CASES IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS:

1. Maximum of 2 pages/case which include facts of the case, issue related to the subject matter and
decision.
2. Deadline of submission is on March 14, 2015.
3. Typewritten on a legal size bond paper, font is Times New Roman, font size is 14, single space.
Rule 72 Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
Distinction between civil action and special proceeding -Natcher v. CA 366 SCRA 385
PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO LETICIA DEL
ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL RESORIO MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO
FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL ROSARIO,
respondent..
BUENA, J.:
May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for reconveyance
annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the settlement of the estate of a deceased
person particularly on questions as to advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?
Sought to be reversed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the decision1 of public
respondent Court of Appeals, the decretal portion of which declares:
"Wherefore in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside and
another one entered annulling the Deed of Sale executed by Graciano Del Rosario in favor of defendantappellee Patricia Natcher, and ordering the Register of Deeds to Cancel TCT No. 186059 and reinstate
TCT No. 107443 without prejudice to the filing of a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of
Graciano Del Rosario in a proper court. No costs.
"So ordered."
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land with an
area of 9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889.
Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, namely: Bayani, Ricardo,
Rafael, Leticia, Emiliana and Nieves, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate on 09
February 1954 adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real property subject of TCT No. 11889.
Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children received 1/14 share of
the said property. Accordingly, TCT No. 11889 was cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 35980 was
issued in the name of Graciano and the Six children.1wphi1.nt
Further, on 09 February 1954, said heirs executed and forged an "Agreement of ConsolidationSubdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights" where they subdivided among themselves the parcel
of land covered by TCT No. 35980 into several lots. Graciano then donated to his children, share and
share alike, a portion of his interest in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60
square meters registered under Graciano's name, as covered by TCT No. 35988. Subsequently, the land
subject of TCT No. 35988 was further subdivided into two separate lots where the first lot with a land
area of 80.90 square meter was registered under TCT No. 107442 and the second lot with a land area of
396.70 square meters was registered under TCT No. 107443. Eventually, Graciano sold the first lot2 to a
third person but retained ownership over the second lot.3
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano
sold the land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 1860594 was
issued in the latter's name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six
children by his first marriage, as heirs.
In a complaint5 filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55,
herein private respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the
employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that
Graciano executed a Deed of Sale dated 25 June 19876 in favor herein petitioner resulting in the
cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher.
Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent
sale, their legitimes have been impaired.

In her answer7 dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married to
Graciano in 20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the
latter. Petitioner further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance,
properties to his children, hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim against Graciano's
estate or against herein petitioner's property.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26 January 1996
holding:8
"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited
by law and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of property was agreed upon
in the marriage settlements or that there has been decreed a judicial separation of property between them,
the spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale;
"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally prohibited by law
under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;
"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be regarded as
an extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased."
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the lower court's decision ratiocinating, inter alia:
"It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
The court a quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond its
jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a
deceased person. XXX
"X X X Thus the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as advance inheritance. What the
court should have done was merely to rule on the validity of (the) sale and leave the issue on advancement
to be resolved in a separate proceeding instituted for that purpose. XXX"
Aggrieved, herein petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the expediency of Rule 45
of the Rules of Court and assails the appellate court's decision "for being contrary to law and the facts of
the case."

We concur with the Court of Appeals and find no merit in the instant petition.
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this
wise:
"XXX a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right,
or the prevention or redress of a wrong.
"A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are government by the rules for ordinary civil
actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
"XXX
"c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular
fact."
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a special
proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by
the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules.
The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or
right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required
unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an
application or motion."9
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:

"It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted and
prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, and
that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted
and prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without
summons and prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions. XXX A
special proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for particular
relief, such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon notice."10
Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil
action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of
property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly
requires the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the
exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to
have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction
of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising
the questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same provision11
contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings".
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of
authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of
herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for reconveyance and annulment of title
with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the
present circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so
as to validly pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his
wife, herein petitioner Natcher.
At this point, the appellate court's disquisition is elucidating:
"Before a court can make a partition and distribution of the estate of a deceased, it must first settle the
estate in a special proceeding instituted for the purpose. In the case at hand, the court a quo determined
the respective legitimes of the plaintiffs-appellants and assigned the subject property owned by the estate
of the deceased to defendant-appellee without observing the proper proceedings provided (for) by the
Rules of Court. From the aforecited discussions, it is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action
cannot resolve to perform acts pertaining to a special proceeding because it is subject to specific
prescribed rules. Thus, the court a quo erred in regarding the subject property as an advance
inheritance."12
In resolving the case at bench, this Court is not unaware of our pronouncement in Coca vs. Borromeo13
and Mendoza vs. Teh14 that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Regional Trial Court
(then Court of First Instance) in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or its limited probate jurisdiction is
not a jurisdictional issue but a mere question of procedure. In essence, it is procedural question involving
a mode of practice "which may be waived".15
Notwithstanding, we do not see any waiver on the part of herein private respondents inasmuch as the six
children of the decedent even assailed the authority of the trail court, acting in its general jurisdiction, to
rule on this specific issue of advancement made by the decedent to petitioner.
Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing principle that
although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested
parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the
probate court is competent to decide the question of ownership.16
Similarly in Mendoza vs. Teh, we had occasion to hold:
"In the present suit, no settlement of estate is involved, but merely an allegation seeking appointment as
estate administratrix which does not necessarily involve settlement of estate that would have invited the
exercise of the limited jurisdiction of a probate court.17 (emphasis supplied)

Of equal importance is that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a compulsory heir may be
reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first.18 The net estate of the decedent must be
ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the property owned by the
deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be added to it. With the
partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be established; and only
thereafter can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.19
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case, reveals that the
trial court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of
Graciano Del Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these wellentrenched rules and hereby holds that under the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise
of its limited jurisdiction, is indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as
well as other related matters involving the settlement of Graciano Del Rosario's estate.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED
and the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Determination of heirship Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran GR 155555 Aug 16, 2005
ISABEL P. PORTUGAL and JOSE DOUGLAS PORTUGAL JR., petitioners, vs. LEONILA
PORTUGAL-BELTRAN, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioners Isabel P. Portugal and her son, Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., assail the September 24, 2002[1]
Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City,
Branch 124[2] which dismissed, after trial, their complaint for annulment of title for failure to state a
cause of action and lack of jurisdiction.
From the records of the case are gathered the following material allegations claims of the parties which
they sought to prove by testimonial and documentary evidence during the trial of the case:
On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo.[3]
On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta.[4]
On September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr.,
her herein co-petitioner.[5]
On April 11, 1950, Paz gave birth to a girl, Aleli,[6] later baptized as Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal,
herein respondent.[7]
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and
Waiver of Rights[8] over the estate of their father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on November 2,
1964.[9] In the deed, Portugals siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation over a 155 sq. m.
parcel of land located in Caloocan in his favor.[10]
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 34292 covering the Caloocan parcel of land in the name of Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C.
Lazo.[11]
On February 18, 1984, Paz died.
On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate.
On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an Affidavit of Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of
Deceased Person[12] adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-172[13] in
Portugals name was subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT No. 159813[14] was issued by the
Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name of respondent, Leonila PortugalBeltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988 transfer by respondent of the
title to the Caloocan property in her name, petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23,

1996 a complaint[15] against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of Adjudication executed by her
and the transfer certificate of title issued in her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal,
hence, not entitled to inherit the Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself when she made
false representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.
Petitioners accordingly prayed that respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and the TCT in her name be
declared void and that the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan be ordered to cancel the TCT in respondents
name and to issue in its stead a new one in their (petitioners) name, and that actual, moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees and litigation expenses be awarded to them.
Following respondents filing of her answer, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order chronicling, among
other things, the issues as follows:
a.

Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr., is valid?

b.
Which of the plaintiff . . . Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the
deceased Jose Q. Portugal Sr.?
c.

Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs.

d.
Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claims under the complaint.[16] (Underscoring
supplied)
After trial, the trial court, by Decision of January 18, 2001,[17] after giving an account of the testimonies
of the parties and their witnesses and of their documentary evidence, without resolving the issues defined
during pre-trial, dismissed the case for lack of cause of action on the ground that petitioners status and
right as putative heirs had not been established before a probate (sic) court, and lack of jurisdiction over
the case, citing Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay v. Del Rosario.[18]
In relying on Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, the trial court held:
The Heirs of Yaptinchay case arose from facts not dissimilar to the case at bar.
xxx
In the instant case, plaintiffs presented a Marriage Contract, a Certificate of Live Birth, pictures (sic) and
testimonial evidence to establish their right as heirs of the decedent. Thus, the preliminary act of having a
status and right to the estate of the decedent, was sought to be determined herein. However, the
establishment of a status, a right, or a particular fact is remedied through a special proceeding (Sec. 3(c),
Rule 1, 1997 Rules of Court), not an ordinary civil action whereby a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong (ibid, a). The operative term
in the former is to establish, while in the latter, it is to enforce, a right. Their status and right as
putative heirs of the decedent not having been established, as yet, the Complaint failed to state a cause of
action.
The court, not being a probate (sic) court, is without jurisdiction to rule on plaintiffs cause to establish
their status and right herein. Plaintiffs do not have the personality to sue (Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 3, in
relation to Secs. 1 and 2, Rule 2, supra).[19] (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thereupon appealed to the Court of Appeals, questioning the trial courts ratio decedendi in
dismissing the case as diametrically opposed to this Courts following ruling in Cario v. Cario,[20] viz:
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from
legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring the previous void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA
572, 579 [1993]) However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal
case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties
thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case. (Nial, et al. v. Bayadog, GR No. 13378, March 14, 2000). In

such cases, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. (Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra)
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
Conceding that the ruling in Cario was promulgated (in 2001) subsequent to that of Heirs of Guido and
Isabel Yaptinchay (in 1999), the appellate court found Cario to be inapplicable, however, to the case in
this wise:
To be borne in mind is the fact that the main issue in the Cario case was the validity of the two marriages
contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago Cario, whose death benefits was the bone of contention
between the two women both named Susan (viz., Susan Nicdao Cario and Susan Yee Cario) both of
whom he married. It is not disputed in said case that SPO4 S. Cario contracted two marriages with said
two women during his lifetime, and the only question was: which of these two marriages was validly
celebrated? The award of the death benefits of the deceased Cario was thus, merely an incident to the
question of which of the two marriages was valid. Upon the other hand, the case at bench is of a different
milieu. The main issue here is the annulment of title to property. The only undisputed fact in this case is
that the deceased Jose Portugal, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-34292. However, here come two contending parties, herein plaintiffsappellants and defendant-appellee, both now insisting to be the legal heir(s) of the decedent. x x x. The
status and rights of the parties herein have not, therefore, been definitively established, as yet. x x x.
Necessarily and naturally, such questions as to such status or right must be properly ventilated in an
appropriate special proceeding, not in an ordinary civil action, whereunder a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the protection or redress of a wrong. The institution of an
ordinary civil suit for that purpose in the present case is thus impermissible. For it is axiomatic that what
the law prohibits or forbids directly, it cannot permit or allow indirectly. To permit, or allow, a declaration
of heirship, or the establishment of the legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child to be determined in an
ordinary civil action, not in an appropriate special proceeding brought for that purpose, is thus to impinge
upon this axiom. x x x[21] (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied).
The appellate court, by Decision of September 24, 2002,[22] thus affirmed the trial courts dismissal of
the case.
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari,[23] faulting the appellate court to have erred when
I.
. . . it affirmed the RTC decision dismissing the initiatory complaint as it failed to state a cause of action.
II.
. . . (i) it applied the ruling in Heirs of Guido [and Isabel] Yaptingchay despite the existence of a later and
contrary ruling in Cario, and (ii) when the Honorable CA and the lower court failed to render judgment
based on the evidence presented relative to the issues raised during pre-trial, . . .[24] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied).
Petitioners thus prayed as follows:
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that the questioned CA decision
be reversed, and a new one entered in accordance with the prayers set forth in the instant complaint based
on the above disquisition and evidence adduced by petitioners in the court a quo.
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, should the Honorable Supreme Court find that the pronouncements in Cario
apply, a decision be entered remanding to the court a quo the determination of the issues of which of the
two marriages is valid, and the determination of heirship and legitimacy of Jose Jr. and Leonila
preparatory to the determination of the annulment of title issued in the name of Leonila.
Other relief and remedy just and equitable in the premises are likewise prayed for.[25] (Underscoring
supplied).
Petitioners, in the main, argue that the appellate court misapplied Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay
and in effect encouraged multiplicity of suits which is discouraged by this Court as a reading of Cario
shows; that Cario allows courts to pass on the determination of heirship and the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child so long as it is necessary to the determination of the case; and that contrary to the
appellate courts ruling, they had established their status as compulsory heirs.

In the main, the issue in the present petition is whether petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to
determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of respondents Affidavit of
Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name.
In the above-cited case of Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,[26] the therein petitioners executed on
March 17, 1994 an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay,
owners-claimants of the two lots mentioned therein. They later discovered on August 26, 1994 that a
portion, if not all, of the two lots had been titled in the name of the therein respondent Golden Bay Realty
and Development Corporation which in turn sold portions thereof to the therein individual respondents.
The therein petitioners Heirs thus filed a complaint for annulment of titles. The therein respondents
moved to dismiss the case for failure of the therein petitioners to, inter alia, state a cause of action and
prove their status as heirs. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss in this wise:
But the plaintiffs who claimed to be the legal heirs of the said Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay have not
shown any proof or even a semblance of itexcept the allegations that they are the legal heirs of the
aforementioned Yaptinchaysthat they have been declared the legal heirs of the deceased couple. Now,
the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased couple must be made in the proper special
proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for reconveyance of property. This must take precedence
over the action for reconveyance . . .[27] (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied).
On petition for certiorari by the Heirs, this Court, albeit holding that the petition was an improper
recourse, found that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the case. Citing
Litam et al. v. Rivera[28] and Solivio v. Court of Appeals,[29] this Court held that the declaration of
heirship can be made only in a special proceeding inasmuch as the petitioners here are seeking the
establishment of a status or right.
In the above-cited case of Litam,[30] Gregorio Dy Tam instituted a special proceeding for issuance of
letters of administration before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, alleging in his petition that
he is the son of Rafael Litam who died in Manila on January 10, 1951 and is survived by him and his
therein named seven (7) siblings who are children of the decedent by his marriage to Sia Khin celebrated
in China in 1911; that the decedent contracted in 1922 in the Philippines another marriage with Marcosa
Rivera; and that the decedent left neither a will nor debt. Dy Tam thus prayed for the issuance of letters of
administration to Marcosa Rivera, the surviving spouse of the decedent. The CFI granted the petition
and issued letters of administration to, on Marcosas request, her nephew Arminio Rivera.
While the special proceeding was pending, Dy Tam and his purported siblings filed a civil case before the
same court, against the estate of Rafael Litam administrator Arminio Rivera and Remedios R. Espiritu,
duly appointed guardian of Marcosa. In their complaint, Dy Tam and his purported siblings substantially
reproduced the allegations made in his petition in the special proceeding, with the addition of a list of
properties allegedly acquired during the marriage of the decedent and Marcosa.
Finding the issue raised in the civil case to be identical to some unresolved incidents in the special
proceeding, both were jointly heard by the trial court, following which it rendered a decision in the civil
case dismissing it, declaring, inter alia, that the plaintiffs Dy Tam et al. are not the children of the
decedent whose only surviving heir is Marcosa.
On appeal to this Court by Dy Tam et al., one of the two issues raised for determination was whether they
are the legitimate children of Rafael Litam.
This Court, holding that the issue hinged on whether Rafael Litam and Sia Khin were married in 1911,
and whether Rafael Litam is the father of appellants Dy Tam et al., found substantially correct the trial
courts findings of fact and its conclusion that, among other things, the birth certificates of Dy Tam et al.
do not establish the identity of the deceased Rafael Litam and the persons named therein as father [and]
it does not appear in the said certificates of birth that Rafael Litam had in any manner intervened in the
preparation and filing thereof; and that [t]he other documentary evidence presented by [them] [is]
entirely immaterial and highly insufficient to prove the alleged marriage between the deceased Rafael
Litam and Sia Khin and [their] alleged status . . . as children of said decedent.
This Court went on to opine in Litam, however, that the lower court should not have declared, in the
decision appealed from, that Marcosa is the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in
the [civil case], it being within the exclusive competence of the court in [the] [s]pecial [p]roceeding.
In Solivio,[31] also cited in Heirs of Guido and Isabel Yaptinchay, there was a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased, who was a soltero, filed before the RTC of Iloilo. In the special

