Alaban Vs Ca

FACTS: This is a petition for review of the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals

(CA) in a civil case dismissing petitioners' petition for annulment of judgment.

Francisco Provido filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and
Testatament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado (decedent'), who died on
26 October 2000 in Janiuay, Iloilo.

Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and the executor of her
will. After which RTC rendered its Decision, allowing the probate of the will of the
decedent and directing the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent,
petitioners filed a motion for the reopening of the probate proceedings 4 months
thereafter.

It appears that one of the petitioners herein, Dolores M. Flores (Flores'), who is a
niece of the decedent, filed a petition for letters of administration with the RTC
of General Santos City, claiming that the decedent died intestate without any
issue, survived by five groups of collateral heirs.

Likewise, they filed an opposition to the allowance of the will of the decedent, as
well as the issuance of letters testamentary to respondent, [8] claiming that
they are the intestate heirs of the decedent and that the will did not satisfy its
formalities prescribed by law. RTC denied the motion.

The RTC dismissed the petition on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, stating
that the probate court in Janiuay, Iloilo has jurisdiction since the venue for
a petition for the settlement of the estate of a decedent is the place where the
decedent died. This is also in accordance with the rule that the first court
acquiring jurisdiction shall continue hearing the case to the exclusion of other
courts, the RTC added. 

CA: Petitioners thereafter filed a petition [13] with an application for preliminary

injunction with the CA, seeking the annulment of the RTC's Decision. Moreover,
the CA declared as baseless petitioners' claim that the proceedings in the RTC
was attended by extrinsic fraud.

Hence Petion at bar: Petitioners were not made parties to the probate
proceedings because the decedent did not institute them as her
heirs. [24] Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are heirs of the
decedent, lack of notice to them is not a fatal defect since personal notice upon
the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional
requisite. 

Issue: Whether or not petitioners were entitled to be notified of the probate

proceedings.

Held: No.
According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator. A perusal of the will shows that
respondent was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as
nephews and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate
heirs [49] who are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings
under the Rules. Respondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in
the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the same.

Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the

purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal
notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a
jurisdictional requisite. 

Therefore, Petitioners were not denied their day in court, as they were not
prevented from participating in the proceedings and presenting their case before
the probate court. The non-inclusion of petitioners' names in the petition and the
alleged failure to personally notify them of the proceedings do not constitute
extrinsic fraud.

RODRIGUEZ Vs.ALCALA

FACTS: This case relates to the probate of the will of the deceased Marta
Alcantara. On or about March 26, 1929, a petition was filed by Rufino R.
Rodriguez in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas, praying (1)
that the will of the deceased Marta Alcantara be admitted to probate, and (2)
that he be appointed special administrator of the estate of the deceased. The
petition was accompanied by the will (Exhibit A) written in Tagalog, with its
translation into English (Exhibit A-1).

To said petition Cayetano Alcala, husband of the deceased, filed an opposition.

Oppositions were also filed by the spouses Maximino de Luna and Petra
Rodriguez, and by Isaac Reynoso, all of them relatives of the deceased. The
oppositions were based on the following grounds:

(1) That the will was not executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed
by Act No. 190, and

(2) that the signatures of the testatrix were not authentic and were procured
through fraud and undue influence.

WILL: The foregoing attestation clause expressly states that the testatrix signed
the will in the presence of the witnesses and that the latter signed it in the
presence of the testatrix and of each other, and that both testatrix and
witnesses signed each and every page of the will.

SUBSCRPTION: It will be noted, however, that the attestation fails to state that
the testatrix signed each and every page of the will in the presence of the
witnesses and that the latter signed each and every page of the will in the
presence of the testatrix and of each other.

trial court denied the petition for the probate of the will, and rendered a
judgment in favor of the opponents declaring the will invalid on the ground that
the attestation clause thereof was not in conformity with the requirements 

Issue: WON

We are unable to agree with the lower court that the omission alone of the
phrase "on the left margin" in the attestation clause, in the absence of any other
defect, is fatal to the validity of the will.

We may conclude, therefore, that a mere omission in the attestation clause of

the phrase "on the left margin," which is not expressly required by the statute,
when said clause is otherwise in strict conformity with the requirements of
section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, does not render a will invalid.

In this case, In the presence of whom they signed each and every page of the
will, the attestation fails to state, in violation of the express requirements of
section 618 of Act No. 190, as amended, to wit: "The attestation clause shall
state . . . that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, . . . in the
presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all
pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other." This defect of
the attestation clause is fatal to the validity of the will.

