Universal Motors vs.

Velasco
Facts:
Mariano T. Velasco bought from Universal Motors a Mercedes-Benz truck on installment
basis. Thereafter, to secure the balance, he executed a promissory note and executed a chattel
mortgage over the truck. Velasco defaulted in his payments, as a result, Universal Motors
instituted an action in the court a quo to recover the truck preparatory to foreclosure of the
chattel mortgage.
By virtue of a writ of replevin issued by the court, the seller was able to re-possess the
truck. Velasco failed to file an answer and was declared in default. The court rendered decision
in favor of the plaintiff, declaring the latter entitled to the possession of the vehicle and ordering
the defendant Velasco to pay plaintiff P1,403.47 as well as the additional sum of P500.00 as
attorney’s fees to be satisfied out of the proceeds of the sale of the vehicle.
However, the plaintiff filed a motion requesting that the court allowed the plaintiff to
require the defendant to pay directly the sums of P1,403.47 and P500.00 instead of ordering the
satisfaction of the same from the proceeds of the auction sale but the motion was denied.
Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in ordering that the sums adjudge in favor of the
plaintiff are to be satisfied only from the proceeds of the auction sale of the mortgage vehicle
subject matter of the litigation.
Ruling: Yes.
In stipulating that the sums adjudged P971.41, premium on replevin bond, P300.00,
sheriff's P132.00, costs of the suit total P1,403.47; and P500.00, attorney's fees — the lower
court relied on the provisions of Article 1484 of the Civil Code which insofar as relevant reads as
follows:
“Art 1484. In a contract of sale of personal property the price of which is payable in installments,
the vendor may exercise any of the following remedies.
(3) Foreclose the chattel mortgage on the thing sold, if one has been constituted, should the
vendee's failure to pay cover two or more installments. In this case, he shall have no further
action against the purchaser to recover any unpaid of the balance of the price. Any agreement to
the contrary shall be void.”
The third paragraph of Art. 1484 is inapplicable to the case at bar. First, as the plaintiff has
correctly pointed out, the action instituted in the court a quo was not foreclosure of the chattel
mortgage but for the replevin; and second, the amounts adjudged in favor of the plaintiff were
not part of the unpaid balance of the price" or in the concept of a deficiency judgment but were
for expenses of the suit.

Ago vs. CA
Facts:
Venancio Castañeda and Nicetas Henson, respondents in this case, brought an action for
replevin in the Manila Court of First Instance to recover from petitioner Pastor D. Ago, a
Caterpillar tractor, a Jaeger hoist and a cargo truck which the former had delivered to the latter
for use in their logging business in Agusan.
The court rendered judgment for respondents ordering petitioner to return the machinery
or, in the alternative, to pay a sum of money. Thereafter, petitioner subsequently appealed the
decision, but while the appeal was thus pending, it was found that petitioner's surety, the Globe
Assurance Co., had become bankrupt.
As a result, upon motion of the respondents, the trial court ordered petitioner to file a new
and sufficient counterbond and, when he failed to file one, it issued a writ of replevin. Hence, the
trial court issued a writ of seizure.
The sheriff thereafter served the writ on petitioner's assistant manager, then took
possession of the tractor and hoist and five days after offered to deliver these machines to the
respondents' representative but the latter refused to accept them on the ground that the tractor and
hoist were unserviceable while the truck could not be produced.
Due to the refusal of the respondents, the sheriff made a report stating that the properties
seized are to be returned to the petitioner but the latter alleged that the tractor and the hoist were
never returned to him. Therefore, he should not be made to pay damages and as regards cargo
truck, petitioner contended that no rental value could be assigned to it because it was already a
junk.
However, the court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that the matter should have
been raised before the decision became final. Subsequently, petitioner's house and lots in Quezon
City were levied upon by the sheriff and advertised for sale.
Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the respondents had a right to reject the machinery and the petitioner a
corresponding obligation to take them back.
Ruling: Yes.
 To begin with, where judgment is rendered for the articles or their value and they cannot
be returned in substantially the same condition, it is settled that the prevailing party may refuse
to take them and instead sue on the redelivery bond or, as in this case, execute on the judgment
for value. (Kunz v. Nelson, 76 P2d 577 [1938].) If the prevailing party has this right after
judgment, it is at once obvious that he must also have the same right when, asking for the
delivery pendente lite of the same property, he afterwards finds them in a substantially
depredated condition. Here, the Court of Appeals found "beyond dispute" that the tractor and the
hoist had so deteriorated that they had become unserviceable. This right to reject is assured in the
first instance by the provision that the judgment in a suit for replevin must be in the alternative so
as to afford a measure of relief where the property cannot be returned (Rule 60, sec. 9); in the
second case it is implied from the requirement that "if for any reason the property is not
delivered to the plaintiff, the officer must return it to the defendant." (Rule 60, sec. 6.) It then
becomes the defendant's obligation to take them back upon tender of the sheriff.

