Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 174975               January 20, 2009

LUISA KHO MONTAÑER, ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, JR., LILLIBETH MONTAÑER-BARRIOS, AND RHODORA
ELEANOR MONTAÑER-DALUPAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SHARI'A DISTRICT COURT, FOURTH SHARI'A JUDICIAL DISTRICT, MARAWI CITY, LILING DISANGCOPAN,
AND ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAÑER, Respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Orders of the Shari’a District Court, Fourth Shari’a
Judicial District, Marawi City, dated August 22, 20061 and September 21, 2006.2

On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montañer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro Montañer, Sr. at the
Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City.3 Petitioners Alejandro Montañer, Jr., Lillibeth Montañer-
Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montañer-Dalupan are their children.4 On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died.5

On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S. Montañer, both
Muslims, filed a "Complaint" for the judicial partition of properties before the Shari’a District Court.6 The said
complaint was entitled "Almahleen Liling S. Montañer and Liling M. Disangcopan v. the Estates and Properties of
Late Alejandro Montañer, Sr., Luisa Kho Montañer, Lillibeth K. Montañer, Alejandro Kho Montañer, Jr., and Rhodora
Eleanor K. Montañer," and docketed as "Special Civil Action No. 7-05."7 In the said complaint, private respondents
made the following allegations: (1) in May 1995, Alejandro Montañer, Sr. died; (2) the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is
a Muslim; (3) petitioners are the first family of the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent; (5)
Almahleen Liling S. Montañer is the daughter of the decedent; and (6) the estimated value of and a list of the
properties comprising the estate of the decedent.8 Private respondents prayed for the Shari’a District Court to order,
among others, the following: (1) the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the appointment of an
administrator for the estate of the decedent.9

Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1) the Shari’a District Court has
no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr., because he was a Roman Catholic; (2) private
respondents failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees; and (3) private respondents’ complaint is barred by
prescription, as it seeks to establish filiation between Almahleen Liling S. Montañer and the decedent, pursuant to
Article 175 of the Family Code.10

On November 22, 2005, the Shari’a District Court dismissed the private respondents’ complaint. The district court
held that Alejandro Montañer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to the settlement and distribution
of the estate of deceased Muslims.11

On December 12, 2005, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration.12 On December 28, 2005, petitioners
filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that the motion for reconsideration lacked a notice of
hearing.13 On January 17, 2006, the Shari’a District Court denied petitioners’ opposition.14 Despite finding that the
said motion for reconsideration "lacked notice of hearing," the district court held that such defect was cured as
petitioners "were notified of the existence of the pleading," and it took cognizance of the said motion.15 The Shari’a
District Court also reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration.16

In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Shari’a District Court reconsidered its order of dismissal dated
November 22, 2005.17 The district court allowed private respondents to adduce further evidence.18 In its second
assailed order dated September 21, 2006, the Shari’a District Court ordered the continuation of trial, trial on the
merits, adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial conference.19
Seeking recourse before this Court, petitioners raise the following issues:

I.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT – MARAWI CITY LACKS JURISDICTION OVER PETITIONERS WHO
ARE ROMAN CATHOLICS AND NON-MUSLIMS.

II.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT – MARAWI CITY DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER "THE
ESTATES AND PROPERTIES OF THE LATE ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, SR." WHICH IS NOT A NATURAL OR
JURIDICAL PERSON WITH CAPACITY TO BE SUED.

III.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT OF
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AGAINST PETITIONERS DUE TO NON-PAYMENT OF THE FILING AND DOCKETING
FEES.

IV.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT—MARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE OPPOSITION OF PETITIONERS AND THEN
GRANTED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF RESPONDENTS LILING DISANGCOPAN, ET AL. WHICH
WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR LACK OF A "NOTICE OF HEARING."

V.

RESPONDENT SHARI’A DISTRICT COURT—MARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SET SPL. CIVIL ACTION 7-05 FOR TRIAL EVEN IF THE
COMPLAINT PLAINLY REVEALS THAT RESPONDENT ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAÑER SEEKS
RECOGNITION FROM ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, SR. WHICH CAUSE OF ACTION PRESCRIBED UPON THE
DEATH OF ALEJANDRO MONTAÑER, SR. ON MAY 26, 1995.

In their Comment to the Petition for Certiorari, private respondents stress that the Shari’a District Court must be given
the opportunity to hear and decide the question of whether the decedent is a Muslim in order to determine whether it
has jurisdiction.20

Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Muslims

Petitioners’ first argument, regarding the Shari’a District Court’s jurisdiction, is dependent on a question of fact,
whether the late Alejandro Montañer, Sr. is a Muslim. Inherent in this argument is the premise that there has already
been a determination resolving such a question of fact. It bears emphasis, however, that the assailed orders did not
determine whether the decedent is a Muslim. The assailed orders did, however, set a hearing for the purpose of
resolving this issue.

Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines, provides that the Shari’a District Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over the settlement of the
estate of deceased Muslims:

ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. — (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:

xxxx
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate of wills,
issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the
aggregate value of the property.

The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments and character of the relief
sought in the complaint or petition.21 The designation given by parties to their own pleadings does not necessarily
bind the courts to treat it according to the said designation. Rather than rely on "a falsa descriptio or defective
caption," courts are "guided by the substantive averments of the pleadings."22

Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Shari’a District Court as a "Complaint" for
judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of
the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased Muslim,23 such as the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death as well as the allegation that he is a Muslim.
The said petition also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs, so far as known to the private
respondents, and a probable list of the properties left by the decedent, which are the very properties sought to be
settled before a probate court. Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the private
respondents to seek judicial settlement of the estate of the decedent.24 These include the following: (1) the prayer for
the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer for the appointment of an administrator of the said
estate.

We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not have jurisdiction over the case
because of an allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss that Montañer, Sr. is not a Muslim. Jurisdiction of a
court over the nature of the action and its subject matter does not depend upon the defenses set forth in an
answer25 or a motion to dismiss.26 Otherwise, jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant27 or result in
having "a case either thrown out of court or its proceedings unduly delayed by simple stratagem.28 Indeed, the
"defense of lack of jurisdiction which is dependent on a question of fact does not render the court to lose or be
deprived of its jurisdiction."29

The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss.30 In the case at bar, the Shari’a District Court is not
deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a defense the allegation that the deceased is not a
Muslim. The Shari’a District Court has the authority to hear and receive evidence to determine whether it has
jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination that the deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Shari’a District
Court determines that the deceased was not in fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction.

Special Proceedings

The underlying assumption in petitioners’ second argument, that the proceeding before the Shari’a District Court is an
ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an erroneous understanding of the proceeding before the
court a quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed to the proceeding before the Shari’a District Court, where the
parties were designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil action. We
reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and
distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules)
defines a special proceeding as "a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact."
This Court has applied the Rules, particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased Muslim.31 In a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the
applicants seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the
decedent’s heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the
estate of the decedent.32 Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montañer, Sr.’s death and,
subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montañer to be recognized as among his heirs, if such is the
case in fact.

Petitioners’ argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party defendant in a civil
action33 applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the deceased, is misplaced. Unlike a
civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite adverse party. The definitions of a
civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which "a
party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong"34 necessarily
has definite adverse parties, who are either the plaintiff or defendant.35 On the other hand, a special proceeding, "by
which a party seeks to establish a status, right, or a particular fact,"36 has one definite party, who petitions or applies
for a declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears
emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding, the
purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate,37 pay its
liabilities,38 and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.39

Docket Fees

Petitioners’ third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired for non-payment of docket fees, is untenable.
Petitioners point to private respondents’ petition in the proceeding before the court a quo, which contains an
allegation estimating the decedent’s estate as the basis for the conclusion that what private respondents paid as
docket fees was insufficient. Petitioners’ argument essentially involves two aspects: (1) whether the clerk of court
correctly assessed the docket fees; and (2) whether private respondents paid the correct assessment of the docket
fees.

Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject matter.40 If the party filing the case paid less than the correct amount for the docket fees
because that was the amount assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of making a deficiency assessment
lies with the same clerk of court.41 In such a case, the lower court concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction,
because of a party’s reliance on the clerk of court’s insufficient assessment of the docket fees.42 As "every citizen has
the right to assume and trust that a public officer charged by law with certain duties knows his duties and performs
them in accordance with law," the party filing the case cannot be penalized with the clerk of court’s insufficient
assessment.43 However, the party concerned will be required to pay the deficiency.44

In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of court’s assessment of the docket fees. Moreover, the
records do not include this assessment. There can be no determination of whether private respondents correctly paid
the docket fees without the clerk of court’s assessment.

Exception to Notice of Hearing

Petitioners’ fourth argument, that private respondents’ motion for reconsideration before the Shari’a District Court is
defective for lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as the unique circumstances in the present case constitute an
exception to this requirement. The Rules require every written motion to be set for hearing by the applicant and to
address the notice of hearing to all parties concerned.45 The Rules also provide that "no written motion set for hearing
shall be acted upon by the court without proof of service thereof."46 However, the Rules allow a liberal construction of
its provisions "in order to promote [the] objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding."47 Moreover, this Court has upheld a liberal construction specifically of the rules of notice of
hearing in cases where "a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice especially if a party
successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face
or from the recitals contained therein."48 In these exceptional cases, the Court considers that "no party can even claim
a vested right in technicalities," and for this reason, cases should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits
rather than on technicalities.49

The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Shari’a District Court of an opportunity to determine whether it
has jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent alleged to be a Muslim would also deny
its inherent power as a court to control its process to ensure conformity with the law and justice. To sanction such a
situation simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice requirement will result in a miscarriage of justice.

In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing, because the rights of the
petitioners were not affected. This Court has held that an exception to the rules on notice of hearing is where it
appears that the rights of the adverse party were not affected.50 The purpose for the notice of hearing coincides with
procedural due process,51 for the court to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, as the
Rules do not fix any period within which to file a reply or opposition.52 In probate proceedings, "what the law prohibits
is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard."53 In the
case at bar, as evident from the Shari’a District Court’s order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners’ counsel received a
copy of the motion for reconsideration in question. Petitioners were certainly not denied an opportunity to study the
arguments in the said motion as they filed an opposition to the same. Since the Shari’a District Court reset the
hearing for the motion for reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied the opportunity to object to
the said motion in a hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show that the purpose for the rules of notice of
hearing, procedural process, was duly observed.
Prescription and Filiation

Petitioners’ fifth argument is premature. Again, the Shari’a District Court has not yet determined whether it has
jurisdiction to settle the estate of the decedent. In the event that a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate
of a decedent is pending, questions regarding heirship, including prescription in relation to recognition and filiation,
should be raised and settled in the said proceeding.54 The court, in its capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to
declare who are the heirs of the decedent.55 In the case at bar, the determination of the heirs of the decedent
depends on an affirmative answer to the question of whether the Shari’a District Court has jurisdiction over the estate
of the decedent.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the Shari’a District Court, dated August 22, 2006 and
September 21, 2006 respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

__________________________________________________________________________

G.R. No. 133000           October 2, 2001

PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner,

vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO – LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA
DEL RESORIO – MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES,
EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL ROSARIO, respondent..

BUENA, J.:

May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance annulment of title
with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on
questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?

Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the decision1 of public respondent
Court of Appeals, the decretal portion of which declares:

"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside and
another one entered annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario in favor of defendant-
appellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering the Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and reinstate TCT
No. 107443 without prejudice to the filing of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Graciano
Del Rosario in a proper court. No costs.

"So ordered."

Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of
9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon the death of
Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely: Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and
Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and dividing
among themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share
while each of the six children received 1/14 share of the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled,
and in lieu  thereof, TCT No. 35980 was issued in the name of Graciano and the Six children.1âwphi1.nêt

Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real
Property with Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided among themselves the parcel of land covered by TCT No.
35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the
land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Graciano's name, as
covered by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two
separate lots where the first lot with a land area of 80.90 square meter was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the
second lot with a land area of 396.70 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano
sold the first lot2 to a third person but retained ownership over the second lot.3

On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the land
covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 1860594 was issued in the latter's name.
On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.

In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, herein private
respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud,
misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of
Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance
of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint
that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.

In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married to Graciano in
20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner further
alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance, properties to his children, hence,
herein private respondents may not anymore claim against Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's property.

After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26 January 1996 holding:8

"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by
law and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of property was agreed upon in
the marriage settlements or that there has been decreed a judicial separation of property between them, the
spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale;

"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally prohibited by law
under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;

"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be regarded as
an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision ratiocinating, inter alia:

"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. The
court a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when
it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person.
XXX

"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance inheritance. What the court
should have done was merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on advancement to be
resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose. XXX"

Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the expediency of Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court and assails the appellate court's decision "for being contrary to law and the facts of the case."

We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.

Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this wise:

"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.

"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for ordinary civil actions,
subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
 "XXX

"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact."

As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a special proceeding.
An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It
is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term "special proceeding" may
be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in
special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special
proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion."9

Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:

"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted and
prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, and
that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and
prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without summons
and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX A special
proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for particular relief,
such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon notice."10

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action, whereas
matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the
decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the application of specific rules
as provided for in the Rules of Court.

Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive
province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been
made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the
heir.

While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same
provision11 contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings".

Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to
render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher,
inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the
proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55
was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the
decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.

At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:

"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it must first settle the
estate in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a quo determined the
respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and assigned the subject property owned by the estate of the
deceased to defendant-appellee without observing the proper proceedings provided (for) by the Rules of
Court. From the aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot resolve to
perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding because it is subject to specific prescribed rules. Thus, the
court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as an advance inheritance."12

In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs.
Borromeo13 and Mendoza vs. Teh14 that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court
(then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is not a
jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it is procedural question involving a mode of
practice "which may be waived".15

Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as the six children of
the decedent even assailed the authority of the trail court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to rule on this specific
issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.

Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing principle that although
generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs, or
the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the
question of ownership.16

Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:

"In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking appointment as
estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have invited the
exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate court.17 (emphasis supplied)

Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be reached, it
is necessary that certain steps be taken first.18 The net estate of the decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all
payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then,
all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the
compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had
prejudiced the legitimes.19

A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case, reveals that the trial court
failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del Rosario. This
Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these well-entrenched rules and hereby holds that
under the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum
to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as other related matters involving the settlement of
Graciano Del Rosario's estate.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED and the
instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

_________________________________________________________________

G.R. No. 164108               May 8, 2009

ALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRST FARMERS HOLDING CORPORATION, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THE HONORABLE AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIX JULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO, Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife,
private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-
Paulino.1 At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The
first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with
petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the
RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as
one of the plaintiffs therein.2

On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The petition was
raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value of the
assets of the decedent to be ₱5 Million, "net of liabilities."3 On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order
appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of
administration in her favor.4 In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of
Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband.5 In the List of Liabilities attached
to the inventory, private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then
being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.6 Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to
the two cases as ₱136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and ₱35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No.
11178.7 Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and
appraisal report pertaining to the estate.8

On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,9 praying
that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private
respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate
proceedings of her husband. Even before the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an
omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the required
inventory of the decedent’s estate.10 Petitioners also filed other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging
lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been
submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.

On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners
are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate
proceedings.11 After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was
filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the
intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the
Bacolod RTC.

On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision12 dismissing the petition and declaring that the
Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings. The
allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to the appellate court, is addressed to the sound
discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in
fact contingent or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts.

Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in denying them the right to
intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of procedure they
cite in support of their argument is not the rule on intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on
Special Proceedings.13

To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo. First, they prayed that
they be henceforth furnished "copies of all processes and orders issued" by the intestate court as well as the
pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with the said court.14 Second, they prayed that the intestate court set a
deadline for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and
upon submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the
appraisal of the fair market value of the same.15 Third, petitioners moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the
submission by the administrator of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her
examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation,
preservation and disposition of the estate.16

The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule on intervention. We can
readily agree with the Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
requires that an intervenor "has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or
an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property
in the custody of the court x x x" While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from
intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an
intervenor "must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant."17

Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily comes into
operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special
proceedings under the Rules of Court,18 not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that
"[i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable,
applicable to special proceedings."

We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not
extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of "intervention" under
Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.

Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of
Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before the RTC, and also now before us, do not square with their
recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance
with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the
right to intervene is not one of those reliefs.

To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn our focus to the Rules on
Special Proceedings.

In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle "any interested persons" or "any persons interested in
the estate" to participate in varying capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions
before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right of "any person interested" to oppose the
issuance of letters testamentary and to file a petition for administration;" (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the
giving of notice of hearing on the petition for letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and "to any other
persons believed to have interest in the estate;" (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a "person interested in the
estate" to petition for the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the
estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of
the decedent, or of evidence of the decedent’s title or interest therein;" (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires
notice of the time and place of the examination and allowance of the Administrator’s account "to persons interested;"
(6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested" before it may hear and
grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90,
which allows "any person interested in the estate" to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the
estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.

Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or implied, then they should
have filed their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the court
immediately after granting letters of administration and published by the administrator immediately after the issuance
of such notice.19 However, it appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his
actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall
within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86.20 These actions, being as
they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to
Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by its
administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case21 was already
pending review before this Court at the time of Benedicto’s death.

Evidently, the merits of petitioners’ claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases where they were
raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted, they
would have the right to enforce the judgment against the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may they be
allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings?

Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,22 and it does provide us with guidance on
how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance and
damages against respondents, and during a hearing of the case, learned that the same trial court was hearing the
intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended
his complaint to implead Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a verified claim-
in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that a co-administrator be appointed, the bond of
the administrator be increased, and that the intestate proceedings not be closed until the civil case had been
terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took cognizance of the pending civil case, the
administrator moved to close the intestate proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an
extrajudicial partition of the estate. The trial court refused to close the intestate proceedings pending the termination
of the civil case, and the Court affirmed such action.

If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to their desire to protect
their interests it appearing that the property in litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only property
of the estate left subject of administration and distribution; and the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil
case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a
far reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case No.
V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record its existence because
of the close interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess of its
jurisdiction.

Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending
determination of the separate civil action for the reason that there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of
administration proceedings until after the separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated,
cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or
personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person
or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or administrator." What practical value would
this provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply because the
heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule
is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of
the estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the
court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an
intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x x23 (Emphasis supplied)
[Citations omitted]

It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-in-intervention under the
Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can partake of the spirit behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the
Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: "[t]he rulings of this court have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding
for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests
are allowed to do so to protect the same, but not for a decision on their action."24

Petitioners’ interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable interests nonetheless.
We are mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also "any person interested" or
"persons interested in the estate" various specified capacities to protect their respective interests in the estate.
Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably
concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent would have already been
distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be enforced against it.

In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person interested in the
estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific
instances when such persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right
to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate
court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in
the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is under this
standard that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners.

The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in connection with the intestate
proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility
of such relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the developments in the intestate proceedings,
including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate
remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the
intestate court if property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed.

At the same time, the fact that petitioners’ interests remain inchoate and contingent counterbalances their ability to
participate in the intestate proceedings. We are mindful of respondent’s submission that if the Court were to entitle
petitioners with service of all processes and pleadings of the intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor,
whether contingent or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit
the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that would mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings
to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims, would unduly complicate and burden the
intestate proceedings, and would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of cases.

Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by this Court, with respect to the
petitioners herein, that addresses the core concern of petitioners to be apprised of developments in the intestate
proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,25 the Court heard a petition for mandamus filed by the same petitioners
herein against the RTC judge, praying that they be allowed access to the records of the intestate proceedings, which
the respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating that "the
records of every court of justice shall be public records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested
person x x x." The Court ruled that petitioners were "interested persons" entitled to access the court records in the
intestate proceedings. We said:

Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records to—monitor prompt compliance with the Rules governing
the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory
and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual accounting—appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the
complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the
settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x26

Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently
preferable precedent than mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the
interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules
will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather than entitling them to the service of
every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the
intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests
of the creditors in the estate are preserved.1awphi1

Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all "interested
parties" the petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be
given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and
allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the
executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3)
Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all,
even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the
petitioners.

We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the submission by administratrix
Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax
appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the
same; and that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administratrix of her verified annual
account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due
notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate. We cannot
grant said reliefs.

Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and
personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the
administrator to render an account of his administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or
of administration. We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty,
but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the
administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there
are protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims against
the estate.

Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy is to seek the
removal of the administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may seek
with the court the removal of the administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have
the personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of
sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to
fulfill such purpose.
All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as we have explained,
petitioners should not be deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this
decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons interested in the
intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such interested persons
in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No
pronouncements as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

__________________________________________________________________

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-63277. November 29, 1983.]

PETRA VDA. DE BORROMEO, Petitioner, v. HON. JULIAN B. POGOY, Municipality/City Trial Court of Cebu
City, and ATTY. RICARDO REYES, Respondents.

1. CIVIL LAW; ACTIONS FOR FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER; PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD; ACTION NOT
BARRED IN THE CASE AT BAR. — Under Article 1147 of the Civil Code, the period for filing actions for forcible
entry and detainer is one year, and this period is counted from demand to vacate the premises. (Desbarat v. Vda. de
Laureano, 18 SCRA 116, Calubayan v. Pascual, 21 SCRA 146, Development Bank of the Philippines v. Canonoy, 35
SCRA 197) In the case at bar, the letter-demand was dated August 28, 1982, while the complaint for ejectment was
filed in court on September 16, 1982. Between these two dates, less than a month had elapsed, thereby leaving at
least eleven (11) full months of the prescriptive period provided for in Article 1147 of the Civil Code. Under the
procedure outlined in Section 4 of PD 1508, the time needed for the conciliation proceeding before the Barangay
Chairman and the Pangkat should take no more than 60 days. Giving private respondent nine (9) months-ample time
indeed- within which to bring his case before the proper court should conciliation efforts fail. Thus, it cannot be
truthfully asserted, as private respondent would want Us to believe, that his case would be barred by the Statute of
Limitations if he had to course his action to the Barangay Lupon.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; SECTION 4 (A) OF P.D. No. 1508; CONSTRUED. — Under Section 4(a) of PD 1508, referral of
a dispute to the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties thereto are "individuals." An "individual" means "a
single human being as contrasted with a social group or institution." Obviously, the law applies only to cases involving
natural persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridical person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation
sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc.

3. ID.; JURIDICAL PERSON; REAL PARTY IN INTEREST; REFERRAL TO BARANGAY LUPON, NOT REQUIRED.
— In Civil Case No. R-239l5, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing in behalf of the Intestate
Estate of Vito Borromeo. while it is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the administrator of an
estate to sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended, it is
indisputable that the real party in interest in Civil Case No. R-23915 is the intestate estate under administration. Since
the said estate is a juridical person (Limjoco v. Intestate of Fragante, 80 Phil. 776) plaintiff administrator may file the
complaint directly in court, without the same being coursed to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration.

DECISION

ESCOLIN, J.:

Petitioner herein seeks to stop respondent Judge Julian B. Pogoy of the Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City from
taking cognizance of an ejectment suit for failure of the plaintiff to refer the dispute to the Barangay Lupon for
conciliation.

The intestate estate of the late Vito Borromeo is the owner of a building bearing the deceased’s name, located at F.
Ramos St., Cebu City. Said building has been leased and occupied by petitioner Petra Vda. de Borromeo at a
monthly rental of P500.00 payable in advance within the first five days of the month.

