SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS: MIDTERMS (PART I)

1. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS AND CIVIL ACTION (2)

Natcher vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. 133000, Oct. 22, 2001
366 SCRA 386

FACTS:
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a
parcel of land in Manila. Upon the death of Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with
his six children entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana’s estate. They
adjudicated and divided among themselves the real property.

Under the agreement: Graciano received 8/14 share while each of the six children
received 1/14 share of the said property. The heirs executed and forged an “Agreement
of Consolidation-Subdivision of Real Property with Waiver of Rights.” They subdivided
among themselves the parcel of land.

Graciano then donated to his children, share and share alike, a portion of his interest
in the land amounting to 4,849.38 square meters leaving only 447.60 square meters
registered under Graciano’s name.

The land was further subdivided into two separate lots. Graciano sold the 1 st lot to a
third person but retained ownership over the 2 nd lot.

Graciano married petitioner Patricia Natcher. He sold the 2 nd lot to Natcher, a title
was issued under her name. Graciano dies leaving his 6 children and Natcher as heirs.

A civil case was filed before the RTC by the 6 children slleging: (a) that Natcher
through the employment of fraud, misrepresentation and forgery, acquired the 2 nd lot by
making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of Sale in her favour; and (b) Alleging
that their legitimes have been impaired.

Natcher contended that she was legally married to Graciano and thus, under the
law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter.

ISSUE: May a Regional Trial Court, acting as a court of general jurisdiction in an action
for reconveyance/annulment of title with damages, adjudicate matters relating to the
settlement of the estate of a deceased person particularly on questions as to
advancement of property made by the decedent to any of the heirs?

HELD: NO. The decision of CA is AFFIRMED.

a. probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution
of the estate.
b. trying an ordinary action for reconveyance/annulment of title, went beyond its
jurisdiction when it performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for
the settlement of estate of a deceased person.

Civil Action versus Special Proceeding

Civil Action
a formal demand of one’s right in a
court of justice in the manner
prescribed by the court or by the law.
method of applying legal remedies
according to definite established rules
Special Proceedings
an application or proceeding to establish
the status or right of a party, or a particular
fact.
no formal pleadings are required unless the
statute expressly so provides.
 the remedy is granted generally upon an
application or motion

HEIRS OF MARCELINO DORONIO VS. HEIRS OF FORTUNATO DORONIO

G.R. NO. 169454
DECEMBER 27, 2007

A probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is the best forum to
ventilate and adjudge the issue of impairment of legitime as well as other related
matters involving the settlement of estate.

An action for reconveyance with damages is a civil action, whereas matters

relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of
property made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding. Special
proceedings require the application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of
Court.

Citing Natcher v. Court of Appeals: Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil

Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this wise:
a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong.

A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for
ordinary civil actions, subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.

b) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status,

a right or a particular fact.

As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between
an action and a special proceeding. An action is a formal demand of one’s right in a
court of justice in the manner prescribed by the court or by the law. It is the method of
applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The term “special
proceeding” may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or
right of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings
are required unless the statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the
remedy is granted generally upon an application or motion.

2. JURISDICTION OF A PROBATE COURT/PROBATE JURISDICTION (2)

THELMA M. ARANAS v. TERESITA V. MERCADO, GR No. 156407, 2014-01-15

Facts:
Emigdio died intestate on January 12, 1991, survived by his second wife,
Teresita, and their five children, namely: Allan, Felimon, Carmencita, Richard, and
Maria Teresita; and his two children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin
and petitioner Thelma.
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his lifetime. He owned
corporate shares in Mervir Realty Corporation and Cebu Emerson Transportation
Corporation. He assigned his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir
Realty, and sold his real property to Mervir Realty.

On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed a petition for the appointment of Teresita as the
administrator of Emigdio’s estate. The RTC granted the petition considering that there
was no opposition. The letters of administration in favor of Teresita were issued on
September 7, 1992. As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the estate
of Emigdio on December 14, 1992 for the consideration and approval by the RTC. She
indicated in the inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had “left no real
properties but only personal properties.” Claiming that Emigdio had owned other
properties that were excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC direct
Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined regarding it. The RTC granted
Thelma's motion.

On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the order supporting her
inventory with copies of three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806 Mervir Realty
shares of stock; the deed of assignment executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991
involving real properties with the market value of P4,440,651.10 in exchange for 44,407
Mervir Realty shares of stock with total par value of P4,440,700.00; and the certificate of
stock issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu Emerson worth
P30,000.00.

Thelma again moved to require Teresita to be examined under oath on the

inventory, and that she (Thelma) be allowed 30 days within which to file a formal
opposition to or comment on the inventory and the supporting documents Teresita had
submitted. The RTC issued an order expressing the need for the parties to present
evidence and for Teresita to be examined to enable the court to resolve the motion for
approval of the inventory. Thelma opposed the approval of the inventory, and asked
leave of court to examine Teresita on the inventory.

With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the jurisdiction of the court on
the issue of what properties should be included in or excluded from the inventory, the
RTC set dates for the hearing on that issue.
After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the RTC issued on March 14,
2001 an order finding and holding that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded
properties that should be included.

Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
approve the inventory, and in ordering her as administrator to include real properties
that had been transferred to Mervir Realty, Teresita, joined by her four children and her
stepson Franklin, assailed the adverse orders of the RTC by petition for certiorari. The
CA partly granted the petition for certiorari.

