Natcher vs.

CA, Heir of Graciano Del Rosario

Facts:

Sps. Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land
located in Manila. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children,
namely: Bayani, Ricardo, Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial
settlement of Graciana’s estate

On 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an “Agreement of

Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights”. Graciano then donated to
his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38
square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters registered under Graciano’s name.

On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage,
Graciano sold his land to his wife Patricia. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his second
wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage, as heirs.

Private respondents filed a complaint alleged that upon Graciano’s death, petitioner Natcher,
through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, making it appear that Graciano
executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor herein petitioner resulting in the
cancellation and the issuance of title in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private
respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their
legitimes have been impaired.

Issue:

May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for
reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by
the decedent to any of the heirs?

Held:

No. The Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of
authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in
favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and
annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said
question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not
properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass upon the question of advancement
made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein petitioner Natcher.

HAGANS v. WISLIZENUS

Facts: This is an original petition, presented in the Supreme Court, for the writ of
certiorari. The facts alleged in the petition are admitted by ademurrer The only question
presented is, whether or not a judge of the Court of First Instance, in "special
proceedings," is authorized under the law to appoint assessors for the purpose of
fixing the amount due to an administrator or executor for his services and expenses in
the care, management, and settlement of the estate of a deceased person.
The respondent judge, in support of his demurrer, argues that the provisions of Act No.
190 permit him to appoint assessors in "special proceedings." The petitioner contends
that no authority in law exists for the appointment of assessors in such proceedings.

Issue/s
1.Whether a CFI judge, in special proceedings, is authorized to appoint assessors

2. Whether an “action” is the same as a “special proceeding”?

1.The only provisions of law which could, by any possibility, permit the appointment of
assessors in "special proceedings" are sections 153-161 of Act No. 190.

1 ALSB2021 Section 154 provides that "either party to an action may apply in writing to
the judge for assessors to sit in the trial. Upon the filing of such application, the judge
shall direct that assessors be provided, . . ."

2. Is a "special proceeding," like the present, an "action"? If it is, then, the court is
expressly authorized by said section 154 to appoint assessors. But upon an
examination of section 1 of Act No. 190, which gives an interpretation of the words used
in said Act, that a distinction is made between an "action" and a "special proceeding."

Montañer vs. Shari’a District Court

Facts

After the death of Alejandro Montañer Sr., Liling and Almahleen, both muslims, filed a
“complaint” for the judicial partition of properties before the Shari’a District Court in
Marawi. They alleged Alejandro Sr was a Muslim, they are the first family, and
requested for the estimated value of the estate of the decedent. They prayed for
partition of the estate of the decedent and appointment of an administrator. Luiso Kho et
al., filed a motion to dismiss upon various grounds. Sharia Court dismissed but
afterwards reconsidered its order of dismissal and allowed Liling et al to adduce further
evidence. In its second order, it ordered the continuation of trial, pre-trial, among others.

Issue

Luisa Kho et al sought recourse before the Supreme Court, and one of the issues raised
was that (II) the Shari’a District Court did not acquire jurisdiction over the complaint of
Liling et al because the “Estates and Properties of the Late Alendro Sr.” is not a natural
or Juridical person with capacity to be sued.

Ruling

SC: The underlying presumption of Luisa Kho et al is an erroneous understanding of

special proceedings before the Sharia court – they presume that it is an ordinary civil
action against a deceased person. Part of it may be because of the designation of the
parties as plaintiffs or defendants and the case was denominated as a special civil
action.

1. A petition for issuance of letters of administration is a petition to establish a

right or status

The proceedings before the Shari’a court for the issuance of letters of administration,
settlement, and distribution of the estates is a special proceeding. Rule 1, Sec. 3(c) of
the Rules of Court defines a special proceeding as “a remedy by which a party seeks to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact”

In Musa v. Moson, the Court applied the rules on special proceedings for the settlement
of the estate of a deceased Muslim. When Liling et al filed a petition for the issuance of
letters of administration, etc, they sought to establish a special proceeding by seeking to
establish the fact of death of the decedent and later be recognized as the heirs (a status
or right).

