LUISA MONTAÑER, ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, JR.

, LILLIBETH MONTAÑER-BARRIOS, AND RHODORA

MONTAÑER-DALUPAN vs. SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT,
MARAWI CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN, AND ALMAHLEEN MONTAÑER
G.R. No. 174975 January 20, 2009 Puno, C.J. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
® On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montañer, Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish
in Cubao, QC. Petitioners Alejandro, Jr., Lillibeth and Rhodora are their children. On May 26, 1995, Alejandro, Sr. died.

® On August 19, 2005, respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Montañer, both Muslims, filed a
"Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties before the Shari’a District Court. They alleged that (a) The late Alejandro, Sr.
is a Muslim; (b) Petitioners are the first family of the decedent; and (c) Liling is the widow of the decedent and Almahleen is
his daughter; and they prayed for (1) the partition of the estate; and (2) the appointment of an administrator for the estate.

® Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds: (1) the Shari’a Court has no jurisdiction over
the estate of the decedent because he was a Roman Catholic; (2) respondents failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees;
and (3) the complaint is barred by prescription as it seeks to establish filiation between Almahleen and the decedent, pursuant
to Art 175 of the Family Code.

® SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT dismissed the complaint and held that Alejandro, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction
extends only to the settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased Muslims.
a. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners filed an Opposition to the same for lack of notice of hearing.
Shari’a District Court denied the opposition.
b. Despite finding that the MR "lacked notice of hearing," it held that such defect was cured as petitioners "were notified of
the existence of the pleading," and it took cognizance of the MR. A hearing was reset for the MR.

® 1st ASSAILED ORDER – Shari’a District Court reconsidered its order of dismissal and allowed respondents to adduce further
evidence. 2nd ASSAILED ORDER - Shari’a District Court ordered the continuation of trial, trial on the merits, adducement of
further evidence, and pre-trial conference. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether Shari’a Court has jurisdiction over petitioners who are Roman Catholics and Non-Muslims.
YES. Art 143 of the Code of Muslim Personal Laws1 provides that the Shari’a District Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction
over the settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims. The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled
by the averments and character of the relief sought in the complaint or petition and NOT the designation given by parties to
their pleadings. Rather than rely on "a falsa descriptio or defective caption," courts are guided by the substantive averments of the
pleadings.

Although respondents designated the pleading as a "Complaint" for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient jurisdictional facts
required for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim such as:
a. The fact of Alejandro, Sr.’s death as well as the allegation that he is a Muslim.
b. The enumeration of the names of his legal heirs, and
c. A probable list of the properties left by the decedent,
d. The reliefs prayed for reveal the intention of respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate of the decedent.

Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and its subject matter does not depend upon the defenses set forth in an answer
or a motion to dismiss. In the case at bar, the Shari’a District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners
raised as a defense the allegation that the deceased is not a Muslim. It has the authority to hear and receive evidence to determine
whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, it is determined
that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE: Whether Shari’a Court acquired jurisdiction over the Estate.

YES. The proceedings before the Shari’a District Courts for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of the estate of the deceased, is a special proceeding. A special proceeding is "a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. This Court has applied the rules on special proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased Muslim. In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the
applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedent’s heirs. Here, the
respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro, Sr.’s death and, subsequently, for Almahleen to be recognized as among his
heirs, if such is the case in fact.

1
The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of
administration or appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the aggregate value of the property.
Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party defendant in a civil action applies to a special
proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a
special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding in the Rules illustrate
this difference.

J ORDINARY CIVIL ACTION J SPECIAL PROCEEDING

Initiatory Pleading is COMPLAINT Initiatory Pleading is PETITION
An action where a party sues another for the enforcement or An action by which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong. a particular fact.
It has one definite party who petitions or applies for a
It has adverse parties (plaintiff or defendant) declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite
adverse party.
In this case, it bears emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding,
the purpose of the settlement of the estate is (a) to determine all the assets of the estate, (b) to pay its liabilities, and (c) to
distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.