proceeding, Branch 23 of said court declared as sole heir Celedonia Solivio, the decedents maternal aunthalf sister of his mother. Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, the decedents paternal aunt-sister of his father,
moved to reconsider the courts order declaring Celedonia Solivio as sole heir of the decedent, she
claiming that she too was an heir. The court denied the motion on the ground of tardiness. Instead of
appealing the denial of her motion, Concordia filed a civil case against Celedonia before the same RTC,
for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages. The civil case was raffled to Branch 26 of
the RTC, which rendered judgment in favor of Concordia. On appeal by Celedonia, the appellate court
affirmed the said judgment.
On petition for review filed before this Court by Celedonia who posed, among other issues, whether
Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain [the civil action] for partition and recovery of
Concordia Villanuevas share of the estate of [the deceased] while the [estate] proceedings . . . were still
pending . . . in Branch 23 of the same court, this Court held that [i]n the interest of orderly procedure
and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedents estate, a court should not interfere with
[estate] proceedings pending in a co-equal court, citing Guilas v. CFI Judge of Pampanga.[32]
This Court, however, in Solivio, upon [c]onsidering that the estate proceedings are still pending, but
nonetheless [therein private respondent-Concordia Villanueva] had lost her right to have herself declared
as co-heir in said proceedings, opted to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of
justice, and declared her an heir of the decedent.
In Guilas[33] cited in Solivio, a project of partition between an adopted daughter, the therein petitioner
Juanita Lopez Guilas (Juanita), and her adoptive father was approved in the proceedings for the settlement
of the testate estate of the decedent-adoptive mother, following which the probate court directed that the
records of the case be archived.
Juanita subsequently filed a civil action against her adoptive father to annul the project of partition on the
ground of lesion, preterition and fraud, and prayed that her adoptive father immediately deliver to her the
two lots allocated to her in the project of partition. She subsequently filed a motion in the testate estate
proceedings for her adoptive father to deliver to her, among other things, the same two lots allotted to her.
After conducting pre-trial in the civil case, the trial court, noting the parties agreement to suspend action
or resolution on Juanitas motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her of the two lots
alloted to her until after her complaint in the civil case had been decided, set said case for trial.
Juanita later filed in the civil case a motion to set aside the order setting it for trial on the ground that in
the amended complaint she, in the meantime, filed, she acknowledged the partial legality and validity of
the project of partition insofar as she was allotted the two lots, the delivery of which she was seeking. She
thus posited in her motion to set aside the April 27, 1966 order setting the civil case for hearing that there
was no longer a prejudicial question to her motion in the testate estate proceedings for the delivery to her
of the actual possession of the two lots. The trial court, by order of April 27, 1966, denied the motion.
Juanita thereupon assailed the April 27, 1966 order before this Court.
The probate courts approval of the project of partition and directive that the records of the case be sent to
the archives notwithstanding, this Court held that the testate estate proceedings had not been legally
terminated as Juanitas share under the project of partition had not been delivered to her. Explained this
Court:
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings
cannot be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong vs. Tecson, supra.); because a judicial partition is not
final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided
the prescriptive period therefor has not elapse (Mari vs. Bonilla, 83 Phil., 137). The better practice,
however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in
the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative
proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by
another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate o[r] intestate court
already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of (Ramos vs.
Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol vs. Cano, supra,; Jingco vs. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92
Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic vs. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil., 455, 460-461).[34]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
This Court thus set aside the assailed April 27, 1966 order of the trial court setting the civil case for
hearing, but allowed the civil case to continue because it involves no longer the two lots adjudicated to
Juanita.

The common doctrine in Litam, Solivio and Guilas in which the adverse parties are putative heirs to the
estate of a decedent or parties to the special proceedings for its settlement is that if the special proceedings
are pending, or if there are no special proceedings filed but there is, under the circumstances of the case, a
need to file one, then the determination of, among other issues, heirship should be raised and settled in
said special proceedings. Where special proceedings had been instituted but had been finally closed and
terminated, however, or if a putative heir has lost the right to have himself declared in the special
proceedings as co-heir and he can no longer ask for its re-opening, then an ordinary civil action can be
filed for his declaration as heir in order to bring about the annulment of the partition or distribution or
adjudication of a property or properties belonging to the estate of the deceased.
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugals estate,
executed on February 15, 1988[35] the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of
Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court.[36] Said rule is an exception to the general rule that
when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should
appoint a qualified administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no
will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.[37]
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt,
has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the
Caloocan parcel of land,[38] to still subject it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding
which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as heirs is not only
impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding.
And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the civil case subject of the present case,
could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court which assumed jurisdiction over the
case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject
Portugals estate to administration proceedings since a determination of petitioners status as heirs could
be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners,[39] the trial court should proceed to evaluate the
evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined
during pre-trial, which bear repeating, to wit:
1. Which of the two (2) marriages contracted by the deceased Jose Q. Portugal, is valid;
2. Which of the plaintiff, Jose Portugal Jr. and defendant Leonila P. Beltran is the legal heir of the
deceased Jose Q. Portugal (Sr.);
3. Whether or not TCT No. 159813 was issued in due course and can still be contested by plaintiffs;
4. Whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to their claim under the complaint.[40]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed September 24, 2002 Decision of the
Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE.
Let the records of the case be REMANDED to the trial court, Branch 124 of the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, for it to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties and render a decision on the aboveenumerated issues defined during the pre-trial.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Termination of proceeding Tabuada v. Ruiz GR 168799 Jun 27, 2008
Sec 2 Hilado v. CA GR 164108 May 8, 2009
Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons
Definition - Montaner v. Sharia District Court, et. al. GR 1744975, Jan 20, 2009
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:

This Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeks to set aside the Orders of the Sharia District Court,
Fourth Sharia Judicial District, Marawi City, dated August 22, 2006[1] and September 21, 2006.[2]
On August 17, 1956, petitioner Luisa Kho Montaer, a Roman Catholic, married Alejandro
Montaer, Sr. at the Immaculate Conception Parish in Cubao, Quezon City.[3] Petitioners Alejandro
Montaer, Jr., Lillibeth Montaer-Barrios, and Rhodora Eleanor Montaer-Dalupan are their children.[4]
On May 26, 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died.[5]
On August 19, 2005, private respondents Liling Disangcopan and her daughter, Almahleen Liling S.
Montaer, both Muslims, filed a Complaint for the judicial partition of properties before the Sharia
District Court.[6] The said complaint was entitled Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and Liling M.
Disangcopan v. the Estates and Properties of Late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., Luisa Kho Montaer, Lillibeth
K. Montaer, Alejandro Kho Montaer, Jr., and Rhodora Eleanor K. Montaer, and docketed as Special
Civil Action No. 7-05.[7] In the said complaint, private respondents made the following allegations: (1)
in May 1995, Alejandro Montaer, Sr. died; (2) the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim; (3)
petitioners are the first family of the decedent; (4) Liling Disangcopan is the widow of the decedent;
(5) Almahleen Liling S. Montaer is the daughter of the decedent; and
(6) the estimated value of and a
list of the properties comprising the estate of the decedent.[8] Private respondents prayed for the Sharia
District Court to order, among others, the following: (1) the partition of the estate of the decedent; and (2)
the appointment of an administrator for the estate of the decedent.[9]
Petitioners filed an Answer with a Motion to Dismiss mainly on the following grounds: (1) the
Sharia District Court has no jurisdiction over the estate of the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr., because he
was a Roman Catholic; (2) private respondents failed to pay the correct amount of docket fees; and (3)
private respondents complaint is barred by prescription, as it seeks to establish filiation between
Almahleen Liling S. Montaer and the decedent, pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.[10]
On November 22, 2005, the Sharia District Court dismissed the private respondents complaint.
The district court held that Alejandro Montaer, Sr. was not a Muslim, and its jurisdiction extends only to
the settlement and distribution of the estate of deceased Muslims.[11]
On December 12, 2005, private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration.[12] On December 28,
2005, petitioners filed an Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, alleging that the motion for
reconsideration lacked a notice of hearing.[13] On January 17, 2006, the Sharia District Court denied
petitioners opposition.[14] Despite finding that the said motion for reconsideration lacked notice of
hearing, the district court held that such defect was cured as petitioners were notified of the existence of
the pleading, and it took cognizance of the said motion.[15] The Sharia District Court also reset the
hearing for the motion for reconsideration.[16]
In its first assailed order dated August 22, 2006, the Sharia District Court reconsidered its order of
dismissal dated November 22, 2005.[17] The district court allowed private respondents to adduce further
evidence.[18] In its second assailed order dated September 21, 2006, the Sharia District Court ordered
the continuation of trial, trial on the merits, adducement of further evidence, and pre-trial conference.[19]
Seeking recourse before this Court, petitioners raise the following issues:
I.
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY LACKS JURISDICTION OVER
PETITIONERS WHO ARE ROMAN CATHOLICS AND NON-MUSLIMS.
II.
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT MARAWI CITY DID NOT ACQUIRE
JURISDICTION OVER THE ESTATES AND PROPERTIES OF THE LATE ALEJANDRO
MONTAER, SR. WHICH IS NOT A NATURAL OR JURIDICAL PERSON WITH CAPACITY TO
BE SUED.
III.
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE
COMPLAINT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AGAINST PETITIONERS DUE TO NON-PAYMENT
OF THE FILING AND DOCKETING FEES.
IV.

RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE OPPOSITION
OF PETITIONERS AND THEN GRANTED THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF
RESPONDENTS LILING DISANGCOPAN, ET AL. WHICH WAS FATALLY DEFECTIVE FOR
LACK OF A NOTICE OF HEARING.
V.
RESPONDENT SHARIA DISTRICT COURTMARAWI CITY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT SET SPL. CIVIL ACTION 705 FOR TRIAL EVEN IF THE COMPLAINT PLAINLY REVEALS THAT RESPONDENT
ALMAHLEEN LILING S. MONTAER SEEKS RECOGNITION FROM ALEJANDRO MONTAER,
SR. WHICH CAUSE OF ACTION PRESCRIBED UPON THE DEATH OF ALEJANDRO
MONTAER, SR. ON MAY 26, 1995.
In their Comment to the Petition for Certiorari, private respondents stress that the Sharia District Court
must be given the opportunity to hear and decide the question of whether the decedent is a Muslim in
order to determine whether it has jurisdiction.[20]
Jurisdiction: Settlement of the Estate of Deceased Muslims
Petitioners first argument, regarding the Sharia District Courts jurisdiction, is dependent on a question
of fact, whether the late Alejandro Montaer, Sr. is a Muslim. Inherent in this argument is the premise that
there has already been a determination resolving such a question of fact. It bears emphasis, however, that
the assailed orders did not determine whether the decedent is a Muslim. The assailed orders did, however,
set a hearing for the purpose of resolving this issue.
Article 143(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of Muslim Personal Laws
of the Philippines, provides that the Sharia District Courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over the
settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims:
ARTICLE 143. Original jurisdiction. (1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over:
xxxx
(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of deceased Muslims, probate
of wills, issuance of letters of administration or appointment of administrators or executors regardless of
the nature or the aggregate value of the property.
The determination of the nature of an action or proceeding is controlled by the averments and character of
the relief sought in the complaint or petition.[21] The designation given by parties to their own pleadings
does not necessarily bind the courts to treat it according to the said designation. Rather than rely on a
falsa descriptio or defective caption, courts are guided by the substantive averments of the
pleadings.[22]
Although private respondents designated the pleading filed before the Sharia District Court as a
Complaint for judicial partition of properties, it is a petition for the issuance of letters of administration,
settlement, and distribution of the estate of the decedent. It contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required
for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim,[23] such as the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s
death as well as the allegation that he is a Muslim. The said petition also contains an enumeration of the
names of his legal heirs, so far as known to the private respondents, and a probable list of the properties
left by the decedent, which are the very properties sought to be settled before a probate court.
Furthermore, the reliefs prayed for reveal that it is the intention of the private respondents to seek judicial
settlement of the estate of the decedent.[24] These include the following: (1) the prayer for the partition of
the estate of the decedent; and (2) the prayer for the appointment of an administrator of the said estate.
We cannot agree with the contention of the petitioners that the district court does not have jurisdiction
over the case because of an allegation in their answer with a motion to dismiss that Montaer, Sr. is not a
Muslim. Jurisdiction of a court over the nature of the action and its subject matter does not depend upon
the defenses set forth in an answer[25] or a motion to dismiss.[26] Otherwise, jurisdiction would depend
almost entirely on the defendant[27] or result in having a case either thrown out of court or its
proceedings unduly delayed by simple stratagem.[28] Indeed, the defense of lack of jurisdiction which
is dependent on a question of fact does not render the court to lose or be deprived of its jurisdiction.[29]

