Specpro Midterm Case Digests Complete

MIDTERM CASES | SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS
WEEK 1 | Preliminaries
1. Broadwell Hagans vs. Adolph Wislizenus, Judge of First Instance Of
Cebu, et al., G.R. No. 16680. September 13, 1920
Doctrine: Held: Under the facts stated in the opinion that there is no law authorizing
the appointment of an "assessor" in special proceedings.
- There is a marked distinction between an "action" and a "special proceeding." An action
is a formal demand of one's right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the
court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite
established rules. The term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or
proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special
proceedings, no formal pleadings are required, unless the statute expressly so provides.
In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion.
Facts: An original petition, presented in the Supreme Court, for the writ of certiorari.
The facts alleged in the petition are admitted by a demurrer.
The respondent judge, in support of his demurrer, argues that the provisions of Act No.
190 permit him to appoint assessors in "special proceedings." The petitioner contends
that no authority in law exists for the appointment of assessors in such proceedings.
The only provisions of law which authorize the appointment of assessors are the
following: (a) Sections 57-62 of Act No. 190; (b) sections 153-161 of Act No. 190; (c) section
44 (a) of Act No. 267; (d) section 2477 of Act No. 2711; and (e) section 2 of Act No. 2369.
Said section 44 (a) of Act No. 267 and section 2477 of Act No. 2711 apply to the city of
Manila only. Act No. 2369 provides for the appointment of assessors in criminal cases
only. Sections 57-62 of Act No. 190 provide for the appointment of assessors in the court
of the justice of the peace. Therefore, the only provisions of law which could, by any
possibility, permit the appointment of assessors in "special proceedings" are sections 153-
161 of Act No. 190.
Section 154 provides that "either party to an action may apply in writing to the judge for
assessors to sit in the trial. Upon the filing of such application, the judge shall direct that
assessors be provided.
Issue: Whether or not a judge of the Court of First Instance, in "special proceedings," is
authorized under the law to appoint assessors for the purpose of fixing the amount due to
an administrator or executor for his services and expenses in the care, management, and
settlement of the estate of a deceased person.
Ruling: NO! From all of the foregoing we are driven to the conclusion that in
proceedings like the present the judge of the Court of First Instance is without authority
to appoint assessors.
There is a marked distinction between an "action" and a "special proceeding." An action
is a formal demand of one's legal rights in a court of justice in the manner pre scribed by
the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite
JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 1|Page

established rules. (People vs. County Judge, 13 How. Pr. [N. Y.], 398.) The term "special
proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right
of a party, or a particular fact. (Porter vs. Purdy, 29 N." Y., 106, 110; Chapin vs. Thompson,
20 Cal., 681.) Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required, unless
the statute expressly so provides. The remedy in special proceedings is generally granted
upon an application or motion. Illustrations of special proceedings, in contradistinction
to actions, may be given: Proceedings for the appointment of an administrator, guardians,
tutors; contest of wills; to perpetuate testimony; to change the name of persons;
application for admission to the bar, etc., etc. (Bliss on Code Pleading, 3d ed., sec. 1.)
Therefore, the demurrer is hereby overruled and the prayer of the petition is hereby
granted, and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the order of the respondent judge
appointing the assessors described in the petition be and the same is hereby annulled and
set aside; and, without any finding as to costs, it is so ordered.
2. Patricia Natcher, vs. Hon. Court Of Appeals and The Heirs Of Graciano
Del Rosario—Leticia Del Rosario, Emilia Del Rosario-Manangan,
Rosalinda Fuentes Llana, Rodolfo Fuentes, Alberto Fuentes, Evelyn
Del Rosario, and Eduardo Del Rosario, G.R. No. 133000. October 2,
2001.
Doctrine: Action,”and “Special Proceeding,” Distinguished.—As could be
gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a
special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one’s right in a court of justice in the
manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies
according to definite established rules. The term “special proceeding” may be defined as
an application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact.
Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the statute
expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an
application or motion.”
A Regional Trial Court acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority to render
an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of an
heir.
Facts: Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a
parcel of land located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889.
Upon the death of Graciana, Graciano, together with his six children, entered into an
extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's estate adjudicating and dividing among themselves
the real property subject of TCT No. 11889. Under the agreement, Graciano received 8/14
share while each of the six children received 1/14 share of the said property.
Graciano's share was further subdivided into two separate lots. Graciano sold the first lot
to a third person but retained ownership over the second lot. Graciano later on married
herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the 2nd lot to his

wife Patricia. Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his
first marriage, as heirs.
In a complaint filed before the RTC of Manila, herein private respondents alleged that
upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud,
misrepresentation and forgery, acquired the 2nd lot by making it appear that Graciano
executed a Deed of Sale in favor herein petitioner.
After trial, the RTC of Manila rendered a decision holding that the deed of sale executed
by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by law and thus
a complete nullity. It also held that although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such
or as a donation, it may however be regarded as an extension of advance inheritance of
Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the lower court's decision. Aggrieved, herein
petitioner seeks refuge under our protective mantle through the expediency of Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court and assails the appellate court's decision "for being contrary to law and
the facts of the case."
Issue: Whether or not the RTC, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action for
reconveyance annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to advancement
of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs.
Ruling: NO! the RTC exceeded its jurisdiction. The SC concured with the CA and found
no merit in the instant petition. Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the
estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise
of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made
or alleged to have been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined
by the court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings; and the final order of the court
thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the
same provision contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having
jurisdiction of the estate proceedings".
Corollarily, the RTC in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of
authority to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real
property in favor of herein petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 471075 for
reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle
to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present circumstances, the RTC of
Manila, Branch 55 was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly pass
upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife,
herein petitioner Natcher.

3. Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio S. Manalo, Orlando S. Manalo, and

Isabelita Manalo vs. Hon. Court Of Appeals, Hon. Regional Trial Court
Of Manila (Branch 35), Purita S. Jayme, Milagros M. Terre, Belen M.
Orillano, Rosalina M. Acuin, Romeo S. Manalo, Roberto S. Manalo,
Amalia Manalo And Imelda Manalo, G.R. No. 129242. January 16,
2001.
Doctrine: It is a fundamental rule that, in the determination of the nature of an action
or proceeding, the averments and the character of the relief sought in the complaint, or
petition, as in the case at bar, shall be controlling.
A petition for issuance of letters of administration, settlement and distribution of estate
is a special proceeding and, as such, it is a remedy whereby the petitioner therein seek to
establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.
Facts: Troadio Manalo, a resident of Sampaloc, Manila, died intestate in 1992. He was
survived by his wife and his eleven children, who are all of legal age. He left several real
properties located in Manila and in Tarlac including a business- Manalo’s Machine Shop
with offices at Quezon City and at Valenzuela. In November, the respondents, who are
eight of the surviving children filed a petition with the RTC for the judicial settlement of
the estate of their late father and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo, as
administrator thereof. The trial court issued an order setting the said petition for hearing
and directing the publication of the order for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in Metro Manila, and directing service by registered mail of the
order. The trial court issued an order declaring the whole world in default, except the
government, and set the reception of evidence of the petitioners.
However, this order of general default was set aside by the trial court upon motion of the
petitioners who were granted ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to the
petition.
The trial court called resolved such issues in the following manner:
1.) admitted the opposition for the purpose of considering the merits;
2.) denied the hearing for such affirmative defenses are irrelevant and immaterial;
3.) declared that the court had jurisdiction;
4.) denied the motion for inhibition;
5.) set the application of Romeo Manalo for appointment as regular administrator in
the for hearing.
The MR of the petitioners was denied; hence, they filed a petition for certiorari,
contending that:
(1) the venue was improperly laid; (2) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons; (3) the share of the surviving spouse was included in the intestate proceedings;
(4)there was absence of earnest efforts toward compromise among members of the same

family, in accordance with Article 222 of NCC, and (5) no certification of non-forum
shopping was attached to the petition.
Issue: Whether or not erred in upholding the questioned orders of the RTC which denied
their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for judicial settlement of estate.
Ruling: NO. The Petition for Issuance of Letters of Administration, Settlement and
Distribution of Estate is a SPECIAL PROCEEDING and, as such, it is a remedy whereby
the respondents seek to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact.
In the determination of the nature of an action or proceeding, the averments and the
character of the relief sought in the complaint shall be controlling. A careful scrutiny of
the petition belies the claim that the same is in the nature of an ordinary civil action. The
said petition contains sufficient jurisdictional facts required in a petition for the
settlement of estate of a deceased person such as the fact of death and his residence which
are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of
the estate rest. It also contains an enumeration of the names of his legal heirs including a
tentative list of the properties left by the deceased which are sought to be settled in the
probate proceedings. In addition, the reliefs prayed for in the said petition leave no room
for doubt as regard the intention to seek judicial settlement of the estate of their deceased
father.
JURISDICTION
4. Testate Estate of Alejandro Gonzales y Tolentino, deceased, Loreto
Esguerra (Gonzales) Mangaliman vs. Manuel I. Gonzales, No. L-21033.
December 28, 1970.
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction of a probate court.—The Court of First Instance, as a
probate court, has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for reconveyance. The
remedy sought by petitioner for the reconveyance to her of her share in the Hacienda
Evangelista upon the ground that the same was acquired by respondent through fraud or
misrepresentation cannot be obtained by a mere petition in the probate proceedings. The
court of first instance, acting as a probate court, has limited jurisdiction and can take
cognizance only of "matters of probate, both testate and intestate estates, xxx and all such
special cases and proceedings are not otherwise provided for." The jurisdiction of a
probate court is limited and special, and this should be understood to comprehend only
cases related to those powers specified in the law, and cannot extend to the adjudication
of collateral matters. The petition for reconveyance has given rise to a controversy
involving rights over a real property which would require the presentation of evidence
and the determination of legal questions that should be ventilated in a court of general
jurisdiction.
Facts: Loreto Esguerra (Gonzales) Mangaliman, an illegitimate daughter of Alejandro
Gonzales y Tolentino, was given a legacy of one-eighth (1/8) undivided portion of the
Hacienda Evangelista located at Umingan, Pangasinan, having an area of 137 hectares.

Because she was a minor when her father died, petitioner's share was placed under the
guardianship of her halfbrother, Alejandro Gonzales, Jr., a legitimate son of the testator.
Manuel I. Gonzales is a legitimate son of the testator, and was for some time the
administrator of the estate. For the payment of the services of said respondent as
administrator, it was agreed on November 5, 1943 among the testator's widow and
legitimate children that he would be paid the sum of P11,000.00. This agreement was
approved by the probate court on December 2, 1943. Alleging that he had not been paid
his fee of P11,000.00, as provided in the compromise agreement, respondent filed before
the probate court a motion for execution on July 28, 1948, which motion was granted in
an order issued by the court on August 23, 1948. Eventually, on July 27, 1950 the
Hacienda Evangelista, which had previously been levied on execution, was sold by the
sheriff to respondent for the sum of P2,307.46. The one year redemption period having
elapsed without petitioner's guardian having taken any step to redeem her undivided
share of the hacienda, the sheriff executed, on October 31, 1951, a final deed of sale in
favor of respondent.
After coming of age, petitioner sought to recover her legacy by filing a motion in the
probate court to set aside the sale of the Hacienda Evangelista. Having found, however,
that her guardian was duly notified of such sale, the court a quo denied her motion on
October 15, 1954. Petitioner did not appeal from this order, instead she filed an action in
the Court of First Instance of Manila against her former guardian for damages for the loss
of her share in the hacienda (Civil Case No. 25986).
Much later, or in April, 1962, petitioner allegedly learned that before the sale to
respondent of the Hacienda Evangelista, including her one-eighth undivided share
thereof, said respondent had actually been paid for his services as administrator an
amount more than the P11,000.00, claimed by him. Contending that respondent, through
fraud and misrepresentations had obtained the order of payment for his services and the
subsequent writs of execution which ultimately led to his acquisition of the property,
thereby enriching himself at her expense, petitioner, on April 21, 1962, filed a petition
before the same probate court for the reconveyance to her of her one-eighth undivided
share in the Hacienda Evangelista by the respondent. After the filing by respondent of his
opposition, and the respective memorandum of the parties herein, the probate court, on
November 12, 1962, issued an order, as follows:
"After considering the petition for reconveyance of Loreto Esguerra (Gonzales)
Mangaliman, dated April 21, 1962, and the opposition thereto, dated May 14, 1962,
of Manuel Gonzales in support of which opposition said Manuel Gonzales filed his
memorandum on September 12, of this year, and in reply to which Loreto Esguerra
(Gonzales) Mangaliman filed hers on October 24, same year, the Court is of the
opinion that inasmuch as the question of title or ownership is involved, said
Manuel Gonzales may not be divested of his title within these probate proceedings
but in an independent suit fiied with a competent court."

Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila, as a probate court, has
jurisdiction to entertain petitioner's petition for reconveyance.
Ruling: NO! The probate court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for
reconveyance, in question. The remedy sought by petitioner for the reconveyance to her
of her share in the Hacienda Evangelista upon the ground that the same was acquired by
respondent through fraud or misrepresentation cannot be obtained by a mere petition in
the probate proceedings. The court of first instance, acting as a probate court, has limited
jurisdiction and can take cognizance only of "matters of probate, both testate and intestate
estates, * * * and all such special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise provided for."
The jurisdiction of a probate court is limited and special, and this should be understood
to comprehend only cases related to those powers specified in the law, and cannot extend
to the adjudication of collateral matters.
The petition filed by petitioner before the probate court which seemingly seeks merely the
reconveyance to her of her undivided share in a parcel of land which originally formed
part of the estate of her father in fact calls for the nullification, of the order of execution
issued by the probate court which is already final, and of the subsequent sale of a property
to respondent, upon the alleged ground of fraud. The defense interposed by respondent
is that petitioner's action to recover the property is already barred by prescription, laches,
and res judicata. The petition for reconveyance has given rise to a controversy involving
rights over a real property which would require the presentation of evidence and the
determination of legal questions that should be ventilated in a court of general
jurisdiction.
5. Pedro E. Baybayan, Cipriano Evangelista, and Spouses Bartolome and

Consuelo Baybayan vs. Hon. Narciso A. Aquino, as Presiding Judge CFI
Pangasinan Branch XIV; Deputy Sheriff Constancio Pagaduan; Eulalia
Evangelista, Norberto, Paulina, Feliza, All Surnamed Padua; Dionisia,
Laureano, Josefina, Leonardo, Anastacia, Valentina, All Surnamed
Orpiano; Servillano. Gertrudes, Pastora, Lorenzo, Fausta, All
Surnamed Delfin; And Dionisio, Faustina, Amado Benjamin, All
Surnamed Oria, No. L-42678. April 9, 1987.
Doctrine: Although the petitioners are not parties in the special proceedings, they,
however, voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the probate court.
A court of first instance acting as a probate court has no jurisdiction to adjudicate
questions concerning ownership of a property alleged to be part of a deceased person 's
estate, which must be submitted to the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction as a court of first instance.
Determination of ownership of a lot by a court exercising probate jurisdiction is not final
and is without prejudice to the right of an interested party to raise the question of
ownership in a proper action.
Facts: On 19 January 1960, herein private respondents Norberto Padua, Paulina Padua,
Felisa Padua, Dionisia Orpiano, Laureano Orpiano, Leonardo Orpiano, Josefina Orpiano,

Valentina Orpiano, Servillano Delfin, Gertrudes Delfin, Pastora Delfin, Lorenzo Delfin,
Fausta Delfin, Dionisio Oria, Faustina Oria, Amado Oria, and Benjamin Oria, all claiming
to be the nephews and nieces of one Vicente Oria who died intestate sometime in 1945 in
Balungao, Pangasinan, filed a petition for the summary settlement of the decedent's
estate, the value of which did not exceed P6,000.00. The petition was filed in the then
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Tayug Branch. The case was docketed therein as
Special Proceeding No. T-300.
After due publication and hearing, the probate court issued an order adjudicating the
estate to the heirs of the decedent, who were ordered to submit a project of partition.
Sometime in 1971, the case was transferred to the Rosales Branch of the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan where it was docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 24-R.
On 18 September 1974, the probate court confirmed the adjudication earlier made and
ordered Eulalia Evangelista to deliver the respective shares of her co-heirs; to make an
accounting of the produce thereof from 1960; and to deliver said produce to her co-heirs
or pay its equivalent. A writ of execution was subsequently issued pursuant thereto.
A writ of possession was also issued sometime thereafter, and the private respondents
were placed in possession of their respective shares. However, when a representative of
the private respondents went to cultivate the portion adjudicated to said private
respondents, he was prevented by Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelista. In view thereof,
the private respondents filed a motion to cite said Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelista in
contempt of court.
As a consequence, herein petitioners Pedro Baybayan, Cipriano Evangelista, and the
spouses Bartolome and Consuelo Baybayan, claiming to be the registered owners of the
lots involved, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Rosales
Branch, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 231-R, against the Deputy Sheriff and the
herein private respondents, for the quieting of their title, plus damages, and to restrain
said defendants from enforcing the writ of execution issued in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R.
Meanwhile, at the hearing of the motion for contempt in Spec. Proc. No, 24-R, the
question of the identity of the lands subject of Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, was brought up, so
that the probate court ordered a relocation survey and commissioned a geodetic engineer
to undertake said survey. After the survey, the commissioner submitted to the Court a
report stating, among others, that the lands which were delivered by the Deputy Sheriff
to the heirs of Vicente Oria, pursuant to the writ of possession issued by the probate court,
are registered in the names of herein petitioners under TCT No. 50269 and TCT No.
50270 of the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan.
By reason thereof, the probate court, in an order dated 30 October 1975, dismissed the
contempt charge against Jose Diaz and Cipriano Evangelista. However, the same court
ordered the petitioners to amend their complaint filed in Civil Case No. 231-R since "it is
necessary that an amended complaint be filed by Pedro Baybayan in order to determine
whether or not the property in question is part of the property under Spec. Proc. No. 24-
R, inasmuch as it is now the property claimed by him which is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 50269.

Pursuant thereto, the herein petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion in Civil Case No. 231-
R, to which was attached an amended complaint wherein some defendants were dropped.
The respondent Judge, however, found that the Amended Complaint did not comply with
his order of 30 October 1975 to exclude Lot E and dismissed the case, "without prejudice
on the part of the plaintiffs to file a proper complaint for the recovery of ownership or
possession of the property in controversy which is Lot B in the relocation plan and
formerly covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 23684, now under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 50269."
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order, but the motion was denied
on 24 December 1975. Thereupon, they filed with this Court a petition for certiorari for
the review of the orders of the lower court. The Court treated the petition as a special civil
action for certiorari. Counsel for the petitioners, in this petition, contends that the
respondent Judge had no authority under the law, both substantive and procedural, to
issue the questioned orders because the order to amend the complaint was issued in, and
in connection with Spec. Proc. No. 24-R where the herein petitioners are not even parties.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge had authority under the law, both
substantive and procedural to issue the questioned orders because the order to amend the
complaint was issued in, and in connection with Spec. Proc. No. 24-R where the herein
petitioners are not even parties.
Ruling: YES! The contention is not meritorious. While it may be true that the order to
amend the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 231-R was issued in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R, so
that it cannot ordinarily bind the herein petitioners who are not parties in said special
proceedings, it appears, however, that the petitioners voluntarily submitted themselves
to the jurisdiction of the probate court, when they filed an Omnibus Motion in Civil Case
No. 231-R, wherein they prayed for leave to amend their complaint in accordance with
the order of the probate court of 30 October 1975. They cannot now be allowed belatedly
to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the jurisdiction of the respondent trial
Judge to whom they submitted their cause voluntarily.
However, the respondent Judge committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack
of jurisdiction, in dismissing the complaint filed by the petitioners, for their alleged failure
to amend their complaint to exclude therefrom Lot E which the respondent Judge found,
in his order of 30 October 1975, issued in the probate court, to be owned by the petitioners
Cipriano Evangelista and Consuelo Baybayan. The findings of the respondent Judge as to
the ownership of Lot E after the hearing conducted in Spec. Proc. No. 24-R do not justify
the order to amend the complaint since the determination of the ownership of the said lot
by the respondent Judge presiding over a court exercising probate jurisdiction is not final
or ultimate in nature and is without prejudice to the right of an interested party to raise
the question of ownership in a proper action.
It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of
decisions, that "when questions arise as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of
the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not
by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the
deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of
administrative proceedings. The Court of First Instance, acting, as a probate court, has no

jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the Court of First
Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a court of first instance.'
Besides, the order to amend the complaint is vague and hazy and does not specify what
the amendments should be or how the complaint should be amended so that the
petitioners should not be faulted if the amended complaint subsequently filed by them in
Civil Case No. 231-R does not contain the allegations that the respondent Judge would
want to appear therein.
6. Hon. Jose F. Fernandez, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Negros

Occidental, Asuncion Maravilla, Et Al., vs. Herminio Maravilla, No. L-
18799. March 31, 1964.
Doctrine: Settlement of estates of deceased persons; Appellate jurisdiction determined
by value of entire conjugal estate and not merely by part pertaining to deceased spouse-
In an appeal from an order of probate court appointing a special co-administrator, such
issue being merely incidental to the probate or testate proceedings of the deceased spouse,
the amount in controversy is not merely the value of the portion of the conjugal estate
pertaining to the deceased spouse but of the entire conjugal estate, and it is this latter
amount that determines what court will have jurisdiction over said appeal.
The Rules of Court contain no provision on special co-administrator because the
appointment of such special administrators is merely temporary and subsists only until a
regular executor or administrator is duly appointed.
Facts: On August 25, 1958, respondent Herminio Maravilla filed with the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for probate of the will (Spec. Proc. No. 4977) of
his deceased wife Digna Maravilla who died on August 12 of that same year. In the will
the surviving spouse was named as the universal heir and executor.
On September 30, 1958, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla (brother and sisters of
the deceased Digna Maravilla) filed an opposition to the probate of the will, on the ground,
inter alia, that the will was not signed on each page by the testatrix in the presence of the
attesting witnesses and of one another.
On March 16, 1959, on motion of respondent Herminio, which was opposed by Pedro,
Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, the court issued an order appointing him special
administrator of the estate of the deceased, for the reason that:
"x x x all the properties subject of the will are conjugal properties of the petitioner
and his late wife, Digna Maravilla, and before any partition of the conjugal property
is done, the Court cannot pinpoint which of the property subject of the Will belongs
to Digna Maravilla, exclusively, that shall be administered by the special
administrator. Hence, although it is true that the petitioner Herminio Maravilla
has an adverse interest in the property subject of the Will, the Court finds it
impossible for the present time to appoint any person other than the petitioner as
special administrator of the property until after the partition is ordered, for the
reason that the properties mentioned in the Will are in the name of the petitioner
who is the surviving spouse of the deceased."
JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 10 | P a g e

On February 8, 1960, the court rendered a decision denying probate of the will, as it was
not duly signed on each page by the testatrix in the presence of the attesting witnesses
and of one another.
On February 17, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a
petition for appointment of Eliezar Lopez (son of Asuncion Maravilla) as special co-
administrator to protect their interests, on the ground that the will, having been denied
probate, they are the legal heirs of the decedent. Said petition was heard on February 20,
at which hearing, respondent's counsel orally moved for postponement, because
respondent's principal counsel (Salonga) had not been notified and was not present. The
court ordered presentation of oral evidence, consisting of the testimonies of Eliezar
Lopez, and Regina and Francisco Maravilla.
On February 26, 1960, respondent filed with the court his notice of appeal, appeal bond
and record on appeal, from the decision denying probate of the will. Some devisees under
the will, likewise, appealed from said decision.
On February 25, 1960, Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina Maravilla, filed with the court a
petition for the removal of respondent as special administrator, as he failed to file an
inventory within 3 months from his appointment and qualification as special
administrator, as provided for in Section 1, Rule 84, of the Rules of Court. To this petition,
respondent filed an opposition, on the ground that said provision of the Rules of Court
does not apply to a special administrator, and an inventory had already been submitted
by him, before said petition for his removal was filed.
On February 27, 1960, the devisees Conchita and Rose Marie Kohlhaas filed with the court
a petition for the appointment of Conchita as special co-administratrix. Devisee Adelina
Sajo, likewise, filed a similar petition on February 29.
On March 5, 1960, the court held a joint hearing on the (1) petition to appoint Eliezar
Lopez as special coadministrator, (2) approval of respondent's record on appeal and
appeal bond, (3) petition to remove respondent as special administrator, (4) petition to
appoint Conchita Kohlhaas as special co-administratrix, and (5) petition to appoint
Adelina Sajo as special co-administratrix. At said hearing, respondent objected to the
appointment of Eliezar Lopez was special co-administratrix, on the grounds that (a) the
law allows only one special administrator, (b) the order of March 16, 1959 estops the court
from appointing Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator, (c) such appointment is unfair
to respondent, because he owns at least 3/4 of the whole property, conjugal in nature,
which would be subjected to the administration of a stranger, and (d) a deadlock between
two special administrators would ruin the management of the property, including those
of respondent. On cross-examination of Eliezar Lopez, respondent's counsel elicited the
facts that (1) Lopez was employed full time in the PCAPE, with office in Manila. and could
not discharge the functions of a co-administrator, and (2) there was merely intention on
Lopez part to resign from office.
After said joint hearing, the court appointed Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator in
an order dictated in open court, to protect the interests of Pedro, Asuncion, and Regina
Maravilla. From this order, respondent, on March 7, 1960, filed with the Court of Appeals
a petition for certiorari and prohibition (with prayer for preliminary injunction) to annul
the order appointing Eliezar Lopez as special coadministrator, and to prohibit the probate
court from further proceeding with the petition for the removal of respondent as special
administrator. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction on March 9,
1960 which was amended on March 11, 1960 to make it more specific.
On October 6, 1960, petitioners Regina Maravilla, et al. filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition to certify the case to the Supreme Court, on the grounds that the principal amount
in controversy in this case exceeds P200,000.-00, and the writs (of certiorari and
prohibition) prayed for are not in aid of appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals,
since the probate case is not on appeal before it. To this petition, respondent filed an
opposition on the grounds that the amount in controversy is less than P200 000.00 and
the decision of the probate court (of February 8, 1960) is now on appeal before the Court
of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R); hence, the writ prayed for is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction, and the present case does not involve title to or possession of real estate
exceeding in value P200,000.00.
On May 16, 1961, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision granting the writs (certiorari
and prohibition) prayed for or by respondent, and declaring null and void the
appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special coadministrator. Petitioners Regina Maravilla, et
al. filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision, but it was denied by the Court of
Appeals. Hence, this appeal.
Petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to issue the writs of
certiorari and prohibition prayed for by respondent, the same not being in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the CA has appellate jurisdiction over special proceedings.
Ruling: NO! Under Section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, the property to be
administered and liquidated in testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse is,
not only that part of the conjugal estate proceeding to the deceased spouse, but the entire
conjugal estate. This Court has already held that even if the deceased had left no debts,
upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the husband or wife, the community
property shall be inventoried, administered, and liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse (Vda. de Roxas v. Pecson, et al., L-2211, December
20, 1948; 82 Phil. 407; see also Vda. de Chantengco v. Chantengco, et al., L- 10663,
October 31, 1958). In a number of cases where appeal was taken from an order of a probate
court disallowing a will, this Court, in effect, recognized that the amount or value involved
or in controversy therein is that of the entire estate (Suntay v. Suntay, L-3087, July 31,
1954, 50 O.G. 5321; Vaño v. Vda. de Garces, et al., L6303, June 30, 1954, 50 O.G. 3045).
Not having appellate jurisdiction over the proceedings in probate (CA-G.R. No. 27478-R),
considering that the amount involved therein is more than P200,000.00, the Court of
Appeals cannot also have original jurisdiction to grant the writs of certiorari and
prohibition prayed for by respondent in the instant case, which are merely incidental
thereto.
Note also that the present proceedings under review were for the annulment of the
appointment of Eliezar Lopez as special co-administrator and to restrain the probate
court from removing respondent as special administrator. It is therefore, a contest for the
administration of the estate and, consequently, the amount or value of the assets of the
whole estate is the value in controversy (4 C.J.S. 204). It appearing that the value of the
estate in dispute is much more than P200,000.00, the Court of Appeals clearly had no
original jurisdiction to issue the writs in question.
7. Florencio Manalo, as Guardian of the Minors Lazaro Mendieta and
Daria Mendieta vs. Honorable Isidro Paredes, Judge of First Instance
of Laguna, and Philippine Food Company, No. 24168. September 22,
1925
Doctrine: WILLS; PROBATE OF; PROCEEDING "IN REM."—The proceeding for
the probate of a will is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265), and the court acquires jurisdiction over
all the persons interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed by section 630
of the Code of Civil Procedure, and any order that may be entered therein is binding
against all of them.
JURISDICTION.—Through the publication of the petition for the probate of the will,
the court acquires jurisdiction over all such persons as are interested in said will; and any
judgment that may be rendered after said proceeding is binding against the whole world.
APPEAL.—The court having jurisdiction over the subject-matter and all the persons
interested in the case, any error that it might have committed in rendering judgment
cannot be corrected through mandamus, but by the proper appeal presented in due time
and manner.
Facts: On March 22, 1924, Laureana Hidalgo, surviving spouse of Francisco Villegas,
filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna an application for letters of administration
of the estate left by her deceased husband, who, according to the application, died
intestate (rec. No. 4031, file 1, of the Court of First Instance of Laguna).
In the course of said administration and on May 5, 1924, Justina Mendieta, Lazaro
Mendieta, Daria Mendieta, and Melecio Fule, supposed testamentary executor, through
their attorney, Mr. Eusebio Lopez, filed a motion with the court, praying for the probate
of the supposed will of Francisco Villegas, wherein most of his property was given as a
legacy to said Justina Mendieta, the latter's children and the legitimate wife of the
deceased Francisco Villegas.
On August 8, 1924, Messrs. E. M. Lopez and V. F. Reyes, attorneys, on behalf of the
executor Melecio Fule, filed a motion wherein they stated that the attesting witnesses,
Exequiel Evidente and Albino Villegas, had assured them that the supposed will had not
been executed by Francisco Villegas in accordance with law, and that the executor Melecio
Fule no longer took interest in the case.
Notwithstanding the foregoing motions, the court, on September 3, 1924, ordered the
publication in the newspaper El Debate, of Manila, of the application of Melecio Fule and
of Justina Mendieta, Lazaro Mendieta, and Daria Mendieta for the probate of the
supposed will of the deceased Francisco Villegas, setting said application for hearing on
the 3d day of October, 1924.
On September 5, 1924, Justina Mendieta, together with her children Lazaro Mendieta and
Daria Mendieta, filed another application for the probate of the same will through their
attorneys, Messrs. Azada and Veluz and on October 13, 1924, the same attorneys and