On August 28, 1982, private respondent Atty. Ricardo Reyes, administrator of the estate and a resident of Cebu City,
served upon petitioner a letter demanding that she pay the overdue rentals corresponding to the period from March to
September 1982, and thereafter to vacate the premises. As petitioner failed to do so, Atty. Reyes instituted on
September 16, 1982 an ejectment case against the former in the Municipal Trial Court of Cebu City. The complaint
was docketed as Civil Case No. R-23915 and assigned to the sala of respondent judge.

On November 12, 1982, petitioner moved to dismiss the case, advancing, among others, the want of jurisdiction of
the trial court. Pointing out that the parties are residents of the same city, as alleged in the complaint, petitioner
contended that the court could not exercise jurisdiction over the case for failure of respondent Atty. Reyes to refer the
dispute to the Barangay Court, as required by PD No. 1508, otherwise known as Katarungang Pambarangay Law.

Respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss. He justified the order in this wise:

"The Clerk of Court when this case was filed accepted for filing same. That from the acceptance from (sic) filing, with
the plaintiff having paid the docket fee to show that the case was docketed in the civil division of this court could be
considered as meeting the requirement or precondition for were it not so, the Clerk of Court would not have accepted
the filing of the case especially that there is a standing circular from the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court without
even mentioning the Letter of Instruction of the President of the Philippines that civil cases and criminal cases with
certain exceptions must not be filed without passing the barangay court." (Order dated December 14, 1982, Annex
"c", P. 13, Rollo).

Unable to secure a reconsideration of said order, petitioner came to this Court through this petition for certiorari. In
both his comment and memorandum, private respondent admitted not having availed himself of the barangay
conciliation process, but justified such omission by citing paragraph 4, section 6 of PD 1508 which allows the direct
filing of an action in court where the same may otherwise be barred by the Statute of Limitations, as applying to the
case at bar.

The excuse advanced by private respondent is unsatisfactory. Under Article 1147 of the Civil Code, the period for
filing actions for forcible entry and detainer is one year, 1 and this period is counted from demand to vacate the
premises. 2

In the case at bar, the letter-demand was dated August 28, 1982, while the complaint for ejectment was filed in court
on September 16, 1982. Between these two dates, less than a month had elapsed, thereby leaving at least eleven
(11) full months of the prescriptive period provided for in Article 1147 of the Civil Code. Under the procedure outlined
in Section 4 of PD 1508, 3 the time needed for the conciliation proceeding before the Barangay Chairman and the
Pangkat should take no more than 60 days. Giving private respondent nine (9) months — ample time indeed —
within which to bring his case before the proper court should conciliation efforts fail. Thus, it cannot be truthfully
asserted, as private respondent would want Us to believe, that his case would be barred by the Statute of Limitations
if he had to course his action to the Barangay Lupon.

With certain exceptions, PD 1508 makes the conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition precedent for filing
of actions in those instances where said law applies. For this reason, Circular No. 22 addressed to "ALL JUDGES OF
THE COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURTS, JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS
COURT, COURTS OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS, CITY COURTS, MUNICIPAL COURTS AND THEIR CLERKS OF
COURT" was issued by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando on November 9, 1979. Said Circular reads:

"Effective upon your receipt of the certification by the Minister of Local Government and Community Development
that all the barangays within your respective jurisdictions have organized their Lupons provided for in Presidential
Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, in implementation of the barangay
system of settlement of disputes, you are hereby directed to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or
proceedings in cases falling within the authority of said Lupons."

While respondent acknowledged said Circular in his order of December 14, 1982, he nevertheless chose to overlook
the failure of the complaint in Civil Case No. R-23915 to allege compliance with the requirement of PD 1508. Neither
did he cite any circumstance as would place the suit outside the operation of said law. Instead, he insisted on relying
upon the pro tanto presumption of regularity in the performance by the clerk of court of his official duty, which to Our
mind has been sufficiently overcome by the disclosure by the Clerk of Court that there was no certification to file
action from the Lupon or Pangkat secretary attached to the complaint.
Be that as it may, the instant petition should be dismissed. Under Section 4(a) of PD No. 1508, referral of a dispute to
the Barangay Lupon is required only where the parties thereto are "individuals." An "individual" means "a single
human being as contrasted with a social group or institution." 5 Obviously, the law applies only to cases involving
natural persons, and not where any of the parties is a juridical person such as a corporation, partnership, corporation
sole, testate or intestate, estate, etc.

In Civil Case No. R-23915, plaintiff Ricardo Reyes is a mere nominal party who is suing in behalf of the Intestate
Estate of Vito Borromeo. While it is true that Section 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court allows the administrator of an
estate to sue or be sued without joining the party for whose benefit the action is presented or defended, it is
indisputable that the real party in interest in Civil Case No. R-23915 is the intestate estate under administration. Since
the said estate is a juridical person 6 plaintiff administrator may file the complaint directly in court, without the same
being coursed to the Barangay Lupon for arbitration.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed. Respondent judge is ordered to try and decide Civil Case No. R-
23915 without unnecessary delay. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos and De Castro, JJ., concur.

Aquino J., concurs in the result.

__________________________________________________________________

G.R. No. 169144               January 26, 2011

IN RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RUPERTA PALAGANAS WITH
PRAYER FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR, MANUEL MIGUEL PALAGANAS and
BENJAMIN GREGORIO PALAGANAS, Petitioners,
vs.
ERNESTO PALAGANAS, Respondent.

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the probate before Philippine court of a will executed abroad by a foreigner although it has not
been probated in its place of execution.

The Facts and the Case

On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas (Ruperta), a Filipino who became a naturalized United States (U.S.)
citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California, she designated her brother,
Sergio C. Palaganas (Sergio), as the executor of her will for she had left properties in the Philippines and in the U.S.

On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas (Ernesto), another brother of Ruperta, filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special
administrator of her estate.1 On October 15, 2003, however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas (Manuel) and
Benjamin Gregorio Palaganas (Benjamin), nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s
will should not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that,
assuming Ruperta’s will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless for having been executed under
duress and without the testator’s full understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also
not qualified to act as administrator of the estate.

Meantime, since Ruperta’s foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on separate occasions in the
Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motion with the RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it
granted. On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not
Ruperta’s U.S. will may be probated in and allowed by a court in the Philippines.
On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an order:2 (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b) appointing respondent
Ernesto as special administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c)
issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto.

Aggrieved by the RTC’s order, petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals
(CA),3 arguing that an unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first
time in the Philippines.

On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision,4 affirming the assailed order of the RTC,5 holding that the RTC properly
allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent Ernesto’s submission of the authenticated copies of the
documents specified in the order and his posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the
Rules of Court does not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the country of its execution, before it can be
probated in the Philippines. The present case, said the CA, is different from reprobate, which refers to a will already
probated and allowed abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision,
Manuel and Benjamin came to this Court.

The Issue Presented

The key issue presented in this case is whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the
Philippines although it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was executed.

The Court’s Ruling

Petitioners Manuel and Benjamin maintain that wills executed by foreigners abroad must first be probated and
allowed in the country of its execution before it can be probated here. This, they claim, ensures prior compliance with
the legal formalities of the country of its execution. They insist that local courts can only allow probate of such wills if
the proponent proves that: (a) the testator has been admitted for probate in such foreign country, (b) the will has been
admitted to probate there under its laws, (c) the probate court has jurisdiction over the proceedings, (d) the law on
probate procedure in that foreign country and proof of compliance with the same, and (e) the legal requirements for
the valid execution of a will.

But our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet
been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our
jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the
Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country.6

In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the
settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the executor, devisee, or legatee named in
the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court
having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a)
the jurisdictional facts; (b) the names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or
decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the estate; (d) the name of the person for whom
letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having custody of it.
Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province
where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province.7 The
rules do not require proof that the foreign will has already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.

In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California, petitioners
Manuel and Benjamin obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But,
reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate
where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is specifically governed by Rule 77
of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot
be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the
foreign probate court provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.
Besides, petitioners’ stand is fraught with impractically.1âwphi1 If the instituted heirs do not have the means to go
abroad for the probate of the will, it is as good as depriving them outright of their inheritance, since our law requires
that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless the will has been proved and allowed by the proper
court.8

Notably, the assailed RTC order of June 17, 2004 is nothing more than an initial ruling that the court can take
cognizance of the petition for probate of Ruperta’s will and that, in the meantime, it was designating Ernesto as
special administrator of the estate. The parties have yet to present evidence of the due execution of the will, i.e. the
testator’s state of mind at the time of the execution and compliance with the formalities required of wills by the laws of
California. This explains the trial court’s directive for Ernesto to submit the duly authenticated copy of Ruperta’s will
and the certified copies of the Laws of Succession and Probate of Will of California.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CV 83564
dated July 29, 2005.

SO ORDERED.

________________________________________________________________

G.R. No. 128314      May 29, 2002

RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Rodolfo and Perico Jao were the only sons of the spouses Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea V. Jao, who died intestate
in 1988 and 1989, respectively. The decedents left real estate, cash, shares of stock and other personal properties.

On April 17, 1991, Perico instituted a petition for issuance of letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 99, over the estate of his parents, docketed as Special Proceedings No. Q-91-8507.1 Pending
the appointment of a regular administrator, Perico moved that he be appointed as special administrator. He alleged
that his brother, Rodolfo, was gradually dissipating the assets of the estate. More particularly, Rodolfo was receiving
rentals from real properties without rendering any accounting, and forcibly opening vaults belonging to their deceased
parents and disposing of the cash and valuables therein.

Rodolfo moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground of improper venue.2 He argued that the deceased
spouses did not reside in Quezon City either during their lifetime or at the time of their deaths. The decedent’s actual
residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga, where his late mother used to run and operate a bakery. As the health of
his parents deteriorated due to old age, they stayed in Rodolfo’s residence at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City,
solely for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment and hospitalization. Rodolfo submitted documentary evidence
previously executed by the decedents, consisting of income tax returns, voter’s affidavits, statements of assets and
liabilities, real estate tax payments, motor vehicle registration and passports, all indicating that their permanent
residence was in Angeles City, Pampanga.1âwphi1.nêt

In his opposition,3 Perico countered that their deceased parents actually resided in Rodolfo’s house in Quezon City at
the time of their deaths. As a matter of fact, it was conclusively declared in their death certificates that their last
residence before they died was at 61 Scout Gandia Street, Quezon City.4 Rodolfo himself even supplied the entry
appearing on the death certificate of their mother, Andrea, and affixed his own signature on the said document.

Rodolfo filed a rejoinder, stating that he gave the information regarding the decedents’ residence on the death
certificates in good faith and through honest mistake. He gave his residence only as reference, considering that their
parents were treated in their late years at the Medical City General Hospital in Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. Their stay
in his house was merely transitory, in the same way that they were taken at different times for the same purpose to
Perico’s residence at Legaspi Towers in Roxas Boulevard. The death certificates could not, therefore, be deemed
conclusive evidence of the decedents’ residence in light of the other documents showing otherwise.5
The court required the parties to submit their respective nominees for the position.6 Both failed to comply, whereupon
the trial court ordered that the petition be archived.7

Subsequently, Perico moved that the intestate proceedings be revived.8 After the parties submitted the names of their
respective nominees, the trial court designated Justice Carlos L. Sundiam as special administrator of the estate of
Ignacio Jao Tayag and Andrea Jao.9

On April 6, 1994, the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Rodolfo was denied, to wit:

A mere perusal of the death certificates of the spouses issued separately in 1988 and 1989, respectively,
confirm the fact that Quezon City was the last place of residence of the decedents. Surprisingly, the entries
appearing on the death certificate of Andrea V. Jao were supplied by movant, Rodolfo V. Jao, whose
signature appears in said document. Movant, therefore, cannot disown his own representation by taking an
inconsistent position other than his own admission. xxx xxx xxx.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, this court DENIES for lack of merit movant’s motion to
dismiss.

SO ORDERED.10

Rodolfo filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 35908. On
December 11, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, no error, much less any grave abuse of discretion of the court a quo having been shown, the
petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned order of the respondent Judge is affirmed in
toto.

SO ORDERED.11

Rodolfo’s motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in the assailed resolution dated February
17, 1997.12 Hence, this petition for review, anchored on the following grounds:

RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD

WITH THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY
RENDERED BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.

II

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE RULING OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN

THE CASE OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO, 100 PHILS. 593, WHICH CLEARLY INTERPRETED WHAT IS
MEANT BY RESIDENCE IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

III

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN A PLACE AT THE TIME
OF DEATH IS DETERMINATIVE OF DECEDENT’S RESIDENCE RATHER THAN THE INTENTION OF
THE DECEDENTS TO ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANOTHER PLACE.

IV

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING BY ANALOGY THE RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN

SEC. 2 OF RULE 4 FOR THE PURPOSE OF SERVING SUMMONS TO A DEFENDANT IN A PERSONAL
ACTION TO THE RESIDENCE CONTEMPLATED IN SEC. 1 OF RULE 73 FOR THE PURPOSE OF
DETERMINING VENUE IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED.
 V

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN GIVING MORE WEIGHT TO THE ENTRY OF PETITIONER AND
PRIVATE RESPONDENT IN THE RESPECTIVE DEATH CERTIFICATES OF THE DECEDENTS RATHER
THAN THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE SHOWING THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE DECEDENTS TO
ESTABLISH THEIR PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.

VI

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN APPLYING THE PRINCIPLE OF ESTOPPEL AS AGAINST

PETITIONER WHICH CAN NOT BE MORE PERSUASIVE THAN THE CLEAR INTENTION OF THE
DECEDENTS THEMSELVES TO ESTABLISH PERMANENT RESIDENCE IN ANGELES CITY.

VII

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DESPITE THE
CLEAR ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT IN INSISTING TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF SP. PROCEEDING NO. Q-91-8507. 13

The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had --- in Pampanga, where the decedents
had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City, where they actually stayed before their demise?

Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Where estate of deceased persons be settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time
of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and
his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he
had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or
proceeding, except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears
on the record. (underscoring ours)

Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration granted in the proper
court located in the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.

Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et al.,14 where we held that the situs of
settlement proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had his permanent residence or domicile at the time of
death. In determining residence at the time of death, the following factors must be considered, namely, the decedent
had: (a) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen; and (c) intention to
stay therein permanently.15 While it appears that the decedents in this case chose to be physically present in Quezon
City for medical convenience, petitioner avers that they never adopted Quezon City as their permanent
residence.1âwphi1.nêt

The contention lacks merit.

The facts in Eusebio  were different from those in the case at bar. The decedent therein, Andres Eusebio, passed
away while in the process of transferring his personal belongings to a house in Quezon City. He was then suffering
from a heart ailment and was advised by his doctor/son to purchase a Quezon City residence, which was nearer to
his doctor. While he was able to acquire a house in Quezon City, Eusebio died even before he could move therein. In
said case, we ruled that Eusebio retained his domicile --- and hence, residence --- in San Fernando, Pampanga. It
cannot be said that Eusebio changed his residence because, strictly speaking, his physical presence in Quezon City
was just temporary.

In the case at bar, there is substantial proof that the decedents have transferred to petitioner’s Quezon City
residence. Petitioner failed to sufficiently refute respondent’s assertion that their elderly parents stayed in his house
for some three to four years before they died in the late 1980s.
Furthermore, the decedents’ respective death certificates state that they were both residents of Quezon City at the
time of their demise. Significantly, it was petitioner himself who filled up his late mother’s death certificate. To our
mind, this unqualifiedly shows that at that time, at least, petitioner recognized his deceased mother’s residence to be
Quezon City. Moreover, petitioner failed to contest the entry in Ignacio’s death certificate, accomplished a year earlier
by respondent.

The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were thus properly considered and presumed
to be correct by the court a quo. We agree with the appellate court’s observation that since the death certificates were
accomplished even before petitioner and respondent quarreled over their inheritance, they may be relied upon to
reflect the true situation at the time of their parents’ death.

The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents’ residence at the time of death, over the numerous
documentary evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure, the documents presented by petitioner pertained not
to  residence at the time of death, as required by the Rules of Court, but to permanent residence or domicile.
In Garcia-Fule v. Court of Appeals,16 we held:

xxx xxx xxx the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal
residence or domicile." This term "resides", like the terms "residing" and "residence", is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application
of venue statutes and rules – Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature –
residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still
it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the
terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides"
should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of
a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal
residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular
length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.17

Both the settlement court and the Court of Appeals found that the decedents have been living with petitioner at the
time of their deaths and for some time prior thereto. We find this conclusion to be substantiated by the evidence on
record. A close perusal of the challenged decision shows that, contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the court below
considered not only the decedents’ physical presence in Quezon City, but also other factors indicating that the
decedents’ stay therein was more than temporary. In the absence of any substantial showing that the lower courts’
factual findings stemmed from an erroneous apprehension of the evidence presented, the same must be held to be
conclusive and binding upon this Court.

Petitioner strains to differentiate between the venue provisions found in Rule 4, Section 2,18 on ordinary civil actions,
and Rule 73, Section 1, which applies specifically to settlement proceedings. He argues that while venue in the
former understandably refers to actual physical residence for the purpose of serving summons, it is the permanent
residence of the decedent which is significant in Rule 73, Section 1. Petitioner insists that venue for the settlement of
estates can only refer to permanent residence or domicile because it is the place where the records of the properties
are kept and where most of the decedents’ properties are located.

Petitioner’s argument fails to persuade.

It does not necessarily follow that the records of a person’s properties are kept in the place where he permanently
resides. Neither can it be presumed that a person’s properties can be found mostly in the place where he establishes
his domicile. It may be that he has his domicile in a place different from that where he keeps his records, or where he
maintains extensive personal and business interests. No generalizations can thus be formulated on the matter, as the
question of where to keep records or retain properties is entirely dependent upon an individual’s choice and
peculiarities.

At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates between venue in ordinary civil actions and
venue in special proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of Appeals19 and Bejer v. Court of Appeals,20 we ruled that venue
for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined,
"residence", in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of
abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.21 All told, the lower court and the Court of
Appeals correctly held that venue for the settlement of the decedents’ intestate estate was properly laid in the
Quezon City court.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 35908 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

__________________________________________________________________

G.R. No. 189121               July 31, 2013

AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,

vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing
the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
88589,1 the decretal portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005,
and the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City are AFFIRMED in toto.2

The Facts

This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein
respondents who are Eliseo’s common-law wife and daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners Amelia
Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth Quiazon (Jenneth)
and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).

Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.

On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon (Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen
(Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City.3 In her
Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived
and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of
Eliseo and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was
bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence of the latter’s marriage with one Filipito Sandico
(Filipito). To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others, attached to the Petition for Letters of
Administration her Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In the same petition, it was alleged that
Eliseo left real properties worth ₱2,040,000.00 and personal properties worth ₱2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the
estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late
father’s estate.

Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid, Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer,
opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners
asserted that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City, at
the time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of
decedent’s estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and not in Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of
improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed
administratix of Eliseo’s estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting
the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of the petition was properly laid in Las Piñas City, thereby
discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseo’s last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The
dispositive of the RTC decision reads:

Having attained legal age at this time and there being no showing of any disqualification or incompetence to serve as
administrator, let letters of administration over the estate of the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to
petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by this Court of a bond in the amount of ₱100,000.00 to be
posted by her.9

On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto in the 28 November 2008 Decision10 rendered by the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise
was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at
No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992.
For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion
reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration
was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August 2009.

The Issues

The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution on the following
grounds:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A
RESIDENT OF LAS PIÑAS AND THEREFORE, THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
WAS PROPERLY FILED WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIÑAS;

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON
WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING MARRIAGE; AND

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT SHOWN
ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. 12

The Court’s Ruling

We find the petition bereft of merit.

Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent
should be filed in the RTC of the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death:

Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. – If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of
his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the province in which he resides at the time of his
death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court of any
province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on
the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding,
except in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
(Emphasis supplied).

The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This
term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object
or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules – Section 1,
Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature – residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor.13 Even where the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally
used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant."15 In
other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.16 It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay
thereat.17 Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and the same meaning.18 As thus
defined, "residence," in the context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or
place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.19

Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the RTC
that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo was properly laid in Las Piñas City. It is evident from the
records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City. For
this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be laid in the said city.

In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseo’s Death Certificate that
he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his estate should be settled. While the recitals in death certificates
can be considered proofs of a decedent’s residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof, however, is not
binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with Lourdes,
deporting themselves as husband and wife, from 1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is consistent
with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to the
extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the courts of law renders untenable petitioners’ position that
Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children. It disproves rather than supports
petitioners’ submission that the lower courts’ findings arose from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on
record. Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and
binding upon this Court.21

Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners’ contention that the Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelia’s marriage to
Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source
of rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned
even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.22 It must be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of
the marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in
Niñal v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at hand. In Niñal, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed
therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of nullity of their father’s marriage to therein respondent after the
death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from voidable marriages, to wit:

Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their
offspring will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That is why the action or defense for nullity is
imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can
assail it but any proper interested party may attack a void marriage.24

It was emphasized in Niñal that in a void marriage, no marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of rights,
such that any interested party may attack the marriage directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be filed
even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage.25

Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s
marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage
may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as
a compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and
Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action.

Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseo’s marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to determine whether or
not the decedent’s marriage to Amelia is void for being bigamous.

Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and Filipito
was sufficiently established by no less than the Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and signed by
the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate is a
competent evidence of marriage and the certification from the National Archive that no information relative to the said
marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the
first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus, the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be
found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is not completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of
any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the
inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27

Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the
Petition for Letters of Administration.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of
letters of administration, thus:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the
death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the
court may select.

Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an
interested person, thus:

Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the
decedent;

(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.

An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who
has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those
whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.28

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is
deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation
to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a
desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir,
who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the debts of the estate are satisfied.29 Having a vested right in
the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested
party within the purview of the law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August 2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

________________________________________________________________ 

G.R. No. L-24742 October 26, 1973

ROSA CAYETANO CUENCO, petitioners,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DIVISION, MANUEL CUENCO, LOURDES CUENCO,
CONCEPCION CUENCO MANGUERRA, CARMEN CUENCO, CONSUELO CUENCO REYES, and TERESITA
CUENCO GONZALEZ, respondents.

Ambrosio Padilla Law Office for petitioner.

Jalandoni and Jamir for respondents.

TEEHANKEE, J.:

Petition for certiorari to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 34104-R, promulgated 21
November 1964, and its subsequent Resolution promulgated 8 July 1964 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration.

The pertinent facts which gave rise to the herein petition follow:

On 25 February 1964 Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died at the Manila Doctors' Hospital, Manila. He was survived
by his widow, the herein petitioner, and their two (2) minor sons, Mariano Jesus, Jr. and Jesus Salvador, both
surnamed Cuenco, all residing at 69 Pi y Margal St., Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and by his children of the first
marriage, respondents herein, namely, Manuel Cuenco, Lourdes Cuenco, Concepcion Cuenco Manguera, Carmen
Cuenco, Consuelo Cuenco Reyes and Teresita Cuenco Gonzales, all of legal age and residing in Cebu.

