.
● Represented by her lawyer, the second wife filed for probate of two wills on
branch 38 of the RTC alleging that the agreement in Utah was due to the
machinations of the second party.
● Ethel then filed a motion to dismiss which the lower court denied. Hence this
petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in an
intestate proceeding be entertained in another branch.

RULING:

Yes. We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.

A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no
will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838,
Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).

The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249;
Baluyot vs. Panio, L-42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of
a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the
intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge
assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.

Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an
opposition and answer to the petition unless she considers her motion to dismiss and
other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who appeared in the
intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the
testate case.

20. Consolidated Bank vs IAC

GR 75017, June 3, 1991
Facts:

1. Don Vicente Madrigal, a resident of Quezon City, died. To settle his estate, Special
Proceedings No. Q-916960 was filed in RTC Quezon City.

2. Judge Agana who was originally assigned in RTC Pasay was temporarily detailed in RTC
QC. During said period, he was assigned to handle SP No. Q-916960. When he was made
to return to RTC Pasay, he also brought with him the case records.
3. In the course of the subject estate proceedings, a Motion for Payment of Lien was filed
by Mrs.Vasquez attaching therewith an agreement executed by and among Don
Madrigal's heirs. In the agreement, the heirs provided that a reimbursement amounting
to P5M be paid to Mrs. Vasquez for all the expenses in the prosecution/defense cases
filed by one against the other. Said reimbursement shall be taken from the Estate of Don
Vicente or from the proceeds of the settlement of the claim of Madrigal and Co.

4. Petitioner did not attend the hearing on the Motion for Payment of Lien. Hence, the
probate court granted it and directed Petitioner to pay Mrs. Vasquez P5,833,333 from the
estate of Don Madrigal.

5. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the said order grounded on the
following reasons:

A. Order was beyond the limited and special jurisdiction of the court
B. No due process was given
C. Order is a violation of tax laws on payment of estate taxes

6. Probate court stood by its decisions regarding the first and second grounds raised by
Petitioner. According to the probate court, the order was made in view of the agreement
executed by all of the heirs. It also cited that the Administrator was properly apprised of
the Motion for Payment of Lien as well as the date of its subsequent hearing but they still
failed to send a representative. As to the third ground, the court found merit. It believes
that a part of the approved amount should be withheld to answer for the estate taxes
which it failed to provide in its earlier order. The court said that P833k must be set aside
for any obligations and liabilities.

7. When an administrative order was issued by the SC limiting RTC Pasay's jurisdiction,
the probate court required the parties to show cause why the case should not be
transferred to RTC QC.

8. Two of the heirs manifested their desire to have the case retained by the current
probate court (RTC Pasay). The Petitioner, on the other hand, did not give its comformity,
in effect, objecting to the retention by the Pasay City probate court.

9. Petitioner later on filed an omnibus motion praying for the return of the case to the
court of origin or RTC QC. But the motion was denied.

10. When the matter was brought to the CA, The appellate court upheld due process in
the instant case and waiver of venue.

11. Petitioner argues that there was improper venue, insisting as a result, that the
probate proceedings including that taken by the Court of Appeals is null. Their failure to
object to the proceedings conducted at Pasay City Regional Trial Court, should not be
taken as a waiver on their part as to venue because they believed that the proceedings
were only temporary and that the case would subsequently be returned to Quezon City
for further proceedings.

Issue: whether or not there was waiver of venue by inaction on the part of petitioner.

Ruling:

1. While the Court agrees with the petitioner that venue in this case should have been
laid in Quezon City, petitioner's inaction has worked against it. We agree with the Court
of Appeals that indeed, petitioner has waived its right to contest the question of venue.

2. The action in the present case pertains to the probate of the intestate estate of the
late Don Vicente Madrigal, in which case a regional trial court properly has jurisdiction
over the case, both under the Judiciary Act of 1948, Sec. 44 (e) and under BP 129, Sec.
19(4).
Objection to improper venue should be made in a motion to dismiss. Until this is done,
venue cannot truly be said to have been improperly laid.

3. It was only when the probate court ordered the petitioner to pay Mrs Vasquez did the
latter raise the issue on improper venue.

4. The court, of course, notes that Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion to Dismiss but it
was belatedly done considering that petitioner has already submitted itself to the
jurisdiction of the court. In fact, petitioner itself had filed no less than four (4) motions
and pleadings with the court a quo, thereby recognizing its jurisdiction.

5. In closing, SC quoted CA's ratiocination: "We are not prepared to rule that all the
proceedings in the past are null and void because of venue and send back the
proceedings to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court, try the case anew from the very
beginning to where this incident came about which proceedings might take more than
five (5) years again. We are not prone to do this, conscious of the fact that one of the
primordial objections of Batas PambansaBlg. 129 is the speedy administration of justice
but within the framework of the rule of law. We are not inclined to give Our affirmance to
the petitioner's desire for the said transfer because the procedure will only militate
against the interest of all the parties considering that everybody is desirous to terminate
the proceedings as early as possible and the continuance of the proceedings before the
respondent court has not caused any damage against the parties and there is no damage
as well against public interest."