ISSUE: Whether Shari’a Court has jurisdiction over the complaint despite the non-payment of docket fees.
YES. Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with jurisdiction
over the subject matter. If the party filing the case paid less than the correct amount for the docket fees because that was the
amount assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment lies with the clerk of court. The court
will not automatically lose jurisdiction because of a party’s reliance on the insufficient assessment of the docket fees. As every
citizen has the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law with certain duties performs them in accordance with
law, the party filing the case cannot be penalized with the clerk of court’s insufficient assessment. In this case, petitioners did not
present the clerk of court’s assessment of the docket fees. There can be no determination of whether respondents correctly paid
the docket fees without the same.

ISSUE: Whether respondent’s MR before the Shari’a Court is defective for lack of notice of hearing.
NO. The unique circumstances in the present case constitute an exception to this requirement. The Rules require every written
motion to be set for hearing by the applicant and to address the notice of hearing to all parties concerned.
A. The Rules allow a liberal construction of its provisions in order to promote the objective of securing a just, speedy, and
inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. A liberal construction is applied to rules of notice of hearing
where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice especially if a party successfully
shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the
recitals contained therein.

To deny the Shari’a District Court of an opportunity to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the
settlement of the estate alleged to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a court to control its process to
ensure conformity with the law and justice. To sanction such situation simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice
requirement will result in a miscarriage of justice.

B. The present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing, because the rights of the petitioners
were not affected. PURPOSE FOR THE NOTICE OF HEARING - for the court to determine whether the adverse party
agrees or objects to the motion.

In probate proceedings, what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack
of opportunity to be heard. In this case, petitioners’ counsel received a copy of the MR and they were certainly not denied an
opportunity to file an opposition to the same. Petitioners were not denied the opportunity to object to the said motion in a hearing.
Taken together, circumstances show that the purpose for the rules of notice of hearing, procedural process, was duly observed.

ISSUE: Whether Shari’a Court committed grave abuse of discretion when it set the Partition of the Estate for trial despite the
complaint revealing that Almahleen seeks recognition from the deceased.
Petitioners’ argument is premature. The Shari’a District Court has not yet determined whether it has jurisdiction to settle the estate
of the decedent. In the event that a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending, questions regarding
heirship, including prescription in relation to recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said proceeding. The
court, in its capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the decedent. In this case, the determination
of the heirs of the decedent depends on an affirmative answer to the question of whether the Shari’a District Court has
jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent.
 ALAN JOSEPH SHEKER vs. ESTATE OF ALICE SHEKER, VICTORIA MEDINA - Administratrix
G.R. No. 157912 December 13, 2007 Austria-Martinez, J. Petition for Certiorari
RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice Sheker and issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims
against the estate. In compliance, petitioner filed on:
a. A contingent claim for agent's commission (₱206K) in the event of the sale of certain land belonging to the estate, and
b. Reimbursement for expenses incurred (₱275K) in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice moved for the dismissal of said money claim on the grounds that:
a. The requisite docket fee had not been paid;
b. Petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and
c. Petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money claim based on the grounds
advanced by respondent. Petitioner's MR was denied. Hence, this petition. Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly
applying to a probate proceeding the rules requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for non-personal filing, and
the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists that Sec 2, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court provides that rules in ordinary
actions are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.

ISSUE: Whether the rules in ordinary actions are ONLY applicable to special proceedings in a suppletory manner.
NO. Sec 2, Rule 72, of the Rules of Court provides that “In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary
actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.” Stated differently, special provisions govern special
proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special
proceedings, as far as practicable. The word "practicable" is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being put into practice,
done or accomplished. This means that in the absence of special provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special
proceedings as much as possible and when doing so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in the Rules
does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or merely suppletory to special proceedings.

Provisions of the Rules of Court requiring a certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a written
explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees for money claims against an estate would not in
any way obstruct probate proceedings, thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person as in the present case.

ISSUE: Whether RTC erred in dismissing the contingent money claim against the estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his
motion a Certification of Non-Forum Shopping.
YES. The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in
ruling that a contingent money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole
probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. After granting letters of
testamentary or of administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court
and the estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.

Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into
consideration in the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main
action for the settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even institute a
separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does
not require a certification against non-forum shopping.