Malayan Insurance vs. Salas

Facts:
Makati Motor Sales, Inc., as vendor mortgagee, sued Rosendo Fernando for the recovery
of four diesel trucks and the connection of the balance of his obligation plus damages. To obtain
immediate possession of the trucks pending trial, Makati Motors Sales, Inc. posted a replevin
bond executed by the Malayan Insurance Co., Inc.
In that bond the surety bound itself to pay P362,775.92 "for the return of the property to
the defendant, if the return thereof be adjudged, and for the payment of such sum as may in the
cause be recovered against the plaintiff ". Pursuant to the order of the court, the sheriff seized the
four trucks. Later, two of the trucks were returned to Fernando.
Thereafter, the lower court rendered judgment ordering Makati Motor Sales, Inc. to
return to Fernando the other two trucks and to pay him for the seizure of each of them. In turn,
Fernando was ordered to pay Makati Motor Sales, Inc. the sum of P66,998.34, as the balance of
the price of the two trucks, with interest.
Makati Motor Sales, Inc. appealed to the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the
lower court's judgment. Meanwhile, before the elevation of the record to the Court of Appeals,
Fernando filed in the trial court an application for damages against the replevin bond but it was
opposed by the surety on the ground that the trial court had lost jurisdiction over the case
because of the perfection of the appeal. The trial court denied the application.
Subsequently, Fernando filed in the Court of Appeals his claim for damages against the
replevin bond. He prayed that the same be included in the judgment. The surety, which was
furnished with a copy of the claim, filed an opposition to it. The Court of Appeals did not act
immediately on that claim but in its 1977 decision it observed that Fernando's motion or claim
"was correct" and it ordered that his claim against Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. "be heard before
the trial court". That decision affirming the lower court's judgment became final and executory.
After the remand of the record to the trial court, Fernando filed a motion to set for
hearing his application for damages against the surety on its replevin bond. The application was
heard with notice to Makati Motor Sales, Inc. and Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. Fernando
submitted documentary evidence. Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. moved to quash the proceeding
regarding the claim for damages. It contended that the trial court has no jurisdiction to alter or
modify the final judgment of the Court of Appeals.
The trial court in its order of July 14, 1978 denied the motion to quash. It directed
Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. to pay Fernando the damages which it had adjudged against Makati
Motor Sales, Inc.
Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction to pass upon Fernando's application for the
recovery of damages on the surety's replevin bond.
Ruling: Yes.
We hold that the trial court has jurisdiction to pass upon Fernando's application for the
recovery of damages on the surety's replevin bond. The reason is that Fernando seasonably filed
his application for damages in the Court of Appeals. It was not his fault that the damages claimed
by him against the surety were not included in the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming
the trial court's award of damages to Fernando payable by the principal in the replevin bond. The
peculiar factual situation of this case makes it an exception to the settled rule that the surety's
liability for damages should be included in the final judgment to prevent duplicity of suits or
proceedings.
Under section 20, in order to recover damages on a replevin bond (or on a bond for
preliminary attachment, injunction or receivership) it is necessary (1) that the defendant-claimant
has secured a favorable judgment in the main action, meaning that the plaintiff has no cause of
action and was not, therefore, entitled to the provisional remedy of replevin; (2) that the
application for damages, showing claimant's right thereto and the amount thereof, be filed in the
same action before trial or before appeal is perfected or before the judgment becomes executory;
(3) that due notice be given to the other party and his surety or sureties, notice to the principal
not being sufficient and (4) that there should be a proper hearing and the award for damages
should be included in the final judgment (Luneta Motor Co. vs. Menendez 117 Phil. 970, 974; 3
Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., pp. 54-56. See Cruz vs. Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co., Inc., 92 Phil. 699).
As may be gathered from section 20 of Rule 57, the application for damages against the
surety must be filed (with notice to the surety) in the Court of First Instance before the trial or
before appeal is perfected or before the judgment becomes executory.
If an appeal is taken, the application must be filed in the appellate court but always before the
judgment of that court becomes executory so that the award may be included in its judgment
(Luneta Motor Co. vs. Menendez 117 Phil. 970, 976).
But it is not always mandatory that the appellate court should include in its judgment the award
of damages against the surety. Thus, it was held that where the application for damages against
the surety is seasonably made in the appellate court, "the latter must either proceed to hear and
decide the application or refer "it" to the trial court and allow it to hear and decide the
same"(Rivera vs. Talavera, 112 Phil. 209, 219).
We have stated earlier that in the instant case Fernando in 1974 made a timely claim in the Court
of Appeals for an award of damages against Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. enforceable against its
replevin bond. The surety was notified of that application. It registered an opposition to the
claim. The Court of Appeals did not resolve the claim immediately but in its 1977 decision it
directed the trial court to hear that claim.
Obviously, the lower court has no choice but to implement that directive which is the law of the
case (See Compagnie Franco Indochinoise vs. Deutsch, etc., 39 Phil. 474, 476).
However, the trial court's implementation of that directive was incorrect. It set the claim for
hearing but the surety assailed its jurisdiction and did not consider itself bound by the mandate of
the appellate court. The merits of the claim for damages were not threshed out at the hearing
because the surety stood pat on its contention that the trial court has no jurisdiction to allow the
claim in view of the finality of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
This Court has held that, if the surety was not given notice when the claim for damages against
the principal in the replevin bond was heard, then as a matter of procedural due process the
surety is entitled to be heard when the judgment for damages against the principal is sought to be
enforced against the surety's replevin bond.
Inasmuch as in this case appellant Malayan Insurance Co., Inc. was not given the summary
hearing during which it could contest the reality or reasonableness of Fernando's claim for
damages, we have to set aside the trial court's order awarding damages against it and, in the
interest of justice, give it another opportunity to be heard on the merits of Fernando's claim for
damages.
 Luneta Motor vs. Menendez
Facts:
Antonio Menendez obtained a loan from the Luneta Motor Co. in the amount of
P6,200.00 with which to complete payment for a motor vehicle which the former had purchased
from a certain Salud vda. de Vergara. A promissory note was executed to evidence the loan
secured by a chattel mortgage on the same motor vehicle.
Of the said loan, only P3,012.00 was paid by Menendez, and as he failed to settle the
balance of P3,098.00. Thereafter, Luneta Motor Co., instituted action for foreclosure of the
chattel mortgage to satisfy the indebtedness and for replevin. Co-defendant of Menendez in this
action was Carlos Baranda who was in actual possession of the car, claiming ownership thereof
thru purchase prior to the execution of the chattel mortgage in favor of the plaintiff.
Luneta Motor Co. posted a bond. Hence, the sheriff of Manila, by order of the court,
seized the said motor vehicle for delivery to the plaintiff, but Baranda, to regain possession
thereof, filed a counterbond. This was subscribed by the Luzon Surety Co., Inc. to secure
delivery of the car if adjudged, and to pay whatever amount may be awarded in favor of the
plaintiff, plus costs of suit.
The case came up for hearing, although, apparently, trial was had without notice to the
surety. Judgment was rendered against defendants Menendez and Baranda. Luzon Surety was not
furnished a copy of the decision. Baranda appealed to the CA but the latter affirmed the decision
of the lower court and again, the record does not show that the surety was served a copy of the
same.
Pending finality of the Court of Appeals decision, the plaintiff filed with the trial court a
motion for leave to claim damages from the Luzon Surety Co., The latter prays for the annulment
of the order holding it liable for damages upon the bond subscribed by it for defendants.

