Doctrines:

 Partition of estate in a will is valid. This right of a testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory
heirs to their legitime.
 Heirs cannot compel payment of their legitime in real estate instead of money as specified in the will.

Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, No. L-24561, June 30, 1970.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

FACTS:
The case is an appeal, on the decision of the Court of First Instance which approved the Executrix-appellee's
project of partition instead of Oppositors-Appellants' proposed counter-project of partition. The facts of the case
were as follows:
 On January 28, 1961, the testatrix, Agripina J. Valdez, a widow, died in Angeles, Pampanga and was
survived by her children and compulsory heirs namely, executrix-appellee, Marina Dizon-Rivera, and the
oppositors, Estela Dizon, Tomas V. Dizon, Bernardita Dizon, Angelina Dizon and Josefina Dizon, and a
legitimate granddaughter named Lilia Dizon, who is the only legitimate child and heir of Ramon Dizon, a
pre-deceased legitimate son of the said decedent.
 Upon approval of the testatrix’s last will and testament for probate by the court and the appointment of
Marina Dizon, as executrix, it was then ascertained that the real and personal properties of the testatrix had
a total appraised value of P1,811,695.60, and the legitime of each of the seven compulsory heirs amounted
to P129,362.11 (1/7 of the half of the estate reserved for the legitime of legitimate children and
descendants). However, the testatrix in her will "commanded that her property be divided" in accordance
with her testamentary disposition, whereby she devised and bequeathed specific real properties comprising
practically the entire bulk of her estate among her six children and eight grandchildren. This disposition in
the will consequently resulted in Marina and Tomas, receiving more than their legitime, while the rest of the
appellants received less than their legitime. Thus in the project partition submitted by Marina (executrix),
the latter and Tomas adjudicated the properties that they received in the will less the cash and/or
properties necessary to complete the prejudiced legitime of the other appellants. The appellants however
argued in their counter-project partition that the testamentary dispositions by the Testatrix should be
reduced to one-half (1/2) of the entire estate of P1,811,695 and divided proportionally among them, while
the other half should then constitute the legitime also to be divided among them in seven equal parts.
 The lower court sustained and approved the executrix’ project of partition and held that if the proposition of
the oppositors were to be upheld, then such would result in a distribution in intestacy which would
contravene the will of the testatrix, who chose to favor certain heirs for reasons of her own. The court also
held that the payment in cash, as well, to complete the impaired legitimes of the oppositors was also legally
permissible under the law, and was a practical and valid solution in order to give effect to the last wishes of
the testatrix. Hence, the present appeal filed by oppositor-appellants.
 In this appeal, the oppositor-appellants contended that testamentary dispositions made in the testatrix’ will
were in the nature of devices imputable to the free portion of her estate, and therefore was subject to
reduction. They argued that this was implied by the use of the words "I bequeath" in the testament. They
also insisted that they were entitled to their devise plus their legitime under Article 1063, and thus may not
be compelled to accept cash in completion of their legitime, instead of some of the real properties left by the
Testatrix.

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the lower Court properly ruled in approving the executrix’ project of partition as
against the proposed partition of the other appellants?

RULING:
Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the testator's wishes and intention constitute the first and principal law in
the matter of testaments, and when expressed clearly and precisely in his last will amount to the only law
whose mandate must imperatively be faithfully obeyed and complied with by his executors, heirs and devisees
and legatees, and neither these interested parties nor the courts may substitute their own criterion for the
testator's will. Thus, if the testator in her will specified each real property in her estate and designated the
particular heir among her compulsory heirs and grandchildren to whom she bequeathed the same, the
testamentary disposition was in the nature of a partition of her estate by will. This is a valid partition of her
estate, as contemplated and authorized in the first paragraph of Article 1080 of the Civil Code. This right of a
testator to partition his estate is subject only to the right of compulsory heirs to their legitime. Moreover, the
court declared that the repeated use of the words I bequeath in the testamentary dispositions did not acquire
any legal significance, such as to convert the same into devises to be taken solely from the free one-half
disposable portion of the estate where the testator's intent that his testamentary dispositions were by way of
adjudications to the beneficiaries as heirs and not as mere devisees, is clear and that said dispositions were
borne out by the use of phrase "my heirs in this testament" referring to the "devisees."

Accordingly, the court ruled that the forced heirs then may not legally insist on their legitime being completed
with real properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash as provided in the will. The properties are not
available for the purpose where the testatrix had specifically partitioned and distributed them to her heirs, and
the heirs are called upon, as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the intention of the testatrix as
solemnized in her will by implementing her manifest wish of transmitting the real properties intact to her named
beneficiaries under the will.

Thus in view of the foregoing, the court moved to affirm the orders of the lower court.

Case Digest by: Alena Icao-Anotado pg. 1