Filing Fees
Non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim against
the estate. The trial court has jurisdiction (a) to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for services rendered by a
lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment of separate docket fees because
the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment, or (b) the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a
reasonable time.

Written Explanation
The rules give the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed (a) if the other modes of service or filing were
not resorted to and (b) no written explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first place. The exercise of
discretion must, necessarily consider the practicability of personal service, for Sec 11 itself begins with the clause "whenever practicable".
GR: When personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of XPN: Otherwise, resort to other modes may be had which
the circumstances of time, place and person, personal service must be accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal
or filing is mandatory. service or filing is not practicable.

As the rule is worded with the use of "may", signifying permissiveness, a violation thereof gives the court discretion whether
to consider the paper as not filed. While it is true that procedural rules are necessary to secure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice, rigid application of Sec 11, Rule 13 may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice. In this case, petitioner
holds office in Makati City, while counsel for respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City.
The lower court should have taken judicial notice of the great distance between said cities and realized that it is indeed not
practicable to serve and file the money claim personally. Thus, the failure of petitioner to submit a written explanation why service
has not been done personally, may be considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion not to dismiss
the money claim in the interest of substantial justice.

The ruling spirit of the probate law is the speedy settlement of estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those
entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have been paid. The RTC should
have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the requirement of a written explanation for non-personal service in
the interest of substantial justice. RTC is directed to give due course and take appropriate action on petitioner's money claim.

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA QUIAZON vs.

MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013 Perez, J. Petition for Review on Certiorari
A Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo was filed by respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and
daughter. Eliseo died intestate. In the petition, Elise claimed that:
a. She is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to
marry each other.
b. Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia was bigamous as it was contracted during the subsistence of latter’s marriage with Filipito.
c. To prove her filiation, she attached her Certificate of Live Birth signed by Eliseo as her father.
d. Eliseo left real properties worth ₱2.040M and personal properties worth ₱2.1M.
e. Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.

Petitioners filed an Opposition to the Petition/Motion to Dismiss claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid. They
asserted that:
a. As shown by Eliseo’s Death Certificate, he was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at his death.
b. Pursuant to Sec 1, Rule 73, the petition for settlement of decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and
not in Las Piñas City.
c. There are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. It ruled
that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby discrediting the position taken by the petitioners as
hearsay.

COURT OF APPEALS affirmed RTC Decision. It held that Elise was able to prove that her parents lived together as husband and
wife by establishing a common residence up to the time of Eliseo’s death. For purposes of fixing the venue, the decedent was a
resident of Las Piñas City. MR denied.

ISSUE: Whether the Petition for Letters of Administration was properly filed with RTC Las Piñas.
YES. Under Sec 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent should be filed
in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death. “Resides” should mean the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It is evident from the records that during his lifetime, Eliseo
resided at Las Piñas City. For this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.

While death certificates can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of his death, its contents are not binding on
the courts. Both the RTC and CA found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes up to the time of his death. This finding is
consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia on the ground that
their marriage is void for being bigamous. That Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts
of law renders untenable petitioners’ position that Eliseo spent the final days of his life with Amelia and her children.

ISSUE: Whether CA erred in declaring Amelia not legally married with Eliseo due to preexisting marriage.
NO. In a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of rights, such that any interested party may
attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage. There is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may
impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage may be questioned directly by filing
an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Elise, as a compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute
nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause
of action. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s
marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.
ISSUE: Whether CA overlooked that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition.
NO. An "interested party," in estate proceedings is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a
claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those whose relationship
with the decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributes.

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an
interested party. Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate is on good grounds. It is founded on her
right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied. Having a
vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested
party within the purview of the law.

EMILIO ADVINCULA vs. JUDGE JOSE TEODORO, SR.,

Judge of CFI Negros Occidental, and ENRIQUE LACSON
G.R. No. L-9282 May 31, 1956 Concepcion, J. Petition for Certiorari
Advincula was appointed as special administrator of the estate of his deceased wife, Josefa. He was then appointed as regular
administrator. The brothers of the deceased submitted to the court a document purporting to be her last will and
testament. Advincula Opposed the Probate on the following grounds:
a. It did not bear the signature of the deceased;
b. The signature if hers, was secured through fraud and duress;
c. The instrument had not been executed with the requisite formalities.