Attorney Marcelino Lontok, on behalf of Justina Mendieta and her minor children, filed
a motion for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for said minors.
At the trial, which was held October 16, 1924, the court below appointed Justina
Mendieta, natural mother of said minors, as their guardian ad litem. Laureana Hidalgo
entered her objection to the probate of the will and immediately the court proceeded to
hear the evidence of the 'parties, each and everyone of the attesting witnesses of the
supposed will, named Tomas Dizon, Albino Villegas, and Exequiel Evidente having
testified, and the applicants having introduced Exhibits A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L,
M, and N and the opponent Exhibits 1, 2, 3, and 4, the trial having been suspended
thereafter, to be continued on October 24, 1924.
When the case was called on October 24, 1924, for the continuation of the trial, Justina
Mendieta, for herself and in her capacity as guardian ad litem of her minor children
Lazaro Mendieta and Daria Mendieta, represented by their attorneys, Messrs. Marcelino
Lontok and Marcial Azada, on the one hand, and Laureana Hidalgo, represented by her
attorney, Mr. J. E. Blanco, on the other, submitted to the court an agreement wherein
Justina Mendieta stated that she withdrew her application for the probate of the supposed
will of the 'deceased Francisco Villegas on the ground that the evidence was insufficient
to justify the probate of said will, and consequently, she prayed that said will be held not
allowable to probate and that the deceased died intestate, without leaving any more heirs
than his legitimate wife, Laureana Hidalgo, and his two adulterous children, Lazaro and
Daria Mendieta, and that the property of the deceased be distributed in accordance with
said agreement
By an order dated October 25, 1924, the court approved said stipulation and rendered
judgment, holding that the supposed will of Francisco Villegas could not be probated, and
awarding to the. heirs of the deceased the estate left by Francisco Villegas in accordance
with said agreement. From this order no appeal has been taken.
On January 7, 1925, one Gelacio Malihan, who claimed to be first cousin of the deceased
Francisco Villegas, filed with the court a new application for the probate of the same
supposed will of the deceased Francisco Villegas.
As may be seen from the facts above stated, the will, the probate of which is applied for in
the petition dated January 7, 1925, is the same one that was the subject of the application
of May 5, 1924, and of September 5, 1924. The only difference lies in that the first
application was filed by Justina Mendieta and her minor children Lazaro Mendieta and
Daria Mendieta and Melecio Fule, supposed testamentary executor, all represented by the
attorney, Mr. Eusebio M. Lopez; the second by Justina Mendieta and her minor children
Lazaro Mendieta and Daria Mendieta, represented by the attorneys Messrs. Azada and
Veluz; and the third and last by one Gelacio Malihan who claimed to be first cousin of the
deceased Francisco Villegas.
Issue: Whether or not the proceeding for the probate of a will is a proceeding in rem and
the court acquires jurisdiction over all the persons interested through publication.
Ruling: The proceeding for the probate of a will is a proceeding in rem (40 Cyc., p. 1265),
and the court acquires jurisdiction over all the persons interested through the publication
of the notice prescribed by section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and any order that

may be entered is binding against all of them. Through the publication ordered by the
Court of First Instance of Laguna of the application for the probate of the supposed will
of Francisco Villegas, filed by Justina Mendieta and her minor children Lazaro and Daria
Mendieta and Melecio Fule, testamentary executor, through their attorney, Mr. Eusebio
Lopez, said court acquired jurisdiction over all such persons as were interested in the
supposed will, including Gelacio Malihan. The court having tried said application for
probate, hearing all the testimony of the attesting witnesses of the said supposed will, the
applicant Justina Mendieta for herself and as guardian ad litem of her minor children,
represented by their attorneys, Messrs. Marcelino Lontok and Marcial Azada, on the one
hand, and Laureana Hidalgo, widow of Francisco Villegas, represented by her attorney,
Jesus. E. Blanco, on the other, having submitted a stipulation wherein the former
withdrew her application and the latter reserved certain rights over the estate left by
Francisco Villegas in favor of Justina Mendieta and her minor children; and the court
having approved said stipulation and declared that Francisco Villegas died intestate
according to said agreement, all the parties became bound by said judgment; and if any
of them or other persons interested were not satisfied with the court's decision, they had
the remedy of appeal to correct any injustice that might have been committed, and cannot
now through the special remedy of mandamus, obtain a review of the proceeding upon a
new application for the probate of the same will in order to compel the respondent judge
to comply with his ministerial duty imposed by section 330 of the Code of Civil Procedure;
because this remedy, being extraordinary, cannot be used in lieu of appeal, or writ of error
(26 Cyc., 177; 18 R.C.L., par. 443); especially when the parties interested have agreed to
disregard the testamentary provisions and divide the estate as they pleased, each of them
taking what pertained to him (25 R.C.L., 359).
RULE 72- Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules
Refer to Case No. 6

WEEK 2 |Rule 73- Venue and Process

1. Cayetano vs. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 522, No. L-54919 May 30, 1984
Doctrine: Succession; Due Process; Attorneys; There being a proper substitution
of attorneys where the Motion to Dismiss Opposition to reprobate of will was filed, trial
judge acted properly in hearing evidence ex parte on probate of will in question.
Same; Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be
passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of will is resolved, probate court should
meet the issue.—The third issue raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will.
As a general rule, the probate court’s authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of
the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of
the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity
of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
Same; The U.S. law on succession in the state of Pennsylvania applies to the intrinsic and
extrinsic validity of the last will and testament of a U.S. national and resident of
Pennsylvania under whose laws a person may give his entire estate to a complete
stranger.—Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and
thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private
respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an
American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
Therefore, under Article 16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide:
x x x x the law which governs Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A.,
which is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the
Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away
by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not
apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would
run counter to the specific provisions of Philippine Law.
Same; Same.—It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of
the will, as provided for by Article 16 (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national
Facts: On January 31, 1977, Adoracion C. Campos died, leaving her father, petitioner
Hermogenes Campos and her sisters, private respondent Nenita C. Paguia, Remedios C.
Lopez and Marieta C. Medina as the surviving heirs. As petitioner was the only
compulsory heir, he executed an Affidavit of Adjudication whereby he adjudicated unto
himself the ownership of the entire estate of the deceased Adoracion Campos.
Eleven months after, Nenita C. Paguia filed a petition for the reprobate of a will of the
deceased which was allegedly executed in the United States and for her appointment as
administratrix of the estate of the deceased testatrix. In her petition, Nenita alleged that
the testatrix was an American citizen at the time of her death and was a permanent
resident of 4633 Ditman Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.

An opposition to the reprobate of the will was filed by herein petitioner alleging among
other things, that he has every reason to believe that the will in question is a forgery; that
the intrinsic provisions of the will are null and void; and that even if pertinent American
laws on intrinsic provisions are invoked, the same could not apply inasmuch as they
would work injustice and injury to him.
The respondent judge issued an order admitting and allowing the probate of the Last Will
and Testament of the late Adoracion C. Campos and appointing Nenita Campos Paguia as
the administratrix of the estate of said decedent
Petitioner filed a motion entitled “Motion to Vacate and/or Set Aside the Order and
dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Petitioner tried to argue his motion to vacate instead of adducing evidence in support of
the petition for relief. Thus, the respondent judge issued an order dismissing the petition
for relief for failure to present evidence in support thereof. Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration but the same was denied. In the same order, respondent judge also
denied the motion to vacate for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse and discretion when
he allowed the withdrawal of the petitioner’s opposition to the reprobate of the will.
Ruling: No! As a general rule, the probate court’s authority is limited only to the extrinsic
validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of
the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly
authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity
of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
Although on its face, the will appeared to have preterited the petitioner and thus, the
respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the private respondents have
sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an American citizen
and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.
The law which governs Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which
is the national law of the decedent. Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law
does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate may be given away by the testatrix to
a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not apply because it would
be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to the
specific provisions of Philippine Law.
It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as
provided for by Article 16 (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent
must apply.

Therefore, the settlement of the estate of Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the
Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate since it was alleged and proven
that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent resident of
Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a “usual resident of Cavite” as alleged by
the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of
the probate court in the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke
the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief, against his opponent and after
failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction.
2. Garcia Fule vs. Court of Appeals, 74 SCRA 189, No. L-40502, No. L-
42670 November 29, 1976
Doctrine: Settlement of estate; Venue; Jurisdiction; Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Rules of Court prescribing the court where a decedent’s estate shall be
nettled, which in at the place of his residence or where the estate is located,
relates to venue and not jurisdiction.—The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73
specifically the clause “so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or
of the location of the estate,” is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule
indicates: “Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes.” It could not
have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal
provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters.
Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over the subject matter is another, x x x A fortiori,
the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and
issuance of letters of administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over
the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue.
Same; Same: Same; The term “resides” in Section 1, Rule 73 on settlement of
a decedent’s estate refers to his actual residence as distinguished from his
legal residence or domicile.—We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term “resides”
connotes ex vi termini “actual residence” as distinguished from “legal residence or
domicile.” This term “resides,” like the terms “residing” and “residence” is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which
it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules—Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court is of such nature—residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor, x x x In other words, “resides,” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place
of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
Same; Same; Venue; Supreme Court may decree, under its supervisory authority over
courts, that venue was transferred from one trial court to another.
Facts: Virginia G. Fule (illegitimate sister) filed with the CFI of Laguna a petition for
letters of administration alleging that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property
owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and

personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of
the Honorable Court. At the same time, she moved ex parte for her appointment as special
administratix over the estate. Judge Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia, the surviving spouse of the
deceased, contending that: 1. order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix
was issued without jurisdiction; 2. there has been no delay or cause for delay in the
proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as the surviving spouse of
Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix;
3. Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia,
therefore, prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of
Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after due hearing. While this
reconsideration motion was pending, Preciosa B. Garcia also filed motion to remove
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground
raised in the motion for reconsideration, the latter’s appointment was obtained through
erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has
adverse interest against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable as
administratrix and as officer of the court.
Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia’s motions
to substitute and remove the special administratrix, and the second, holding that the
power allowed the special administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an inventory
of the assets of the estate.
The Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo
A. Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.
The CA also denied of their motion for reconsideration which prompted Virginia G. Fule
to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court on appeal by certiorari.
Issues:
1.) Are venue and jurisdiction the same? How can it be determined in the present
case?
2.) What does the word “resides” in Revised Rules of Court Rule 73 Section 1 Mean?
3.) Who is entitled as special administratix of the estate?
Ruling:
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: “If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
nettled; in the Court, of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of
First Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise

jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a

court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an
appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction
appears on the record.”
With particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2,’ Rule 79 of the
Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively
show the existence of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should
allege all the necessary facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the
decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is
relied upon, and the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin,
creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his
last residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent
proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was
not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the
state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration.
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically
the clause “so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of the estate,” is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule
indicates: “Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons, Venue and Processes.” It
could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter,
because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely
with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject
matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter
“existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began.” That power or
authority is not altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the
manner in which the power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There
are cases though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the
provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses
the power to exercise it legally. However, this does not amount to a loss of
jurisdiction over the subject matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby
lose jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby be rendered
defective for lack of something essential to sustain it. The appearance of this
provision in the procedural law at once raises a strong presumption that it has
nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain
words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the parties.
2. The term “resides,” like the terms “residing” and “residence,” is elastic and should be
interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules—Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature—residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.
Even where the statute uses the word “domicile” still it is construed as meaning residence
and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms
“residence” and “domicile” but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are
synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term “inhabitant.” In other words,
“resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal,
actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence
simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires
bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular
length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be Garcia
more than temporary.
3. In the present case, SC ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased should be
the venue of the court. Amado G. Garcia was in Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna
base on his death certificate. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the
decedent at the time of his death.
3. Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 360, No. L-24742 October 26,
1973
Doctrine: Settlement of estates; Jurisdiction; Venue; Residence of deceased not
element of jurisdiction, but of venue.—For purposes of determining what court has
jurisdiction in the settlement of a deceased’s estate, the residence of the deceased or the
location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the subject matter but merely
of venue.
Same; Testate proceedings take precedence over intestate proceedings. —ln
accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings
for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left
a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate
proceedings even it at that stage an administrator had already been appointed x x x. This,
however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected
or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy.
Same; Jurisdiction; Opposition to jurisdiction of trial court in settlement proceedings
should be by appeal.
Same; When proceedings for settlement of estate will not be annulled even if
court had improper venue.—The mischievous effect in the administration of justice
of considering the question of residence as affecting the jurisdiction of the trial court and
annulling the whole proceedings only to start all over again the same proceedings before
another court of the same rank in another province is too obvious to require comment.

Venue; Supreme Court may order change of venue under its supervisory authority over
inferior courts.
Facts: Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and
two minor sons, residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in
Cebu. Lourdes, one of the children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration with the Court of First Instance (CFI) Cebu, alleging that the senator died
intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and Quezon City.
The petition still pending with CFI Cebu, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a
petition with CFI Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was named
executrix. Rosa also filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court
held in abeyance resolution over the opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the
probate proceedings.
Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of
jurisdiction and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive
jurisdiction over the case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon
appeal CA ruled in favor of Lourdes and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.
Issues:
1. Whether or not CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition
2. Whether or not CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion
in taking cognizance and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate
proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order expressly consenting in deference to
the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings
Ruling: The Court finds that the appellate court erred in law in issuing the writ of
prohibition against the Quezon City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings
and annulling and setting aside all its orders and actions, particularly its admission to
probate of the deceased’s last will and testament and appointing petitioner-widow as
executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator’s express wish.
1. The Judiciary Act7 concededly confers original jurisdiction upon all Courts of First
Instance over “all matters of probate, both of testate and intestate estates.” On the other
hand, Rule 73, section of the Rules of Court lays down the rule of venue, as the very
caption of the Rule indicates, and in order to prevent conflict among the different courts
which otherwise may properly assume; jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that
“the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.” It is equally conceded that the
residence of the deceased or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over
the subject matter but merely of venue.
Conversely, such court, may upon learning that a petition for probate of the decedent’s
last will has been presented in another court where the decedent obviously had his
conjugal domicile and resided with his surviving widow and their minor children, and

that the allegation of the intestate petition before it stating that the decedent died intestate
may be actually false, may decline to take cognizance of the petition and hold the petition
before it in abeyance, and instead defer to the second court which has before it the petition
for probate of the decedent’s alleged last will.
2. Implicit in the Cebu court’s order was that if the will was duly admitted to probate by
the Quezon City court, then it would definitely decline to take cognizance of Lourdes’
intestate petition which would thereby be shown to be false and improper, and leave the
exercise of jurisdiction to the Quezon City court, to the exclusion of all other courts.
Likewise, by its act of deference, the Cebu court left it to the Quezon City court to resolve
the question between the parties whether the decedent’s residence at the time of his death
was in Quezon City where he had his conjugal domicile rather than in Cebu City as claimed
by respondents. The Cebu court thus indicated that it would decline to take cognizance of
the intestate petition before it and instead defer to the Quezon City court, unless the latter
would make a negative finding as to the probate petition and the residence of the decedent
within its territory and venue.
3. It should be noted that in the Supreme Court’s exercise of its supervisory authority over
all inferior courts, it may properly determine, as it has done in the case at bar, that venue
was properly assumed by and transferred to the Quezon City court and that it is the
interest of justice and in avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court’s exercise
of jurisdiction over the testate estate of the decedent (with the due deference and consent
of the Cebu court) and its admission to probate of his last will and testament and
appointment of petitioner-widow as administratrix without bond in pursuance of the
decedent’s express will and all its orders and actions taken in the testate proceedings
before it be approved and authorized rather than to annul all such proceedings regularly
had and to repeat and duplicate the same proceedings before the Cebu court only to revert
once more to the Quezon City court should the Cebu court find that indeed and in fact, as
already determined by the Quezon City court on the strength of incontrovertible
documentary evidence of record, Quezon City was the conjugal residence of the decedent.
Judgment is hereby rendered reversing the appealed decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals and the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
originally filed by respondents with the Court of Appeals is ordered dismissed.
4. Ongsingco, etc., vs. Tan, etc., and Borja, 97 Phil. 330, No. L-7635 July
25, 1955
Doctrine: COURTS; JURISDICTION; POWER OF PROBATE COURT TO
DETERMINE QUESTION OF OWNERSHIP.—It is well settled in this jurisdiction,
sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions that, "the question of ownership of
property is one which should be determined in an ordinary action and not in probate
proceedings, and this whether or not the property is alleged to belong to the estate"
(Franco vs. O'Brien, 13 Phil., 359). In another case, it was held that "The general rule is

that questions as to title to property cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate

proceedings" (Pascual vs. Pascual, 73 Phil., 561, 562; or, stating the rule more elaborately,
"when questions arise as to the ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of
deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of
any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased and
his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of administrative
proceedings. The Court of First Instance, acting as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction as a court of first instance.
JUDGMENT AND DECREE; INTERFERENCE WITH OTHER COURTS OF
CONCURRENT OR COORDINATE JURISDICTION, IMPROPER.—It is settled
by an overwhelming weight of authority that no court has power to interfere by injunction
with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having
equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction. * * * The various branches of the
Court of First Instance of Manila are in a sense coordinate courts and to allow them to
interfere with each other's judgments or decrees by injunctions would obviously lead to
confusion and might seriously hinder the administration of justice." (Cabigao vs. Del
Rosario, 44 Phil., 182; Phil. National Bank vs. Javellana, 92 Phil., 525; Montesa vs. Manila
Cordage Company, 92 Phil., 25.)
Facts: Petitioner Tasiana Ongsingco is the wife and judicial guardian of one Francisco de
Borja who was declared incompetent by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in Special
Proceedings. Francisco de Borja is the surviving spouse of Josefa Tangco whose estate is
being settled another Special Proceedings of the same court. Respondent Jose de Borja is
the son of Francisco de Borja who was appointed administrator of the estate of Josefa
Tangco.
Francisco de Borja, according to petitioner, is the owner of two parcels of land situated in
Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija, which he acquired by inheritance from his late father and as
such form part of his separate properties.
Francisco de Borja was declared incompetent by the court as aforesaid, and petitioner, his
second wife, was appointed his guardian. As such guardian, petitioner took over from her
husband the possession of said two parcels of land and commenced the threshing of the
palay crop standing thereon for the benefit of her ward.
Respondent Jose de Borja, as administrator of the estate of Josefa Tangco, filed a motion
in the estate proceedings of the latter praying that petitioner be restrained from threshing
the palay on the lands until the ownership thereof has been definitely determined either
by the court or by agreement of the parties. Petitioner opposed the motion challenging
the jurisdiction of the court and contending that if its purpose is to pass on the question
of ownership, such can only be threshed out elsewhere and not by the probate court.
Because it became obvious to petitioner that respondent administrator would insist in his
motion whose main aim is to prevent petitioner and her laborers from threshing the crop

standing on the lands and, on the other hand, the several attempts made to agree on the
identity of the lands had failed, petitioner filed an action in the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija to restrain respondent administrator from interferring with the harvesting
and threshing of the crop on the claim that the lands were the exclusive property of her
ward Francisco de Borja. The court granted the preliminary injunction prayed for upon
the filing by petitioner of a bond of P5,000. Respondent Jose de Borja filed an urgent
petition in the same case asking the court to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction and
to dissolve the preliminary injunction that was issued. This petition was denied.
The respondent court ordered not to meddle in the threshing of the palay harvested in the
lands.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration calling attention to the fact that both the
guardian and the administrator had already attempted to arrive at an agreement as to the
identity of the lots which are claimed to be the exclusive property of Francisco de Borja,
but they failed to do so, and because of such inability and the immediate need of
harvesting and threshing the crop standing thereon, petitioner filed an action in the Court
of First Instance of Nueva Ecija precisely to determine once and for all the title to, and
ownership of said lands and to issue a preliminary injunction restraining respondent Jose
de Borja from interferring with the work of petitioner; but, in view of respondent Borja's
opposition, respondent court denied the motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this appeal.
Issues: (1) Considering that the dispute between petitioner and respondent
administrator involves the ownership of two parcels of land now the subject of an action
in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, has respondent court jurisdiction to
determine said dispute in the estate proceedings of the late Josefa Tangco?; and
(2) Having the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija issued a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain respondent administrator from interferring with the threshing of
the crop standing on said lands, can respondent court, after having been apprised of said
order, issue an order the effect of which is to nullify and render ineffective said writ of
preliminary injunction?
Ruling:
1. NO
2. NO
It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of
decisions that, "the question of ownership of property is one which should be determined
in an ordinary action and not in probate proceedings, and this whether or not the property
is alleged to belong to the estate" (Franco vs. O'Brien, 13 Phil., 359). In another case, it
was held that the general rule is that questions as to title to property cannot be passed

upon in testate or intestate proceedings or stating the rule more elaborately, "When
questions arise as to the ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of a
deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of
any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased and
his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the courts of administrative
proceedings. The Court of First Instance, acting as a probate court, has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction as a court of first instance."
The dispute between petitioner and respondent administrator involving, as it does,
the ownership of two parcels of land situated in Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija, and this
question having been squarely raised in an action pending in the court of first instance of
said province, which was instituted by petitioner against respondent administrator
precisely because of the dispute that had arisen between them over said property, it is the
sense of this Tribunal that respondent court exceeded its jurisdiction in acting upon the
said question in its capacity as probate court. On the face of such issue which necessarily
involves the ownership of the properties, we consider of no consequence the claim that
what respondent court merely did was to look into the identity of said properties. This
question is necessarily imbibed in the greater issue of ownership and being interwoven
one can hardly draw the line of demarcation that would separate one from the other.
As regards the question whether the order of respondent court restraining petitioner
from threshing the palay crop standing on the lands has been properly issued on the face
of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija,
the answer is not difficult to find: the court should not have issued the order, for "It is
settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that no court has power to interfere by
injunction with the judgments or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction
having equal power to grant the relief sought by injunction. . . . The various branches of
the Court of First Instance of Manila are in a sense coordinate courts and to allow them
to interfere with each other's judgments or decrees by injunctions would obviously lead
to confusion and might seriously hinder the administration of justice."
5. Vicente Uriarte, Petitioners vs The Court of First Instance of Negros

Occidental, et al., Respondents, G.R. No. L-21938-3929 May 1970
Doctrine: COURTS OF FIRST INSTANCE; ORIGINAL AND EXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION OVER "ALL MATTERS OF PROBATE." — Under the Judiciary Act of
1948, Courts of First Instance have original exclusive jurisdiction over "all matters of
probate," that is, over special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons — whether they died testate or intestate.
SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE OF DECEASED PERSONS; VENUE; COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF PROVINCE WHERE DECEDENT INHABITANT OF PHILIPPINES
RESIDED AT TIME OF HIS DEATH OR WHERE INHABITANT OF FOREIGN
COUNTRY HAD ESTATE. — The matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance

where the special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by Section 1, Rule 73 of

the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of
first instance in the province of which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had
estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of a non-resident alien — like the
decedent in the instant case — the Courts of First Instance in provinces where the
deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper
special proceeding for the settlement of his estate.
TESTATE PROCEEDINGS TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS.
— Testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take
precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus, if in the course of
intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent
had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the intestate
proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter
being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the
executor subsequently appointed.
PROBATE OF WILL SHOULD BE FILED IN SAME COURT WHERE INTESTATE
PROCEEDINGS HAD BEEN COMMENCED. — Where intestate proceedings had already
been commenced before a court of first instance, as in the case at bar, the probate of the
will of the decedent should be submitted to the same court, either in a separate proceeding
or in an appropriate motion for said purpose in the intestate proceedings. It is not in
accord with public policy and the orderly and inexpensive administration of justice to
unnecessarily multiply litigation, especially if several courts would be involved.
VENUE; WRONG VENUE WAIVABLE; WAIVER BY LACHES; INSTANT CASE. — It is
well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is merely a waivable procedural defect.
Petitioner, in the instant case, has waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded
from doing so by laches.
Facts: On 06 November 1961, petitioner Vicente Uriarte filed with the Negros Court a
petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan G. Uriarte (SP No. 6344)
alleging therein, inter alia, that as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that,
during the lifetime of the decedent, petitioner had instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the
same Court for his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son. Upon petitioner
Uriarte’s motion, the Negros Court appointed Philippine National Bank as special
administrator but the latter never actually qualified as such. Respondent Higinio Uriarte
filed an opposition to the petition alleging that he was a nephew of the deceased Juan G.
Uriarte who had executed a Last Will and Testament in Spain, an authenticated copy of
which to be provided to the court, and further questioning petitioner’s capacity and
interest to commence the intestate proceeding.
On 28 August 1962, respondent Juan Uriarte Zamacona commenced SP No. 51396 in the
Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan

G. Uriarte and on the same date filed in SP No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to
dismiss the petition filed by Vicente Uriarte. Petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss
contending that, as Negros was first to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of
the deceased Uriarte, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the same pursuant to
Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. The Negros Court sustained Zamacona’s motion
and dismissed the SP No. 6344 pending before it. Petitioner, then, filed a record on appeal
before the Negros Court. Pending approval on the record on appeal, petitioner proceeded
to file a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, the subject of this case. The
record on appeal was denied and the petitioner filed a supplemental petition for
mandamus.
On 01 July 1963, the Manila Court denied the Omnibus Motion file by Vicente Uriarte in
SP No. 5136 pending in Manila Court, asking for leave to intervene therein; for the
dismissal of the petition and the annulment of the proceedings had in said special
proceeding.
Issues:
(1) Whether the Manila Court has jurisdiction over the probate proceedings,
notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of the intestate proceedings before the
Negros Court; and
(2) Whether the petition for the probate of the last will of Juan G. Uriarte should have
been filed with the Negros Court – particularly in SP No. 6344 – or in a separate
proceeding as with the Manila Court.
Ruling:
(1) Yes, the Manila Court has jurisdiction.
Under the Judiciary Act of 1948, Courts of First Instance have original exclusive
jurisdiction over "all matters of probate," that is, over special proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons — whether they died testate or
intestate. While their jurisdiction over such subject matter is beyond question, the
matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special
proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of
his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the
province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of
a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate.
Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of a non-resident alien
— like the deceased Juan G. Uriarte — the Courts of First Instance in
provinces where the deceased left any property have concurrent
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special proceeding for the
settlement of his estate. In the case in question, these Courts of First
Instance are the Negros and the Manila Courts — province and city
where the deceased Juan G. Uriarte left considerable properties.