2. In a special proceeding, there is no definite adverse party. has only one definite
party.
3. The estate is not sued for any cause of action because the purpose of the
settlement of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate, pay its
liabilities, and distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.
PACIFIC BANKING CORPORATION v. CA, GR No. L-41014, 1988-11-28
Facts:
On October 21, 1963, Fire Policy No. F-3770 (Exhibit "A"), an open policy, was issued to
the Paramount Shirt Manufacturing Co. (hereinafter referred to as the insured, for
brevity), by which private respondent Oriental Assurance Corporation bound itself to
indemnify the insured... for any loss or damage, not exceeding P61,000.00, caused by
fire to its property consisting of stocks, materials and supplies usual to a shirt factory,
including furniture, fixtures, machinery and equipment while contained in the ground,
second and third floors of the building... situated at number 256 Jaboneros St., San.
Nicolas, Manila, for a period of one year commencing from that date to October 21,
1964.
The insured was at the time of the issuance of the policy and is up to this time, a debtor
of petitioner in the amount of not less than Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P800,000.00) and the goods described in the policy were held in trust by the insured
for the petitioner under... trust receipts
Said policy was duly endorsed to petitioner as mortgagee/trustor of the properties
insured, with the knowledge and consent of private respondent to the effect that "loss if
any under this policy is payable to the Pacific Banking Corporation".
On January 4, 1964, while the aforesaid policy was in full force and effect, a fire broke
out on the subject premises destroying the goods contained in its ground and second
floors
On January 24, 1964, counsel for the petitioner sent a letter of demand to private
respondent for indemnity due to the loss of property by fire under the endorsement of
said policy (Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, pp. 16-17).
On January 28, 1964, private respondent informed counsel for the petitioner that it was
not yet ready to accede to the latter's demand as the former is awaiting the final report
of the insurance adjuster, H.H. Bayne Adjustment Company ( On March 25, 1964, the
said insurance adjuster notified counsel for the petitioner that the insured under the
policy had not filed any claim with it, nor submitted proof of loss which is a clear
violation of Policy Condition No. 11, and for which reason, determina­tion of the... liability
of private respondent could not be had
On April 24, 1964, petitioner's counsel replied to aforesaid letter asking the insurance
adjuster to verify from the records of the Bureau of Customs the entries of merchandise
taken into the customs bonded warehouse razed by fire as a reliable proof of loss
(Supra, pp.
21-22). For failure of the insurance company to pay the loss as demanded, petitioner
(plaintiff there­in) on April 28, 1964, filed in the court a quo an action for a sum of money
against the private respondent, Oriental Assurance Corporation, in the principal sum of
P61,000.00 issued in favor of Paramount Shirt Manufacturing Co.
On May 25, 1964, private respondent raised the following defenses in its answer to wit:
(a) lack of formal claim by insured over the loss and (b) premature filing of the suit as
neither plaintiff nor insured had submitted any proof of loss on the basis of which
defendant would... determine its liability and the amount thereof, either to the private
respondent or its adjuster
At the trial, petitioner presented in evidence Exhibit "H", which is a communication dated
December 22, 1965 of the insurance adjuster, H.H. Bayne Adjustment Co. to Asian
Surety Insurance Co., Inc., revealing unde­clared co-insurances with the following:
P30,000.00 with
Wellington Insurance; P25,000.00 with Empire Surety and P250,000.00 with Asian
Surety, undertaken by insured Paramount on the same property covered by its policy
with private respondent whereas the only co-insurances declared, in the subject policy
are those of P30,000.00... with Malayan, P50,000.00 with South Sea and P25,000.00
with Victory
It will be noted that the defense of fraud and/or violation of Condition No. 3 in the Policy,
in the form of non-declaration of co-insurances which was not pleaded in the answer
was also not pleaded in the Motion to Dismiss.
on June 30, 1967, the trial court denied private respondent's motion on the ground that
the defense of lack of proof of loss or defects therein was raised for the first time after
the commencement of the suit and that it must be deemed to have waived the
requirement... of proof of loss
On April 18, 1968, the trial court rendered a deci­sion adjudging private respondent liable
to the petition­er under the said contract of insurance,... the Court of Appeals reversed
the decision of the trial court
Issues:
The crux of the controversy centers on two points: (a) unrevealed co-insurances which
violated policy con­ditions No. 3 and (b) failure of the insured to file the required proof of
loss prior to court action.
Ruling:
Policy Condition No. 3 explicitly provides:
"3. The Insured shall give notice to the Company of any insu­rance already effected, or
which may subsequently be effected, cover­ing any of the property hereby insured, and
unless such notice be given and the particulars of such insurance or insurances be
stated in... or endorsed on this Policy by or on behalf of the Company before the
occurrence of any loss or damage, all benefit under this policy shall be forfeited."
It is not disputed that the insured failed to reveal before the loss three other insurances.
As found by the Court of Appeals, by reason of said unrevealed insurances, the insured
had been guilty of a false declaration; a clear misrepresentation and a vital one because
where the... insured had been asked to reveal but did not, that was deception.
Otherwise stated, had the insurer known that there were many co-insurances, it could
have hesitated or plainly desisted from entering into such contract. Hence, the insured
was guilty of clear fraud

Lazaro Rayray vs Chae Kyung Lee

Lazaro Rayray married Chae Kyung Lee in 1952 in Pusan, Korea. Before the marriage,
Lee was able to secure a marriage license which is a requirement in Korea prior to
marrying. They lived together until 1955. Rayray however later found out that Lee had
previously lived with 2 Americans and a Korean. Lee averred that it is not unusual in
Korea for a woman to have more than one partner and that it is legally permissive for
them to do so and that there is no legal impediment to her marriage with Rayray.
Eventually they pursued their separate ways. Rayray later filed before lower court of
Manila for an action to annul his marriage with Lee because Lee’s whereabouts cannot
be determined and that he could not have given his consent in marrying Lee if only he
had known prior that Lee had been living with other men. His action for annulment had
been duly published and summons were made known to Lee but due to her absence
Rayray moved to have Lee be declared in default. The lower court denied Rayray’s
action stating that since the marriage was celebrated in Korea the court cannot take
cognizance of the case and that the facts presented by Rayray is not sufficient to
debunk his marriage with Lee.

ISSUE: Whether or not Rayray’s marriage with Lee is void.