Respondent Enrique, one of the brothers, filed a motion praying that he be appointed administrator of said estate. The counseld for
Advincula filed an opposition to the same. One of the counsels was served in open court, a copy of the Amended Motion for Change
of Administrator due to the incompetency and incapability of the present administrator to discharge the estate, he being foreign to
the estate.

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE revoked the appointment of Advincula as administrator and appointed Enrique. MR was denied.
ISSUE: Whether the lower court erred in granting Enrique’s motion.
YES. Respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in removing Advincula and appointing Lacson as administrator of the estate of
the deceased. The writ of certiorari prayed for is in order. Lacson’s appointment, in lieu of Advincula, as administrator of the
estate is predicated upon the fact that the former is named executor in the alleged will of said deceased. The provision to this effect
cannot be enforced, however, until after said document has been allowed to probate, for Sec 4 of Rule 79 of the Rules of Court
provides that “When a will has been proved and allowed, the court shall issue letters testamentary to the person named as
executor therein, if he is competent, accepts the trusts, and gives bond as required by these rules.”

Besides, the discovery of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of a deceased, after the appointment of an
administrator of the estate of the latter, upon the assumption that he or she had died intestate, does not ipso facto nullify the
letters of administration already issued or even authorize its revocation, until the alleged will has been “proved and allowed
by the court.

It is untenable from the viewpoint of logic and experience, because a stranger to deceased may be competent, capable and fit to
administer her estate, in much the same as a member of her immediate family could be incompetent, incapable and unfit to do so.
At any rate, Advincula is not a stranger, either to her or to her estate, he bring her surviving spouse and, as such, one of her forced
heirs, whether she died testate or intestate.
a. He is prima facie entitled to 1/2 of all property subject to the authority of the administrator of said estate,
b. Advincula has not been found guilty of any specific act or omission constituting one of the legal grounds for the removal
of an executor or administrator.
 ANICETO SALUDO, JR. vs. AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL and/or IAN FISH and DOMINIC MASCRINAS
G.R. No. 159507 April 19, 2006 Callejo, Sr. J.
Saludo filed a Complaint for Damages for the alleged wrongful dishonor of Saludo's AMEX credit card and the supplementary card
issued to his daughter, against the American Express and/or its officers with RTC, alleging that:
a. He is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, and a member of the HOR and a resident of Southern Leyte, Philippines.
b. AMEX is a corporation doing business in the PH and engaged in providing credit and other allied services.

In their Answer, respondents prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and raised the affirmative defenses of lack of cause of action
and improper venue. They averred that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground that venue was improperly laid because
none of the parties was a resident of Leyte.
a. Saludo was not allegedly a resident thereof as evidenced by his community tax certificate,
b. Saludo's complaint was prepared in Pasay City and signed by a lawyer of the said city.

Saludo asserted that any allegation refuting his residency in Southern Leyte was baseless and unfounded considering that he was
the congressman of the lone district thereof at the time of the filing of his complaint. His community tax certificate was issued at
Pasay City only because he has an office thereat. In any event, the community tax certificate is not determinative of one's residence.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT found the allegations of the complaint sufficient to constitute a cause of action against respondents.
It likewise denied respondents' affirmative defense that venue was improperly laid.

COURT OF APPEALS found that venue was improperly laid. Not one of the parties was a resident of Southern Leyte. Specifically,
Saludo was not a resident thereof. For purposes of venue, the residence of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation,
or his actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein
with continuity and consistency.
RESIDENCE DOMICILE
Indicates a place of abode, whether permanent A fixed permanent residence to which when
or temporary. absent, one has the intention of returning.
There can be several residences There can only be ONE domicile
No length of residence without intention of Residence coupled with intention to remain
remaining will constitute domicile. for an unlimited time.
ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in holding that venue was improperly laid.
YES. Saludo's complaint for damages is a personal action. As such, it is governed by Sec 2, Rule 4 which reads that “All other
actions may be commenced and tried where the plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs resides, or where the defendant or any
of the principal defendants resides, or in the case of a non-resident defendant where he may be found, at the election of the
plaintiff. Following this rule, Saludo, as plaintiff, had opted to file his complaint in Maasin City, Southern Leyte. He alleged in his
complaint that he was a member of the HOR and a resident of Southern Leyte to comply with the residency requirement of the
rule.