Further, testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a

deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the
same purpose. Thus, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending
before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left a
last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should replace the
intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already
been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over
the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however,
is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected
or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. This is a clear
indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate
proceedings.
(2) Where intestate proceedings had already been commenced before a

court of first instance, as in the case at bar, the probate of the will of
the decedent should be submitted to the same court, either in a
separate proceeding or in an appropriate motion for said purpose in
the intestate proceedings. It is not in accord with public policy and the orderly
and inexpensive administration of justice to unnecessarily multiply litigation,
especially if several courts would be involved. Furthermore, the party seeking the
probate of the will in the instant case knew before filing the petition for probate
with another court of first instance of the pendency of the intestate proceedings.
However, it is well settled in this jurisdiction that wrong venue is
merely a waivable procedural defect. Petitioner, in the instant case, has
waived the right to raise such objection or is precluded from doing so
by laches.
6. Paz Y. Ocampo et al., Plaintiff-Appellees vs Conrado Potenciano, et al.,

Defendants-Appellants, G.R. No. L-2263 30 May 1951
Doctrine: HUSBAND AND WIFE; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP; DISSOLUTION;

HUSBAND CAN NO LONGER LIQUIDATE, UNDER PRESENT RULE. — The decisions
laying down the rule that, upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the wife,
the husband must liquidate the partnership affairs are now obsolete. The present rule is
that when the marriage is dissolved by the death of either husband or wife, the
partnership affairs must be liquidated in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse.
PACTO DE RETRO SALE, DECLARED AN EQUITABLE MORTGAGE. — Where it is not
disputed that the pacto de retro sale in question was in reality a loan with security, or an
equitable mortgage, with simulated rental for interest, the lenders had no right, through

the unilateral declaration of one or both of them, to consolidate title in themselves over
the property given as security.
Facts: On 03 February 1930, Edilberto Ocampo, married to Paz Yatco, executed a deed
purporting to convey Conrado Potenciano, and the latter’s wife, Rufina Reyes, by way of
sale with pacto de retro for the sum of P2,500, a town lot with a house of strong materials
standing thereon and signed another document, making it appear that, for an annual
rental of P300, which, as may be noted, is equivalent to 12% of the purchase price, the
vendees were leasing to Ocampo the house and lot for the duration of the redemption
period. The property, though registered in the name of Ocampo alone, it in reality
belonged to him and his wife as conjugal property.
The period originally fixed for the repurchase was one year, but several extensions were
granted. After the lapse of the last extension without the repurchase having been made,
Potenciano filed with the Register of Deeds of Laguna an affidavit for the consolidation of
title, on the strength of which TCT No. 18056 was issued in the name of Potenciano and
his wife. However, on 28 February 1939, with Edilberto Ocampo and Rufina Reyes
already dead, Potenciano gave Paz Yatco an option to repurchase the property for P2,500
within 5 years, and a lease thereon for the same period at an annual rate of P300,
equivalent to 12% of the purchase price. On or about 7 February 1944, Paz Yatco sought
to exercise the option by tendering to Potenciano the sum of P4,000, an amount sufficient
to cover both principal and interest, and upon the tender being rejected, deposited the
money in court and brought an action in her own name and as judicial administratrix of
the estate of her deceased husband to compel Potenciano to accept it and to have the title
to the property reinstated in her name and that of her husband.
Issue:
1. Whether the conveyance made by Edilberto Ocampo is that of pacto de retro sale
or an equitable mortgage.
2. Whether Potenciano had authority to enter into an option agreement
involving the mortgaged property as a de facto administrator upon
dissolution of marriage by virtue of the spouse’s death.
3. Whether a valid tender of payment was made which relieved the debtor Paz Yatco
from liability.
Ruling:
1. Yes, the conveyance made by Edilberto Ocampo in favor of Conrado Potenciano
and his wife was in reality a loan with security or an equitable mortgage, with
simulated rental for interest. Such being the case, the lenders had no right, through
the unilateral declaration of one or both of them, to consolidate title in themselves
over the property given as security. The consolidation of title effected by
Potenciano in this case was, therefore, null and void.
2. No, Potenciano had no authority to enter into the option agreement involving the
property mortgaged after the death of his wife. The Court of Appeals erred in

supposing that the surviving spouse had such authority as de facto administrator
of the conjugal estate. As pointed out by appellants, the decisions relied on by that
court in support of its view are now obsolete. Those decisions laid down the rule
that, upon the dissolution of the marriage by the death of the wife, the husband
must liquidate the partnership affairs. But the procedure has been changed by Act
No. 3176, now section 2, Rule 75, of the Rules of Court, which provides that
when the marriage is dissolved by the death of either husband or wife,
the partnership affairs must be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of the deceased spouse.
3. Yes, there was a valid tender of payment. There is ground to believe that, as alleged
by the appellees, the option agreement in question was nothing more than a mere
extension of time for the payment of the mortgage debt, since in the mind of the
parties the real transaction had between them was that of loan with security, or
equitable mortgage, though, as is usual in these cases, it was given the form of a
sale with right to repurchase. It follows from the foregoing that at the time Paz
Yatco made the tender of payment and consigned the necessary amount in court,
the said contract of loan with security was still in effect, and as the tender was made
in legal currency, the tender and consignation must be held to produce their legal
effect, which is that of relieving the debtor from liability.
8. Agueda Benedicto De La Rama, Plaintiff-Appellee vs Esteban De La

Rama, Defendant-Appellant, G.R. No. 7476 9 October 1913
Doctrine: HUSBAND AND WIFE; DIVORCE; EVIDENCE OF VALUE OF CONJUGAL

PROPERTY. — The admission of evidence, without objection, of an inventory purporting
to set forth the amount and value of certain property, does not bind the trial court to
accept as true the contents of such inventory in an case wherein the amount and value of
the property in question is at issue, and where other evidence as to its amount and value
has been submitted. In such a case the document for what it is worth evidence and is to
be held as conclusive of the truth of its contents if there is other evidence in the record
disclosing its inaccuracy or failure truly to set forth the value and quantity of the property.
Facts: The plaintiff Agueda B. De La Rama charged her husband with adultery and
prayed for a divorce, the division of the conjugal property, and alimony pendente lite
before the trial court of Iloilo. The defendant denied the adultery charged against him,
charged his wife with adultery, and alleged that his only income was a monthly salary of
P450 received as a manager of the firm “Hijos de I. de la Rama.” Judgment was rendered
against the defendant by the trial court granting a divorce, dissolving the conjugal
partnership, and allowing plaintiff the sum of P81,042.76 as her share of the conjugal
property, and P3,200 as alimony.
From the judgment, the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed the
trial court’s judgment, being of opinion that the evidence showed that both plaintiff and
defendant had committed adultery thus, neither of the parties was entitled to divorce. The
plaintiff appealed the Supreme Court’s decision to the Supreme Court of the United
States, which in turn reversed the former court’s decision and ordered that the case be
remanded to the Supreme Court of the Philippines for further proceedings not
inconsistent with the Supreme Court of United States’ decision.
After the case had been remanded to this court, plaintiff moved that the original judgment
of the Court of First Instance be affirmed.
Issue:
1. Whether the only action remaining for the Supreme Court was to affirm the
judgment of the Court of First Instance in its entirety since the whole case was
finally disposed of by the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States.
2. Whether the trial court erred in its findings of fact as to the value of the conjugal
property, and in the mode of procedure adopted in liquidating the partnership
assets.
Ruling:
1. The Supreme Court rule in the negative and held:
The only thing considered by the Supreme Court of the United States was
that part of the decision of the Court of First Instance which related to the
right of the plaintiff to a divorce. It did not pass upon the division of the
conjugal property. Its order was that the case be remanded to this court for
further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion. If the contention of
the plaintiff is true, it seems that the order of that court would have been
one reversing the judgment of this court and affirming that of the Court of
First Instance. By remanding the case to this court for further proceedings
not inconsistent with the opinion of the Supreme Court, it seems to have
been the intention of that court that this court should dispose of the
assignments of error not already disposed of.
2. No, the trial court did not commit an error as to the value of the conjugal property
and the mode of procedure adopted in liquidating the partnership assest. – After a
careful review of the entire record, we think that the findings of fact by the trial
judge are fully sustained by the evidence, and that the method adopted by him in
liquidating the assets of conjugal partnership was substantially in accord with the
method prescribed in the code and indicated in our opinion filed with our
judgment remanding the case for a new trial.
In so far as defendant-appellant’s assignments of error are based on the action of

the trial court in refusing to accept as true the contents of the document described
as Exhibit 1, it might be sufficient to say that we are of opinion that the reasons for
doing so set forth by the trial judge himself in his opinion are a sufficient reputation
of defendant-appellant’s contention in this regard. As pointed our by the trial
judge, their inventory appears to have been prepared by or for the defendant for
the purposes of this action; and in any event it was prepared after this action was

originally instituted, and under conditions which justified the trial judge in
believing that the defendant had every opportunity to intervene in its preparation
and to use his personal influence to have the document speak favorably to his
contention. Granting that it is true, as contended by the defendant, that
this document was admitted in evidence without objection, it by no
means follows that the trial judge was bound to accept its contents as
true where other evidence or record disclosed in inaccuracies and its
failure correctly to list the property in question. It was admitted for
what it was worth as evidence, but in the very nature of things, it should
not be held as a conclusive of the truth of its contents. We think that the
trial judge is fully sustained by the evidence of record in his findings that this
inventory failed to set forth the true status of the affairs of the company, and we
are or opinion, and so hold, that there was no error in his findings as to the true
value of the property in question.
After sufficiently disposing the defendant-appellant’s assignments of error, the Supreme
Court concluded that there is nothing in the record which would justify sustaining the
contentions of the defendant-appellant as to error in the findings of fact or in the
conclusion drawn therefrom in the opinion filed by the trial judge. Judgment was
affirmed.
9. Josefa Fulgencio, Plaintiff-Appelleet vs Benita Gatchalian, et al.,

Defendant-Appellants, G.R. No. 5772 23 January 1912
Doctrine: HUSBAND AND WIFE; DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BY

DEATH OF HUSBAND; RIGHTS OF EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR. — When
against the conjugal partnership there are outstanding debts which must be settled with
the proceeds of the property thereof, upon the death of the husband, the executor or
administrator of the husband’s estate has a right, in fulfilling his duty, to claim the
possession of all the property belonging to the estate, in order that, pursuant to law, he
may make the required inventory and proceed, with the authorization of the court, with
the payment of the debts, duly demanded of the commission of appraisal appointed in the
special proceedings; for it is a fixed principle of law that, before proceeding with the
division of the property among the heirs, the debts of their deceased predecessor in
interest must be settled, without prejudice to the rights of the surviving widow as such
and with respect to her own property which does not form a part of the conjugal
partnership property and is not liable for the payment of the obligations contracted by the
partnership.
WIFE’S PERSONAL PROPERTY. — When the wife’s own private property or that brought
by her to marriage, of the nature of paraphernalia, has been included among the property
of the conjugal partnership, a claim or demand for its segregation on the part of its
legitimate owner can only be properly made after the making of the inventory of the

property which forms the assets of the partnership dissolved by the death of the
husband. If it be not conclusively proven that certain property is paraphernal, or that it
belongs exclusively to a widow, the same must be deemed to be conjugal partnership
property and liable for the debts and obligations of the partnership, saving always the
right of the said widow to have her own personal property of every kind excluded.
Facts: Plaintiff Josefa Fulgencio, jointly with Benita Gatchalian, were appointed as
administratrix of the intestate estate of Dionisio Fulgencio. Benita Gatchalian expressly
renounced the appointment, making Josefa Fulgencio as the sole administratrix of the
intestate estate who subsequently filed a written complaint with the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan against Benita Gatchalian, widow of Dionisio Fulgencio, and the
other defendants for refusing to deliver the property left by the deceased, consisting
chiefly of conjugal partnership property, in order that she might preserve and administer
the same as belonging to the estate of which she was the administratrix.
The defendants denied the allegations of the complaint, and Benita Gatchalian alleged
that her deceased husband only brought, when they were married, certain drugstore
effects which were worth about one hundred pesos, while she brought to the conjugal
partnership 9,000 pesos in cash and goods to the value of 3,000 pesos, and acquired by
use of her funds the property described in the complaint, expecting a portion thereof
which was the subject matter of accounts current, yet unsettled, with various commercial
firms of Manila. She, therefore, prayed that they be absolved from the complaint, and that
the property described in the complaint be held to be the private exclusive property of the
widow, Benita Gatchalian, and not conjugal partnership property.
Issue:
1. Whether the administratrix has a right to be placed in possession of the conjugal
partnership property for the purpose of its inventory in the special proceedings.
2. Whether the paraphernal property of the widowed spouse may be exempted from
inventory of the estate of the deceased husband.
RULING:
1. Yes, the administratrix has a right to be placed in possession of the
conjugal partnership property for the purpose of its inventory in the
special proceedings.
Article 1407 of the Civil Code provides that all the property of the marriage shall
be considered as partnership property until it is proven that it belong, exclusively
to the husband or to the wife.
Among other obligations expressly specified in article 1408 of the same code, as
being those for which the conjugal partnership shall be liable, are the debts and
obligations contracted during the marriage. If it be not proven conclusively
that the property claimed by the administratrix is paraphernalia and
belongs exclusively to the defendant Benita Gatchalian, it must be

deemed to be conjugal partnership property, liable for the debts of the

conjugal partnership, and therefore, by virtue of the preinserted
agreement, the administratrix has a right to be placed in possession of
the same for the purpose of its inventory in the special proceedings,
without prejudice to the rights of the widow Benita Gatchalian in
relation to her own property or to that of the nature of paraphernalia,
for, once the inventory of the property of the intestate estate has been
made, the latter will have the same opportunity to claim the exclusion
of the property belonging to her exclusively and that of the nature of
paraphernalia.
2. No, once the paraphernal property of the wife was included among the
property of the conjugal partnership, demand for its exclusion may
only be made after the inventory of the estate of the deceased husband.
Evidence was introduced to prove that the widow, Benita Gatchalian, on
contracting marriage with the now deceased Dionisio Fulgencio, brought to the
conjugal partnership, property worth about twelve thousand pesos, being
paraphernalia of the wife’s exclusive ownership; but once included among the
property of the conjugal partnership, a demand for its exclusion on the part of its
legitimate owner could properly be made only after the formation of the inventory
of the property that constitutes the estate of her deceased husband.
10. In the Matter of the Declaration of the Civil Status of: Lourdes
G. Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-8492, February
29, 1956
Doctrine: A judicial pronouncement that one’s spouse is presumed to be dead cannot be
made in a special proceeding, even if final and executory, for it would still be a prima facie
presumption only. It is still disputable. It is for that reason that it cannot be the subject of
a judicial pronouncement or declaration, if it is the only question or matter involved in a
case, or upon which a competent court has to pass. It is, therefore, clear that a judicial
declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he had been unheard from in
seven years, being a presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot
reach the stage of finality or become final.
Facts: Lourdes G. Lukban contracted marriage with Francisco Chuidian on December
10, 1933 at the Paco Catholic Church, Manila. On December 27, of the same year,
Francisco left Lourdes after a violent quarrel and since then he has not been heard from
despite diligent search made by her. She also inquired about him from his parents and
friends but no one was able to indicate his whereabouts. She has no knowledge if he is
still alive, his last known address being Calle Merced, Paco, Manila. She believes that he
is already dead because he had been absent for more than twenty years, and because she
intends to marry again, she desires that her civil status be defined in order that she may
be relieved of any liability under the law.

The Solicitor General opposed the petition on the ground that the same is not authorized
by law. After Lukban presented her evidence, the court sustained the opposition and
dismissed the petition. Hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether Lukban needs to secure declaration of presumptive death before she can
remarry.
Ruling: NO. For the purposes of the civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the
former spouse judicially declared an absentee. The declaration of absence made in
accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code has for its sole purpose to enable the
taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the absentee.
For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former
spouse has been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage,
that the spouse present does not know his or her former spouse to be living, that each
former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so believes at the
time of the celebration of the marriage.

WEEK 3 |Rule 74- Summary of Settlement of Estates

1. Intestate estate of the deceased Luz Garcia: Pablo G. Utulo v. Leona
Pasion Viuda de Garcia, G.R. No. 45904, September 30, 1938
Doctrine: When all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate,
they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial
administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.
When a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of
age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial administration and the
appointment of an administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings.
Facts: Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate, and in the proceedings instituted in the CFI
of Tarlac for the administration of his property, Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia, the
surviving spouse and herein oppositor, was appointed judicial administratrix. The said
deceased left legitimate children, named Juan Garcia, Jr., Patrocinio Garcia and Luz
Garcia who, with the widow, are the presumptive forced heirs. Luz Garcia married the
applicant Pablo G. Utulo and during the pendency of the administration proceedings of
the said deceased, she died in the province without any legitimate descendants, her only
forced heirs being her mother and her husband. The latter commenced in the same court
the judicial administration of the property of his deceased wife, stating in his petition that
her only heirs were he himself and his mother-in-law, the oppositor, and that the only
property left by the deceased consisted in the share due her from the intestate of her
father, Juan Garcia Sanchez, and asking that he be named administrator of the property
of said deceased. The oppositor objected to the petition, opposing the judicial
administration of the property of her daughter and the appointment of the applicant as
administrator. She alleged that inasmuch as the said deceased left no indebtedness, there
was no occasion for the said judicial administration; but she stated that should the court
grant the administration of the property, she should be appointed the administratrix
thereof inasmuch as she had a better right than the applicant. After the required
publications, trial was had and the court finally issued the appealed order to which the
oppositor excepted and thereafter filed the record on appeal which was certified and
approved.
Issue: Whether there should be an appointment of an administrator of the property left
by the deceased Luz Garcia and if so, who has a better right to the said office.
Ruling: Section 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure enunciates the general rule that when
a person dies living property in the Philippine Islands, his property should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator, in the
order established in the section, in case the deceased left no will, or in case he had left one
should he fail to name an executor therein. This rule, however, is subject to the exceptions
established by Sections 596 and 597 of the same Code, as finally amended. According to
the first, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate,
they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial
administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator. According to the
second, if the property left does not exceed six thousand pesos, the heirs may apply to the
competent court, after the required publications, to proceed with the summary partition

and, after paying all the known obligations, to partition all the property constituting the
inheritance among themselves pursuant to law, without instituting the judicial
administration and the appointment of an administrator.
Construing the scope of Section 596, the SC repeatedly held that when a person dies
without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not
bound to submit the property to a judicial administration and the appointment of an
administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings.
The SC conceive of no powerful reason which counsels the abandonment of a doctrine so
uniformly applied. There is no weight in the argument adduced by Utulo to the effect that
his appointment as judicial administrator is necessary so that he may have legal capacity
to appear in the intestate of the deceased Juan Garcia Sanchez. As he would appear in the
said intestate by the right of the representation, it would suffice for him to allege in proof
of his interest that he is a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife who, in turn, would
be a forced heir and an interested and necessary party if she were living. In order to
intervene in said intestate and to take part in the distribution of the property it is not
necessary that the administration of the property of his deceased wife be instituted – an
administration which will take up time and occasion inconvenience and unnecessary
expenses.
2. Cresencia Hernandez v. Zacarias Andal, G.R. No. L-273, March 29,
1947
Doctrine: The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered
has for its purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the
heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive
notice, and this means notice to others. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of
partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when, as
in this case, there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. No rights of
creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an
agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by
law.
Facts: The plaintiff, Cresencia Hernandez, the intervenors, Maria and Aquilina
Hernandez, and Pedro and Basilia Hernandez who are not parties here, are brother and
sisters. They acquired in common by descent from their father a parcel of land.
Maria and Aquilina sold 1800 square meters of this parcel to Zacarias Andal, the
defendant, and Andal's wife in consideration of Php860. This portion purports to be the
combined shares of Maria and Aquilina in the larger parcel, allotted to them in a verbal
partition alleged to have been made among the five brother and sisters.
After the sale, Cresencia alleged in her complaint that she attempted to repurchase the
land sold to Andal for Php150 which was the amount Andal had paid for but the latter
refused to part with the property. Later on, Andal executed a deed of sale for Php970 in
favor of Maria and Aquilina, an amount which included Andal's expenses as well as the
normal sale price.

Andal alleged that Maria and Aquilina had sold him their respective portions of the
inherited land for Php860 and that he had no objection to disposing of those portions in
favor of the Cresencia for Php860 plus the expenses he had incurred in the execution of
the deed of sale amounting to Php50, but that he was unwilling to accept Php150, which
was all Cresencia offered him besides his expenses.
Maria and Aquilina alleged that there had been an oral partition among them and their
brother and sisters, and that there are witnesses ready to prove such partition. However,
Cresencia asserted that under the Rules of Court, parol evidence of partition is
inadmissible.
Issue: Whether oral evidence is admissible in proving a contract of partition among
heirs.
Ruling: Section 1 of Rule 74 contains no such express or clear declaration that the
required public instruments is to be constitutive of a contract of partition or an inherent
element of its effectiveness as between the parties. And the SC had no apparent reason,
in adopting this rule, to make the efficacy of a partition as between the parties dependent
on the execution of a public instrument and its registration.
In the first place, the Rules of Court of which the rule under consideration forms a part
were promulgated by the Judicial Department under authority to deal with matters of
procedure exclusively. For the SC to prescribe what is to be a binding agreement between
co-heirs in the settlement of their private affairs which in no way affect the rights of third
parties would be to transcends its rule-making power. This limitation upon the authority
of the SC to make rules, as an aid to interpretation, was used as a method of arriving at
the conclusion that Section 1 of Rule 74 was meant to be remedial and not a rule of
substantive law of far-reaching importance and serious juridical and practical
implications. It is to be presumed that the framers of the Rules of Court realized the
bounds of this SC’s functions and did not intend to trespass on purely substantive rights
of the parties to the partition. To the extent the execution and registration of a notarized
instrument are made essential elements to validity to protect innocent third parties, the
rule is legitimate and necessary; legitimate because decedent's estate are placed under the
jurisdiction of the courts to administer and distribute. The interests of third parties
eliminated, the rule loses its character as one of procedure and practice and invades the
realm of substantive law.
The requirement that a partition be put in a public document and registered has for its
purpose the protection of creditors and at the same time the protection of the heirs
themselves against tardy claims. The object of registration is to serve as constructive
notice, and this means notice to others. It must follow that the intrinsic validity of
partition not executed with the prescribed formalities does not come into play when, as
in this case, there are no creditors or the rights of creditors are not affected. No rights of
creditors being involved, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an
agreement for distribution in a manner and upon a plan different from those provided by
law.

3. In the matter of the intestate estate of Paz E. Siguion Torres: Alberto

S. Torres v. Conchita Torres and Angel S. Torres, G.R. No. L-19064,
January 31, 1964
Doctrine: Where the decedent left no debts and heirs or legatees are all of age, as in this
case, there is no necessity for the institution of special proceedings and the appointment
of an administrator for the settlement of the estate, because the same can be effected
either extrajudicially or through an ordinary action for partition. If there is an actual
necessity for court intervention, in view of the heirs’ failure to reach an agreement as to
how the estate would be divided physically, there is still the remedy of an ordinary action
for partition.
Facts: Alberto S. Torres, claiming to be one of the four legitimate children of Paz E.
Siguion Torres who died intestate, prayed for the issuance in his favor of letters of
administration in connection with the properties left by the decedent, with an aggregate
value of about Php300,000.00. It was also alleged therein that he was unaware of any
existing debt or obligation contracted by the deceased or by her estate, from any of the
heirs or from third persons.
Conchita Torres, one of the heirs, opposed the petition on the ground that the
appointment of an administrator is unnecessary in view of the fact that the heirs of the
deceased (including Alberto) had already entered into an extrajudicial partition and
settlement of the estate, pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. Alberto
admitted that such extrajudicial partition was signed by the heirs, but contended that
attempts at the actual designation of their respective shares had failed thus needing the
court's intervention. It was also claimed that some properties of considerable value were
not included in said extrajudicial partition. In a supplemental answer to the opposition,
subsequently filed, Alberto likewise alleged that the estate has an existing debt of
Php50,000.00 from third persons, a fact which he claimed was not incorporated in the
petition, through oversight. Alberto, however, offered to amend the petition before
presentation of evidence, with leave of court.
The court, finding that an extrajudicial settlement had already been entered into by the
heirs, dismissed the petition. Hence, the institution of the present appeal.
Issue: Whether a special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased is
necessary.
Ruling: NO. The SC agreed with the lower court that a special proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased is not necessary here.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, provides: Extra-judicial settlement by agreement
between heirs. – If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age or
the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing
letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of
a public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds, and should they disagree,
they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee,
he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affected affidavit filed in the
office of the Register of Deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no

creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two years after the death of the
decedent.
Thus, where the decedent left no debts and heirs or legatees are all of age, as in this case,
there is no necessity for the institution of special proceedings and the appointment of an
administrator for the settlement of the estate, because the same can be effected either
extrajudicially or through an ordinary action for partition. If there is an actual necessity
for court intervention, in view of the heirs’ failure to reach an agreement as to how the
estate would be divided physically, there is still the remedy of an ordinary action for
partition.
This is not to overlook the allegation that the estate has an outstanding obligation of
Php50,000.00. However, this remains a bare allegation which cannot be considered as
concise statement to constitute a cause of action. Nor does the unverified statement that
there are other properties not included in the deed of extrajudicial partition in the
possession of one of the heirs, justify the institution of an administration proceeding
because the same questions that may arise as to them, if proven to belong to the intestate,
can be properly and expeditiously litigated in an ordinary action of partition.
4. ARCILLAS V. MONTEJO 26 SCRA 197 (1968)

Doctrine: REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; SETTLEMENT OF ESTATES;
SEC. 1 OF RULE 74 OF THE RULES OF COURT NOT MANDATORY; HEIRS MAY
RESORT TO INSTITUTION OF ADMINISTRATION PROCEEDINGS.- Section 1 of Rule
74 of the Rules of Court does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration
proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligation, if they do not desire to resort
for good reasons to an ordinary action of partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to
divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action
of partition, it does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a different
course of action. Said Section is not mandatory or compulsory as may be gleaned from
the use made therein of the word may. If the intention were otherwise the framer of the
rule would have employed the word shall as was done in other provisions that are
mandatory in character. Note that the word may is used not only once but in the whole
Section which indicates an intention to leave the matter entirely to the discretion of the
heirs (Rodriguez, Et. Al. v. Tan, Et Al., 92 Phil. 273). Having decided to institute
administration proceedings (as in the case at bar) instead of resorting to the less
expensive modes of settlement of the estate, i.e. extrajudicial settlement or ordinary
action for partition, the heirs may not be rebuffed in the exercise of their discretion
granted under Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court merely on the ground that the
expenses usually common in administration proceedings may deplete the funds of the
estate. The resultant delay and necessary expenses incurred thereafter are consequences
which must be deemed to have been voluntarily assumed by the heirs themselves so that
they may not in the
Facts: Geronimo Arcillas filed a petition for the cancellation of title in the name of his
late father. He asked in the same petition that the title to the property reflect the shares
of each sibling laid down in the petition. He alleged that portions of the land were sold to
Vicente Arcillas, also an heir. Petitioner on the other hand filed a petition for the issuance
of letters of administration for the estate, including as one of the properties the land in
question. Respondents opposed this on the ground that it was unnecessary to undertake
administrative proceedings as there was only one property involved and that there was
no debts payable.
Issue: WON respondent Judge acted properly in dismissing the administration
proceedings under the authority of Section 1, Rule 74 of the New Rules of Court upon
averments that the estate left no debts and all the heirs entitled to share in its distribution
are all of age.
Ruling: Having decided to institute administration proceedings instead of resorting to
the less expensive modes of settlement of the estate, i.e. extrajudicial settlement or
ordinary action for partition, the heirs may not then be rebuffed in the exercise of their
discretion granted under section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court merely on the ground
that the expenses usually common in administration proceedings may deplete the funds
of the estate. The resultant delay and necessary expenses incurred thereafter are
consequences which must be deemed to have been voluntarily assumed by the heirs
themselves so that they may not in the future be heard to complain of these matters.
Besides, the truth or veracity of petitioner's claim as to the alleged existence of other
properties of the deceased aside from the lot in question can be more adequately
ascertained in administration proceedings rather than in any other action.
Understandably the allowance of the hearing of the "cadastral" motion, supposedly
brought under the authority of section 112 of Act 496, cannot be sustained. While this
section authorizes, among others, a person in interest to ask the court for any erasure,
alteration, or amendment of a certificate of title "upon the ground that registered interests
of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate have terminated
and ceased," and apparently the November 12 petition comes within its scope, such relief
can only be granted if there is unanimity among the parties, or there is no adverse claim
or serious objection on the part of any party in interest; otherwise the case becomes
controversial and should be threshed out in an ordinary case or in the case where the
incident properly belongs (see Puguid v. Reyes, L‐21311, August 10, 1967 and the cases
cited therein). In the instant case the obvious lack of unanimity among the parties in
interest, manifestly demonstrated by petitioners' express objection to the cancellation of
TCT No. RT‐ 244, sufficiently removes the November 12 petition from the scope of section
112 of Act 496. Besides, the proceedings provided in the Land Registration Act are
summary in nature and hence inadequate for the litigation of issues which properly
pertain to the case where the incident belongs.

5. ERMAC VS. MEDELO (64 SCRA 359)

Doctrine: It is not proper to delay the summary settlement of a deceased person just
because an heir or a person claims that certain properties does not belong to the estate
but to him. Such claim must be ventilated in an independent action.
Facts: Potenciano Ermac and Anastacia Mariquit died leaving a parcel of land. Their
heirs filed for the summary settlement of the estate. They presented a plan for partition.
Pedro Ermac sought to exclude Lot 1327 from the estate as it belongs to him and his
wife. The court denied it saying that they should file a separate suit. They filed a
separate suit. The probate court approved the partition despite the objection of Pedro
saying that the court should await the outcome of their separate suit.
Issue: WON the trial court should have awaited the outcome of the trial suit?
Ruling: No. The policy of the law is to terminate the proceedings for settlement of estate
of a deceased person with the least loss of time. This is especially true with small estates
for which the rules provide precisely a summary procedure dispensing with the
appointment of the administrator together with the other involved and cumbersome steps
ordinarily required in the determination of the assets of the deceased and the persons
entitled to inherit therefrom and the payment of his obligations.
While there are settled exceptions to this rule as applied to regular administration
proceedings, it is not proper to delay the summary settlement of a deceased person just
because an heir or a person claims that certain properties does not belong to the estate
but to him. Such claim must be ventilated in an independent action, and the probate court
should proceed to the distribution of the estate, if there are no other legal obstacles to it,
for after all, such distribution must always be subject to the results of the suit.
6. CARREON V. AGCAOILI 1 SCRA 521 (1961)

Doctrine: Thus, in a case involving registered land it was held that the lien created by
Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court is effective only for a period of two years.
Accordingly, where the land object of extrajudicial settlement of estate was sold to an
innocent purchaser for value by the alleged heir to whom a certificate of title was issued
containing a memorandum regarding the liability of the distributees and estate, and more
than two years had elapsed since the date of the issuance of said certificate of title, the
right of the transferee to have such lien as carried over on his certificate of title cancelled
became vested on him and that the same had become functus officio.
Facts: When Bonifacio Carreon died, his widow adjudicated to herself the parcel of land
which they acquired during his lifetime. She didn't disclose that she had children with
Bonifacio. She was granted, subject to the annotation in the title of Section 4, Rule 74.
Thereafter, she obtained a loan from the bank and as security, mortgaged ½ of the land.
She was not able to pay the loan on time and looked for a buyer for the land. There came
Agcaoili who bought the same. The loan was paid., the mortgage subsequently released.

Consequently, the children of Celerina sought the annulment of the sale to Agcaoili on the
ground of fraud employed by their mother in adjudicating the land to herself
notwithstanding that she had children who were also heirs to the deceased Bonficacio.
Issue: WON the appellees were buyers in bad faith.
Ruling: On the transfer certificate of title issued to Agcaoili there was annotated a
statement that it was subject to Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. This was an
annotation carried over from Celerina's transfer certificate. Section 4, Rule 74, provides
the following:
SEC. 4. Liability of distributees and estate. If it shall appear at any time within two years
after the settlement and distribution of an estate in accordance with the provisions of
either of the first two sections of this rule, that an heir or other person has been unduly
deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, such heir or such other person may
compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided for
the purpose of satisfying such lawful participation. And if within the same time of two
years, it shall appear that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not
been paid, or that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful
participation payable in money, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order
for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of such debts or lawful participation and
order how much and in what manner each distributee shall contribute in the payment
thereof, and may issue execution, if circumstances require, against the bond provided in
the preceding section or against the real estate belonging to the deceased, or both. Such
bond and such real estate shall remain charged with a liability to creditors, heirs, or other
persons for the full period of two years after such distribution, notwithstanding any
transfers of the real estate that may have been made.
The above lien is effective only for a period of two years. From September 28, 1946, when
a transfer certificate of title was issued to Celerina, to September 8, 1949 when the deed
of sale in favor of Agcaoili was issued and registered, more than two years had elapsed We
sustain the lower court's opinion that thenceforth the right to have such lien cancelled
became vested on appellee Agcaoili and that the same had become functus oficio. And
there being no fraud in the transaction on the part of appellee, nor proof that he knew of
any legal infirmity in the title of his vendor, we find no reason to apply the proposition
that he is deemed to be holding the land in trust for the children of Celerina Dauag.
7. McMicking v. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil 211 (1912)

Doctrine: Administrator absconded with the properties so new administrator filed a
claim against the estate of surety of the former administrator. Administrator of the surety
refused to pay so they went after the surety of the administrator of the surety. Sy Con
Bieng was such administrator. Sy Con Bieng was not liable because his principal was not.
When the persons interested in the estate of Mariano Ocampo agreed voluntarily upon a
partition and division, the matter passed out of the hands of Velasco as administrator.