Issues: Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain
properties in the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been either
transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares in Mervir Realty by the decedent
during his lifetime?

Ruling: The appeal is meritorious. Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court,
the letters of administration may be granted at the discretion of the court to the surviving
spouse, who is competent and willing to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon
issuing the letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC becomes duty-
bound to direct the preparation and submission of the inventory of the properties of the
estate, and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and responsibility to
submit the inventory within three months from the issuance of letters of administration
pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court.

The usage of the word “all” in Section 1, supra, demands the inclusion of all the
real and personal properties of the decedent in the inventory. However, the word all is
qualified by the phrase which has come into his possession or knowledge, which
signifies that the properties must be known to the administrator to belong to the
decedent or are in her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no exception,
for the phrase true inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the
decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the
possession of another person or entity.
The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the inventory and appraisal of the
estate of the decedent is “to aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the
liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making a final and equitable
distribution (partition) of the estate and otherwise to facilitate the administration of the
estate.” Hence, the RTC that presides over the administration of an estate is vested with
wide discretion on the question of what properties should be included in the inventory.

According to Peralta v. Peralta, the CA cannot impose its judgment in order to

supplant that of the RTC on the issue of which properties are to be included or excluded
from the inventory in the absence of “positive abuse of discretion”, for in the
administration of the estates of deceased persons, “the judges enjoy ample
discretionary powers and the appellate courts should not interfere with or attempt to
replace the action taken by them, unless it be shown that there has been a positive
abuse of discretion.” As long as the RTC commits no patently grave abuse of discretion,
its orders must be respected as part of the regular performance of its judicial duty.

There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is
special and limited. The trial court cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a
part of the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse to that of the
decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All
that the trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they
should be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the
administrator. Such determination is provisional and may be still revised.

It is clear that the RTC took pains to explain the factual bases for its directive for
the inclusion of the properties in question. Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the
directives of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence relevant to the procedure for
preparing the inventory by the administrator. The directive to include the properties in
question in the inventory rested on good and valid reasons, and thus was far from
whimsical, or arbitrary, or capricious.

The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties

for purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the
administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional unless the interested
parties are all heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement,
or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the
rights of third parties are not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or
collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of
the status of each heir and whether property included in the inventory is the conjugal or
exclusive property of the deceased spouse.

EMILIO B. PACIOLES v. MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING

GR NO. 127920, 2005-08-09

Facts:
Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties, stock investments, bank deposits
and interests in certain businesses. She was survived by her husband, petitioner, and
their two minor children. Milio Pacioles, husband of deceased Miguelita, filed with the
RTC a verified petition for the settlement of Miguelita’s estate. Miguelita’s mother,
Miguela, filed an opposition, on the grounds that petitioner is incompetent and unfit to
exercise the duties of an administrator; and the bulk of Miguelita’s estate is composed
of “paraphernal properties.”
Issue: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon questions of
ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent’s estate?
Ruling: General Rule: The intestate court is not the appropriate forum for the resolution
of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging to Miguelita’s
estate.

It bears stressing that the bulk of Miguelita’s estate, as stated in petitioner’s

inventory, comprises real estates covered by the Torrens System which are registered
either in the name of Miguelita alone or with petitioner. As such, they are considered the
owners of the properties until their title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary
action.

In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property

covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title
should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling evidence to the
contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in
controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action,
particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the
persons named in the title.

A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a

probate court may hear and pass upon questions of ownership when its purpose is to
determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory.

Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its
proper course should have been to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It is well-
settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a long line of decisions, that
when a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of
the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue
of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased
and his estate, such question cannot be determined in the course of an intestate or
probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the
exercise of its general jurisdiction as a regional trial court.

Jurisprudence teaches us that: "[A] probate court or one in charge of

proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to
properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to
outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of
properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and
good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties
have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting
claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.”

3. PARTITION AS A MODE OF SETTLING THE ESTATE OF A DECEASED

PERSON (2)

SPS. MARIA BUTIONG AND FRANCISCO VILLAFRIA v. MA. GRACIA RIÑOZA

PLAZO
GR No. 187524, 2015-08-05

Facts:
 In 1989, Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate, leaving several heirs, including his
children with his first wife leaving several properties to them. Thereafter, a complaint for
judicial partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession was filed by the
respondents alleging that they discovered that their co-heirs sold the properties to the
petitioners, who were now deceased and duly represented by their son, without their
consent.
The respondents also learned of a notice of an extra-judicial settlement of estate
of their late father was published in a tabloid called Balita. Because of this, they caused
the annotation of their adverse claims over the subject properties before the Register of
Deeds and filed the said complaint.
The petitioners denied the allegations of the complaint on the ground of lack of
personal knowledge and good faith in acquiring the subject properties. Petitioner
Francisco further contended that what they purchased was only the resort. He also
presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of
Rights and Sale which provides that respondents’ co-heirs sold the family home to
spouses Rolando and Ma. Cecilia Bondoc for P1 million as well as a Deed of Sale
whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners.
The trial court nullified the transfer of the subject properties to petitioners and
spouses Bondoc due to irregularities in the documents of conveyance offered by
petitioners as well as the circumstances surrounding the execution of the same. CA
affirmed hence, the petition where they alleged that since the Respondents’ complaint
alleged causes of action for settlement of estate under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court,
therefore it is actually one for settlement of estate and not of judicial partition.