HELD: No. However, the Supreme Court ruled that the lower court erred in ruling that
Philippine courts do not have jurisdiction over the case. As far as marriage status is
concerned, the nationality principle is controlling NOT lex loci celebracionis. The lower
court is however correct in ruling that Rayray’s evidence is not sufficient to render his
marriage with Lee void. Rayray said that the police clearance secured by Lee is meant
to allow her to marry after her subsequent cohabitation/s with the other men – which is
considered bigamous in Philippine law. The SC ruled that the police clearance is
wanting for it lacks the signature of the person who prepared it and there is no
competent document to establish the identity of the same. Also, through Rayray himself,
Lee averred that it is okay in Korea for a person who cohabited with other men before to
marry another man. This is an indication that Lee herself is aware that if it were a
previous marriage that is concerned then that could be a legal impediment to any
subsequent marriage. Rayray cannot be given credence in claiming that his consent
could have been otherwise altered had he known all these facts prior to the marriage
because he would lie to every opportunity given him by the Court so as to suit his case.

Agapay vs Palang Digest

Facts:

Miguel Palang married Carlina Palang in 1949. He left to work in Hawaii a few months
after the wedding. Their only child Herminia was born in 1950. When Miguel returned for
good in 1972, he refused to live with Carlina.

In 1973, Miguel who was then 63 years old contracted a subsequent marriage with
19-year old Erlinda Agapay. Two months earlier, they jointly purchased a riceland. A
house and lot was likewise purchased, allegedly by Erlinda as the sole vendee. Miguel
and Erlinda’s cohabitation produced a son named Kristopher.

1975, Miguel and Carlina executed a Deed of Donation as a form of compromise

agreement to settle and end a case filed by the latter. The parties therein agreed to
donate their conjugal property consisting of six parcels of land to their only child,
Herminia.

In 1979, Miguel and Erlinda were convicted of concubinage upon Carlina’s complaint.
Two years later, Miguel died. Carlina and Herminia instituted a case for recovery of
ownership and possession with damages against Erlinda, seeking to get back the
riceland and the house and lot allegedly purchase by Miguel during his cohabitation with
Erlinda. The lower court dismissed the complaint but CA reversed the decision.

Issues:

1. Who owns the riceland?

2. Who owns the house and lot?
3. Does the trial court’s decision adopting the compromise agreement partake the
nature of judicial confirmation of the separation of property between Miguel and
Carlina and the termination of their conjugal partnership?
4. Can Kristopher’s status and claim as an illegitimate son and heir be adjudicated
in an ordinary civil action for recovery of ownership and possession?
5. Should Kristopher Palang be considered as party-defendant in the case?

Held:
1. The sale of the riceland on May 17, 1973, was made in favor of Miguel and Erlinda.
The provision of law applicable here is Article 148 of the Family Code providing for
cases of cohabitation when a man and a woman who are not capacitated to marry each
other live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage. While Miguel and Erlinda contracted marriage on
July 15, 1973, said union was patently void because the earlier marriage of Miguel and
Carlina was still susbsisting and unaffected by the latter’s de facto separation.
Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their
actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that actual
contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that
efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as
contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or
income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there
will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares.

Erlinda tried to establish by her testimony that she is engaged in the business of buy
and sell and had a sari-sari store. Worth noting is the fact that on the date of
conveyance, May 17, 1973, she was only around 22 years of age and Miguel was already
64 and a pensioner of the U.S. Government. Considering her youthfulness, it is
unrealistic to conclude that in 1973 she contributed P3,750.00 as her share in the
purchase price of subject property, there being no proof of the same.

In the nature of an afterthought, Erlinda claims that the riceland was bought 2 months
before she and Miguel actually cohabited to exclude their case from the operation of
Article 148 of the Family Code. Proof of the precise date when they commenced their
adulterous cohabitation not having been adduced, we cannot state definitively that the
riceland was purchased even before they started living together. In any case, even
assuming that the subject property was bought before cohabitation, the rules of
co-ownership would still apply and proof of actual contribution would still be essential.

Since Erlinda failed to prove that she contributed money to the purchase price of the
riceland, there is no basis to justify her co-ownership with Miguel over the same.
Consequently, the riceland should revert to the conjugal partnership property of Miguel
and Carlina.

2. With respect to the house and lot, Erlinda allegedly bought the same for P20,000.00
on September 23, 1975 when she was only 22 years old. The testimony of the notary
public who prepared the deed of conveyance for the property reveals the falsehood of
this claim. Atty. Constantino Sagun testified that Miguel provided the money for the
purchase price and directed that Erlinda’s name alone be placed as the vendee. The
transaction was properly a donation made by Miguel to Erlinda, but one which was
clearly void and inexistent by Article 739 of the Civil Code because it was made between
persons guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation. Moreover, Article
87 of the Family Code expressly provides that the prohibition against donations
between spouses now applies to donations between persons living together as husband
and wife without a valid marriage, for otherwise, the condition of those who incurred
guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal union.

3. No. Separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place
except by judicial order or without judicial conferment when there is an express
stipulation in the marriage settlements. The judgment which resulted from the parties’
compromise was not specifically and expressly for separation of property and should
not be so inferred.
4. No. Questions as to who are the heirs of the decedent, proof of filiation of illegitimate
children and the determination of the estate of the latter and claims thereto should be
ventilated in the proper probate court or in a special proceeding instituted for the
purpose and cannot be adjudicated in the instant ordinary civil action which is for
recovery of ownership and possession.