As we have already indicated, the basis of the liability of a surety on an administrators'

bond is the fault or failure of the principal. The liability of the principal precedes that of
the surety.
Facts: Margarita Jose died intestate and left properties here and abroad. Palanca
qualified as administrator of the estate and took possession of all the properties of the
decedent. Ocampo and another served as sureties of Palanca. When Ocampo died,
Palanca was ordered to file an additional bond in replacement of the surety given by
Ocampo. Ocampo’s estate was in turn administered by Velasco, with several persons
serving as his sureties. The estate was extrajudicially partitioned by the heirs and they
undertook to pay any debts of the estate. Later on, Palarca was removed from office for
his refusal to render accounting of the properties he took in administration. McMicking
took his stead and consequently filed a claim against the estate of Ocampo, arising
allegedly from the surety it undertook for Palarca.
Ruling: In the case at the bar we are of the opinion that, under the broad and liberal
policy which we must adopt in the interpretation and application of the provisions
referred to, the decision of the property of Mariano Ocampo, deceased, in the form, in the
manner and for the purposes expressed, falls within the provisions of said sections and
may be termed, therefore, and we hold it to be, a partition of the property of a decedent
without legal proceedings within the meaning of those sections. The fact of the prior
appointment of an administrator and the filing of an inventory before such partition is of
no consequence so far as the right of the owners to partition is concerned. The only
requisite for such petition prescribed by the law is that "there are no debts . . . or all the
debts have been paid by the heirs." When the condition is fulfilled the partition can take
place, no matter what stage the administration may have reached. By this it is, of course,
not meant that the partition after the appointment of an administrator will interfere with
the rights acquired by third person dealing with said administrator within the limits of
his authority and prior to the partition; nor that the administrator can be deprived of the
property of which he is legally in possession without proper proceedings and the consent
of the court.
As we have already indicated, the basis of the liability of a surety on an administrators'
bond is the fault or failure of the principal. The liability of the principal precedes that of
the surety. If Velasco incurred no liability, then his surety incurred none. The question
that naturally suggests itself is, then, In what was Velasco at fault or in what did he fail?
When the persons interested in the estate of Mariano Ocampo agreed voluntarily upon a
partition and division of the property of said estate and the actual partition followed, the
matter passed out of the hands of Velasco as administrator. The parties to the partition
stood invoking their rights under section 596 and 597. Velasco was helpless. He was
powerless to prevent the parties from taking the property to which they were entitled
under the agreement, it being conceded that they were actually entitled thereto in law.
Those sections were applicable to the situation and there was nothing that Velasco could
do to prevent the estate from being divided according to their provisions. In giving his

consent to the partition and in assisting the parties to obtain the approval of the court
thereto he did no wrong.
Moreover, the sureties of an administrator so appointed can not be held liable for property
which by force of law has been taken from the principal and its ownership and control
turned over to others. Their obligation is that their principal shall obey the law in the
handling and distribution of the estate. Their obligation is discharged when the estate is
legally turned over to those entitled thereto. The law requires the principal to turn it over
to those who bring themselves within the provisions of section 596. Having turned over
the whole estate under the compelling power of the law, his obligation ceased. The
responsibility of the sureties ceased at the same time. Without their consent another
obligation could not be imposed upon them in relation to the same principal, and the
same property, or apart thereof, especially after the lapse of two years. Their undertaking
was that their principal should discharge one obligation, not two
We have not overlooked the contention that at the time this partition took place there was
a contingent claim against the estate partitioned, namely, the claim which would arise on
the contingency that the administrator for whom Mariano Ocampo was surety might
default or otherwise fail to perform his duties thus rendering Mariano Ocampo liable on
his bond; and that contingent claim, being one expressly recognized by sections 746 to
749 of the Code of Civil Procedure as a claim entirely proper to present, no partition of
this estate under section 596 and 597 was legally possible until such claim was provided
for by the petitioning parties. This contention goes upon the assumption that a partition
under the sections of the Code of Civil Procedure so often referred to is void unless every
debt is paid or provided for by the petitioning parties, and may therefore be entirely
disregarded by the creditor holding a claim either unpaid or provided for. We do not
believe that this assumption is warranted. In the first place, we must remember that the
partition proceedings in question are proceedings out of court. Consequently, there is no
prescribed method of ascertaining and settling claims. The appointment of
commissioners, the publication of notice to creditors, and all the other proceedings
necessary in cases of administration in court are not required in partition out of court.
The law is silent as to how the claims are to be ascertained, presented and determined.
We must assume, therefore, that the method of ascertaining them and determining their
validity was left to the good sense and sound judgment of the persons concerned.
In the second place, it must be on served that express provisions is made by sections 596
and 597 for the payment of a claim discovered by them or presented after the partition.
That is one of the main provisions. It is a necessary deduction, therefore, that it was not
the intention of the law to pronounce the partition void of no effect simply because not all
of the debts were paid before the partition was made. The fact of non payment cannot,
then, because by the creditor as a reason for attacking the partition directly; that is, by
asserting that, inasmuch as a payment of all the debts is a condition precedent to the right
of partition, such partition cannot legally and validly take place while a debt is
outstanding. While a partition manifestly fraudulent in inception and result might
possibly be attacked directly by an action to set aside, a question which we do not discuss

or decide, the manner of attacking the partition prescribed by the law is the one, generally
speaking, preferably to be followed; and that is to throw into administration so much of
the estate as is necessary to pay the outstanding claim. The method, though indirect,
accomplishes a better result than a direct attack.
8. PEREIRA V. COURT OF APPEALS 174 SCRA 154 (1939)

Doctrine:
General Rule: When a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially
administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator a.
Exception: When all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the
estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial
administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.
Where partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened
with an administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons. It has been
uniformly held that in such case the judicial administration and the appointment of an
administrator are superfluous and unnecessary proceedings. What constitutes "good
reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the estate of a deceased when the heirs are
all of legal age and there are no creditors will depend on the circumstances of each case.
a. questions as to what property belonged to the deceased (and therefore to the heirs) may
properly be ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where such property is in
the hands of one heir.
b. merely to avoid a multiplicity of suits since the heir seeking such appointment wants to
ask for the annulment of certain transfers of property, that same objective could be
achieved in an action for partition and the trial court is not justified in issuing letters of
administration.
c.to have legal capacity to appear in the intestate proceedings
Facts: Pereira was an employee of PAL until he died. he was survived by his widow and
sister. His sister then filed a petition for letters of administration of his estate.
Notwithstanding opposition from the widow, she was appointed as administratix. It was
the petitioner’s contention that judicial administration is unnecessary given there was no
estate left by the husband and that no debts are payable.
Issue: WON a judicial administration proceeding necessary when the decedent dies
intestate without leaving any debts?
Ruling: The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased left no
will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to name an executor therein. An exception

to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74. Under this exception, when all the heirs
are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to
partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the
appointment of an administrator.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the heirs
from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations,
if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary action for partition. While
Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, or to
resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision does not compel them to do
so if they have good reasons to take a different course of action. It should be noted that
recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned
only if the heirs have good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where
partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an
administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons.
Thus, it has been repeatedly held that when a person dies without leaving pending
obligations to be paid, his heirs, whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the
property to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the
appointment of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such
case the judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous
and unnecessary proceedings.
Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a judicial administration of the estate of
a deceased when the heirs are all of legal age and there are no creditors will depend on
the circumstances of each case.
9. JEREZ VS. NIETES (30 SCRA 905)

Doctrine: It is within the power of a judge to reopen the proceedings and allow
intervention.
Facts: Nicolas Jalandoni died on October 3, 1960. Before the end of that month, on
October 27, a special proceeding for the settlement of his estate was filed before the sala
of respondent Judge, petitioner Lucrecia Jerez, his widow, being appointed as
administratrix. A project of partition and final accounting was submitted on June 14,
1966, resulting in an order from respondent Judge dated June 15, 1966, approving the
same. On June 29, 1966, respondent Lucilo Jalandoni, alleging that he is an
acknowledged natural child of the late Nicolas Jalandoni, and respondent Victoria
Jalandoni de Gorriceta, alleging that she is an illegitimate daughter, sought to be allowed
to intervene on the ground that they were preterited in the project of partition which they
would have respondent Judge reject for being contrary to law. Then came on July 80,
1966 an order of respondent Judge allowing intervention and reopening the proceedings
to permit the movants, now private respondents, "to present whatever evidence they may
have to show their right to participate in the estate of the deceased." After a motion for

reconsideration, filed by petitioners, was denied, the matter was elevated to the Court of
Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed on
September 3, 1966. CA sustained CFI order.
Issue: WON the CA erred in sustaining the CFI order.
Ruling: The basis for such resolution, penned by Justice Martin with the concurrence of
Justice Rodriguez, Justice Esguerra concurring in the result with a separate opinion, was
explained in this wise: "that the determination of a prima facie interest in an estate to
justify reopening proceedings for the settlement thereof is primarily addressed to the
sound discretion and judgment of the probate court; that, while no supporting documents
are appended to the motion to reopen tending to show the personality to intervene, the
said motion is nevertheless verified upon oaths of the claimants of interest and the
probate court has authority to require the submission of at least a prima facie showing of
said interest; that the motion to reopen was filed on June 29, 1966 before the order closing
the proceedings of June 15, 1966 had achieved finality and during the reglementary period
within which the court still had jurisdiction over the case and retained full power to
amend and control its process and orders so as to make them comfortable to law and
justice; that, because the closure order aforesaid had not yet become final, the
requirements of Rule 38 respecting relief from judgment do not apply and, hence, the
failure of the motion to reopen to allege any of the grounds therein stated is not fatal; that
the better practice in case of the appearance of alleged preterited heirs is to secure relief
by reopening the proceedings by a proper motion within the reglementary period (Ramos,
et al., vs. Ortuzar, et al., G.R. No. L-3299, August 20, 1951), it being desirable that all
aspects of a controversy be ventilated in the same proceeding and thus avoid multiplicity
of suits.

WEEK 4 | Rule 75- Production of Will, Allowance of Will Necessary

| Rule 76- Allowance or Disallowance of Wills
1. FERNANDEZ VS. DIMAGIBA

(21 SCRA 428)
Doctrine: A probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning
capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of the will.
Facts: Ismaela Dimagiba filed a petition for probate of the will of Benedicta de los Reyes.
Such petition was opposed by Dionisio Fernandez, et al. The court ruled in favor of
probate. Fernandez et al appealed, but it was beyond the reglementary period. They
argued that they were entitled to await the other grounds for opposition before appealing.
Issue: WON the probate of the will became final for lack of appeal.
Ruling: Yes. A probate decree finally and definitively settles all questions concerning
capacity of the testator and the proper execution and witnessing of the will. As such, a
probate order is final and appealable. They do not have to await the resolution of its other
oppositions since the Rules of Court enumerates six different instances when appeal may
be taken in special proceedings.
2. MERCADO VS. SANTOS
(66 SCRA 215)
Doctrine: The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof
and cannot be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud,
in any separate or independent action or proceeding.
Facts: Mercado filed a petition for the probate of the will of his deceased wife. The court
admitted the will to probate. 16 months after the probate of the will, the intervenors filed
a complaint against Mercado for falsification or forgery of the will probated. Mercado
moved to dismiss claiming that the will alleged to have been forged had already been
probated and, further, that the order probating the will is conclusive as to the authenticity
and due execution thereof.
Issue: WON the probate of the will bars criminal prosecution for the alleged forgery of
the probated will.
Ruling: YES
The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and cannot
be impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate
or independent action or proceeding. The probate of a will by the probate court having
jurisdiction thereof is usually considered as conclusive as to its due execution and validity,
and is also conclusive that the testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time when
he executed the will, and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence,
and that the will is genuine and not a forgery.
The probate of a will is a proceeding in rem. The provision of notice by publication as a
prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive notice to the whole world, and when

probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the
State.
Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law makes so peremptory that it will
not allow them to be overturned by any contrary proof however strong. The will in
question having been probated by a competent court, the law will not admit any proof to
overthrow the legal presumption that it is genuine and not a forgery.
3. Sumilang vs Ramagosa
Doctrine: Probate is one thing; the validity of the testamentary provisions is another.
The first decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the
testator; the second relates to descent and distribution.
In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have
an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as
executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who would be
benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against the estate like a
creditor.
The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the
will has been duly authenticated. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called
upon to rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the provisions of the will.
Facts: Sumilang filed a petition for the probate of the decedent Ramagosa, wherein the
former was the sole heir to the estate. The probate was opposed by the respondents
alleging that the will was made under duress and not intended to be the decedent’s last will
and testament. When the petitioner finished adducing evidence on his behalf, the
oppositors didn’t adduce their own but instead, they moved for the dismissal of the probate
proceedings, alleging that the court didn’t have jurisdiction as the will was allegedly
revoked by law when the decedent sold the parcels of land, subject of the will, to petitioners.
The motion was denied on the ground that it goes into the intrinsic value of the will, which
the probate court doesn’t have jurisdiction to settle.
Issue: Whether the probate court should pass upon the intrinsic validity of the will.
Ruling: The petition below being for the probate of a will, the court's area of inquiry is
limited to the extrinsic validity thereof. The testator's testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the formal requisites or solemnities prescribed by law are the only
questions presented for the resolution of the court. Any inquiry into the intrinsic validity
or efficacy of the provisions of the will or the legality of any devise or legacy is premature.
Oppositors would want the court a quo to dismiss petition for probate on the ground that
the testator had impliedly revoked his will by selling, prior to his death, the lands disposed
of therein.
True or not, the alleged sale is no ground for the dismissal of the petition for probate.
Probate is one thing the validity of the testamentary provisions is another. The first

decides the execution of the document and the testamentary capacity of the testator; the
second relates to descent and distribution.
Sometime after this case was elevated to this Court appellee moved to dismiss the appeal
on the ground that the order appealed from is interlocutory. We deferred action on the
motion until after the brief of both parties had been filed. The motion, although now
practically academic in view of our resolution of the main issue involved, must be denied,
since the order of the lower court striking out appellants' opposition to the probate of the
will on the ground that they have no personality to intervene in the case, was final and
therefore appealable order insofar as they were concerned.
The order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against oppositors- appellants.
4. BALANAY V. MARTINEZ 64 SCRA 452
Doctrine: Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will
be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will evinces
an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. So
compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the wishes of the
testator should prevail that sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the
purpose of giving it effect.
Facts: Balanay Jr. filed a petition for the probate of the will of his late mother, which was
opposed by his father and siblings. The father claims to have been preterited and that there
was an illegal partition of the conjugal properties. Balanay Jr. then presented documents
allegedly executed by the father withdrawing any opposition to the probate proceedings as
well as the renunciation of whatever share in the estate of his late wife. The opposition
was then overruled by the court and proceedings continued. However, during the
proceedings, one who was allegedly Balanay’s new counsel filed a motion for the dismissal
of the probate proceedings on the ground that the will is void for illegally partitioning the
conjugal assets and constituted a compromise on future legitime. The motion included that
the testate proceedings should be dismissed and replaced with an intestate one. The court
sustained the motion and dismissed the proceedings. Balanay Jr. then averred that he
didn’t authorized Montinolla to file the same motion and that the court shouldn’t dismiss
the proceedings. The trial court held that it didn’t decide solely on the basis of the motion
filed but due to the reading of the provisions of the will itself.
Issue: Whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will,
before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.
Ruling: In view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and
because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed
to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in
passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been
established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to
be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of
the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
It was wrong however for the probate court to convert the proceedings into an intestate
one. The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does
not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the
testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had
not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of a will are valid
and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid
without defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general
testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries"
5. PASTOR V. COURT OF APPEALS 122 SCRA 885
Doctrine: As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate
Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate
Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not
conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
The ordered payment of legacy would be violative of the rule requiring prior liquidation
of the estate of the deceased, i.e., the determination of the assets of the estate and payment
of all debts and expenses, before apportionment and distribution of the residue among
the heirs and legatees.
Facts: Pastor Sr. died and was survived by his wife, who later also died, 2 legitimate
children—Pastor Jr., and Sofia, and one illegitimate child Quemada Pastor Jr. Quemada
Pastor Jr. sought the probate of the alleged holographic will of his father. The will contained
only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of QUEMADA consisting of 30% of
PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share in the operation by Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development
Corporation (ATLAS) of some mining claims in Cebu. He was subsequently appointed as
the special administrator of the estate and by purview of this authority, he instituted
actions against Pastor Jr. for the reconveyance of some properties of the estate, which
covers the legacy bequeathed to Quemada. This was opposed by Pastor Jr. and his wife
but was overruled. Probate proceedings commenced and Quemada kept on asking for the
payment of his legacies.
While the reconveyance suit was still pending, the PROBATE COURT issued the now
assailed Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the
royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to QUEMADA was not
inofficious.
The order found that as per the holographic will and a written acknowledgment of Pastor,
Jr. of the above 60% interest in the mining claims belonging to the Pastor Group, 42%
belonged to Pastor, Sr. and only 33% belonged to Pastor, Jr. The remaining 25% belonged
to E. Pelaez, also of the Pastor Group. The probate court thus directed ATLAS to remit
directly to Quemada the 42% royalties due decedent's estate, of which Quemada was

authorized to retain 75% for himself as legatee and to deposit 25% with a reputable banking
institution for payment of the estate taxes and other obligations of the estate. The 33%
share of PASTOR, JR. and/or his assignees was ordered garnished to answer for the
accumulated legacy of Quemada from the time of Pastor, Sr.'s death, which amounted to
over two million pesos.
The order being "immediately executory", Quemada succeeded in obtaining a Writ of

Execution and Garnishment. Pastor Jr. sought reconsideration.
Issue: Whether the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 resolved with finality the
questions of ownership and intrinsic validity the propriety of certiorari as a means to
assail the validity of the order of execution and the implementing writ.
Ruling: In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted
to the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. As a rule, the
question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve
with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or
should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass
upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject
to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title.
Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific

properties. On the contrary, it is manifest therein that ownership was not resolved. For it
confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the win, and the need for and
propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the
holographic win "with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly
authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law." It declared that
the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed " subject to the outcome of the suit
for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties in Civil Case
274‐T before Branch IX of the CFI of Cebu." Then again, the Probate Order (while indeed it
does not direct the implementation of the legacy) conditionally stated that the intestate
administration aspect must proceed "unless . . . it is proven . . . that the legacy to be given
and delivered to the petitioner does not exceed the free portion of the estate of the
testator," which clearly implies that the issue of impairment of legitime (an aspect of
intrinsic validity) was in fact not resolved. Finally, the Probate Order did not rule on the
propriety of allowing Quemada to remain as special administrator of estate properties not
covered by the holographic will, "considering that this (Probate) Order should have been
properly issued solely as a resolution on the issue of whether or not to allow and approve
the aforestated will. "
It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the
Probate Order adjudged with finality the question of ownership of the mining

properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion
of the said Probate Order directed the special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute.
With respect to the intrinsic validity of the will, there was no appropriate
determination, much less payment, of the debts of the decedent and his estate. Nor had
the estate tax been determined and paid, or at least provided for, as of December 5,
1972. The net assets of the estate not having been determined, therefore, the legitime
of the forced heirs in concrete figures could not be ascertained. All the foregoing
deficiencies considered, it was not possible to determine whether the legacy of
Quemada ‐ a fixed share in a specific property rather than an aliquot part of the entire
net estate of the deceased ‐ would produce an impairment of the legitime of the
compulsory heirs.
Finally, there actually was no determination of the intrinsic validity of the will in other
respects. It was obviously for this reason that as late as March 5, 1980 ‐ more than 7 years
after the Probate Order was issued the Probate Court scheduled on March 25, 1980 a
hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will.
Under the circumstances of the case at bar, the challenge must be rejected. Grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction is much too evident in the actuations of the
probate court to be overlooked or condoned.
(a) Without a final, authoritative adjudication of the issue as to what properties
compose the estate of PASTOR, SR. in the face of conflicting claims made by heirs
and a non-heir involving properties not in the name of the decedent, and in the
absence of a resolution on the intrinsic validity of the will here in question, there was
no basis for the Probate Court to hold in its Probate Order of 1972, which it did not,
that private respondent is entitled to the payment of the questioned legacy.
Therefore, the Order of Execution of August 20, 1980 and the subsequent
implementing orders for the payment of QUEMADA's legacy, in alleged
implementation of the dispositive part of the Probate Order of December 5, 1972,
must fall for lack of basis.
(b) See doctrine
(c) Neither has the estate tax been paid on the estate of PASTOR, SR. Payment therefore
of the legacy to QUEMADA would collide with the provision of the National Internal
Revenue Code requiring payment of estate tax before delivery to any beneficiary of
his distributive share of the estate (Section 107 [c])
(d) The assailed order of execution was unauthorized, having been issued purportedly
under Rule 88, Section 6 of the Rules of Court.
The above provision clearly authorizes execution to enforce payment of debts of estate. A
legacy is not a debt of the estate; indeed, legatees are among those against whom
execution is authorized to be issued.
... there is merit in the petitioners' contention that the probate court generally cannot
issue a writ of execution. It is not supposed to issue a writ of execution because its orders
usually refer to the adjudication of claims against the estate which the executor or
administrator may satisfy without the necessity of resorting to a writ of execution. The
probate court, as such, does not render any judgment enforceable by execution.
The circumstances that the Rules of Court expressly specifies that the
probate court may issue execution (a) to satisfy (debts of the estate out of)
the contributive shares of devisees, legatees and heirs in possession of the
decedent's assets (Sec. 6. Rule 88), (b) to enforce payment of the expenses of
partition (Sec. 3, Rule 90), and (c) to satisfy the costs when a person is cited
for examination in probate proceedings (Sec. 13, Rule 142) may mean, under
the rule of inclusion unius est exclusion alterius, that those are the only
instances when it can issue a writ of execution. (Vda. de Valera vs. Ofilada, 59
SCRA 96, 108.)
(d) It is within a court's competence to order the execution of a final judgment; but to
order the execution of a final order (which is not even meant to be executed) by reading
into it terms that are not there and in utter disregard of existing rules and law, is manifest
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. Consequently, the rule that
certiorari may not be invoked to defeat the right of a prevailing party to the execution of
a valid and final judgment, is inapplicable. For when an order of execution is issued with
grave abuse of discretion or is at variance with the judgment sought to be enforced (PVTA
vs. Honorable Gonzales, 92 SCRA 172), certiorari will lie to abate the order of execution.
(e) Aside from the propriety of resorting to certiorari to assail an order of execution
which varies the terms of the judgment sought to be executed or does not find support in
the dispositive part of the latter, there are circumstances in the instant case which justify
the remedy applied for.
Petitioner MA. ELENA ACHAVAL DE PASTOR, wife of PASTOR, JR., is the holder in her
own right of three mining claims which are one of the objects of conflicting claims of
ownership. She is not an heir of PASTOR, SR. and was not a party to the probate
proceedings. Therefore, she could not appeal from the Order of execution issued by the
Probate Court. On the other hand, after the issuance of the execution order, the urgency
of the relief she and her co-petitioner husband seek in the petition for certiorari states
against requiring her to go through the cumbersome procedure of asking for leave to
intervene in the probate proceedings to enable her, if leave is granted, to appeal from the
challenged order of execution which has ordered the immediate transfer and/or
garnishment of the royalties derived from mineral properties of which she is the duly
registered owner and/or grantee together with her husband. She could not have
intervened before the issuance of the assailed orders because she had no valid ground to
intervene. The matter of ownership over the properties subject of the execution was then
still being litigated in another court in a reconveyance suit filed by the special
administrator of the estate of PASTOR, SR.
Likewise, at the time petitioner PASTOR, JR. Med the petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, appeal was not available to him since his motion for reconsideration
of the execution order was still pending resolution by the Probate Court. But in the face

of actual garnishment of their major source of income, petitioners could no longer wait
for the resolution of their motion for reconsideration. They needed prompt relief from the
injurious effects of the execution order. Under the circumstances, recourse to certiorari
was the feasible remedy.
6. US V. CHIU GUIMOO 36 PHIL 917
Doctrines: Penalty for withholding a will.
Order to the effect that the accused should be committed to the provincial jail until he
should produce the will or until further order, can only be applied when a court is acting in
the exercise of its jurisdiction over the administration of the estates of deceased persons;
and where administration proceedings are not already pending, the court, before taking
action under this section, should require that there be before it some petition, information,
or affidavit of such character as to make action by the court under this section appropriate.
Facts: Joaquin Cruz was a wealthy Chinese merchant who resided permanently in a
certain municipality. When he visited China, he married Uy Chuan and had a child with
her. When he returned, he then met Maria who he also married. He then decided to return
to China but he wasn’t able to come back as he died. Before his death, he executed a will
which named his brother, defendant in this case, and another person as heir. The brother
filed a petition for the probate but didn’t produce the will. He then negotiated with Maria
for the renunciation of her share in the estate in exchange for money. Thereafter, criminal
action was filed against defendant for refusing to produce the will of his deceased brother
as well as to distribute the estate.
Issue: Authority of the court to give the notice and make the order in question under
section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides the testator neglects without
reasonable cause to deliver the same to the court having jurisdiction, after notice by the
course so to do, he may be committed to the prison of the province by a warrant issued
by the court and there kept in close confinement until he delivers the will.
Ruling: The judge of first instance believed that he had authority to give the notice and
make the order in question under section 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides
the testator neglects without reasonable cause to deliver the same to the court having
jurisdiction, after notice by the course so to do, he may be committed to the prison of the
province by a warrant issued by the court and there kept in close confinement until he
delivers the will.
It is our opinion that this provision can only be applied when a court is acting in the exercise
of its jurisdiction over the administration of the estates of deceased persons; and where
administration proceedings are not already pending, the court, before taking action under
this section, should require that there be before it some petition, information, or affidavit of
such character as to make action by the court under this section appropriate.
The proceedings in this case, under section 628 of the Code of the Civil Procedure, is an
ordinary criminal prosecution. The act penalized in that section (628) is a special
statutory offense and is properly prosecuted upon complaint or information as other

criminal offenses created by law. The fact that this penal provision is contained in the
Code of Civil Procedure does not make the proceeding to enforce the penalty a civil
proceeding in any sense. The remedy provided in section 629 of the Code of Procedure is
evidently a totally different remedy, having no relation with that provided in section 628;
and it is in our opinion not permissible in a prosecution under the last mentioned section
to superimpose upon the penalty of fine therein prescribed the additional penalty of
imprisonment prescribed in section 629.
I may further be observed that one grace difficulty in applying the remedy provided in
section 629 in a prosecution under section 628 is that to enforce the production of the will
b the accused at such trial would virtually compel him to convict himself, since the mere
production of the will by him would be conclusive that he had possession of it as charged
in the criminal complaint; and it seems probable that this would constitute an
infringement of that provision of law which says that in a criminal action the defendant
shall be exempt from testifying against himself. (See Gen. Orders No. 58, sec. 15.)
From what has been said it follows that the order of commitment made by the lower
court remanding the accused to jail should be vacated and if subsidiary imprisonment
should be imposed for insolvency the defendant shall, under the provisions of Act No.
2557, be credited with the time during which he was confined in pursuance of the order
of the lower court, With this modification the judgment of the court below should be
affirmed with costs against the appellant.
7. ANGELA RODRIGUEZ, MARIA RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., petitioners, vs.

HON. JUAN DE BORJA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan, Branch III, ANATOLIA PANGILINAN and ADELAIDA
JACALAN, respondents. GR No.L-21993, June 21, 1966
Doctrine: Settlement of decedent’s estates; Probate proceedings; Court
acquires jurisdiction when will is deposited in court.—The jurisdiction of a probate court
becomes vested upon the delivery thereto of the will even if no petition for its allowance
was filed until later, because, upon the will being deposited, the court could, motu proprio
have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the
corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the
Revised Rules of Court (Sections 3 Rule 77, of the old Rules). The use of the disjunctive in
the words “when a will is delivered to or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed”
plainly indicates that the court may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent’s
testament, even if no petition for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for
probate is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the
time when the will was delivered.
Same; Jurisdiction.—The power to settle decedents’ estates is conferred by law upon all
Courts of First Instance, and the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but not the
jurisdiction of the court (In re Kaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239; Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484;
Bernabe vs. Vergara, 73 Phil. 676).

Same; Court first taking cognizance of probate proceeding excludes other courts.—Where
the estate proceedings were initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead of any
other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, even
if it were a case of wrong venue (Sec. 1, Rule 73, Revised Rules of Court),
Facts: Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the
Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez. Private
respondents then filed a petition in this Court for the probation of the will delivered by
the and It was stipulated by the parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Parañaque, Rizal;
that he was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from the year 1930
up to the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in Parañaque, and that he left real
properties in Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan. Meanwhile the petitioners filed a
petition before the court to examine the purported will but which was later withdrawn,
and a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez was subsequently
filed in a another court in Rizal. The petitioners now sought the dismissal of the special
proceeding on the settlement of the decedent's estate based on the purported will,
questioning therefore the jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Bulacan has jurisdiction to proceed
with the testate proceedings.
Ruling: Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon
the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no
petition for its allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the
court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will,
and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule
76, of the Revised Rules of Court.
The estate proceedings having been initiated in the Bulacan Court of First Instance ahead
of any other, that court is entitled to assume jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other
courts, even if it were a case of wrong venue by express provisions of Rule 73 (old Rule
75) of the Rules of Court, since the same enjoins that:
The Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. (Sec. 1)
This disposition presupposes that two or more courts have been asked to take cognizance
of the settlement of the estate. Of them only one could be of proper venue, yet the rule
grants precedence to that Court whose jurisdiction is first invoked, without taking venue
into account.
The other reason is that, in our system of civil law, intestate succession is only subsidiary
or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the absence of a valid
operative will. Says Article 960 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
Therefore, as ruled in Castro, et al. vs. Martinez, 10 Phil. 307, "only after final decision as
to the nullity of testate succession could an intestate succession be instituted in the form
of pre-established action". The institution of intestacy proceedings in Rizal may not thus
proceed while the probate of the purported will of Father Rodriguez is pending.

8. VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant, vs.ANA DEL VAL, ETC.,

oppositor-appellant. G.R. No. L-18753, March 26, 1965
Doctrine: CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; ALIEN WIFE OF CITIZEN NOT
AUTOMATICALLY CITIZEN BUT MUST PROVE COMPLIANCE WITH
REQUIREMENTS. — The alien wife of a Filipino citizen does not automatically become a
Philippine citizen upon her husband’s naturalization. She must first prove that she has all
the qualifications required by Section 2 and none of the disqualifications enumerated in
Section 4 of the Naturalization Law before she may be deemed a Philippine citizen.
REASON FOR RULE; POLICY OF SELECTIVE ADMISSION TO PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP. — The rule laid down by this Court in this and in other cases heretofore
decided is believed to be in line with the national policy of selective admission to
Philippine citizenship which after all is a privilege granted only to those who are found
worthy thereof, and not indiscriminately to anybody at all on the basis alone of marriage
to a man who is a citizen of the Philippines, irrespective of moral character, ideological
belief, and identification with Filipino ideals, customs and traditions.
Facts: Maria Mortera died on July 1955 leaving properties worth P600,000. She
executed a will written in Spanish, affixed her signature and acknowledged before Notary
Public by her and the witnesses. Among the legacies made in the will was the P20,000 for
Rene Teotico who was married to the testatrix’s niece, Josefina Mortera.
The usufruct of Maria’s interest in the Calvo Building were left to the said spouses and the
ownership thereof was left in equal parts to her grandchildren, the legitimate children of
said spouses. Josefina was likewise instituted, as sole and universal heir to all the
remainder of her properties not otherwise disposed by will. Vicente Teotico filed a petition
for the probate of the will but was opposed by Ana del Val Chan, claiming that she was an
adopted child of Francisca (deceased sister of Maria) and an acknowledged natural child
of Jose (deceased brother of Maria), that said will was not executed as required by law
and that Maria as physically and mentally incapable to execute the will at the time of its
execution and was executed under duress, threat, or influence of fear.
Vicente B. Teotico, filed a motion to dismiss the opposition alleging that the oppositor
had no legal personality to intervene. The probate court, after due hearing, allowed the
oppositor to intervene as an adopted child of Francisca Mortera, and on June 17, 1959,
the oppositor amended her opposition by alleging, the additional ground that the will is
inoperative as to the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter was the physician who
took care of the testatrix during her last illness. After the parties had presented their
evidence, the probate court rendered its decision on November 10, 1960, admitting the
will to probate but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico void with
the statement that the portion to be vacated by the annulment should pass to the
testatrix's heirs by way of intestate succession.
Petitioner Teotico, together with Josefina Mortera, filed a motion for reconsideration of
that part of the decision which declares the portion of the estate to be vacated by the
nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene Teotico as passing to the legal heirs, while the
oppositor filed also a motion for reconsideration of the portion of the judgment which
decrees the probate of the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico requested leave to intervene
and to file a motion for reconsideration with regard to that portion of the decision which
nullified the legacy made in his favor. The motions for reconsideration above adverted to
having been denied, both petitioner and oppositor appealed from the decision, the former
from that portion which nullifies the legacy in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the
vacated portion as subject of succession in favor of the legal heirs, and the latter from that
portion which admits the will to probate.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene in this proceeding.
2. Whether or not the will in question been duly admitted to probate.
3. Whether or not the probate court commit an error in passing on the intrinsic
validity of the provisions of the will and in determining who should inherit the portion to
be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico.
Ruling:
1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a
probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property
to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate (Ngo The Hua v. Chung
Kiat Hua, et al., L-17091, September 30, 1963); and an interested party has been defined
as one who would be benefited by the estate such as an heir or one who has a claim against
the estate like a creditor.
Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right to intervene because she has no interest
in the estate either as heir, executor, or administrator, nor does she have any claim to any
property affected by the will, because it nowhere appears therein any provision
designating her as heir, legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate.
It is true that oppositor claims to be an acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a
deceased brother of the deceased, and also an adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a
deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim cannot give her any comfort for, even if it
be true, the law does not give her any right to succeed to the estate of the deceased sister
of both Jose Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so because being an illegitimate
child she is prohibited by law from succeeding to the legitimate relatives of her natural
father. Thus, Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An illegitimate child has no right to
inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; “
2. The next question to be determined is whether the will Exhibit A was duly admitted
to probate. The evidence which has not been successfully refuted proves conclusively that
the will was duly executed because it was signed by the testatrix and her instrumental
witnesses and the notary public in the manner provided for by law.
The mere claim that Josefina Mortera and her husband Rene Teotico had the opportunity
to exert pressure on the testatrix simply because she lived in their house several years
prior to the execution of the will and that she was old and suffering from hypertension in
that she was virtually isolated from her friends for several years prior to her death is
insufficient to disprove what the instrumental witnesses had testified that the testatrix
freely and voluntarily and with full consciousness of the solemnity of the occasion
executed the will under consideration. The exercise of improper pressure and undue

influence must be supported by substantial evidence and must be of a kind that would
overpower and subjugate the mind of the testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make
her express the will of another rather than her own. The burden is on the person
challenging the will that such influence was exerted at the time of its execution, a matter
which here was not done, for the evidence presented not only is insufficient but was
disproved by the testimony of the instrumental witnesses.
3. The question of whether the probate court could determine the intrinsic validity of
the provisions of a will has been decided by this Court in a long line of decisions among
which the following may be cited:
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot be
entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to determine if the
will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of the law." (Palacios v.
Palacios, 58 0. G. 220)
... The authentication of a will decides no other questions than such as touch upon the
capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or solemnities which the
law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor even by implication
prejudge the validity or efficiency of the provisions; these may be impugned as being
vicious or null, notwithstanding its authentication. The questions relating to these points
remain entirely unaffected, and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.
...
From the fact that the legalization of a will does not validate the provisions therein
contained, it does not follow that such provision lack the efficiency, or fail to produce the
effects which the law recognizes when they are not impugned by anyone. In the matter of
wills it is a fundamental doctrine that the will of the testator is the law governing the
interested parties, and must be punctually complied with in so far as it is not contrary to
the law or to public morals. (Montañano v. Suesa, 14 Phil. 676, 679-680)
To establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the facts that a will was
executed with the formalities required by law and that the testator was in a condition to
make a will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under the new code for the probate of
a will. (Sec. 625.) The judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine
nothing more. In them the court has no power to pass upon the validity of any provisions
made in the will. It cannot decide, for example, that a certain legacy is void and another
one is valid. (Castañeda v. Alemany, 3 Phil. 426, 428)
9. FERNANDO vs. CRISOSTOMO, 90 SCRA 585, 1951
Doctrine: 1.JUDGMENTS; RES ADJUDICATA.—Where the question of whether this
intestate case should or should not be dismissed had been presented and decided by this
court in another case between the same parties and involving the same intestate
proceeding, the decision on that question is res judicata.
ADMINISTRATORS; PROBATE COURT'S DISCRETION IN THEIR APPOINTMENT.—
No evidence .having been presented why the brother and the sister of the decedent, as
nearest of kin, should not be appointed co-administrators of the Intestate Estate of said

decedent either on aceount of their incompetency or lack of moral qualifications, the

order of the lower court appointing them should be affirmed.
Facts: In case G.R. No. L-2963, Hermogenes C. Fernando was appointed on August 14,
1945, guardian of Rufino Crisostomo and his minor children Rufino, Jr., Juan, Roberto,
and Gabriel as to their persons and properties. Later Rufino Crisostomo Sr., died, leaving
his said four minor children under the guardianship of said Hermogenes C. Fernando.
On June 12, 1948, the guardian filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan
praying for the approval of an extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the deceased
parents of the minors. The guardian ad litem filed an opposition to said motion. The
regular guardian filed an answer to the opposition. The court ruled against the guardian,
Hermogenes C. Fernando.
The guardian filed in the guardianship proceedings a petition praying the court to punish
for contempt German Crisostomo (one of the administrators of the estate of the deceased
spouses appointed in the intestate proceedings above mentioned) and one Victor
Dimagiba, because they had illegally taken possession of certain properties belonging to
the minor wards. The Court denies the petition in which case he filed a motion for
reconsideration which the court denied. He appealed from said order.
In a separate case G.R. No. L-2694, entitled "Intestate Estate of the Spouses Rufino
Crisostomo and Petra Fernando," German Crisostomo filed a petition, for himself and
Pacita Fernando as next of kin and as co-administrator of said estate. The guardian filed
an opposition to the appointment of the administrators and moved for the dismissal of
the inestate proceedings. The court issued an order denying the motion to dismiss the
inestate proceedings. Aggrieved with the decision, Hermogenes C. Fernando filed another
petition reiterating the motion of dismissal. The court denied the motion and appointed
German Crisostomo and Pacita Fernando co-administrators of the estate.
The guardian filed a motion for the closing, termination and filing in the archives of the
record of the inestate proceedings on the ground that the properties involved therein had
already been extra-judicially declaring null and void the extrajudicial partition made by
the guardian and denying said motion for closing the inestate proceedings. The guardian
appealed from the above order as well as from the one dismissing the petition for
contempt.
Issue:
1. Whether or not the court should have denied or dismissed the petition for the opening
of intestate, upon motion of the appellant, after they had commenced it.
2. Whether or not the project of partition submitted by the guardian in the guardianship
proceedings should have been approved.
Ruling:
This Court, after giving due consideration to all the facts and arguments appearing in the
original petition and in the motion for reconsideration, passed the resolution of June 11,
1948, which reads as follows:
In G.R. No. L-2172, Fernando vs. Judge of First Instance of Bulacan, et al., the motion for
reconsideration is denied. Respondent judge had jurisdiction and did not exceed it in
appointing the other respondent, who are the brother and sister or nearest of kin of the
decedent, as administrators of the latter's estate. The jurisdictional facts referred to in
section 2 (a) Rule 80, are the death of the decedent, his having left his estate in such
province were probate court is sitting, or life he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his
having left his estate in such province. The name or competency of the person or persons
for whim letters of administration are prayed is not a jurisdictional fact, it is another
additional fact to be alleged in the petition (d); but "no defect in the petition shall render
void the issue of letters of administration" that is, shall divest the court of its jurisdiction
to appoint the administrator. A petition for certiorari does not lie to correct errors; if the
lower court has committed any error, the proper remedy would be appeal. The guardian
of the minors father who died after the guardian had been appointed, until said properties
have been adjudicated or awarded to them either by extrajudicial or judicial partition. No
partition either judicial or extra judicial having as yet been made adjudicating the said
properties to the minors, the properties of the deceased have never been placed under the
administration of the guardian of his minor children.
It will be seen from the above that the principal issue in this case as to whether the
intestate proceedings should be dismissed has already been decided by this Court in the
certiorari proceedings as far back as July 2, 1948, with the exception that if there had been
errors committed in the appointment of the guardian (not in the institution of the
intestate proceedings, which had been declared within the jurisdiction of the court) those
errors in the appointment may be corrected in an appeal. After examining the record, we
do not see any error in the appointment of German Crisostomo and Pacita Fernando as
co-administrators as they were the brother and sister, respectively, of the deceased, no
evidence having been presented by the appellant why those persons should not be
appointed, either on account of their incompetency or lack of moral qualifications. We,
therefore, affirm the order of the court appointing them.
It should be borne in mind that the above resolutions of this Court constitute res judicata
and "the law of the case" with regard to this appeal and they can no longer be questioned
or put in issue in the present case. It results then, that the claim of the appellant that the
intestate proceedings should be dismissed has to be denied and, as all the other questions
are dependent on said issue, they should also be decided adversely to the appellant.
10. NIEVES ARAUJO, ET AL., Plaintiffs-Appellants, vs. GREGORIA
CELIS, Defendant-Appellee.
Doctrine: WILLS, LOSS OF; EVIDENCE, SECONDARY.—The testimony in this
case was insufficient to establish in a satisfactory manner the loss of the alleged will.
Secondary evidence, to prove the contents of the will, can, therefore, not be allowed, as
the allowance of such evidence is a violation of section 321 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Facts: Rosario Darwin Araujo inherited from her mother, Asuncion Araujo y Belen, the
hacienda known as Pangpang and other property. She subsequently married Jose Araujo
y Celis, the defendant's son, and died later on leaving no descendants or ascendants, but
only collateral relatives, of whom the plaintiffs in this case claim to be the nearest. They
consequently alleged that they should succeed to the estate of the said Rosario Darwin

Araujo, and asked that the property inherited by her be delivered to them as the heirs of
the said Rosario. The property in question is now held by the defendant, who took
possession of the same after the death of her son, Jose Araujo, the husband of the said
Rosario.
The defendant admits that the property in question belonged privately and exclusively to
the wife, Rosario Darwin, but claims that Rosario died leaving a will in which she
bequeathed all of her property to her husband, Jose Araujo, and that the latter having
died without a will she, the defendant, succeeded under the law to all of his property,
rights, and actions. The court below entered judgment in favor of the defendant. The
plaintiffs excepted to the judgment, made a motion for a new trial on the ground that the
same was plainly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence, and brought the case
to this court by bill of exceptions.
Issue: Whether or not Rosario Darwin executed a legal and valid will in the form and
manner alleged by the defendant.
Ruling: This point as to the will, however, was not as clearly established as it should have
been. The defendant introduced no will in evidence, offered secondary parol evidence as
to its contents under the claim that the original will had been lost. The court allowed this
evidence over the objection of the plaintiffs, and this is one of the errors assigned by them
on this appeal. We are of the opinion that the plaintiffs' objection to the admission of such
evidence was well taken and that it could therefore have been sustained
This was all the more important as the witness further testified that the will, a copy of
which he saw and had in his possession, was signed by two witnesses only. A will signed
by two witnesses only could not under any circumstances be valid under the law in force
at the time referred to by the witness, and legally speaking such will could not then have
been probated or recorded. As to the nature of the copy of the will in question and the
alleged loss of the same, the testimony of the witness Poral is no more conclusive than
that of the other witness. We, therefore, deem it unnecessary to refer to it, and what has
been said before in regard thereto is equally applicable to the testimony of this witness.
These were the only witnesses presented by the defendant upon this point. Their
testimony is absolutely insufficient to establish in a satisfactory manner the loss of the
alleged will of Rosario Darwin, and the court below should not have, therefore, allowed
the secondary evidence introduced by her as to the contents of the will, particularly in
view of the fact that, as it appears from the record, there had been pending since 1889 an
action to declare this very will null and void. The undue allowance of such evidence by the
court was a violation of the provision of section 321 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
11. CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA, respondents. G.R.
No. 83484. February 12, 1990.
Doctrine: Special Proceedings; Settlement of Estate; Courts; Jurisdiction;
Trial court has no jurisdiction to entertain an action for partition and recovery of
properties belonging to the estate of a deceased person, while the probate proceedings

for the settlement of said estate are still pending in another branch of the same court. —
After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner’s contention that the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva’s
action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while
the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still
pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission
and approval of the administratrix’s inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of
the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings (p. 31, Record) x x x In the interest
of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent’s
estate, a court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a coequal court.
Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L 26695,
January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117, where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a
project of partition executed between her and her father in the proceedings for the
settlement of the estate of her mother: “The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate
under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate
delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the
project of partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol v.
Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30).
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the
probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated (Siguiong v. Tecson,
supra); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the
heirs from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period
therefore has not elapsed (Mari v. Bonilla, 83 Phil. 137). The better practice, however, for
the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion
in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or
administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent
action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision
or order of the probate or intestate court already final and executed and reshuffle
properties long ago distributed and disposed of.” (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741742;
Timbol v. Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman
Catholic v. Agustines, L14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460461; Italics supplied)
Probate proceedings are proceedings in rem, publication of the notice of the
proceedings is constructive notice to the whole world.—The probate proceedings
are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time and place of hearing of the petition is required
to be published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3, Rule 79, Rules of Court). Notice of
the hearing of Celedonia’s original petition was published in the “Visayan Tribune” on
April 25, May 2 and 9, 1977 (Exh. 4, p. 197, Record). Similarly, notice of the hearing of her
amended petition of May 26, 1977 for the settlement of the estate was, by order of the
court, published in “Bagong Kasanag” (New Light) issues of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977
(pp. 182305, Record). The publication of the notice of the proceedings was constructive
notice to the whole world. Concordia was not deprived of her right to intervene in the
proceedings for she had actual, as well as constructive notice of the same.

Facts: This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of
the first post-war Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor ,without decendants
ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: 1. his maternal
aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio and 2. The
private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close
friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor
but deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack
on February 26, 1977 without having set up the foundation.
Wishing to fulfill the decedent’s wish to place his properties into a foundation, Solivio
filed a petition for the letters of administration of the estate be issued to her and
consequently be appointed as a special administrator. The petition was later amended to
declare her as sole heir of the decedent. The court ruled in favor of Solivio and explained
that she did this to facilitate the formation of the foundation among other reasons.
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion
for reconsideration of the court’s order declaring Celedonia as “sole heir” of Esteban, Jr.,
because she too was an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was denied
by the court for tardiness (pp. 8081, Record). Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia
filed on January 7, 1980 (or one year and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, entitled “Concordia JavellanaVillanueva v.
Celedonia Solivio” for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages. On
September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in
favor of Concordia JavellanaVillanueva. On Concordia’s motion, the trial court ordered
the execution of its judgment pending appeal and required Celedonia to submit an
inventory and accounting of the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those orders,
Celedonia averred that the properties of the deceased had already been transferred to,
and were in the possession of, the “Salustia Solivio 125 VOL. 182, FEBRUARY 12, 1990
125 Solivio vs. Court of Appeals Vda. de Javellana Foundation.” The trial court denied her
motions for reconsideration. In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court
of Appeals (CAGR CV No. 09010). On January 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals, Eleventh
Division, rendered judgment affirming the decision of the trial court in toto.
Hence, this petition for review.
Issue: WON the trial court has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling: No. After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner’s
contention that the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain
Concordia Villanueva’s action for partition and recovery of her share of the estate of
Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540) for the
settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as
yet no orders for the submission and approval of the administratrix’s inventory and
accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the

proceedings (p. 31, Record) x x x In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid
confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent’s estate, a court should not interfere
with probate proceedings pending in a coequal court. Thus, did we rule in Guilas v. Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L 26695, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 111, 117,
where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project of partition executed between
her and her father in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of her mother: “The
probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment
of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same.
The finality of the approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate
the probate proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1 SCRA 1271, 1276, L15445, April 29, 1961;
Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As long as the order of the distribution of the
estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and
terminated (Siguiong v. Tecson, supra); because a judicial partition is not final and
11/14/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 182
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000167101c7f21ef6a367a003600fb00
2c009e/t/?o=False 2/20 conclusive and does not prevent the heirs from bringing an
action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefore has not elapsed
(Mari v. Bonilla, 83 Phil. 137). The better practice, however, for the heir who has not
received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate
or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or administrative
proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which
would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of
the probate or intestate court already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago
distributed and disposed of.” (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730, 741742; Timbol v. Cano,
supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L5107, April 24, 1953, 92 Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines,
L14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460461; Italics supplied)

WEEK 5 | Rule 77- Allowance of Will Proved Outside of the Philippines

1. SUNTAY V. SUNTAY, 95 PHIL 500 (1954)
Doctrine: WlLLS; PROBATE OF WlLLS; ASSIGNMENT OF INTEREST IN
THE ESTATE, NOT A BAR TO PROBATE OF A LOST OR FOREIGN WlLL. — In
an intestate proceeding that had already been instituted in the Philippines, the widow and
child of the testator are not estopped from asking for the probate of a lost will or of a
foreign will just because of the transfer or assignment of their share, right, title and
interest in the estate of the deceased. The validity and legality of such assignments cannot
be threshed out in the probate proceeding which is concerned only with the probate of the
will.
PROBATE OF WILL is A PROCEEDING IN REM; NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES
ESSENTIAL FOR ITS VALIDITY.—In the absence of proof that the municipal district
court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters,
it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in
the Chinese courts are the same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a
proceeding in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by
publication or both to all interested parties must be made.
PROCEEDINGS LIKENED TO A DEPOSITION OR TO A PERPETUATION OF
TESTIMONY.—The proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy, China,
may be likened to a deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so,
notice to all interested parties was necessary for the validity of such proceedings.
WILLS PROVED IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY; PROBATE SHOULD BE IN
ACCORDANCE WlTH ACCEPTED BASIC AND FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS
AND PRINCIPLES.—Where it appears that the proceedings in the court of a foreign
country were held for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to
the will and the order of the probate court did not purport to allow the will, the
proceedings cannot be deemed to be for the probate of a will, as it was not done in
accordance with the basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the
probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the will referred to therein cannot be
allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this country.
APPEALS ; JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT TO REVIEW FINDINGS
OF FACT AND LEGAL PRONOUNCEMENTS IN CASES INVOLVING MORE
THAN P50,000.—In an appeal from a judgment of the probate court, the Supreme
Court, in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, has the power to review and correct
erroneous findings of fact and legal pronouncements of the probate court, where the
amount involved is more than P50,000.
Facts: In 1934, Jose B. Suntay, a Filipino citizen and a resident of the Philippines, died
in Amoy, China. He left real and personal properties in the Philippines and a house in
Amoy. During his lifetime, he married twice, the first wife was Manuela Cruz, with

whom he had several children. The second marriage was with Maria Natividad Lim
Brillian, with whom he had a son, petitioner Silvino Suntay.
Intestate proceedings were instituted by the heirs from the first marriage. While
the second wife, the surviving widow who remained in Amoy China, filed a petition for
the probate of the last will and testament of the deceased which was claimed to have
been executed and signed in the Philippines on November, 1929. The petition was
denied due to the loss of the will before the hearing thereof. After the pacific war,
Silvino, claimed to have found among the records of his father, a last will and testament
in Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on January, 1931 and
probated in the Amoy District Court. He filed a petition in the intestate proceedings for
the probate of the will executed in the Philippines on November 1929 or the will
executed in Amoy China on November, 1931.
ISSUE: Whether or not the will executed in Amoy, China can still be validly probated in
the Philippines
Ruling: The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China is a probate court must
be proved. The law of China on procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also
be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of the will in China in 1931 should
also be established by competent evidence. There is no proof on these points.
Moreover, it appears that all the proceedings had in the municipal district court of
Amoy were for the purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will
and that the order of the municipal district court of Amoy does not purport to probate the
will.
The order of the municipal district court of Amoy, China does not purport to
probate or allow the will which was the subject of the proceedings. In view thereof, the
will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance
with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the
probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the authenticated transcript of
proceedings held in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, cannot be deemed and
accepted as proceedings leading to the probate of allowance of a will and therefore, the
will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of
this country.
2. In the matter of the Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased. A. W.

FLUEMER, petitioner and appellant, vs. ANNIE COUSINS Hix,
oppositor and appellee.
Doctrine: WlLLS; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; CODE OF ClVIL

PROCEDURE, SECTION 781, AS AMENDED, APPLIED; RIGHT OF SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATOR TO APPEAL FROM DlSALLOWANCE OF A WlLL.—The

special administrator of an estate is a bperson interested in the allowance or disallowance

of a will by a Court of First Instance,b within the meaning of section 781, as amended, of
the Code of Civil Procedure, and so may be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court
from the disallowance of a will.
CONFLICT OF LAWS; CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, SECTIONS 300 AND

301, APPLIED. —The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our
courts. The courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of
the laws of the various States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts.
The requirements of sections 300 and 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be met.
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, SECTION 633, APPLIED.—The due execution of

a will alleged to have been executed in another jurisdiction must be established. Where
the witnesses to the will reside without the Philippine Islands, it is the duty of the
petitioner to prove execution by some other means.
DOMICILE.—where it is desired to establish the execution of a will in another

jurisdiction, it is necessary to prove that the testator had his domicile in that jurisdiction
and not in the Philippine Islands.
Facts: Fleumer, the special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appealed
from adecision of Judge of First Instance Tuason denying the probate of the document
alleged to by the last will and testament of the deceased. Appellee is not authorized
to carry on this appeal. We think, however, that the appellant, who appears to have been
the moving party in these proceedings was a 'person interested in the allowance or
disallowance of a will by the Court of First Instance,' ' and so should be permitted to
appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance of the will.
It is theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on
November 3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of
West Virginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., and as certified to by the Director of
the National Library should govern.
Issue: Whether or not the laws of West Virginia should govern.
Ruling: The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. The
courts of the Philippine Islands are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the
various States of the American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. The
requirements of sections 300 and 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure must be met.
In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on this
point is to be found in the testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing
to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the testator in the presence of two
competent witnesses, or that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the
testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the supposition
that the witnesses to the will reside without the Philippine Islands, it would then be the

duty of the petitioner to prove execution by some other means (Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 633). It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his
domicile in West Virginia and not in the Philippine Islands. The only evidence introduced
to establish this fact consisted of the recitals in the alleged will and the testimony of the
petitioner. Also in beginning administration proceedings originally in the Philippine
Islands, the petitioner violated his own theory by attempting to have the principal
administration in the Philippine Islands.
3. Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo. JUAN MICIANO, administrator,
petitioner and appellee, vs. ANDRE BRIMO, opponent and appellant
Doctrine: FOREIGN LAWS; PRESUMPTION.—In the absence of evidence to the
contrary foreign laws on a particular subject are presumed to be the same as those of the
Philippines. (Lim and Lim vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
SUCCESSIONS; CONDITIONAL LEGACY; CONDITION CONTRARY TO
LAW; NULLITY OF.—If the condition imposed upon the legatee is that he respect the
testator's order that his property be distributed in accordance with the laws of the
Philippines and not in accordance with the laws of his nation, said condition is illegal,
because, according to article 10 of the Civil Code, said laws govern his testamentary
disposition, and, being illegal, shall be considered unwritten, thus making the
institution unconditional.
Facts: Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the estate. Juan
Miciano, the judicial administrator of the estate left filed a scheme of partition. However,
Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. Brimo’s opposition is based
on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph Brimo’s
will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason
they are void as being in violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code.
Issue: Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to govern his
testamentary disposition.
Ruling: A foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in
accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his
national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 of the Civil
Code states said national law should govern. Said condition then, in the light of the legal
provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said
will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein
oppositor.
4. Leon & Ghezzi v. Manufacturers Life Insurance Co., 90 Phil 459 (1951)
Doctrines: EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; EXTENT OF POWER OF

ADMINISTRATION.—The general rule universally recognized is that administration
extends only to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was

granted, so that an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over
property in another state or country.
ANNUITIES; PROCEEDS NO LONGER FORM PART OF DECEDENT'S

ESTATE; FUNDS BEYOND THE CONTROL OF PROBATE COURT.—The entire
amount invested in a contract of annuity by virtue of which the beneficiary receives a
periodical sum during her lifetime, no longer forms part of a decedent's estate and is
beyond the control of a probate court. It has passed completely into the hands of the
company from which the annuity was purchased in accordance with contract duly
authorized and validly executed. Whether considered as a trust or as a simple
consideration for the company's assumed obligation, the proceeds of the sale can not be
withdrawn without the consent of the company, except where upon the death of the
annuitant, the residuary legatee claims the remainder, if there be any. Neither the
domiciliary or ancillary executor of the decedent's will, nor the trustee, nor the annuitant
has disposition of any of these funds beyond the amount and except upon the conditions
agreed upon in the contract of annuity.
Facts: The motion prayed for the citation of the Manager of the Manila Branch of the
Manufacturers Life Insurance Co. of Toronto, Canada, to appear and under a complete
accounting of certain funds the said Branch allegedly has in its possession and claimed to
belong to the estate. His Honor, Judge Rafael Amparo of the court below, held that these
funds "came into the possession of the Manufacturers Life Insurance Co., Inc., regularly
and in due course and, therefore, sees no justifiable ground to require said company to
render an accounting thereon."
The essential facts are that Basil Gordon Butler, formerly a resident of the Philippines,
died in Brooklyn, New York City, in 1945, leaving a will which was duly probated in the
Surrogate's Court of New York County on August 3 of the same year, and of which James
Ross, Sr., James Madison Ross, Jr. and Ewald E. Selph were named executors. The estate
having been settled, the proceedings were closed on July 17, 1947.
The will contained this residuary clause:

After payment of these legacies and my just debts, including funeral expenses, I devise,
give and bequeath all of my remaining estate and personal effects of which I may die
possessed to Mercedes de Leon, of Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal, to wit: the personal effects
to be delivered to her for her use and profit; the moneys, securities and other valuable
property, not personal effects, to be held in trust for her benefit by my executors, at their
absolute discretion, to be administered for her permanent benefit in whatever way they
may consider most advantageous in the circumstances existing. Since the said Mercedes
de Leon is not of sound judgment, and discretion in the handling of money, it is not my
wish that she be given any sums of money other than for her current needs, except as my
executors in their judgment deem advantageous to her. In case the amount available for
this bequest be sufficient to purchase an adequate annuity, the executors in their
discretion may do so. And I attest and direct that I do not wish to intend that the action
of my executors upon their discretion in this matter be questioned by anyone
whatsoever.

For the purpose of carrying out that testamentary provision, James Madison Ross was
appointed trustee by the New York County Surrogate's Court on February 4, 1948. Once
appointed, and with the beneficiary signing the application with him, Ross bought an
annuity from the Manufacturer's life Insurance Co. at its head office in Toronto, Canada,
paying in advance $17,091.03 as the combined premiums. The contract stipulates for a
monthly payment of $57.60 to Mercedes Benz during her lifetime, with the proviso that
in the event of her death, the residue, if any, of the capital sum shall be paid in one sum
to James Madison Ross or his successor as trustee. And beginning May 27, 1948,
Mercedes de Leon has been receiving the stipulated monthly allowance through the
Insurance Company's Manila Office.
The administration of Butler's estate granted in New York was the principal or
domiciliary administration (Johannes vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 175), while the
administration taken out in the Philippines is ancillary. However, the distinction serves
only to distinguish one administration from the other, for the two proceedings are
separate and independent. (34 C.J.S. 1232,1233).
The important thing to inquire into is the Manila court's authority with respect to the
assets herein involved. The general rule universally recognized is that administration
extends only to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was
granted, so that an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over
property in another state or country. (Keenan vs. Toury, 132 A.L.R. 1362; Nash vs.
Benari, 3 A.L.R. 61; Michigan Trust Co. vs. Chaffee, 149 A.L.R. 1078).This principle is
specifically embodied in section 4 of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
Issues:
1. Whether or not the Administratrix appellant has the right to administer
the decedent’s estate even if outside the country.
2. Whether or not Annuities and proceeds form part of the decedent’s estate
and is beyond the control of the probate court.
Ruling: No: No. It is manifest from the facts before set out that the funds in question
are outside the jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila. Having been invested in an
annuity in Canada under a contract executed in the country, Canada is the suits of the
money. The party whose appearance the appellant seeks is only a branch or agency of the
company which holds the funds in its possession, the agency's intervention being limited
to delivering to the annuitant the checks made out and issued from the home office. There
is no showing or allegation that the funds have been transferred or removed to the Manila
Branch.
Even if the money were in the hands of the Manila Branch, yet it no longer forms part of
butler's estate and is beyond the control of the court. It has passed completely into the
hands of the company in virtue of a contract duly authorized and validly executed.
Whether considered as a trust or as simple consideration for the company's assumed
obligation, which it has been religiously performing, of paying periodical allowances to
the annuitant, the proceeds of the sale can not be withdrawn without the consent of the
company, except, upon the death of the annuitant, the residuary legatee may claim the
remainder, if there be any. Neither the domiciliary or ancillary executor of Butler's will,

nor the trustee, nor the annuitant has disposition of any of these funds beyond the
amounts and except upon the conditions agreed upon in the contract for annuity.
In the third place, the power of the court to cite a person for the purpose stated in the
administratrix's motion is defined in section 7 of Rule 88, which provides.
Person entrusted with estate compelled to render account.—The court, on complaint of

an executor or administrator, with any part the estate of the deceased to appear before it,
and may require such person to render a full account, on oath, of the money, goods,
chattels, bonds, accounts, or other papers belonging to such estate as came to his
possession in trust for such executor or administrator, and for his proceedings thereon;
and if the person so cited refuses to appear to render such account, the court may punish
him for contempt as having disobeyed a lawful order of the court.
The appellant administratrix did not entrust to the appellee the money she wants
the latter to account for, nor did the said money come to the appellee's possession in trust
for the administratrix. In other words, the administratrix is a complete stranger to the
subject of the motion and to the appellee. There being no creditors, the only subject of the
motion, we incline to believe, is to enable Mercedes de Leon to get the legacy in a lump
sum in complete disregard of the wishes of the testator, who showed deep concern for her
welfare, and of the annuity contract which the annuitant herself applied for in conjunction
with the trustee.
All in all, from every standpoint, including that of the annuitant's financial well-being, the
motion and the appeal are utterly groundless and ill-advised.