The same rationale applies to an answer with a motion to dismiss.[30] In the case at bar, the Sharia
District Court is not deprived of jurisdiction simply because petitioners raised as a defense the allegation
that the deceased is not a Muslim. The Sharia District Court has the authority to hear and receive
evidence to determine whether it has jurisdiction, which requires an a priori determination that the
deceased is a Muslim. If after hearing, the Sharia District Court determines that the deceased was not in
fact a Muslim, the district court should dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Special Proceedings
The underlying assumption in petitioners second argument, that the proceeding before the Sharia District
Court is an ordinary civil action against a deceased person, rests on an erroneous understanding of the
proceeding before the court a quo. Part of the confusion may be attributed to the proceeding before the
Sharia District Court, where the parties were designated either as plaintiffs or defendants and the case
was denominated as a special civil action. We reiterate that the proceedings before the court a quo are for
the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of the estate of the deceased, which is
a special proceeding. Section 3(c) of the Rules of Court (Rules) defines a special proceeding as a remedy
by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact. This Court has applied the Rules,
particularly the rules on special proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased Muslim.[31] In
a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, settlement, and distribution of estate, the applicants
seek to establish the fact of death of the decedent and later to be duly recognized as among the decedents
heirs, which would allow them to exercise their right to participate in the settlement and liquidation of the
estate of the decedent.[32] Here, the respondents seek to establish the fact of Alejandro Montaer, Sr.s
death and, subsequently, for private respondent Almahleen Liling S. Montaer to be recognized as among
his heirs, if such is the case in fact.
Petitioners argument, that the prohibition against a decedent or his estate from being a party defendant in
a civil action[33] applies to a special proceeding such as the settlement of the estate of the deceased, is
misplaced. Unlike a civil action which has definite adverse parties, a special proceeding has no definite
adverse party. The definitions of a civil action and a special proceeding, respectively, in the Rules
illustrate this difference. A civil action, in which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of
a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong[34] necessarily has definite adverse parties, who are
either the plaintiff or defendant.[35] On the other hand, a special proceeding, by which a party seeks to
establish a status, right, or a particular fact,[36] has one definite party, who petitions or applies for a
declaration of a status, right, or particular fact, but no definite adverse party. In the case at bar, it bears
emphasis that the estate of the decedent is not being sued for any cause of action. As a special proceeding,
the purpose of the settlement of the estate of the decedent is to determine all the assets of the estate,[37]
pay its liabilities,[38] and to distribute the residual to those entitled to the same.[39]
Docket Fees
Petitioners third argument, that jurisdiction was not validly acquired for non-payment of docket fees, is
untenable. Petitioners point to private respondents petition in the proceeding before the court a quo,
which contains an allegation estimating the decedents estate as the basis for the conclusion that what
private respondents paid as docket fees was insufficient. Petitioners argument essentially involves two
aspects: (1) whether the clerk of court correctly assessed the docket fees; and (2) whether private
respondents paid the correct assessment of the docket fees.
Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest a trial court
with jurisdiction over the subject matter.[40] If the party filing the case paid less than the correct amount
for the docket fees because that was the amount assessed by the clerk of court, the responsibility of
making a deficiency assessment lies with the same clerk of court.[41] In such a case, the lower court
concerned will not automatically lose jurisdiction, because of a partys reliance on the clerk of courts
insufficient assessment of the docket fees.[42] As every citizen has the right to assume and trust that a
public officer charged by law with certain duties knows his duties and performs them in accordance with
law, the party filing the case cannot be penalized with the clerk of courts insufficient assessment.[43]
However, the party concerned will be required to pay the deficiency.[44]
In the case at bar, petitioners did not present the clerk of courts assessment of the docket fees. Moreover,
the records do not include this assessment. There can be no determination of whether private respondents
correctly paid the docket fees without the clerk of courts assessment.
Exception to Notice of Hearing
Petitioners fourth argument, that private respondents motion for reconsideration before the Sharia
District Court is defective for lack of a notice of hearing, must fail as the unique circumstances in the

present case constitute an exception to this requirement. The Rules require every written motion to be set
for hearing by the applicant and to address the notice of hearing to all parties concerned.[45] The Rules
also provide that no written motion set for hearing shall be acted upon by the court without proof of
service thereof.[46] However, the Rules allow a liberal construction of its provisions in order to
promote [the] objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.[47] Moreover, this Court has upheld a liberal construction specifically of the rules of notice
of hearing in cases where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice
especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory
judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein.[48] In these exceptional cases,
the Court considers that no party can even claim a vested right in technicalities, and for this reason,
cases should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits rather than on technicalities.[49]
The case at bar falls under this exception. To deny the Sharia District Court of an opportunity to
determine whether it has jurisdiction over a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent alleged
to be a Muslim would also deny its inherent power as a court to control its process to ensure conformity
with the law and justice. To sanction such a situation simply because of a lapse in fulfilling the notice
requirement will result in a miscarriage of justice.
In addition, the present case calls for a liberal construction of the rules on notice of hearing, because
the rights of the petitioners were not affected. This Court has held that an exception to the rules on notice
of hearing is where it appears that the rights of the adverse party were not affected.[50] The purpose for
the notice of hearing coincides with procedural due process,[51] for the court to determine whether the
adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, as the Rules do not fix any period within which to file a
reply or opposition.[52] In probate proceedings, what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous
notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of opportunity to be heard.[53] In the case at bar, as
evident from the Sharia District Courts order dated January 17, 2006, petitioners counsel received a
copy of the motion for reconsideration in question. Petitioners were certainly not denied an opportunity to
study the arguments in the said motion as they filed an opposition to the same. Since the Sharia District
Court reset the hearing for the motion for reconsideration in the same order, petitioners were not denied
the opportunity to object to the said motion in a hearing. Taken together, these circumstances show that
the purpose for the rules of notice of hearing, procedural process, was duly observed.
Prescription and Filiation
Petitioners fifth argument is premature. Again, the Sharia District Court has not yet determined
whether it has jurisdiction to settle the estate of the decedent. In the event that a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of a decedent is pending, questions regarding heirship, including prescription in
relation to recognition and filiation, should be raised and settled in the said proceeding.[54] The court, in
its capacity as a probate court, has jurisdiction to declare who are the heirs of the decedent.[55] In the case
at bar, the determination of the heirs of the decedent depends on an affirmative answer to the question of
whether the Sharia District Court has jurisdiction over the estate of the decedent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Orders of the Sharia District Court, dated August 22,
2006 and September 21, 2006 respectively, are AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Rule 73 Venue and Process-Limited jurisdiction of probate court -Camaya v. Patulandon, GR 144915 23 Feb 2004
FACTS:
On November 17, 1972, Rufina Reyes (testatrix) executed a notarized will wherein she devised Lot no.
288-A to her grandson Anselmo Mangulabnan. During her lifetime, the testatrix herself filed the petition
for the probate of her will before the CFI. Later, on June 27, 1973, the testatrix executed a codicil
modifying her will by devising the said Lot 288-A in favor of her four children Bernardo (the executor),
Simplicia, Huillerma and Juan (all surnamed Patulandong), and her grandson Mangulabnan to the extent
of 1/5 each.
Mangulabnan later sought the delivery to him by executor Patulandong of the title of Lot 288-A, but
Patulandong refused to heed the request because of the codicial which modified the will of the testatrix.
Thus, Mangulabnan filed an action for partition against Patulandong in the RTC. The court in this
partition ordered the partitioning of the property. However, the court holds that the partition is without
prejudice to the probate of the codicil in accordance with the Rules of Court. So, by virtue of the decision
in partition case, Mangulabnan caused the cancellation of the title of the testatrix over Lot 288-A, and

another TCT was issued in his name. Mangulabnan later sold to herein petitioners Camayas Lot no. 288-A
by a Deed of Sale, and thus, a TCT was issued under the name of the Camayas.
However, come now the decision of the probate court admitting the codicil, and disposing that the Deed
of Sale in favor of the Camayas, and the corresponding TCT issued in their name are null and void, and
that the Register of Dees was ordered to issue instead corresponding certificates of titles to the aforesaid
four children of the testatrix, and her grandson Mangulabnan to the extent of 1/5 each pursuant to the
codicil.
The Camayas and Mangulabnan filed an MR. But the probate court denied this. The CA affirmed the
decision of the probate court. Thus, the case was brought to the SC via a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES:
1.Whether the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared null and void and ordered the
cancellation of the TCT of Camayas and the deed of sale.
2.Whether the final judgment in partition case bars the allowance of the codicil.
HELD:
1.As to the first issue, the probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared the deed of sale as null
and void, and also as to the cancellation of the TCTs under the name of the Camayas. It is well-settled rule
that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to
outside parties. All that said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should
not be included in the inventory. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for final determination of the
conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. Having been apprised of the fact that the
property in question was in the possession of third parties and more important, covered by a transfer
certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court should have denied the
motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the
property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession and ownership
of the property. The probate court exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared the deed of sale and the titles
of the Camayas as null and void, it having had the effect of depriving them possession and ownership of
the property.

Pacioles v. Chuatoco-Ching GR 127920 Aug 9, 2005

Facts:
On 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value ofP10.5M, stock
investments worth P518, 783.00, bank deposits amounting to P6.54M, and interests in certain
businesses. She was survived by her husband (Petitioner) and their 2minor children. Consequently,
petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition for the settlement of Miguelitas estate. He prayed that
(a) letters of administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the estate be divided
among the compulsory heirs. Miguelitas mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching (Respondent) filed an
opposition, specifically to petit ioners prayer for the issuance of letters of administration on the
grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to exercise the duties of an administrator; and (b) the
bulk of Miguelitas estate is composed of paraphernal properties. Respondent prayed that the letters of
administration be issued to her instead. Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her appointment as special
administratrix. Petitioners allegations: That the resp. had no direct and material interest in the estate, she
not being a compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to be
appointed as administrator under the law. Respondents contentions: That she has direct and material
interest in the estate because she gave half of her inherited properties to Miguelita on condition that both
of them would undertake whatever business endeavor they decided to, in the capacity of
business partners. In her omnibus motion, she nominated her son Emmanuel to act as special
administrator. The RTC appointed petitioner and Emmanuel as joint regular administrators of the estate.
Both were issued letters of administration after taking their oath and posting the requisite bond.

Heirs of Doromio v. Heirs of Doromio GR 169454; 541 SCRA 479

Facts:

Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante deceased,were the registered owners of a parcel of
land located.

Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato Doronio, deceased, were the children of the spouses and the
parties in this case are their heirs.

Petitioners are the heirs of Marcelino Doronio, while respondents are the heirs of Fortunato
Doronio.

Eager to obtain the entire property, the heirs of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico filed before
the RTC in Urdaneta, Pangasinana petition "For the Registration of a Private Deed of Donation"docketed
as Petition Case No. U-920.

No respondents were named in the said petition although notices of hearing were posted on the
bulletin boards of Barangay Cabalitaan, Municipalities of Asingan and Lingayen. During the hearings, no
one interposed an objection to the petition. After the RTC ordered a general default, the petition was
eventually granted on September 22, 1993.

This led to the registration of the deed of donation, cancellation of OCT No. 352 and issuance of
anew Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 44481 in the names of Marcelino Doronio and Veronica
Pico. Thus, the entire property was titled in the names of petitioners predecessors.

On April 28, 1994,the heirs of Fortunato Doronio filed a pleading before the RTC in the form of a
petition in the same Petition Case No. U-920. The petition was for the reconsideration of the decision of
the RTC that ordered the registration of the subject deed of donation. It was prayed in the petition that an
order be issued declaring null and void the registration of the private deed of donation and that TCT No.
44481 be cancelled. However, the petition was dismissed on the ground that the decision in Petition Case
No. U-920 had already become final as it was not appealed.
Issue: Can respondents be bound by the decision in Petition CaseNo. U-920 even if they were not made
parties in the said case?
Held:Petitioners cannot use the finality of the RTC decision in Petition Case No. U-920 as a shield against
the verification of the validity of the deed of donation. According to petitioners, the said final decision is
one for quieting of title. In other words, it is a case for declaratory relief under Rule 64 (now Rule 63) of
the Rules of Court. Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor are they, strictly speaking, in
personam, but being against the person in respect of the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi
in rem. The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between the parties. Thus, respondents are
not bound by the decision in Petition Case No. U-920 as they were not made parties in the said case.The
rules on quieting of title expressly provide that any declaration in a suit to quiet title shall not prejudice
persons who are not parties to the action. That respondents filed a subsequent pleading in the same
Petition Case No. U-920 after the decision there had become final did not change the fact that said
decision became final without their being impleaded in the case. Said subsequent pleading was dismissed
onthe ground of finality of the decision.
Reyes v. Sotero, et al., GR No. 167405, Feb 16, 2006
FACTS:
Respondent Corazon Chichioco filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration & settlement of
estate of the late Elena Lising before the RTC of Paniqui, Tarlac, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 204,
claiming that she [Chichioco] was the niece and heir of Lising who died intestate, among other co-heirs.
Petitioner Ana Joyce Reyes filed an opposition to the petition, claiming that she was an adopted child of
Lising and the latters husband, Serafin Delos Santos and asserting that she was the sole heir of the
deceased.
Reyes filed a supplement to the opposition, attaching thereto the (a) Certification issued by the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Paniqui stating that Reyes was indeed adopted by Lising and Delos Santos pursuant to a
decision rendered in Spec. Proc. No. 1410; and (b) a Certification issued by the clerk of court of the
Tarlac RTC stating that a judgment was indeed rendered in said special proceeding decreeing Reyes'
adoption.
Case was soon deemed submitted for resolution.

Sometime later, Chichioco and her alleged co-heirs filed before the CA a petition for annulment of the
adoption decree, claiming that no proceedings for Reyes' adoption took place.
Upon motion of Chichioco, the RTC ordered the suspension of hearings on Spec. Proc. 204 pending the
outcome of the petition for annulment of the adoption decree.
CA dismissed the petition for failure to complly with Sec. 4, par. 3 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court
Reyes filed a motion before the RTC praying that the opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204 be finally
resolved and that the petition be dismissed, w/ an ex parte motion praying for the immediate resolution of
her opposition.
Chichioco et al. filed with the RTC a comment to the opposition, stating that reasonable doubts have been
cast on petitioners claim that she was legally adopted due allegedly to certain "badges of fraud" and
informed same that they filed a criminal complaint against Reyes for alleged falsification of the adoption
decree (later on dismissed).
The RTC issued a Resolution deferring resolution of Reyes' opposition to Spec. Proc. No. 204, pending
the outcome of the criminal case filed against her.
Chichioco filed an urgent motion to appoint a special administrator, on the ground that there was yet no
true determination and appraisal of the decedents universal estate, praying that the Branch Clerk of
Court, Atty. Paulino Saguyod, be appointed -- this was granted by the RTC
Reyes filed a motion for reconsideration before the RTC, contending that (a) Atty. Saguyod was appointed
without being required to file a bond; and (b) she is the sole heir of the decedent but to no avail.
Chichioco and the other alleged co-heirs filed a motion before the RTC to enjoin Reyes from conducting
business in a certain property belonging to the estate this was also granted by the RTC by way of
resolution issued on Sept. 18, 2002; a motion for reconsideration was likewise filed as regards this, which
was denied on Nov. 12, 2002
Reyes filed a special civil action for certiorari before the CA, assailing the Sept. 18 and Nov. 12
resolutions of the RTC. CA rendered judgment nullifying the resolutions of the RTC, but without
dismissing Spec. Proc. 204 since the dismissal of SP No. 53457 was not a judgment on the merits and did
not operate as res judicata to the former
Reyes' motion for reconsideration was denied
Hence this petition
ISSUES:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER HAD TO PROVE THE
VALIDITY OF HER ADOPTION DUE TO IMPUTATIONS OF IRREGULARITIES IN VIEW OF
SECTION 47 OF RULE 39.35
B. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DISMISSAL IN SP NO. 53457
WAS NOT A DISMISSAL ON THE MERITS.36
The petition is meritorious.
On the first assigned error, we agree with petitioner that she need not prove her legal adoption by any
evidence other than those which she had already presented before the trial court. To recall, petitioner
submitted a certification from the local civil registrars office that the adoption decree was registered
therein and also a copy of Judicial Form No. 43 and a certification issued by the clerk of court that the
decree was on file in the General Docket of the RTC-Tarlac City. Both certifications were issued under the
seal of the issuing offices and were signed by the proper officers. These are thus presumed to have been
regularly issued as part of the official duties that said public officers perform.37
It should be borne in mind that an adoption decree is a public document38 required by law to be entered
into the public records, the official repository of which, as well as all other judicial pronouncements
affecting the status of individuals, is the local civil registrars office as well as the court which rendered
the judgment.
Documents consisting of entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer
are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.39 As such, the certifications issued by the local civil
registrar and the clerk of court regarding details of petitioners adoption which are entered in the records
kept under their official custody, are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. These
certifications suffice as proof of the fact of petitioners adoption by the Delos Santos spouses until