On 5 March 1964, (the 9th day after the death of the late Senator)1 respondent Lourdes Cuenco filed a Petition for
Letters of Administration with the court of first instance of Cebu (Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R), alleging among other things,
that the late senator died intestate in Manila on 25 February 1964; that he was a resident of Cebu at the time of his
death; and that he left real and personal properties in Cebu and Quezon City. On the same date, the Cebu court
issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 10 April 1964, directing that due notice be given to all the heirs and
interested persons, and ordering the requisite publication thereof at LA PRENSA, a newspaper of general circulation
in the City and Province of Cebu.

The aforesaid order, however, was later suspended and cancelled and a new and modified one released on 13
March 1964, in view of the fact that the petition was to be heard at Branch II instead of Branch I of the said Cebu
court. On the same date, a third order was further issued stating that respondent Lourdes Cuenco's petition for the
appointment of a special administrator dated 4 March 1964 was not yet ready for the consideration of the said court,
giving as reasons the following:

It will be  premature for this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to
try this proceeding, the requisite publication of the notice of hearing not yet having been complied
with. Moreover, copies of the petition have not been served on all of the heirs specified in the basic
petition for the issuance of letters of administration.2

In the meantime, or specifically on 12 March 1964, (a week after the filing of the Cebu petition) herein petitioner Rosa
Cayetano Cuenco filed a petition with the court of first instance of Rizal (Quezon City) for the  probate of the
deceased's last will and testament and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor, as the surviving widow
and executrix in the said last will and testament. The said proceeding was docketed as Special Proceeding No. Q-
7898.
Having learned of the intestate proceeding in the Cebu court, petitioner Rosa Cayetano Cuenco filed in said Cebu
court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 30 March 1964, as well as an Opposition to Petition for
Appointment of Special Administrator, dated 8 April 1964. On 10 April 1964, the Cebu court issued an order holding
in abeyance its resolution on petitioner's motion to dismiss "until after the Court of First Instance of Quezon City shall
have acted on the petition for probate of that document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased
Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco."3 Such order of the Cebu court deferring to the  probate proceedings in the Quezon City
court was neither excepted to nor sought by respondents to be reconsidered or set aside by the Cebu court nor did
they challenge the same by certiorari or prohibition proceedings in the appellate courts.

Instead, respondents filed in the Quezon City court an Opposition and Motion to Dismiss, dated 10 April
1964, opposing probate of the will and assailing the jurisdiction of the said Quezon City court to entertain petitioner's
petition for probate and for appointment as executrix in Sp. Proc. No. Q-7898 in view of the alleged exclusive
jurisdiction vested by her petition in the Cebu court in Sp. Proc. No. 2433-R. Said respondent prayed that Sp. Proc.
No. Q-7898 be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and/or improper venue.

In its order of 11 April 1964, the Quezon City court denied the motion to dismiss, giving as a principal reason the
"precedence of probate proceeding over an intestate proceeding."4 The said court further found in said order that
the residence of the late senator at the time of his death was at No. 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City.
The pertinent portion of said order follows:

On the question of residence of the decedent, paragraph 5 of the opposition and motion to dismiss
reads as follows: "that since the decedent Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco was a resident of the City of
Cebu at the time of his death, the aforesaid petition filed by Rosa Cayetano Cuenco on 12 March
1964 was not filed with the proper Court (wrong venue) in view of the provisions of Section 1 of
Rule 73 of the New Rules of Court ...". From the aforequoted allegation, the Court is made to
understand that the oppositors do not mean to say that the decedent being a resident of Cebu City
when he died, the intestate proceedings in Cebu City should prevail over the probate proceedings
in Quezon City, because as stated above the probate of the will should take precedence, but that
the probate proceedings should be filed in the Cebu City Court of First Instance. If the last
proposition is the desire of the oppositors as understood by this Court, that could not also be
entertained as proper because paragraph 1 of the petition for the probate of the will indicates
that Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco at the time of his death was a resident of Quezon City at 69 Pi y
Margal. Annex A (Last Will and Testament of Mariano Jesus Cuenco) of the petition for probate of
the will shows that the decedent at the time when he executed his Last Will clearly stated that he is
a resident of 69 Pi y Margal, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, and also of the City of Cebu. He
made the former as his first choice and the latter as his second choice of residence." If a party has
two residences, the one will be deemed or presumed to his domicile which he himself selects or
considers to be his home or which appears to be the center of his affairs. The petitioner, in thus
filing the instant petition before this Court, follows the first choice of residence of the decedent and
once this court acquires jurisdiction of the probate proceeding it is to the exclusion of all others.5

Respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion for reconsideration of the Quezon City court's said order of 11 April 1964
asserting its exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceeding as deferred to by the Cebu court was denied on 27
April 1964 and a second motion for reconsideration dated 20 May 1964 was likewise denied.

On 11 May 1964, pursuant to its earlier order of 11 April 1964, the hearing for probate of the last will of the decedent
was called three times at half-hour intervals, but notwithstanding due notification none of the oppositors appeared
and the Quezon City court proceeded at 9:00 a.m. with the hearing in their absence.

As per the order issued by it subsequently on 15 May 1964, the Quezon City court noted that respondents-oppositors
had opposed probate under their opposition and motion to dismiss on the following grounds:

(a) That the will was not executed and attested as required by law;

(b) That the will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the
beneficiary or some other persons for his benefit;
 (c) That the testator's signature was procured by fraud and/or that the testator acted by mistake
and did not intend that the instrument he signed should be his will at the time he affixed his
signature thereto.6

The Quezon City court further noted that the requisite publication of the notice of the hearing had been duly complied
with and that all the heirs had been duly notified of the hearing, and after receiving the testimony of the three
instrumental witnesses to the decedent's last will, namely Atty. Florencio Albino, Dr. Guillermo A. Picache and Dr.
Jose P. Ojeda, and of the notary public, Atty. Braulio A. Arriola, Jr., who ratified the said last will, and the
documentary evidence (such as the decedent's residence certificates, income tax return, diplomatic passport, deed of
donation) all indicating that the decedent was a resident of 69 Pi y Margal St., Quezon City, as also affirmed by him in
his last will, the Quezon City court in its said order of 15 May 1964 admitted to probate the late senator's last will and
testament as having been "freely and voluntarily executed by the testator" and "with all formalities of the law" and
appointed petitioner-widow as executrix of his estate without bond "following the desire of the testator" in his will as
probated.

Instead of appealing from the Quezon City court's said order admitting the will to probate and naming petitioner-
widow as executrix thereof, respondents filed a special civil action of certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction with respondent Court of Appeals (docketed as case CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) to bar the Rizal court from
proceeding with case No. Q-7898.

On 21 November 1964, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of respondents (petitioners therein) and
against the herein petitioner, holding that:

Section 1, Rule 73, which fixes the venue in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person, covers both testate and intestate proceedings. Sp. Proc. 2433-R of the Cebu CFI
having been filed ahead, it is that court whose jurisdiction was first invoked and which first
attached. It is that court which can properly and exclusively pass upon the factual issues of (1)
whether the decedent left or did not leave a valid will, and (2) whether or not the decedent was a
resident of Cebu at the time of his death.

Considering therefore that the first proceeding was instituted in the Cebu CFI (Special Proceeding
2433-R), it follows that the said court must exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the Rizal CFI, in
which the petition for probate was filed by the respondent Rosa Cayetano Cuenco (Special
Proceeding Q-7898). The said respondent should assert her rights within the framework of the
proceeding in the Cebu CFI, instead of invoking the jurisdiction of another court.

The respondents try to make capital of the fact that on March 13, 1964, Judge Amador Gomez of
the Cebu CFI, acting in Sp. Proc. 2433-R, stated that the petition for appointment of special
administrator was "not yet ready for the consideration of the Court today. It would be premature for
this Court to act thereon, it not having yet regularly acquired jurisdiction to try this proceeding ... . "
It is sufficient to state in this connection that the said judge was certainly not referring to the court's
jurisdiction over the res, not to jurisdiction itself which is acquired from the moment a petition is
filed, but only to the exercise of jurisdiction in relation to the stage of the proceedings. At all events,
jurisdiction is conferred and determined by law and does not depend on the pronouncements of a
trial judge.

The dispositive part of respondent appellate court's judgment provided as follows:

ACCORDINGLY, the writ of prohibition will issue, commanding and directing the respondent Court
of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IX, Quezon City, and the respondent Judge Damaso B. Tengco to
refrain perpetually from proceeding and taking any action in Special Proceeding Q-7898 pending
before the said respondent court. All orders heretofore issued and actions heretofore taken by said
respondent court and respondent Judge, therein and connected therewith, are hereby annulled.
The writ of injunction heretofore issued is hereby made permanent. No pronouncement as to costs.

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a resolution of respondent Court of Appeals, dated 8 July 1965;
hence the herein petition for review on certiorari.
The principal and decisive issue at bar is, theretofore, whether the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of
prohibition against the Quezon City court ordering it to refrain perpetually from proceeding with
the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate
of the decedent's last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond in
compliance with the testator's express wish in his testament. This issue is tied up with the issue submitted to the
appellate court, to wit, whether the Quezon City court acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings filed with it, in pursuance of the
Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate
proceedings that it (the Quezon City court) should first act "on the petition for probate of the document purporting to
be the last will and testament of the deceased Don Mariano Jesus Cuenco" - which order of the Cebu court
respondents never questioned nor challenged by prohibition or certiorari proceedings and thus enabled the Quezon
City court to proceed without any impediment or obstruction, once it denied respondent Lourdes Cuenco's motion to
dismiss the probate proceeding for alleged lack of jurisdiction or improper venue, to  proceed with the hearing of the
petition and to admit the will to probate upon having been satisfied as to its due execution and authenticity.

The Court finds under the above-cited facts that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition
against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its
orders and actions, particularly its admission to probate of the deceased's last will and testament and appointing
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's express wish, for the following
considerations: —

1. The Judiciary Act7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First Instance over "all matter of
probate, both of testate and intestate estates." On the other hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays down
the rule of venue, as the very caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict among the different courts
which otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that "the court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts." The cited Rule provides:

Section 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters
of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the Province in
which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of
First Instance of the province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of
the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence, of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in
an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on
the record. (Rule 73)8

It is equally conceded that the residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction
over the subject matter but merely of venue. This was lucidly stated by the late Chief Justice Moran in Sy Oa vs. Co
Ho9 as follows:

We are not unaware of existing decisions to the effect that in probate cases the place of residence
of the deceased is regarded as a question of jurisdiction over the subject-matter. But we decline to
follow this view because of its mischievous consequences. For instance, a probate case has been
submitted in good faith to the Court of First Instance of a province where the deceased had not
resided. All the parties, however, including all the creditors, have submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court and the case is therein completely finished except for a claim of a creditor
who also voluntarily filed it with said court but on appeal from an adverse decision raises for the
first time in this Court the question of jurisdiction of the trial court for lack of residence of the
deceased in the province. If we consider such question of residence as one affecting the
jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter, the effect shall be that the whole
proceedings including all decisions on the different incidents which have arisen in court will have to
be annulled and the same case will have to be commenced anew before another court of the same
rank in another province. That this is of mischievous effect in the  prompt administration of justice is
too obvious to require comment. (Cf. Tanunchuan vs. Dy Buncio & Co., G.R. No. 48206, December
31, 1942) Furthermore, section 600 of Act No. 190, 10 providing that the estate of a deceased
person shall be settled in the province where he had last resided, could not have been intended as
defining the jurisdiction of the probate court over the subject-matter, because such legal provision
 is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters, and, as we have said
time and again, procedure is one thing and jurisdiction over the subject matter is another.
(Attorney-General vs. Manila Railroad Company, 20 Phil. 523.) The law of jurisdiction — Act No.
136, 11 Section 56, No. 5 — confers upon Courts of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases
independently of the place of residence of the deceased. Since, however, there are many courts of
First Instance in the Philippines, the Law of Procedure, Act No. 190, section 600, fixes the venue or
the place where each case shall be brought. Thus, the place of residence of the deceased is not an
element of jurisdiction over the subject-matter but merely of venue. And it is upon this ground that
in the new Rules of Court the province where the estate of a deceased person shall be settled is
properly called "venue".

It should be noted that the Rule on venue does not state that the court with whom the estate or intestate petition
is first filed acquires exclusive jurisdiction.

The Rule precisely and deliberately provides that "the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a
decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts."

A fair reading of the Rule — since it deals with venue and comity between courts of equal and co-ordinate jurisdiction
— indicates that the court with whom the petition is first filed, must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the
estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.

Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent's last will has been presented
in another court where the decedent obviously had his conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and
their minor children, and that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent
died intestate may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition before it in
abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition for probate of the decedent's alleged
last will.

2. This exactly what the Cebu court did. Upon petitioner-widow's filing with it a motion to dismiss Lourdes' intestate
petition, it issued its order holding in abeyance its action on the dismissal motion and deferred to the Quezon City
court, awaiting its action on the petition for probate before that court. Implicit in the Cebu court's order was that if the
will was duly admitted to probate, by the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of
Lourdes' intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the exercise of
jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts. Likewise by its act of deference, the Cebu
court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve the question between the parties whether the decedent's residence at
the time of his death was in Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed by
respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline to take cognizance of the intestate petition before it
and instead defer to the Quezon City court, unless the latter would make a negative finding as to the  probate petition
and the residence of the decedent within its territory and venue.

3. Under these facts, the Cebu court could not be held to have acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
jurisdiction in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and deferring to the Quezon City court.

Necessarily, neither could the Quezon City court be deemed to have acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of
and acting on the probate petition since under Rule 73, section 1, the Cebu court must first take cognizance over the
estate of the decedent and must exercise jurisdiction to exclude all other courts, which the Cebu court declined to do.
Furthermore, as is undisputed, said rule only lays down a rule of venue and the Quezon City court indisputably had at
least equal and coordinate jurisdiction over the estate.

Since the Quezon City court took cognizance over the  probate petition before it and assumed jurisdiction over the
estate, with the consent and deference of the Cebu court, the Quezon City court should be left now, by the same rule
of venue of said Rule 73, to exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

Under the facts of the case and where respondents submitted to the Quezon City court their opposition to probate of
the will, but failed to appear at the scheduled hearing despite due notice, the Quezon City court cannot be declared,
as the appellate court did, to have acted without jurisdiction in admitting to probate the decedent's will and appointing
petitioner-widow as executrix thereof in accordance with the testator's testamentary disposition.
4. The relatively recent case of Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental 12 with facts analogous to the
present case 13 is authority against respondent appellate court's questioned decision.

In said case, the Court upheld the doctrine of precedence of probate proceedings over intestate proceedings in this
wise:

It can not be denied that a special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a
deceased person, whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance
with his will, is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true,
however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for
the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for
the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings
pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a last will, proceedings
for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that state an
administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn
over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This however, is
understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved,
the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that
proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. 14

The Court likewise therein upheld the jurisdiction of the second court, (in this case, the Quezon City court) although
opining that certain considerations therein "would seem to support the view that [therein respondent] should have
submitted said will for probate to the Negros Court, [in this case, the Cebu court] either in a separate special
proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose filed in the already pending Special Proceeding No.
6344," 15 thus:

But the fact is that instead of the aforesaid will being presented for probate to the Negros Court, Juan Uriarte
Zamacona filed the petition for the purpose with the Manila Court. We can not accept petitioner's contention in this
regard that the latter court had no jurisdiction to consider said petition, albeit we say that it was not the proper
venue therefor.

It is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect, and, in
the light of the circumstances obtaining in the instant case, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that
petitioner has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so by laches. It is
enough to consider in this connection that petitioner knew of the existence of a will executed by
Juan Uriarte y Goite since December 19, 1961 when Higinio Uriarte filed his opposition to the initial
petition filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344; that petitioner likewise was served with notice of the
existence (presence) of the alleged last will in the Philippines and of the filing of the petition for its
probate with the Manila Court since August 28, 1962 when Juan Uriarte Zamacona filed a motion
for the dismissal of Special Proceeding No. 6344. All these notwithstanding, it was only on April 15,
1963 that he filed with the Manila Court in Special Proceeding No. 51396 an Omnibus motion
asking for leave to intervene and for the dismissal and annulment of all the proceedings had therein
up to that date; thus enabling the Manila Court not only to appoint an administrator with the will
annexed but also to admit said will to probate more than five months earlier, or more specifically,
on October 31, 1962. To allow him now to assail the exercise of jurisdiction over the probate of the
will by the Manila Court and the validity of all the proceedings had in Special Proceeding No. 51396
would put a premium on his negligence. Moreover, it must be remembered that this Court is not
inclined to annul proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper
venue therefor, if the net result would be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other
court of similar jurisdiction; more so in a case like the present where the objection against said
proceedings is raised too late. 16

5. Under Rule 73, section 1 itself, the Quezon City court's assumption of jurisdiction over the decedent's estate on the
basis of the will duly presented for probate by petitioner-widow and finding that Quezon City was the
first choice of residence of the decedent, who had his conjugal home and domicile therein — with the deference in
comity duly given by the Cebu court — could not be contested except by appeal from said court in the original case.
The last paragraph of said Rule expressly provides:

... The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in
 an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the
record. (Rule 73)

The exception therein given, viz, "when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record" could probably be properly
invoked, had such deference in comity of the Cebu court to the Quezon City court not appeared in the record, or had
the record otherwise shown that the Cebu court had taken cognizance of the petition before it and assumed
jurisdiction.

6. On the question that Quezon City established to be the residence of the late senator, the appellate court while
recognizing that "the issue is a legitimate one" held in reliance on Borja vs. Tan  17 that.

... The issue of residence comes within the competence of whichever court is considered to prevail
in the exercise jurisdiction - in this case, the Court of First Instance of Cebu as held by this Court.
Parenthetically, we note that the question of the residence of the deceased is a serious one,
requiring both factual and legal resolution on the basis of ample evidence to be submitted in the
ordinary course of procedure in the first instance, particularly in view of the fact that the deceased
was better known as the Senator from Cebu and the will purporting to be his also gives Cebu,
besides Quezon City, as his residence. We reiterate that this matter requires airing in the proper
court, as so indicated in the leading and controlling case of Borja vs. Hon. Bienvenido Tan, et al.,
G.R. L-7792, July 27, 1955.

In the case at bar, however, the Cebu court declined to take cognizance of the intestate petition first filed with it and
deferred to the testate proceedings filed with the Quezon City court and in effect asked the Quezon City court to
determine the residence of the decedent and whether he did leave a last will and testament upon which would
depend the proper venue of the estate proceedings, Cebu or Quezon City. The Quezon City court having thus
determined in effect for both courts — at the behest and with the deference and consent of the Cebu court —
that Quezon City was the actual residence of the decedent who died testate and therefore the  proper venue, the
Borja ruling would seem to have no applicability. It would not serve the practical ends of justice to still require the
Cebu court, if the Borja ruling is to be held applicable and as indicated in the decision under review, to determine for
itself the actual residence of the decedent (when the Quezon City court had already so determined Quezon City as
the actual residence at the Cebu court's behest and respondents have not seriously questioned this factual finding
based on documentary evidence) and if the Cebu court should likewise determine Quezon City as the actual
residence, or its contrary finding reversed on appeal, only then to allow petitioner-widow after years of waiting and
inaction to institute the corresponding proceedings in Quezon City.

7. With more reason should the Quezon City proceedings be upheld when it is taken into consideration that Rule 76,
section 2 requires that the petition for allowance of a will must show: "(a) the jurisdictional facts." Such "jurisdictional
facts" in probate proceedings, as held by the Court in Fernando vs. Crisostomo 18 " are the death of the decedent, his
residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a
foreign country, his having left his estate in such province."

This tallies with the established legal concept as restated by Moran that "(T)he probate of a will is a proceeding in
rem. The notice by publication as a pre-requisite to the allowance of a will, is a constructive notice to the whole world,
and when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State. The
probate of a will by a court having jurisdiction thereof is conclusive as to its due execution and validity." 19 The
Quezon City court acted regularly within its jurisdiction (even if it were to be conceded that Quezon City was not the
proper venue notwithstanding the Cebu court's giving way and deferring to it,) in admitting the decedent's last will to
probate and naming petitioner-widow as executrix thereof. Hence, the Quezon city court's action should not be set
aside by a writ of prohibition for supposed lack of jurisdiction as per the appellate court's appealed decision, and
should instead be sustained in line with Uriarte, supra, where the Court, in dismissing the certiorari petition
challenging the Manila court's action admitting the decedent's will to probate and distributing the estate in accordance
therewith in the second proceeding, held that "it must be remembered that this Court is not inclined to annul
proceedings regularly had in a lower court even if the latter was not the proper venue therefor, if the net result would
be to have the same proceedings repeated in some other court of similar jurisdiction." As stressed by Chief Justice
Moran in Sy Oa, supra, "the mischievous effect in the administration of justice" of considering the question
of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over
again the same proceedings before another court of the same rank in another province "is too obvious to require
comment."
8. If the question of jurisdiction were to be made to depend only on who of the decedent's relatives gets first to file a
petition for settlement of the decedent's estate, then the established jurisprudence of the Court that Rule 73, section 1
provides only a rule of venue in order to preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing
so and creating conflicts between them to the detriment of the administration of justice, and that venue is waivable,
would be set at naught. As between relatives who unfortunately do not see eye to eye, it would be converted into a
race as to who can file the petition faster in the court of his/her choice regardless of whether the decedent is still
in cuerpo presente and in disregard of the decedent's actual last domicile, the fact that he left a last will and
testament and the right of his surviving widow named as executrix thereof. Such dire consequences were certainly
not intended by the Rule nor would they be in consonance with public policy and the orderly administration of justice.

9. It would finally be unjust and inequitable that petitioner-widow, who under all the applicable rules of venue, and
despite the fact that the Cebu court (where respondent Lourdes Cuenco had filed an intestate petition in the Cebu
court earlier by a week's time on 5 March 1964) deferred to the Quezon City court where petitioner had within fifteen
days (on March 12, 1964) after the decedent's death (on February 25, 1964) timely filed the decedent's last will and
petitioned for letters testamentary and is admittedly entitled to  preference in the administration of her husband's
estate, 20 would be compelled under the appealed decision to have to go all the way to Cebu and submit anew the
decedent's will there for probate either in a new proceeding or by asking that the intestate proceedings
be converted into a testate proceeding — when under the Rules, the proper venue for the testate proceedings, as per
the facts of record and as already affirmed by the Quezon City court is Quezon City, where the decedent and
petitioner-widow had their conjugal domicile.

It would be an unfair imposition upon petitioner as the one named and entitled to be executrix of the decedent's last
will and settle his estate in accordance therewith, and a disregard of her rights under the rule on venue and the law
on jurisdiction to require her to spend much more time, money and effort to have to go from Quezon City to the Cebu
court everytime she has an important matter of the estate to take up with the probate court.

It would doubly be an unfair imposition when it is considered that under Rule 73, section 2, 21 since petitioner's
marriage has been dissolved with the death of her husband, their community property and conjugal estate have to
be administered and liquidated in the estate proceedings of the deceased spouse. Under the appealed decision,
notwithstanding that petitioner resides in Quezon City, and the proper venue of the testate proceeding was in Quezon
City and the Quezon City court properly took cognizance and exercised exclusive jurisdiction with the deference in
comity and consent of the Cebu court, such proper exercise of jurisdiction would be nullified and petitioner would
have to continually leave her residence in Quezon City and go to Cebu to settle and liquidate
even her own community property and conjugal estate with the decedent.