5. No. Kristopher, not having been impleaded, was not a party to the case at bar. His
mother, Erlinda, cannot be called his guardian ad litem for he was not involved in the
case at bar. (Erlinda Agapay vs. Carlina Palang, G.R. No. 116668, July 28 1997).

MATUTE VS. MATUTE

Facts: FACTS:
Armando Medel brought an action for legal separation against Rosario Matute, upon the
ground of adultery
committed with his brother, Ernesto Medel. The decision found Rosario guilty of the
charge against her, decreeing
said legal separation, and awarding to Armando the custody of their four (4) minor
children.
Armando went to the US, leaving the children in the City of Davao under the care of his
sister Pilar Medel, in
whose house Rosario subsequently lived in order to be with her offspring. Armando
returned to the Philippines late
in 1954.
With his permission, Rosario brought the children to Manila to attend the funeral of her
father. Armando alleges
that he only consented on the condition that she would return the children to him within
two (2) weeks. However,
Rosario did not do so.
Rosario filed a motion for praying for the awarding the custody of her children and
Armando be obligated to
support the children in their studies and give them a monthly allowance. It was alleged
that three of the children
did not want to live with their father because he is already living with a woman other
than their mother.
Armando opposed this motion and countered with a petition to declare and punish
Rosario for contempt of court,
because of her failure and alleged refusal to restore the custody of their children to him.
CFI Manila, presided over by respondent judge, issued an order absolving Rosario from
the charge of contempt of
court as she secured Armando's consent before bringing the children to Manila. On the
other hand, the Court
denied her motion for the custody of the children and ordering her to deliver them to
Armando within twenty-four
hours from notice.
Rosario instituted this action of certiorari and prohibition on Armando and respondent
judge.

ISSUE(S)
: Can Rosario obtain custody of her children?
HELD
:
No. Petition is dismissed
She merely obtained his permission to bring them to Manila, for the purpose of
attending the funeral of their
maternal grandfather. She obtained and has the physical possession of the minors in a
precarious manner. He may,
therefore, demand their return at any time, and she is bound to comply immediately with
such demand.
Again, it is conceded that children over ten (10) years of age, whose parents are
divorced or living separately, may
choose which parent they prefer to live with, unless the parent chosen is unfit to take
charge of their care by reason
of “moral depravity, habitual drunkenness, incapacity or poverty” (Rule 100, section 6,
Rules of Court).
The fact remains that she is without means of livelihood and, according to her own
admission, she lives on the
charity of her brothers. She has no home of her own to offer to her children, but only
she would shelter them under
the roof of her brothers.” “Poverty”, among other causes, rendered her unfit to take
charge of her children or made
it unwise to place them under her care.

Manalo vs Court of Appeals Case Digest

G.R. No. 129242 ; January 16, 2001

FACTS: Troadic Manalo died intestate and was survived by his wife, Pilar, and his 11 children.
The deceased left several real properties in Manila and a business in Tarlac. Herein respondents
(originally petitioners), 8 of the surviving children, filed a petition with RTC Manila for the
judicial settlement of the estate of their late father and for appointment of their brother Romeo
Manalo as administrator thereof.

On the date set for hearing of the petition, the trial court issued an order 'declaring the whole
world in default, except the government”. However, the trial court set aside the order of general
default of herein petitioners (originally respondents - the other children of Troadic who did not
join the original petitioners) and they were granted 10 days within which to file their opposition
to the petition.

Herein petitioners then filed an Omnibus Motion. The trial court denied this motion. Petitioners
then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals
averring among others that here was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among
members of the same family. CA dismissed the petition for certiorari. The motion for
reconsideration filed by herein petitioners was likewise denied.
ISSUE: WON the case at bar is covered under Article 151 where earnest efforts toward
compromise should first be made prior the filing of the petition.

HELD: NO. Article 151 of the Family Code applicable only to ordinary civil actions and not to
special proceedings.

It is a fundamental rule that in the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the
averments and the character of the relief were sought in the complaint or petition, shall be
controlling.

Sheker vs. Sheker

G.R. No. 157912

December 13, 2007

FACTS: The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice Sheker and
thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims against the
estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed on a contingent claim for agent’s
commission due him in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the
estate, and reimbursement for expenses incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in
the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice Sheker (MEDINA) moved for the dismissal of said
money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the requisite docket fee, as
prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2)
petitioner failed to attach a certification against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner
failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served
personally.

The RTC-Iligan City issued the assailed Order dismissing without prejudice the money
claim based on the grounds advanced by respondent. Petitioner’s MR was
denied.Petitioner then filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner maintains that the RTC erred in strictly applying to a probate proceeding the
rules requiring a certification of non-forum shopping, a written explanation for
non-personal filing, and the payment of docket fees upon filing of the claim. He insists
that Section 2, Rule 72 of the ROC provides that rules in ordinary actions
are applicable to special proceedings only in a suppletory manner.
[The Court gave due course to the petition for review on certiorari although directly
filed with this Court, pursuant to Section 2(c), Rule 41 of the ROC]- note lang^^

ISSUE:

(a) must a contingent claim filed in the probate proceeding contain a certification
against non-forum shopping, failing which such claim should be dismissed?