contradicted or overcome by sufficient evidence. Mere "imputations of irregularities" will not cast a
"cloud of doubt" on the adoption decree since the certifications and its contents are presumed valid until
proof to the contrary is offered.
In this regard, it must be pointed out that such contrary proof can be presented only in a separate action
brought principally for the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree. The latter cannot be assailed
collaterally in a proceeding for the settlement of a decedents estate, as categorically held in Santos v.
Aranzanso.40 Accordingly, respondents cannot assail in these proceedings the validity of the adoption
decree in order to defeat petitioners claim that she is the sole heir of the decedent. Absent a categorical
pronouncement in an appropriate proceeding that the decree of adoption is void, the certifications
regarding the matter, as well as the facts stated therein, should be deemed legitimate, genuine and real.
Petitioners status as an adopted child of the decedent remains unrebutted and no serious challenge has
been brought against her standing as such. Therefore, for as long as petitioners adoption is considered
valid, respondents cannot claim any interest in the decedents estate. For this reason, we agree with
petitioner that Spec. Proc. No. 204 should be dismissed.
As succinctly held in Santos v. Aranzanso:41
From all the foregoing it follows that respondents - x x x and those who, like them x x x, claim an interest
in the estate x x x as alleged first cousins, cannot intervene, as such, in the settlement proceedings, in view
of the fact that in the order of intestate succession adopted children exclude first cousins (Articles 979 and
1003, New Civil Code). The same holds true as long as the adoption must be - as in the instant case considered valid. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner, whose adoption is presumed to be valid, would necessarily exclude respondents from inheriting
from the decedent since they are mere collateral relatives of the latter. To allow the proceedings below to
continue would serve no salutary purpose but to delay the resolution of the instant case. After all, the
dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 204 is the logical consequence of our pronouncement relative to the
presumed validity of petitioners adoption.
Moreover, it must be stressed that all the evidence pertinent to the resolution of the petitioners
opposition, which is actually a motion to dismiss the petition for letters of administration and settlement
of the estate, is a matter of record in the instant case. The same has in fact been submitted for resolution
before the RTC more than six years ago and is so far the only pending incident before the RTC. The
parties have likewise amply ventilated their positions on the matter through their respective pleadings
filed before the lower courts. No useful purpose will thus be served if we let the RTC resolve the matter,
only for its ruling to be elevated again to the Court of Appeals and subsequently to this Court. The remand
of the case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the Court is in a
position to resolve the dispute based on the evidence before it.42 This is in keeping with the avowed
purpose of the rules of procedure which is to secure for the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive
determination of every action or proceeding.43 Hence, since the grounds for the dismissal of Spec. Proc.
No. 204 are extant in the records and there is no cogent reason to remand the case to the RTC, Spec. Proc.
No. 204 should be dismissed.
Based on the foregoing, the Court sees no need to discuss petitioners second assigned error.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Special Proceedings No. 204 pending before the
Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City, Branch 67 is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Termination of the special proceeding
Munsayac-De Villa, v. CA 414 SCRA 436
THE CASE
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March
2, 2001 Decision2 and the June 21, 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No.
60914. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby
GRANTED only insofar as nullifying and setting aside the order of arrest contained in Respondent Judge
Antonio C. Reyes Orders dated June 22, 2000 and August 28, 2000 in Special Proceedings 704-R,

entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Late Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and the Late Vicenta
Munsayac.
"No pronouncement as to costs."4
The assailed Resolution denied both petitioners Partial Motion for Reconsideration5 and private
respondents Motion for Reconsideration.6
The Facts
The facts of the case were summarized by the CA in this wise:
"A recapitulation of facts shows that the present controversy before [u]s stems from Special Proceeding
Case No. 704-R, entitled In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Late Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and the
Late Vicenta Munsayac and pending before Branch 61 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. The
said special proceeding case was filed on November 17, 1998 by Grace F. Munsayac-De Villa (DE
VILLA), Lily F. Munsayac-Sunga (SUNGA) and Roy Peter F. Munsayac (ROY) three (3) of the five
(5) children of the late Spouses GELACIO and VICENTA MUNSAYAC for letters of administration
nominating DE VILLA as administratrix of the intestate estate of their parents. DE VILLAs nomination
was opposed by the two (2) other children of the late Munsayac Spouses, namely, Gelacio F. Munsayac,
Jr. (MUNSAYAC, JR.) and the late Nora F. Munsayac-Visperas (VISPERAS), who nominated
MUNSAYAC, JR. as administrator of the late Munsayac Couples intestate estate.
"MUNSAYAC, JR. was eventually appointed administrator pursuant to respondent Judges Order dated
March 22, 2000, replacing Lawyer Ceasar G. Oracion as special administrator of the said intestate estate,
pursuant to the Order dated April 27, 1998.
"Despite the approved 60-day suspension of the proceedings to enable the parties to discuss an amicable
settlement, the protracted exchange of pleadings between the opposing siblings in Special Proceeding
Case No. 704-R was of no help in the immediate settlement of the intestate estate of the late Munsayac
Couple.
"Even the efforts of the petitioners to inhibit respondent Judge further complicated the intestate
proceedings. Thus, there was the Request for Inhibition dated September 28, 1999, which was filed by DE
VILLA and SUNGA. Barely a week after the aforesaid Request for Inhibition was filed and before
respondent Judge could act on it, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
which was received by this Court on October 4, 1999, docketed as CA-G.R. SP NO. 55193 which has for
its petitioners and respondents the same respective parties involved in the present petition before [u]s, and
questions, among others, respondent Judges Order in open court dated September 29, 1999
directing/ordering DE VILLA to produce by 2:00 p.m. in the afternoon of the same date certain bank time
deposit certificates/documents; and the order of arrest of DE VILLA by about 4:00 p.m. in the afternoon
of the same date, for failure to produce the said bank certificates/documents. Pending the resolution of
CA-G.R. SP NO. 55193, petitioners filed an administrative case dated July 11, 2000 before the Supreme
Court, docketed as OCA IPI NO. 00-989-RTJ, which not only prayed for respondent Judges suspension
but also his permanent removal from office on grounds of grave misconduct and serious inefficiency.
"Acting on the Omnibus Motion dated April 24, 2000 which was filed by the administrator of the intestate
estate, respondent Judge issued the Order dated May 4, 2000, which underscored the order to surrender,
under pain of contempt, (a) the amount of the bank investment discovered in the names of the late
VICENTA, DE VILLA and SUNGA made with the United Coconut Planters Bank, Baguio City
(UCPB) under Investment Confirmation No. 0666 worth P13,506,343.33, and which amount was not
disclosed by the petitioners in the estate return tax, (b) as well as the surrender of all the pieces of jewelry
given by the late VICENTA to DE VILLA and SUNGA, subject of the freeze order with the China
Banking Corporation.
"The Court a quo substantially reiterated the import of the Order dated May 4, 2000, by issuing the Order
dated May 24, 2000 and, on the account of petitioners failure to faithfully comply therewith, issued the
Order dated June 22, 2000, which contained the following decretal portion
WHEREFORE, for their failure to comply with the Order of this Court dated May 24, 2000, the
petitioners Grace de Villa, Lily Sunga and Peter Roy Munsayac are hereby ordered ARRESTED in
accordance with Section 8, Rule 71, of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure, until their compliance to
immediately surrender in custodia legis to this Court for the Special Administrator the amount of
P13,506,343.33 plus the legal interest of 12% per annum compounded annually, from May 1995 until
fully complied with or a total amount of P23,802,788.00 more or less, as of May, 2000.

The petitioners Grace de Villa, Lily Sunga and Peter Roy Munsayac are likewise ORDERED to
surrender in custodia legis to this Court for the Special Administrator the amount of P15,298,835.95 and
P3,010,822.02 plus the legal interest of 12% per annum compounded annually, from May 1995 until fully
complied with or a total amount of P32,267,868.00, more or less, as of May 2000, within fifteen (15) days
from receipt of this Order.
SO ORDERED.
and the Order dated August 28, 2000, the pertinent portion of which reads The order for the petitioners to surrender the amounts stated in this Courts order dated June 22, 2000
shall stand and the order for the petitioners arrest shall not be lifted until their full and faithful
compliance with the order to place the said money in the legal custody of either the special administrator
or this Court. The motion for reconsideration on the matter of petitioners standing order of arrest is
therefore DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
were issued by respondent Judge and are now both subject of this present petition x x x."71a\^/phi1.net
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In nullifying the arrest order issued by Judge Reyes, the CA ruled that he had summarily ordered the
arrest of petitioners without any written charge filed against them or any hearing conducted thereon.
According to the appellate court, "there is nothing in Rule 71 which explicitly allows that the
requirements of filing a written charge and hearing in indirect contempt cases may be dispensed with."8 It
thus set aside the Order of Arrest issued by respondent judge.
Ruling on the request for inhibition filed by petitioners, the CA, however, held that there was no
convincing proof that the demeanor of the trial judge had put him under suspicion, especially in the light
of their clear display of contumacious behavior toward the court.9 It further held that their request for
inhibition was unacceptable, because they had come to the court with "unclean hands."10
Hence, this Petition.11
THE ISSUE:
In their Memorandum,12 petitioners submit this sole issue for our consideration:
"With due respect, the Respondent Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law in not ordering the inhibition
of the respondent presiding judge who, as shown in all his actuations and orders, [has] demonstrated
vindictiveness, arbitrariness, prejudice and bias against petitioners and partiality in favor of private
respondents thereby denying petitioners fundamental right to be entitled to an impartial tribunal."13
THE COURTS RULING:
The Petition for inhibition has no merit, but the trial judge must lift the freeze order and cause the return
of property or money still in custodia legis.
Sole Issue:
Inhibition
Before delving into the issue of inhibition, we note that the CA Decision nullified and set aside the Order
of Arrest issued by Judge Reyes against petitioners. Consequently, the propriety of the Order was no
longer raised in this Petition. Neither was it raised by respondents.
In a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court -- as distinguished from an ordinary appeal of a criminal
case in which the whole case is opened for review -- the appeal is limited to the errors assigned by
petitioner.14 Since respondents did not contest the Decision of the CA, no affirmative relief can be sought
by or given to them.15 Thus, not all the issues raised before the appellate court need to be considered by
this Court. The sole issue in the present Petition is the question of inhibition of respondent judge.

We emphasize at the outset that the main case from which this Petition arose has already been decided by
the CA. The Decision is now final and executory.16 Already terminated in that main case was Special
Proceedings No. 704-R, which had given rise to a number of incidents and petitions including the herein
matter. In CA-GR SP No. 64025, the CA found that Judge Reyes had gravely abused his discretion when
he disallowed the Extrajudicial Partition17 executed by the heirs of the Munsayac spouses. Thus, the
appellate court disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant special civil action is hereby GRANTED.1a\^/phi1.net
Accordingly, the assailed Orders dated March 1, 2001 and March 21, 2001 are hereby NULLIFIED and
SET ASIDE, and a new one ENTERED approving the Extrajudicial Partition between the Heirs of the
Spouses Gelacio J. Munsayac, Sr. and Vicenta F. Munsayac, and terminating Special Proceedings No.
704-R pending before respondent Court[.] The parties are hereby ENJOINED to abide by the same."18
Petitioners, however, argue that since there are still matters pending before the trial judge, such as the
withdrawal/release of money deposited in custodia legis and the lifting of a freeze order on certain
jewelry, his inhibition is still needed.19
We disagree. After the CA terminated Special Proceedings No. 704-R, we see no more reason why the
inhibition of Judge Reyes should still be an issue. The Petition therefor has already become moot and
academic in view of the termination of the main case. How can he be inhibited from a case that has
already been decided with finality?
It should be clear that the CA Decision20 terminating Special Proceedings No. 704-R found that the Deed
of Extrajudicial Partition executed by all the parties was the "final, complete and absolute settlement of
their respective shares and claims as heirs of deceased spouses Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and Vicenta
Munsayac."21 As such, any and all incidents relating to the special proceedings should also be deemed to
have been terminated.
When Judge Reyes issued his Orders commanding the bank manager of the China Bank branch in Baguio
City to freeze the safety deposit box of petitioners22 and to deposit certain amounts in custodia legis,23
he did so as the presiding judge in the probate court that was hearing Special Proceedings No. 704-R.
Now that the case has finally been terminated, it follows that neither he nor his court has any more right to
hold the properties that were the subject of his Orders in the special proceedings.
Needless to say, the lifting of any freeze order and the return of any property previously deposited with
the court should be effected. The judge had no more discretion to decide whether the amounts and the
property deposited should be released. Likewise, any standing order on any property in relation to the
special proceedings should be lifted. This ruling reiterates the long-standing principle that a tribunal
acting as a probate court exercises limited jurisdiction.24 However, the determination of whether a
property should be included in the inventory is within its probate jurisdiction. Such determination is only
provisional -- not conclusive -- in character and subject to the final decision in a separate action that may
be instituted by the parties.25
Neither are we unmindful of the rule that questions on an advance made or allegedly made by the
deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court that has jurisdiction over the estate
proceedings; and that the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the
questions and on the heirs.26
In a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated this settled, corollary principle: generally, a
probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, but it may do so if the interested parties are
all heirs; or the question is one of collation or advancement; or the parties consent to its assumption of
jurisdiction and the rights of third parties are not impaired.27 These principles, however, have no more
application in this case, since the main proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the
deceased couple have already been decided and terminated. Indeed, every litigation must come to an
end.28
To be sure, this Court is not tasked to look into the ownership of the properties deposited with or ordered
frozen by the lower court during the progress of the special proceedings. Neither can Judge Reyes do so
now. Whether those properties should have been adjudicated by the legal heirs of the Munsayac spouses is
beside the point at this time. The former have already entered into an Extrajudicial Partition representing
the final, complete and absolute settlement of their shares as heirs of the latter. What is left to be done is
simply the lifting of any freeze order and the release of any property originally deposited by petitioners in
custodia legis.

In view of the above ruling, we deem it necessary to direct Judge Reyes to immediately lift any freeze
order still pending and to order the release of any property deposited in custodia legis. It is already an
accepted rule of procedure for this Court to strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding,
leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation.29 To achieve that end and to expedite the
case in the interest of substantial justice, a directive to the trial judge to lift the freeze order and release the
property deposited with the court becomes indispensable.30
WHEREFORE, the prayer for the inhibition of Judge Antonio C. Reyes is hereby DENIED for being
moot and academic. However, he is DIRECTED to immediately lift any order he made on properties
relative to Special Proceedings No. 704-R. He is further ORDERED to cause the return of any amount or
property originally deposited by petitioners in custodia legis. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Meaning of residence San Luis v. San Luis Feb 6, 2007
FACTS:
During his lifetime, Felicisimo (Rodolfos dad) contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with
Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.
However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San
Luis (marriage solemnized at California, U.S.A.), then surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December
18, 1992. Upon death of his dad Rodolfo sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and
the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Rodolfo filed a motion to dismiss on the
grounds of improper venue and failure to state the cause of action. He also claimed that respondent has no
legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the
time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee. The RTC ruled that Felicidad, as a widow of the
decedent, possessed the legal standing to file the petition and that the venue was properly laid.
Mila, one of the children by first marriage, filed a motion for inhibition against Judge Tensuan. The
motion was granted and the case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Arcangel. Same issues
were raised at the second trial. However, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of administration.
It held that, at the the time of Felicisimos death, he was duly elected governor and a resident of Laguna.
Hence, the petition should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that
respondent was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her
marriage with the decedent was bigamous, thus, void ab initio.
On appeal to the CA, it reversed the decision of the RTC. It held that the venue was properly laid and that
the decedent has legal capacity to remarry, emphasizing that the foreign divorce having been obtained by
the Foreigner on December 14, 1992, the Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under
Philippine laws". For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not be
denominated as "a bigamous marriage. Hence the instant petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
(1) whether venue was properly laid
(2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
RULING:
The petition lacks merit.
(1) Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the
estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the province "in which he resides at the
time of his death." The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from
"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In
the application of venue statutes and rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature - residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. The word
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not
legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place,

while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than
temporary.
There is a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of
fixing the venue of actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous
terms, that is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning.
However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his
personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily
be his legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it
is possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another. In the instant case,
while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that
he also maintained a residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. From the
foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue
of the settlement of his estate.
The subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which has
territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17, 1993. At
that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City
as per Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
(2) The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry,
would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce
obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find
that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may
be considered the co-owner of Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint
efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be granted to the
surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. - A petition for letters of administration must be
filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or
one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not
merely indirect or contingent.
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct interest in the estate
of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not denied by petitioners. If she
proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo's capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage
with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-owner
under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. In a co-ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired
through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie
presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. The regime of limited co-ownership of
property governing the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who
nonetheless live together as husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in
proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the proven
actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent thereof, their contributions
and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent's legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under
Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming
the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and
its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed petitioners' motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let
this case be REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