10. The Court therefore holds under the facts of record that the Cebu court did not act without jurisdiction nor with
grave abuse of discretion in declining to take cognizance of the intestate petition and instead deferring to
the testate proceedings filed just a week later by petitioner as surviving widow and designated executrix of the
decedent's last will, since the record before it (the petitioner's opposition and motion to dismiss) showed the falsity of
the allegation in the intestate petition that the decedent had died without a will. It is noteworthy that respondents
never challenged by certiorari or prohibition proceedings the Cebu court's order of 10 April 1964 deferring to the
probate proceedings before the Quezon City court, thus leaving the latter free (pursuant to the Cebu court's order of
deference) to exercise jurisdiction and admit the decedent's will to probate.

For the same reasons, neither could the Quezon City court be held to have acted without jurisdiction nor with grave
abuse of discretion in admitting the decedent's will to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix in accordance
with its testamentary disposition, in the light of the settled doctrine that the provisions of Rule 73, section 1 lay down
only a rule of venue, not of jurisdiction.

Since respondents undisputedly failed to appeal from the Quezon City court's order of May 15, 1964 admitting the will
to probate and appointing petitioner as executrix thereof, and said court concededly has jurisdiction to issue said
order, the said order of probate has long since become final and can not be overturned in a special civic action of
prohibition.

11. Finally, it should be noted that in the Supreme Court's exercise of its supervisory authority over all inferior
courts, 22 it may properly determine, as it has done in the case at bar, that venue was  properly assumed by
and transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that
the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference and
consent of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will and testament and appointment of petitioner-
widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the decedent's express will and all its orders and actions taken
in the testate proceedings before it be approved and authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly
had and to repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert once more to the Quezon
City court should the Cebu court find that indeed and in fact, as already determined by the Quezon City court on the
strength of incontrovertible documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the
decedent.

ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction originally filed by respondents with
the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 34104-R) is ordered dismissed. No costs.

Makalintal, C.J., Zaldivar, Makasiar, Antonio and Esguerra, JJ., concur.

Fernando and Castro, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J.,  concurring:

I concur in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee.

I only want to stress that in my view, the failure of respondents to question within a reasonable time the laying of the
venue in the Quezon City Court of First Instance and the assumption of jurisdiction by that court, after the Court of
First Instance of Cebu deferred in its favor, in order to prevent the holding therein of any proceeding and trial, and
their having filed therein a formal opposition to the probate of the will, makes them guilty of laches, for which reason
they are not entitled to the equitable relief prayed for in the present petition.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J.,  concurring:

I concur in the main opinion of Mr. Justice Teehankee.

I only want to stress that in my view, the failure of respondents to question within a reasonable time the laying of the
venue in the Quezon City Court of First Instance and the assumption of jurisdiction by that court, after the Court of
First Instance of Cebu deferred in its favor, in order to prevent the holding therein of any proceeding and trial, and
their having filed therein a formal opposition to the probate of the will, makes them guilty of laches, for which reason
they are not entitled to the equitable relief prayed for in the present petition.

G.R. No. L-55509 April 27, 1984

ETHEL GRIMM ROBERTS, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE TOMAS R. LEONIDAS, Branch 38, Court of First Instance of Manila; MAXINE TATE-GRIMM, EDWARD
MILLER GRIMM II and LINDA GRIMM, respondents.

N. J. Quisumbing and Associates for petitioners.

Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala and Cruz for respondents.

AQUINO, J.:

The question in this case is whether a petition for allowance of wills and to annul a partition, approved in
an  intestate proceeding by Branch 20  of the Manila Court of First Instance, can be entertained by its Branch 38  (after
a probate in the Utah district court).
Antecedents. — Edward M. Grimm an American resident of Manila, died at 78 in the Makati Medical Center on
November 27, 1977. He was survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm and their two children, named Edward
Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (McFadden), his two
children by a first marriage which ended in divorce (Sub-Annexes A and B. pp. 36-47, Rollo).

He executed on January 23, 1959 two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate
which he described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The second win disposed of his estate
outside the Philippines.

In both wills, the second wife and two children were favored. The two children of the first marriage were given their
legitimes in the will disposing of the estate situated in this country. In the will dealing with his property outside this
country, the testator said: têñ.£îhqwâ£

I purposely have made no provision in this will for my daughter, Juanita Grimm Morris, or my
daughter, Elsa Grimm McFadden (Ethel Grimm Roberts), because I have provided for each of them
in a separate will disposing of my Philippine property. (First clause, pp. 43-47, Rollo).

The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine Tate Grimm and E. LaVar Tate on March 7, 1978 in
Probate No. 3720 of the Third Judicial District Court of Tooele County, Utah. Juanita Grimm Morris of Cupertino,
California and Mrs. Roberts of 15 C. Benitez Street, Horseshoe Village, Quezon City were notified of the probate
proceeding (Sub-Annex C, pp. 48-55, Rollo).

Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition filed in Manila by Ethel in January, 1978 (p. 53,
Rollo). In its order dated April 10, 1978, the Third Judicial District Court admitted to probate  the two wills and the
codicil It was issued upon consideration of the stipulation dated April 4, 1978 "by and between the attorneys for
Maxine Tate Grimm, Linda Grimm, Edward Miller Grimm II, E. LaVar Tate, Juanita Kegley Grimm (first wife), Juanita
Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts" (Annex C, pp. 48-51, Rollo).

Two weeks later, or on April 25, 1978, Maxine and her two children Linda and Pete, as the first parties, and Ethel,
Juanita Grimm Morris and their mother Juanita Kegley Grimm as the second parties, with knowledge of the intestate
proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. It was signed by David E.
Salisbury and Donald B. Holbrook, as lawyers of the parties, by Pete and Linda and the attorney-in-fact of Maxine
and by the attorney-in-fact of Ethel, Juanita Grimm Morris and Juanita Kegley Grimm.

In that agreement, it was stipulated that Maxine, Pete and Ethel would be designated as personal representatives
(administrators) of Grimm's Philippine estate (par. 2). It was also stipulated that Maxine's one-half conjugal share in
the estate should be reserved for her and that would not be less than $1,500,000 plus the homes in Utah and Santa
Mesa, Manila (par. 4). The agreement indicated the computation of the "net distributable estate". It recognized that
the estate was liable to pay the fees of the Angara law firm (par. 5).

It was stipulated in paragraph 6 that the decedent's four children "shall share equally in the Net Distributable Estate"
and that Ethel and Juanita Morris should each receive at least 12-1/2% of the total of the net distributable estate and
marital share. A supplemental memorandum also dated April 25, 1978 was executed by the parties (Sub-Annex F,
pp. 49-61, Annex, F-1, pp. 75-76, Testate case).

Intestate proceeding No. 113024.-At this juncture, it should be stated that forty- three days after Grimm's death, or
January 9, 1978, his daughter of the first marriage, Ethel, 49, through lawyers Deogracias T. Reyes and. Gerardo B.
Macaraeg, filed with Branch 20 of the Manila Court of First Instance intestate proceeding No. 113024 for the
settlement of his estate. She was named special administratrix.

On March 11, the second wife, Maxine, through the Angara law office, filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the
intestate proceeding on the ground of the pendency of Utah of a proceeding for the probate of Grimm's will. She also
moved that she be appointed special administratrix, She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm's will disposing of his
Philippine estate. It is found in pages 58 to 64 of the record.

The intestate court in its orders of May 23 and June 2 noted that Maxine, through a new lawyer, William C. Limqueco
(partner of Gerardo B. Macaraeg, p. 78, testate case withdrew that opposition and motion to dismiss and, at the
behest of Maxine, Ethel and Pete, appointed them joint administrators. Apparently, this was done pursuant to the
aforementioned Utah compromise agreement. The court ignored the will already found in the record.

The three administrators submitted an inventory. With the authority and approval of the court, they sold for P75,000
on March 21, 1979 the so-called Palawan Pearl Project, a business owned by the deceased. Linda and Juanita
allegedly conformed with the sale (pp. 120-129, Record). It turned out that the buyer, Makiling Management Co., Inc.,
was incorporated by Ethel and her husband, Rex Roberts, and by lawyer Limqueco (Annex L, p. 90, testate case).

Also with the court's approval and the consent of Linda and Juanita, they sold for P1,546,136 to Joseph Server and
others 193,267 shares of RFM Corporation (p. 135, Record).

Acting on the declaration of heirs and project of partition signed and filed by lawyers Limqueco and Macaraeg (not
signed by Maxine and her two children), Judge Conrado M. Molina in his order of July 27, 1979 adjudicated to Maxine
onehalf (4/8) of the decedent's Philippine estate and one-eighth (1/8) each to his four children or 12-1/2% (pp. 140-
142, Record). No mention at all was made of the will in that order.

Six days later, or on August 2, Maxine and her two children replaced Limqueco with Octavio del Callar as their
lawyer who on August 9, moved to defer approval of the project of partition. The court considered the motion moot
considering that it had already approved the declaration of heirs and project of partition (p. 149, Record).

Lawyer Limqueco in a letter to Maxine dated August 2, 1979 alleged that he was no longer connected with Makiling
Management Co., Inc. when the Palawan Pearl Project was sold: that it was Maxine's son Pete who negotiated the
sale with Rex Roberts and that he (Limqueco) was going to sue Maxine for the lies she imputed to him (Annex H, p.
78, testate case).

Ethel submitted to the court a certification of the Assistant Commissioner of Internal Revenue dated October 2, 1979.
It was stated therein that Maxine paid P1,992,233.69 as estate tax and penalties and that he interposed no objection
to the transfer of the estate to Grimm's heirs (p. 153, Record). The court noted the certification as in conformity with
its order of July 27, 1979.

After November, 1979 or for a period of more than five months, there was no movement or activity in the intestate
case. On April 18, 1980 Juanita Grimm Morris, through Ethel's lawyers, filed a motion for accounting "so that the
Estate properties can be partitioned among the heirs and the present intestate estate be closed." Del Callar, Maxine's
lawyer was notified of that motion.

Before that motion could be heard, or on June 10, 1980, the Angara law firm filed again its appearance in
collaboration with Del Callar as counsel for Maxine and her two children, Linda and Pete. It should be recalled that
the firm had previously appeared in the case as Maxine's counsel on March 11, 1978, when it filed a motion to
dismiss the intestate proceeding and furnished the court with a copy of Grimm's will. As already noted, the firm was
then superseded by lawyer Limqueco.

Petition to annul partition and testate proceeding No. 134559. — On September 8, 1980, Rogelio A. Vinluan of the
Angara law firm in behalf of Maxine, Pete and Linda, filed in Branch 38 of the lower court a petition praying for the
probate of Grimm's two wills (already probated in Utah), that the 1979 partition approved by the intestate court be set
aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and that Ethel and Juanita Morris
be ordered to account for the properties received by them and to return the same to Maxine (pp. 25-35, Rollo).

Grimm's second wife and two children alleged that they were defraud due to the machinations of the Roberts
spouses, that the 1978 Utah compromise agreement was illegal, that the intestate proceeding is void because Grimm
died testate and that the partition was contrary to the decedent's wills.

Ethel filed a motion to dismiss the petition. Judge Leonidas denied it for lack of merit in his order of October 27, 1980.
Ethel then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in this Court, praying that the testate proceeding be dismissed,
or. alternatively that the two proceedings be consolidated and heard in Branch 20 and that the matter of the
annulment of the Utah compromise agreement be heard prior to the petition for probate (pp. 22-23, Rollo).

Ruling. — We hold that respondent judge did not commit any grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of
jurisdiction, in denying Ethel's motion to dismiss.
A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and "no will shall pass either real or
personal property unless it is proved and allowed" (Art. 838, Civil Code; sec. 1, Rule 75, Rules of Court).

The probate of the will is mandatory (Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Baluyot vs. Panio, L-
42088, May 7, 1976, 71 SCRA 86). It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in
an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the
judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.

Ethel may file within twenty days from notice of the finality of this judgment an opposition and answer to the petition
unless she considers her motion to dismiss and other pleadings sufficient for the purpose. Juanita G. Morris, who
appeared in the intestate case, should be served with copies of orders, notices and other papers in the testate case.

WHEREFORE the petition is dismissed. The temporary restraining order is dissolved. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

_________________________________________________________________

G.R. No. 139587               November 22, 2000

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF DECEASED ISMAEL REYES, THE HEIRS OF OSCAR R.
REYES, petitioners,
vs.
CESAR R. REYES, respondent.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to annul the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 467611 which affirmed the Order2 dated January 26, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96,
Quezon City, in Special Proceeding No. 89-2519, a petition for issuance of letters of administration, and the
resolution dated July 28, 1999 denying their motion for reconsideration.3

Spouses Ismael Reyes and Felisa Revita Reyes are the registered owners of parcels of land situated in Arayat
Street, Cubao, Quezon City covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 4983 and 3598 (39303). The spouses have
seven children, namely: Oscar, Araceli, Herminia, Aurora, Emmanuel, Cesar and Rodrigo, all surnamed Reyes.

On April 18, 1973, Ismael Reyes died intestate. Prior to his death, Ismael Reyes was notified by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) of his income tax deficiency which arose out of his sale of a parcel land located in Tandang
Sora, Quezon City. For failure to settle his tax liability, the amount increased to about P172,724.40 and since no
payment was made by the heirs of deceased Ismael Reyes, the property covered by TCT No. 4983 was levied4 sold
and eventually forfeited by the Bureau of Internal Revenue in favor of the government.5

Sometime in 1976, petitioners’ predecessor Oscar Reyes availed of the BIR’s tax amnesty and he was able to
redeem the property covered by TCT No. 49836 upon payment of the reduced tax liability in the amount of about
P18,000.7

On May 18, 1982, the Office of the City Treasurer of Quezon City sent a notice to Felisa Revita Reyes informing her
that the Arayat properties will be sold at public auction on August 25, 1982 for her failure to settle the real estate tax
delinquency from 1974-1981.8

On December 15, 1986, petitioners’ predecessor Oscar Reyes entered into an amnesty compromise agreement with
the City Treasurer and settled the accounts of Felisa R. Reyes.9
On May 10, 1989, private respondent Cesar Reyes, brother of Oscar Reyes, filed a petition for issuance of letters of
administration with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City praying for his appointment as administrator of the estate
of the deceased Ismael Reyes which estate included 50% of the Arayat properties covered by TCT Nos. 4983 and
3598.10 Oscar Reyes filed his conditional opposition thereto on the ground that the Arayat properties do not form part
of the estate of the deceased as he (Oscar) had acquired the properties by redemption and or purchase.11

The probate court subsequently issued letters of administration in favor of Cesar Reyes where the latter was ordered
to submit a true and complete inventory of properties pertaining to the estate of the deceased and the special powers
of attorney executed by the other heirs who reside in the USA and that of Aurora Reyes-Dayot conforming to his
appointment as administrator.12 Cesar Reyes filed an inventory of real and personal properties of the deceased which
included the Arayat properties with a total area of 1,009 sq. meters.13 On the other hand, Oscar Reyes filed his
objection to the inventory reiterating that the Arayat properties had been forfeited in favor of the government and he
was the one who subsequently redeemed the same from the BIR using his own funds.14

A hearing on the inventory was scheduled where administrator Cesar Reyes was required to present evidence to
establish that the properties belong to the estate of Ismael Reyes and the oppositor to adduce evidence in support of
his objection to the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory.15 After hearing the parties’ respective arguments,
the probate court issued its Order dated January 26, 1994, the dispositive portion of which reads:16

"WHEREFORE, pursuant to the foregoing findings, the Court hereby modifies the inventory submitted by the
administrator and declares to belong to the estate of the late Ismael Reyes the following properties, to wit:

1. One half (1/2) of the agricultural land located in Montalban, Rizal containing an area of 31,054 square
meters, covered by TCT 72730 with an approximate value of P405,270.00;

2. One half (1/2) of two (2) adjoining residential lots located on Arayat Street, Cubao, Quezon City, with total
area of 1,009 square meters, more or less, covered by TCTs No. 4983 AND 3598 (39303), with an
approximate value of P3,027,000.00; but this determination is provisional in character and shall be without
prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought hereafter in the proper Court on the issue of ownership
of the properties; and,

3. The building constructed by and leased to Sonny Bernardo and all its rental income from the inception of
the lease, whether such income be in the possession of oppositor, in which case he is hereby directed to
account therefor, or if such income be still unpaid by Bernardo, in which case the administrator should move
to collect the same.

Consistent with the foregoing things, either of the administrator oppositor, or heir Felisa R. Reyes, in her personal
capacity as apparent co-owner of the Arayat Street properties, may commence the necessary proper action for
settling the issue of ownership of such properties in the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City and to inform the Court of
the commencement thereof by any of them as soon as possible.

The administrator is hereby directed to verify and check carefully on whether other properties, particularly the real
properties allegedly situated in Montalban, Rizal; in Marikina, Metro Manila (near Boys Town); and in Bulacan,
otherwise referred to as the Hi-Cement property truly pertained to the estate; to determine their present condition and
the status of their ownership; and to render a report thereon in writing within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order.

The motion demanding for accounting to be done by oppositor Oscar Reyes is hereby denied for being unwarranted,
except whatever incomes he might have received from Sonny Bernardo, which he is hereby directed to turn over to
the administrator within thirty (30) days from finality of this Order.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Oscar Reyes which was denied in an Order dated May 30, 1994.17 He then
filed his appeal with the respondent Court of Appeals. While the appeal was pending, Oscar died and he was
substituted by his heirs, herein petitioners.

On May 6, 1999, the respondent Court issued its assailed decision which affirmed the probate court’s order. It ruled
that the probate court’s order categorically stated that the inclusion of the subject properties in the inventory of the
estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes "is provisional in character and shall be without prejudice to the outcome of any
action to be brought hereafter in the proper court on the issue of ownership of the properties"; that the provisional
character of the inclusion of the contested properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction
of intestate court. It further stated that although the general rule that question of title to property cannot be passed
upon in the probate court admits of exceptions, i.e. if the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the
property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of the question to the probate court for adjudication, such
has no application in the instant case since petitioner-appellee and oppositor-appellant are not the only parties with
legal interest in the subject property as they are not the only heirs of the decedent; that it was never shown that all
parties interested in the subject property or all the heirs of the decedent consented to the submission of the question
of ownership to the intestate court.

Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied in a resolution dated July 28, 1999. Hence this
petition for review on certiorari alleging that the respondent Court erred (1) in ruling that the court a quo correctly
included one half (1/2) of the Arayat properties covered by TCT Nos. 4983 and 3598 (39303) in the inventory of the
estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes (2) in upholding that the court a quo has no jurisdiction to determine the issue
of ownership.

Petitioners argue that a probate court’s jurisdiction is not limited to the determination of who the heirs are and what
shares are due them as regards the estate of a deceased person since the probate court has the power and
competence to determine whether a property should be excluded from the inventory of the estate or not, thus the
Court a quo committed a reversible error when it included the Arayat properties in the inventory of the estate of
Ismael Reyes despite the overwhelming evidence presented by petitioner-oppositor Oscar Reyes proving his claim of
ownership. Petitioners contend that their claim of ownership over the Arayat properties as testified to by their
predecessor Oscar Reyes was based on two (2) grounds, to wit (1) his redemption of the Arayat properties and (2)
the abandonment of the properties by his co-heirs; that his act of redeeming the properties from the BIR in 1976 and
therefter from the City Treasurer of Quezon City using his own funds have the effect of vesting ownership to him.
Petitioners claim that private respondent is already barred from claiming the Arayat properties since he only filed this
petition 16 years after the death of Ismael Reyes and after the prices of the real properties in Cubao have already
escalated tremendously.

We find no merit in this argument.

The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and the
probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and removal of administrators, executors, guardians and
trustees.18 The question of ownership is as a rule, an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with
finality.19 Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the
inventory of estate proceeding, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is
provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.20

We find that the respondent Court did not err in affirming the provisional inclusion of the subject properties to the
estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes without prejudice to the outcome of any action to be brought thereafter in the
proper court on the issue of ownership considering that the subject properties are still titled under the torrens system
in the names of spouses Ismael and Felisa Revita Reyes which under the law is endowed with incontestability until
after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law.21 The declaration of the provisional character of the
inclusion of the subject properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of the Probate
Court.

Petitioners next claim that as an exception to the rule that the probate court is of limited jurisdiction, the court has
jurisdiction to resolve the issue of ownership when the parties interested are all heirs of the deceased and they
submitted the question of title to the property, without prejudice to third persons. Petitioners allege that the parties
before the probate court were all the heirs of deceased Ismael Reyes and they were allowed to present evidence
proving ownership over the subject properties, thus private respondent cannot argue that he did not in any way
consent to the submission of the issue of ownership to the probate court as the records of this case is replete with
evidence that he presented evidence in an attempt to prove ownership of the subject properties.

We are not persuaded.

Settled is the rule that the Regional Trial Court acting as a probate court exercises but limited jurisdiction, thus it has
no power to take cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property claimed by a third person adversely to the
decedent, unless the claimant and all other parties having legal interest in the property consent, expressly or
impliedly, to the submission of the question to the Probate Court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are
not thereby prejudiced.22

The facts obtaining in this case, however, do not call for the application of the exception to the rule. It bears stress
that the purpose why the probate court allowed the introduction of evidence on ownership was for the sole purpose of
determining whether the subject properties should be included in the inventory which is within the probate court’s
competence. Thus, when private respondent Cesar Reyes was appointed as administrator of the properties in the
court’s Order dated July 26, 1989, he was ordered to submit a true inventory and appraisal of the real and personal
properties of the estate which may come into his possession or knowledge which private respondent complied with.
However, petitioner Oscar Reyes submitted his objection to the inventory on the ground that it included the subject
properties which had been forfeited in favor of the government on April 21, 1975 and which he subsequently
redeemed on August 19, 1976. The Court resolved the opposition as follows:

At the hearing today of the pending incidents, it was agreed that the said incidents could not be resolved without
introduction of evidence.

Accordingly, the hearing on the inventory of real and personal properties is hereby set on April 24, 1990 at 10:00 A.M.
at which date and time the petitioner/administrator shall be required to present evidence to establish that the
properties stated in the inventory belong to the estate of Ismael Reyes. The oppositor shall thereafter adduce his
evidence in support of his objection to the inclusion of certain properties of the estates in the inventory.

Notably, the Probate Court stated, from the start of the hearing, that the hearing was for the merits of accounting and
inventory, thus it had jurisdiction to hear the opposition of Oscar Reyes to the inventory as well as the respective
evidence of the parties to determine for purposes of inventory alone if they should be included therein or excluded
therefrom. In fact, the probate court in its Order stated that "for resolution is the matter of the inventory of the estate,
mainly to consider what properties should be included in the inventory and what should not be included." There was
nothing on record that both parties submitted the issue of ownership for its final resolution. Thus the respondent Court
did not err in ruling that the trial court has no jurisdiction to pass upon the issue of ownership conclusively.

In fact, the probate court, aware of its limited jurisdiction declared that its determination of the ownership was merely
provisional and suggested that either the administrator or the widow Felisa Reyes may commence the proper action
in the Regional Trial Court. Moreover, the court admitted that it was not competent to pass upon the ownership of the
subject properties, thus:

"Although the testimony of the oppositor should have greater persuasive value than that of the
petitioner/administrator, mainly because it agrees closely with the recitals of facts found in the several public
documents submitted as evidence in this case and is corroborated to the greatest extent by the fact that the
properties were, indeed, abandoned in his possession since 1975 until the present, his alleged ownership of the
Arayat Street properties cannot still be sustained in a manner which would warrant their exclusion from the
administrator’s inventory.