Issue: Whether or not the petition is for partition or for settlement of estate?
Ruling: The court held that the complaint filed by the respondents was for judicial
partition. It is true that some of respondents’ causes of action pertaining to the
properties left behind by the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and
extent of their interests thereon may fall under an action for settlement of estate.
However, a complete reading of the complaint would readily show that, based on the
nature of the suit, the allegations therein, and the relief’s prayed for, the action is clearly
one for judicial partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession.
It was expressly alleged in the complaint, and was not disputed, that Pedro died
without a will, leaving his estate without any ending obligations. Thus, contrary to
petitioner’s contention, respondents were under no legal obligation to submit the subject
properties of the estate of a special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and
are, in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned, judicially or extrajudicially.

4. PROBATE OF A HOLOGRAPHIC WILL (5)

5. PROBATE OF A NOTARIAL WILL (5)

6. LETTERS OF TESTAMENTARY AND LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION (2)

7. EXECUTORS (5)

8. ADMINISTRATORS (5)

9. SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR (2)

10. TRUSTEES RELATING TO WILLS (2)

11. CLAIMS AGAINST ESTATE (5)

12. PAYMENT OF DEBTS OF ESTATE (1)

13. DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF ESTATE (3)

14. ESCHEAT (3)

15. GUARDIANSHIP (3)

16. TRUSTEES RELATING TO WRITTEN INSTRUMENTS OTHER THAN A WILL (2)

17. ADOPTION (3)

18. RESCISSION OF ADOPTION (1)

19. REVOCATION OF ADOPTION (3)

20. HOSPITALIZATION OF INSANE PERSONS (2)

21. HABEAS CORPUS (5)

22. WRIT OF AMPARO (2)

The Secretary of National Defense vs. Manalo

GR No. 180906
October 7, 2008
Facts:
Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men
belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of
the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August 13,
2007.
Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and
Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving
them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was pending, the
Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently
filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo
petition.
The Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA ordered
the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the
Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the
Manalos’ custody, confirm the present places of official assignment of two military
officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers
while under military custody. The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of
the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set aside the decision promulgated
by the CA.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of the Manalos right to
security. The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person
whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with
violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and by
private individuals or entities.
Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and
protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The
circumstances of respondents’ abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably
support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted,
tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security,
and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo.

Tapuz vs. Del Rosario

GR No. 182484
June 17, 2008

Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari against the issuance of the writ of amparo and
habeas data filed by Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, et al. (Petitioners), against the presiding
judge (Respondent, “R “for short) who issued said writs (Judge Elmo Del Rosario, RTC
of Kalibo, Br. 5).
Private Respondents Sps. Sanson (Gregorio and Ma. Lourdes) filed with the
MCTC of Aklan a complaint for forcible entry with damages with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of prelim mandatory injunction against petitioners. Said court,
rendered judgment in favor of Private Respondents. Petitioners, appealed said
judgment to RTC.
The case was appealed with RTC Br. 6 of Kalibo. On appeal, Private
Respondents filed a motion for the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. After complying with all the requirements for the issuance of said writ,
Respondent issued the same. Petitioner moved to reconsider the issuance of said writ,
while the Private Respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition which
petitioner also opposed. Respondent denied the opposition against the motion for
demolition and the same issued a writ of demolition.
Petitioners thereafter filed with the CA a petition for review of the Permanent
Mandatory Injunction and the Order of Demolition. After that, Petitioners also filed
herein petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with prayers for the issuance of the writs of
habeas data and amparo.
Petitioners to support the issuance of said writs alleged factual positions contrary
and opposed to the MCTC’s findings and legal reasons. (Note: Contrary to MCTCs
findings, actually, said court found the factual situation in the contrary to Petitioners’
contention. Petitioners contend that they had prior possession of the subject real
property; and Private Respondents intrude and took away their possession of the same
by force and violence).
Issue: Whether Petitioners have a basis for the issuance of the prayed writs to his
favor.
Ruling: The petitions for the issuance of the writs of habeas data and amparo are
fatally defective both as to its substance and form.
WRIT OF AMPARO
Such writ, as held by the Court in this case: “the writ of amparo was originally
conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced
disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to
address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats
to the rights to life, liberty or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy
beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to
these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or
commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain
grounds.”
 The alleged acts of violence made by PR against P were disproved at the
proceedings with the MCTC – through a full-blown trial.
Rather than acts of terrorism that pose a continuing threat to the persons of the
petitioners, the violent incidents alleged appear to us to be purely property-related and
focused on the disputed land. Thus, if the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the
alleged perpetrators criminally accountable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of
ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the
writ of amparo.