Rule 74 Summary Settlement of Estates-Two year prescriptive period

Pedrosa v. CA, 353 SCRA 620

FACTS:
On April 8, 1946, the spouses Miguel Rodriguez and Rosalina J. de Rodriguez initiated proceedings
before the CFI of Ozamiz City for the legal adoption of herein petitioner, Maria Elena Rodriguez Pedrosa.
On August 1, 1946, the CFI granted the petition and declared petitioner Pedrosa the adopted child of
Miguel and Rosalina.
On April 29, 1972, Miguel died intestate. Thereafter, petitioner and Rosalina entered into an extrajudicial
settlement of Miguel's estate, adjudicating between themselves in equal proportion the estate of Miguel.
On November 21, 1972, private respondents filed an action to annul the adoption of petitioner before the
CFI of Ozamiz City, with petitioner and herein respondent Rosalina as defendants docketed as OZ 349.
On August 28, 1974, the CFI denied the petition and upheld the validity of the adoption. Thereafter, the
private respondents appealed said decision to the Court of Appeals.
On March 11, 1983, while said appeal was pending, the Rodriguezes entered into an extrajudicial
settlement with respondent Rosalina for the partition of the estate of Miguel and of another sister, Pilar.
Rosalina acted as the representative of the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez. Pilar had no heirs except his
brothers and sisters.
The Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition covered fourteen parcels of land covering a total area
of 224,883 square meters. These properties were divided among Jose, Carmen, Mercedes, Ramon and the
heirs of Miguel, represented solely by Rosalina. The heirs of Miguel were given 226 square meters of
parcel 2, and 9,567 square meters and 24,457 square meters of parcels 7 and 9, respectively. 1 The total
land area allocated to the heirs of Miguel was 34,250 square meters.
Armed with the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition, respondents Rodriguezes were able to
secure new Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) and were able to transfer some parcels to the other
respondents herein.
On June 19, 1986, the parties in the appeal which sought to annul the adoption of petitioner Pedrosa filed
a joint Motion to Dismiss. On June 25, 1986, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal but upheld the
validity of the adoption of petitioner.
Thereafter, petitioner sent her daughter, Loreto Jocelyn, to claim their share of the properties from the
Rodriguezes. The latter refused saying that Maria Elena and Loreto were not heirs since they were not
their blood relatives.
Petitioner, then, filed a complaint to annul the 1983 partition. The said complaint was filed on January 28,
1987. Said complaint was later amended on March 25, 1987 to include the allegation "that earnest efforts
toward a compromise were made between the plaintiffs and the defendants, but the same failed."7
The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution
dated December 20, 1994.
ISSUE: Has the action for the complaint for the annulment of the "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and
Partition" already prescribed?
RULING: NO.
Sec. 4, Rule 74: two-year prescriptive period -- (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had
notice of the extrajudicial partition; and (2) when the provisions of Sec. 1, Rule 74 have been strictly
complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial
settlement or are represented by themselves or through guardians.
Maria Elena did not participate in the extrajudicial partition; thus, the two-year prescriptive period is not
applicable in her case.
the applicable prescriptive period would be four years from the discovery of the fraud [since after all, this
is an action for the annulment of a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the ground of fraud, for the
lack of notice and consent of Maria Elena (in the words of the SC: a deed of extrajudicial partition

executed without including some of the heirs, who had no knowledge of and consent to the same is
fraudulent and vicious)].
"Discovery" is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and
new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively.
Considering that the complaint of the petitioner was filed on Jan.28, 1987, or three years and ten months
after the questioned extrajudicial settlement dated March 11, 1983 was executed, her action against the
respondents on the basis of fraud has not yet prescribed
Another thing, re: publication rule on extrajudicial settlement: Sec. 1, Rule 74 provides: The fact of the
extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the
manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any
person who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof.
To say that Maria Elena was represented by Rosalina in the partitioning is imprecise. Maria Elena, the
adopted child, was no longer a minor at the time Miguel died. Rosalina, only represented her own
interests and not those of Maria Elena. Since Miguel predeceased Pilar, a sister, his estate automatically
vested to his child and widow, in equal shares. Respondent Rodriguezes' interests did not include Miguel's
estate but only Pilar's estate.
Could petitioner still redeem the properties from buyers? Given the circumstances in this case, we are
constrained to hold that this is not the proper forum to decide this issue. The properties sought to be
recovered by the petitioner are now all registered under the name of third parties. Well settled is the
doctrine that a Torrens Title cannot be collaterally attacked. The validity of the title can only be raised in
an action expressly instituted for such purpose
Extrajudicial partition -Pada-Kilario, et al. vs. CA et al., GR 134329, 19 Jan 2000
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The "Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition" executed by private
respondents on March 11, 1983 is declared invalid. The amount of P100,000.00 is hereby awarded to
petitioner as damages to be paid by private respondents, who are also ordered to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Rule 75 Production of Will. Allowance of Will Necessary-Probate mandatory
Pascual v. CA, 409 SCRA 105
THE FACTS
Petitioner Consolacion Sioson (CONSOLACION) and respondent Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino
(REMEDIOS) are the niece and granddaughter, respectively, of the late Canuto Sioson (CANUTO).
CANUTO and 11 other individuals, including his sister Catalina Sioson (CATALINA) and his brother
Victoriano Sioson (VICTORIANO), were co-owners of a parcel of land in Tanza, Navotas, Metro
Manila. The property, known as Lot 2 of Plan Psu 13245, had an area of 9,347 square meters and was
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 4207 issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal. CATALINA,
CANUTO, and VICTORIANO each owned an aliquot 10/70 share or 1,335 square meters of Lot 2. [2]
On 20 November 1951, CANUTO had Lot 2 surveyed and subdivided into eight lots (Lot Nos. 2-A to 2H) through Subdivision Plan Psd 34713 which the Director of Lands approved on 30 May 1952. Lot No.
2-A, with an area of 670 square meters, and Lot No. 2-E, with an area of 2,000 square meters, were placed
under CANUTOs name. Three other individuals took the remaining lots.[3]
On 26 September 1956, CANUTO and CONSOLACION executed a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan[4]
(KASULATAN). Under the KASULATAN, CANUTO sold his 10/70 share in Lot 2 in favor of
CONSOLACION for P2,250.00. The KASULATAN, notarized by Notary Public Jose T. de los Santos of
Navotas.
On 28 October 1968, CONSOLACION registered the KASULATAN and the JOINT AFFIDAVIT with
the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal (Register of Deeds). Based on these documents, the
Register of Deeds issued to CONSOLACION Transfer Certificate of Title No. (232252) 1321 covering
Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E of Subdivision Plan Psd 34713 with a total area of 2,670 square meters.

On 4 February 1988, REMEDIOS filed a complaint against CONSOLACION and her spouse Ricardo
Pascual in the Regional Trial Court of Malabon, Branch 165, for Annulment or Cancellation of Transfer
Certificate [of Title] and Damages. REMEDIOS claimed that she is the owner of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E
because CATALINA devised these lots to her in CATALINAs last will and testament[7] (LAST WILL)
dated 29 May 1964. REMEDIOS added that CONSOLACION obtained title to these lots through
fraudulent means since the area covered by TCT (232252) 1321 is twice the size of CANUTOs share in
Lot 2. REMEDIOS prayed for the cancellation of CONSOLACIONs title, the issuance of another title in
her name, and the payment to her of damages.
Petitioners sought to dismiss the complaint on the ground of prescription. Petitioners claimed that the
basis of the action is fraud, and REMEDIOS should have filed the action within four years from the
registration of CONSOLACIONs title on 28 October 1968 and not some 19 years later on 4 February
1988. REMEDIOS opposed the motion, claiming that she became aware of CONSOLACIONs adverse
title only in February 1987. CONSOLACION maintained that she had timely filed her complaint within
the four-year prescriptive on 4 February 1988.
In its order of 28 April 1988, the trial court denied petitioners motion to dismiss. The trial court held that
the reckoning of the prescriptive period for filing REMEDIOS complaint is evidentiary in nature and
must await the presentation of the parties evidence during the trial. During the pre-trial stage,
REMEDIOS clarified that she was claiming only CATALINAs 10/70 share in Lot 2, or 1,335 square
meters, which constitute of the area of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E.[8] The trial of the case then ensued.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 26 November 1990, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing the case and ordering REMEDIOS to
pay petitioners P10,000 as attorneys fees and the cost of suit. The trial court held that the action filed by
REMEDIOS is based on fraud, covered by the four-year prescriptive period. The trial court also held that
REMEDIOS knew of petitioners adverse title on 19 November 1982 when REMEDIOS testified against
petitioners in an ejectment suit petitioners had filed against their tenants in Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. Thus,
the complaint of REMEDIOS had already prescribed when she filed it on 4 February 1988.
The trial court further ruled that REMEDIOS has no right of action against petitioners because
CATALINAs LAST WILL from which REMEDIOS claims to derive her title has not been admitted to
probate. Under Article 838 of the Civil Code, no will passes real or personal property unless it is allowed
in probate in accordance with the Rules of Court. The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision
provides:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the defendants and against plaintiff, ordering:
1.

The dismissal of this case;

2. The plaintiff to pay the defendants the sum of Ten Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos as and for
attorneys fees; and
3.

The plaintiff to pay the costs of suit.

REMEDIOS appealed to the Court of Appeals.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 31 January 1994, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment reversing the decision of the trial court.
The appellate court held that what REMEDIOS filed was a suit to enforce an implied trust allegedly
created in her favor when CONSOLACION fraudulently registered her title over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E.
Consequently, the prescriptive period for filing the complaint is ten years, not four. The Court of Appeals
counted this ten-year period from 19 November 1982. Thus, when REMEDIOS filed her complaint on 4
February 1988, the ten-year prescriptive period had not yet expired.
The appellate court held that CATALINAs unprobated LAST WILL does not preclude REMEDIOS from
seeking reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E as the LAST WILL may subsequently be admitted to
probate. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts ruling provides:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Registry of Deeds of
Rizal or Metro Manila, District III, is ordered to place Transfer Certificate of Title No. (232252) 1321

under the name of Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino as executor of the will of Catalina Sioson and cancel the
names of the Spouses Ricardo Pascual and Consolacion Sioson inscribed over said title as owners of the
covered lot. Defendants-appellees spouses Ricardo Pascual and Consolacion Sioson are ordered to pay
plaintiff-appellant Remedios S. Eugenio-Gino moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, exemplary
damages of P20,000[.00] and attorneys fees of P20,000.00 and P500.00 per appearance.[10]
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the ruling. However, the Court of Appeals denied their motion in its
order dated 15 June 1994.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
Petitioners allege the following assignment of errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CAUSE
OF ACTION IS NOT BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION WHICH FINDING IS MANIFESTLY
CONTRARY TO LAW AND THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT DOES
NOT HAVE ANY TITLE AND HAS UTTERLY FAILED TO PROVE ANY TITLE TO THE LOTS
INVOLVED IN THIS CASE, AND IN ORDERING THE CANCELLATION OF THE CERTIFICATE
OF TITLE OF PETITIONERS.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION AND IN GROSS VIOLATION OF THE RULES OF COURT IN
ORDERING THE ENTIRE PROPERTY COVERED BY TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO.
(232252) 1321 TO BE PLACED IN THE NAME OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT, BECAUSE THE
CLAIM OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS LIMITED ONLY TO ONE-HALF (1/2) PORTION OF THE
PROPERTY, AND THE OTHER HALF THEREOF UNQUESTIONABLY BELONGS TO
PETITIONERS.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ACTED
FRAUDULENTLY AND IN BAD FAITH IN SECURING THEIR CERTIFICATE OF TITLE TO THE
PROPERTY INVOLVED IN THIS CASE, AND IN ORDERING PETITIONERS TO PAY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS MORAL DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES.[11]
The pivotal questions are: (1) whether prescription bars the action filed by REMEDIOS, and (2) whether
REMEDIOS is a real party-in-interest.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has merit.
The Action is Barred by Prescription
The trial court held that the action filed by REMEDIOS is one based on fraud. REMEDIOS action seeks
to recover real property that petitioners allegedly acquired through fraud. Consequently, the trial court
held that the action prescribes in four years counted from REMEDIOS actual discovery of petitioners
adverse title. The trial court concluded that REMEDIOS belatedly filed her suit on 4 February 1988
because she actually knew of petitioners adverse title since 19 November 1982.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals held that what REMEDIOS filed was a suit to enforce an implied
trust. REMEDIOS had ten years counted from actual notice of the breach of trust, that is, the assertion of
adverse title, within which to bring her action. The appellate court held that REMEDIOS seasonably filed
her complaint on 4 February 1988 because she allegedly discovered petitioners adverse title only on 19
November 1982.
What REMEDIOS filed was an action to enforce an implied trust but the same is already barred by
prescription.
Prescriptive Period is 10 Years Counted
From Registration of Adverse Title

The four-year prescriptive period relied upon by the trial court applies only if the fraud does not give rise
to an implied trust, and the action is to annul a voidable contract under Article 1390[12] of the Civil Code.
In such a case, the four-year prescriptive period under Article 1391[13] begins to run from the time of
discovery of the mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
In the present case, REMEDIOS does not seek to annul the KASULATAN. REMEDIOS does not assail
the KASULATAN as a voidable contract. In fact, REMEDIOS admits the validity of the sale of 1,335
square meters of land under the KASULATAN. However, REMEDIOS alleges that the excess area of
1,335 meters is not part of the sale under the KASULATAN. REMEDIOS seeks the removal of this
excess area from TCT No. (232252) 1321 that was issued to CONSOLACION. Consequently,
REMEDIOS action is for Annulment or Cancellation of Transfer Certificate [of Title] and
Damages.[14]
REMEDIOS action is based on an implied trust under Article 1456 since she claims that the inclusion of
the additional 1,335 square meters in TCT No. (232252) 1321 was without basis. In effect, REMEDIOS
asserts that CONSOLACION acquired the additional 1,335 square meters through mistake or fraud and
thus CONSOLACION should be considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the rightful
owner of the property. Clearly, the applicable prescriptive period is ten years under Article 1144 and not
four years under Articles 1389 and 1391.
It is now well-settled that the prescriptive period to recover property obtained by fraud or mistake, giving
rise to an implied trust under Article 1456[15] of the Civil Code, is ten years pursuant to Article 1144.[16]
This ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date the adverse party repudiates the implied
trust, which repudiation takes place when the adverse party registers the land.[17]
REMEDIOS filed her complaint on 4 February 1988 or more than 19 years after CONSOLACION
registered her title over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E on 28 October 1968. Unquestionably, REMEDIOS filed the
complaint late thus warranting its dismissal. As the Court recently declared in Spouses Alfredo v. Spouses
Borras,[18]
Following Caro,[19] we have consistently held that an action for reconveyance based on an implied trust
prescribes in ten years. We went further by specifying the reference point of the ten-year prescriptive
period as the date of the registration of the deed or the issuance of the title.
The Court of Appeals Reckoning of
Prescriptive Period from Actual Notice
of Adverse Title Not Justified
In holding that the action filed by REMEDIOS has not prescribed, the Court of Appeals invoked this
Courts ruling in Adille v. Court of Appeals.[20] In Adille, the Court reckoned the ten-year prescriptive
period for enforcing implied trusts not from registration of the adverse title but from actual notice of the
adverse title by the cestui que trust. However, the Court, in justifying its deviation from the general rule,
explained:
[W]hile actions to enforce a constructive trust prescribes (sic) in ten years, reckoned from the date of the
registration of the property, we x x x are not prepared to count the period from such date in this case. We
note the petitioners sub rosa efforts to get hold of the property exclusively for himself beginning with his
fraudulent misrepresentation in his unilateral affidavit of extrajudicial settlement that he is the only heir
and child of his mother Feliza[] with the consequence that he was able to secure title in his name also.
(Emphasis supplied)
Such commission of specific fraudulent conduct is absent in the present case. Other than asserting that
petitioners are guilty of fraud because they secured title to Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E with an area twice bigger
than what CANUTO allegedly sold to CONSOLACION, REMEDIOS did not present any other proof of
petitioners fraudulent conduct akin to Adille.
CONSOLACION obtained title to Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E through the KASULATAN executed by
CANUTO and the JOINT AFFIDAVIT executed by his surviving children, one of whom, Felicidad, is the
mother of REMEDIOS. The KASULATAN referred to the sale of CANUTOs 10/70 share in Lot 2
without specifying the area of the lot sold. The JOINT AFFIDAVIT referred to the Plano de
Subdivision Psd-34713 without also specifying the area of the lot sold. However, Subdivision Plan Psd
34713, as certified by the Assistant Director of Lands on 30 May 1952, showed an area of 2,670 square
meters in the name of CANUTO. Based on these documents, the Register of Deeds issued TCT No.
(232252) 1321 to CONSOLACION covering an area of 2,670 square meters.