"To begin with, there are portions in the records which show that the oppositor himself was somehow uncertain about
his rights on the properties and the basis therefor. During his cross-examination (tsn, Oct. 4, 1991), he gave the
following statements:

x x x           x x x          x x x

(Atty. Habitan)

Q: And if we will add the other taxes you have paid, (you) are now claiming to be the owner of the Arayat property
because you have paid all these taxes?

A: The amounts I have paid and all the expenses I have and if I had not paid all these amounts the property in
question would have been lost, sir.

Q: So, in effect, you are now claiming ownership over the property, I want a categorical answer, Mr. Witness?
A: If I am going to sum up all these expenses, my share in the Hi-Cement property, my share in the Bulacan property,
the amount of the property in Cubao is small and also all my sufferings because of the property in Cubao, this cannot
be paid in terms of money, sir. (tsn, Oct. 4, 1991, pp. 10-12)

"On re-direct examination (tsn, Sept. 18, 1992), he clarified his statements as follows:

x x x           x x x          x x x

(Atty, Javellana)

Q: Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, you were asked by the petitioner’s counsel whether because you had paid the
BIR P17,872.44 you are now claiming to be the owner of the property in Arayat Street to which you answered no, will
you explain your answer?

A: When I paid almost P18,000.00, it does not mean that I claim the property already; on the contrary, I have my
own reasons to claim it now on other conditions which are the following: number one, there was a levy by the
BIR on the property, it was forfeited due to delinquency of real estate taxes; number two, for abandonment, when my
mother, brother(s) and sisters left the property, they told me it is my problem and I should take care of it. Number
three, the disposition, my mother, my brothers and sisters sold the property of my father, the Hi-Cement and the
property in Visayas Street without giving my share. And another thing I have to sell my own property, my own assets
so that I can redeem from the BIR the Arayat property and which I did with my personal funds, and number five,
nobody helped me in my problems regarding those properties, I was alone and so I felt that the property in Arayat is
mine.

x x x           x x x          x x x

(tsn, Sept. 18, 1992, pp. 2-3)

Notwithstanding his clarifying statements on redirect examination, the impression of the Court on the issue is not
entirely favorable to him. Apart from the absence of a specific document of transfer, the circumstances and factors he
gave may not suffice in and by themselves to convey or transfer title, for, at best, they may only be the basis of such
transfer. They may be considered as proof of the intention to dispose in his favor or as evidence of a set off among
the heirs, which seems to be what he has in mind. There might also be substance in his assertions about the
abandonment in his favor, which, if raised in the proper action, could constitute either prescription or laches. It is
hardly needed to stress, therefore, that more than these are required to predicate the exclusion of the properties from
the inventory.

Another obtrusive reality stands out to invite notice: the BIR levy was only made on the property covered in TCT
4983 and did not include the property covered in TCT 3598 (39303). This somehow detracts from the logic of the
oppositor’s assertion of ownership of the entire Arayat Street properties; even if his assertion is valid and true, it can
encompass, at most, only the property subject of the BIR’s levy and declaration of forfeiture (i.e., TCT 4983), not the
property covered by TCT 3598 (39303).1ªvvph!1

These pronouncements should not by any means diminish or deprive the oppositor of whatever rights or properties
he believes or considers to be rightfully his. Although the circumstances and factors he has given to the Court herein
may have legal consequences that could have defeated opposing-claims and rendered oppositor’s claim on the
properties unassailable, this Court’s competence to adjudicate thus in this proceedings is clearly non-existent.
In Baybayan vs. Aquino (149 SCRA 186), it was held that the question of ownership of a property alleged to be part
of the estate must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction.

This ruling then, cannot be a final adjudication on the present and existing legal ownership of the properties.
Whatever is declared herein ought not to preclude oppositor from prosecuting an ordinary action for the purpose of
having his claims or rights established over the properties. If he still cares hereafter to prosecute such claim of
ownership adversely to the estate and the apparent co-owner, his mother Felisa. As stated in Valera, et al. vs.
Judge Inserto, et al. (149 SCRA 533), this Court, acting as a probate court, exercises but limited jurisdiction;
accordingly, its determination that property should be included in the inventory or not is within its probate jurisdiction,
but such determination is only provisional in character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a
separate action that may be instituted by the parties."
 x x x           x x x          x x x

The aforecited findings clarify that there were several reasons for having the issue of ownership ventilated elsewhere.
Apart from the fact that only one-half of the two lots known as the Arayat property (i.e., the half that could pertain to
the estate) could be settled herein, there was the realization that the evidence adduced so far (including that bearing
on the oppositor’s basis for excluding from the estate the property) was inadequate or otherwise inconclusive.

A practical way of looking at the problem is that this Court, sitting herein as an intestate court, does not consider itself
competent to rule on the ownership of the entire Arayat property."

Finally, anent private respondent’s allegation that the instant petition was filed one day late, hence should be
dismissed, we find the same to be devoid of merit. Petitioners received copy of the decision denying their motion for
reconsideration on August 13, 1999, thus they have until August 28, 1999 within which to file petition for review.
Petitioners filed their motion for extension on August 27, 1999 praying for 30 days extension from August 28, 1999 or
until September 27, 1999 to file their petition which this Court granted. Petitioners filed their petition on September 27,
1999, which is within the period given by the Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

_________________________________________________________________

G.R. No. 198994

IRIS MORALES, Petitioner,
vs.
ANA MARIA OLONDRIZ, ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ, JR., ALEJANDRO MORENO OLONDRIZ, ISABEL ROSA
OLONDRIZ and FRANCISCO JAVIER MARIA OLONDRIZ, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Iris Morales from the May 27, 2011 decision and October 12, 2011
resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 102358.1 The CA denied Morales' petition
for certiorari from the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) July 12, 2007 and October 30, 2007 orders in SP. Proc. No. 03-
0060 and SP. Proc. No. 03-0069.2

Antecedents

Alfonso Juan P. Olondriz, Sr. (the decedent) died on June 9, 2003. He was survived by his widow, Ana Maria Ortigas
de Olondriz, and his children: Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr., Alejandro Marino O. Olondriz, Isabel Rosa O. Olondriz,
Angelo Jose O. Olondriz, and Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz. His widow and children are collectively
referred to as the respondent heirs.

Believing that the decedent died intestate, the respondent heirs filed a petition with the Las Piñas RTC for the
partition of the decedent’s estate and the appointment of a special administrator on July 4, 2003. The case was
raffled to Branch 254 and docketed as Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0060.

On July 11, 2003, the RTC appointed Alfonso Juan O. Olondriz, Jr. as special administrator.

However, on July 28, 2003, Iris Morales filed a separate petition with the RTC alleging that the decedent left a will
dated July 23, 1991. Morales prayed for the probate of the will and for her appointment as special administratrix. Her
petition was also raffled to Branch 254 and docketed as Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0069.
The pertinent portions of the decedent’s will reads:

1. Upon my death, IRIS MORALES OLONDRIZ shall be the executor hereof and administrator of my estate until its
distribution in accordance herewith. x x x

2. My entire estate shall be divided into six (6) parts to be distributed equally among and between (1) IRIS MORALES
OLONDRIZ, my children (2) ALFONSO JUAN OLONDRIZ, JR., (3) ALEJANDRO OLONDRIZ, (4) ISABEL
OLONDRIZ, (5) ANGELO OLONDRIZ, and their mother (6) MARIA ORTEGAS OLONDRIZ, SR. 3

Notably, the will omitted Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz, an illegitimate son of the decedent.

On September 1, 2003, Morales filed a manifestation in Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0060 and moved to suspend the
intestate proceedings in order to give way to the probate proceedings in Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0069. The
respondent heirs opposed Morales’ motion for suspension and her petition for allowance of the will.

On November 27, 2003, the RTC consolidated Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-0060 with Sp. Proc. Case No. SP-03-
0069.

On January 6, 2004, the respondent heirs moved to dismiss the probate proceedings because Francisco was
preterited from the will.

On January 10, 2006, Morales agreed to the holding of an evidentiary hearing to resolve the issue of preterition.
Thus, the RTC ordered the parties to submit their factual allegations to support or negate the existence of preterition.
Only the respondent heirs complied with this order.

After several postponements at the instance of Morales, the reception of evidence for the evidentiary hearing was
scheduled on May 29, 2006. However, Morales failed to appear, effectively waiving her right to present evidence on
the issue of preterition.

On June 23, 2006, the RTC, through Judge Gloria Butay Aglugub, suspended the intestate proceedings in Sp. Proc.
Case No. SP-03-0060 and set the case for probate. The RTC reasoned that probate proceedings take precedence
over intestate proceedings.

The respondent heirs moved for reconsideration of the suspension order but the RTC denied the motion on
September 1, 2006. The RTC also summarily revoked the Letters of Administration previously issued to Alfonso Jr.

The respondent heirs moved for reconsideration of the summary revocation of the Letters of Administration. They
also moved for the inhibition of Judge Aglugub of Branch 254.

On November 16, 2006, the RTC granted the motion for inhibition. The case was transferred to Branch 253 presided
by Judge Salvador V. Timbang, Jr.

On July 12, 2007, the RTC resolved (1) the respondent heirs’ motion for reconsideration of the revocation of the
Letters of Administration and (2) Morales’ motion to be appointed Special Administratrix of the estate. The RTC noted
that while testacy is preferred over intestacy, courts will not hesitate to set aside probate proceedings if it appears
that the probate of the will might become an idle ceremony because the will is intrinsically void.

The RTC observed: (1) that Morales expressly admitted that Francisco Javier Maria Bautista Olondriz is an heir of the
decedent; (2) that Francisco was clearly omitted from the will; and (3) that based on the evidentiary hearings,
Francisco was clearly preterited. Thus, the RTC reinstated Alfonso Jr. as administrator of the estate and ordered the
case to proceed in intestacy.

Morales moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied on October 30, 2007, for lack of merit.
On February 7, 2008, Morales filed a petition for certiorari against the orders of the RTC. Morales alleged that the
RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion in proceeding intestate despite the existence of the will. The petition was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 102358.

On May 27, 2011, the CA dismissed Morales’ petition for certiorari. The CA reasoned that while probate proceedings
take precedence over intestate proceedings, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line annuls the
institution of heirs in the will and opens the entire inheritance into intestate succession.4 Thus, the continuation of the
probate proceedings would be superfluous and impractical because the inheritance will be adjudicated intestate. The
CA concluded that the RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion.

Morales moved for reconsideration which the CA denied on October 12, 2011. Hence, she filed the present petition
for review on certiorari  on December 5, 2011.

The Petition

Morales maintains that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the case to proceed intestate
because: (1) the probate of a decedent’s will is mandatory; (2) the RTC Branch 254 already ordered the case to
proceed into probate; (3) the order setting the case for probate already attained finality; (3) the probate court cannot
touch on the intrinsic validity of the will; and (4) there was no preterition because Francisco received a house and
lot inter vivos as an advance on his legitime.

The respondent heirs counter: (1) that it is within the RTC’s jurisdiction to reverse or modify an interlocutory order
setting the case for probate; (2) that the petitioner failed to mention that she did not appear in any of the evidentiary
hearings to disprove their allegation of preterition; (3) that the RTC and the CA both found that Francisco was
preterited from the will; and (4) that Francisco’s preterition annulled the institution of heirs and opened the case into
intestacy. They conclude that the RTC did not exceed its jurisdiction or act with grave abuse of discretion when it
reinstated Alfonso Jr. as the administrator of the estate and ordered the case to proceed intestate.

Our Ruling

We join the ruling of the CA.

Preterition consists in the omission of a compulsory heir from the will, either because he is not named or, although he
is named as a father, son, etc., he is neither instituted as an heir nor assigned any part of the estate without expressly
being disinherited – tacitly depriving the heir of his legitime.5 Preterition requires that the omission is total, meaning
the heir did not also receive any legacies, devises, or advances on his legitime.6

In other words, preterition is the complete and total omission of a compulsory heir from the testator’s
inheritance without the heir’s express disinheritance.

Article 854 of the Civil Code states the legal effects of preterition:

Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at
the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to the
right of representation. (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Code, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line shall annul the institution of heirs, but the
devises and legacies shall remain valid insofar as the legitimes are not impaired. Consequently, if a will does not
institute any devisees or legatees, the preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line will result in total intestacy.7

In the present case, the decedent’s will evidently omitted Francisco Olondriz as an heir, legatee, or devisee. As the
decedent’s illegitimate son, Francisco is a compulsory heir in the direct line. Unless Morales could show otherwise,
Francisco’s omission from the will leads to the conclusion of his preterition.
During the proceedings in the RTC, Morales had the opportunity to present evidence that Francisco received
donations inter vivos  and advances on his legitime from the decedent. However, Morales did not appear during the
hearing dates, effectively waiving her right to present evidence on the issue. We cannot fault the RTC for reaching
the reasonable conclusion that there was preterition.

We will not entertain the petitioner’s factual allegation that Francisco was not preterited because this Court is not a
trier of facts.1âwphi1 Furthermore, the CA concurred with the RTC’s conclusion. We see no cogent reason to deviate
from the factual findings of the lower courts.

The remaining question is whether it was proper for the RTC to (1) pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will during
probate proceedings and (2) order the case to proceed intestate because of preterition.

The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the scope of the court’s inquiry is limited to questions on the extrinsic
validity of the will; the probate court will only determine the will’s formal validity and due execution.8 However, this rule
is not inflexible and absolute.9 It is not beyond the probate court’s jurisdiction to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the
will when so warranted by exceptional circumstances.10 When practical considerations demand that the intrinsic
validity of the will be passed upon even before it is probated, the probate court should meet the issue.11

The decedent’s will does not contain specific legacies or devices and Francisco’s preterition annulled the institution of
heirs.1avvphi1 The annulment effectively caused the total abrogation  of the will, resulting in total intestacy of the
inheritance.12 The decedent’s will, no matter how valid it may appear extrinsically, is null and void. The conduct of
separate proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of its testamentary provisions would be superfluous. Thus, we
cannot attribute error – much less grave abuse of discretion – on the RTC for ordering the case to proceed intestate.

Finally, there is no merit in the petitioner’s argument that the previous order setting the case for probate barred the
RTC from ordering the case to proceed intestate. The disputed order is merely interlocutory and can never become
final and executory in the same manner that a final judgment does.13 An interlocutory order does not result in res
judicata.14 It remains under the control of the court and can be modified or rescinded at any time before final
judgment.15

Certiorari is a limited form of review confined to errors of jurisdiction. An error of jurisdiction is one where the officer
or tribunal acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.16 As discussed, it is well within the jurisdiction of the probate court to pass upon the intrinsic validity of
the will if probate proceedings might become an idle ceremony due to the nullity of the will.

On the other hand, grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to an
evasion of positive duty, or a virtual refusal to act at all in contemplation of the law.17 It is present when power is
exercised in a despotic manner by reason, for instance, of passion and hostility. Morales failed to show that the R TC
acted in such a capricious and despotic manner that would have warranted the CA's grant of her petition
for certiorari. On the contrary, the RTC acted appropriately in accordance with the law and jurisprudence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against the petitioner.

__________________________________________________________________

G.R. No. 127920. August 9, 2005

EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR AND HEIR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE
OF MIGUELITA CHING-PACIOLES, Petitioners,
vs.
MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING, Respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the people he leaves behind. For in death, a
person’s estate remains, providing a fertile ground for discords that break the familial bonds. Before us is another
case that illustrates such reality. Here, a husband and a mother of the deceased are locked in an acrimonious dispute
over the estate of their loved one.

This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr., herein petitioner, against Miguela Chuatoco-
Ching, herein respondent, assailing the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated September 25, 1996 and Resolution2 dated
January 27, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571.3 The Appellate Court affirmed the Order dated January 17, 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, Quezon City denying petitioner’s motion for partition and distribution of the
estate of his wife, Miguelita Ching-Pacioles; and his motion for reconsideration.

The facts are undisputed.

On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value of ₱10.5 million, stock
investments worth ₱518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to ₱6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses. She
was survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their two minor children.

Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition4 for the settlement of Miguelita’s
estate. He prayed that (a) letters of administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate be
divided among the compulsory heirs.

Miguelita’s mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an opposition, specifically to petitioner’s prayer
for the issuance of letters of administration on the grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the
duties of an administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of "paraphernal properties."
Respondent prayed that the letters of administration be issued to her instead.5 Afterwards, she also filed a motion for
her appointment as special administratrix.6

Petitioner moved to strike out respondent’s opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and material interest in the
estate, she not being a compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be
appointed as administrator under the law.7

Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave half of her inherited
properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them "would undertake whatever business endeavor they
decided to, in the capacity of business partners."8

In her omnibus motion9 dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to act as special
administrator.

On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel as joint regular
administrators of the estate.10 Both were issued letters of administration after taking their oath and posting the
requisite bond.

Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila Standard on September 12, 19, and 26,
1994. However, no claims were filed against the estate within the period set by the Revised Rules of Court.

Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita’s estate.11 Emmanuel did not submit
an inventory.

On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only compulsory heirs of
Miguelita.12

On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion13 praying, among others, that an Order be
issued directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among the declared
heirs; and 3) payment of attorney’s fees.

Respondent opposed petitioner’s motion on the ground that the partition and distribution of the estate is "premature
and precipitate," considering that there is yet no determination "whether the properties specified in the inventory are
conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture."14 Respondent claimed that she owns the bulk of Miguelita’s
estate as an "heir and co-owner." Thus, she prayed that a hearing be scheduled.

On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and attorney’s fees but denied
petitioner’s prayer for partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed "premature." The intestate court
ratiocinated as follows:

"On the partition and distribution of the deceased’s properties, among the declared heirs, the Court finds the prayer of
petitioner in this regard to be premature. Thus, a hearing on oppositor’s claim as indicated in her opposition to the
instant petition is necessary to determine ‘whether the properties listed in the amended complaint filed by
petitioner are entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a co-ownership between the
oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership venture.’"

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution dated May 7, 1996.

Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the intestate
court’s Order dated January 17, 1996 and Resolution dated May 7, 1996 which denied petitioner’s prayer for partition
and distribution of the estate for being premature, indicating that it (intestate court) will first resolve respondent’s claim
of ownership.

The Appellate Court dismissed the petition for certiorari, holding that in issuing the challenged Order and Resolution,
the intestate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion.

The Appellate Court ruled:

"Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in entertaining
private respondent’s unsupported claim of ownership against the estate. In fact, there is no indication that the probate
court has already made a finding of title or ownership. It is inevitable that in probate proceedings, questions of
collation or of advancement are involved for these are matters which can be passed upon in the course of the
proceedings. The probate court in exercising its prerogative to schedule a hearing, to inquire into the propriety of
private respondent’s claim, is being extremely cautious in determining the composition of the estate. This act is not
tainted with an iota of grave abuse of discretion."

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari anchored on the following assignments of error:

"I

RESPONDENT COURT’S DECISION WHICH AFFIRMS THE INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER IS A GRAVE ERROR
FOR BEING CONTRARY TO THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY OF THE LAW THAT ESTATE
PROCEEDINGS MUST BE SETTLED EXPEDITIOUSLY.

II

RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER TO
CONDUCT HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE, AS SAID FUNCTION IS
OUTSIDE AND BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTESTATE COURT.

III

RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE INTESTATE COURT’S ORDER AND
RESOLUTION NOTWITHSTANDING THAT RESPONDENT CHING’S OWNERSHIP CLAIMS ARE CONFLICTING,
FRIVOLOUS AND BASELESS."

The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon
questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate?
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to matters
having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not extend to the
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.15 The patent rationale for this rule is
that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction.16

A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon
questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the
inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental and provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr. vs. Court of
Appeals,17 we held:

"x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with
finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in
the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination
is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title."

The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate court to
conduct a hearing on respondent’s claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key
consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of
ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. The facts of
this case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.

First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and Opposition18 dated September 18, 1995,
respondent expressly adopted the inventory prepared by petitioner, thus:

"6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his Amended Compliance dated October 6, 1994,
and filed only on November 4, 1994 not October 5, 1995 as erroneously asserted in Par. 12 of the Omnibus Motion.
Oppositor, however, takes exception to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties and reserves her right
to submit a more accurate and realistic pricing on each."

Respondent could have opposed petitioner’s inventory and sought the exclusion of the specific properties which
she believed or considered to be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory, taking
exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties.

And second, Emmanuel, respondent’s son and representative in the settlement of Miguelita’s estate, did not submit
his own inventory. His mandate, as co-administrator, is "to submit within three (3) months after his appointment a true
inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased which have come into his possession or
knowledge."19 He could have submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those properties which respondent
considered to be hers. The fact that he did not endeavor to submit one shows that he acquiesced with
petitioner’s inventory.

Obviously, respondent’s purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what properties should or
should not be included in the inventory. She wanted something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate court a final
determination of her claim of ownership over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelita’s estate. The
intestate court went along with respondent on this point as evident in its Resolution20 dated May 7, 1996, thus:

"On petitioner’s motion for partition and distribution of the estate of the late Miguelita Ching Pacioles, it is believed
that since oppositor had interposed a claim against the subject estate, the distribution thereof in favor of the heirs
could not possibly be implemented as there is still a need for appropriate proceedings to determine the propriety of
oppositor’s claim. It must be mentioned that if it is true that oppositor owns the bulk of the properties, which she
allegedly placed/registered in the name of the deceased for convenience, Oppositor, therefore, has a material and
direct interest in the estate and hence, should be given her day in Court."

It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set by the intestate court was actually to
"determine the propriety of oppositor’s (respondent’s) claim." According to the intestate court, "if it is true that
the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelita’s) properties," then it means that she has a "material
and direct interest in the estate" and, hence, "she should be given her day in court." The intended "day in court"
or hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of respondent’s contention that she is the true owner of the bulk
of Miguelita’s estate.
Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondent’s ingenious attempt to secure a proceeding for the purpose of resolving
her blanket claim against Miguelita’s estate. Although, she made it appear that her only intent was to determine the
accuracy of petitioner’s inventory, however, a close review of the facts and the pleadings reveals her real intention.

Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been to
maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line
of decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of the
deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from
the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the
course of an intestate or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate
such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a
regional trial court.21 Jurisprudence teaches us that:

"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside
parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not
be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well
and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do
so."22

Hence, respondent’s recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The intestate court is not
the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to
Miguelita's estate.

Now, even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make a provisional or prima facie determination of
the issue of ownership, still respondent’s claim cannot prosper. It bears stressing that the bulk of Miguelita’s estate,
as stated in petitioner’s inventory, comprises real estates covered by the Torrens System which are registered either
in the name of Miguelita alone or with petitioner. As such, they are considered the owners of the properties until
their title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action. We find this Court’s pronouncement
in Bolisay vs. Alcid23 relevant, thus:

"It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of ownership, for, on
the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with incontestability until
after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does not include, bringing up
the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. x x
x

x x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens Title is
involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong
compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in
controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in
the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. x x x"

Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The Property Registration Decree," proscribes collateral attack against
Torrens Title, hence:

"Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.

A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except
in a direct proceeding in accordance with law."

Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to present convincing evidence to bolster her
bare assertion of ownership. We quote her testimony, thus:

"Q: I now direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on page 1 of this sworn statement of yours which I quote:"
In accordance with the Chinese tradition and culture in the distribution of properties to the legal heirs, we decided to
give only a token to our daughter Miguelita and leave the rest to our only son Emmanuel, with the undertaking that
being the son he will take full responsibility of the rest of the family despite his marriage. Madame witness, do you
recall having stated that in your sworn statement?

A: Yes sir, but it was not carried out.

Q What was actually given to your daughter Miguelita is only a token, is that right?

A: Not a token, sir, but one half of the share of the estate was given to Lita and the other half was given to
Emmanuel.

Q: What went to Emmanuel was also ½, is that right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What makes up the one half share of Lita, if you recall?

A: What was given to her were all checks, sir, but I cannot remember any more the amount.

xxxxxx

Q: Summing up your testimony, Madame, you cannot itemize the one half share of the estate of Miguelita, is
that right?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Was there any document covering this partition of the estate among you, Emmanuel and Miguelita with
respect to the estate of your late husband?

A: If I only knew that this will happen…

Q: Samakatuwid po ay walang dokumento?

A: Wala po."24

She further testified as follows:

"Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of land, stocks, investments, bank accounts and
deposits both here and abroad, interests and participation in IFS Pharmaceuticals and Medical Supplies, Inc.
and various motor vehicles, per your pleasure, Madam Witness, how should these properties be partitioned
or what should be done with these properties? According to you earlier, you are agreeable for the partition of
the said properties with Emil on a 50-50 basis, is that right?

A: Kung ano po ang sa akin, iyon ang dapat na bumalik sa akin, sir.

Q Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels of land located in Pag-Asa, in Silangan, in San
Lazaro, in Sta. Cruz, in San Francisco del Monte and shares of stock. Alinsunod sa inyo, paano po ang dapat
na partihan o hatian ninyo ni Emil?

A: Kung ano ang sa akin…

xxxxxx

Q Ang tanong ko po sa inyo ay ganito, ito po ba ang inyong iminungkahi kay Emil? Ito po ba ang inyong
paghahatian or hindi?
A: Iyo akin talaga na hindi nila pinaghirapan, sir." 25

Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the properties listed in petitioner’s inventory belong to her.
Neither could she present any document to prove her claim of ownership. The consistently changing basis of her
claim did nothing to improve her posture. Initially, she insisted that the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed of
paraphernal properties.26 Sensing that such assertion could not strengthen her claim of ownership, she opted to
change her submission and declare that she and Miguelita were "business partners" and that she gave to the latter
most of her properties to be used in a joint business venture.27 Respondent must have realized early on that if the
properties listed in petitioner’s inventory are paraphernal, then Miguelita had the absolute title and ownership over
them and upon her death, such properties would be vested to her compulsory heirs, petitioner herein and their two
minor children.28

At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish or deprive respondent of whatever rights
or properties she believes or considers to be rightfully hers. We reiterate that the question of ownership of properties
alleged to be part of the estate must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction.29

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 41571 are hereby REVERSED.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________________________________________________

G.R. No. 156407               January 15, 2014

THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner,
vs.
TERESITA V. MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO, CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V. MERCADO,
MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, and FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes of their inclusion or
exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional
unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired.
Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive
property of the deceased spouse.

Antecedents

Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado
(Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado, Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard
V. Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin
L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).

Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty
Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned his real
properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir Realty.

On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the appointment of
Teresita as the administrator of Emigdio’s estate (Special Proceedings No. 3094-CEB).1 The RTC granted the petition
considering that there was no opposition. The letters of administration in favor of Teresita were issued on September
7, 1992.

As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate of Emigdio on December 14, 1992 for the
consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had "left
no real properties but only personal properties" worth ₱6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of ₱32,141.20; furniture
and fixtures worth ₱20,000.00; pieces of jewelry valued at ₱15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir Realty worth
₱6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth ₱22,708.25.2

Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the
RTC direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. The RTC granted Thelma’s motion
through the order of January 8, 1993.

On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order of January 8, 1993,3 supporting her inventory with
copies of three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty shares of stock;4 the deed of assignment
executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991 involving real properties with the market value of ₱4,440,651.10 in
exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par value of ₱4,440,700.00;5 and the certificate of stock
issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth ₱30,000.00.6

On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory, and that
she (Thelma) be allowed 30 days within which to file a formal opposition to or comment on the inventory and the
supporting documents Teresita had submitted.

On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to present evidence and for
Teresita to be examined to enable the court to resolve the motion for approval of the inventory.7

On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked leave of court to examine Teresita on
the inventory.

With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what properties should
be included in or excluded from the inventory, the RTC set dates for the hearing on that issue.8

Ruling of the RTC

After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and
holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded properties that should be included, and accordingly
ruled:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and considerations, the Court hereby denies the administratrix’s
motion for approval of inventory. The Court hereby orders the said administratrix to re-do the inventory of properties
which are supposed to constitute as the estate of the late Emigdio S. Mercado by including therein the properties
mentioned in the last five immediately preceding paragraphs hereof and then submit the revised inventory within sixty
(60) days from notice of this order.

The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an account of her administration of the estate of the late
Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to her possession. She must render such accounting within sixty (60) days from
notice hereof.

SO ORDERED.9

On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs of Emigdio, timely sought the reconsideration of the order of
March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real properties affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had
already been sold to Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land covered by the deed of assignment had already come
into the possession of and registered in the name of Mervir Realty.10 Thelma opposed the motion.

On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration,11 stating that there was no cogent reason for the
reconsideration, and that the movants’ agreement as heirs to submit to the RTC the issue of what properties should
be included or excluded from the inventory already estopped them from questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon the
issue.

Decision of the CA

Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to approve the inventory, and in
ordering her as administrator to include real properties that had been transferred to Mervir Realty, Teresita, joined by
her four children and her stepson Franklin, assailed the adverse orders of the RTC promulgated on March 14, 2001
and May 18, 2001 by petition for certiorari, stating:

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION (sic)
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE REAL PROPERTY WHICH WAS
SOLD BY THE LATE EMIGDIO S. MERCADO DURING HIS LIFETIME TO A PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR
REALTY CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S.
MERCADO.

II

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION (sic)
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT REAL PROPERTIES WHICH ARE IN
THE POSSESSION OF AND ALREADY REGISTERED IN THE NAME (OF) PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR
REALTY CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S.
MERCADO.

III

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOW ESTOPPED FROM
QUESTIONING ITS JURISDICTION IN PASSING UPON THE ISSUE OF WHAT PROPERTIES SHOULD BE
INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO MERCADO. 12

On May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the petition for certiorari, disposing as follows:13

WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, this petition is GRANTED partially. The assailed Orders
dated March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 are hereby reversed and set aside insofar as the inclusion of parcels of land
known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an area of 53,301 square meters subject matter of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the various parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment
dated February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in the revised inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is
concerned and affirmed in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the petition for certiorari because the order of the RTC directing
a new inventory of properties was interlocutory; that pursuant to Article 1477 of the Civil Code, to the effect that the
ownership of the thing sold "shall be transferred to the vendee" upon its "actual and constructive delivery," and to
Article 1498 of the Civil Code, to the effect that the sale made through a public instrument was equivalent to the
delivery of the object of the sale, the sale by Emigdio and Teresita had transferred the ownership of Lot No. 3353 to
Mervir Realty because the deed of absolute sale executed on November 9, 1989 had been notarized; that Emigdio
had thereby ceased to have any more interest in Lot 3353; that Emigdio had assigned the parcels of land to Mervir
Realty as early as February 17, 1989 "for the purpose of saving, as in avoiding taxes with the difference that in the
Deed of Assignment dated January 10, 1991, additional seven (7) parcels of land were included"; that as to the
January 10, 1991 deed of assignment, Mervir Realty had been "even at the losing end considering that such parcels
of land, subject matter(s) of the Deed of Assignment dated February 12, 1989, were again given monetary
consideration through shares of stock"; that even if the assignment had been based on the deed of assignment dated
January 10, 1991, the parcels of land could not be included in the inventory "considering that there is nothing wrong
or objectionable about the estate planning scheme"; that the RTC, as an intestate court, also had no power to take
cognizance of and determine the issue of title to property registered in the name of third persons or corporation; that
a property covered by the Torrens system should be afforded the presumptive conclusiveness of title; that the RTC,
by disregarding the presumption, had transgressed the clear provisions of law and infringed settled jurisprudence on
the matter; and that the RTC also gravely abused its discretion in holding that Teresita, et al. were estopped from
questioning its jurisdiction because of their agreement to submit to the RTC the issue of which properties should be
included in the inventory.

The CA further opined as follows:

In the instant case, public respondent court erred when it ruled that petitioners are estopped from questioning its
jurisdiction considering that they have already agreed to submit themselves to its jurisdiction of determining what
properties are to be included in or excluded from the inventory to be submitted by the administratrix, because
actually, a reading of petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration dated March 26, 2001 filed before public respondent
court clearly shows that petitioners are not questioning its jurisdiction but the manner in which it was exercised for
which they are not estopped, since that is their right, considering that there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or in excess of limited jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Order dated March 14, 2001 denying the
administratrix’s motion for approval of the inventory of properties which were already titled and in possession of a
third person that is, Mervir Realty Corporation, a private corporation, which under the law possessed a personality
distinct and separate from its stockholders, and in the absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction,
the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of Mervir Realty Corporation should stand undisturbed.

Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court had no authority to determine the applicability of the
doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction and even if public respondent court was not merely acting in a limited
capacity as a probate court, private respondent nonetheless failed to adjudge competent evidence that would have
justified the court to impale the veil of corporate fiction because to disregard the separate jurisdictional personality of
a corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and convincingly established since it cannot be presumed.14

On November 15, 2002, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration of Teresita, et al.15

Issue

Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had
been either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his
lifetime?

Ruling of the Court

The appeal is meritorious.

Was certiorari the proper recourse

to assail the questioned orders of the RTC?

The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Thelma contends that the resort to the special civil action for certiorari to
assail the orders of the RTC by Teresita and her co-respondents was not proper.

Thelma’s contention cannot be sustained.

The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on whether the assailed orders of the
RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. In Pahila-Garrido v. Tortogo,16 the Court distinguished between final and
interlocutory orders as follows:

The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter
in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by
execution what the court has determined, but the latter does not completely dispose of the case but leaves something
else to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be
held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final
is: does the order or judgment leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it
does, the order or judgment is interlocutory; otherwise, it is final.

The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the application for the writ of preliminary injunction, was an
interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the subject of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an appeal from
an interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and
decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily
delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur
unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose as many appeals as there are incidental questions
raised by him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued by the lower court. An interlocutory order may
be the subject of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered, with the ground for appealing the order
being included in the appeal of the judgment itself.

The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule
65, provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.

The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresita’s motion for the approval of the inventory and the order dated
May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the
properties in the inventory was not yet a final determination of their ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory
and the concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were
provisional and subject to revision at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings.

In Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals,17 the Court, in affirming the decision of the CA to the effect that the
order of the intestate court excluding certain real properties from the inventory was interlocutory and could be
changed or modified at anytime during the course of the administration proceedings, held that the order of exclusion
was not a final but an interlocutory order "in the sense that it did not settle once and for all the title to the San Lorenzo
Village lots." The Court observed there that:

The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included
in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties (3
Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Edition, pages 448-9 and 473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L-42257, June
14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).18 (Bold emphasis supplied)

To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals,19 where the Court declared that a "probate court, whether in a
testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title provisionally," and reminded, citing Jimenez v.
Court of Appeals, that the "patent reason is the probate court’s limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of
title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a
separate action." Indeed, in the cited case of Jimenez v. Court of Appeals,20 the Court pointed out:

All that the said court could do as regards the said properties is determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the
ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. (Bold emphasis supplied)

On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct recourse for Teresita, et al. to take against the assailed orders.
The final judgment rule embodied in the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court,21 which also governs
appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that only the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of law "that
completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when declared by these Rules to be appealable"
may be the subject of an appeal in due course. The same rule states that an interlocutory order or resolution
(interlocutory because it deals with preliminary matters, or that the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the
judgment rendered) is expressly made non-appealable.

Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a practical recognition of the possibility that material issues
may be finally determined at various stages of the special proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of Court
enumerates the specific instances in which multiple appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings, viz:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be taken. - An interested person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations
Court, where such order or judgment:

(a) Allows or disallows a will;

(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased person, or the distributive share of the estate to which
such person is entitled;

(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim
presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against it;

(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee or guardian;

(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, or the
administration of a trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court of the rights of the party
appealing, except that no appeal shall be allowed from the appointment of a special administrator; and

(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and affects the substantial rights of the person
appealing, unless it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or for reconsideration.

Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory, did not come under any of the instances in which multiple
appeals are permitted.

II

Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion

in directing the inclusion of the properties
in the estate of the decedent?

In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion for including properties
in the inventory notwithstanding their having been transferred to Mervir Realty by Emigdio during his lifetime, and for
disregarding the registration of the properties in the name of Mervir Realty, a third party, by applying the doctrine of
piercing the veil of corporate fiction.

Was the CA correct in its conclusion?

The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that the CA, in reaching its conclusion, ignored the law and the
facts that had fully warranted the assailed orders of the RTC.

Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters of administration may be granted at the discretion of the
court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the
letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-bound to direct the preparation and
submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the
duty and responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of administration
pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz:

Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within three months. – Within three (3) months after his appointment
every executor or administrator shall return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal
estate of the deceased which has come into his possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of such estate, the
court may order one or more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their assistance.

The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the
decedent in the inventory.22 However, the word all is qualified by the phrase which has come into his possession or
knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are in
her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no
properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the
possession of another person or entity.

The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is "to aid the
court in revising the accounts and determining the liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making a final
and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the estate."23 Hence,
the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on the question of what
properties should be included in the inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta,24 the CA cannot impose its judgment in
order to supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included or excluded from the inventory in
the absence of "positive abuse of discretion," for in the administration of the estates of deceased persons, "the judges
enjoy ample discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to replace the action
taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a positive abuse of discretion."25 As long as the RTC commits
no patently grave abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial
duty.

There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited. The trial court
cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title
adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the
trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of
properties to be administered by the administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still revised. As the
Court said in Agtarap v. Agtarap:26

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an intestate court, relates only to
matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this
rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or
one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could
do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the inventory of properties to
be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties,
the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action before a court exercising general
jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.

However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by expediency and convenience.

First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion
in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to final determination of ownership in a
separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction
extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of
the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased
spouse.27 (Italics in the original; bold emphasis supplied)

It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its directive for the inclusion of the properties
in question in its assailed order of March 14, 2001, viz:

In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted that Emigdio Mercado was one of the heirs of Severina
Mercado who, upon her death, left several properties as listed in the inventory of properties submitted in Court in
Special Proceedings No. 306-R which are supposed to be divided among her heirs. The administratrix admitted,
while being examined in Court by the counsel for the petitioner, that she did not include in the inventory submitted by
her in this case the shares of Emigdio Mercado in the said estate of Severina Mercado. Certainly, said properties
constituting Emigdio Mercado’s share in the estate of Severina Mercado should be included in the inventory of
properties required to be submitted to the Court in this particular case.

In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado also admitted in Court that she did not
include in the inventory shares of stock of Mervir Realty Corporation which are in her name and which were paid by
her from money derived from the taxicab business which she and her husband had since 1955 as a conjugal
undertaking. As these shares of stock partake of being conjugal in character, one-half thereof or of the value thereof
should be included in the inventory of the estate of her husband.

In the third place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio Mercado admitted, too, in Court that she had a bank
account in her name at Union Bank which she opened when her husband was still alive. Again, the money in said
bank account partakes of being conjugal in character, and so, one-half thereof should be included in the inventory of
the properties constituting as estate of her husband.

In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing in this case that Lot No. 3353 of Pls-657-D located in
Badian, Cebu containing an area of 53,301 square meters as described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 3252 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cebu is still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado until
now. When it was the subject of Civil Case No. CEB-12690 which was decided on October 19, 1995, it was the estate
of the late Emigdio Mercado which claimed to be the owner thereof. Mervir Realty Corporation never intervened in the
said case in order to be the owner thereof. This fact was admitted by Richard Mercado himself when he testified in
Court. x x x So the said property located in Badian, Cebu should be included in the inventory in this case.

Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several parcels of land by the late Emigdio S. Mercado to Mervir
Realty Corporation on January 10, 1991 by virtue of the Deed of Assignment signed by him on the said day (Exhibit N
for the petitioner and Exhibit 5 for the administratrix) was a transfer in contemplation of death. It was made two days
before he died on January 12, 1991. A transfer made in contemplation of death is one prompted by the thought that
the transferor has not long to live and made in place of a testamentary disposition (1959 Prentice Hall, p. 3909).
Section 78 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 provides that the gross estate of the decedent shall be
determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property to the extent of any interest therein of which
the decedent has at any time made a transfer in contemplation of death. So, the inventory to be approved in this case
should still include the said properties of Emigdio Mercado which were transferred by him in contemplation of death.
Besides, the said properties actually appeared to be still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado at least ten
(10) months after his death, as shown by the certification issued by the Cebu City Assessor’s Office on October 31,
1991 (Exhibit O).28

Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence relevant to the procedure
for preparing the inventory by the administrator. The aforequoted explanations indicated that the directive to include
the properties in question in the inventory rested on good and valid reasons, and thus was far from whimsical, or
arbitrary, or capricious.

Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio from Severina Mercado should be included in the inventory
because Teresita, et al. did not dispute the fact about the shares being inherited by Emigdio.

Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in August 3,
1988, their property regime was the conjugal partnership of gains.29 For purposes of the settlement of Emigdio’s
estate, it was unavoidable for Teresita to include his shares in the conjugal partnership of gains. The party asserting
that specific property acquired during that property regime did not pertain to the conjugal partnership of gains carried
the burden of proof, and that party must prove the exclusive ownership by one of them by clear, categorical, and
convincing evidence.30 In the absence of or pending the presentation of such proof, the conjugal partnership of
Emigdio and Teresita must be provisionally liquidated to establish who the real owners of the affected properties
were,31 and which of the properties should form part of the estate of Emigdio. The portions that pertained to the estate
of Emigdio must be included in the inventory.

Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already registered in the name of Mervir Realty, the RTC made
findings that put that title in dispute. Civil Case No. CEB-12692, a dispute that had involved the ownership of Lot
3353, was resolved in favor of the estate of Emigdio, and

Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was still in Emigdio’s name.1âwphi1 Indeed, the RTC noted
in the order of March 14, 2001, or ten years after his death, that Lot 3353 had remained registered in the name of
Emigdio.

Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all in Civil Case No. CEB-12692. Such lack of interest in Civil Case
No. CEB-12692 was susceptible of various interpretations, including one to the effect that the heirs of Emigdio could
have already threshed out their differences with the assistance of the trial court. This interpretation was probable
considering that Mervir Realty, whose business was managed by respondent Richard, was headed by Teresita
herself as its President. In other words, Mervir Realty appeared to be a family corporation.

Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by Emigdio in favor of Mervir Realty was a notarized instrument
did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from the inventory of the properties involved. A notarized deed of sale only
enjoyed the presumption of regularity in favor of its execution, but its notarization did not per se guarantee the legal
efficacy of the transaction under the deed, and what the contents purported to be. The presumption of regularity could
be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.32 As the Court has observed in Suntay v. Court of
Appeals:33

x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the presumption of regularity, it is not
the intention nor the function of the notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never, in the first place,
intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The intention of the parties still and always is the
primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract. (Bold emphasis supplied)

It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares of stock of Mervir Realty with the real properties owned
by Emigdio would still have to be inquired into. That Emigdio executed the deed of assignment two days prior to his
death was a circumstance that should put any interested party on his guard regarding the exchange, considering that
there was a finding about Emigdio having been sick of cancer of the pancreas at the time.34 In this regard, whether
the CA correctly characterized the exchange as a form of an estate planning scheme remained to be validated by the
facts to be established in court.