The appellate court committed reversible error in finding that Saludo was not a resident of Southern Leyte at the time of the
filing of his complaint, and consequently holding that venue was improperly laid in the court a quo. There is no dispute that
Saludo was the congressman of the lone district of Southern Leyte at the time of filing of his complaint. As a member of the HOR,
Saludo is also deemed to have had his residence therein for purposes of venue for filing personal actions. Southern Leyte, as the
domicile of Saludo, was also his residence, as the term is understood in its popular sense. This is because "residence is not domicile,
but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time." “Resides” should mean the personal, actual
or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat.
 HEIRS OF ERNESTO MORALES, NAMELY: ROSARIO DANGSALAN, EVELYN SANGALANG, NENITA SALES,
ERNESTO MORALES, JR., RAYMOND MORALES, AND MELANIE MORALES vs. ASTRID MORALES AGUSTIN,
REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, EDGARDO TORRES
G.R. No. 224849 June 6, 2018 Reyes, Jr. J.
Respondent Astrid Agustin is the grandchild of Jayme Morales, a registered owner of land in Barangay Sto. Tomas, Laoag City.
She initially initiated the complaint for the partition of Jayme's property with Lydia (another grandchild) and her cousin. The alleged
that they were co-owners of the subject property by virtue of their successional rights as heirs.

Ernesto Morales (Heir of Vicente; Cousin of Astrid) filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss and Compulsory Counter-claims. He alleged
that Astrid has no cause of action because:
1. The proper remedy should not be a complaint for partition but an action for the settlement of the intestate estate of Jayme
and his wife; and
2. Astrid has no more right of participation over the subject property because the same has long been conveyed to Ernesto
Morales by the respondent's parents, Simeon and Leonila Morales.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ruled in favor of Astrid. It ruled that the estate of a deceased who died intestate may be partitioned
without need of any settlement or administration proceeding. COURT OF APPEALS affirmed the RTC Decision.
ISSUE: Whether partition of the property is proper despite the absence of settlement of the estate.

YES. An administration proceeding for the settlement of the estate is NOT a condition precedent before any partition and
distribution could be effected, but the trial court should have collated Jayme's other properties, if any, prior to the promulgation
of any judgment of partition in accordance with the laws on Succession.

Who May Effect Partition:

1. the heirs themselves extrajudicially,
2. the court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the course of administration proceedings,
3. by the testator himself, and
4. by the third person designated by the testator.

A reading of the enumeration set above would reveal instances when the appointment of an executor or administrator is dispensed
with. One is through the execution of a public instrument by the heirs in an extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Another, which
is the focal point of this case, is through the ordinary action of partition.

According to Rule 74, the heirs may resort to an ordinary action of partition of the estate of the deceased if they disagree as to
the exact division of the estate, and only if the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or the minors are
represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose.

The ordinary action for partition therefore is meant to take the place of the special proceeding on the settlement of the estate. The
reason is that, if the deceased dies without pending obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an administrator
to administer the estate for the heirs and the creditors, much less, the necessity to deprive the real owners of their possession to
which they are immediately entitled.
 MARIA SOCORRO AVELINO vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELINA AVELINO, SHARON AVELINO, ANTONIO
AVELINO, JR., TRACY AVELINO, PATRICK AVELINO and MARK ANTHONY AVELINO
G.R. No. 115181 March 31, 2000 Quisumbing, J.
Maria Socorro is a daughter and compulsory heir of the late Antonio, Sr., and his 1 wife is respondent Angelina. The other
st

respondents are likewise compulsory heirs of the decedent. Sharon, an American, is the 2nd wife of Avelino Sr. The others are
siblings of petitioner Ma. Socorro.

RTC. Socorro filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of who died intestate. She asked that she be
appointed the administrator of the estate. An opposition was filed by the respondents by filing a motion to convert the said
proceedings to an action for judicial partition which petitioner duly opposed. RTC converted the petition into judicial partition of
the estate. COURT OF APPEALS held that the Partition was proper.