REMEDIOS does not assail the KASULATAN or the JOINT AFFIDAVIT as fictitious or forged.
REMEDIOS even admits the authenticity of Subdivision Plan Psd 34713 as certified by the Assistant
Director of Lands.[21] Moreover, REMEDIOS has not contested petitioners claim that CANUTO
doubled his share in Lot 2 by acquiring VICTORIANOs share.[22]
Plainly, the increase in the area sold from 1,335 square meters to 2,670 square meters is a glaring mistake.
There is, however, no proof whatsoever that this increase in area was the result of fraud. Allegations of
fraud in actions to enforce implied trusts must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.[23] Adille,
which is anchored on fraud,[24] cannot apply to the present case.
At any rate, even if we apply Adille to this case, prescription still bars REMEDIOS complaint. As
executrix of CATALINAs LAST WILL, REMEDIOS submitted to the then Court of First Instance of
Caloocan in Special Proceedings Case No. C-208 the inventory of all the property comprising
CATALINAs estate, which included Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E. In a motion dated 7 November 1977,
CONSOLACION sought the exclusion of these lots from the inventory, invoking her title over them.
REMEDIOS was served a copy of the motion on 8 November 1977 against which she filed an opposition.
Nevertheless, the trial court overruled REMEDIOS objection. In its order of 3 January 1978, the trial
court granted CONSOLACIONs motion and ordered the exclusion of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E from the
estate of CATALINA. REMEDIOS did not appeal from this ruling.
REMEDIOS thus had actual notice of petitioners adverse title on 8 November 1977. Even if, for the sake
of argument, the ten-year prescriptive period begins to run upon actual notice of the adverse title, still
REMEDIOS right to file this suit has prescribed. REMEDIOS had until 11 November 1987 within which
to file her complaint. When she did so on 4 February 1988, the prescriptive period had already lapsed.
Respondent is Not a Real Party-in-Interest
Not only does prescription bar REMEDIOS complaint. REMEDIOS is also not a real party-in-interest
who can file the complaint, as the trial court correctly ruled.
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure require that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name
of the real party-in-interest who is the party who stands to benefit or suffer from the judgment in the suit.
[25] If one who is not a real party-in-interest brings the action, the suit is dismissible for lack of cause of
action.[26]
REMEDIOS anchored her claim over Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E (or over its one-half portion) on the devise of
these lots to her under CATALINAs LAST WILL. However, the trial court found that the probate court
did not issue any order admitting the LAST WILL to probate. REMEDIOS does not contest this finding.
Indeed, during the trial, REMEDIOS admitted that Special Proceedings Case No. C-208 is still pending.
[27]
Article 838 of the Civil Code states that [N]o will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is
proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court. This Court has interpreted this provision to
mean, until admitted to probate, [a will] has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed
thereunder.[28] REMEDIOS anchors her right in filing this suit on her being a devisee of CATALINAs
LAST WILL. However, since the probate court has not admitted CATALINAs LAST WILL,
REMEDIOS has not acquired any right under the LAST WILL. REMEDIOS is thus without any cause of
action either to seek reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and 2-E or to enforce an implied trust over these lots.
The appellate court tried to go around this deficiency by ordering the reconveyance of Lot Nos. 2-A and
2-E to REMEDIOS in her capacity as executrix of CATALINAs LAST WILL. This is inappropriate
because REMEDIOS sued petitioners not in such capacity but as the alleged owner of the disputed lots.
Thus, REMEDIOS alleged in her complaint:
3.
The plaintiff is a niece and compulsory heir of the late CATALINA SIOSON who died single and
without any child of her own and who, during her lifetime, was the owner of those two (2) parcels of
land located at Tanza, Navotas, Rizal (now Metro Manila), formerly covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 4207 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Rizal, x x x.
4.
The plaintiff, aside from being the compulsory heir of the deceased CATALINA SIOSON, has sole
and exclusive claim of ownership over the above-mentioned two (2) parcels of land by virtue of a will or
Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya executed by Catalina Sioson on May 19, 1964 before Notary Public
Efren Y. Angeles at Navotas, Rizal, in which document the deceased Catalina Sioson specifically and
exclusively bequeathed to the plaintiff the above-mentioned Lots 2-A and 2-E of Psd-34713 approved by

the Bureau of Lands on May 30, 1952. Copy of the Huling Habilin at Pagpapasiya consisting of four
(4) pages is hereto attached and forms an integral part hereof as Annex A;
5.
Sometime on or about February, 1987, plaintiff discovered that the above-mentioned Lots 2-A and
2-E of subdivision plan Psd-34713 are now registered or titled in the name of the defendants under
Transfer Certificate of Title No. (232252) 1321 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, now Metro-Manila
District III. Copy of the title is hereto attached and forms an integral part hereof as Annex B;
6.
Upon further inquiry and investigation, plaintiff discovered that the defendants were able to obtain
title in their name of the said parcels of land by virtue of a Kasulatan ng Bilihang Tuluyan allegedly
executed by Canuto Sioson on September 26, 1956 before Notary Public Jose [T.] de los Santos of
Navotas, Metro-Manila. Copy of the said document is hereto attached and forms an integral part hereof
as Annex C;
7.
The plaintiff also discovered that although x x x the original sale did not specify the parcels of land
sold by Canuto Sioson, the defendants submitted an alleged Affidavit executed by Felicidad Sioson and
Beatriz Sioson identifying the lots sold by Canuto Sioson to the defendants as Lots 2-A and 2-E of
subdivision plan Psd-34713. Copy of the Affidavit dated October 3, 1968 on the basis of which the
present Transfer Certificate of Title No. (232252) 1321 was issued to the defendants is hereto attached and
forms an integral part hereof as Annex D;
8.
The defendants are clearly guilty of fraud in presenting the aforementioned Affidavit (Annex D)
to the Register of Deeds as the basis of their claim to Lots 2-A and 2-E in view of the fact that the parcels
sold to them by Canuto Sioson, assuming there was such a sale, were different parcels of land, Lots 2-A
and 2-E being the properties of the late Catalina Sioson who bequeathed the same to the plaintiff.
xxxx
12. Because of the defendants fraudulent actuations on this matter, plaintiff suffered and continious
[sic] to suffer moral damages arising from anxiety, shock and wounded feelings. Defendants should also
be assessed exemplary damages by way of a lesson to deter them from again committing the fraudulent
acts, or acts of similar nature, by virtue of which they were able to obtain title to the parcels of land
involved in this case x x x.[29] (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, all throughout the proceedings below and even in her Comment to this petition, REMEDIOS
continued to pursue her claim as the alleged owner of one-half of the disputed lots.
Other Matters Raised in the Petition
The Court deems it unnecessary to pass upon the other errors petitioners assigned concerning the award of
damages and attorneys fees to REMEDIOS. Such award assumes that REMEDIOS is a real party-ininterest and that she timely filed her complaint. As earlier shown, this is not the case.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 31 January 1994
and its Resolution dated 15 June 1994 are SET ASIDE. The complaint filed by respondent Remedios
Eugenio-Gino, dated 2 February 1988 is DISMISSED.
Probate proceeding in rem
Alaban v. CA GR 156021 Sept 23, 2005
FACTS:
On November 2000, respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition in Iloilo for the probate of
the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado (decedent). Respondent alleged
that he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her will. On May 2001, RTC rendered its
Decision, allowing the probate of the will of the decedent and directing the issuance of letters
testamentary to respondent.
On October 2001, Petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings. They also filed
an opposition to the allowance of the will of the decedent, and the issuance of letters testamentary to
respondent, claiming that they are the intestate heirs of the decedent. Petitioners claimed that the RTC did
not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to non-payment of the correct docket fees, defective
publication, and lack of notice to the other heirs. Moreover, they alleged that the will could not have
been probated because: (1) the signature of the decedent was forged; (2) the will was not executed in

accordance with law, that is, the witnesses failed to sign below the attestation clause; (3) the decedent
lacked testamentary capacity to execute and publish a will; (4) the will was executed by force and under
duress and improper pressure; (5) the decedent had no intention to make a will at the time of affixing of
her signature; and (6) she did not know the properties to be disposed of, having included in the will
properties which no longer belonged to her. Petitioners prayed that the letters testamentary issued to
respondent be withdrawn and the estate of the decedent disposed of under intestate succession.
RTC issued and Order denying Petitioners motion for being unmeritorious.
Petitioners sought annulment of RTCs decision with the CA with a prayer for preliminary injunction
denied
Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the decision sought to be
annulled was rendered and, thus, they could not have availed of the ordinary remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief from judgment and other appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling of the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Petitioners were made parties in the proceedings.
HELD:
Petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have not become parties to the
probate proceedings.
Under the Rules of Court, any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested
in the estate may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have
the will allowed. Notice of the time and place for proving the will must be published for three (3)
consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the province, as well as furnished to the
designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator. Thus, it has been held that a
proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the corresponding publication of the
petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the
estate of the decedent.
Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who
might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the
publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with
jurisdiction to hear and decide it. Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for
probate, they eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice of
hearing.
As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the remedies of
motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a
motion to reopen, which is essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners praying for the reopening of
the case and the setting of further proceedings. However, the motion was denied for having been filed out
of time, long after the Decision became final and executory.
According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs, legatees, and devisees of
the testator. A perusal of the will shows that respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent.
Petitioners, as nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs who are
entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to
mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the same.
Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the purported infirmity is cured
by the publication of the notice. After all, personal notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural
convenience and not a jurisdictional requisite.
The non-inclusion of petitioners names in the petition and the alleged failure to personally notify them of
the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud. Petitioners were not denied their day in court, as they
were not prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting their case before the probate
court.

False will
Obando v People GR 138696 July 7, 2010

Sometime in 1964, Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras (Alegria), together with Eduardo and Francisco
Figueras, sons of her husband Jose Figueras by previous marriage, filed a petition for the intestate
proceedings of the estate of Jose Figueras, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 61567. Alegria was
named administratrix of Joses estate without opposition from her stepsons.
While the settlement of Joses estate was still pending considerations in the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Alegria died in May 1979. Eduardo was issued new Letters of Administration with the duty to administer
both Joses and Alegrias estates. Fritz Strebel, as brother of Alegria, came forth claiming part of Alegrias
estate as Alegria died without issue which the Figueras brothers made no opposition.
Subsequently, the Figueras brothers and Fritz Strebel were served with copies of a Petition for Probate of
the alleged last will and testament of Alegria filed by petitioner Felizardo Obando, which petition was
docketed as Special Proceeding No. 123948. In his petition, petitioner Felizardo asked to be named as
executor of Alegrias last will and testament, which bequeathed Alegrias rights and interest in the real
properties left by the Figueras couple, as well as personal properties, including all her pieces of jewelry to
petitioners Felizardo and Juan, and their families. The Figueras brothers opposed the probate of the
alleged will, as well as petitioner Felizardos prayer for the issuance of a letter of administration, on the
ground that the alleged will was done either under duress or the same was a forgery.
Later, both Special Proceeding Nos. 61567 and 123948 were consolidated under Branch 17 of the RTC of
Manila which, after hearing, denied petitioner Felizardos prayer to be named as executor. Petitioner
Felizardo appealed the matter to the CA which partially reversed the RTC by appointing Eduardo and
petitioner Felizardo as co-administrators of the joint estates of Jose and Alegria Figueras.
Eduardo and Fritz still opposed the probate of the alleged Alegrias will, insisting that the will was a
forgery. Subsequently, these conflicting parties agreed to submit the alleged will to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) for examination and comparison with the common standard signatures of Alegria.3
After the examination and comparison of the submitted documents, NBI Document Examiner Zenaida
Torres submitted her report4 dated March 26, 1990, with the findings that the questioned and standard
sample signatures of Alegria S. Vda. de Figueras were NOT written by one and same person.
By reason of the forged will which was the basis of the CA in appointing Felizardo as co-administrator of
the Figueras estates, petitioners had taken possession of the pieces of jewelry, furniture and other personal
properties enumerated in the alleged will, as well as the rentals of the Figueras residence in Gilmore
Street, Quezon City being leased to the Community of Learners.
Eduardo and Fritz questioned these acts of petitioner Felizardo and, since the latter could not account for
these properties which were under his possession when the probate court required him to do so, they sued
him for Estafa thru Falsification of Public Document since the alleged will which petitioner Felizardo
submitted for probate was found to be forged.
On July 26, 1990, an Information was filed with the RTC of Manila, charging petitioners Felizardo S.
Obando and Juan S. Obando, together with the persons who signed in the alleged will, namely, Cipriano
C. Farrales, Mercedes B. Santos, Victorino Cruz, and Franklin A. Cordon, with the crime of estafa thru
falsification of public document, committed as follows:
That on or about November 11, 1978, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused Felizardo S. Obando, Juan S. Obando, Mercedes B. Santos, [Victorino] Cruz
and Franklin A. Cordon, being then private individuals, and accused Cipriano C. Farrales, a Notary
Public, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud Eduardo F. Figueras thru falsification of public document in the
following manner, to wit: the said accused forged and falsified or caused to be forged and falsified, a
document denominated as the Last Will and Testament of Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras, dated
November 11, 1978, duly notarized by accused Cipriano C. Farrales and, therefore, a public document, by
stating in said Last Will and Testament, among others, that the said Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras had
bequeathed to her nephews, herein accused Felizardo S. Obando and Juan S. Obando, all her rights and
interests over all her jewelries (sic), except those given to her other relatives, with an aggregate total value
of P2,000,000.00, that she had appointed accused Felizardo S. Obando as the sole executor of her Last
Will and Testament and the exclusive administrator of her estate, and thereafter, feigning, simulating and
counterfeiting or causing to be feigned, simulated and counterfeited the signature of the said Alegria
Strebel Vda. de Figueras appearing on the left hand margin of pages 1 and 2 and over the typewritten
name Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras on page 3 of said document, thus making it appear, as it did
appear, that the said Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras had, in fact, bequeathed all her rights and interests
over the said jewelries (sic) to accused Felizardo S. Obando and Juan S. Obando, and that she had