WEEK 6 | Rule 78 – Rule 85 and Rule 87
1. GUERRERO VS TERAN, 13 Phil 212 JOHNSON; March 19, 1909
Doctrines: ESTATES; RESPONSIBILITY OF ADMINISTRATORS AND

GUARDIANS.—The administrator of an estate belonging to minors is liable to them for
the management of their interests therein from the time of his acceptance of the
appointment until his removal or release. If such administrator has, in the meantime,
permitted other persons to intervene in the management, the responsibility for their acts
falls upon him. The administrator, however, may have a right of action against such
persons for any loss occasioned by their negligence or corruption.
APPOINTMENT OF RESIDENT ADMINISTRATORS AND GUARDIANS.—There is no

law at present in force which requires the courts to appoint residents only as
administrators or guardians. No person, however, should be appointed as guardian or
administrator who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court making the appointment.
Facts:
Salvador Guerrero, the guardian of minors Maria Manuela and Maria del Carmen
Sanchez Munoz,filed an action against Leopoldo Teran to recover the sum of P4,129.56
on the theory that Teran had been the administrator of the estate of Antonio Sanchez
Munoz from 1901-1906.- Teran admitted he owed Guerrero P188.39 but claimed that the
latter owed him P482.14.- CFI found that Teran, as administrator of said estate, owed
Guerrero the sum of P3,447.46.
Issue: Whether or not Teran managed and administered the estate of Sanchez Munoz
from 1901-1906
Ruling: NO. Teran was the duly appointed and recognized representative of the minors
Maria Manuela and Maria del carmen in the administration of their interests in the estate
of the said Antonio Sanchez Munozfrom Sept.17, 1901 until March 18, 1902.
Teran was appointed as administrator of said estate on Sept.17, 1901. He entered into a
bond of 10,000 dollars, gold, for the faithful performance of his duties as such
representative. On March 18, 1901, the CFI of Albay appointed Maria Munoz y Gomez.
As guardian for said minors and she gave the required bond for the faithful performance
of her duties as such guardian.- While there are some indications that Teran continued to
act as the administrator of said estate after the appointment of Maria Munoz y Gomez, up
to Oct.6, 1906, yet the fact exists that said Maria Munoz was the actual representative of
the minors from and after March 18, 1902 untilOct.6, 1906, and therefore she, as such
guardian and administratrix of the estate, must be held responsible for the property
belonging to said minors during the period while she was their actual guardian.- Maria

Munoz, for the reason that she was not a resident of the Philippines at the time of her
appointment, was removed as guardian by the CFI. Felix Samson was then appointed as
guardian. The mere fact that she was removed as guardian did not relieve her, nor her
bondsmen from liability to the minors during the time that she was duly acting as said
guardian. If during the time that she was the guardian she allowed other persons to handle
the property of her wards and if any mismanagement or loss occurred thereby, the
responsibility must fall upon her.
Therefore, if any loss occurred to the minors between March 18, 1902 and Oct.6, 1906,
they have a right of action only against said Maria Munoz y Gomez as their legal guardian
and under the law the administratrix of the property of their estate.
Teran was liable for losses only during the time that he was acting as the legal
representative of the said minors in the management of their estate, from Sept.17, 1901
up to the time that he was superseded by Maria Munoz y Gomez, on March 18, 1902.
There is no proof showing that any of the losses claimed by Guerrero occurred within
this period. Thus, Teran is liable only for the amount of P188.39, the amount he
admitted he owed the plaintiff.
On appointment of administrators or guardians: Maria Munoz was removed on the theory

that her appointment was void because she was not a resident of the Philippines. There is
nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as administrators
or guardians. Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should
not consent to the appointment of persons as administrators or guardians who are not
personally subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here, otherwise, the courts will find
much difficulty in complying with the duty of protecting the estates of deceased persons,
wards of the estate, etc.
2. Navas v. Garcia, 44 Phil 711
Doctrine: EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; APPOINTMENT OF;

PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS OR SURVIVING SPOUSE. — A probate court cannot
arbitrarily disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the administration
of the estate of a deceased person; but if the person enjoying such preferential rights is
unsuitable the court may appoint another person.
UNSUITABLENESS FOR APPOINTMENT. — Unsuitableness for appointment as

administrator may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those
immediately interested in the estate to such an extent as to render the appointment
inadvisable.
DETERMINATION OF UNSUITABLENESS. — The determination of a person’s

suitability for the office of administrator rests to a great extent, in the sound judgment of
the court exercising the power of appointment and such judgment will not be interfered
with on appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the court below was in error.
Facts: This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Samar, dated
November 11, 1922 and appointing Jose Garcia, administrator of the estate of the
deceased Geronima Uy Coque.
The appellant is the surviving spouse of the deceased and maintains that the court erred
in not appointing him administrator instead of Jose Garcia. As the refusal to appointment
the appellant appears in an order of the court below dated September 30, 1922, from
which no appeal has been taken, we might well consider the question raised upon this
appeal res adjudicata. For the satisfaction of counsel, we shall, however, briefly state
another reason why the appeal must fail.
Issue: Whether or not a probate Court can arbitrarily disregard the preferential rights
of the surviving spouse to the administration of the estate of a deceased person.
Ruling: Yes. It is well settled that a probate court cannot arbitrarily and without
sufficient reason disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse to the
administration of the estate of the deceased spouse. But, if the person enjoying such
preferential rights is unsuitable, the court may appoint another person. (Paragraph 2 of
sec. 642 of the Code of Civil Procedure.) The determination of a person’s suitability for
the office of administrator rests, to a great extent in the sound judgment of the court
exercising the power of appointment and such judgment will not be interfered with on
appeal unless it appears affirmatively that the court below was in error.
In the present case the court based its ruling on the fact that it appeared from the record
in Civil Case No. 1041 of the same court, that the appellant had adverse interests in the
estate of such a character as to render him unsuitable as administrator. Unsuitableness
may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested
in the estate. The court below therefore stated facts which may constitute sufficient
grounds for setting aside the appellant’s preferential rights and which, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, must be presumed sufficient. Whether they are in fact sufficient,
we are not in position to determine as we have not before us the record in the aforesaid
case No. 1041; it being a record of the court below, that court could properly take
judicial notice thereof, but we cannot.
The order appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So ordered.

3. Mercado v. Vda. De Jaen, 64 Phil 75
Doctrine: EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; APPOINTMENT MADE BY THE

TESTATOR, WHICH SHOULD BE RESPECTED; EXCEPTION IN CASES OF
UNWORTHINESS, INCAPACITY, INEPTITUDE OR UNFITNESS OF THE EXECUTOR
DESIGNATED.—When the evidence shows that the testator, in making his will naming
somebody as executor of his estate in preference to anybody else, was in the full
enjoyment of his intellectual faculties, it is not only just but also right to fully comply with
his will because it is to be assumed that he had good reasons for so doing. Section 641 of
Act No. 190 clearly provides that when a will has been probed and allowed, the court is
bound to issue letters testamentary thereon to the person named as executor therein,
provided he accepts the trust and gives the bond as required by law. While it is true that
this provision of the law should not be strictly interpreted, because the court would be
deprived of its power not to appoint, in certain cases, one who is unworthy of the trust,
notwithstanding the fact that he was named as such by the testator (sec. 653, Act No. 190);
it is also true that for this to be done, the unworthiness, incapacity, ineptitude and
unfitness of such person must be manifest and real and not merely imaginary.
Facts: Monsignor Juan Bautista Perfecto Gorordo, retired Bishop of Cebu, died in Cebu
on December 20, 1934. He left a will instituting his sister, Maria Gorordo Viuda de Jaen,
as the universal heir to his estate, and in case of her death, his nieces Telesfora Jaen and
Cesarea Gorordo Revilles. He bequeathed part of his estate to the various persons and
entities mentioned in his will, and named Father Emiliano Mercado, parish priest of San
Nicolas, Cebu, as executor, and in the absence of the latter Father Alejandro Espina,
parish priest of the Cebu Cathedral. The will of the deceased bishop was probated
without opposition and consequently the Court of First Instance of Cebu confirmed the
appointment of Father Emiliano Mercado as executor after the latter filed a bond of
P5,000 fully in accordance with law.
The heirs Maria Gorordo Viuda de Jaen, Telesfora Jaen and Cesarea Gorordo de Revilles
instituted in the will, however, excepted to the order of February 15, 1935, appointing
Father Emiliano Mercado as the executor, and in order to insist upon their opposition to
the appointment of said executor, the three heirs, in their motion of February 23, 1935,
prayed for the suspension of said appointment and for the ad interim designation of
Father Alejandro Espina as special executor, pending decision of the appeal which they
expected to take from the order in question.
What acts committed by Father Mercado argue against his capacity? The appellants
allege as one of them his having engaged the services of Attorney Alo, to whom he is
under obligation, in order to be able to repay him in some way not with his own money
but with the money of the estate, thereby insinuating that he lacks the interest which a
good executor must have for the protection of the rights and interest of the estate
entrusted to him. The evidence relative to this matter shows that Attorneys Hipolito Alo
and Gabino R. Veloso were engaged by Father Emiliano Mercado not as attorneys for
the estate but as his own, in his capacity as petitioner for the probate of the will of
Bishop Monsignor Juan Bautista Perfecto Gorordo. It shows further that the special
agreement he had with said attorneys (Exhibit 3) was to the effect that their fees would
only be that determined and fixed by the court.
Issue: Whether or not the Court has the right to subdue appointments of administrators
and executors made by the testator.
Ruling: The appellants’ proposition not to name any executor to save the estate
unnecessary expenses, as the testator left no debts and his heirs on the other hand, are
willing to secure payment of the legacies, is untenable. The will contains so many
provisions, there are so many legacies to deliver and pay, and it is premature to assert that
the estate has no obligations or debts to pay, because, on the contrary, it appears that it
has debts and obligations as shown by the committee’s report of August 29, 1935, that
claims amounting to approximately P40,000 have been filed, that it is absolutely
necessary to have an executor to take charge of the estate so as to protect the interests
thereof and later enforce compliance with the will of the testator.
The appellants’ last proposition that they and Attorney Margarito E. Revilles — the latter
being the husband of the appellant Cesarea Gorordo — could look after the interests of
the estate better than Father Mercado and attorneys Alo and Veloso, is likewise untenable.
The estate in their hands would be no more immune from irregularities, and the interest
of the legatees amounting to more than those of the heirs would not be better taken care
of because of what may be inferred from the incident which took place during the
preparation of the inventory of the estate left by the testator. Said incident may be inferred
from the following excerpt from the record:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
You said that you did not wish to engage the services of Attorney Revilles because, as a
member of the family he may not be impartial. Since when did you have such opinion? —
A. I have formed this opinion in view of the fact that when we were preparing the
inventory, there appeared therein shares of the Monte de Piedad which, according to Mr.
Revilles, should not be included in the inventory because they were not in the will. I said:
’Even the last pin found in the safe will appear in the inventory.’" (Testimony of Father
Mercado, t. s. n., p. 32.)
For the foregoing reasons, the appellants’ appeal is declared unfounded and is, therefore,
dismissed, affirming the orders appealed from with costs. So ordered.
4. Ozaeta v. Pecson and BPI 93 Phil 416 (1953)
Doctrine: The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary

concomitant of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes.

It has been held that when a will has been admitted to probate, it is the duty of the court
to issue letters testamentary to the person named as executor upon his application (23
C.J. 1023). It is the testator that appoints his executor, as the question as to his peculiar
fitness for such a position or his want of ability to manage the estate can not be addressed
to the discretion of the county judge.
In the case at bar, the will has already been admitted to probate, and respondent judge
himself has expressly appointed petitioner as administrator. The only reason or ground,
therefore, for suspending his appointment, and for the appointment of a special
administrator, who is not the petitioner himself, is a very technical one.
Facts: Carlos Palanca died with a will. In the will, petitioner Roman Ozaeta, was named
executor if General Manuel A. Roxas fails to qualify. Upon Palanca's death, and General
Roxas having died previously, Ozaeta presented a petition for the probate of the will, at
the same time praying that he be appointed special administrator. Some of the heirs of
the decedent opposed this petition, and the court later on appointed the Philippine Trust
Company, a non-applicant and a stranger to the proceedings, special administrator. On
April 20, 1951, the Philippine Trust Company presented a petition to resign as special
administrator on the ground of incompatibility of interest, as it had granted a loan to heir
Angel Palanca, who had pledged to it shares of the Far Eastern University allegedly
belonging to the estate of the deceased. Thereupon Ozaeta reiterated his previous
petition, but the court appointed Sebastian Palanca, one of the heirs, to take the place of
the Philippine Trust Company. The order is dated June 30, 1951. But on October 23rd,
the court rendered an order admitting the will to probate and appointing Ozaeta as
administrator.
And on October 25, 1951, the court allowed the Philippine Trust Company to resign,
reconsidered its order appointing Sebastian Palanca special administrator, and appointed
instead BPI. Ozaeta moved to reconsider the order, but his motion was denied, and
thereupon the present petition was filed. In its order the court held that it has discretion
to choose the special administrator and is not bound to appoint the person named therein
as executor, because the order had been appealed.
Issue: Does a probate court commit an abuse of discretion if, pending an appeal against
its order or judgment admitting a will to probate and appointing as judicial administrator
the person named therein as executor, it appoints as special administrator any person
other than the executor named in the will?
Ruling: Yes.
It should be noted at the outset that Rule 81 of the Rules of Court, under the provisions of
which the order appealed from was made, grants discretion to the probate court to
appoint or not to appoint a special administrator. It is silent as to the person that may be
appointed as special administrator, unlike section 6 of Rule 79, which expressly gives the
order of preference of the persons that may be appointed regular administrator. We have
held in the case of Roxas vs. Pecson, however, that the appointment of special

administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the appointment of regular

administrators. (Roxas vs. Pecson, 82 Phil., 407, 46 Off. Gaz. [5] 2058.) But we further
held, however, that while the choice of the person lies within the court's discretion, such
discretion should not be a whimsical one, but one that is reasonable and logical and in
accord with fundamental legal principles and justice. The fact that a judge is granted
discretion does not authorize him to become partial, or to make his personal likes and
dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Such discretion must be based
on reason and legal principle, and it must be exercised within the limits thereof. And there
is no reason why the same fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a
regular administrator should not be taken into account in the appointment of the special
administrator.
The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative of a testator, a necessary concomitant
of his right to dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is natural that the
testator should desire to appoint one of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry
out his wishes in the disposal of the estate. The curtailment of this right may be considered
as a curtailment of the right to dispose. And as the rights granted by will take effect from
the time of death (Article 777, Civil Code of the Philippines), the management of his estate
by the administrator of his choice should be made as soon as practicable, when no
reasonable objection to his assumption of the trust can be interposed any longer. It has
been held that when a will has been admitted to probate, it is the duty of the court to issue
letters testamentary to the person named as executor upon his application (23 C.J. 1023).
It is the testator that appoints his executor, as the question as to his peculiar fitness for
such a position or his want of ability to manage the estate can not be addressed to the
discretion of the county judge. (Holbrook vs. Head, 6 S.W. 592, 593, 9 Ky. 755.).
In the case at bar, the will has already been admitted to probate, and respondent judge
himself has expressly appointed petitioner as administrator. The only reason or ground,
therefore, for suspending his appointment, and for the appointment of a special
administrator, who is not the petitioner himself, is a very technical one. It also appears
that the Philippine Trust Company, which had acted as special administrator for a period
of only a few months, has submitted a bill for P90,000. This would cut deep into the
income of the estate, and if the new special administrator appointed by the respondent
judge takes office, it is not improbable that the estate may again be subjected to the same
expensive cost of administration. Under these circumstances, it would seem unreasonable
to refuse to appoint the petitioner as special administrator. To do so would be delaying
the fulfillment of the wishes of the testator and subjecting the estate to unnecessary
expense. Petitioner has cited precedents in the surrogate courts of the State of New York
to support his claim that as the will appointing him regular administrator has been
admitted to probate by the trial judge, he should now be appointed special administrator
during the pendency of the appeal against the order admitting the will to probate.

5. De Guzman v. Limcolioc, G.R. No. L-46134 April 18, 1939
Doctrine: The principal consideration reckoned with in the appointment of the

administrator of the estate of a deceased person is the interest in said estate of the one to
be appointed as such administrator.
It is the interest in the estate is that principally determines the preference in the
appointment of an administrator of the estate of a deceased person. If under the
circumstances of each case, it develops that there is another who has more interest therein
than the surviving spouse, the preference established in the latter's favor becomes
untenable.
If the properties left by the deceased Proceso de Guzman were acquired during his
marriage with Agatona Santos, his children, among them Nicolasa, have more interest
therein than his now widow, Angela Limcolioc, who would only be entitled, by way of
usufruct, to a portion equal to that corresponding to one of the children who has received
no betterment.
Facts: Proceso de Guzman died on January 1, 1937, without leaving a will. The deceased
was first married to Agatona Santos, with whom he had 4 children, named Nicolasa,
Apolinario, Ana and Tomasa. After Agatona's death, the deceased contracted a second
marriage with Angela Limcolioc, with whom he did not have any child.
On the 7th of the same month of January, 1937, the Court of First Instance of Rizal
appointed Nicolasa de Guzman judicial administratrix of the properties of the deceased
Proceso de Guzman. On the 8th of the same month of January, 1937, Angela Limcolioc,
widow of the deceased, asked that this appointment be set aside and that she had named
administratrix instead, on that ground of her preference as the widow. The court denied
this petition and sustained the appointment of Nicolasa. From these resolutions, Angela
appealed.
In this instance the appellant contends that the trial court erred in not appointing her
administratrix of the estate of the deceased Proceso de Guzman and in appointing
Nicolasa de Guzman as such administratrix without first setting the case for hearing.
Issue: WON Angela Limcolioc is the proper administratrix.
Ruling: The principal consideration reckoned with in the appointment of the

administrator of the estate of a deceased person is the interest in said estate of the one to
be appointed as such administrator. This is the same consideration which the law takes
into account in establishing the preference of the widow to administer the estate of her
husband, upon the latter's death, because she is supposed to have an interest therein as a
partner in the conjugal partnership. But this preference established by law is not absolute,
if there are other reasons justifying the appointment of an administrator other than
surviving spouse. If the interest in the estate is what principally determines the preference
in the appointment of an administrator of the estate of a deceased person, and if, under
the circumstances of each case, it develops that there is another who has more interest

therein than the surviving spouse, the preference established in the latter's favor becomes
untenable.
The application filed by Nicolasa de Guzman for her appointment alleges that during the
marital life of the deceased with his first wife Agatona Santos, both, through their mutual
labor, acquired all the properties left by the deceased, not having acquired any property
during his second marriage with Angela Limcolioc. The court bore these allegations in
mind. It is true that the case was not heard for the purpose of establishing these
allegations, but when Angela asked for the reconsideration of the appointment of
Nicolasa, she did not deny these allegations and merely stated that they do not justify her
appointment as administratrix. For failure of Angela to deny these allegations, thus taking
them for granted, the court was justified in considering them when it denied the
reconsideration of its resolution and when it sustained the appointment of Nicolasa.
If the properties left by the deceased Proceso de Guzman were acquired during his
marriage with Agatona Santos, his children, among them Nicolasa, have more interest
therein than his now widow, Angela Limcolioc, who would only be entitled, by way of
usufruct, to a portion equal to that corresponding to one of the children who has received
no betterment.
6. Gonzales v. Aguinaldo, 190 SCRA 112 (1990)

G.R. No. 74769 September 28, 1990
Doctrine: Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their trust as entitle
them to protection from removal without just cause. Hence, Section 2 of Rule 82 of the
Rules of Court provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the court to remove an
administrator.
While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an
administrator, it however must have some fact legally before it in order to justify a
removal. There must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator
not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court, which it deems
sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator. In making such a
determination, the court must exercise good judgment, guided by law and precedents.
Certainly, it is desirable that the administration of the deceased's estate be marked with
harmonious relations between co-administrators. But for mere disagreements between
such joint fiduciaries, without misconduct, one's removal is not favored. Conflicts of
opinion and judgment naturally, and, perhaps inevitably, occur between persons with
different interests in the same estate. Such conflicts, if unresolved by the co-
administrators, can be resolved by the probate court to the best interest of the estate and
its heirs.
Temporary absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an administrator of the
estate.

The removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the
heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, nor on the belief of the court that it would result in
orderly and efficient administration.
Facts: Ramona Gonzales was survived by her four children who are her only heirs,
namely, Asteria Favis, Cecila Favis-Gomez, Beatriz Gonzales, and Teresa Olbes. In the
estate proceedings of Ramona Gonzales, 2 of her 4 children were appointed as co‐
administratix (Beatriz Gonzales and Teresa Olbes). While Beatriz was in the US to
accompany her sick husband to treatment, Teresa filed a motion in court for her removal
on the ground that she was incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust and had
committed acts and omissions detrimental to the interst of the estate and the heirs. It was
further alleged that there was conflict between the two co‐administratrices as well as
continued misunderstandings. Without really hearing the side of the administratrix
sought to be removed, the court issued an order for her removal.
The Judge, in an order, cancelled the letters of administration granted to Beatriz Gonzales
and retained Teresa Olbes as the administratrix of the estate of the late Ramona Gonzales.
Beatriz Gonzales moved to reconsider the order which was denied by respondent judge
for lack of merit.
Issue: WON the Judge’s order should be nullified on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion, as Beatriz’s removal was not shown to be anchored on any of the grounds
provided under the Rules of Court.
Ruling: Yes. Section 2, Rule 82, or the Rules of Court, states:
Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator.

Proceedings upon death, resignation or removal — If an executor or
administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to
law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty expressly provided
by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or
unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or in its discretion,
may permit him to resign.
Administrators have such an interest in the execution of their trust as entitle them to
protection from removal without just cause. Hence, Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of
Court provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the court to remove an
administrator.
While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an
administrator, it however must have some fact legally before it in order to justify a
removal. There must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator
not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court, which it deems
sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator. In making such a
determination, the court must exercise good judgment, guided by law and precedents.

In the present case, the court a quo did not base the removal of the Beatriz Gonzales as
co-administratrix on any of the causes specified in Olbes's motion for relief of the
petitioner. Neither did it dwell on, nor determine the validity of the charges brought
against her by Olbes. The court based the removal of the petitioner on the fact that in the
administration of the estate, conflicts and misunderstandings have existed between her
and Obles which allegedly have prejudiced the estate, and the added circumstance that
petitioner had been absent from the country since October 1984, and up to 15 January
1985, the date of the questioned order.
Certainly, it is desirable that the administration of the deceased's estate be marked with
harmonious relations between co-administrators. But for mere disagreements between
such joint fiduciaries, without misconduct, one's removal is not favored. Conflicts of
opinion and judgment naturally, and, perhaps inevitably, occur between persons with
different interests in the same estate. Such conflicts, if unresolved by the co-
administrators, can be resolved by the probate court to the best interest of the estate and
its heirs.
The court found of material importance the fact that the court a quo failed to find hard
facts showing that the conflict and disharmony between the two (2) co-administratrices
were unjustly caused by Beatriz Gonzales, or that she was guilty of incompetence in the
fulfillment of her duties, or prevented the management of the estate according to the
dictates of prudence, or any other act or omission showing that her continuance as co-
administratrix of the estate materially endangers the interests of the estate.
As to the other grounds, temporary absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an
administrator of the estate. Thus, as held in re Mc Knight's Will, a temporary residence
outside of the state, maintained for the benefit of the health of the executors' family, is
not such a removal from the state as to necessitate his removal as executor.
Moreover, the court a quo sought refuge in the fact that 2 of the other 3 heirs of the estate
of the deceased (Teresa Olbes and Cecilia Favis Gomez) have opposed the retention or re-
appointment of petitioner as co-administratrix of the estate. Suffice it to state that the
removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs
or beneficiaries of the estate, nor on the belief of the court that it would result in orderly
and efficient administration.
As the appointment of petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was valid, and no satisfactory cause
for her removal was shown, the court a quo gravely abused its discretion in removing her.
Stated differently, petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was removed without just cause. Her
removal was therefore improper.

7. Johannes v. Harvey, 43 Phil 175 (1922)
Doctrine: It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When
a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a
foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the
jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any
other administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is
because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the
limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign
state has no authority in the United States. The ancillary administration is proper,
whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property
to be administered in the nature of assets of the decedent, liable for his individual debts
or to be distributed among his heirs.
Facts: Carmen died intestate while residing in Singapore. She was survived by her
husband and 3 siblings. The husband, B.E. Johannes, and 2 siblings were residents of
Singapore. A sibling/brother named Alfred was in Manila. Estate proceedings were held
in Singapore and her husband was appointed as the administrator. Thereafter, estate
proceedings were instituted by Alfred in the Philippines. The husband opposed this.
Issue: WON Honorable George Harvey, as judge of CFI Manila, has acted in excess of
his jurisdiction in appointing Alfred as administrator of the estate of the deceased in the
Philippines.
Ruling: No. It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate.
When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in
a foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the
jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any
other administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is
because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the
limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign
state has no authority in the United States. The ancillary administration is proper,
whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his las domicile, property
to be administered in the nature of assets of the decedent, liable for his individual debts
or to be distributed among his heirs. (23 C. J., 1010, et seq.; 24 C. J., 1109, et seq.;
Wilkins vs. Ellett [1882], 108 U. S., 256; Perez vs. Aguerria [1901], 1 Porto Rico Fed., 443;
Vaughn vs. Barret [1833], 5 Vt., 333.)
The principal administration in this instance is that at the domicile of the late Carmen
Theodora Johannes in Singapore, Straits Settlements. What is sought in the Philippine
Islands is an ancillary administration subsidiary to the domiciliary administration,
conformable to the provisions of sections 601, 602, and 603 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. The proper course of procedure would be for the ancillary administrator to
pay the claims of creditors, if there be any, settle the accounts, and remit the surplus to
the domiciliary jurisdiction, for distribution among the next of kin. Such administration
appears to be required in this jurisdiction since the provisions of section 596 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, which permit of the settlement of certain estates without legal

proceedings, have not been met. The decision of this court in Baldemor vs. Malangyaon
([1916]), 34 Phil., 368), on which relators rely, is then not in point because predicated
directly on the provisions of the section last cited.
It is almost a universal rule to give the surviving spouse a preference when an

administrator is to be appointed, unless for strong reasons it is deemed advisable to name
someone else. This preference has particular force under Spanish law precedents. (4
Escriche, Diccionario de Legislacion y Jurisprudencia, 1085.) However, the Code of Civil
Procedure, in section 642, while naming the surviving husband or wife, as the case may
be, as one to whom administration can be granted, leaves this to the discretion of the court
to determine, for it may be found that the surviving spouse is unsuitable for the
responsibility.
Moreover, nonresidence is a factor to be considered in determining the propriety of the

appointment, and in this connection, it is to be noted that the husband of the deceased,
the administrator of the principal administration, resides in Singapore. Undoubtedly, if
the husband should come into this jurisdiction, the court would give consideration to this
petition that he be named the ancillary administrator for local purposes. Ancillary letters
should ordinarily be granted to the domicilliary representative, if he applies therefor, or
to his nominee, or attorney; but in the absence of express statutory requirement the court
may in its discretion appoint some other person. (24 C. J., 1114.)
There is still another aspect to the case. This is that pursuant to section 783 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, an order of a Court of First Instance appointing an administration of
the estate of a deceased person constitutes a final determination of the rights of the parties
thereunder, within the meaning of the statute, and is appealable. (Sy Hong Eng vs. Sy Lioc
Suy [1907], 8 Phil., 594.)
The CFI has not acted in excess of its jurisdiction.
8. In the matter of the Estate of the Deceased Francisco Varela

Calderon Antonio Gutierrez del Campo vs Miguel Varela Calderon
et al, 59 Phil 631
Doctrine: The appellants in this case are not forced heirs of the deceased and therefore
have no right to any part of the property left by the testator, once he had disposed of the
same by will. If any of them were forced heirs they would be entitled to intervene in this
case and protect their interest in so far as they may have been prejudiced by the will. It is
evident therefore that they have not been injured or prejudiced in any manner
whatsoever. Only forced heirs whose rights have been prejudiced have a right to intervene
in a case of this character.
Fact: Francisco Varela Calderon was a bachelor and at the time of his death, he left no
ascendants. He was survived by his brother and sister, as well as his illegitimate children.
There being no forced heirs, he instituted his illegitimate children as his beneficiaries upon
his death. His brother and sister opposed this on the ground that the beneficiaries under

the will of the deceased are illegitimate children and that they are not qualified to inherit
from the deceased.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in refusing to admit and to consider the
opposition filed by the oppositors-appellants to the approval of the project of partition,
not being the forced heirs of the late Francisco Varela Calderon.
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court held in Barrios vs Enriquez that while it is true that
Article 845 of the Civil Code provides that illegitimate children who have not the status of
natural children shall be entitled to support only, and therefore cannot demand anything
more of those bound by law to support them, it does not prohibit said illegitimate children
from receiving, nor their parents from giving them, something more than support, so long
as the legitimate children are not prejudiced. If the law permits a testator to dispose of
the free third of his hereditary estate in favor of a stranger under Article 808 of the Civil
Code, there is no legal, moral or social reason to prevent him from making over that third
to his illegitimate son who has not the status of a natural son. On the contrary, by reason
of blood, the son, although illegitimate, has a preferential right over a stranger unless by
his behavior he has become unworthy of such consideration.
The appellants in this case are not forced heirs of the deceased and therefore have no right
to any part of the property left by the testator, once he had disposed of the same by will.
If any of them were forced heirs they would be entitled to intervene in this case and protect
their interest in so far as they may have been prejudiced by the will. It is evident therefore
that they have not been injured or prejudiced in any manner whatsoever. Only forced
heirs whose rights have been prejudiced have a right to intervene in a case of this
character.
9. Testate Estate of the Deceased Damasa Crisostomo, Nazario

Trillana, Administrator-Appellee vs Consorcia P. Crisostomo, et al
Doctrine: In civil actions and special proceedings, unless otherwise provided by law, the
interest in order that a person may be a party on appeal must be material and direct, so
that he will be materially and directly benefited or injured by the court's order, decree or
judgment: and not indirect or contingent.
Fact: Crisostomo and others appealed the denial of their petition for relief of judgment of
the probate of the will of the deceased. They alleged that the judgment allowing the probate
of the later will was procured by fraud, that the court erred when it did not set a date for
proving the probate of the August 1948 will and the failure to prove was due to the court’s
own fault and negligence.
The appellants further argue that they are interested parties and therefore may appeal
in the present case, because in the event the will of October 19 is disallowed and in its
that of August 16 is allowed, and the legacies in the latter are declared invalid or the
legatees incapable to inherit, the legacies will go to appellants.