SOCORRO ARGUMENTS:
1. NO partition of the estate is possible as no determination has yet been made of the character and extent of the decedent's
estate. In addition, the estate is in danger of being depleted for want of an administrator to manage and attend to it.
2. The Rules of Court does not provide for conversion of a motion for the issuance of letters of administration to an action
for judicial partition. The conversion of should be struck down for lack of legal basis.

ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in finding that a judicial partition is proper.

NO. When a person dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his will or the executor so named is incompetent, or
refuses the trust, or fails to furnish the bond required by the Rules of Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially
administered and the competent court shall appoint a qualified administrator in the order established in the Rules. The exceptions
to this rule are the following:
1. Extrajudicial Settlement by Agreement between Heirs
2. Summary Settlement of Estates of Small Value

The heirs succeed immediately to all of the rights and properties of the deceased at the moment of the latter's death. The Rules
allows heirs to divide the estate among themselves without need of delay and risks of being dissipated. When a person dies
without leaving pending obligations, his heirs, are not required to submit the property for judicial administration, nor apply
for the appointment of an administrator by the court. The CA found that in this case "the decedent left no debts and the heirs
and legatees are all of age." With this finding, it is our view that Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court should apply.

A complete inventory of the estate may be done during the partition proceedings, especially since the estate has no debts. Hence,
the CA committed no error when it ruled that the lower court did not err in converting petitioner's action for letters of
administration into an action for judicial partition. In cases where the heirs disagree as to the partition of the estate and no
extrajudicial settlement is possible, then an ordinary action for partition may be resorted to, as in this case.
LILIBETH ESPINAS-LANUZA, ONEL ESPINAS, AS HEIRS OF LEOPOLDO ESPINAS, AND THE MUNICIPAL ASSESSOR
OF DARAGA, ALBAY vs. FELIX LUNA, JR., ARMANDO AND ANTONIO VELASCO, AS HEIRS OF SIMON VELASCO,
G.R. No. 229775 March 11, 2019 J. Reyes, JR., J.
During his lifetime, the decedent Simon was the owner of several properties in Albay (subject property). Simon had 4 children,
namely, Heriberto, Genoviva, Felisa, and Juan. Felix is the son of Genoviva, while Armando and Antonio are the children of
Heriberto

Respondents allege that Juan and Felisa, through deceit, connivance, and misrepresentation, executed EJS with Sale, which
adjudicated the subject property to Leopoldo, son of Felisa. They further contend that they discovered the fraud when they came
to know that a Tax Dec was issued in Leopoldo's name.

In their defense, the children of Leopoldo, argue that when Simon died intestate, his children agreed to partition his estate and
the heirs were given their respective shares. On the other hand, the subject property was the joint share of Juan and Felisa who
subsequently executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale conveying the subject property to Leopoldo.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ruled that the parties were co-owners of the subject land. The sale by Felisa and Juan of their
respective undivided shares in the co-ownership was valid and the vendee, Leopoldo, became the owner of the shares sold to him.

COURT OF APPEALS denied the appeal and emphasized that no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. It opined that fraud had been committed against the excluded heirs, thus,
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Sale must be annulled.

PETITIONER
a. All of Simon's children were given their respective
hereditary shares from the estate;
b. When they sold the subject property to Leopoldo, they no
longer deemed it necessary to have Genoviva and
Heriberto sign the EJS with Sale;
c. Genoviva and Heriberto never questioned the ownership
of Juan and Felisa during their lifetime nor the sale made
in favor of Leopoldo.
ISSUE: [1] Whether the EJS and Sale to Leopoldo was valid. [2] Whether the oral partition was valid
RESPONDENTS
a. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed without
including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of
and consent to the same, is fraudulent and vicious; and
b. After the death of Simon, his children never partitioned
his estate.

YES. PARTITION – the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. It
may be effected extrajudicially by the heirs themselves through a public instrument filed before the register of deeds.

As between the parties, a public instrument is neither constitutive nor an inherent element of a contract of partition. Since
registration serves as constructive notice to third persons, AN ORAL PARTITION BY THE HEIRS IS VALID IF NO
CREDITORS, ARE AFFECTED. Moreover, even the requirement of a written memorandum under the statute of frauds does not
apply to partitions effected by the heirs where no creditors are involved considering that such transaction is not a conveyance of
property resulting in change of ownership but merely a designation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir.

Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition,
although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.

In the case at bar, it has been shown that upon the death of Simon, his children, orally partitioned the estate among
themselves, with each one of them possessing their respective shares and exercising acts of ownership. It must be emphasized that
no one among the children of Simon disturbed the status quo which has been going on from the year 1966. They chose to remain
silent precisely because they were already given their respective shares in the estate. Hence, it can be gleaned that the heirs of
Simon agreed to orally partition his estate among themselves, as evinced by their possession of the inherited premises, their
construction of improvements thereon, and their having declared in their names for taxation purposes their respective shares.
Actual possession and exercise of dominion over definite portions of the property in accordance with an alleged partition are
considered strong proof of an oral partition.
ISSUE: Whether laches can be invoked in the validity of the EJS being questioned.

YES. laches has set in against respondents, precluding their right to recover the subject property. The elements of laches are:
(1) conduct on the part of the defendant, or one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation that led to the
complaint and for which the complaint seeks a remedy;
(2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and having
been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
 (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he
bases his suit; and
(4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.

In this case, there is no question on the presence of the first element of laches. The object of respondents' complaint before the was
to annul the extrajudicial settlement in order to recover their shares in the subject property, which is presently in the hands of
petitioners. The second element of delay is also present in the case at bar. Respondents' suit was instituted 44 years after the
property was conveyed to Leopoldo in 1966. Again, respondents' could not have been unaware of Leopoldo's open and continuous
possession of the subject property. The third element is also present in this case. Petitioners had no inkling of respondents' intent
to possess the subject property considering that Simon's children never contested the conveyance of the subject property to
Leopoldo. As to the fourth element of laches, it goes without saying that petitioners will be prejudiced if respondents' complaint
is accorded relief, or not held barred. Needless to say, laches has set in against respondents, precluding their right to recover the
subject property.

Accordingly, considering that Felisa and Juan already owned the subject property at the time they sold the same to Leopoldo,
having been assigned such property pursuant to the oral partition of the estate of Simon effected by his heirs, petitioners are
entitled to actual possession thereof.

AVELINA REBUSQUILLO [substituted by her heirs] and SALVADOR OROSCO vs.

SPS. DOMINGO and EMELINDA GUALVEZ and the CITY ASSESSOR OF LEGAZPI CITY
G.R. No. 204029 June 4, 2014 Velasco, JR., J.
Avelina and Salvador filed a Complaint for annulment and revocation of an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and DOAS. They alleged that:
a. Avelina was one of the children of Eulalio and Victoria. Eulalio died intestate, survived by his wife, 6 legitimate children,
and 1 illegitimate child, namely: (1) Avelina; (2) Fortunata, the mother of Salvador; (3) Rosalino; (4) Juan; (5) Feliciano;
(6) Abraham; and (7) Carlos. His wife Victoria eventually died intestate.

On his death, Eulalio left behind an untitled parcel of land in Legazpi City. Avelina was supposedly made to sign 2 documents
by her daughter Emelinda and her son-in-law Domingo on the pretext that the documents were needed to facilitate the titling of
the lot. It was only thereafter that Avelina realized that what she signed was an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and a DOAS in
favor of respondents.

Respondents admitted that the execution of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the Deed of Sale was intended to facilitate the
titling of the subject property.

RTC annulled the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and the DOAS on the grounds that:
1. As to the Affidavit - she was not the sole heir of her parents and was not therefore solely entitled to their estate; and
2. As to the DOAS – she did not really intend to sell her share in the property as it was only executed to facilitate the titling
of such property.

CA arguing that the Deed of Sale cannot be annulled being a public document that has for its object the creation and transmission
of real rights over the immovable subject property. Pending the resolution of appeal, Avelina died intestate. CA held that the RTC
erred in annulling the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication simply on allegation of the existence of the heirs of Eulalio, considering that
issues on heirship must be made in administration or intestate proceedings, not in an ordinary civil action. Further, the DOAS
cannot be nullified as it is a notarized document that has in its favor the presumption of regularity and is entitled to full faith and
credit upon its face.