(b) must a contingent claim filed against an estate in a probate proceeding be

dismissed for failing to pay the docket fees at the time of its filing thereat?

(a) must THE contingent claim filed in a probate proceeding be dismissed because
of its failure to contain a written explanation on the service and filing by registered
mail?

HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders of the RTC are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The RTC is hereby DIRECTED to give due course
and take appropriate action on petitioner’s money claim in accordance with Rule 82 of
the ROC.

It must be emphasized that petitioner’s contention that rules in ordinary actions are
only supplementary to rules in special proceedings is not entirely correct. Section 2,
Rule 72, Part II of the same ROC provides:

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of Civil Actions. – In the absence of special

provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable,
applicable in special proceedings.

Stated differently, special provisions under Part II of the ROC govern special
proceedings; but in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in Part
I of the Rules governing ordinary civil actions shall be applicable to special
proceedings, as far as practicable.

The word “practicable” is defined as: possible to practice or perform; capable of being
put into practice, done or accomplished. This means that in the absence of special
provisions, rules in ordinary actions may be applied in special proceedings as much as
possible and where doing so would not pose an obstacle to said proceedings. Nowhere in
the ROC does it categorically say that rules in ordinary actions are inapplicable or
merely suppletory to special proceedings. Provisions of the ROC requiring a
certification of non-forum shopping for complaints and initiatory pleadings, a
written explanation for non-personal service and filing, and the payment of filing fees
for money claims against an estate would not in any way obstruct probate proceedings,
thus, they are applicable to special proceedings such as the settlement of the estate of a
deceased person as in the present case.

(a) NO; The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints
and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent money
claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the
whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing of the petition for
allowance of the decedent’s will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of
Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, all persons having
money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the
estate administrator of their respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred,
subject to certain exceptions.

Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for
creditors’ claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in the proper disposition
of the properties of the estate. In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,[6] the Court explained
thus:

x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a

material but incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which
the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is
confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some question
that is collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with and
dependent upon the principal remedy.xx

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the
decedent’s estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the claimant cannot even
institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner‘s
contingent money claim, not being an initiatory pleading, does not require
a certification against non-forum shopping.

(b) NO; On the issue of filing fees, the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals[ that
the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney’s fees) against an estate
for services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her
duties to the estate even without payment of separate docket fees because the filing fees
shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the ROC, or
the trial court may order the payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time. After
all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the
estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the
estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim against the
estate.

(c) NO; With regard to the requirement of a written explanation, Maceda v. De Guzman
Vda. de Macatangay is squarely in point. Therein, the Court held thus:

In Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. v. Ricafort, this Court, passing upon Section 11 of
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, held that a court has the discretion to consider a pleading
or paper as not filed if said rule is not complied with.

Personal service and filing are preferred for obvious reasons. Plainly, such should
expedite action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely,
minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service or filing is done by mail,
considering the inefficiency of the postal service. Likewise, personal service will do
away with the practice of some lawyers who, wanting to appear clever, resort to the
following less than ethical practices: (1) serving or filing pleadings by mail to catch
opposing counsel off-guard, thus leaving the latter with little or no time to prepare, for
instance, responsive pleadings or an opposition; or (2) upon receiving notice from the
post office that the registered mail containing the pleading of or other paper from the
adverse party may be claimed, unduly procrastinating before claiming the parcel, or,
worse, not claiming it at all, thereby causing undue delay in the disposition of such
pleading or other papers.

If only to underscore the mandatory nature of this innovation to our set of adjective
rules requiring personal service whenever practicable, Section 11 of Rule 13 then gives
the court the discretion to consider a pleading or paper as not filed if the
other modes of service or filing were not resorted to and no written
explanation was made as to why personal service was not done in the first
place. The exercise of discretion must, necessarily consider the
practicability of personal service, for Section 11 itself begins with the
clause “whenever practicable”.

We thus take this opportunity to clarify that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, personal service and filing is the general rule, and resort to
other modes of service and filing, the exception. Henceforth, whenever
personal service or filing is practicable, in the light of the circumstances of time, place
and person, personal service or filing is mandatory. Only when personal service or
filing is not practicable may resort to other modes be had, which must then be
accompanied by a written explanation as to why personal service or filing was not
practicable to begin with. In adjudging the plausibility of an explanation, a court shall
likewise consider the importance of the subject matter of the case or the issues involved
therein, and the prima facie merit of the pleading sought to be expunged for violation of
Section 11.

In the present case, petitioner holds office in Salcedo Village, Makati City, while counsel
for respondent and the RTC which rendered the assailed orders are both in Iligan City.
The lower court should have taken judicial notice of the great distance between said
cities and realized that it is indeed not practicable to serve and file the money claim
personally. Thus, following Medina v. Court of Appeals. the failure of petitioner to
submit a written explanation why service has not been done personally, may be
considered as superfluous and the RTC should have exercised its discretion under
Section 11, Rule 13, not to dismiss the money claim of petitioner, in the interest of
substantial justice.

The RTC should have relaxed and liberally construed the procedural rule on the
requirement of a written explanation for non-personal service, again in the interest of
substantial justice.

[ G.R. No. 46100, May 26, 1939 ]

ALFREDO HIDALGO RIZAL, PETITIONER, VS. JOSEFA RIZAL MERCADO ET AL.,

RESPONDENTS.