Issue: Whether or not, the appellants as nephews and nieces of the deceased are
interested parties in the probate of the will of the deceased.
Ruling: No. In civil actions and special proceedings, unless otherwise provided by law,
the interest in order that a person may be a party on appeal must be material and direct,
so that he will be materially and directly benefited or injured by the court's order, decree
or judgment: and not indirect or contingent.
In the case at bar, the interest claimed by the appellants is purely contingent or dependent
upon several uncertain and future events to (1) The disallowance of the will of October 19,
1948 (2) The allowance of the will of August 16, 1948, and (3) invalidation of certain
legacies left in said will of August 16, 1948. Thus, they are not interested parties in the
probate of the will of the deceased.
10. In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Irene Santos
Jose D. Villegas, Administrator; Adela Santos Gutierrez, movant-
appellee vs Jose D. Villegas and Rizalina Santos Rivera, movant-
appellants
Doctrine: Although Adela had filed a manifestation dropping herself from the
proceedings and presenting therewith the supposed Deed of Assignment, the record,
nevertheless fails to show that action thereon had been taken by the probate Court. Every
act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed
to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or
any other transaction (Art. 1082, NCC). No serious argument can be offered to deny the
co-heirship of appellee in the estate under probate. It appearing, that the transaction is in
the nature of extrajudicial partition, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot
just divest the court of its jurisdiction over the estate and over their persons, by the mere
act of assignment and desistance.
Fact: Irene Santos died and was survived by her husband and two nieces, daughters of
her deceased brother. Her husband filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration, naming himself and the two nieces as the surviving heirs of the decedent.
He was later named by the court as administrator. Thereafter, an unverified manifestation
was filed by Adela Gutierrez, one of the nieces, in court, attesting to a deed of assignment
conveying all her interest in participating in the proceedings to her sister. On a later date
however, another manifestation was filed by Adela, alleging that the deed of assignment
mentioned in the earlier filed manifestation was procured by the administrator by fraud
and that she signed the same by mistake. She alleged that she was misled by the husband
in signing said manifestation in exchange for money loaned to her by her sister, and that
she continuously seeks to participate in the intestate proceedings of her aunt. She then
filed a motion to transfer the special proceedings in the same branch where a case for the
nullity of deed of assignment was filed. This motion was denied. Adela then sought that the
administrator be ordered to furnish her all records of the proceedings. The administrator
opposed this on the ground of the earlier filed manifestation. The court ordered in favor
of the administrator.

Issue: Whether or not the deed of assignment, assuming its due execution, is sufficient
to divest the court of its jurisdiction over the estate and over the persons, by the mere act
of assignment and desistance.
Ruling: No. Although Adela had filed a manifestation dropping herself from the
proceedings and presenting therewith the supposed Deed of Assignment, the record,
nevertheless fails to show that action thereon had been taken by the probate Court. Every
act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed
to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or
any other transaction (Art. 1082, NCC). No serious argument can be offered to deny the
co-heirship of appellee in the estate under probate. It appearing, that the transaction is in
the nature of extrajudicial partition, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot
just divest the court of its jurisdiction over the estate and over their persons, by the mere
act of assignment and desistance.

WEEK 7 | Rule 88 – Payment of the Debts of the Estate

1. In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Mercedes
Cano Florante C. Timbol, Administrator-Appellee vs Jose Cano,
Oppositor-Appellant
Doctrine: In probate proceedings the court orders the probate of the will of the
decedent; grants letters of administration to the party best entitled thereto or to any
qualified applicant; supervises and controls all acts of administration; hears and approves
claims against the estate of the deceased; orders payment of lawful debts; authorizes sale,
mortgage or any encumbrance of real estate; directs the delivery of the estate to those
entitled thereto. It has been held that the court acts as a trustee, and as such trustee,
should jealously guard the estate and see that it is wisely and economically administered,
not dissipated.
Facts: Mercedes Cano died without a will leaving her only son Florante C. Timbol as sole
heir. Timbol at the time of death of his father was still a minor. His uncle Jose was appointed
in the meantime as the administrator of the estate. Jose petitioned that he be allowed to
lease the land owned by Cano and he would accordingly pay for its rental. This was allowed
by the court together with the approval to convert a portion of the land into a subdivision.
The plans of partition were approved. Later on, when Timbol was appointed as the
administrator in Jose’s stead, he petitioned that the land area allotted for subdivision
development be increased. This was opposed by Jose on the ground of prejudice on its
part with respect to the portion of land he was leasing, among other objections. The
motion however was still granted.
Cano appealed the decision of the probate court arguing among others that the court has
no jurisdiction to deprive him of his rights under the lease because these rights may be
annulled or modified only by a court of general jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not the probate court has jurisdiction to deprive the appellant of his
rights under the lease, as appellant argues that his rights may be annulled or modified
only by a court of general jurisdiction.
Ruling: Yes. In probate proceedings the court orders the probate of the will of the
decedent; grants letters of administration to the party best entitled thereto or to any
qualified applicant; supervises and controls all acts of administration; hears and approves
claims against the estate of the deceased; orders payment of lawful debts; authorizes sale,
mortgage or any encumbrance of real estate; directs the delivery of the estate to those
entitled thereto. It has been held that the court acts as a trustee, and as such trustee,
should jealously guard the estate and see that it is wisely and economically administered,
not dissipated.
Even the contract of lease under which the appellant holds the agricultural lands of the
intestate and which he now seeks to protect, was obtained with the court's approval. If the
probate court has the right to approve the lease, so may it order its revocation, or the
reduction of the subject of the lease. The matter of giving the property to a lessee is an act

of administration, also subject to the approval of the court. Of course, if the court abuses
its discretion in the approval of the contracts or acts of the administrator, its orders may
be subject to appeal and may be reversed on appeal; but not because the court may make
an error may it be said that it lacks jurisdiction to control acts of administration of the
administrator.
2. JAUCIAN V. QUEROL ROMAN JAUCIAN, plaintiff and appellant,

vs. FRANCISCO QUEROL, administrator of the intestate estate of
the deceased Hermenegilda Rogero, defendant and appellee.
Doctrine: Where a guarantor or surety is jointly and severally bound with the principal
debtor, the obligation of the guarantor or surety, equally with that of the principal debtor,
is absolute and not contingent within the meaning of section 746 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Where two persons are bound in solidum for the same debt and one of them
dies, the whole indebtedness can be proved against the estate of the latter; and if the claim
is not presented to the committee appointed to allow claims against the estate within the
time contemplated in section 689 of the Code of Civil Procedure the same will be barred
as against such estate, under the provisions of section 695 of the same Code.
Nature: An appeal to reverse a judgment of the Court of first Instance of Albay refusing
to allow a claim in favor of the plaintiff Jaucian against the estate of Rogero.
Facts: Oct 1908- Lino Dayandante and Hermenegilda Rogero executed a private writing
in which they acknowledge themselves to be indebted to Jaucian in the sum of P 13,
332.33. Rogero signed this document in the capacity of surety for Dayandante; but as
clearly appears from the instrument itself both debtors bound themselves jointly and
severally to the creditor or, and there is nothing in the terms of the obligation itself to
show that the relation between the two debtors was that of principal and surety.
Nov 1909- Rogero brought an action in the CFI of Albay against Jaucian, asking that the
document in question be cancelled as to her upon the ground that her signature was
obtained by means of fraud.
Jaucian responded, by way of cross-complaint, asking for judgment against Rogero for
the amount due upon the obligation, which appears to have matured at that time. But CFI
decided in favor of Rogero hence Jaucian appealed in the Supreme Court.
While the case was pending in the Supreme Court, Rogero died and the administrator of
her estate was substituted as the party plaintiff and appellee. Francisco Querol was named
administrator; and a committee was appointed to pass upon claims against the estate of
Rogero. This committee made its report on claims against Rogero estate on September 3,
1912.
Nov 25, 1913 - the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court and held that
the disputed claim was valid.
March 24, 1914- Jaucian entered an appearance in the estate proceedings, and filed with
the court a petition for the execution of the document of October, 1908, by the deceased;

since there is a failure on the part her coobligor Dayandante, to pay any part of the debt,
except the P100 received from him in March, 1914. Dayandante was completely insolvent.
Upon these facts, Jaucian asked the court for an order directing Querol, as administrator
of Rogero estate, to pay him the principal sum of P13, 332.33 plus its interest. But Querol
opposed the granting of the petition upon grounds that the claim had never been
presented to the committee for allowance; that 18 mths (Sept 1912-Mar 1914) had passed
since the filing of the report of the committee, and that the court was therefore without
jurisdiction to entertain the demand of the claimant.
On April 13, 1914, CFI (Hon. Moir) ruled that:
“…This claim is a contingent claim, because, according to the decision of the Supreme
Court, Hermenegilda Rogero was a surety of Lino Dayandante. The object of presenting
the claim to the commissioners is simply to allow them to pass on the claim and to give
the administrator an opportunity to defend the estate against the claim. This having been
given by the administrator defending the suit in the Supreme Court… he cannot now come
into court and hide behind a technicality and say that the claim had not been presented
to the commissioners and that, the commissioners having long since made report, the
claim cannot be referred to the commissioners and therefore the claim of Roman Jaucian
is barred.”
"Hermenegilda Rogero having been simply surety for Lino Dayandante, the administrator
has a right to require that Roman Jaucian produce a judgment for his claim against Lino
Dayandante, in order that the said administrator may be subrogated to the rights of
Jaucian against Dayandante. …When this action shall have been taken against Lino
Dayandante and an execution returned 'no effects,' then the claim of Jaucian against the
estate will be ordered paid or any balance that may be due to him." The court further
added that there must be a legal action taken against Lino Dayandante to determine
whether or not he is insolvent and that a simple affidavit saying that he has no property
except P100 worth of property, which he has ceded to Roman Jaucian, is not sufficient.
And so, following this suggestion by the court, Jaucian brought a legal action against
Dayandante and recovered a judgment against him for the full amount of the obligation
evidenced by the document of October 24, 1908. Execution was issued upon this
judgment, but was returned by the sheriff wholly unsatisfied, no property of the judgment
debtor having been found.
Then On October 28, 1914, counsel for Jaucian filed another petition in the estate
proceedings of Rogero, in which they averred, upon the grounds last stated, that
Dayandante was insolvent, and renewed the prayer of the original petition. It was
contended that the court, by, its order of April 13, 1914, had "admitted the claim."
The petition was again opposed by the administrator of the estate upon the grounds that
the claim was not admitted by the order of April 13, 1914; that the said claim was a mere
contingent claim against the property of Rogero; that the claim was not reduced to
judgment during the lifetime of Rogero; that it was not presented to the commissioners;

that this credit is outlawed or prescribed; and that this court has no jurisdiction to
consider this claim. CFI ruling (Hon. Jenkins) November 24, 1914 - CFI Albay refused to
grant Jaucian's petition. On December 11, 1914, the judge a quo entered an order denying
the rehearing and setting forth at length, the reasons upon which he based his denial of
the petition. These grounds were briefly, that as the claim had never been presented to
the committee on claims, it was barred; that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain it;
that the decision of the Supreme Court in the action brought by the deceased against
Jaucian did not decide anything except that the document therein disputed was a valid
instrument.
Issues:
1. WON the order of April 13, 1914 is final and hence appealable
2. WON Rogero’s liability was that of principal, though she was only a surety for
Dayandante
Ruling: 1. No, it was not final and therefore it was not appealable. In effect, it held that
whatever rights Jaucian might have against the estate of Rogero were subject to the
performance of a condition precedent, namely, that he should first exhaust this remedy
against Dayandante... The pivotal fact upon which the order was based was the failure of
appellant to show that he had exhausted his remedy against Dayandante, and this failure
the court regarded as a complete bar to the granting of the petition at that time. The order
of April 13, 1914, required no action by the administrator at that time, was not final, and
therefore was not appealable. We therefore conclude that no rights were conferred by the
said order of April 13, 1914, and that it did not preclude the administrator from making
opposition to the petition of the appellant when it was renewed.
2. Yes, Rogero’s liability is that of a principal even though she was only a surety for
Dayadante But Hon. Jenkins was correct in rejecting the claim of Jaucian, since it was
absolute claim and not contingent.
Bearing in mind that the deceased Hermenegilda Rogero, though surety for Lino
Dayandante, was nevertheless bound jointly and severally with him in the obligation, the
following provisions of law are here pertinent.
Article 1822 of the Civil Code provides: "By security a person binds himself to pay or
perform for a third person in case the latter should fail to do so. "If the surety binds
himself jointly with the principal debtor, the provisions of section fourth, chapter third,
title first, of this book shall be observed."
Article 1144 of the same code provides: "A creditor may sue any of the joint and several
(solidarios) debtors or all of them simultaneously. The claims instituted against one shall
not be an obstacle for those that may be later presented against the others, as long as it
does not appear that the debt has been collected in full."
Article 1830 of the same code provides: "The surety can not be compelled to pay a creditor
until application has been previously made of all the property of the debtor."

Article 1831 provides: "This application can not take place " (1) * * * (2) If he has jointly
bound himself with the debtor * * *."
The foregoing articles of the Civil Code make it clear that Hermenegilda Rogero was liable
absolutely and unconditionally for the full amount of the obligation without any right to
demand the exhaustion of the property of the principal debtor previous to its payment.
Her position so far as the creditor was concerned was exactly the same as if she had been
the principal debtor.
The absolute character of the claim and the duty of the committee to have allowed it in
full as such against the estate of Hermenegilda Rogero had it been opportunely presented
and found to be a valid claim is further established by section 698 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, which provides:
"When two or more persons are indebted on a joint contract, or upon a judgment founded
on a joint contract, and either of them dies, his estate shall be liable therefor, and it shall
be allowed by the committee as if the contract had been with him alone or the judgment
against him alone. But the estate shall have the right to recover contribution from the
other joint debtor."
In the official Spanish translation of the Code of Civil Procedure, the sense of the English
word "joint," as used in two places in the section above quoted, is rendered by the Spanish
word "mancomunadamente." This is incorrect. The sense of the word "joint," as here
used, would be more properly translated in Spanish by the word "solidaria," though even
this word does not express the meaning of the English with entire fidelity.
The section quoted, it should be explained, was originally taken by the author, or
compiler, of our Code of Civil Procedure from the statutes of the State of Vermont; and
the word "joint" is, therefore, here used in the sense which attaches to it in the common
law where there is no conception of obligation corresponding to the divisible joint
obligation contemplated in article 1138 of the Civil Code. It is just to say, the obligation is
apportionable among the debtors; and in case of the simple joint contract neither debtor
can be required to satisfy more than his aliquot part.
In the common law system every debtor in a joint obligation is liable in solidum for the
whole; and the only legal peculiarity worthy of remark concerning the "joint" contract at
common law is that the creditor is required to sue all the debtors at once.
To avoid the inconvenience of this procedural requirement and to permit the creditor in
a joint contract to do what the creditor in a solidary obligation can do under article 1144
of the Civil Code, it is not unusual for the parties to a common law contract to stipulate
that the debtors shall be "jointly and severally" liable. The force of this expression is to
enable the creditor to sue any one of the debtors or all together at pleasure.
From what has been said it is clear that Hermenegilda Rogero, and her estate after her
death, was liable absolutely for the whole obligation, under section 698 of the Code of

Civil Procedure; and if the claim had been duly presented to the committee for allowance
it should have been allowed, just as if the contract had been with her alone.
It is thus apparent that by the express and incontrovertible provisions both of the Civil
Code and the Code of Civil Procedure, this claim was an absolute claim. Applying section
695 of the Code of, Civil Procedure, this court has frequently decided that such claims are
barred if not presented to the committee in time; and we are of the opinion that, for this
reason, the claim was properly rejected by Judge Jenkins.
There is no force, in our judgment, in the contention that the pendency of the suit
instituted by the deceased for the cancellation of the document in which the obligation in
question was recorded was a bar to the presentation of the claim against the estate. The
fact that the lower court had declared the-document void was not conclusive, as its
judgment was not final, and even assuming that if the claim had been presented to the
committee for allowance, it would have been rejected and that the decision of the
committee would have been sustained by the Court of First Instance, the rights of the
creditor could have been protected by an appeal from that decision.
The only concrete illustration of a contingent claim given in section 746 is the case where
a person is liable as surety for the deceased, that is, where the principal debtor is dead.
This is a very different situation from that presented in the concrete case now before us,
where the surety is the person who is dead. - It is enough to say that where, as in the case
now before us, liability extends unconditionally to the entire amount stated in the
obligation, or, in other words, where the debtor is liable in solidum and without
postponement of execution, the liability is not contingent but absolute.
Dispositive: For the reasons stated, the decision of the trial court denying appellant's
petition and his motion for a new trial was correct and must be affirmed.
3. CU UNJIENG V. TIAOQUI 64 PHIL
Doctrine: DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION; CONTINGENT CLAIMS.—In the case of E.
Gaskell & Co. vs. Tan Sit (43 Phil., 810), this court defined a contingent claim as that "in
which liability depends on some future event that may or may not happen, and which
makes it uncertain whether there will ever be any liability." Elaborating on the idea, it was
stated: "The expression is used in contradistinction to the absolute claim, which is subject
to no contingency and may be proved and allowed as a debt by the committee on claims.
The absolute claim is such a claim as, if contested between living persons, would be proper
subject of immediate legal action and would supply a basis of a judgment for a sum
certain. It will be noted that the term 'contingent' has reference to the uncertainty of the
liability and not to the uncertainty in 'which the realization or collection of the claim may
be involved. The word 'contingent', as used in the original English, in the Code of Civil
Procedure, conveys the idea of ultimate uncertainty as to the happening of the event upon
which liability will arise; and it is not the precise equivalent of the Spanish word 'eventual'
by which it is commonly translated. The idea involved in the word 'eventual' may be
satisfied with the idea of that which is uncertain only in respect to the element of time. A

thing that is certain to happen at some time or other will eventually come to pass although
the exact time may be uncertain; to be contingent its happening must be wholly uncertain
until the event which fixes liability occurs." Some courts of the American Union have
defined a contingent claim as follows: "A contingent claim is where the liability depends
upon some future event which may or may not happen, and therefore makes it now wholly
uncertain whether there ever will be a liability.
ID.; ID.—The counterclaim of the defendants-appellants is not a contingent claim
because the obligation which it is attempted to enforce against the deceased or his legal
representatives, the administrators, does not depend on an uncertain or future event.
According to the allegations of the counterclaim contained in the amended answer, the
obligation contracted by the deceased arose from the time the conspiracy was carried out
and from the time the preliminary attachment was obtained illegally and without any
justifiable motive.
ID.; ID.—The Code of Civil Procedure contains no provision compelling the defendants
and appellants to inform the probate court that they had filed a counterclaim against the
deceased. However, if under section 602 of the same Code the probate court alone had
acquired jurisdiction to try and decide the settlement, payment of debts and distribution
of the estate of the deceased, to the exclusion of all other courts, it cannot be denied that
if the defendants-appellants wanted some remedy from said court for the protection of
their rights, they should apply to it on time and ask for the retention of properties
sufficient to pay for the counterclaim in case it should prosper.
ID.; ID.; DELIVERY OF PROPERTIES.—It cannot be denied that in the ordinary course
of an intestate proceeding the probate court should not authorize the delivery of the
properties until after payment has been made of the recognized debts of the deceased and
of the expenses of administration, and after the approval of the project of partition (sec.
753 of the Code of Civil Procedure), and that, as the counterclaim of the defendants-
appellants was pending decision in another court, it was improper to order either the
distribution of the inheritance or the delivery thereof to the heirs, but in this case, we
should not lose of the fact that, as the court had not theretofore been directly informed of
said counterclaim, it understood that the inheritance was ready for distribution, it
appearing from the report of the committee that there were no debts to be paid and it
being inferable from the record that the expenses of administration, including the
inheritance tax, had already been paid.
ID.; ID.; REMEDY OF THE DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.—The appellants have
within their reach the remedy afforded by section 731 of the Code of Civil Procedure in
accordance with which they may, after having obtained favorable judgment, ask that the
heirs contribute in proportion to the value of the properties received by them, for payment
of their counterclaim (Pavia vs. De la Rosa, 8 Phil., 70; Lopez vs. Enriquez, 16 Phil., 336;
Fabie vs. Yulo, 24 Phil., 240). Cu Unjieng and Cu Unjieng vs. Tiaoqui and Hidalgo Rizal,
64 Phil. 566, No. 43748 July 31, 1937

Facts: Tiaoqui filed a case for collection of money from the Cu Unjiengs. In the said case
initially instituted, properties of the Cu Unjiengs were preliminarily attached upon filing
of bond by Tiaoqui during his lifetime. During the pendency of the proceedings, Tiaoqui
died and was substituted later on by the administrators of his estate. When he died, estate
proceedings were commenced and when asked to file accounts and project of partition,
the administrators found difficulty in the same due to the pending litigation with the Cu
Unjiengs. When the accounting was submitted and duly approved, the final project of
partition took a later time to do. In the meanwhile, Cu Unjiengs had a counterclaim
against the plaintiff.
Issue: The issue in this case revolves around the nature of the counterclaim as a
contingent claim and whether the same should have been relayed to the probate court.
Ruling: From the definitions just quoted, it is evident that the counterclaim of the
defendants‐appellants is not a contingent claim because the obligation sought to be
enforced against the deceased or his legal representatives, the administrators, does not
depend on an uncertain or future event. According to the allegations of the counterclaim
contained in the amended answer, the obligation contradicted by the deceased arose from
the time the conspiracy was carried out and from the time the preliminary attachment
was obtained illegally and without any just cause. However, the administrators contend
in their brief that the counterclaim is of the nature of a contingent claim because it can
not be realized until final judgment has been rendered by the court. This contention is
sufficiently refuted by reproducing what has been stated in the case of E. Gaskell & Co. vs.
Tan Sit, supra, to the effect that "the term contigent has reference to the uncertainty of
the liability and not to the uncertainty in which the realization or collection of the claim
may be involved."
Referring now to the contention of the defendants‐appellants that they were not in duty
bound to inform the probate court that they had filed a counterclaim against the deceased,
it is true that the Code of Civil Procedure contains nor provision directly imposing such
duty on them. However, if under section 602 of the same Code the probate court alone
had acquired jurisdiction to try and decide the settlement, payment of debts and
distribution of the estate of the deceased, to the exclusion of all other courts, it cannot be
denied that if the defendants‐appellants wanted some remedy from said court for the
protection of their rights, they should timely apply to it and ask for the retention of
properties sufficient to pay for the counterclaim in case it should prosper. This court is
not unmindful of the fact that in this case the administrators were also in duty bound to
inform the probate court of the existence of the counterclaim, which duty was partly
complied with by them when they reiteratedly informed the court that it was not possible
to present a final account or project of partition on the ground that there were pending
litigations, among them that brought against the defendants Cu Unjiengs, and when they
applied for the reopening of the intestate proceedings and for authority to continue the
suit against said defendants. Such duty, however, was coextensive with that of the
defendants‐appellants and that latter were not relieved thereof by the conduct that might

have been observed by the administrators, which conduct,on the other hand, cannot be
considered improper taking into consideration all the circumstances hereinbefore stated.
4. INTESTATE OF JANUARIA GONZALES 72 PHIL 245
Doctrine: In the administration and liquidation of the estate of a deceased person, sales
ordered by the probate court for payment of debts are final and are not subject to legal
redemption. Unlike in ordinary execution sales, there is no legal provision allowing
redemption in the sale of property for payment of debts of a deceased person
Facts: In the summary settlement of the estate of Gonzales, the court ordered the
payment to creditor Abarro. No payment being made, the only property left by the
deceased was sold in public auction and proceeds were used to pay the debt. However, the
court ordered the same to be subject to legal redemption. One year has passed and since
then, no redemption was made. Thereafter, Abarro sought the finality of the sale. Tomasa
as one of the heirs opposed the same on the ground she has tendered the money already
to the sheriff to redeem the property.
Ruling: Tomasa de Guia has no right to redeem and that the sale made in favor of
Sisenando Abarro is final. In the administration and liquidation of the estate of a deceased
person, sales ordered by the probate court for payment of debts are final and are not
subject to legal redemption. Unlike in ordinary execution sales, there is no legal provision
allowing redemption in the sale of property for payment of debts of a deceased person
5. ECHAUS V. BLANCO, 179 SCRA 704
Doctrine: Remedial Law; Special Proceedings; Estates; Money claims against a
defendant who dies before a decision could be rendered in the civil case, should have been
instituted as a money claim in the intestate estate of the deceased person.—It must be
noted that Civil Case No. 6628 which is a money claim, was instituted during the lifetime
of C. N. Hodges. During its pendency and before a decision could be rendered by the
Regional Trial Court hearing the case, C.N. Hodges died. Upon his death, he was
substituted by PCIB as administrator of his estate. Being a money claim, said civil case
should have been dismissed and instituted as a money claim in the intestate estate of C.
N. Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1627) in accordance with Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Revised
Rules of Court. Echaus vs. Blanco, 179 SCRA 704, G.R. No. 30453 December 4, 1989.
Facts: Eschaus filed a claim in her capacity as administratrix of her late father’s estate
against Hodges for allegedly profits from a business endeavor. During the pendency of
the case, Hodges died. However, the case proceeded and PCIB was even substituted as a
party to the case with no objection. When judgment was rendered in favor of Eschaus,
instead of a writ of execution, a motion for payment pursuant to judgment was filed in the
special proceedings. The widow opposed the same.
Issue: WON the opposition is correct.

Ruling: It must be noted that Civil Case No. 6628 which is a money claim, was Instituted
during the lifetime of C. N. Hodges. During its pendency and before a decision could be
rendered by the Regional Trial Court hearing the case, C. N. Hodges died.
Upon his death, he was substituted by PCIB as administrator of his estate. Being a money
claim, said civil case should have been dismissed and instituted as a money claim in the
intestate estate of C. N. Hodges.
However, this is not to suggest that because the claim of petitioner was pursued to its
conclusion in Civil Case No. 6682 instead of being dismissed and filed as a money claim
in Special Proceedings No. 1672, the judgment rendered therein is null and void.
Moreover, when PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges was ordered to be
substituted as defendant, it registered no objection to the order. Thus, even if We admit
for the sake of argument that the trial court, after the death of C. N. Hodges has no
jurisdiction to render a judgment therein, the argument must fail. PCIB, participated
actively in the said case. It did not appeal the decision rendered therein, neither did it
raise the issue of jurisdiction ion at any stage. It has been consistently held by this court
that while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party's active participation
in the proceedings before the court without jurisdiction will estop such party from
assailing such lack of jurisdiction.
The Rules of Court allows a creditor to file his claim after the period set by the court in
the notice to creditors, provided the conditions stated in the rules are present. The period
prescribed for creditors isn’t exclusive and may be made before the order of distribution,
subject to the discretion of the court and under equitable terms.

Rule 89 – Sales, Mortgages and other Encumbrances of Property of

Decedent
1. The Estate of Luis Gamboa Carpizo vs. Roberto Floranza, G.R No.
4069, December 5, 1908.
Doctrine: Estates; Probate Jurisdiction.—A Court of First Instance, in the exercise

of its probate jurisdiction, has no' power to allow the sale of a specific piece of real estate
for the purpose of paying off a mortgage lien thereon.
Order Of Court.—An order made by a Court of First Instance, in probate proceedings, for
the sale of real property belonging to the estate of a deceased person, is void when no
notice of the hearing upon the petition for such sale is given, as required by section 722
of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Commissioners; Priority Or Claims.—Commissioners appointed to hear evidence with

respect to claims in proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, have
no jurisdiction to determine the question of priority in the payment of such claims.
Waiver Of Mortgage Lien.—The question whether a mortgage creditor waives his

mortgage in presenting his claim before the commissioners appointed for the settlement
of an estate, by reason of the provisions of section 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure, not
decided.
Facts: This case stemmed from the two orders of the CFI in probate proceeding directing
for the sale of real property. The Commissioners appointed to hear claims against the
estate of Luis Gamboa Carpizo in the judicial proceedings for the settlement of that estate
allowed a claim in favor of Balbino Jaucian. In their report made to the court, they said
that this claim "was secured by a mortgage on real estate and expressed an opinion as to
the preferential rights to which this creditor and another mortgage creditor would be
entitled in the distribution of the proceeds of the sale.
The administrator presented a petition to the court in which he referred to the report of
the commissioners, stated that it appeared that some of the creditors were mortgage
creditors, and asked that the court appoint a day for a hearing upon the question as to the
preference which these creditors enjoyed.
On the 22d of October, 1906, the court, acting on the petition filed by the administrator,
apparently without hearing any of the parties interested, made an order directing the
administrator to present a motion asking for an order directing the sale of the mortgaged
property; that the mortgage debt be paid from the proceeds of the sale, and that what
remained be distributed among the other creditors. This is one of the orders appealed
from.
In the whole course of the proceedings, the court allowed the sale of a property for the
payment of a specific debt. The rules however provide that the sale can be allowed to
satisfy the debts.