For all of the foregoing, it is held that the will in question is invalid because of
the failure of the attestation clause to state in whose presence the pages of the
will were signed by the testatrix and the witnesses. The judgment appealed
from, denying probate of the will, should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs.
So ordered.

In the Matter of the Testate Estate of BASIL GORDON BUTLER;

MERCEDES LEON, petitioner-appellant, and ADA LOGGEY
GHEZZI, administratrix-appellant, vs. MANUFACTURERS LIFE INSURANCE
CO., thru Philippine Branch, oppositor-appellee.

This is an appeal from the Court of First Instance of Manila which denied a
motion of the administratrix in the matter of the testate estate of Basil Gordon
Butler

FACTS: formerly a resident of the Philippines, died in Brooklyn, New York City, in 1945, leaving
a will which was duly probated in the Surrogate's Court of New York County on August 3 of the
same year, and of which James Ross, Sr., James Madison Ross, Jr. and Ewald E. Selph were
named executors.
After payment of these legacies and my just debts, including funeral expenses, I devise, give and
bequeath all of my remaining estate and personal effects of which I may die possessed to
Mercedes de Leon, of Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal, to wit: the personal effects to be delivered to
her for her use and profit; the moneys, securities and other valuable property, not personal
effects, to be held in trust for her benefit by my executors, at their absolute discretion, to be
administered for her permanent benefit in whatever way they may consider most advantageous
in the circumstances existing.

Since the said Mercedes de Leon is not of sound judgment, and discretion in the handling of
money, it is not my wish that she be given any sums of money other than for her current needs,
except as my executors in their judgment deem advantageous to her. In case the amount
available for this bequest be sufficient to purchase an adequate annuity, the executors in their
discretion may do so. And I attest and direct that I do not wish to intend that the action of my
executors upon their discretion in this matter be questioned by anyone whatsoever.

James Madison Ross was appointed trustee by the New York County Surrogate's Court on
February 4, 1948. 

Once appointed, and with the beneficiary signing the application with him, Ross bought an
annuity from the Manufacturer's life Insurance Co. at its head office in Toronto, Canada, paying
in advance $17,091.03 as the combined premiums. The contract stipulates for a monthly
payment of $57.60 to Mercedes Benz during her lifetime, with the proviso that in the event of her
death, the residue, if any, of the capital sum shall be paid in one sum to James Madison Ross or
his successor as trustee. And beginning May 27, 1948, Mercedes de Leon has been receiving
the stipulated monthly allowance through the Insurance Company's Manila Office.

Mercedes de Leon on September 4, 1948, presented Butler's will for probate in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, and secured the appointment of Ada Loggey Ghezzi as administratrix with
the will 

 (James Madison Ross and Ewald E. Selph had expressly declined appointment as executors
"on the ground that the probate proceedings of the above estate were terminated by the
Surrogate's Court of the County of New York, New York City, U. S. A.,

Issue: Whether or not the properties in Canada may be subjected to a will of the
decedent

Held: No, The general rule universally recognized is that administration extends
only to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was
granted, so that an administrator appointed in one state or country has no
power over property in another state or country.

Estate, how administered.-When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant
letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such
letters testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the
testator in the Philippines.

Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration,
shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon
it; and the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of
estates in the Philippines belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another
state or country.

It is manifest from the facts before set out that the funds in question are outside
the jurisdiction of the probate court of Manila. Having been invested in an
annuity in Canada under a contract executed in the country, Canada is the suits
of the money. The party whose appearance the appellant seeks is only a branch
or agency of the company which holds the funds in its possession, the agency's
intervention being limited to delivering to the annuitant the checks made out
and issued from the home office. There is no showing or allegation that the
funds have been transferred or removed to the Manila
Branch.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Even if the money were in the hands of the Manila Branch, yet it no longer forms
part of butler's estate and is beyond the control of the court. It has passed
completely into the hands of the company in virtue of a contract duly authorized
and validly executed. Whether considered as a trust or as simple consideration
for the company's assumed obligation, which it has been religiously performing,
of paying periodical allowances to the annuitant, the proceeds of the sale can not
be withdrawn without the consent of the company, except, upon the death of the
annuitant, the residuary legatee may claim the remainder, if there be any.
Neither the domiciliary or ancillary executor of Butler's will, nor the trustee, nor
the annuitant has disposition of any of these funds beyond the amounts and
except upon the conditions agreed upon in the contract for
annuity.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In other words, the administratrix is a complete stranger to the subject of the

motion and to the appellee. There being no creditors, the only subject of the
motion, we incline to believe, is to enable Mercedes de Leon to get the legacy in
a lump sum in complete disregard of the wishes of the testator, who showed
deep concern for her welfare, and of the annuity contract which the annuitant
herself applied for in conjunction with the trustee.chanroblesvirtualawl

Fule vs CA

Facts:  Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at
Calamba a petition for letters of administration to the property of the
decedent Amado Garcia

MR was filed by the surviving spouce Preciosa B. Garcia alleging she

should be preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and,
Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B.
Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be appointed special administratrix of
the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as regular administratrix after
due hearing.