appointed the said Felizardo S. Obando as the sole executor of her Last Will and Testament and the
exclusive Administrator of her estate, and causing it to appear further that the said Alegria Strebel Vda. de
Figueras participated and intervened in the signing of said document when in truth and in fact as the said
accused well knew, such was not the case in that the said Last Will and Testament is an outright forgery;
that the late Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras did not bequeath all her rights or interests over the
aforementioned jewelries to accused Felizardo S. Obando and Juan S. Obando, that she did not appoint
accused Felizardo S. Obando as the sole executor of her Last Will and Testament and the exclusive
Administrator of her estate, and that she did not participate and intervene in the signing of said document,
much less did she authorize the said accused, or anybody else, to sign her name or affix her signature
thereon; that once the said document has been forged and falsified in the manner above set forth, the said
accused Felizardo S. Obando and Juan S. Obando presented the same for probate with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila wherein an ensuing litigation which ultimately reached the Court of Appeals, said
accused Felizardo S. Obando was appointed co-administrator of said Eduardo F. Figueras, and who, as
such co-administrator, forthwith took possession of the jewelries mentioned above which the said accused
subsequently, with intent to defraud, misappropriated, misapplied and converted to their own personal use
and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the said Eduardo F. Figueras in the aforesaid amount of
P2,000,000.00, Philippine currency.
Contrary to law.5
Notary Public Farrales asked for a re-investigation claiming innocence and good faith and was,
subsequently, deleted from the Information.
When arraigned, all the accused, with the exception of Franklin Cordon who is at-large, assisted by
counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the charge. They posted bail for their temporary liberty.
Trial thereafter ensued.
In its Order dated October 10, 1992, the RTC stated that the parties stipulated that whatever testimony of
witnesses utilized in the intestate and probate proceedings of the will, as well as the documentary
evidence submitted therein, shall be utilized in the criminal case in toto subject to further cross of the
defense lawyer only on matters not touched in the former proceedings.6
On October 7, 1996, the RTC rendered its Decision,7 the dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds accused FELIZARDO S. OBANDO and
JUAN S. OBANDO GUILTY of violating Article 315, paragraph 1, sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to Article 172, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code, their culpability having been
proven beyond reasonable doubt and are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in
its maximum period, from seventeen (17) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.
Finding no evidence of culpability in their persons, accused MERCEDES B. SANTOS and VICTORINO
CRUZ are hereby ACQUITTED.
With respect to accused FRANKLIN A. CORDON, who remains at-large up to the present, this case
against him is hereby ordered ARCHIVED, to be revived upon his apprehension. Let an Alias Warrant of
Arrest be issued against accused Franklin A. Cordon for his immediate apprehension.
SO ORDERED.8
In so ruling, the RTC found that: the fact of damage was sufficiently established with the testimonies of
Felizardo and Juan that Alegria's rights and interests in the real and personal properties of the Figueras
couple were to go to them, and that they already gave the pieces of jewelry to their sister, to Juan's wife
and his two daughters, and Felizardo's daughter which showed that they had already profited from the
estate of the Figueras couple even before the same was brought to the court for settlement. As to the
matter of forgery, the RTC gave more credence to the findings of NBI Document Examiner Zenaida
Torres than that of PNP Document Section Chief Francisco Cruz, since (1) Torres was the common choice
of all the parties, thus by which act, petitioners became bound to the results of said findings; (2) Torres
was definite in her conclusion that the question and standard/ sample signatures of Alegria S. Vda. de
Figueras were not written by one and same person unlike Cruz's report stating that no definite conclusion
can be made due to the limited amount of appropriate standard signatures for comparison; and (3) Torres
was not paid for her services and, therefore, impartial while Cruz received honorarium from Juan Obando;
that while petitioners presented copies of pictures showing Alegria allegedly signing the will in the
presence of Mercedes Santos Cruz, Victorino Cruz and Franklin Cordon, nothing would establish what
document was being held by them.

The RTC found petitioners to have conspired to commit forgery as established by the following evidence,
to wit: (a) Felizardo admitted that the last will and testament which Alegria voiced out to him was dictated
by him to a certain Atty. Alcantara; (b) that Felizardo retained the services of Atty. Alcantara and Atty.
Farrales who notarized the alleged will; (c ) Juan was the one who enticed Mercedes Santos Cruz, his
sister-in-law, and Victorino Cruz into acting as attesting witnesses and Juan's taking pictures of the entire
signing ceremony which was a sign of evil intention because it was an expectancy of future rift or trouble;
(d) Felizardo held and kept the alleged will from the time of alleged signing up to Alegria's death which
possession and control lasted for several months; (e) the testimony of Torres that the first two pages of
Exhibit "A," which contained the dispositions of the properties of the Figueras estates, as well as the
forged signatures were substitutes for the originals; and (g) that petitioners and their respective families
gained enormously by reason of said will.1avvphi1
The RTC said that even if the alleged will was found to be authentic, it will still be contested as the
dispositions made therein were contrary to law most particularly that portion bequeathing to petitioners
the whole residential property of the spouses Jose and Alegria Figueras, which was conjugal, to the
exclusion of Eduardo and Francisco Figueras and Fritz Strebel who are forced heirs; that because of such
disposition, the RTC was convinced that the alleged will was not that of Alegria but of petitioners, since
Alegria being the administratrix of the estate of her husband Jose would be the last person to give this
property outside of the Figueras family. Mercedes Santos and Victorino Cruz were acquitted for lack of
evidence.
Petitioners filed their appeal with the CA.
On August 13, 1988, the CA issued its assailed Decision affirming in toto the decision of the RTC.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated May 17, 1999.
Hence, this petition for review filed by petitioners on the following grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD OVERLOOKED AND FAILED TO CONSIDER
THE SIGNIFICANT FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE WHICH, IF PROPERLY
CONSIDERED, SHOULD HAVE DRAWN A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION AND WHICH SHALL
CONSIDERABLY AFFECT THE RESULT OF THIS CASE.
B. THE NON-PRODUCTION AND/OR NON-PRESENTATION OF THE ORIGINAL COPY OF THE
ALLEGED FALSIFIED LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF ALEGRIA STREBEL VDA. DE
FIGUERAS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT IS A FATAL DEFECT WHICH ENTITLES HEREIN
APPELLANTS TO ACQUITTAL.
C. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO CONSPIRACY TO WARRANT CONVICTION OF FELIZARDO
AND [JUAN] OBANDO.
D. THE WILL OF ALEGRIA STREBEL VDA. DE FIGUERAS DISPOSES ONLY OF HER RIGHTS
AND INTERESTS OVER THE PROPERTIES BEQUEATHED TO FELIZARDO AND JUAN
OBANDO.
E. CONFLICTING EXPERT TESTIMONIES, COUPLED WITH THE POSITIVE EVIDENCE AS TO
THE DUE EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY OF THE WILL SHOULD FAVOR APPELLANTS.
F. THE ABSENCE IN THE NBI FINDINGS (EXHIBIT "D-1") AS TO THE GENUINENESS AND/OR
FALSITY OF THE SIGNATURES OF MERCEDES SANTOS CRUZ, VICTORINO CRUZ AND ATTY.
FRANKLIN CORDON ON THE "LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT" (EXHIBIT "A"), NEGATES THE
FALSIFICATION AND/OR SUBSTITUTION OF THE FIRST AND SECOND PAGES OF THE SAID
"LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF DOA ALEGRIA STREBEL VDA. DE FIGUERAS."
G. THERE IS NO ESTAFA COMMITTED BY APPELLANTS, NEITHER DID THE PROSECUTION
PROVE THE COMPLEX CRIME OF ESTAFA THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC
DOCUMENT.9
Petitioners contend that the non-presentation of the original copy of the alleged falsified will before the
RTC was a fatal defect which entitles them to an acquittal.
We are not persuaded.

We note that during the trial of this case, petitioners did not raise any objection when the alleged will was
presented and testified to by NBI Document Examiner Torres. We also note that in the Offer of
Prosecution Evidence,10 where the machine copy of the alleged will was marked as Exhibit "A," the
prosecution, in the last paragraph of such offer, stated that "all these (documents) form the bulk of
evidence in Special Proceeding Nos. 123948 and 61567 and were simply reproduced here as agreed upon
by the parties. We are compelled to mention this so that the accused will have no reason for questioning
their authenticity."11 In their Comment/Objection to the Offer of Prosecution Evidence,12 petitioners
merely stated that: "If this particular document is the original copy of the Last Will and Testament of
Doa Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras, which was marked as Exhibits "J," "J-1" to "J-17" in Special
Proceedings Nos. 61567 and 123948, then the accused admits not only of its existence but also its validity,
authenticity and due execution of said Last Will and Testament," but nowhere did they object to such
submission of the machine copy. In fact, petitioners never sought reconsideration when the RTC admitted
the machine copy of the alleged will.
More importantly, we note that a duplicate original copy of the alleged will was formally offered in
evidence13 as one of petitioners' documentary evidence and the same was already admitted by the RTC.
Thus, a duplicate original copy of the alleged will was already admitted in the records of the case which
the RTC used for comparison of the questioned signatures with that of the standard signatures of Alegria.
Petitioners fault the RTC and the CA for giving more weight to the findings of NBI Document Examiner
Torres that the signature in the alleged will was forged as against the findings of PNP Document
Examination Chief Cruz that the questioned signature was genuine.
The rule is that the findings of fact of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses and
its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are
accorded high respect if not conclusive effect. This is more true if such findings were affirmed by the
appellate court. When the trial courts findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, said findings are
generally binding upon this Court unless when that determination is clearly without evidentiary support
on record, or when the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts or overlooked certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion,14 which we do not find in this case.
In examining the questioned signatures of Alegria, Torres used the standard specimen signatures
submitted by petitioners, Eduardo and Fritz, the parties in the probate proceedings. Torres found that the
questioned and standard/sample signatures of Alegria were not written by one and the same person.
However, as petitioners did not agree with such findings, petitioners moved for another examination of
the same documents together with three additional documents to be conducted by the PNP. PNP
Document Examiner Chief Francisco Cruz submitted his report where he found that the questioned
signatures and the standard signatures executed in 1978 indicated that they were written by one person.
Both Torres and Cruz testified in court.
Torres, in her direct and cross-examinations, thoroughly explained her findings by establishing the
fundamental differences in the writing characteristics and habits existing in the questioned and standard
signatures.
First, in the alignment characteristics, i.e., the relationship of the letters in the name with the base line or
where the letters rest. She pointed out that in the standard signatures, all the letters in the name were
written in an even straight base notwithstanding that some of the standard signatures were written without
the horizontal line. In the questioned signatures, the name Alegria S. Vda. de Figueras was written either
in a going up or going down direction, i.e., there was no even placement of the letters.15
Second, in the arrangement characteristics, i.e., the position of the written signature in relation to the
typewritten name. Torres found that the one who wrote the questioned signatures had the habit of affixing
the signatures across and covering the entire typewritten name. While in the standard signatures, the
writer affixed the signatures above the typewritten name and there was no instance where the signature
crossed the typewritten name. Torres intimated that such arrangement characteristic in handwriting
identification was very significant, because it was considered to be an inconspicuous characteristic which
meant that even the writers themselves would not notice that manner of signing.16
Third, the slight but consistent difference in the slant of the letter "g" in the name Alegria. Torres stated
that slant meant the slope of the letter in relation to the base line. She found that in the standard
signatures, the slopes of the letter "g" in Alegria formed an angle of less than 90 degrees; that the letter
"g" was slanting to the right. While in the questioned signatures, the slopes of letter "g" formed an angle
of more than 90 degrees.17
Fourth, the proportion characteristic which meant the relationship of one letter to the next letter.18

Fifth, the manner of execution of the questioned signatures was different from that of the standard
signatures. Torres found that in the questioned signatures, there were presence of hesitations, tremors,
slow drawing movement, and consciousness which were not found in the standard signatures, which she
had explained in details in her testimony.
On the other hand, PNP Document Examiner Cruz stated that there was a wide range of variations
existing between the questioned signatures made in 1978 and the standard signatures executed in 1974,
1976 and 1978, indicating that there was a radical change in the physical condition of the writer wherein
the muscle and nerves were affected resulting in the loss of muscular control. He also stated that while the
questioned signatures and the standard signatures were dissimilar in the manner of execution, quality of
lines, alignment and size of letter, no definite conclusion can be reached in view of the wide gap of
execution. He then stated that the questioned signatures executed on November 11, 1978 and the standard
signature executed in December 1978, which was most contemporaneous to the date of the execution of
the questioned signatures, he found they were similar and showed that they were written by one person.19
We note that Cruzs findings as to the loss of muscular control in Alegrias hand allegedly due to her
physical condition was contradicted by Torres' testimony that the standard signature executed by Alegria
in December 1978, i.e., one month after the alleged will was executed, showed that she was in good
physical condition, because her signature was smooth with flowing strokes with an even alignment which
indicated that Alegria had good muscular control and coordination.20 Notably, Dr. Elena Cariaso, the
doctor who was tasked by the probate court to examine the physical and mental condition of Alegria in
December 1978, testified that Alegria was physically and mentally fit with only a weakness in her lower
extremities; thus, corroborating Torres finding that Alegria's hand had good muscular control and
coordination. In fact, Torres established that the standard signatures written in 1966, 1974, 1976 and in
December 1978, all showed that the signatures were made in a continuous, spontaneous and unconscious
manner21 unlike that of the questioned signatures.
Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive. They are generally regarded as purely advisory in character.
The courts may place whatever weight they choose upon and may reject them, if they find them
inconsistent with the facts in the case or otherwise unreasonable. When faced with conflicting expert
opinions, as in this case, courts give more weight and credence to that which is more complete, thorough,
and scientific.22 The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements
of whether a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out
distinguishing marks, characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of
writing which would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.23
We agree with the RTC and the CA in giving more weight and credence to the testimony of Torres as the
examination conducted by Torres was complete, thorough and scientific. We find that the RTC had the
opportunity to examine the relevant documents and make comparisons thereof. In fact, upon our own
comparison of the questioned signatures and the standard signatures taking into consideration
inconspicuous differences noted by Torres on the questioned and standard signatures, we find that the
questioned signatures showed substantial differences with that of the standard signatures of Alegria.
Petitioner claims that the testimonies of the notary public, as well as the two attesting witnesses that they
saw Alegria sign the will in their presence, should have outweighed the testimony of Torres.
We are not persuaded.
In his testimony, Notary Public Farrales testified that when he, together with another lawyer, Atty.
Cordon, went inside the room of Alegria who was in bed, he presented to her copies of the will which he
brought from his office;24 that Alegria read the same and called in petitioner Felizardo to bring some
small board where she could write; after Felizardo handed the same, he again left the room. Farrales said
that Alegria signed the will in his presence, as well as in the presence of Atty. Cordon and the other
attesting witnesses, Mercedes and Victorino; that petitioner Felizardo was just outside the room when the
signing was on-going;25 that Farrales was the one who assisted Alegria in turning the pages of the
documents and was the one who pointed to her the portion where she was to affix her signatures;26 and
that after the signing and notarization of the will, Alegria requested them to call on petitioner Felizardo
and once Felizardo was inside the room, Alegria gave the documents to the latter who placed the will in
an envelope.27
On the other hand, Mercedes testified that when she and Victorino entered Alegria's room, she saw
Alegria, Felizardo, Attys. Farrales and Cordon; that Alegria instructed petitioner Felizardo to read aloud
the will which Felizardo did;28 and that Alegria and the other witnesses signed the will in the presence of
each other and was duly notarized; and that she saw Felizardo keep the will inside the vault. 29