[ISSUE?]
RULING: There is nothing in any one of these sections nor in any other sections of the
code which indicates that the Court of First Instance, in the exercise of its probate
jurisdiction, has any power to order the sale of a specific piece of real estate for the
purpose of paying a mortgage debt which is a lien thereon. It may be that the court would
have authority to sell the property, subject to the mortgage lien, for the purpose of paying
other debts of the estate, but there is nothing giving the court authority to sell it for the
purpose of paying that specific debt.
Another fatal objection to the order of the 12th of November, directing the sale, is that the
court entirely failed to comply with the provisions of section 722 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. That section requires the administrator to present a petition asking for the
sale of the real estate. It also distinctly provides that, when such petition is made, the
court shall appoint a time and place for hearing it and shall require notice of the petition
and of the time and place of such hearing to be given in a newspaper of general circulation,
and that the court may order such further notice given as it deems proper.
2. Julian Boñaga vs. Roberto Soler, et. al., G.R No. 15717, June 30, 1961.
Doctrine: Executors and Administrators; Sale of property under administration; Notice
to heirs and hearing of application to sell essential; Sales without notice and hearing as
well as the order approving it are null and void ab initio.—Under Sections 4 and 7, Rule
90 where the authority to sell property under administration is issued without notice to
all the heirs and hearing of the application, such authority to sell as well as the sale itself
and the order approving it, are null and void ab initio (Arcilla vs. David, 77 Phil. 718;
Gabriel vs. Encarnacion, L-6736, May 4, 1954; and others cited therein).
Same; Notice under Section 4, Rule 90, Rules of Court, applies to all heirs residing in and
out of the Philippines.—Since Section 4, Rule 90, Rules of Court, does not distinguish
between heirs residing in and those residing outside the Philippines, its requirements
apply regardless of the place of residence of those required to be notified under said rule.
FACTS: Spouses Alejandro Ros and Maria Isaac died in 1935 and 1940, respectively. The
probate court appointed Juan Garza as administrator of the estate. Upon application, the
probate court authorized Garza to sell certain parcels of land pertaining to the estate.
Garza sold parcels of land (consisting of 21 parcels of abaca, coconut, pasture and forest
lands with an aggregate area of more than 1,001 hectares) to Roberto Soler.
During World War II, the records of the case were destroyed. Upon reconstitution, the
court appointed Julian Bonaga as administrator. Bonaga filed suit, in his capacity as
administrator, to annul the sales in favor of Soler. He alleged that said transactions were
fraudulent, made without notice to the heirs of Alejandro Ros of the hearing of the
application to sell, and that the sales were not beneficial to the heirs for various reasons.

Soler filed three motions to dismiss, the first two were dismissed. He alleged in the third
motion to dismiss various grounds including estoppel, prescription, and non-inclusion of
necessary parties. Without any hearing the court dismissed the action.
Issue: Whether the trial court erred in dismissing the action without trial on the merits
considering that there is allegation that the sale of the parcels of land to Soler did not
comply with the requirements under the Rules of Court?
Ruling: The sale on 1944 appears to be of 21 parcels of abaca, coconut, forest and pasture
lands, covering an aggregate area of more than 1, 001 hectares for the lump sum of P142K,
Japanese currency. Plaintiff-appellant alleges (and the record nowhere indicates the
contrary, that these lands comprised almost the entire estate. Nothing in the record would
show whether, as required by Rule 90, sections 4 and 7, the application for authority to
sell was set for hearing, or that the court ever caused notice thereof to be issued to the
heirs of Alejandro Ros. Incidentally, these heirs seem not to have gotten any part of the
purchase price since they were then allegedly in Spain. Yet, in the order of declaration of
heirs of the wife and approving the sale to Soler, the declaration of the heirs of the
husband Alejandro Ros was expressly held in abeyance, indicating a recognition of their
existence. Appellees maintain that the sale was made for the purpose of paying debts, but
this, at lease, is controversial. Appellant asserts that the total outstanding debts of the
estate at the time of the sale amounted to only P4, 641K a relatively meager sum compared
to the large tracts of land sold.
The lower court erred in dismissing the action without a hearing on the merits. A sale of
properties of an estate as beneficial to the interested parties, under Sections 4 and 7, Rule
90, must comply with the requisites therein provided, which are mandatory. Among these
requisites, the fixing of the time and place of hearing for an application to sell, and the
notice thereof to the heirs, are essential ; and without them, the authority to sell, the sale
itself, and the order approving it, would be null and void ob initio. Rule 90, Section 4,
does not distinguish between heirs residing in and those residing outside the Philippines.
Therefore, its requirements should apply regardless of the place of residence of those
required to be notified under said rule.
3. Luisa Avecilla Vda. De Celis, vs. Asuncion Roque Vda. De La Santa

and the Honorable Court Of Appeals, G.R. No. L-5294, September 30,
1953.
Doctrine: Objection of one of the heirs to the application for authority to sell a property
of the estate, or her failure to receive the notice of such application, is not a sufficient legal
cause to annul the sale ordered by the court, where it appears that he had actual
knowledge of the applicalion. The probate court has authority under the provisions of
sections 4 and 7 of Rule 90 to grant authority to the executor or administrator to sell
properties of the decedent, despite objection of one or some of the heirs.
Where five of the heirs of the decedent petition the court for authority to have a property
of the estate sold, and fail to notify one of the other heirs of such petition, and the latter
heir is likewise not notified of the orders granting such authority and approving the sale,

said orders are not final and executory in so far as said heir is concerned. The remedy of
appeal is still available.
Facts: Plaintiff-appellee Asuncion Roque Vda. de la Santa is one of the instituted heirs
in the will of her deceased brother, Teofilo Roque together with her other brothers and
sisters. The said will was allowed to probate in special proceedings of the CFI of Manila.
Sofronio Roque, one of the heirs, is the executor of the estate. In the special proceedings,
a petition was filed by Asuncion’s son (Ricardo de la Santa) praying that he be allowed to
file such petitions, pleadings etc, as may be necessary for the protection of his mother’s
interest. Pending resolution, Ricardo filed with the said special proceeding a special
power of attorney but the court denied the same.
Further, the probate court issued an order wherein it was recited that the instituted heirs,
with the exception of Asuncion Roque who was very ill in the provinces, had prayed for
the sale of the house and lot in question. The said order also contained the provision that
notice should be given to Ricardo de la Santa, as attorney-in-fact of appellee, of said
petition and the hearing of the same. Several orders was also issued by the court,
authorizing the administrator to sell the disputed property, requiring the appearance in
the court of the heir-petitioners, together with the administrator and Recardo de la Santa,
as attorney in fact of Asuncion Roque.
The same court, issued another order approving the deed of sale of the property in
controversy which order also authorized the administrator to receive the purchase price
and the final account of the administrator and the project of partition were approved by
the probate court.
From the findings of the Court of Appeals which recite the allegations set out in the
motion filed by the respondent Asuncion Roque Vda. de la Santa by which she objected,
for the reasons therein stated, to the sale of the lot and buildings in question, it appears
that she had actual knowledge of the application to sell the lot and buildings erected
thereon. Such knowledge is equivalent to notice.
Issue: The question then that arises is: Granting that she objected to the sale of the lot
and buildings erected thereon and her objection considered, as it must be presumed for
it was in the record of the special proceedings when the hearing of the application for
authority to sell was heard, but was disregarded, by the probate court, could her objection
be sufficient to prevent the probate court from granting the executor authority to sell the
property?
Ruling: Objection of one of the heirs to the application for authority to sell a property of
the estate, or her failure to receive the notice of such application, is not a sufficient legal
cause to annul the sale ordered by the court, where it appears that he had actual
knowledge of the applicalion. The probate court has authority under the provisions of
sections 4 and 7 of Rule 90 to grant authority to the executor or administrator to sell
properties of the decedent, despite objection of one or some of the heirs.

Under the Code of Civil Procedure, partition of real estate assigned to two or more heirs,
devisees or legatees and held by them in common could be applied to the court or judge
having jurisdiction of the estate by any of the co-owners, and such partition may bring
about or result in the sale of the real estate held in common despite objection to the sale
by a co-owner.
4. Leon de Jesus, et. al. vs. Eusebia de Jesus, et. al. G.R No. L-16553,
November 29, 1961.
Doctrine: Courts; Jurisdiction; Courts empowered Io approve stipulations

recognizing co-ownership of properly held in trust by the deceased - There being no
controversy between the former administratrix and the defendants that the latter and the
deceased"M. J."own the lot under litigation in common and that it was registered in the
deceased's name only in trust for all the co-owners, the probate court could approve, as it
did approve, the agreement wherein the parties expressly recognized their common
ownership of the property in question and the trust character of the exclusive title held by
the deceased over the same.
Descent and administration; Executors and administrators; Property ‘held in Trust;

probate court empowered to deed property held in trust to persons for "whose benefit
it was so held - Where the deceased in his lifetime held real property in trust for another
persons, the law permits the probate court to authorize the executor or administrator to
deed such property to the person or persons for whose use and benefit it was so held.
Same; Effect of lack of Notice to interested parties; The Rules of Court (Sec. 8, Rule 90)
make it mandatory that notice be served on the heirs and other interested persons of the
application for approval of any conveyance of property held in trust by the deceased, and
where no such notice is given, the order authorizing the conveyance, as well as the
conveyance itself, is completely void.
Facts: Ines Alejandrino, as administratrix of her late husband's estate, filed an inventory
which included a parcel of land. The decedent's sister opposed this inclusion on the
ground that it was co-owned with her and another brother. Instead of litigating the same,
the parties entered into an agreement dubbed as Statement of Facts. Ines Alejandrino
acknowledged that the land was co-owned and that her late husband was just holding the
same in trust. Later on, when Ines’s son substituted his mother as administrator, he
instituted an action to annul said agreement..
Issue: The principal issue here is whether or not the stipulations in question are void and
ineflective, either for lack of jwisdiction on the part of the probate court to act on them,
or for lack of notice of their approval to the heirs of the deceased.
Ruling: On the question of jurisdiction, we think the probate court had jurisdiction to
act on and approve of the stipulations in question, not only as an incident to its power to
exclude any property from the inventory of the estate of the deceased, but under section
9, Rule 90, Rules of Court, which permits the probate court, whenever the deceased in his
lifetime held real property in trust for another person, to authorize the executor or

administrator to deed such property to the person or persons for whose use and benefit it
was so held. There beins no controversy between the former administratrix and the
defendants that the latter and the deceased Melecio de Jesus own the lot in question in
common and that it was registered in the deceased's name only in trust for all the co-
owners, there was no need to file a separate action to an ordinary court to establish the
common ownership of the parties over said property and the probate court could approve,
as it did approve, the asreement wherein the parties expressly recognized their common
ownership of the property in question and the trust character of the exclusive title held by
the deceased over the same, especially since the parties themselves state that such
agreement was entered into in order to forestall future litigation between them and to
foster family relations, and in addition, the defendant Eusebia de jesus had agreed, in
consideration of the court's approval of said aweement, to waive a money claim against
the estate, so that court approval of said agreement would really redound to the benefit of
the estate and the heirs.
Section 9, Rule 90, however, provides that authority can be given by the probate court to
the administrator to convey property held in trust by the deceased to the benefeciaries of
the trust only "after notice given as required in the last preceding section'' i.e., that. “no
such conveyonce shell be authorized until notice of the application Tor that purpose hos
been given personally or by mail to oll persons interested, ond such further notice has
been given, by publication or otherwise, as the court deems proper” (sec. 8, Rule 90).
This rule makes it mandatory that notice be served on the heirs and other interested
persons of the application for approval of any conveyance of property held in trust by the
deceased, and where no such notice is given, the order authorizing the conveyance, as well
as the conveyance itself, is completely void. Here, plaintiffs claim that no such notice was
given the heirs of the deceased Melecio de Jesus of the petition for the approval of the
stipulations in question, and it is quite probable that the claim is true, because said heirs
were all minors when the proceedings in question took place. It would have been
necessary, therefore, to appoint a guardian od litern for them before they could be validly
served said notice, yet the records here do not show that such appointment of guardian
was obtained. In fact, any such appointment appears improbable, considering that the
stipulations in question were approved the very next day following their execution and
submission for approval. It must be observed that in 1948, before the promulgation of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, parents as such were not the legal representatives of their
children before the courts and could not dispose of their pro perty without judicial
authorization.

WEEK 8 | Rule 90- Distribution and Partition of the Estate

1. IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED
EMETERIO LOPEZ. CONCEPCION LOPEZ, PETITIONER AND APPELLEE,
VS. ADELA LOPEZ ET AL., OPPOSITORS AND APPELLANTS, G.R. No.
45736, May 26, 1939
Doctrine: It is a well-settled rule of pleadings, applicable to motions or petitions, that
the prayer for relief, though part of the pleading, is no part of the cause of action or
defense alleged therein, and the pleader is entitled to as much relief as the facts duly
pleaded may warrant. In the motion for reconsideration filed by them, the lack of notice
is alleged; but the motion is not even verified. In the present case, record showed that
Attorney Simplicio B. Pena was the counsel for both the administrator and the oppositors-
appellants. The petition for declaration of heirs, although signed by Attorney Simplicio B.
Pena as "abogado del administrador", was, in fact, a petition filed in behalf of the
oppositors-appellants as their right to succession is therein asserted and prayed for.
Under these circumstances, there exists sufficient ground for holding, as we do hold, that
the oppositors-appellants had notice of the petition as well as of the hearing where the
said attorney was present.
Facts: Concepcion Lopez filed a petition in the intestate proceedings of the deceased
Emeterio Lopez, claiming to the an acknowledged natural daughter of the deaceased and
praying that she be declared his universal heiress entitled to a summary award of his
estate, valued at P6000 (the jurisdictional amount before it was amended to P10,000).
The oppositors, nephews and nieces of the deceased represented by counsel Atty. Peña,
filed their opposition to the claim and praying that they be adjudged entitled to the
property of the deceased. Conception Lopez filed an amended petition alleging that the
value of the estate was actually P9,000 and that distribution should be made through a
regular administration proceeding. An administrator was appointed, and Atty. Peña filed
a motion for declaration of heirs and prayed that the oppositors be declared as such. The
CFI granted the petition of the Concepcion and declared her as the acknowledged natural
child of the deceased and universal heir. Oppositors maintain that there must be a
separate action for recognition and assuming that no separate action is necessary, the
petition filed by Concepcion in the intestate proceedings were insufficient.
Issue: Whether the Court exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring the oppositors as heirs.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. A person recognized as such need
simply to intervene in the intestate proceedings, by alleging and proving therein his or
her status as such, and claiming accordingly the right to share in the inheritance. On the
second issue, even if there is no prayer that she be declared an acknowledged natural
child... her prayer that she be declared universal heiress implies like a prayer that she be
recognized as an acknowledged natural child... Under the rules of pleadings... the pleader
is entitled to as much relief as the fact duly pleaded may warrant. The fact that Concepcion
held such status for an uninterrupted length of time was conclusive. Further, the
oppositors cannot claim that they had no notice because their counsel signed as the
“abogado de administrador”, Atty. Peña serving as counsel to both the administrator and
the oppositors.
2. Intestate of the deceased Benita Lambengco. AMBROSIO
SANTIESTEBAN, administrator, ROSA SANTIESTEBAN and THE HEIRS
OF PERFECTO SANTIESTEBAN, appellees, vs. GUADALUPE
SANTIESTEBAN and CLARA SANTIESTEBAN, appellants, G.R. No. L-45217
June 30, 1939
Doctrine: Under Section 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure, (corresponding to Section
1, Rule 90) what brings an intestate (or testate) proceeding to a close is the order of
distribution directing delivery of the residue to the persons entitled thereto after paying
the indebtedness, if any, left by the deceased.
Facts: Benita Lambengco died leaving her surviving spouse Ambrosio Santiesban and
her children, Perfecto, Guadalupe, Rosa and Clara as heirs. In the intestate proceedings,
Ambrosio was appointed judicial administrator. As the deceased left no unpaid debts or
obligations, her heirs executed an extrajudicial partition of the estate approved by the
court, 8 parcels of which was given to Ambrosio. The court ordered the final closure of the
intestate as the properties have been delivered to the heirs and the inheritance tax was
paid.
Ambrosio conveyed the 8 parcels to Guadalupe and the latter applied for registration but
was opposed by Macondray & Co. alleging ownership by virtue of a foreclosure of a
mortgage. 2 years later, Ambrosio moved to reopen the intestate proceeding and was
granted on MR and was required to name a new administrator. He failed to do so since
he died. A year later, Guadalupe filed a motion to reopen the instate and named a new
administrator which was granted by the court on Nov. 12 but was reversed on MR on Dec.
11 hence the case at bar.
Issue: Whether the court exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside the order of Nov. 12.
Ruling: The order of Nov. 12 did not finally determine the action and was only
interlocutory in nature. The orders irregularly issued by the court were those which
reopened the intestate and appointed a new administrator, because the order closing the
intestate put an end thereto and relieved the administrator from his duties. Under Sec.
753 of the Code of Civil Procedure, what brings an intestate proceeding to a close is the
order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue to the persons entitled thereto
after paying the indebtedness, if any, left by the deceased. This order was issued in the
intestate when the court approved the partition executed and submitted by all the heirs.

3. ELEDONIA SOLIVIO, PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS AND CONCORDIA JAVELLANA VILLANUEVA, RESPONDENTS,
G.R. No. 83484, February 12, 1990
Doctrine: In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court
of First Instance (now RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set aside the order
declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia) declared as
co-heir and recover her share of the properties of the deceased, was properly filed by her
in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when the court denied her motion, was to elevate the
denial to the Court of Appeals for review on certiorari. However, instead of availing of that
remedy, she filed more than one year later, a separate action for the same purpose in
Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate action was improperly filed for it is the
probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the
estate.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of
a decedent's estate, a court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a
co-equal court.
Facts: This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr,", known
for writing “Without Seeing the Dawn”.Javellana died a bachelor, without descendants,
ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his
maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia
Solivio; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his
deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
Esteban, Jr. had, repeatedly shared to his aunt Celedonia and some close friends his
desire to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but
deserving students obtain a college education. Alas he perished prior to reaching his
dream.
The funeral concluded, Concordia and Celedonia discussed the disposition of Esteban's
properties. Celedonia agreed to take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of
the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed a Spl.
Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of
Esteban Javellana, Jr.. She subsequently filed an amended petition praying that letters of
administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that
after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be
adjudicated to her.
Upon due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she
was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. Thereafter, she sold
properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and
proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION"
which she caused to be registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission on July

17,1981 under Reg. No. 0100027.

Sometime later, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a MoR of the court's order declaring
Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased.
Concordia’s motion was denied by the court for tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial,
Concordia filed a civil case in the RTC of Iloilo for partition, recovery of possession,
ownership and damages.
Issue: Whether the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No. 13207 for
partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban Javellana,
Jr. even while the probate proceedings were still pending in the same court
Ruling: The RTC holds no authority , to rule entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for
partition and recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate
proceedings (Spl, Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in the
same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and approval of the
administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir,
and terminating the proceedings.
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to
the administration and thus far relieves the administrator from his duties.
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the
payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive
the same.
The finality of the approval of the project of The probate court, in the exercise of its
jurisdiction to make distribution, has power to determine the proportion or parts to which
each distributed is entitled. The power to determine the legality or illegality of the
testamentary provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making a just and legal
distribution of the inheritance.
4. MARGARITA SALVADOR; IN HER OWN BEHALF AND AS ATTORNEY-
IN-FACT OF: CANDIDA SALVADOR, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON.
JUDGE ANDRES STA. MARIA, DOMINADOR CARDENAS, REMEDIOS
CABRERA, ALBERTO M.K. JAMIR AND SIMEON ENRIQUEZ,
RESPONDENTS, G.R. No. L-25952, June 30, 1967
Doctrine: It is a settled point of law that the right of heirs to specific, distributive shares
of inheritance does not become finally determinable until all the debt of the estate are
paid. Until then, in the face of said claims, their rights cannot be enforced, are inchoate,
and subject to the existence of a residue after payment of the debts. In the case at bar,
Petitioners rely for their rights on their alleged character as heirs of Celestino; as such,
they were substituted in the reconveyance case; the reconveyance to them was
reconveyance to them as heirs of Celestino Salvador. It follows that the properties they

claim are, even by their own reasoning, part of Celestino's estate. Their right thereto as
allegedly his heirs would arise only if said parcels of land are part of the estate of Celestino,
not otherwise.
Facts: In 1941 Celestino sold the lots to spouses Salvador. In 1955 alleging that for lack
of valuable consideration, he instituted an action for reconveyance to reclaim the lots sold
to the spouses. 1 year later celestino died testate. The 21 heirs then continued the
reconveyance case wherein they were able to get favorable judgment. The testate
proceedings continued and as payment for a debt of the estate, the probate court
proceeded to settle the debt by liquidating one of the lots which was won in the
reconveyance case.
Issue: Whether the probate court can settle the estate using the lot which was won in the
reconveyance suit.
Ruling: Yes, probate court’s decision sustained. It is a settled point of law that the right
of heirs to specific distributive shares of inheritance does not become finally determinable
until all the debts of the estate are paid. Until then, in the face of said claims, their rights
cannot be enforced, are inchoate, and subject to the existence of a residue after payment
of the debts. Petitioners do not question the existence of the debts abovementioned. They
only contend that the properties involved having been ordered by final judgment
reconveyed to them, not to the estate, the same are not properties of the estate but their
own, and thus, not liable for debts of the estate.
Said contention is self-refuting. Petitioners rely for their rights on their alleged character
as heirs of Celestino; as such, they were substituted in the reconveyance case; the
reconveyance to them was reconveyance to them as heirs of Celestino Salvador. It follows
that the properties they claim are, even by their own reasoning, part of Celestino's estate.
Their right thereto as allegedly his heirs would arise only if said parcels of land are part of
the estate of Celestino, not otherwise. Their having received the same, therefore, in the
reconveyance action, was perforce in trust for theestate, subject to its obligations. They
cannot distribute said properties among themselves as substituted heirs without the debts
of the estate being first satisfied.

5. Timbol vs Cano G.R. No. L-15445, April 29, 1961

Doctrine: In probate proceedings the court orders the probate of the will of the
decedent, grants letters of administration to the party best entitled to any qualified
applicant, supervises and controls all acts of administration, hears and approves claims
against the estate of the deceased, orders payment of lawful debts, authorizes the sale,
mortgage or any encumbrance of real estate (Rule 90, Sec. 2) and directs the delivery of
the estate to those entitled thereto. The court acts as a trustee, and, as such trustee, should
jealously guard the estate and see that it is wisely and economically administered, not
dissipated.
Facts: Mercedes Cano died leaving her only son Floranto Timbol as sole heir. Her
brother, Jose Cano, was appointed judicial administrator. Jose proposed that the
agricultural lands of the estate be leased to him at Php4,000, and said this rental to be
used for the maintenance of the minor and the payment of land taxes and dues to the
government, which was thereby approved by the court. On January 14, 1956 the court,
upon motion of the administrator and the conformity of the minor heir and his uncles,
approved the reduction of the annual rental of the agricultural lands of the intestate leased
to the administrator from P4,000 to P2,400 and the conversion of 30 hectares of the
agricultural lands into a subdivision. On June 6, 1957 Florante C. Timbol was appointed
administrator in place of Jose Cano. Florante then presented a modified motion (a) that
the area destined for the projected subdivision be increased from 30 hectares to 41.9233
hectares and (b) that the plan submitted be approved, but said motion was opposed by
Jose because the enlargement of the subdivision would reduce the land leased to him and
his tenants will lose their landholdings. Nevertheless, the court approved Florante’s
petition hence the case at bar.
Issue: Whether or not the probate court has jurisdiction to annul rights under the
contract of lease though it would prejudice the lessee.
Ruling: The Supreme Court held in a YES. In probate proceedings, the court orders the
probate of the will of the decedent, grants letters of administration of the party best
entitled thereto, supervises and controls all acts of administration, hears and approves
claims against the estate of the deceased, orders payment of lawful debts, authorizes sale,
mortgage, or any encumbrance or real estate, directs the delivery of the estate to those
entitled. The lease was obtained with the court’s approval hence if the probate court has
the right to approve the lease, so may it order its revocation or reduction of the subject of
the lease. And though lessee may be prejudiced by the reduction, reduction alone cannot
bar the reduction of the land leased because such reduction is necessary to raise funds to
pay and liquidate the debts of the estate under administration.
6. Uriarte vs. Court of First Instance of Negros Occ. GR Nos. L-21938-
39. May 29, 1970.
Doctrine: - The matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the
special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by former Rule 75, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, now Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that
the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, shall be in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he

resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court
of first instance of any province in which he had estate.
- In accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings for the
Settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings
for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate
proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found that the decedent had left
a last will, proceedings for 'the probate of the latter should replace the intestate
proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter
being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the
executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice,
that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding- shall
continue as an intestacy,
Facts: Don Juan Uriarte y Goite died in Spain, left properties both in Manila and Negros.
The alleged natural son of Don Juan, Vicente Uriarte, filed petition (Special Proceeding
No. 6344) on November 6, 1961 for settlement of Intestate Estate of Don Juan before the
Negros Occidental court. He alleged therein, inter alia, that, as a natural son of the latter,
he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of said decedent, petitioner had
instituted Civil Case No. 6142 in the same Court for his compulsory acknowledgment as
such natural son. Upon petitioner's motion the Negros Court appointed PNB as special
administrator of the estate, but the latter failed to qualify. Said petition was opposed by
Higinio Uriarte, the nephew of Don Juan and one of the two respondents therein. On
August 28, 1962, Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced
Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the Manila Court for the probate of a document alleged
to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he filed in
Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the
following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there
was no legal basis to proceed with said intestate proceedings, and (2) that petitioner
Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate said intestate proceedings,
he not being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent. A copy of the Petition for
Probate and of the alleged Will were attached to the Motion to Dismiss. Vicente opposed
the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros Court was first to take
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the decease, it had acquired exclusive
jurisdiction over same pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. The Negros
Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to dismiss and dismissed the Special
Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it. His motion for reconsideration of said order
having been denied on July 27, 1963, petitioner proceeded to file his notice of appeal,
appeal bond and record on appeal for the purpose of appealing from said orders to this
court on questions of law. Vicente then filed Omnibus Motion in Manila Court for leave
to intervene, and dismissal of petition for probate, and annulment of proceedings, which
was denied by said court. On the other hand, after proper proceedings were had in Special
Proceeding No. 51396, the Manila Court admitted to probate the document submitted to,
it as the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite, the petition for probate appearing not to have
been contested.
Issue: Whether or not the Negros Court erred in dismissing Special Proceeding No. 6644,
on the one hand, and on the other, and whether the Manila Court similarly erred in not

dismissing Special Proceeding No. 51396 notwithstanding proof of the prior filing of
Special Proceeding No. 6344 in the Negros Court.
Ruling: No, Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the
estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen
or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in which he resided at the
time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance
of any province in which he had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that
of a non-resident alien — like the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, the Courts of First
Instance in provinces where the deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the proper special proceeding for the settlement of his estate. These
Courts of First Instance are the Negros and the Manila Courts, province and city where
the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite left considerable properties. It cannot be denied that a
special proceeding intended to effect the distribution of the estate of a deceased person,
whether in accordance with the law on intestate succession or in accordance with his will,
is a "probate matter" or a proceeding for the settlement of his estate. It is equally true,
however, that in accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate
proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over
intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in
the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found it
hat the decedent had left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the latter should
replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been
appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his
possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be
without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the
proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication
that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. Having
said the Negros Court’s special proceeding for the settlement of the Intestate Estate shall
give way to the Manila Court’s Special Proceeding No. 51396 admission of the document
submitted to, it as the last will of Juan Uriarte y Goite, the petition for probate appearing
not to have been contested.

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MIDTERM CASES | SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 1|Page

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 2|Page

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 3|Page

3. Pilar S. Vda. De Manalo, Antonio S. Manalo, Orlando S. Manalo, and

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 4|Page

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 5|Page

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 6|Page

5. Pedro E. Baybayan, Cipriano Evangelista, and Spouses Bartolome and

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 7|Page

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 8|Page

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 9|Page

6. Hon. Jose F. Fernandez, Judge of the Court of First Instance, Negros

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 10 | P a g e

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 13 | P a g e

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 14 | P a g e

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 15 | P a g e

WEEK 2 |Rule 73- Venue and Process

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JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 18 | P a g e

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 19 | P a g e

jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 21 | P a g e

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 22 | P a g e

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 23 | P a g e

that questions as to title to property cannot be passed upon in testate or intestate

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 24 | P a g e

Hence, this appeal.

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 25 | P a g e

5. Vicente Uriarte, Petitioners vs The Court of First Instance of Negros

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 26 | P a g e

where the special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by Section 1, Rule 73 of

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 27 | P a g e

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 28 | P a g e

Further, testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of a

(2) Where intestate proceedings had already been commenced before a

6. Paz Y. Ocampo et al., Plaintiff-Appellees vs Conrado Potenciano, et al.,

Doctrine: HUSBAND AND WIFE; CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP; DISSOLUTION;

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 29 | P a g e

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 30 | P a g e

8. Agueda Benedicto De La Rama, Plaintiff-Appellee vs Esteban De La

Doctrine: HUSBAND AND WIFE; DIVORCE; EVIDENCE OF VALUE OF CONJUGAL

In so far as defendant-appellant’s assignments of error are based on the action of

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 32 | P a g e

9. Josefa Fulgencio, Plaintiff-Appelleet vs Benita Gatchalian, et al.,

Doctrine: HUSBAND AND WIFE; DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BY

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 33 | P a g e

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 34 | P a g e

deemed to be conjugal partnership property, liable for the debts of the

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 35 | P a g e

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 36 | P a g e

WEEK 3 |Rule 74- Summary of Settlement of Estates

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JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 39 | P a g e

3. In the matter of the intestate estate of Paz E. Siguion Torres: Alberto

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 40 | P a g e

4. ARCILLAS V. MONTEJO 26 SCRA 197 (1968)

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 42 | P a g e

5. ERMAC VS. MEDELO (64 SCRA 359)

6. CARREON V. AGCAOILI 1 SCRA 521 (1961)

JUDGE MANASSEH S. BASTES | DVOREF | LAW 3B ’18-19 43 | P a g e