The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens titles in the name of Mervir Realty could not be a valid
basis for immediately excluding them from the inventory in view of the circumstances admittedly surrounding the
execution of the deed of assignment. This is because:

The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands; it is merely a system of registration of titles to
lands.1âwphi1 However, justice and equity demand that the titleholder should not be made to bear the unfavorable
effect of the mistake or negligence of the State’s agents, in the absence of proof of his complicity in a fraud or of
manifest damage to third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to quiet title to land and put a stop
forever to any question as to the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the certificate at the time of
registration or that may arise subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens system shall forever be
sullied by the ineptitude and inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily presumed to have regularly
performed their duties.35

Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the deed of assignment of January 10, 1991, such lots should
still be included in the inventory to enable the parties, by themselves, and with the assistance of the RTC itself, to test
and resolve the issue on the validity of the assignment. The limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court might
have constricted the determination of the rights to the properties arising from that deed,36 but it does not prevent the
RTC as intestate court from ordering the inclusion in the inventory of the properties subject of that deed. This is
because the RTC as intestate court, albeit vested only with special and limited jurisdiction, was still "deemed to have
all the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it effective."37

Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be prepared and submitted for the important purpose of resolving
the difficult issues of collation and advancement to the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every compulsory
heir and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita herself, to "bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which
he (or she) may have received from the decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of donation, or any other
gratuitous title, in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir, and in the account
of the partition." Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court also provided that any advancement by the decedent on the
legitime of an heir "may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings, and the
final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir." Rule 90 thereby
expanded the special and limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the matters relating to the
inventory of the estate of the decedent by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated or bestowed by
gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the decedent.38

The determination of which properties should be excluded from or included in the inventory of estate properties was
well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted
with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy that it was best to include all properties in the
possession of the administrator or were known to the administrator to belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude
properties that could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As long as the RTC commits no patent grave
abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse
of discretion means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or
virtually refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
board exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction.39

In light of the foregoing, the CA's conclusion of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC was unwarranted
and erroneous.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders issued on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by the
Regional Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special
Proceedings No. 3094-CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to
resolve the case; and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

_______________________________________________________________

G.R. No. 162956             April 10, 2008

FAUSTINO REYES, ESPERIDION REYES, JULIETA C. RIVERA, and EUTIQUIO DICO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
PETER B. ENRIQUEZ, for himself and Attorney-in-Fact of his daughter DEBORAH ANN C. ENRIQUEZ, and
SPS. DIONISIO FERNANDEZ and CATALINA FERNANDEZ, respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:

This case is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court from the decision of the
Court of Appeals (CA) dated September 29, 2003 in CA G.R. CV No. 68147, entitled "Peter B. Enriquez, et al. v.
Faustino Reyes, et al., reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch XI dated June
29, 2000, which dismissed the complaint filed by the respondents herein.1

The subject matter of the present case is a parcel of land known as Lot No. 1851 Flr-133 with an aggregate area of
2,017 square meters located in Talisay, Cebu.2

According to petitioners Faustino Reyes, Esperidion Reyes, Julieta C. Rivera, and Eutiquio Dico, Jr., they are the
lawful heirs of Dionisia Reyes who co-owned the subject parcel of land with Anacleto Cabrera as evidenced by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-3551 (T-8070). On April 17, 1996, petitioners executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes (the Extra Judicial Settlement) involving a portion of the subject
parcel of land. On March 21, 1997, the petitioners and the known heirs of Anacleto Cabrera executed a Segregation
of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale (the Segregation and Confirmation) over the same property. By virtue of the
aforestated documents, TCT No. RT-35551 (T-8070) was cancelled and new TCTs were issued: (1) TCT No. T-
98576 in the name of Anacleto Cabrera covering Lot 1851-A; (2) TCT No. T-98577 covering Lot 1851-B in the name
of petitioner Eutiquio Dico, Jr.; (3) TCT No. T-98578 covering Lot 1851-C in the name of petitioner Faustino Reyes;
(4) TCT No. T-98579 covering Lot 1851-D in the name of petitioner Esperidion Reyes; (5) TCT No. T-98580 covering
Lot 1851-E in the name of petitioner Julieta G. Rivera; (6) TCT No. T-98581 covering Lot 1851-F in the name of
Felipe Dico; and (7) TCT No. T-98582 covering Lot 1851-G in the name of Archimedes C. Villaluz.3

Respondents Peter B. Enriquez (Peter) for himself and on behalf of his minor daughter Deborah Ann C. Enriquez
(Deborah Ann), also known as Dina Abdullah Enriquez Alsagoff, on the other hand, alleges that their predecessor-in-
interest Anacleto Cabrera and his wife Patricia Seguera Cabrera (collectively the Spouses Cabrera) owned ½ pro-
indiviso share in the subject parcel of land or 1051 sq. m. They further allege that Spouses Cabrera were survived by
two daughters – Graciana, who died single and without issue, and Etta, the wife of respondent Peter and mother of
respondent Deborah Ann – who succeeded their parents’ rights and took possession of the 1051 sq. m. of the subject
parcel of land. During her lifetime, Graciana sold her share over the land to Etta. Thus, making the latter the sole
owner of the one-half share of the subject parcel of land. Subsequently, Etta died and the property passed on to
petitioners Peter and Deborah Ann by virtue of an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate. On June 19, 1999, petitioners
Peter and Deborah Ann sold 200 sq. m. out of the 1051 sq. m. for P200,000.00 to Spouses Dionisio and Catalina
Fernandez (Spouses Fernandez), also their co-respondents in the case at bar. After the sale, Spouses Fernandez
took possession of the said area in the subject parcel of land.4

When Spouses Fernandez, tried to register their share in the subject land, they discovered that certain documents
prevent them from doing so: (1) Affidavit by Anacleto Cabrera dated March 16, 1957 stating that his share in Lot No.
1851, the subject property, is approximately 369 sq. m.; (2) Affidavit by Dionisia Reyes dated July 13, 1929 stating
that Anacleto only owned ¼ of Lot No. 1851, while 302.55 sq. m. belongs to Dionisia and the rest of the property is
co-owned by Nicolasa Bacalso, Juan Reyes, Florentino Reyes and Maximiano Dico; (3) Extra-Judicial Settlement
with Sale of the Estate of Dionisia Reyes dated April 17, 1996; (4) certificates of title in the name of the herein
petitioners; and (5) Deed of Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale dated March 21, 1997 executed by
the alleged heirs of Dionisia Reyes and Anacleto Cabrera. Alleging that the foregoing documents are fraudulent and
fictitious, the respondents filed a complaint for annulment or nullification of the aforementioned documents and for
damages. 5 They likewise prayed for the "repartition and resubdivision" of the subject property.6

The RTC, upon motion of the herein petitioners, dismissed the case on the ground that the respondents-plaintiffs
were actually seeking first and foremost to be declared heirs of Anacleto Cabrera since they can not demand the
partition of the real property without first being declared as legal heirs and such may not be done in an ordinary civil
action, as in this case, but through a special proceeding specifically instituted for the purpose.7

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTC and directed the trial court to proceed with the hearing of the
case.8 The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the herein petitioners was similarly denied.9

Hence this petition.

The primary issue in this case is whether or not the respondents have to institute a special proceeding to determine
their status as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera before they can file an ordinary civil action to nullify the affidavits of Anacleto
Cabrera and Dionisia Reyes, the Extra-Judicial Settlement with the Sale of Estate of Dionisia Reyes, and the Deed of
Segregation of Real Estate and Confirmation of Sale executed by the heirs of Dionisia Reyes and the heirs of
Anacleto Cabrera, as well as to cancel the new transfer certificates of title issued by virtue of the above-questioned
documents.

We answer in the affirmative.

An ordinary civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.10 A special proceeding, on the other hand, is a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact.11

The Rules of Court provide that only a real party in interest is allowed to prosecute and defend an action in court.12 A
real party in interest is the one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the one entitled to
the avails thereof.13 Such interest, to be considered a real interest, must be one which is present and substantial, as
distinguished from a mere expectancy, or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential interest.14 A plaintiff is a
real party in interest when he is the one who has a legal right to enforce or protect, while a defendant is a real party in
interest when he is the one who has a correlative legal obligation to redress a wrong done to the plaintiff by reason of
the defendant’s act or omission which had violated the legal right of the former.15 The purpose of the rule is to protect
persons against undue and unnecessary litigation.16 It likewise ensures that the court will have the benefit of having
before it the real adverse parties in the consideration of a case.17 Thus, a plaintiff’s right to institute an ordinary civil
action should be based on his own right to the relief sought.

In cases wherein alleged heirs of a decedent in whose name a property was registered sue to recover the said
property through the institution of an ordinary civil action, such as a complaint for reconveyance and partition,18 or
nullification of transfer certificate of titles and other deeds or documents related thereto,19 this Court has consistently
ruled that a declaration of heirship is improper in an ordinary civil action since the matter is "within the exclusive
competence of the court in a special proceeding." 20 In the recent case of Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran,21 the Court
had the occasion to clarify its ruling on the issue at hand, to wit:
 The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the
estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings
are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the
case, a need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised
and settled in said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been
finally closed and terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the
special proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can
be filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or
adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.22

In the instant case, while the complaint was denominated as an action for the "Declaration of Non-Existency[sic],
Nullity of Deeds, and Cancellation of Certificates of Title, etc.," a review of the allegations therein reveals that the
right being asserted by the respondents are their right as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who they claim co-owned one-
half of the subject property and not merely one-fourth as stated in the documents the respondents sought to annul.
As correctly pointed out by the trial court, the ruling in the case of Heirs of Guido Yaptinchay v. Hon. Roy del
Rosario23 is applicable in the case at bar. In the said case, the petitioners therein, claiming to be the legal heirs of the
late Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay filed for annulment of the transfer certificates of title issued in the name of Golden
Bay Realty Corporation on the ground that the subject properties rightfully belong to the petitioners’ predecessor and
by virtue of succession have passed on to them. In affirming the trial court therein, this Court ruled:

...(T)he plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not shown
any proof or even a semblance of it — except the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the
aforementioned Yaptinchays — that they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now,
the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take precedence
over the action for reconveyance.24

In the same manner, the respondents herein, except for their allegations, have yet to substantiate their claim as the
legal heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are, thus, entitled to the subject property. Neither is there anything in the records
of this case which would show that a special proceeding to have themselves declared as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
had been instituted. As such, the trial court correctly dismissed the case for there is a lack of cause of action when a
case is instituted by parties who are not real parties in interest. While a declaration of heirship was not prayed for in
the complaint, it is clear from the allegations therein that the right the respondents sought to protect or enforce is that
of an heir of one of the registered co-owners of the property prior to the issuance of the new transfer certificates of
title that they seek to cancel. Thus, there is a need to establish their status as such heirs in the proper forum.

Furthermore, in Portugal,25 the Court held that it would be superfluous to still subject the estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of the parties' status as heirs could be achieved in the ordinary civil case filed
because it appeared from the records of the case that the only property left by the decedent was the subject matter of
the case and that the parties have already presented evidence to establish their right as heirs of the decedent. In the
present case, however, nothing in the records of this case shows that the only property left by the deceased Anacleto
Cabrera is the subject lot, and neither had respondents Peter and Deborah Ann presented any evidence to establish
their rights as heirs, considering especially that it appears that there are other heirs of Anacleto Cabrera who are not
parties in this case that had signed one of the questioned documents. Hence, under the circumstances in this case,
this Court finds that a determination of the rights of respondents Peter and Deborah Ann as heirs of Anacleto Cabrera
in a special proceeding is necessary.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and the
decision of the Regional Trial Court dated June 29, 2000 DISMISSING the complaint is REINSTATED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

________________________________________________________________

G.R. No. 198680               July 8, 2013

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON, NAMELY, ALVARO YPON, ERUDITA Y. BARON, CICERO YPON, WILSON
YPON, VICTOR YPON, AND HINIDINO Y. PEÑALOSA, PETITIONERS,
vs.
GAUDIOSO PONTERAS RICAFORTE A.K.A. "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
TOLEDO CITY, RESPONDENTS.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

This is a direct recourse to the Court from the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 59 (RTC), through a
petition for review on certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, raising a pure question of law. In particular,
petitioners assail the July 27, 20112 and August 31, 20113 Orders of the RTC, dismissing Civil Case No. T-2246 for
lack of cause of action.

The Facts

On July 29, 2010, petitioners, together with some of their cousins,4 filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and
Reconveyance with Damages (subject complaint) against respondent Gaudioso Ponteras Ricaforte a.k.a. "Gaudioso
E. Ypon" (Gaudioso), docketed as Civil Case No. T-2246.5 In their complaint, they alleged that Magdaleno Ypon
(Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C, 2-F, and 2-J which
were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.6 Claiming to be the sole heir of
Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication and caused the cancellation of the aforementioned
certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transfer in his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7 to the
prejudice of petitioners who are Magdaleno’s collateral relatives and successors-in-interest.8

In his Answer, Gaudioso alleged that he is the lawful son of Magdaleno as evidenced by: (a) his certificate of Live
Birth; (b) two (2) letters from Polytechnic School; and (c) a certified true copy of his passport.9 Further, by way of
affirmative defense, he claimed that: (a) petitioners have no cause of action against him; (b) the complaint fails to
state a cause of action; and (c) the case is not prosecuted by the real parties-in-interest, as there is no showing that
the petitioners have been judicially declared as Magdaleno’s lawful heirs.10

The RTC Ruling

On July 27, 2011, the RTC issued the assailed July 27, 2011 Order,11 finding that the subject complaint failed to state
a cause of action against Gaudioso. It observed that while the plaintiffs therein had established their relationship with
Magdaleno in a previous special proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration,12 this did not mean that they
could already be considered as the decedent’s compulsory heirs. Quite the contrary, Gaudioso satisfactorily
established the fact that he is Magdaleno’s son – and hence, his compulsory heir – through the documentary
evidence he submitted which consisted of: (a) a marriage contract between Magdaleno and Epegenia Evangelista;
(b) a Certificate of Live Birth; (c) a Letter dated February 19, 1960; and (d) a passport.13

The plaintiffs therein filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied on August 31, 2011 due to the
counsel’s failure to state the date on which his Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance was
issued.14

Aggrieved, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. T-2246,15 sought direct recourse to the Court
through the instant petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The core of the present controversy revolves around the issue of whether or not the RTC’s dismissal of the case on
the ground that the subject complaint failed to state a cause of action was proper.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition has no merit.

Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.16 It is well-settled that
the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint.17 In this relation, a complaint is
said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would
be entitled to the relief prayed for.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can
be maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the
defendants.19

As stated in the subject complaint, petitioners, who were among the plaintiffs therein, alleged that they are the lawful
heirs of Magdaleno and based on the same, prayed that the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Gaudioso be
declared null and void and that the transfer certificates of title issued in the latter’s favor be cancelled. While the
foregoing allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for in the said complaint,
the rule that the determination of a decedent’s lawful heirs should be made in the corresponding special
proceeding20 precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of title and reconveyance, from granting the
same. In the case of Heirs of Teofilo Gabatan v. CA,21 the Court, citing several other precedents, held that the
determination of who are the decedent’s lawful heirs must be made in the proper special proceeding for such
purpose, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and/or possession, as in this case:

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must be made in the proper
special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownership and possession of
property.1âwphi1 This must take precedence over the action for recovery of possession and ownership. The Court
has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make a declaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that
such a declaration can only be made in a special proceeding. Under Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Revised Rules of
Court, a civil action is defined as one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong while a special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status,
a right, or a particular fact. It is then decisively clear that the declaration of heirship can be made only in a special
proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the establishment of a status or right.

In the early case of Litam, et al. v. Rivera, this Court ruled that the declaration of heirship must be made in a special
proceeding, and not in an independent civil action. This doctrine was reiterated in Solivio v. Court of Appeals x x x:

In the more recent case of Milagros Joaquino v. Lourdes Reyes, the Court reiterated its ruling that matters relating to
the rights of filiation and heirship must be ventilated in the proper probate court in a special proceeding instituted
precisely for the purpose of determining such rights. Citing the case of Agapay v. Palang, this Court held that the
status of an illegitimate child who claimed to be an heir to a decedent's estate could not be adjudicated in an ordinary
civil action which, as in this case, was for the recovery of property.22 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations
omitted)

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination of heirship may be
dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case had voluntarily submitted the issue to
the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently
rendered judgment thereon,23 or when a special proceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.24

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence, there lies the need
to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of the parties involved, ultimately resulting
to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

Verily, while a court usually focuses on the complaint in determining whether the same fails to state a cause of action,
a court cannot disregard decisions material to the proper appreciation of the questions before it.25 Thus, concordant
with applicable jurisprudence, since a determination of heirship cannot be made in an ordinary action for recovery of
ownership and/or possession, the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 was altogether proper. In this light, it must be
pointed out that the RTC erred in ruling on Gaudioso’s heirship which should, as herein discussed, be threshed out
and determined in the proper special proceeding. As such, the foregoing pronouncement should therefore be devoid
of any legal effect.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246 is hereby AFFIRMED, without
prejudice to any subsequent proceeding to determine the lawful heirs of the late Magdaleno Ypon and the rights
concomitant therewith.
SO ORDERED

________________________________________________________________

G.R. No. L-50553             February 19, 1991

NAZARIO VITA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
SOLEDAD MONTANANO, ESTANISLAO JOVELLANO and ESTEBANA JOVELLANO, defendants-appellants.
JOSE, ELENA AND ALODIA, ALL SURNAMED MONTANO, intervenors-appellants.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

In a resolution dated March 16, 1979, the Court of Appeals certified this case to Us because it involves pure
questions of law (pp. 70-80, Rollo).

The pertinent facts are as follows:

A complaint was filed before the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Laguna by plaintiff-appellant
Nazario Vita, in his capacity as judicial administrator of the estate of deceased Edilberto Vita, seeking to recover from
defendants-appellants Soledad Montanano, Estanislao Jovellano and Estebana Jovellano the possession of three (3)
parcels of land located in Barrio Talangan, Nagcarlan, Laguna and their annual yield since January, 1962 in the
amount of P1,100.00 a year. Plaintiff-appellant claims that during the lifetime of Edilberto Vita, he was the owner and
possessor of these three (3) parcels of land covered by: Tax Declaration No. 1252 (73, old) with an area of 3,640
square meters, Tax Declaration No. 1231 (72, old) with an area of 1,000 square meters, and Tax Declaration No.
1253 (4, old) with an area of 640 square meters; and he was enjoying the fruits therefrom. When he died on January
23, 1962, defendants-appellants, through stealth and strategy, took possession of the above-stated parcels of land
and gathered the fruits therefrom. Notwithstanding demands from plaintiff-appellant, defendants-appellants refused to
surrender the possession of these parcels of land. Plaintiff-appellant further claims reimbursement in the sum of
P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and P1,000.00 as actual or compensatory damages.

In their answer dated December 1, 1964, defendants-appellants deny that the three (3) parcels of land belong to the
estate of Edilberto Vita. Instead, they claim that the two parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1252 and Tax
Declaration No. 1231 belong to Soledad Montanano as these were conveyed to her by Isidra Montanano (her aunt
and wife of Edilberto Vita) and Edilberto Vita in a document signed and executed by them on November 22, 1938 and
ratified by one Mr. Matienzo, a Notary Public from Nagcarlan, Laguna. However, all copies of said document were
lost during the last war. The parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1253 is owned in common by Soledad
Montanano, her brother Jose and sisters Elena and Alodia. It originally belonged to Francisca Asilo, deceased sister
of their grandmother, Micaela Asilo. Its ownership was transferred to them under the arrangement sanctioned by
Edilberto Vita himself wherein all the proceeds from the yearly harvests therefrom shall be spent for the yearly
masses to be held for the souls of Francisca Asilo and Isidra Montanano. This being the case, plaintiff-appellant is
now estopped from instituting this action. Defendants-appellants claim also that Edilberto Vita could not have
inherited these parcels of land from Isidra Montanano as the latter's estate has never been the subject of a judicial or
extra-judicial proceeding. The erroneous inclusion of these parcels of land in the inventory of the estate of Edilberto
Vita in Special Proceedings No. SC-136 of the Court of First Instance of Laguna does not make them actually a part
of his estate. There is no fixed income from these parcels of land because since 1962, plaintiff-appellant, with
unknown persons, has been gathering whatever crops that may be taken therefrom. And, by reason of the malicious
filing of this complaint, they seek reimbursement of the amount of P1,000.00 representing attorney's fees and other
litigation expenses.

Replying to defendants-appellants' answer, plaintiff-appellant claims that Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita never
executed any document on November 22, 1938 and if they had, it was thereafter repudiated, canceled and
destroyed, for which reason, the three (3) parcels of land remained in the possession of Isidra Montanano and
Edilberto Vita; that upon the death on September 25, 1957 of Isidra Montanano, who left neither descendants nor
ascendants, her surviving spouse Edilberto Vita succeeded her and took immediate possession of her estate; and
that from the time defendants-appellants took possession of these parcels of land, they have continuously gathered
the fruits therefrom.
In a petition dated August 20, 1966, Jose, Elena and Alodia Montanano sought leave of court to intervene in this
case. In the order of the trial court dated April 12, 1967, the amended answer dated September 10, 1966, which
intervenors-appellants filed jointly with Soledad Montanano, was admitted as their answer-in-intervention.
Incorporated therein is a counterclaim that Soledad, Jose, Elena and Alodia Montanano are the co-owners of (pp. 43-
44, Record on Appeal):

(a) A parcel of coconut land situated in Bo. Bangbang, Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing an area of 2,450
square meters, more or less, covered by Tax Declaration No. 8953;

(b) A parcel of coconut and secano land situated in Bo. Buboy, Nagcarlan, Laguna with an area of 15,096
square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 10228;

(c) A parcel of coconut land, with its improvements, situated in Bo. Yucos, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with an area
of 2,500 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 7999;

(d) A parcel of coconut land, with its improvements, situated in Bo. Talangan, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with an
area of 12,865 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 1233 (sic) (third parcel of
land in the complaint); and

(e) A parcel of residential land, with its improvements, situated in Gen. Luna, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with an
area of 167.50 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 102;

that Jose Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, ibid):

(a) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Bangbang, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with
an area of 10,000 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 6493; and

(b) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Banago, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with
an area of 9,604 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 8304;

that Soledad Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, ibid):

(a) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Talangan, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with
an area of 4,165 square meters more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 123 (sic) (the second
parcel of land in the complaint); and

(b) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Talangan, Nagcarlan, Laguna,
containing an area of 10,434 square meters, more or less; and covered by Tax Declaration No. 1252 (the
first parcel of land in the complaint);

that Alodia Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, Ibid):

(a) A parcel of coconut land and irrigated riceland, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Buboy,
Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing an area of 24,153 square meters, more or less and covered by Tax
Declaration No. 10268; and

(b) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Buboy, Nagcarlan, Laguna,
containing an area of 1,619 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 8510;

that Elena Montanano is the sole owner of (p. 44, Ibid):

(a) A parcel of coconut land, with improvements thereon, situated in Bo. Buboy, Nagcarlan, Laguna,
containing an area of 6,242 square meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 8511; and

(b) A portion of a parcel of riceland situated at C. Lirio St., Nagcarlan, Laguna, containing an area of 9,691
square meters, more or less and covered by Tax Declaration No. 1184.
They alleged therein that they acquired ownership of the three (3) parcels of land mentioned in the complaint, which
are in the possession of Soledad Montanano, and the other parcels of land mentioned in their counterclaim, which
are in the possession of plaintiff-appellant, by virtue of a donation mortis causa executed by Isidra Montanano on
November 22, 1938 or by a donation executed by her on December 20, 1940 which was confirmed by Edilberto Vita.
They pray that these parcels of land be adjudicated to them in the manner set forth in their counterclaim; that plaintiff-
appellant be ordered to account for the harvests from these parcels of land from the time he took possession; and
that they be awarded damages corresponding to their litigation expenses.

In his reply dated July 4, 1967, plaintiff-appellant denied all the allegations contained in the answer-in-intervention
and reiterated that there was no such donation executed by Isidra Montanano. If such donation were really executed,
she was forced to do so at a time when she was not mentally in a position to execute and sign freely said document.

On September 15, 1973, the trial court rendered judgment adverse to all parties, the dispositive portion of which
reads (p. 52, Record on Appeal):

Considering that the plaintiff has not shown by preponderating evidence that the three (3) parcels of land
covered in the complaint belong to the estate of Edilberto Vita and it appearing likewise that the defendants
and intervenors have not shown that the parcels of land covered in the counterclaim were validly donated to
them and that they have legally accepted the donation made by Isidra Montanano, the complaint filed by the
plaintiff and the counterclaim filed by the intervenors are hereby DISMISSED. This is without prejudice to the
filing of a separate proceedings (sic) in Court for the proper disposition of the estate of the deceased Isidra
Montanano, including that of her share in the fruits of the properties donated to her during her marriage with
Edilberto Vita which is considered part of their conjugal properties. No assessment is hereby made with
respect to the damages sustained by the parties as they offset each other, if any.

Without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

All parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. The case is now before Us raising mainly the following legal issues:

1) whether or not the three (3) parcels of land mentioned in the complaint are included in the estate of Edilberto Vita
(as regards the appeal of plaintiff-appellant); and

2) whether or not acceptance is necessary in a donation mortis causa; and whether the donation dated December 20,
1940 is mortis causa or  inter vivos (with respect to the appeal of defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants).

Plaintiff-appellant avers that the trial court failed to consider that Edilberto Vita's right to the conjugal half in the first
two parcels as surviving spouse had ceased to be inchoate upon the death of Isidra in 1957, and that such right had
been vested upon him by operation of law. With respect to the conjugal half pertaining to Isidra in said two parcels,
and the entirety of the third parcel as her paraphernal property, they were likewise vested upon him by operation of
law, subject only to the right of her nephew and nieces, pursuant to Articles 995 and 1001 of the New Civil Code.