DECISION UPON NEW TRIAL[1]

VILLA-REAL, J.:
We are here concerned with a new trial of the present petition for certiorari granted the
petitioner Alfredo Hidalgo Rizal by resolution of this court dated February 4, 1939, in
which each of the parties submitted a memorandum in support of his contention.
Alfredo Hidalgo Rizal petitions this court to reverse the decision rendered by the second
division of the Court of Appeals dismissing the appeal taken by petitioner from the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and to order the said Court of Appeals
to reinstate the appeal thus dismissed by it and to decide said appeal on its merits.
In answer to the petition, respondents Josefa Rizal Mercado et al., express their assent
to what is prayed for therein in order that they may not be condemned to pay costs and
ask that judgment be rendered on the merits.
The ultimate facts which the second division of the Court of Appeals took into
consideration and upon which it relied in dismissing the appeal above-mentioned, are as
follows:
On January 10, 1935, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered in civil case No.
44808 a judgment against the therein defendant and herein petitioner, Alfredo Hidalgo
Rizal. On the fourteenth of the same month and year, he received notice of said
judgment. On the twenty-third, also of the same month and year, the aforesaid
defendant and petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration based on the ground that the
judgment is contrary to law and the weight of the evidence. The trial court denied the
motion for reconsideration by order of January 30, 1935. On February 6, 1935, the
defendant and petitioner received notice of the order denying his motion for
reconsideration and on the eighth of that month and year he excepted to said order and
asked for a new trial on the same ground that the judgment rendered in the case is
contrary to law and the weight of the evidence. By order of February 16, 1935, the Court
of First Instance of Manila denied the motion for new trial, and on February 21, 1935
defendant filed his exception and notice of appeal. On March 2, 1935 he filed the
corresponding bill of exceptions.
From January 14, 1935, when defendant received notice of the judgment against him, to
January 23, 1935, when he filed his motion for reconsideration which is equivalent to a
motion for new trial (Pascua vs. Ocampo and Aguilar, 59 Phil., 48; Blouse vs. Moreno
and Garcia, 60 Phil., 741; Levett vs. Sy Quia, 61 Phil., 847; Rodriguez vs. Rovira, 63 Phil,
476) nine days elapsed with twenty-one of the thirty days within which he is entitled to
file his motion referred to, still remaining. The filing of his said motion for new trial
suspended the running of the twenty-one days left to him and they did not begin to run
again until February 6, 1935 on which date he was notified of the order denying his
motion for new trial (Layda vs. Legazpi, 39 Phil., 83, and cases therein cited; San Miguel
Brewery vs. Legarda, 48 Phil., 507; Agra vs. Zandueta, 56 Phil., 528; and cases therein
cited). The filing of his second motion for new trial on February 8, 1935, did not suspend
the running of the twenty-one days left to him, inasmuch as it was based on the same
grounds relied upon in the first motion.
In the case of Aquino vs. Tongco (61 Phil, 840), this court enunciated the doctrine that a
party desiring to appeal from a judgment rendered against him may file several motions
for new trial within the period of thirty days, but that each of them must have to be
based on different legal grounds. According to this doctrine, the petitioner could file
other motions for new trial within the twenty-one days which he still had. If, instead of
excepting to the resolution which denied his second motion for new trial and of filing his
notice of intention to appeal to the Court of Appeals, he had filed a third motion for new
trial, this would have been proper, since no more than thirteen days would have had
elapsed, with eight days still remaining within which he could file another motion for
new trial. If the third motion for new trial which he could file on February 21, 1935, were
valid; but nevertheless the same is denied by the court, the petitioner would have five
days to file his exception and notice of intention to appeal if he had no wish to take
advantage of the remaining period to file another motion for new trial; or if the third
motion were not valid and had not suspended the running of the remaining period of
eight days, said period would have expired on the eighth day, or on March 1, 1935. In
that event, the expiration of the period would be equivalent to the denial of his third
motion for new trial, and he would have the right to file his exception and notice of
intention to appeal within five days. Hence, from whatever point of view the question of
the filing of the exception and notice of intention to appeal on February 21, 1935 may be
considered, said filing was done on time and the submission of the bill of exceptions on
March 2, 1935, or nine (9) days thereafter, was also done on time because for that
purpose petitioner had ten days counting from the date of the notice of intention to
appeal referred to.
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that if the filing of a
notice of intention to appeal in an ordinary civil case is done within the period
remaining for the presentation of another motion for new trial, the filing is timely,
although five days may have elapsed from the denial of the last motion for new trial, as
long as it is done within the thirty days authorized by law for the presentation of mot
ions for new trial, not including the time which the trial court may have spent to decide
said motions.
Wherefore, the writ prayed for is granted, the decision appealed from is reversed, and
the case is ordered returned to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings, with costs
against the respondents. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-56340 June 24, 1983 SPOUSES ALVARO PASTOR, JR. and MA. ELENA
ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, JUAN Y.
REYES, JUDGE OF BRANCH I, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU and
LEWELLYN BARLITO QUEMADA, respondents. PLANA, J.:

FACTS: Spouses Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.) and his wife Sofia Bossio were
survived by their two legitimate children, Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and
Sofia Pastor de Midgely (SOFIA), as well as an illegitimate child Lewellyn
Barlito Quemada (QUEMADA PASTOR, JR.). QUEMADA filed a petition for the
probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of PASTOR, SR. with the
CFI of Cebu, (PROBATE COURT). The will contained only one testamentary
disposition: a legacy in favor of QUEMADA consisting of 30% of PASTOR, SR.'s
42% share in the operation by Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development
Corporation (ATLAS). The PROBATE COURT appointed QUEMADA as a special
administrator of the entire estate of PASTOR, SR. QUEMADA instituted
against PASTOR, JR. and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged
properties of the estate, which included the properties subject of the legacy
which were in the names of PASTOR, JR. and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de
Pastor, who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by
inheritance. PASTOR, JR. and his sister SOFIA filed their opposition to the
petition for probate and the order appointing QUEMADA as special
administrator. The PROBATE COURT issued an order allowing the will to
probate. The CA affirmed the said decision. On petition for review, the SC
dismissed the petition in a minute resolution and remanded the same to the
PROBATE COURT after denying reconsideration.

QUEMADA asked for payment of his legacy and seizure of the properties
subject of said legacy. PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA opposed these pleadings on
the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit. All pleadings remained
unacted upon by the PROBATE COURT. Later on, the PROBATE COURT
required the parties to submit their respective position papers as to how
much inheritance QUEMADA was entitled to receive. PASTOR. JR. and SOFIA
manifested that determination of how much QUEMADA should receive was
still premature. ATLAS, upon order of the Court, submitted a sworn statement
of royalties paid to the Pastor Group. The statement revealed that of the
mining claims being operated by ATLAS, 60% pertained to the Pastor Group
distributed as follows: 1. A. Pastor, Jr. ...................................40.5% 2. E. Pelaez, Sr.
...................................15.0% 3. B. Quemada .......................................4.5% On August 20, 1980,
while the reconveyance suit was still being litigated, the PROBATE COURT
issued the assailed Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the
question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect
that the legacy to QUEMADA was NOT INOFFICIOUS . The PROBATE COURT
directed ATLAS to remit directly to QUEMADA the 42% royalties due
decedent's estate, of which QUEMADA was authorized to retain 75% for
himself as legatee and to deposit 25% with a reputable banking institution for
payment of the estate taxes and other obligations of the estate. The 33%
share of PASTOR, JR. and/or his assignees was ordered garnished to answer
for the accumulated legacy of QUEMADA from the time of PASTOR, SR.'s
death. The order being "immediately executory", QUEMADA succeeded in
obtaining a Writ of Execution and Garnishment, serving the same on ATLAS
on the same day. The oppositors sought reconsideration thereof on the
ground that the PROBATE COURT gravely abused its discretion when it
resolved the question of ownership of the royalties and ordered the payment
of QUEMADA's legacy after

prematurely passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will. In the meantime,
the PROBATE COURT ordered suspension of payment of all royalties due
PASTOR, JR. and/or his assignees until after resolution of oppositors' motion
for reconsideration. Before the Motion for Reconsideration could be resolved,
PASTOR, JR. and his wife Ma. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, filed with the
Court of Appeals a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with a prayer for writ
of preliminary injunction, assailing the writ of execution and garnishment
issued by the Probate Court. Said petition was denied as well as their motion
for reconsideration. Hence, this Petition for Review by certiorari

``ISSUE: Whether or not questions of ownership and the intrinsic validity of

the holographic were resolved by the Probate Court with finality in the case at
bar?

RULING: No, it was not resolved by the Probate Court in the case at bar. In a
special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted
to the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound
mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed
by law. (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section 9.) As a rule, the
question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court
cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a
certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate
properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such
determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final
decision in a separate action to resolve title. Nowhere in the dispositive
portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. It confined
itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the will, and the need for and
propriety of appointing a special administrator. It allowed and approved the
holographic will with respect to its
De Leon vs. Court of Appeals
FACTS:

On August 8, 1991, private respondents filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
a complaint for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of two (2) parcels of land
against petitioners, Spouses Rosalina and Alejandro De Leon. Private respondents paid
the docket fee of a flat rate of P400.00 as provided for in Rule 141, Paragraph 7 (b)(1) of
the Rules of Court.

On September 26, 1991, petitioners moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the trial court did not acquire any jurisdiction over the case by reason of
private respondents' non-payment of the correct amount of docket fees. Petitioners
argue that an action for annulment or rescission of a contract of sale of real property is a
real action and, therefore, the amount of the docket fees to be paid by private
respondent should be based either on the assessed value of the property, subject matter
of the action, or is estimated value as alleged in the complaint, pursuant to the last
paragraph 7(b) of Rule 141, as amended by the Resolution of the Court dated September
12, 1990. Since private respondents' alleged that the land, in which they claimed an
interest as heirs, had been sold for P4,378,000.00 to petitioners, this amount should be
considered the estimated value of the land for the purpose of determining the docket
fees.

On the other hand, private respondents counter that an action for annulment or
rescission of a contract of sale of real property is incapable of pecuniary estimation and,
so, the docket fees should be the fixed amount of P400.00 in Rule 141, paragraph 7
(b)(1).

On September 30, 1991, private respondents filed opposition to the motion to dismiss,
arguing that outright dismissal of their complaint was not warranted on the basis of the
alleged nonpayment of the correct amount of docket fees, considering that the amount
paid by them was that assessed by the clerk of court.