Issue:
Whether or not the surety can be made liable for damages despite the fact that no copy of
the decision was served to the surety.

Ruling: No.
The procedure for the enforcement of the surety’s liability under a bond for delivery of
personal property is described in section 10, Rule 62, in connection with section 20, Rule 59 of
the Rules of Court, said provisions reading as follows:
"Judgment to include recovery against sureties. — The amount, if any, to be awarded to either
party upon any bond filed by the other in accordance with the provisions of this rule, shall be
claimed, ascertained, and granted under the same procedure as prescribed in Section 20, of Rule
59." (Section 10, Rule 62)
"Claim for damages on plaintiff’s bond on account of illegal attachment. — If the judgment on
the action be in favor of the defendant, he may recover, upon the bond given by the plaintiff,
damages resulting from the attachment. Such damages may be awarded only upon application
and after proper hearing, and shall be included in the final judgment. The application must be
filed before the trial or, in the discretion of the court, before entry of final judgment, with due
notice to the plaintiff and his surety sureties, setting forth the facts showing his right to damages
and the amount thereof. Damages sustained during the pendency of the appeal may be claimed
by the defendant, if the judgment of the appellate court be favorable to him, by filing an
application therewith, with notice to the plaintiff and his surety or sureties, and the appellate
court may allow the application to be heard and decided by the trial court." (Emphasis supplied.)
(Section 20, Rule 59).
Under these provisions, in order to recover on a replevin bond, the following requisites must be
complied with:
1. Application for damages must be filed before trial or before entry of final judgment;
2. Due notice must be given the other party and his surety; and
3. There must be proper hearing and award of damages, if any, must be included in the final
judgment. (Alliance Surety Co., Inc. v. Piccio, Et Al., G.R. No. L-9950, July 31, 1959.)
There is no question that the plaintiff-appellee here, in claiming damages against the surety, has
complied with the first two requisites above stated. But although there was a hearing on the
claim, the award of damages was not included in the decision of the Court of Appeals, which
became final and executory on September 2, 1959.
The purpose of the Rules in requiring notice and hearing before the entry of final judgment on a
bond is to include in said judgment the award, if any, that the claimant may recover from both or
either the principal and the surety. In other words, it is not only the filing of the claim before
final judgment that is required. The claimant on the bond must see to it that the award against the
surety be included in the final judgment. In Joseph Abelow v. de la Riva, G.R. No. L-12271,
January 31, 1959, this Court has ruled that the surety may only be held liable if, before the
judgment becomes final, an order against the surety is entered after a hearing with notice to the
surety (See also Cajefe, etc., Et. Al. v. Fernandez, etc., Et Al., G.R. No. L-15709, October 19,
1960.)
In summary, the application for damages against the surety must be filed in the Court of First
Instance before trial, or even after trial, but before judgment becomes executory; and if appeal is
taken, then application must be made in the appellate court, but always before judgment of the
latter becomes final and executory so that the award, if any, may be included in said judgment.