In other words, plaintiff-appellant is again claiming that the parcels of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1252 (73,
old) and Tax Declaration No. 1231 (72, old) are conjugal properties of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita whereas
the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1253 (4, old) is the paraphernal property of Isidra Montanano. We
are in conformity with the finding of the trial court that the three (3) parcels of land mentioned in the complaint were
paraphernal properties of Isidra Montanano, being supported by documentary and testimonial evidence (p. 48,
Record on Appeal):

. . . plaintiff claims that in accordance with the inventory prepared by Edilberto Vita of his properties before
his death (Exhs. "O", "O-1", "O-1-A", "O-1-B", and "O-1-C"), the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration
No. 4 (old) was a paraphernal property of his wife Isidra Montanano while the parcels of land covered by Tax
Declaration Nos. 72 (old) and 73 were conjugal properties of the spouses Edilberto Vita and Isidra
Montanano as they were donated to the latter by Francisca Asilo during their marriage. It is the contention of
the plaintiff that upon the death of Isidra Montanano, her husband Edilberto Vita acquired ownership of these
properties.
 This contention of the plaintiff in effect corroborates the claim of the defendants and intervenors that an the
three (3) parcels of land, subject-matter of the complaint, including all the parcels of land being claimed by
them in the intervenor's counterclaim, were all paraphernal properties of Isidra Montanano. The two (2)
parcels of land supposedly received as donation by Isidra Montanano during her marriage with Edilberto Vita
should be classified as her paraphernal properties, it being acquired by her through lucrative title (Art. 148,
Civil Code). On the other hand, plaintiffs testimony that the third parcel of land covered in the complaint was
inherited by Edilberto Vita from Isidra Montanano is an admission that the said property was the paraphernal
property of the latter.

The defendants and intervenors claim that the above-stated three (3) parcels of land and the properties
covered in their counterclaim were donated to them by Isidra Montanano by virtue of two (2) deeds of
donation she executed on November 22, 1938 and December 20, 1940. They presented testimonial and
documentary evidence to prove that Isidra Montanano acquired all these parcels of land, either by
inheritance or donation, from her father Domingo Montanano, her aunt Francisca Asilo and her uncle Juan
Asilo. Aside from this, the tax declarations covering the properties involved in the complaint and
counterclaim are mostly in the name of Isidra Montanano, except one each in the name of her father
Domingo Montanano, her aunt Francisca Asilo and her nephew Jose Samonte. The court is convinced,
therefore, that all the properties involved in t litigation were the paraphernal properties of the deceased Isidra
Montanano.

Whatever merit there may be in plaintiff-appellant's claim that upon the death of Isidra Montanano, the ownership of
these parcels of land (except with respect to the parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 1253 (4, old) which
was validly donated to defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants by Isidra Montanano, as We shall discuss
later) are vested upon Edilberto Vita by operation of law, subject only to the right of her nephew and nieces,
liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita must be undertaken prior to the
adjudication of properties to the heirs (Vicente J. Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, 1970
Edition, p. 619). In this connection, contrary to the trial court's ruling, it is not necessary to file a separate proceeding
in court for the proper disposition of the estate of Isidra Montanano. Under Rule 73, Section 2 of the Rules of Court, if
both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either.
In the present case, therefore, the conjugal partnership of Isidra Montanano and Edilberto Vita should be liquidated in
the testate proceedings of the latter.

Defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants allege the following: 1) that a donation mortis causa (as in the case
of the November 22, 1938 donation), being in the nature of a legacy, need not be accepted; their acceptance of that
donation is superfluous and 2) that the December 20, 1940 donation is a donation inter vivos because: a) there is no
stipulation or provision therein that the donation is essentially revocable; b) there was an acceptance of the donation;
c) the donation was not simply made in consideration of the death of the donor but of her affection for the donees.

It is explicit in Article 725 * of the Civil Code that acceptance is necessary in a donation. This applies to all kinds of
donation because the law does not make any distinction. The rationale behind the requirement of acceptance is that
nobody is obliged to receive a benefit against his will (Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the
Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume II, 1972 Edition, p. 521). We uphold the trial court that (p. 50, Record on
Appeal):

. . . notwithstanding the fact that from the secondary evidence presented, the said deed of donation mortis
causa of November 22, 1938 seems to have been legally and validly executed, it cannot be given force and
effect as the acceptance thereof by the donees is void and illegal in as much (sic) as they were made at the
time of the execution of the document, not after the death of the donor Isidra Montanano. A donation mortis
causa takes effect only after the death of the donor, consequently it is only after the latter's death that its
acceptance maybe made.

x x x           x x x          x x x

However, We adopt a view contrary to that of the trial court regarding the second allegation of defendants-appellants
and intervenors-appellants. According to the trial court (p. 50, Record on Appeal):

The defendants and intervenors further claim that all the properties covered by that counterclaim were
donated to them by Isidra Montanano pursuant to a second deed of donation executed by the latter on
 December 20, 1940 (Exh. "3"). A careful study of the said document, however, shows that it is another deed
of donation mortis causa, considering the following provisions appearing therein with respect to its effectivity:

Na bagaman at sa kasulatang ito ay lubusan ng ibinibigay at ipinagkakaloob sa bawat isa ng pag-

aaring dito'y itinungod sa kani-kanila, matangi ang ganang napaukol sa kay Dr. Vicente C.
Chipongian at kay Maria Osuna, na iyon ay patuluyan nang ngayo'y iginagawad sa kanila ng
walang pasubali, na magagawa na nila ang buong karapatan ngayon bilang tunay na may-ari,
gayon man, ay kami pa ring mag-asawa ang mananatili sa pag-mamayari, pakikinabang at
pamomosision sa kani-kaniyang pag-aaring ditoy ipinagkakaloob, sa buong panahon na ang bawat
isa sa amin mag-asawa'y nabubuhay, at kung kailan bawian kami ng hiram na buhay, ay saka at
saka pa lamang maaring matamo nila ang ganap na pagmamayari at pakikinabang sa mga pag-
aaring iyan na dito'y inihayag nila ang pagtangap.

From this provision of the document, it clearly appears that the donors shall continue to be the owner and
possessors of the properties involved in the donation and shall continue to enjoy the fruits of said properties
while they are still living and it is only upon their death that ownership will transfer to the donees. It was the
evident intent of the donors in this case to give the donation after their death. In the meantime, they retain
full or naked ownership and control of the properties while they are still living and title will pass to the donees
only after their death. This is donation mortis causa (Heirs of Bonsato v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-6600,
July 30, 1954, 50 O.G. 3568; Howard v. Padilla, G.R. L-7064, 7098, April 22, 1955).

The quoted provision in the second deed of donation should be understood in its entirety.1âwphi1 Thus, based on the
first part of the paragraph which states " '[n]a bagaman at sa kasulatang ito ay lubusan ng ibinibigay at
ipinagkakaloob sa bawat isa . . . na iyon ay patuluyan nang ngayo'y iginagawad sa kanila ng walang pasubali,
na magagawa na nila ang buong karapatan ngayon bilang tunay na may-ari . . . " (Emphasis supplied), supra, it was
obviously the intention of Isidra Montanano to grant a donation inter vivos to defendants-appellants and intervenors-
appellants. Although the rest of the paragraph states "'gayon man, ay kami pa ring mag-asawa ang mananatili sa
pag-mamayari, pakikinabang at pamomosision, –– na kani-kaniyang pag-aaring dito'y ipinagkakaloob, sa buong
panahon na ang bawat isa sa amin mag-asawa'y nabubuhay, at kung kailan bawian kami ng hiram na buhay, ay
saka at saka pa lamang maaring matamo nila ang ganap na pagmamayari at pakikinabang sa mga pag-aaring
iyan . . . supra," We have adjudged in the case of Heirs of Juan Bonsato, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 95 Phil.
481, 488:

It is true that the last paragraph in each donation contains the phrase "that after the death of the donor the
aforesaid donation shall become effective." . . . However, said expression must be construed together with
the rest of the paragraph, and thus taken, its meaning clearly appears to be that after the donor's death, the
donation will take effect so as to make the donees the absolute owners of the donated property, free from all
liens and encumbrances; for it must be remembered that the donor reserved for himself a share of the fruits
of the land donated. Such reservation constituted a charge or encumbrance that would disappear upon the
donor's death, when full title would become vested in the donees.

It was also Our observation therein that (ibid, at p. 487):

. . . The donor only reserved for Himself, during his lifetime, the owner's share of the fruits or produce . . . a
reservation that would be unnecessary if the ownership of the donated property remained with the donor.
Most significant is the absence of stipulation that the donor could revoke the donations . . .

Furthermore, mention must be made of the fact that the consideration of the second deed of donation is love and
services rendered by defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants to Isidra Montanano, as revealed by the third
and fourth paragraphs therein (Exhibit "3," for the defendants):

Na sapagkat ang banal kong nais ay kung bawian man ako ng aking hiram na buhay ay matumbasan man
lamang sa pamamag-itan ng isinasagawa kong pagkakaloob sa hinaharap na kasulatan yuong manga
pagdamay, pagmamahal at paghahasikaso na tinanggap ko at tunay na ipinakita sa akin ng mga ditoy
itinangi ko, ––

Kaya't dahil diya'y buong puso kong ibinibigay, isinusulit at ganap na IPINAGKAKALOOB, ang mga natitira
ko pang mga pag-aari, na wala pang kinatutunguran o napagbibigyan, sa kaparaanang dito'y itinatagubilen
ko, sa manga taong gaya nitong mga sumusunod:
 x x x           x x x          x x x

As We have ruled in Concepcion, et al. v. Concepcion, 91 Phil. 823, 830:

. . . even if he (donor) says it (the donation) is to take effect after his death, when from the body of the
instrument or donation it is to be gathered that the main consideration of the donation is not the death of the
donor but rather services rendered to him by the donee or his affection for the latter, then the donation
should be considered as inter vivos, . . . and the condition that the donation is to take effect only after the
death of the donor should be interpreted as meaning that the possession and enjoyment of the its of the
property donated should take place only after donor's death.

Along the same line of ratiocination is Our holding in Balaqui, et al. v. Dongso, et al., 53 Phil. 673, 677:

. . . that as the donor guaranteed the right which she conferred on the donee by virtue of the deed of gift,
wherein, in recompense of the latter's good services to the former, she donates to her the two parcels of
land with their improvements, said gift is inter vivos and irrevocable, and not mortis causa, notwithstanding
the fact that the donor stated in said deed that she did not transfer the ownership of the two parcels of land
donated, save upon her death, for such a statement can mean nothing else than that she only reserved to
herself the possession and usufruct of said property, and because the donor could not very well guarantee
the aforesaid right after her death.

ACCORDINGLY, the appeal of plaintiff-appellant is hereby DENIED whereas the appeal of defendants-appellants is
hereby PARTLY GRANTED. The decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna dated September 15, 1973 is
MODIFIED as follows: 1) the dismissal of the complaint of plaintiff-appellant is AFFIRMED; 2) the dismissal of the
counterclaim of defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants is SET ASIDE; and 3) plaintiff-appellant is ordered:
a) to deliver the possession of the properties donated to defendants-appellants and intervenors-appellants by virtue
of the deed of donation dated December 20, 1940, and b) to render an accounting of the products harvested
therefrom from January 23, 1962 up to the present.

SO ORDERED.

____________________________________________________________________

G.R. No. 134100               September 29, 2000

PURITA ALIPIO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ROMEO G. JARING, represented by his Attorney-In-Fact RAMON G.
JARING, respondents.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

The question for decision in this case is whether a creditor can sue the surviving spouse for the collection of a debt
which is owed by the conjugal partnership of gains, or whether such claim must be filed in proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of the decedent. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in the affirmative. We reverse.

The facts are as follows:

Respondent Romeo Jaring1 was the lessee of a 14.5 hectare fishpond in Barito, Mabuco, Hermosa, Bataan. The
lease was for a period of five years ending on September 12, 1990. On June 19, 1987, he subleased the fishpond, for
the remaining period of his lease, to the spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and the spouses Bienvenido and
Remedios Manuel. The stipulated amount of rent was ₱485,600.00, payable in two installments of ₱300,000.00 and
₱185,600.00, with the second installment falling due on June 30, 1989. Each of the four sublessees signed the
contract.
The first installment was duly paid, but of the second installment, the sublessees only satisfied a portion thereof,
leaving an unpaid balance of ₱50,600.00. Despite due demand, the sublessees failed to comply with their obligation,
so that, on October 13, 1989, private respondent sued the Alipio and Manuel spouses for the collection of the said
amount before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Dinalupihan, Bataan. In the alternative, he prayed for the
rescission of the sublease contract should the defendants fail to pay the balance.

Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her husband, Placido Alipio, had passed away
on December 1, 1988.2 She based her action on Rule 3, §21 of the 1964 Rules of Court which then provided that
"when the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in
the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules."
This provision has been amended so that now Rule 3, §20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

When the action is for the recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before
entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed
but shall instead be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff
therein shall be enforced in the manner especially provided in these Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate
of a deceased person.

The trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that since petitioner was herself a party to the sublease
contract, she could be independently impleaded in the suit together with the Manuel spouses and that the death of
her husband merely resulted in his exclusion from the case.3 The Manuel spouses failed to file their answer. For this
reason, they were declared in default.

On February 26, 1991, the lower court rendered judgment after trial, ordering petitioner and the Manuel spouses to
pay private respondent the unpaid balance of ₱50,600.00 plus attorney's fees in the amount of ₱10,000.00 and the
costs of the suit.

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court erred in denying her motion to dismiss.
In its decision4 rendered on July 10, 1997, the appellate court dismissed her appeal. It held:

The rule that an action for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon must be dismissed when the defendant dies
before final judgment in the regional trial court, does not apply where there are other defendants against whom the
action should be maintained. This is the teaching of Climaco v. Siy Uy, wherein the Supreme Court held:

Upon the facts alleged in the complaint, it is clear that Climaco had a cause of action against the persons named as
defendants therein. It was, however, a cause of action for the recovery of damages, that is, a sum of money, and the
corresponding action is, unfortunately, one that does not survive upon the death of the defendant, in accordance with
the provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

x x x           x x x          x x x

However, the deceased Siy Uy was not the only defendant, Manuel Co was also named defendant in the complaint.
Obviously, therefore, the order appealed from is erroneous insofar as it dismissed the case against Co. (Underlining
added)

Moreover, it is noted that all the defendants, including the deceased, were signatories to the contract of sub-lease.
The remaining defendants cannot avoid the action by claiming that the death of one of the parties to the contract has
totally extinguished their obligation as held in Imperial Insurance, Inc. v. David:

We find no merit in this appeal. Under the law and well settled jurisprudence, when the obligation is a solidary one,
the creditor may bring his action in toto against any of the debtors obligated in solidum. Thus, if husband and wife
bound themselves jointly and severally, in case of his death, her liability is independent of and separate from her
husband's; she may be sued for the whole debt and it would be error to hold that the claim against her as well as the
claim against her husband should be made in the decedent's estate. (Agcaoili vs. Vda. de Agcaoili, 90 Phil. 97).5

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied on June 4, 1998.6 Hence this petition based on the
following assignment of errors:
 A. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING CLIMACO v. SIY UY,
19 SCRA 858, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT THE PETITIONER WAS NOT SEEKING THE DISMISSAL
OF THE CASE AGAINST REMAINING DEFENDANTS BUT ONLY WITH RESPECT TO THE CLAIM FOR
PAYMENT AGAINST HER AND HER HUSBAND WHICH SHOULD BE PROSECUTED AS A MONEY
CLAIM.

B. THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN APPLYING IMPERIAL

INSURANCE INC. v. DAVID, 133 SCRA 317, WHICH IS NOT APPLICABLE BECAUSE THE SPOUSES IN
THIS CASE DID NOT BIND THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT
JARING.7

The petition is meritorious. We hold that a creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary
proceeding for the collection of a sum of money chargeable against the conjugal partnership and that the proper
remedy is for him to file a claim in the settlement of estate of the decedent.

First. Petitioner's husband died on December 1, 1988, more than ten months before private respondent filed the
collection suit in the trial court on October 13, 1989. This case thus falls outside of the ambit of Rule 3, §21 which
deals with dismissals of collection suits because of the death of the defendant during the pendency of the case and
the subsequent procedure to be undertaken by the plaintiff, i.e., the filing of claim in the proceeding for the settlement
of the decedent's estate. As already noted, Rule 3, §20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure now provides that the
case will be allowed to continue until entry of final judgment. A favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein will
then be enforced in the manner especially provided in the Rules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a
deceased person. The issue to be resolved is whether private respondent can, in the first place, file this case against
petitioner.

Petitioner and her late husband, together with the Manuel spouses, signed the sublease contract binding themselves
to pay the amount of stipulated rent. Under the law, the Alipios' obligation (and also that of the Manuels) is one which
is chargeable against their conjugal partnership. Under Art. 161(1) of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable
for ¾

All debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted
by the wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership.8

When petitioner's husband died, their conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved9 and debts chargeable
against it are to be paid in the settlement of estate proceedings in accordance with Rule 73, §2 which states:

Where estate settled upon dissolution of marriage. ¾ When the marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband or
wife, the community property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the
testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be
liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of either.

As held in Calma v. Tañedo,10 after the death of either of the spouses, no complaint for the collection of indebtedness
chargeable against the conjugal partnership can be brought against the surviving spouse. Instead, the claim must be
made in the proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the conjugal property. The reason for this is that upon
the death of one spouse, the powers of administration of the surviving spouse ceases and is passed to the
administrator appointed by the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of estate proceedings.11 Indeed, the
surviving spouse is not even a de facto administrator such that conveyances made by him of any property belonging
to the partnership prior to the liquidation of the mass of conjugal partnership property is void.12

The ruling in Calma v. Tañedo was reaffirmed in the recent case of Ventura v. Militante.13 In that case, the surviving
wife was sued in an amended complaint for a sum of money based on an obligation allegedly contracted by her and
her late husband. The defendant, who had earlier moved to dismiss the case, opposed the admission of the amended
complaint on the ground that the death of her husband terminated their conjugal partnership and that the plaintiff's
claim, which was chargeable against the partnership, should be made in the proceedings for the settlement of his
estate. The trial court nevertheless admitted the complaint and ruled, as the Court of Appeals did in this case, that
since the defendant was also a party to the obligation, the death of her husband did not preclude the plaintiff from
filing an ordinary collection suit against her. On appeal, the Court reversed, holding that ¾
as correctly argued by petitioner, the conjugal partnership terminates upon the death of either spouse. . . . Where a
complaint is brought against the surviving spouse for the recovery of an indebtedness chargeable against said
conjugal [partnership], any judgment obtained thereby is void. The proper action should be in the form of a claim to
be filed in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse.

In many cases as in the instant one, even after the death of one of the spouses, there is no liquidation of the conjugal
partnership. This does not mean, however, that the conjugal partnership continues. And private respondent cannot be
said to have no remedy. Under Sec. 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court, he may apply in court for letters of
administration in his capacity as a principal creditor of the deceased . . . if after thirty (30) days from his death,
petitioner failed to apply for administration or request that administration be granted to some other person.14

The cases relied upon by the Court of Appeals in support of its ruling, namely, Climaco v. Siy Uy15 and Imperial
Insurance, Inc. v. David,16 are based on different sets of facts. In Climaco, the defendants, Carlos Siy Uy and Manuel
Co, were sued for damages for malicious prosecution. Thus, apart from the fact the claim was not against any
conjugal partnership, it was one which does not survive the death of defendant Uy, which merely resulted in the
dismissal of the case as to him but not as to the remaining defendant Manuel Co.

With regard to the case of Imperial, the spouses therein jointly and severally executed an indemnity agreement which
became the basis of a collection suit filed against the wife after her husband had died. For this reason, the Court
ruled that since the spouses' liability was solidary, the surviving spouse could be independently sued in an ordinary
action for the enforcement of the entire obligation.

It must be noted that for marriages governed by the rules of conjugal partnership of gains, an obligation entered into
by the husband and wife is chargeable against their conjugal partnership and it is the partnership which is primarily
bound for its repayment.17 Thus, when the spouses are sued for the enforcement of an obligation entered into by
them, they are being impleaded in their capacity as representatives of the conjugal partnership and not as
independent debtors such that the concept of joint or solidary liability, as between them, does not apply. But even
assuming the contrary to be true, the nature of the obligation involved in this case, as will be discussed later, is not
solidary but rather merely joint, making Imperial still inapplicable to this case.

From the foregoing, it is clear that private respondent cannot maintain the present suit against
petitioner.1âwphi1 Rather, his remedy is to file a claim against the Alipios in the proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of petitioner's husband or, if none has been commenced, he can file a petition either for the issuance of letters
of administration18 or for the allowance of will,19 depending on whether petitioner's husband died intestate or testate.
Private respondent cannot short-circuit this procedure by lumping his claim against the Alipios with those against the
Manuels considering that, aside from petitioner's lack of authority to represent their conjugal estate, the inventory of
the Alipios' conjugal property is necessary before any claim chargeable against it can be paid. Needless to say, such
power exclusively pertains to the court having jurisdiction over the settlement of the decedent's estate and not to any
other court.

Second. The trial court ordered petitioner and the Manuel spouses to pay private respondent the unpaid balance of
the agreed rent in the amount of ₱50,600.00 without specifying whether the amount is to be paid by them jointly or
solidarily. In connection with this, Art. 1207 of the Civil Code provides:

The concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one and the same obligation does not imply
that each one of the former has a right to demand, or that each one of the latter is bound to render, entire compliance
with the prestations. There is a solidary liability only when the obligation expressly so estates, or when the law or the
nature of the obligation requires solidarity.

Indeed, if from the law or the nature or the wording of the obligation the contrary does not appear, an obligation is
presumed to be only joint, i.e., the debt is divided into as many equal shares as there are debtors, each debt being
considered distinct from one another.20

Private respondent does not cite any provision of law which provides that when there are two or more lessees, or in
this case, sublessees, the latter's obligation to pay the rent is solidary. To be sure, should the lessees or sublessees
refuse to vacate the leased property after the expiration of the lease period and despite due demands by the lessor,
they can be held jointly and severally liable to pay for the use of the property. The basis of their solidary liability is not
the contract of lease or sublease but the fact that they have become joint tortfeasors.21 In the case at bar, there is no
allegation that the sublessees refused to vacate the fishpond after the expiration of the term of the sublease. Indeed,
the unpaid balance sought to be collected by private respondent in his collection suit became due on June 30, 1989,
long before the sublease expired on September 12, 1990.

Neither does petitioner contend that it is the nature of lease that when there are more than two lessees or sublessees
their liability is solidary. On the other hand, the pertinent portion of the contract involved in this case reads:22

2. That the total lease rental for the sub-leased fishpond for the entire period of three (3) years and two (2) months is
FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT-FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (₱485,600.00) PESOS, including all the improvements,
prawns, milkfishes, crabs and related species thereon as well all fishing equipment, paraphernalia and
accessories. The said amount shall be paid to the Sub-Lessor by the Sub-Lessees in the following manner, to wit:

A. Three hundred thousand (₱300,000.00) Pesos upon signing this contract; and

B. One Hundred Eight-Five Thousand Six-Hundred (₱185,6000.00) Pesos to be paid on June 30, 1989.

Clearly, the liability of the sublessees is merely joint. Since the obligation of the Manuel and Alipio spouses is
chargeable against their respective conjugal partnerships, the unpaid balance of ₱50,600.00 should be divided into
two so that each couple is liable to pay the amount of ₱25,300.00.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Bienvenido Manuel and Remedios Manuel are ordered to pay the amount
of ₱25,300.00, the attorney's fees in the amount of ₱10,000.00 and the costs of the suit. The complaint against
petitioner is dismissed without prejudice to the filing of a claim by private respondent in the proceedings for the
settlement of estate of Placido Alipio for the collection of the share of the Alipio spouses in the unpaid balance of the
rent in the amount of ₱25,300.00.

SO ORDERED.