23. HABEAS DATA (2)

Tapuz vs. Del Rosario

GR No 182484
June 17, 2008
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari against the issuance of the writ of amparo and
habeas data filed by Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, et al. (Petitioners), against the presiding
judge (Respondent, “R “for short) who issued said writs (Judge Elmo Del Rosario, RTC
of Kalibo, Br. 5).
Private Respondents Sps. Sanson (Gregorio and Ma. Lourdes) filed with the
MCTC of Aklan a complaint for forcible entry with damages with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of prelim mandatory injunction against petitioners. Said court,
rendered judgment in favor of Private Respondents. Petitioners, appealed said
judgment to RTC.
The case was appealed with RTC Br. 6 of Kalibo. On appeal, Private
Respondents filed a motion for the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction. After complying with all the requirements for the issuance of said writ,
Respondent issued the same. Petitioner moved to reconsider the issuance of said writ,
while the Private Respondents, on the other hand, filed a motion for demolition which
petitioner also opposed. Respondent denied the opposition against the motion for
demolition and the same issued a writ of demolition.
Petitioners thereafter filed with the CA a petition for review of the Permanent
Mandatory Injunction and the Order of Demolition. After that, Petitioners also filed
herein petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with prayers for the issuance of the writs of
habeas data and amparo.
Petitioners to support the issuance of said writs alleged factual positions contrary
and opposed to the MCTC’s findings and legal reasons. (Note: Contrary to MCTCs
findings, actually, said court found the factual situation in the contrary to Petitioners’s
contention. Petitioners contend that they had prior possession of the subject real
property; and Private Respondents intrude and took away their possession of the same
by force and violence).
Issue: Whether Petitioners have a basis for the issuance of the prayed writs to his
favor.
Ruling: The petitions for the issuance of the writs of habeas data and amparo are
fatally defective both as to its substance and form.

WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires the following material
allegations of ultimate facts in a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects the right
to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the
person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information, if known
(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification, suppression or
destruction of the database or information or files kept by the respondent.

These allegations obviously lack what the Rule on Writ of Habeas Data requires
as a minimum, thus rendering the petition fatally deficient. Specifically, we see no
concrete allegations of unjustified or unlawful violation of the right to privacy related to
the right to life, liberty or security. The petition likewise has not alleged, much less
demonstrated, any need for information under the control of police authorities other than
those it has already set forth as integral annexes. The necessity or justification for the
issuance of the writ, based on the insufficiency of previous efforts made to secure
information, has not also been shown.
In sum, the prayer for the issuance of a writ of habeas data is nothing more than
the fishing expedition that this Court – in the course of drafting the Rule on habeas data
– had in mind in defining what the purpose of a writ of habeas data is not. In these
lights, the outright denial of the petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data is
fully in order.

MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY v. ROSARIO GOPEZ LIM

G.R. No. 184769, October 5, 2010
Facts:
Rosario G. Lim, also known as Cherry Lim, is an administrative clerk at the
Manila Electric Company (MERALCO). On June 4, 2008, an anonymous letter was
posted at the door of the Metering Office of the Administration building of MERALCO
Plaridel, Bulacan Sector, which reads:
Cherry Lim: MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO,
NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG KUMPANYA SA MGA
BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG
UTANG NA LOOB.
Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen.
Respondent reported the matter on June 5, 2008 to the Plaridel Station of the Philippine
National Police. By Memorandum dated July 4, 2008, petitioner Alexander Deyto, Head
of MERALCO’s Human Resource Staffing, directed the transfer of respondent to
MERALCO’s Alabang Sector in Muntinlupa as A/F OTMS Clerk, effective July 18, 2008
in light of the receipt of reports that there were accusations and threats directed against
[her] from unknown individuals and which could possibly compromise [her] safety and
security.
Respondent, by letter of July 10, 2008 addressed to petitioner Ruben A. Sapitula,
Vice-President and Head of MERALCO’s Human Resource Administration, appealed
her transfer and requested for a dialogue so she could voice her concerns and
misgivings on the matter, claiming that the punitive nature of the transfer amounted to a
denial of due process. In her letter, the repondent cited the grueling travel from her
residence in Pampanga to Alabang, and violation of the provisions on job security of
their Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).
Respondent thus requested for the deferment of the implementation of her
transfer pending resolution of the issues she raised. No response to her request having
been received, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data
against petitioners before the RTC of Bulacan.
By respondent’s allegation, petitioner’s unlawful act and omission consisting of
their continued failure and refusal to provide her with details or information about the
alleged report which MERALCO purportedly received concerning threats to her safety
and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and security,
correctible by habeas data. Respondent thus prayed for the issuance of a writ
commanding petitioners to file a written return containing the following:

a) a full disclosure of the data or information about respondent in relation to the report
purportedly received by petitioners on the alleged threat to her safety and security; the
nature of such data and the purpose for its collection;

b) the measures taken by petitioners to ensure the confidentiality of such data or

information; and

c) the currency and accuracy of such data or information obtained.

Additionally, respondent prayed for the issuance of a TRO enjoining petitioners

from effecting her transfer to the MERALCO Alabang Sector.

The trial court granted respondent's application for a TRO.

Petitioners moved for the dismissal of the petition and recall of the TRO on the
grounds that, resort to a petition for writ of habeas data was not in order; and the RTC
lacked jurisdiction over the case which properly belongs to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC).
By Decision of September 22, 2008, the trial court granted the prayers of
respondent including the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction directing petitioners
to desist from implementing respondents transfer until such time that petitioners comply
with the disclosures required. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Writ of Habeas Data is the proper remedy.
Ruling: No. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data provides:
Section 1. Habeas Data. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the
person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.
The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial
complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an
individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce ones right to the truth and to
informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right
to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology.
It bears reiteration that like the writ of amparo, habeas data was conceived as a
response, given the lack of effective and available remedies, to address the
extraordinary rise in the number of killings and enforced disappearances. Its intent is to
address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or security as a remedy
independently from those provided under prevailing Rules.
Castillo v. Cruz underscores the emphasis laid down in Tapuz v. del Rosario that
the writs of amparo and habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or
commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor
are vague or doubtful.
Employment constitutes a property right under the context of the due process
clause of the Constitution. It is evident that respondent’s reservations on the real
reasons for her transfer - a legitimate concern respecting the terms and conditions of
one’s employment - are what prompted her to adopt the extraordinary remedy of
habeas data. Jurisdiction over such concerns is inarguably lodged by law with the
NLRC and the Labor Arbiters.
In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners
committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy vis-a-vis
the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners refusal to disclose the
contents of reports allegedly received on the threats to respondents safety amounts to a
violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these
threats and accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her
July 10, 2008 letter as highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed
at all. And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work betray[s] the
real intent of management] and could be a punitive move. Her posture unwittingly
concedes that the issue is labor-related.