On October 21, 1991, the trial court denied petitioners' motion to dismiss but required
private respondents to pay the amount of docket fees based on the estimated value of
the parcels of land in litigation as stated in the complaint.

The Court of Appeals held that an action for rescission or annulment of contract is not
susceptible of pecuniary estimation and, therefore, the docket fees should not be based
on the value of the real property, subject matter of the contract sought to be annulled or
rescinded.

ISSUE:

Whether or not in assessing the docket fees to be paid for the filing of an action for
annulment or rescission of a contract of sale, the value of the real property, should be
used as basis.

HELD:

No. The action for annulment or rescission is considered as one which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation.

A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining whether an

action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation, this
Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the principal action or
remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the Municipal
Courts or in the Court of First Instance would depend on the amount of the claim.
However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of
money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or consequence of, the
principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the
contract (specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a
judgment or to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases
where the subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are
cognizable exclusively by Courts of First Instance.

Actions for specific performance of contracts have been expressly pronounced to be

exclusively cognizable by courts of first instance: De Jesus vs. Judge Garcia, L-26816,
February 28, 1967; Manufacturers Distributors, Inc. vs. Yu Siu Liong, L-21285, April
29, 1966. And no cogent reason appears, and none is here advanced by the parties, why
an action for rescission (or resolution) should be differently treated, a rescission being a
counterpart, so to speak, of specific performance. In both cases, the court would
certainly have to undertake an investigation into facts that would justify one act or the
other. No award for damages may be had in an action for rescission without first
conducting an inquiry into matters which would justify the setting aside of a contract, in
the same manner that courts of first instance would have to make findings of fact and
law in actions not capable of pecuniary estimation expressly held to be so by this Court,
arising from issues like those raised in Arroz v. Alojado, et al., L-22153, March 31, 1967
(the legality or illegality of the conveyance sought for and the determination of the
validity of the money deposit made); De Ursua v. Pelayo, L-13285, April 18, 1950
(validity of a judgment); Bunayog v. Tunas, L-12707, December 23, 1959 (validity of a
mortgage); Baito v. Sarmiento, L-13105, August 25, 1960 (the relations of the parties,
the right to support created by the relation, etc., in actions for support); De Rivera, et al.
v. Halili, L-15159, September 30, 1963 (the validity or nullity of documents upon which
claims are predicated). Issues of the same nature may be raised by a party against whom
an action for rescission has been brought, or by the plaintiff himself. It is, therefore,
difficult to see why a prayer for damages in an action for rescission should be taken as
the basis for concluding such action as one capable of pecuniary estimation a prayer
which must be included in the main action if plaintiff is to be compensated for what he
may have suffered as a result of the breach committed by defendant, and not later on
precluded from recovering damages by the rule against splitting a cause of action and
discouraging multiplicity of suits.

Conformably with this discussion of actions where the value of the case cannot be
estimated, the Court in Bautista v. Lim, held that an action for rescission of contract is
one which cannot be estimated and therefore the docket fee for its filing should be the
flat amount of P200.00 as then fixed in the former Rule 141, 5(10).

Thelma Aranas vs. Teresita Mercado

G.R. No. 156407 – 713 SCRA 194 – 724 Phil. 174 – Remedial Law – Special
Proceedings – Settlement of Estate – Jurisdiction of the Probate Court; The probate
court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for purposes of
their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory

Order excluding or including properties to the estate inventory is interlocutory; An

interlocutory order is not appealable but may be subject to certiorari under Rule 65 if
tainted with grave abuse of discretion or issued without jurisdiction

In 1991, Emigdio Mercado died. Later, a special proceedings case was had to settle his
estate. His widow, Teresita Mercado was appointed as the administrator of the estate. In
1992, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate but it only included personal
properties. Thelma Aranas, one of the children of Emigdio in his first family, opposed the
approval of the inventory on the ground that a real property was excluded.
In her defense, Teresita explained that the real property in question was already sold in
1989 and that the title over the said property was already under a corporation.

The RTC ruled in favor of the opposition of Thelma. The RTC then issued an order
including the real property into the estate inventory.

Teresita filed a certiorari case under Rule 65 against the order of the judge on the
ground that the same was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Teresita argued that
the probate court cannot ignore the fact that the real property has long been sold to the
corporation and the corporation (third party) is already in possession of the real
property. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Teresita.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.

HELD: No. Section 1, Rule 83 of the Rules of Court requires the inclusion of all the real
and personal properties of the decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is
qualified by the phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge, which
signifies that the properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the
decedent or are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception,
for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the
decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the
possession of another person or entity.

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate court or an
intestate court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination
of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this
rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction. A probate court
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and
which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance
from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that
the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they
should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no problem, but if there is, then the
parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action
before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title.

ISSUE: Is the remedy of Teresita in questioning the order of inclusion issued by the
RTC proper?
Yes. An order including or excluding a property into or from the estate inventory is an
interlocutory order. As such, it is not final and may be subject to change throughout the
proceedings. An interlocutory order is not subject to appeal. However, it may be subject
to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court if there are allegations of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this case however,
Teresita was not able to prove that the probate court acted with grave abuse of
discretion.

MUNSAYAC-DE VS. RTC