Meanwhile notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration

filed by Virginia was published.
RTC: Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to
the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by
praying to be appointed as special and regular administratrix of the
estate.

Denied the MR.

Before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of

Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a
petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City Branch over the same intestate estate of Amado G.
Garcia. Judge Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed
Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix.

Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before his court
until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case
pending before the Court of Appeals upon informing the presiding judge
of the pending appeal.

Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order
granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate
Obligations" in that the payments were for the benefit of the estate and
that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in
Sp. Proc.

Issue: Residence: WON venue is improperly laid down.

In the application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the

Revised Rules of Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is
construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some
cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as
generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey
the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." 8 In other words, "resides" should
be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the
term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or
domicile. 9 Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given
place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention
to make it one's domicile. 10 No particular length of time of residence is required
though; however, the residence must be more than temporary. 1

In this case it was appeared in his death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule
herself before the Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of
Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City.
Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged
that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna."
Therefore , a death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the
decedent at the time of his death.

Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive her objection to the jurisdiction or
venue assumed by the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of
a mere practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as surviving
spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the proper venue of
the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent

Issue: As to appointment of Administrator

Held:

Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen there is delay in granting letters

testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the
allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until
the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators
appointed. 

Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator was only proper when the
allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal.

The new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such
appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree
among themselves. 14 

Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not

lies in the probate court. 15 That, however, is no authority for the judge to
become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his
passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on
reason, equity, justice and legal principle. There is no reason why the same
fundamental and legal principles governing the choice of a regular administrator
should not be taken into account in the appointment of a special
administrator. 16 

Nothing is wrong for the judge to consider the order of preference in the
appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special administrator.
After all, the consideration that overrides all others in this respect is
the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate of the decedent. 17 

Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of
the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal
partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not more, interest in
administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or
bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked
ownership of a property. 18
VENUE:

SC held under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may properly
decree that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and
transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice and
avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of
jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia
and the appointment of special administratrix over the latter's estate be
approved and authorized and the Court of First Instance of Laguna be
disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be required to transfer
all the records thereof to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for the
continuation of the proceedings.

ARANZ VS GALING

FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals, dated 13 January 1987, in CA-G.R. SP No. 09622, entitled "Joaquina R-
Infante de Aranz, et al., petitioners vs. Hon. Nicolas Galing, etc., et al.,
respondents," dismissing petitioners' petition for certiorari and prohibition as-,
sailing the orders 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, dated 12
May 1986 and 30 May 1986, respectively, in Sp. Proc. No. 9995, entitled, "In the
Matter of Petition for Approval of the Last Will and Testament of Montserrat R-
Infante y G-Pola Joaquin R. Infante, Petitioner."

Private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, a
petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and testament of the late
Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola 

Said order was published in the "Nueva Era" A newspaper of general circulation
in Metro Manila once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. On the date of the
hearing, no oppositor appeared.

private respondent presented his evidence ex-parte and placed Arturo Arceo one

of the testamentary witnesses, on the witness stand. During the proceedings,
private respondent was appointed executor.

petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of 12 May 1986

alleging that, as named legatees, no notices were sent to them as required
by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and they prayed that they be given
a period of ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to the probate of
the will.

 RTC order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration. CA also dismissed the
petition hence case at bar.

Issue: WON there was notice to the heirs.

Held: None, The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not
satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.

Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Cof reads:

SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by

mail or personally. — The court shag also cause copies of the notice
of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to
the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the
testator resident in the Philippines at their places of residence, and
deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at
least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of
residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like manner be
mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not, the
petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not
petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal service
of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of
hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.

It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the
hearing for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other
known heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of
residence, if such places of residence be known. There is no question that the
residences of herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the
probate court. The petition for the allowance of the wig itself indicated the
names and addresses of the legatees and devisees of the testator. 7 But despite
such knowledge, the probate court did not cause copies of the notice to be sent
to petitioners. The requirement of the law for the allowance of the will was not
satisfied by mere publication of the notice of hearing for three (3) weeks in a
newspaper of general circulation in the province.

decision of the Court of Appeals dated 13 January 1987 is hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE.

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