24. CHANGE OF NAME/CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL

REGISTRY (6)

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. LORENA OMAPAS SALI

G.R. NO. 206023
APRIL 3, 2017

Facts:
Lorena Omapas Sali filed a Verified Petition for Correction of
Entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court before the RTC.

Petitioner is the daughter of Spouses Vedasto A. Omapas and Almarina A. Albay

who was born on April 24, 1968 in Baybay, Leyte.

Unfortunately, in recording the facts of her birth, the personnel of the Local Civil
Registrar of Baybay, Leyte, thru inadvertence and mistake,  erroneously entered in the
records the following: Firstly, the first name of the petitioner as “DOROTHY” instead of
“LORENA” and Secondly, the date of birth of the petitioner as “June 24, 1968” instead
of “April 24, 1968.”

The petitioner alleged that she has been using the name “Lorena A. Omapas”
and her date of birth as “April 24, 1968” for as long as she could remember and is
known to the community in general as such.

To sustain petitioner’s claim that the entries in her Certificate of Live Birth
pertaining to her first name and date of birth should be corrected so that it will now read
as “LORENA A. OMAPAS” and “April 24, 1968”. RTC granted the Petition. However,
appealed the RTC Decision for lack of jurisdiction on the part of RTC because the title
of the petition and the order setting the petition for hearing did not contain Sali’s
aliases.

The CA denied the appeal, ruling that: (1) the records are bereft of any indication
that Sali is known by a name other than “Lorena,” hence, it would be absurd to compel
her to indicate any other alias that she does not have; (2) Sali not only complied with the
mandatory requirements for an appropriate adversarial proceeding under Rule 108 of
the Rules but also gave the Republic an opportunity to timely contest the purported
defective petition; and (3) the change in the first name of Sali will certainly avoid further
confusion as to her identity and there is no showing that it was sought for a fraudulent
purpose or that it would prejudice public interest.

Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition.

Ruling: No. In this case, the petition, insofar as it prayed for the change of Sali’s first
name, was not within the RTC’s primary jurisdiction. It was improper because the
remedy should have been administrative, that is, filing of the petition with the local civil
registrar concerned. For failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the RTC should
have dismissed the petition to correct Sali’s first name.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. MERCADERA

GR No. 186027
December 8, 2010
FACTS:

Mercadera sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in her

Certificate of Live Birth – from Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, pursuant to RA. No. 9048.

The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect
the correction unless a court order was obtained “because the Civil Registrar therein is
not yet equipped with a permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions
for corrections filed before their office as mandated by Republic Act 9048.”

Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For Correction of Some Entries
as Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before the RTC.

ISSUE: W/N the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC falls under Rule 103 or 108.

HELD: It falls under Rule 108.

The “change of name” contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not be
confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of one’s name under Rule 103 can
be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for change of
name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the
person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. To assess the
sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be adversarial proceedings.

In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other

innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in
Section 2, Rule 108 also includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently
misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in
one’s name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right
under Rule 108.

This rule in "names," however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to the
correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary proceeding.

The petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it
simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means "to
make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a
substitute." From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower
court "to remove the faults or error" from her registered given name "MARILYN," and "to
make or set aright" the same to conform to the one she grew up to, "MERLYN." It does
not take a complex assessment of said petition to learn of its intention to simply correct
the clerical error in spelling. Mercadera even attempted to avail of the remedy allowed
by R.A. No. 9048 but she unfortunately failed to enjoy the expediency which the law
provides and was constrained to take court action to obtain relief.