Sagupay vs. CA
Facts:
Plaintiff Mobil Philippines, Inc. filed a complaint for replevin with damages against
defendant Lina Joel Sapugay before the Court of First Instance of Rizal. The complaint alleged
that the plaintiff and defendant entered into a Dealership Agreement and pending consideration
of the dealership application, the former loaned to the latter the properties installed in the
premises of Nemar at Sto. Tomas, Batangas. However, defendant failed to secure and file the
required surety bond, compelling plaintiff to reject defendant's application and the return and
redelivery of the aforementioned properties.
Notwithstanding, defendant refused to return said equipments, and demanded instead that
defendant be paid first the sum of P15,000.00 daily as rental and guard's fees from June 8, 1982
up to the day of actual pull-out. Thereafter, the lower court issued an order for the issuance of a
writ of replevin upon the filing of plaintiff's bond but the defendant filed her answer alleging as
affirmative defenses that upon presentation of defendant's application, plaintiff and it's manager,
R.P. Cardenas, imposed upon them as a condition for the approval of their application
defendant's acquisition of the premises where the business will be conducted.
Defendant and her husband exerted their best effort to secure a bond but the bonding
companies required a copy of the dealership agreement which was continuously withheld from
them by plaintiff, that defendant discovered that plaintiff and its manager intended all along, to
award said dealership to Island Air Product Corporation. As counterclaim, defendant prayed that
plaintiff and its manager be made liable for their pre-operation expenses rental, storage, and
guarding fees, unrealized profit including damages and the return of the LP-Gas equipment to the
premises.
The writ of replevin issued by Honorable Eduardo C. Abaya of the Court of First
Instance, Rizal, was duly executed and the pre-trial conference was terminated without any
amicable settlement. Thereafter, the trial court rendered judgement in favor of defendant and
ordered plaintiff and its manager, R.P. Cardenas to pay the pre-operation expenses, rental,
storage, and guarding fees of plaintiff's LPG equipment; unrealized profits, moral damages
including litigation expenses, attorney's fees and costs of the suit.
The defendant filed a motion for application to have plaintiffs bond posted by the
Malayan Surety Company liable for the satisfaction of the judgment. Thereafter, the plaintiff-
corporation filed a notice of appeal manifesting that it was appealing to the Court of Appeals
from the decision of the lower court. However, the trial court issued an order denying the
defendant's motion considering that the lower court no longer had any jurisdiction to act on the
matter with the perfection of plaintiff’s appeal.
The Court of Appeals rendered decision which deleted the awards of rental, storage and
guarding fees and the award of unrealized profits if favor of the defendant and held Mobil
Philippines, lnc solely liable.
Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that Malayan Insurance Co., Inc., is not liable on
the bond.
Ruling: No.
As to the second assigned error, the finding of the Court of Appeals that no sufficient and
substantial evidence exists to warrant an award of guarding fees and unearned profits is
conclusively binding on this Court, for failure of private respondents to show that the appellate
court acted with grave abuse of discretion or erred in making such finding. Fundamental is the
rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals will not be disturbed unless shown to have been
rendered with arbitrariness, nor are any of the jurisprudentially accepted exceptions thereto
present in this case.
Anent the issue on the surety's liability upon the replevin bond, we do not believe that Malayan
Insurance Co., Inc. should be made liable thereon. As correctly observed by respondent court,
"the damages awarded by the trial court were based on Articles 19 and 20 of the New Civil Code
and not on the deprivation of personal properties subject of the replevin bond. Moreover, no
judgment was entered for the return of the properties subject of the replevin bond to the
defendant, the latter never having raised the issue of rightful possession to the said properties."
A replevin bond is simply intended to indemnify the defendant against any loss that he may
suffer by being compelled to surrender the possession of the disputed property pending the trial
of the action. He cannot recover on the bond as for a reconversion when he has failed to have the
judgment entered for the return of the property. Nor is the surety liable for payment of the
judgment for damages rendered against the plaintiff on a counterclaim or punitive damages for
fraudulent or wrongful acts committed by the plaintiffs and unconnected with the defendant's
deprivation of possession by the plaintiff. Indeed, even where the judgment was that the
defendant was entitled to the property, but no order was made requiring the plaintiff to return it
or assessing damages in default of a return, it was declared that until judgment was entered that
the property should be restored, there could be no liability on the part of the sureties.

Fernandez vs. International Corporate Bank

Facts:
Petitioners purchased a Nissan Sentra Sedan through a financing scheme of the private
respondent, the International Corporate Bank, now Union Bank of the Philippines, and the
chattel mortgage was executed in favor of the financing institution. Petitioners alleged that due to
the respondent bank's "greedy desire" to unjustly enrich itself at the expense of the petitioners,
the bank filed an unfounded complaint for a sum of money with replevin before the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 44, Pasay City.
The petitioners argued that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the case because
considering that the principal amount involved was P553,944.00 which is outside of the
jurisdiction of the MTC. Thereafter, petitioners filed an Answer mentioning in the special and
affirmative defenses a Motion to Dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction, but this was denied.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Pasay City had
jurisdiction over civil cases in which the amount of the demand did not exceed P200,000
exclusive of interest, damages and attorney's fees. The basic claim in the present case was
P190,635.90; hence, the MTC had jurisdiction.
The appellate court further held that the objection to the impropriety of the venue should
have been raised in a motion to dismiss before the filing of a responsive pleading. The said issue,
however, was raised for the first time only in petitioners' Answer.
Lastly, the Court of Appeals agreed with the MTC that the Writ of Replevin could be
validly executed anywhere in Metro Manila because Section 27, Chapter III of B.P. 129,
authorized the establishment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila with eighty-two
(82) branches. Therefore, any branch — in this case, Branch 44 which was stationed in Pasay —
could issue writs and processes that could validly be served and executed anywhere within Metro
Manila.
Hence this petition.