ISSUE: Whether the issues on the declaration of heirship shall be made in an administration or intestate proceedings, not in an
ordinary civil action.
NO. While it has been ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special proceeding, not in an independent civil
action. This Court had likewise held that recourse to administration proceedings to determine who heirs are is sanctioned only
if there is a good and compelling reason for such recourse. It had allowed exceptions to the rule requiring administration
proceedings as when:

1. the parties in the civil case already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and
2. the RTC had consequently rendered judgment upon the issues it defined during the pre-trial.

In the present case, there appears to be only one parcel of land being claimed by the contending parties as the inheritance from
Eulalio. It would be more practical to dispense with a separate special proceeding for the determination of the status of Avelina
as sole heir of Eulalio, especially in light of the fact that spouses Gualvez admitted in court that they knew for a fact that Avelina
was not the sole heir of Eulalio and that Salvador was one of the other living heirs with rights over the subject land. In light of
the admission of spouses Gualvez, it is with more reason that a resort to special proceeding will be but an unnecessary
superfluity.

An Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is only proper when the affiant is the sole heir of the decedent. Without a doubt, Avelina had
perjured herself when she declared in the affidavit that she is "the only daughter and sole heir of spouses EULALIO. The falsity
of this claim renders her act of adjudicating to herself the inheritance left by her father invalid. The RTC did not err in granting
Avelina’s prayer to declare the affidavit null and void and so correct the wrong she has committed.

The DOAS was correctly nullified and voided by the RTC. Avelina was not in the right position to sell and transfer the absolute
ownership of the subject property as she was not the sole heir of Eulalio and her Affidavit of Self-Adjudication is void, the subject
property is still subject to partition.

What Avelina could have transferred to respondents was only the ownership of such aliquot portion. It is apparent from the
admissions of respondents and the records of this case that Avelina had no intention to transfer the ownership, of whatever extent,
over the property to respondents. Hence, the Deed of Absolute Sale is nothing more than a simulated contract.

AMPARO CRUZ; ERNESTO HALILI; ALICIA FLORENCIO; DONALD HALILI; EDITHA RIVERA; ERNESTO
HALILI, JR.; and JULITO HALILI vs. ANGELITO, CONCEPCION, SERAFIN, and VICENTE CRUZ
G.R. No. 2111153 February 28, 2018 Del Castillo, J.
Respondents Angelito, Concepcion, and Serafin alleged that they inherited a parcel of land from their parents together with
their siblings’ petitioners Amparo and Antonia. The Parties executed a deed of EJS on agreement that each heir was to receive an
equal portion

When property was subdivided, respondents discovered that

• Antonia was allocated 2 lots as against 1 for each
• Antonia’s allocation of 2 lots contravened the agreement

Amparo and Antonia were able to do that by inducing Concepcion (illiterate) to sign the deed of EJS, wripen in English without
reading and explaining the contents thereof
• Amparo and Antonia fraudulently took advantage of Concepcion’s ignorance and mental weakness

Petitioners claimed that the deed had been voluntarily and freely executed by the parties, free from vitiated consent and that
respondents’ cause of action has prescribed.
ISSUE: Whether the EJS written in a language not understood by the party is valid.
NO. It is void. Under the rule, 'no extra-judicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or
had no notice thereof.' As the partition was a total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs.

ISSUE: Whether the action for declaration of nullity of the defective deed prescribes.

NO. The deed of extra-judicial partition in the case at bar being invalid, the action to have it annulled does not prescribe. Section
1 of Rule 74 does not apply to the partition in question which was null and void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The
rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in the present case was invalid because it excluded the heirs who were entitled to
equal shares in the partitioned property.

While the CA was correct in ruling in favor of Concepcion and setting aside the subject deed of extrajudicial settlement, it erred
in appreciating and ruling that the case involved fraud - thus applying the four-year prescriptive period - when it should have
simply held that the action for the declaration of nullity of the defective deed of extrajudicial settlement does not prescribe,
under the circumstances, given that the same was a total nullity. Clearly, the issue of literacy is relevant to the extent that
Concepcion was effectively deprived of her true inheritance, and not so much that she was defrauded.