BRAZA v. CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR

G.R. No. 181174
December 4, 2009

Facts:
Ma. Cristina and Pablo Braza were married on Jan. 4, 1978. They had three
children namely Josef, Janelle and Gian. However, Pablo died on April 2002 in a
vehicular accident in Indonesia. During his wake, the respondent Lucille introduced her
son Patrick as Pablo’s child.
Naturally Ma. Cristina inquired as to the veracity of Lucille’s claim. She acquired a
copy of Patrick’s birth certificate from the Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City. It reflects
that the child was born on Jan. 1, 1996 but was registered late a year after. It has an
annotation wherein Pablo acknowledge the child as his, and that the child was
legitimated by a subsequent marriage of his parents on April 1998.
Because of her findings, she filed a petition to correct the entries in the birth
record of Patrick with RTC of Himamaylan Negros Occidental. Her contention is that
Patrick could not have been legitimated by the subsequent marriage of Lucille and
Pablo because such is bigamous (their marriage was subsisting at that time). She
prayed for the correction of Patrick’s legitimation, acknowledgment of the father, and
use of Braza as last name. She also asked that Patrick be submitted to DNA testing and
to declare Lucille and Pablo’s marriage as bigamous.
Respondent filed MTD alleging that a special proceeding for correction of entry, the
court does not have jurisdiction to annul her marriage, impugn legitimacy and order
DNA testing. Why? Because the court is not acting as a family court. These should be
ventilated in an ordinary action.
RTC granted MTD. Petitioners filed MR but was denied so they filed this present
action.
Issue: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to annul the marriage of respondent and
impugn legitimacy of respondent’s child in a petition to correct entries in local civil
register?
Ruling: No.
Petitioners: the court may pass upon the validity of marriage and legitimacy of child in
an action to correct entries in civil registrar. As basis, they cited Cariño v. Carino, Lee v.
CA and Republic v. Kho, alleging that even substantial errors, such as those sought to
be corrected in the present case, can be the subject of a petition under Rule 108.
SC: No. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108, the trial court
has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and rule on legitimacy and filiation. Under these
rules, only correction of clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the civil registry may be allowed.  
A clerical error is one which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding;
an error made by a clerk or a transcriber; a mistake in copying or writing, or a harmless
change such as a correction of name that is clearly misspelled or of a misstatement of
the occupation of the parent.  Substantial or contentious alterations may be allowed
only in adversarial proceedings, in which all interested parties are impleaded and due
process is properly observed.
 As applied: the petitioners seek to nullify the marriage of respondent and Pablo and
impugn their child’s filiation and to subject him to DNA testing. They contend that these
are merely incidental to the main petition which is correction of entry under Rule 108.
However the court held that the applicable rule is under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC Art.
171 of the Family Code, the petition should be filed in a Family Court as expressly
provided in said Code.

REPUBLIC VS. COSETENG-MAGPAYO

G.R. NO. 174689
OCTOBER 22 2007

Facts: 
Respondent Julian Edward Emerson was born in Makati City to Fulvio M.
Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as
respondent’s certificate of live birth shows, contracted marriage on March 26,
1972. Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed
before RTC of Quezon City a petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson
Marquez-Lim Coseteng.
In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the NSO
stating that his mother Anna Dominique does not appear in its National Indices of
Marriage. Respondent also submitted his academic records from elementary up to
college showing that he carried the surname "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his
child where "Coseteng" appears as his surname. Respondent ran and was elected as
Quezon City’s Councilor using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG.”
The RTC granted the petition and ordered the Civil Registrar to: 
1. Delete the entry “date and place of marriage” (of parents) in respondent’s live
birth certificate
2. Change entry of “Last name” from Magpayo to Coseteng
3. Delete entry of Coseteng from “Middle name”
4. Delete entry of Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr. in the entry for “Father”. 

Republic appealed contending that deletion of the entry on the date and place of
marriage of respondent’s parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing his
civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a person
must be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.
Issues: 
1. Was there a valid ground for changing respondent's name?
2. Did respondent file the proper remedy?

Ruling:
1. The petition is impressed with merit. A person can effect a change of name under
Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a)
when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as
 legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase
signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f)
when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired
change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest. Respondent’s reason for changing his name cannot be
considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however. 

The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines.
In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon, to use the name that
she had been known since childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny
her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use the surname of her mother which
she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was
lawfully entitled to use her mother’s surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion
was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however,
respondent denies his legitimacy. 

2. No. Changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate are

substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate
adversary proceedings. Since respondents desired change affects his civil status
from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies and not Rule 103. Rule 108 clearly
directs that a petition which concerns one’s civil status should be filed in the
civil registry in which the entry is sought to be cancelled or corrected, that of Makati
in the present case, and all persons who have or claim any interest which would
be affected thereby should be made parties to the proceeding.

As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where
his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the above-mentioned
title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil
registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties thereto.

Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these two
statutory remedies, respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently complied with
Rule 108. For, as reflected above, aside from improper venue, he failed to implead
the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties as respondents in the case.

When a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves
substantial and controversial alterations including those on citizenship, legitimacy of
paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the
requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR

G.R. No. 189538
February 10, 2014

FACTS:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of
No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her
boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already
married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National. She denied having contracted
said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband. She, thus, filed a
Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the
wife portion thereof.
 During trial, she completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she
revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met
them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadel's Pension House. She believed
that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom
she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. A document
examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged. The
RTC decided in favor of the petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar.
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on
the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous
errors in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the
alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.
Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take
cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering
that respondent’s identity was used by an unknown person to contract marriage with a
Korean national, it would not be feasible for respondent to institute an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles
35 and 36 of the Family Code.
Issue: May the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies
the marriage, be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding?
Ruling: Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or
adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If
the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed
substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary.
Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia, 225 Phil. 408, the Court has
repeatedly ruled that “even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected through
a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved
by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding.” An
appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted
proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where
opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case,
and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be
dispensed with, and the remedy is granted upon mere application or motion. However, a
special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not
a summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the
inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by
the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in
interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make
orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss
the petition or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural
requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to
effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry
cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to
prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under
the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these
safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment
of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family
Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial
Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen
cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in
the civil registry (Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the
National Statistics Office G.R.No. 196049, June 26, 2013).
While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of
marriage, we cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties
had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures
were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been admitted and
examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no
marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the
truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the
subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did
not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

FRANCLER P. ONDE VS. LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF LAS PIÑAS CITY

GR NO. 197174
SEPT. 10, 2014

Facts:
Petitioner filed a petition for correction of entries in his certificate of live birth
before the RTC and named respondent Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Las Piñas
City as sole respondent. He prayed that the following entries on his birth certificate be
corrected as follows: 1) on the Entry pertaining to the Date and Place of Marriage of
Parents, from “December 23, 1983, Bicol” to “Not Married”; 2) First Name Of Mother,
from “Tely” to “Matilde”; and, 3) First Name, from “Franc Ler” to “Francler).