Issues: 1. May the Writ of Replevin issued by the MTC of Pasay City be enforced outside the
city?
2. Were petitioners entitled to the redelivery of the subject vehicle?
Ruling:
1. Yes.
Petitioners argue that the Writ of Replevin issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay could
be enforced only within the confines of Pasay City. In support, they cite Section 28 of Batas
Pambansa (BP) 129, which states:
Sec. 28. Other Metropolitan Trial Courts. — The Supreme Court shall constitute Metropolitan
Trial Courts in such other metropolitan areas as may be established by law whose territorial
jurisdiction shall be co-extensive with the cities and municipalities comprising the metropolitan
area.
Every Metropolitan Trial Judge shall be appointed to a metropolitan area which shall be his
permanent station and his appointment shall state the branch of the court and the seat thereof to
which he shall be originally assigned. A Metropolitan Trial Judge may be assigned by the
Supreme Court to any branch within said metropolitan area as the interest of justice may require,
and such assignment shall not be deemed an assignment to another station within the meaning of
this section.
We are not convinced. Under the Resolution of the Supreme Court en banc dated January 11,
1983, providing for the interim rules and guidelines relative to the implementation of BP 129, a
writ of replevin like the one issued in the present case may be served anywhere in the
Philippines. Specifically, the said Resolution states:
3. Writs and processes. —
(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo, warranto, habeas corpus and injunction
issued by a regional trial court may be enforced in any part of the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court or municipal circuit trial court may be served anywhere in the Philippines,
and, in the last three cases, without a certification by the judge of the regional trial court. 10
Thus, the Writ of Replevin issued by Judge Paas, which obviously does not fall under item "a" of
the above-cited Rule, may be validly enforced anywhere in the Philippines. Petitioners confused
the jurisdiction of a court to hear and decide a case on the one hand with, on the other, its power
to issue writs and processes pursuant to and in the exercise of said jurisdiction.
2. No.
Petitioners assail the MTC's refusal to release the seized vehicle despite a Manager's Check in
the amount of P69,168 they issued for the redelivery of the vehicle within five days from its
seizure.
This argument is devoid of merit. As observed by the trial court, petitioners failed to comply
with the requisites for the redelivery of the vehicle seized:
Under the Rules of Court, the defendant has a period of 5 days from January 7, 1997 to post a re-
delivery bond, in order to secure the return of the subject vehicle and to post a counter bond
double the amount of the chattel. In this respect, defendants failed to exercise his right.
Indeed, a careful perusal of the records shows that petitioners failed to comply with the
requirements prescribed by Rule 60 of the Rules of Court in effect at the time:
Sec. 5. Return of Property. — If the defendant objects to the sufficiency of the plaintiff's bond, or
of the surety or sureties thereon, he cannot require the return of the property as in this section
provided; but if he does not so object, he may, at any time before the delivery of the property to
the plaintiff, require the return thereof, by filing with the clerk or judge of the court a bond
executed to the plaintiff, in double the value of the property as stated in the plaintiff's affidavit,
for the delivery of the property to the plaintiff, if such delivery be adjudged, and for the payment
of such sum to him as may be recovered against the defendant, and by serving a copy of such
bond on the plaintiff or his attorney.
Sec. 6. Disposition of property by officer. — If within five (5) days after the taking of the
property by the officer, the defendant does not object to the sufficiency of the bond, or of the
surety or sureties thereon; or require the return of the property as provided in the last preceding
section; or if the defendant so objects, and the plaintiff's first or new bond is approved; or if the
defendant so requires, and his bond is objected to and found insufficient and he does not
forthwith file an approved bond, the property shall be delivered to the plaintiff. If for any reason
the property is not delivered to the plaintiff, the officer must return it to the defendant.
In their Petition for Review, petitioners plainly admit that they issued a check for only P69,168
for the purpose of covering the advance payments plus the redelivery bond. Clearly, that amount
was insufficient to cover even just the required redelivery bond alone, which should be in an
amount double that of the chattel. Hence, the MTC's refusal to grant petitioners' Motion for
redelivery was correct, and the Court of Appeals did not err in upholding it.

Francisco vs. Zandueta

Facts:
Respondent Eugenio Leopoldo Francisco, a minor, through his natural mother and
guardian ad litem, Rosario Gomez, instituted an action for support against the herein petitioner in
the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila.
The petitioner Luis Francisco, defendant in this case, answered by a general denial of
each and every material allegation contained in the complaint but notwithstanding this denial of
paternity the respondent judge issued the order.
Thereafter, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of that order on the ground that it
was issued in excess of jurisdiction in view of the fact that the civil status of the plaintiff was
placed in issue by the pleadings and that the plaintiff has no right to monthly support from the
defendant until his status as a child of the latter is finally determined in his favor. The respondent
judge, the Honorable Francisco Zandueta, denied that motion, hence the institution of this special
proceeding.
Issue: Whether or not the minor has the right to receive support from the defendant pending the
determination of his status as a child of the former.
Ruling: No.
Under article 143 of the Civil Code the following are bound to support each other: (1)
Husband and wife, (2) legitimate ascendants and descendants, (3) parents and acknowledged
natural children and the legitimate descendants of the latter, (4) parents and illegitimate children
not having the legal status of natural children and (5) brothers and sisters. In all these cases it is a
civil status or a juridical relation which is the basis of the action for support, the civil status of
marriage or that of relationship.
Paraphrasing the language used in the decision in the Yangco case it may be said that in
the present case the action for support is brought by a minor, through his guardian ad litem, who
alleges that he is the son of the petitioner; therefore it is necessary for him to prove his civil
status as such son. His alleged civil status being in litigation, it is evident that nothing can be
taken for granted upon the point in issue. There is no law or reason which authorizes the granting
of support to a person who claims to be a son in the same manner as to a person who establishes
by legal proof that he is such son. In the latter case the legal evidence raises a presumption of
law, while in the former there is no presumption, there is nothing but a mere allegation, a fact in
issue, and a simple fact in issue must not be confounded with an established right recognized by
a final judgment. The civil status of sonship being denied and this civil status, from which the
right to support is derived, being in issue, it is apparent that no effect can be given to such a
claim until an authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of the cause. It is also
evident that there is a substantial difference between the capacity of a person after the rendition
of a final judgment in which that person is declared to be in possession of the status of a son and
his capacity prior to such time when nothing exists other than his suit or claim to be declared in
possession of such a status.
The Civil Code grants the right of support to a son. This status not appearing by a final judgment,
the respondent judge was without jurisdiction to order the petitioner, as defendant in case No.
47238, to pay the plaintiff the sum of P30, or any other amount as monthly support, pendente
lite.