Victorino testified that when he and Mercedes entered Alegria's room, he saw Atty. Farrales, Cordon,
Felizardo and Alegria who was in a reclined position in her bed; that Alegria asked Felizardo to get the
sealed document from a cabinet;30 that Alegria told petitioner Felizardo to give each one of them a copy
of the document and instructed petitioner Felizardo to read the contents of the will aloud;31 and that he
saw Alegria signed the will in their presence.
Notably, their testimonies showed material inconsistencies which affected their credibilities. Farrales
testified that the copies of the alleged will came from his office and he was the one who gave the same to
Alegria which, however, was contrary to Victorinos claim that petitioner Felizardo got the alleged will
from the cabinet. Farrales testified that petitioner Felizardo was not inside the room when the signing was
ongoing which was again contrary to the claims of both Mercedes and Victorino that petitioner Felizardo
was inside the room while the signing was on-going; and that Alegria even instructed Felizardo to read
aloud the contents of the same to them. Notably, Farrales testified that he was the one who turned the
pages of the will and was also the one who pointed to Alegria the portion where to affix her signatures and
that no other person rendered such assistance except him.32 However, in petitioner Felizardo's testimony,
he said that he was present when the will was being signed by Alegria.33 In fact, petitioner Felizardo
submitted photographs which were admittedly taken by co-petitioner Juan to prove the former's presence
during the signing and to show that he was the one assisting Alegria in signing the will.
Such contradictory statements coming from persons who allegedly were present when the will was
executed render doubtful the genuineness of the alleged forged will. Thus, we find no error committed by
the RTC in not giving credence to their testimonies.
We find the elements of falsification of public document present in this case. Essentially, the elements of
the crime of Falsification of Public Document under Article 172 (1) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are:
(1) that the offender is a private individual; (2) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification
enumerated under Article 171; and (3) that the act of falsification is committed in a public document.
Under paragraph 2 of Article 171, a person may commit falsification of a public document by causing it to
appear in a document that a person or persons participated in an act or proceeding, when such person or
persons did not, in fact, so participate in the act or proceeding.
In this case, petitioners are private individuals who presented the alleged will to the probate court and
made it appear that Alegria signed the alleged will disposing of her rights and interest in the real
properties, as well as all of her personal properties to petitioners when in fact petitioners knew that
Alegria never signed such alleged will as her signatures therein were forged.
We find apropos the findings of the RTC that petitioners conspired to perpetuate such forgery, to wit:
1. The so-called Will and Testament was admitted by Felizardo S. Obando in open hearing to have been
dictated by him to a certain Atty. Alcantara allegedly as voiced out to him by Alegria;
2. He said he procured the service of said lawyer and the very notary public, one Atty. C. Farrales to
notarize it;
3. Juanito Obando enticed the couple Mercedes B. Santos and Victorino Cruz into acting as witnesses,
Mercedes being his sister-in-law, and his taking pictures of the entire ceremony of signing such document.
This taking of such pictures is itself a sign of evil intention, because it is an expectancy of future rift or
trouble;
4. Felizardo held and kept the questioned document with him from its inception to its alleged signing and
up to Alegrias death which possession and complete control lasted for several months;
5. Felizardo and Juanito Obando and their respective families again by their joint admissions, gained
enormously and by reason of said will.
The crime of falsification of public document was the means for petitioners to commit estafa. The
elements of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC34 are as follows: (1) that money, goods or
other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (2) that there be
misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such
receipt; and (3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another.
Petitioner Felizardo argued that he already had in his possession the personal properties of Alegria which
included the pieces of jewelry by virtue of an alleged general power of attorney executed by Alegria in his

favor. However, as correctly argued by the Solicitor General, such agency between Alegria and petitioner
Felizardo, was terminated upon Alegrias death; thus, he had no basis for taking possession and custody of
Alegrias properties after her death. However, by virtue of the falsified will which petitioners presented
for probate, and by which petitioner Felizardo became a co-administrator of the estate of the Figueras
couple, and had gained possession of the jewelry, he was not able to account for the same when ordered to
do so by the probate court.
On the other hand, co-petitioner Juan admitted that the pieces of jewelry went to his daughters and nieces,
while the real properties were already sold even while the intestate and probate proceedings were still
pending in court.
Petitioners' misappropriation of the jewelry was to the prejudice of Eduardo Figueras who also has the
right to Alegria's jewelry in general which were part of the declared conjugal estate of his father Jose and
Alegria Figueras. Notably, Alegria, as administratrix of the estate of Jose, submitted in 1966 an inventory
of the conjugal real and personal properties of the Figueras couple and one of those listed under conjugal
personal properties was jewelry in the amount of P2,150.00. Such inventory was contained in the Order
dated September 10, 1980 of the probate court and which was submitted in evidence by petitioners.
The crime committed was estafa through falsification of public document. Being a complex crime, the
penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed in its maximum period.35 While we sustain the
conviction of petitioners of the crime charged, we found, however, that the penalty imposed by the trial
court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals was not proper.
The amount of damages is the basis of the penalty for estafa. However, we note that the prosecution failed
to satisfactorily show that the amount of jewelry misappropriated was indeed two million pesos. The only
evidence on record which would establish the amount of the jewelry was the inventory submitted in 1966
by Alegria where she listed the jewelry in the amount of P2,150.00.
Since the amount misappropriated by petitioners was established to be only in the amount of P2,150.00,
the applicable provision is paragraph (3) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, which imposes the
penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, where the
amount defrauded is over P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00. Thus, in this case, it appears that the
most serious crime, which should be the basis of penalty for the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document, would be the falsification and, under Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code, the penalty is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than
P5,000.00.
Thus, the maximum penalty to be imposed in this case is the medium period of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be taken from the penalty next lower in degree
which is arresto mayor maximum to prision correccional minimum in any of its period.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 13, 1998 and the Resolution dated
May 17, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalty
imposable. Petitioners are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional, as
the maximum, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

Rule 76 Allowance or Disallowance of Will -Grounds Azuela v. CA, GR No. 122880, April 12, 2006
Rule 77 Allowance of Will Proved Outside of Philippines and Administration of Estate Ancheta v.
Guersay-Dalaygon; GR No. 139868, June 8, 2006
Rule 78 Letters Testamentary and of Administration, When and to Whom Issued
Failure to attend hearings of applicant -Silverio v. CA, 304 SCRA 541
Intestate estate of Cristina suntay v Isabel Cojuangco GR 183053 June 16, 2010

Rule 79 Opposing Issuance of Letters Testamentary. Petition and Contest for Letters of Administration
Justification for appointment of an administrator -Avelino v CA, GR 115181, 31 Mar 2000
Rule 80 Special Administrator
Qualifications -Valarao v. Pascual 392 SCRA 695; Vilma Tan et al v. Hon Gedonio GR 166520 Mar 14,
2008
Justification for special administrator -De Guzman vs. Guadiz Jr., et al., L-48585, 31 Mar 1980
Appointment of special administrator discretionary -Jamero v. Melicos, GR 140929, 26 May 2005; Heirs
of Castillo v. Gabriel GR 162934 Nov 11, 2005 474 SCRA
Removal Co v. Rosario et al GR No. 160671 Apr 30, 2008
Rule 82-Revocation of Administration, Death, Resignation, and Removal of Executors and Administrators
Ocampo v Ocampo GR 187879 Jul 2 , 2010
Rule 83 Inventory and Appraisal. Provision for Support of Family
Provisional inclusion in inventory -Heirs of Miguel Franco v. CA, 418 SCRA 60;Chua v. Absolute
Management Corp. 413 SCRA 547
Rule 84 General Powers and Duties of Executors and Administrators
Conflict of interest -Mananquil v. Villegas, GR 2430, 30 Aug 1990
Rule 85 Accountability and Compensation of Executors and Administrators
Duty to account -Tumang v. Laguio GR 50277 14 Feb 1980;
Charges and expenses of the administrator Quasha Pena v. LCN Const GR 174873 Aug 26, 2008
Rule 86 Claims Against Estate
Substitution of heirs -Heirs of Lorilla, et al. v. CA, GR 118655 12 Apr 2000;
Liability of heirs for debts of decedent -Union Bank v. Santibaez, GR 149926, 23 Feb 2005
Attys fees -Salonga Hernandez v. Pascual, GR No. 127165, May 2, 2006
Money claims Stronghold v. Republic GR 174561 Jun 22, 2006; Gutierrez v. Barreto-Datu GR L-17175
Jul 31, 1962
Rule 87 Actions by and Against Executors and Administrators
Recovery of estate property -Valera v. Inserto GR 56504, 7 May 1987;
Damages arising from crime ABS CBN v Office of Ombudsman GR 133347 Apr 23, 2010
Rule 89 Sales, Mortgages, and other Encumbrances of Property of Decedent
Mortgage of estate property -Pahamatong v. PNB, GR 156403, 31 Mar 2005; Orola v. Rural Bank of
Pontevedra, GR 158566 Sept 20, 2005
Can heir sell estate property -Aggabao v. RTC, GR No. 146006 Feb 23, 2004
Rule 90 Distribution and Partition of the Estate
Distribution, when Quasha Pena v LCN Const GR 174873 Aug 26, 2008
Joinder Guy v. CA GR 163707 Sep 15, 2006
Final Liquidation set aside, when Tirso T. Reyes v. Barreto-Datu, GR No. 17818, Jan. 27, 1967
Forfeiture of Share in Conjugal Property Gomez v. Lipana, 33 SCRA 215
Rule 91 Escheats
Republic v. CA & Solano GR 143483, 375 SCRA
Municipal Council v. Colegio de San Jose, Inc. 65 Phil. 323
Escheat judgment that has become final cant be nullified Republic v. CA, GR No. 143483, Jan. 31,
2002
Property transferred to Filipino citizen, reversion doesnt apply Republic v. Register of Deeds of Roxas
City, GR No. 158230, July 16, 2008
Guardians and Guardianship
Necessity for Guardianship Alamayri v. Pabare, GR No. 151243, April 30, 2008
Kinds of Guradians People v. Watiwat, GR No. 139400, Sept. 3, 2003
Guardianship over Incompetents
Comatose person is an incompetent Uy v. CA, GR No. 109557, Nov. 29, 2000
Rule 92 Venue
Parco v. CA, L-33152 30 Jan 1982; Vancil v. Balmes, GR 132223, 19 June 2001

Rule 93 Appointment of Guardians

Persons disqualified to be guardians Francisco v. CA, GR No. 57438, Jan. 31, 1984
Rule 94 Bonds of Guardians
Jocson v. Empire Insurance Co., 103 Phil 580; Pineda v. CA, 226 SCRA 754
Rule 95 Selling and Encumbering Property of Ward
De Pua v. San Agustin, GR L-17402, 25 July 1981; Ledesma Hermanos v. Castro, 55 Phil 136
Rule 96 General Powers and Duties of Guardians
Visaya et. al. v. Suiguitan, et. al., GR No. L-8300
Rule 97 Termination of Guardianship
Gonzales v. Aguinaldo, GR No. 74769, Sept. 28, 1990
Guardianship of Minors
Between mother & uncle, better right to guardianship Cabanas v. Pilapil, 58 SCRA 94
Rule 98 Trustees
Express trust vs. implied trust Richard Lopez Trustee v. CA GR 157784 Dec 16, 2008; Heirs of Lorenzo
Yap v. CA 312 SCRA 603; Saltiga de Romero v. CA 319 SCRA 180; Richard Lopez v CA GR 157784
Dec 16, 2008
Other Special Proceedings
AM No. 02-6-02-SC Rules on Adoption
In the matter of adoption of Stephanie Astorga, GR 148311, 31 Mar 2005;
Lahom vs. Sibulo, GR No. 143989, July 14, 2003; Landingin v. Republic, GR No. 164948, June 27, 2006
Republic v. Miller, 306 SCRA 183; Republic v. Hernandez, GR 117209, 9 Feb 1996
In re petition for adoption of Michelle Lim GR 168992 May 21, 2009
AM No. 03-04-04 SC Rules on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in relation to Custody of
Minors
Nature of the case Manalo v. CA, GR No. 129242, Jan. 16, 2002
Parental Preference Rule Santos v. CA, 242 SCRA 407
Tender Years Rule Espiritu v. CA, 242 SCRA 362
Maternal Preference Rule David v. CA, 250 SCRA 82
Exception to Maternal Preference Medina v. Makabali, 27 SCRA 502; Cervantes v. Fajardo, 169 SCRA
575
Custody to other persons Chua v. Cabangbang, 27 SCRA 291
Special Proceedings Involving Family Code Provisions
AM 02-11-10-SC Rules on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages
Nature of the Case Rayray v. Chae Kyung Lee, 18 SCRA 450
Non-application of Unclean Hands Doctrine Chi Ming Tsoi v. CA, 266 SCRA 324
Imprescriptibility of Action or Defense Heirs of Romana Injugtiro v. Casals, GR No. 134718, Aug. 20,
2001
Psychological Incapacity Republic v. De Gracia, GR No. 171557, Feb. 12, 2014; Mendoza v. Republic,
et. al., GR No. 157649, Nov. 12, 2012; Matias v. Dagdag, GR No. 109975, Feb. 9, 2001; Marcos v.
Marcos, GR No. 136490, Oct. 19, 2000
Active Participation of Provl./City Prosecutor Sin v. Sin, GR No. 137590, March 26, 2001; Tolentino v.
Villanueva, 56 SCRA 1
No valid compromise on annulment Mendoza v. CA, 19 SCRA 756
AM 02-11-11 SC Rule on Legal Separation
Nature of action purely personal Lapus v. Eufemio 43 SCRA 177
Abandonment as a ground De la Cruz v. Dela Cruz, GR No. L-19565, Jan 30, 1968
Cooling-off period Pacete v. Carianga, 231 SCRA 321
Designation of Parent to exercise parental authority Cang v. CA, 296 SCRA 128
Rule 101 Proceedings for Hospitalization of Insane Persons
Chin Ah Foo v. Concepcion, 54 Phil 775; People of the Philippines v. Dungo, GR No. 89420, July 31,
1991

Rule 102 Habeas Corpus

AM No. 03-04-04 SC Rules on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of
Minors
SC Rules on Writs of Amparo and Habeas Data /Writ of Kalikasan
Sec of Defense v Manalo GR 180906 Oct 7, 2009
In Re Writ of Habeas Corpus for Reynaldo De Villa, GR 158802, Nov. 17, 2004
Glenn Caballes v. CA, GR 163108, 23 Feb 2005; Ilusorio v. Bildner, 332 SCRA 169
Pp v. Andal, 307 SCRA 650; Feria v. CA, 325 SCRA 525; Canlas v. Napico GR 182795 Jun 5, 2008;
Tapuz v. Del Rosario GR 182484 Jun 19, 2008
P/Supt. Felixberto Castillo v. Dr. Amanda T. Cruz, GR 182165, Nov 25, 2009; Gen Avelino Razon, Jr. et
al. v Mary Jean Tagitis, et al, GR 182498, Feb 16, 2010; Yano et al v Sanchez et al GR 186640 Feb 11,
2010
Rule 103 Change of Name
RA 9048 Clerical Error Law
RA 9255 An act allowing illegitimate children to use the surname of their father
Republic v. Lim, GR No. 153883 13 Jan 2004; In Re: Petition of Julian Wang, GR 159966, 30 March
2005
Republic v. Capote GR 157043 Feb 2, 2007; Silverio v. Republic, GR No. 174689, October 22, 2007
Remo v. Hon. Sec. of Foreign Affairs, GR No. 169202, March 5, 2010
Rule 108 Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry
Tan Co v. Civil Register, GR 138496; 23 Feb 2004; Lee v. CA, 367 SCRA 110
Barco v CA 420 SCRA 162; Gerbert Corpuz v Sto Tomas GR 186571 Aug 11, 2010
Republic v. Cagandahan, GR No. 166676, Sept. 12, 2008
Rule 109 Appeals in Special Proceedings
Testate of Maria Biascan v. Biascan, 347 SCRA 621; Briones v. Lilia Henson-Cruz GR 159130 Aug 22,
2008; Heirs of Siapian et al v Estate of Mackay GR 184799 Sept 1, 2010
In the Matter of the Heirship of the Late Hermogenes Rodrigues, et. al. v. Robles, GR No. 182645, Dec. 4,
2009