21. JAO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 128314      May 29, 2002

FACTS:
Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea
V. Jao, who died intestate. The decedents left real estate, cash, shares of stock and other
personal properties.
On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration
before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City over the estate of his parents. Pending the
appointment of a regular administrator, Perico moved that he be appointed as special
administrator. He alleged that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating the assets
of the estate. More particularly, Rodolfo was receiving rentals from real properties
without rendering any accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging to their
deceased parents and disposing of the cash and valuables therein.
Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue. He
argued that the deceased spouses did not reside in Quezon City either during their
lifetime or at the time of their deaths. The decedent’s actual residence was in Angeles
City, Pampanga, where his late mother used to run and operate a bakery. As the health
of his parents deteriorated due to old age, they stayed in Rodolfo’s residence atQuezon
City, solely for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment and hospitalization. Rodolfo
submitted documentary evidence previously executed by the decedents, consisting of
income tax returns, voter’s affidavits, statements of assets and liabilities, real estate tax
payments, motor vehicle registration and passports, all indicating that their permanent
residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga.
In his opposition, Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided in
Rodolfo’s house in Quezon City at the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, it was
conclusively declared in their death certificates that their last residence before they died
was at Quezon City. Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry appearing on the death
certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed his own signature on the said document.
Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the decedents’
residence on the death certificates in good faith and through honest mistake. He gave his
residence only as reference, considering that their parents were treated in their late
years at the Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Their stay in his
house was merely transitory, in the same way that they were taken at different times for
the same purpose to Perico’s residence at Legaspi Towers in Roxas Boulevard. The death
certificates could not, therefore, be deemed conclusive evidence of the decedents’
residence in light of the other documents showing otherwise.
The motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was denied.
Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals and was dismissed.
Rodolfo’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this
petition for review
ISSUE:

Where should the settlement proceedings be had --- in Pampanga, where the decedents
had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City, where they actually stayed before
their demise?

RULING:

Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Where estate of deceased persons be settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of

the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall
be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court
of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death xxx.

Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of

administration granted in the proper court located in the province where the
decedent resides at the time of his death.

Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et al., where we
held that the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had
his permanent residence or domicile at the time of death. In determining residence at
the time of death, the following factors must be considered, namely, the decedent had:
(a) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen;
and (c) intention to stay therein permanently. 15 While it appears that the decedents in
this case chose to be physically present in Quezon City for medical convenience,
petitioner avers that they never adopted Quezon City as their permanent residence.

The contention lacks merit.

The facts in Eusebio  were different from those in the case at bar. The decedent therein,
Andres Eusebio, passed away while in the process of transferring his personal belongings
to a house in Quezon City. He was then suffering from a heart ailment and was advised
by his doctor/son to purchase a Quezon City residence, which was nearer to his doctor.
While he was able to acquire a house in Quezon City, Eusebio died even before he could
move therein. In said case, we ruled that Eusebio retained his domicile --- and hence,
residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It cannot be said that Eusebio changed his
residence because, strictly speaking, his physical presence in Quezon City was just
temporary.

In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to
petitioner’s Quezon City residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute respondent’s
assertion that their elderly parents stayed in his house for some three to four years
before they died in the late 1980s.
Furthermore, the decedents’ respective death certificates state that they were both
residents of Quezon City at the time of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner
himself who filled up his late mother’s death certificate. To our mind, this unqualifiedly
shows that at that time, at least, petitioner recognized his deceased mother’s residence
to be Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the entry in Ignacio’s death
certificate, accomplished a year earlier by respondent.

The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were thus
properly considered and presumed to be correct by the court a quo. We agree with the
appellate court’s observation that since the death certificates were accomplished even
before petitioner and respondent quarreled over their inheritance, they may be relied
upon to reflect the true situation at the time of their parents’ death.

The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents’ residence at the time
of death,  over the numerous documentary evidence presented by petitioner. To be
sure, the documents presented by petitioner pertained not to  residence at the time
of death, as required by the Rules of Court, but to permanent residence or domicile.
In Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeal, we held:

xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as

distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides", like the
terms "residing" and "residence", is elastic and should be interpreted in the light
of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules
of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.
Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction
between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the
term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that
is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence
must be more than temporary.

Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the decedents have been
living with petitioner at the time of their deaths and for some time prior thereto. We find
this conclusion to be substantiated by the evidence on record. A close perusal of the
challenged decision shows that, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the court below
considered not only the decedents’ physical presence in Quezon City, but also other
factors indicating that the decedents’ stay therein was more than temporary. In the
absence of any substantial showing that the lower courts’ factual findings stemmed from
an erroneous apprehension of the evidence presented, the same must be held to be
conclusive and binding upon this Court.

Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule 4, Section
2, on ordinary civil actions, and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies specifically to
settlement proceedings. He argues that while venue in the former understandably refers
to actual physical residence for the purpose of serving summons, it is the permanent
residence of the decedent which is significant in Rule 73, Section 1. Petitioner insists that
venue for the settlement of estates can only refer to permanent residence or domicile
because it is the place where the records of the properties are kept and where most of
the decedents’ properties are located.

Petitioner’s argument fails to persuade.

It does not necessarily follow that the records of a person’s properties are kept in the
place where he permanently resides. Neither can it be presumed that a person’s
properties can be found mostly in the place where he establishes his domicile. It may be
that he has his domicile in a place different from that where he keeps his records, or
where he maintains extensive personal and business interests. No generalizations can
thus be formulated on the matter, as the question of where to keep records or retain
properties is entirely dependent upon an individual’s choice and peculiarities.

At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates between venue
in ordinary civil actions and venue in special proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of
Appeals and Bejer v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions and
that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined,
"residence", in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s
actual residence or place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. All told, the lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that venue
for the settlement of the decedents’ intestate estate was properly laid in the Quezon City
court.