Coquia vs. Baltazar

Facts:
Gaspara, Francisca, Dionisio, Alfredo, and Salvador Coquia, assisted by their mother and
guardian ad litem Maria Dalori, filed an action in the Court of the First Instance of Leyte against
the spouses Silvestra Coquia and Luis Carandang to recover the possession as owner of four
parcels of land, of which three belong pro indiviso to Alfredo Coquia and his sister, the petitioner
Silvestra Coquia, now a deceased, upon the allegation that they are acknowledged natural
children and the sole heirs of the latter.
Thereafter, pending the trial of the case said respondents (plaintiff's below) filed a
petition for alimony pendente lite which Judge Edmundo S. Piccio granted. The respondent
judge, Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, a denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration, holding that
the order of Judge Piccio for alimony pendente lite was well founded.
Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the petition for alimony pendente lite was proper in this case.
Ruling: No.
Rule 63 of the Rules of the Court, which authorizes the granting of alimony pendente
lite" at the commencement of the proper action, or at any time afterwards but prior to the final
judgment," is not applicable to this case. The action commenced before the respondent judge was
not for support but for the recovery of the ownership and possession of real property. Manifestly
such an action is not "the proper action" contemplated by said rule The mere fact that the
plaintiffs have legal and equitable rights in the property they seek to recover (Q. E. D. ) does not
authorize the court to compel the defendants to support the plaintiffs pending the determination
of the suit.
Moreover, the petitioners, who are sister and brother-in law, respectively, of the deceased
Alfredo Coquia, are not bound to support the alleged natural children of the latter. Under the
article 143 of the Civil Code only the following are bound to support each other: (1) husband and
wife: (2) legitimate ascendants and descendants: and (3) parents and acknowledged natural
children, and the legitimate descendants of the latter.
Even in an action for divorce and alimony, it has been held that the court has no jurisdiction to
grant alimony pendente lite where the answer to the complaint alleging marriage and praying for
divorce denies the fact of marriage, because the right of a wife to support depends upon her
status as such, and where the existence of such status is put in issue by the pleading, it cannot be
presumed to exist for the purpose of granting alimony. (Yangco vs. Rohde, 1 Phil., 404.)

Saavedra vs. Estrada

Facts:
Aleida Saavedra instituted an action against her husband, Ceferino Ybañez Estrada in the
Court of First Instance of Cebu. The purpose of such action was to secure a judgment for
maintenance for the plaintiff and her children from the defendant, and to obtain an order
requiring him to pay such maintenance not only in the future but for a period in the past.
After hearing, the trial rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the
sum of P200 per month beginning September, 1929, the date of the filing of this action, and
ending with the month of March 30, 1930, when this decision was promulgated, after which he
required the defendant to pay, in future installments, a monthly stipend of P200, and further to
reimburse the plaintiff in the amount of P2,000 for attorneys' fees, and the costs of the action.
Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in its failure to award to plaintiff judgment for past
due maintenance accruing under a preliminary order in case No. 3335, effective September,
1920, and running until the present action was instituted.
Ruling: No.
In this connection it appears that an order for maintenance pendente lite was entered by
the trial court in that case, and nothing has ever been paid upon said account. Nevertheless, it
appears that, on May 21, 1926, the herein plaintiff, also plaintiff in case No. 3335, cause said
action to be dismissed, in reliance upon the defendant's promises. The dismissal of the said case
necessarily had the effect of abrogating the order for maintenance pendente lite, and placed the
plaintiff in a position where she is unable to enforce that order. An order pendente lite is in its
very nature contingent, and the dismissal of the action had the effect of abrogating the order.
It appears, however, that as a result of the failure of the defendant to pay said maintenance under
the order referred to, the present plaintiff has been compelled to incur debts for the maintenance
of herself and family, and to pay these debts, so far as they have been paid, she has been
compelled to sacrifice valuable paraphernal property under authority granted by the court. The
amount which the plaintiff has been compelled to disburse in this way, and the value of the
paraphernal property sacrificed, or obligations incurred, have not been proved; and while it is
obvious that the defendant is under an obligation to reimburse the plaintiff for these outlays and
sacrifices, we are not in a position to give her relief as to such items, under the prayer of the
present complaint. But the order hereinafter made for the affirmance of the judgment in this
respect will be made without prejudice to her right hereafter, by independent action, or in the
ultimate liquidation of the conjugal estate, to be reimbursed as to the matters mentioned.