The Regional Trial Court dismissed his petition, noting that the first correction
(the date and place of marriage of parents) are substantial corrections, while the other
corrections may be made before the City Civil Registry under Republic Act 9048.
Francler moved to reconsider, but the RTC denied it, hence he filed a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 to assail the ruling of the RTC.

Issue: Is the trial court correct in dismissing the case?

Ruling:
The Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed the RTC in dismissing the
petition for correction of entries. When a petition for cancellation or correction of an
entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations, including
those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of the Rules of Court is mandated. When cancellation
or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons
who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to
the proceeding. Since the petitioner did not implead his father and mother as parties
because the substantial correction he is seeking will also affect them, there was no
compliance with the strict requirements of the Rules. Hence, the petition was correctly
dismissed by the trial court.

Note that the Supreme Court agree with the RTC that the first name of petitioner
and his mother as appearing in his birth certificate can be corrected by the city civil
registrar under R.A. No. 9048. The SC also agree with the RTC in ruling that correcting
the entry on petitioner’s birth certificate that his parents were married on December 23,
1983 in Bicol to “not married” is a substantial correction requiring adversarial
proceedings. 
 
25. DISSOLUTION OF CORPORATION (most recent) (1)

26. FILIATION (2)

LIYAO VS. LIYAO
GR NO. 138961
MARCH 7, 2002

Facts:
William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by her
mother (Corazon), filed a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita L.
Tan and Linda Liyao to recognize and acknowledge the former as a compulsory heir of
the deceased and to be entitled to all successional rights. Liyao Jr. was in continuous
possession and enjoyment of the status as the child of the deceased having been
recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during his lifetime.
There were two sides of the story. Corazon maintained that she and the
deceased were legally married but living separately for more than 10 years and that
they cohabited from 1965 until the death of the deceased.
On the other hand, one of the children of the deceased stated that her mom and
the deceased were legally married and that her parents were not separated legally or in
fact.
Issue: Whether the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from
the estate of the deceased.
Ruling: Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband,
or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the reason that he was the one directly confronted
with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produced and he should be
the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the moral and
economic interest involved. Hence, it was then settled that the legitimacy of the child
can only be impugned in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the proper parties
and within the period limited by law.
Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and positive
evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized
his paternity.

TONOG VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. NO. 122906
FEBRUARY 7, 2002

Facts:
In 1989, Dinah B. Tonog gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her
illegitimate daughter with Edgar V. Daguimol. A year after the birth of Gardin, Dinah left
for the USA where she found a work as a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care
of her father and paternal grandparents.
 Edgar filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin in the RTC of Quezon City. In
March 1992, the court granted the petition and appointed Edgar as legal guardian of
Gardin. In May 1992, Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgment. She averred that
she learned of the judgment only on April 1, 1992. The trial court set aside its original
judgment and allowed Dinah to file her opposition to Edgar’s petition. Edgar, in turn,
filed a motion for reconsideration.
In 1993, Dinah filed a motion to remand custody of Gardin to her. In 1994, the
trial court issued a resolution denying Edgar’s motion for reconsideration and granting
Dinah’s motion for custody of Gardin. Dinah moved for the immediate execution of the
resolution.
Edgar, thus, filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The CA
dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Upon motion for reconsideration, CA modified its
decision and let Gardin remain in the custody of Edgar until otherwise adjudged. Dinah
appealed to the Supreme Court, contending that she is entitled to the custody of the
minor, Gardin, as a matter of law. First, as the mother of Gardin, the law confers
parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor. Second, Gardin
cannot be separated from her since she had not, as of then, attained the age of seven.
Employing simple arithmetic however, it appears that Gardin is now twelve years old.
Issue: Who is entitled to the temporary custody of the child pending the guardianship
proceeding?
Ruling: In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare
and well-being of the child. Statute sets certain rules to assist the court in making an
informed decision.
Insofar as illegitimate children are concerned, Article 176 of the Family Code
provides that illegitimate children shall be under the parental authority of their mother.
Likewise, Article 213 of the Family Code provides that “no child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise.”
It will be observed that in both provisions, a strong bias is created in favor of the
mother. This is especially evident in Article 213 where it may be said that the law
presumes that the mother is the best custodian. As explained by the Code
Commission:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid a tragedy where a mother has
seen her baby torn away from her. No man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother
who is deprived of her child of tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be
for “compelling reasons” for the good of the child. For these reasons, even a mother
may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven years of age for
“compelling reasons.” Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment,
unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of
the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness.
If older than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the
court is not bound by that choice. The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding
the child’s preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance,
custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person.
In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the
minor, Gardin, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial
court have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who
should have final custody of the minor.
Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor, we
find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime
parental custody over her. Meanwhile, the child should not be wrenched from her
familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and
places to which she had apparently formed an attachment.
Moreover, whether a mother is a fit parent for her child is a question of fact to be
properly entertained in the special proceedings before the trial court. It should be
recalled that in a petition for review on certiorari, we rule only on questions of law. We
are not in the best position to assess the parties’ respective merits vis-à-vis their
opposing claims for custody.
Yet another sound reason is that inasmuch as the age of the minor, Gardin, has
now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference and opinion
must first be sought in the choice of which parent should have the custody over her
person.
For the present and until finally adjudged, temporary custody of the subject minor
should remain with her father, the private respondent herein pending final judgment of
the trial court.

27. DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH (2)

ESTRELLITA TADEO-MATIAS V. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 230751
APRIL 25, 2018

Facts:
Estrellita Tadeo-Matias was married to Wilfredo Matias who was a member of the
Philippine Constabulary and assigned in Arayat, Pampanga. They were married on
January 7, 1968.

On September 15, 1979, Wilfredo left their conjugal home at San Miguel, Tarlac City
in order to serve his duties. He was never seen or heard from again and has never
made contact with any of his or Petitioner’s relatives. Petitioner constantly sought
updates from the Philippine Constabulary regarding the whereabouts of her husband to
no avail.

After 3 decades of waiting, Petitioner sought for a claim of death benefits under P.D.
1638 from the Philippine Veteran’s Affair Office (PVAO) of the AFP. One of its
requirements is a judicial declaration of presumptive death.

RTC: Affirmed Petitioner and declared Petitioner’s husband presumptively dead under
Art. 41 of the Family Code.

CA: Reversed RTC ruling since Art. 41only allows such declaration in cases of
remarriage which Petitioner did not seek.

Issue: Whether Petitioner can validly be granted the judicial declaration of presumptive
death.

Ruling: No. Petitioner erred in filing for judicial declaration of presumptive death which
is not a viable suit. Article 41 of the Family Code involves that presumption of death
established therein is only applicable for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent
marriage. The RTC erred in considering said petition because it was not filed for the
purpose of remarriage under the FC but Art. 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absence still lives, he
 shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for those of succession. The
absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession
till after an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his succession
may be opened

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division
of the estate
among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which
is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel
or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been
missing for four
years;
(3) a person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four years.

Since Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code merely express rules of evidence,
an action brought exclusively to declare a person presumptively dead under either of
the said articles actually presents no actual controversy that a court could decide. The
presumption in the said articles is already established by law. In short, the petition is not
authorized by law.

It is unnecessary for Petitioner to file for judicial declaration of presumptive death

to claim death benefits from the PVAO or the AFP. What is only required is evidence of
the claimant that the concerned soldier had been missing for a number of years and or
under the circumstance prescribed under Art. 390 and 391 of the Civil Code.

REPUBLIC VS. COURT OF APPEALS, MADRONA

G.R. NO. 163604
MAY 6, 2005

Facts:
In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee Spouse Clemente P.
Jomoc, the Regional Trial Court granted the petition on the basis of the Commissioners
Report and accordingly declared the absentee spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife
nine years earlier, presumptively dead.

In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona, cited Article 41,
par. 2 of the Family Code. Said article provides that for the purpose of contracting a
valid subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a previous marriage where the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years, the spouse present must
institute summary proceedings for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee spouse, without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent
spouse.

Issue: Whether a petition for declaration of the presumptive death of a person is in the
nature of a special proceeding

Ruling: Considering the aforementioned distinction, this Court finds that the instant
petition is in the nature of a special proceeding and not an ordinary action. The petition
merely seeks for a declaration by the trial court of the presumptive death of absentee
spouse Clemente Jomoc. It does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the
prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it involve a demand of right or a cause of
action that can be enforced against any person.
 On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the subject Order dated January 13,
2000 denying OSG’s Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November 22, 1999
disapproving its Notice of Appeal was correctly issued. The instant petition, being in the
nature of a special proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition to its Notice of
Appeal, a record on appeal in accordance with Section 19 of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines to Implement BP Blg. 129 and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

28. ABSENTEE (2)

REYES VS. ALEJANDRO
G.R. NO. L-32026
JANUARY 16, 1986

This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Cavite dismissing
the petition filed by petitioner-appellant Erlinda Reynoso Reyes to have her husband
Roberto Reyes declared an absentee.

In a petition Erlinda Reynoso prayed for the declaration of the absence of her
husband Roberto L. Reyes alleging that her husband had been absent from their
conjugal dwelling since April 1962 and since then had not been heard from and his
whereabouts unknown. The petition further alleged that her husband left no will nor any
property in his name nor any debts.

After hearing the Court a quo dismissed the petition on the ground that since
Roberto L. Reyes left no properties there was no necessity to declare him judicially an
absentee. 

Issue: Whether or not there is a need for the declaration of absence of Roberto Reyes.

Ruling: No. The need to have a person judicially declared an absentee is because of
his properties which have to be administered by a representative appointed by the Court
(Article 384, Civil Code); the spouse of the absentee is asking for separation of property
(Article 191, Civil Code) or his wife is asking the Court that the administration of an
classes of property in the marriage be transferred to her (Article 196, Civil Code).

The petition to declare the husband an absentee and the petition to place the
management of the conjugal properties in the hands of the wife may be combined and
adjudicated in the same proceedings (Peyer vs. Martinez, 88 Phil. 72, 80).

Judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the order of the lower Court

dismissing the petition to declare Roberto L. Reyes an absentee. With costs against
petitioner-appellant.

29. ADVANCE DISTRIBUTION OF PROCEEDS IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS (1)