Ramos vs. CA
Facts:
 Fernando and Lorraine Lagos, minors, assisted by their mother Felisa Lagos, filed a
complaint against Luis T. Ramos, the petitioner herein, for support and damages alleging that the
children were the product of their illicit relationships with Ramos. The complaint further alleged
that Ramos failed despite repeated demands from Felisa Lagos to support their children.
Ramos denied the allegations in the complaint and set up a counterclaim for damages.
Thereafter, the case went to trial and the court rendered judgement in favor of Felisa Lagos
ordering Ramos to pay each child the sum of P75.00 monthly. Ramos appealed to the Court of
Appeals, and as a result, the plaintiffs-appellees moved for support pendente lite.
The Court Appeals in its resolution, ordered Ramos to deposit with its Clerk the sum of
P4,727.50 which represents the one-half of the amount due under the appealed decision to the
aforesaid plaintiffs and once the amount is deposited, to deliver such amount to the latter.
Ramos filed a petition before the Supreme Court and after the approval of the requisite
bond, the high court issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the enforcement of the
contested resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in issuing the said order there having been neither a
recognition of paternity by the petitioner nor its establishment by final judgment.
Ruling: No.
Although the law gives the right of support to acknowledged natural children, and
although Laureano Garcia has not yet been actually acknowledged because the decision has not
yet become executory, still as the confirmation of the order of recognition may be said to relate
back to the date of the original decision, it lies within the discretion of the trial court to direct the
father to give support pending the appeal. Indeed, there may be instance where, in view of the
poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him support until the decision of
the judge is sustained on appeal. There being at least prima facie evidence of the child's right to
support, the Cavite court acted within its power and discretion.6
As above indicated, not only had evidence on the alleged relation between the minors and Ramos
been introduced in the case at bar. Judgment had, moreover, been rendered finding that said
relation had been duly established, although an appeal from said judgment was and is still
pending in the Court of Appeals. Indeed, the Rules of Court clearly authorizes the granting of
support pendente lite, even prior to the rendition of judgment by the trial court. Sections 1 and 5
of Rule 61 provide:
SEC. 1. Application. — The plaintiff, at the commencement of the proper action, or at any time
afterwards but prior to final judgment, may file an application for support pendente lite, stating
the grounds for the claim and the financial conditions of both parties, and shall be accompanied
by affidavits, depositions or other authentic documents in support thereof.
SEC. 5. Order. — The court shall determine provisionally the pertinent facts, and shall render
such order as equity and justice may require, having due regard to the necessities of the
applicant, the means of the adverse party, the probable outcome of the case, and such other
circumstances as may aid in the proper elucidation of the question involved. If the application is
granted, the court shall fix the amount of money to be provisionally paid, and the terms of
payment. ... .
It goes without saying that if, before the rendition of judgment, the trial court may
"provisionally" grant alimony pendente lite, with more reason may an appellate court exercise a
similar authority, after a full dress trial and a decision of the trial court on the merits finding that
the claim of filiation and support has been adequately proven — in the case at bar, beyond doubt
— even if such decision were still pending appeal taken by the party adjudged to be bound to
give such support.
Needless to say, the refusal of the trial court to grant, said alimony pendente lite did not and
cannot deprive the appellate court of said authority, or even dent the wisdom of the action taken
by the latter, considering that the former did not give any plausible reason for its aforementioned
refusal and that the same may have, in fact, been due to the appeal taken by the defendant, whose
record on appeal had already been approved.

Reyes vs. Ines Luciano

Facts:
Private petitioner, Celia Ilustre-Reyes, filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
of Quezon City a complaint against her husband, Manuel J. C. Reyes, for legal separation on the
ground that the defendant had attempted to kill plaintiff.
The plaintiff asked for support pendente lite for her and her three children. The
defendant, petitioner herein, opposed the application for support pendente lite on the ground that
his wife had committed adultery with her physician.
Thereafter, the respondent Judge issued an order granting plaintiff's prayer for alimony
pendente lite in the amount of P5,000.00 but petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
reiterating that his wife is not entitled to support during the pendency of the case, and, alleging
that even if she entitled, the amount awarded was excessive.
Hence, the respondent judge reduced the amount to P4,000.00. Manuel J. C. Reyes filed a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals asking that the order granting support pendente lite
to private respondent Celia Ilustre-Reyes, be annulled on the ground that the respondent Judge,
Leonor Ines-Luciano, had committed a grave abuse of discretion or that said order be modified
inasmuch as the amount awarded as support pendente lite is excessive.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Hence this petition.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the wife is entitled to support from the husband despite the fact that a case
for adultery had been filed by the husband against her.
2. Whether or not in determining the amount of support pendente lite, it is enough that the
court ascertain the kind and amount of evidence even by affidavits only or other documentary
evidence appearing in the records.
Ruling:
1. Yes.
It is true that the adultery of the wife is a defense in an action for support however, the alleged
adultery of wife must be established by competent evidence. The allegation that the wife has
committed adultery will not bar her from the right receive support pendente lite. Adultery is a
good defense and if properly proved and sustained wig defeat the action.7
In the instant case, at the hearing of the application for support pendente lite before the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court presided by the respondent Judge, Hon. Leonor Ines-Luciano the
petitioner did not present any evidence to prove the allegation that his wife, private respondent
Celia Ilustre-Reyes, had committed adultery with any person.
The petitioner has still the opportunity to adduce evidence on the alleged adultery of his wife
when the action for legal separation is heard on the merits before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Quezon City. It is to be noted however, that as pointed out by the respondents
in their comment, the "private respondent was not asking support to be taken from petitioner's
personal funds or wherewithal, but from the conjugal property—which, was her documentary
evidence ...". 8 It is, therefore, doubtful whether adultery will affect her right to alimony
pendente lite. In Quintana vs. Lerma, the action for support was based on the obligation of the
husband to support his wife.
2. Yes.
The contention of the petitioner that the order of the respondent Judge granting the private
respondent support pendente lite in the amount of P4,000.00 a month is not supported by the
allegations of the complaint for legal separation and by competent evidence has no merit.
In fixing the amount of monthly support pendente lite of P4,000,00, the respondent judge did not
act capriciously and whimsically. When she originally fixed the amount of P5,000.00 a month,
the respondent Judge considered the following:
On record for plaintiff's cause are the following: that she and defendant were married on January
18, 1958; that she is presently unemployed and without funds, thus, she is being supported by her
father with whom she resides: that defendant had been maltreating her and Cried to kill her; that
all their conjugal properties are in the possession of defendant who is also president, Manager
and Treasurer of their corporation namely:
1. Standard Mineral Products, which was incorporated on February 9, 1959: presently with
paid-in capital of P295,670.00; assets and liabilities of P757,108.52; Retained Earnings of
P85,654.61: and majority stockholder is defendant;

2. Development and Technology Consultant Inc. incorporated on July 12, 1971, with paid-
in capital of P200,000.00; Assets and liabilities of P831,669.34; defendant owns 99% of the
stocks; and last Retained Earnings is P98,879.84.
3. The Contra-Prop Marine Philippines, Inc. which was incorporated on October 3, 1975, with
paid-in capital of P100,000 defendant owns 99% of the stocks.
To secure some of the of said Agreement of Counter-Guaranty Mortgage with Real Estate, and
Real Estate Mortgage were undertaken by plaintiff of their properties outside of other
accommodations; and that she needs of P5,000.00 a month for her support in accordance with
their station in life.
The amount of support pendente lite was reduced to P4,000.00 inasmuch as the children are in
the custody of the petitioner and are being supported by him. It is thus seen that the respondent
judge acted with due deliberation before fixing the amount of support pendente lite in the amount
of P4,000.00 a month.
In determining the amount to be awarded as support pendente lite it is not necessary to go fully
into the merits of the case, it being sufficient that the court ascertain the kind and amount of
evidence which it may deem sufficient to enable it to justly resolve the application, one way or
the other, in view of the merely provisional character of the resolution to be entered. Mere
affidavits may satisfy the court to pass upon the application for support pendente lite. It is
enough the facts be established by affidavits or other documentary evidence appearing in the
record.

Vasco vs. CA
Facts:
 Reynaldo Vasco and Lolita Vasco were found by The Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court of Quezon City as illegitimate children of Antonio Vasco and Angelina Reyes. Thereafter,
it ordered Antonio to pay them sum of P200 as monthly allowance for support and attorney’s
fees.
Antonio appealed to the Court of Appeals and perfected such on January 6, 1977.
However, two months after the approval of the record on appeal, Reynaldo Vasco and Lolita
Vasco filed a motion for the execution of the judgment of The Juvenile and Domestic Relations
pending appeal. Antonio opposed the motion on the ground that that the lower court had no
jurisdiction to grant execution but the lower court granted the motion.
Again, Antonio assailed that order of execution in his petition for certiorari in the Court
of Appeals but the latter upheld the order of execution pending appeal in the "interest of
substantial justice" and on the theory that the judiciary is an agency of the State acting as parens
patriae and that if the said order is erroneous, the error is only an error of judgment and is not a
grave abuse of discretion or an act in excess of jurisdiction.
Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in issuing the order of execution pending appeal?
Ruling: Yes.
The petition is meritorious because the trial had no jurisdiction (long after the perfection
of the appeal) to issue an order for execution pending appeal. It had no jurisdiction because, after
the perfection of the appeal, "the trial court loses its jurisdiction over the case, except to issue
orders for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any
matter litigated by the appeal, to prove compromises offered by the parties prior to the
transmittal of the record on appeal to the appellate court, and to permit the prosecution of
pauper’s appeals" (Sec. 9, Rule 41, Rules of Court.).
An order for execution pending appeal does not fall within the said exceptions because it is a
proceeding involving the very matter litigated by the appeal (Cabilao v. Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga, L-18454, August 29, 1966, 17 SCRA 992, 997).
Before the rendition of the judgment, the plaintiffs could have availed themselves in the lower
court of the provisional remedy of support pendente lite (Rule 61, Rules of Court). They did not
do so. On the other hand, the general rule is that an appeal stays the execution of the judgment
(Araneta v. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil. 328, 338; Caragao v. Maceren and Sebellino, 92 Phil. 121,
124).
In granting execution pending appeal, the lower court relied upon Garcia v. Court of Appeals,
114 Phil. 619 and Hamoy v. Batingolo, 116 Phil. 115. The facts of the two cases are different
from the situation in the instant case.
The Garcia case refers to support pendente lite which is immediately executory. The Hamoy case
refers to an execution pending appeal against a person who was not a party to the case and who
had a remedy in the trial court, which issued the writ of execution, even if the appeal of a party
had already been perfected. That is different from the incident in this case.
The instant case is governed by the rule that a trial court, in ordering (after the approval of the
bill of exceptions, now record on appeal) the execution of a judgment requiring the husband to
pay support to his wife, acted without jurisdiction and, therefore, the order of execution is illegal
and void (Marcelo v. Estacio, 69 Phil. 145; Estacio v. Provincial Warden of Rizal, 69 Phil. 150).
Contrary to the impression of the Court of Appeals, the trial court’s error is not merely an error
of judgment. It is clear that the trial court acted without jurisdiction. Hence, certiorari lies to
annul its order of execution pending appeal.