RULE 74

Summary Settlement of Estates

MALAHACAN VS. IGNACIO (August 4, 1911)

FACTS: This is an appeal from a judgment of the CFI Marinduque awarding the
possession of the subject lands to the plaintiff. The action is brought by Simon
Malahacan as administrator of the estate of Guillerma Martinez against the heirs
of the deceased to recover possession of the real estate owned by the deceased
and occupied by the heirs some years before the commencement of this action.

ISSUE: WON the Administrator may recover the possession of the real property
from the heirs of the deceased?

HELD: NO. Under the provisions of the Civil Code, the ownership of real estate
passes to the heirs of the owner instantly on his death. Martinez, having died
seized of the lands involved in this suit, leaving the defendants as her only heirs at
law, it follows that said heirs instantly became the owners and were entitled to
the immediate possession thereof. It is not alleged in the complaint nor does it
appear from the record or the evidence in this case that there were debts
’outstanding against Martinez at the time of her death. The only ground upon
which an administrator can demand of the heirs at law possession of the real
estate of which his intestate died seized is that such land will be required to be
sold to pay the debts of the deceased.

The rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his
death; in other words, the heirs succeed immediately to all of the property of the
deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death
of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to
them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing
against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said
property immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so. If
they desire to partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual
agreement, they also have that privilege.

The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by
a petition for partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the division. When
there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion for
the intervention of an administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate
among the heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts,
there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the costs and
expenses of an administrator. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in
the absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right to
intervene in any way whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs. They
are co-owners of an undivided estate and the law offers them a remedy for the
division of the same among themselves.

There is nothing in the present case to show that the heirs requested the
appointment of the administrator, or that they intervened in any way whatever in
the present action. If there are any heirs of the estate who have not received their
participation, they have their remedy by petition for partition of the said estate.

AURELIO ARCILLAS vs. HON. GREGORIO D. MONTEJO (November 29, 1968)

FACTS: Two separate petitions were filed on Nov. 12 and Nov. 16, 1962 before CFI
Zamboanga. These 2 petitions have direct reference to Lot 276 which forms a
major part of the estate of Eustaquio Arcillas, who died intestate in Zamboanga.
In the Nov. 12 petition, Geronimo Arcillas, one of the heirs of the deceased,
sought the cancellation of TCT of the land in the name of the deceased and
prayed for the issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the heirs.
Invoking the Land Registration Act, Geronimo Arcillas argued that the proportion
of each heir's participation in said lot should be accurately reflected in a new
certificate of title. On Nov. 6, however, 5 other children of the deceased filed a
petition praying for the issuance of letters of administration in favour of Aurelio
Arcillas (herein petitioner). This later petition also includes that the deceased, as
far as petitioners know, left no debt remaining unpaid.

Aurelio filed his opposition to the Nov. 12 petition since lot 276 was included in
the estate of the deceased for which a petition for administration had actually
been filed and was awaiting resolution, hence the nov. 12 petition should be held
in abeyance until the nov. 16 petition was closed and terminated. Respondent
Judge then issued an order temporarily holding in abeyance resolution of the
November 12 petition until the termination of the intestate proceedings.
Geronimo Arcillas opposed the issuance of letters of administration to herein
petitioner, arguing that inasmuch as Lot No. 276 was the only property left by the
deceased and the deceased left no debts, the petition for administration was
improper.

Then the respondent court denied the November 16 petition for the issuance of
letters of administration and at the same time gave due course to the November
12 petition stating that the cadastral motion of oppositor Geronimo is the most
expedient and proper action and in order to obviate the necessity of spending
uselessly which would only deplete the funds of the estate; to avoid unnecessary
delay in the partition of the property involved herein, and following the doctrines
established by the Honorable Supreme Court in consonance with the provisions of
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Judge acted properly in dismissing the administration

proceedings under the authority of section 1, rule 74 of the New Rules of Court
upon averments that the estate left no debts and all the heirs entitled to share in
its distribution are all of age

HELD: NO. Under section 1, Rule 74 of the New Rules of Court, if the decedent left
no will and no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are
represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters
of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of
a public instrument filed in the office of the Register of Deeds and should they
disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of partition. And primarily
anchored on the proposition that inasmuch as in the present case the minimum
requirements of the aforementioned section obtain, i.e. the decedent left no will
and no debts and the heirs are all of age, respondents claim that there is no
necessity for the institution of special proceedings and the appointment of an
administrator for the settlement of the estate for the reason that it is superfluous
and unnecessary. In other words, respondents apparently view section 1 of Rule
74 as mandatory upon the heirs so long as the deceased left no will nor any
pending obligations to be paid and his heirs are all of age.

Having decided to institute administration proceedings instead of resorting to the

less expensive modes of settlement of the estate, i.e. extrajudicial settlement or
ordinary action for partition, the heirs may not then be rebuffed in the exercise of
their discretion granted under section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court merely on
the ground that the expenses usually common in administration proceedings may
deplete the funds of the estate. The resultant delay and necessary expenses
incurred thereafter are consequences which must be deemed to have been
voluntarily assumed by the heirs themselves so that they may not in the future be
heard to complain of these matters. Besides, the truth or veracity of petitioner's
claim as to the alleged existence of other properties of the deceased aside from
the lot in question can be more adequately ascertained in administration
proceedings rather than in any other action.

VICTORIA BRINGAS PEREIRA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RITA
PEREIRA NAGAC (June 20, 1989)

FACTS: Andres de Guzman Pereira, an employee of PAL, passed away in Cavite

without a will. He was survived by his legitimate spouse of ten months, the herein
petitioner Victoria Bringas Pereira, and his sister Rita Pereira Nagac, the herein
private respondent.

Rita instituted a Special Proceeding for the issuance of letters of administration in

her favour. In her verified petition she alleged the following: that she and Victoria
Bringas Pereira are the only surviving heirs of the deceased; that the deceased left
no will; that there are no creditors of the deceased; that the deceased left several
properties and finally, that the spouse of the deceased had been working in
London as a nurse and as such 1/2 of her salary forms part of the estate of the
deceased.

Victoria filed her opposition alleging that there exists no estate of the deceased
for purposes of administration and praying in the alternative, that if an estate
does exist, the letters of administration relating to the said estate be issued in her
favor as the surviving spouse.

The RTC appointed Rita as administratrix upon a bond posted by her in the
amount of Pl,000.00. The C.A. affirmed the said order.

ISSUES/RULINGS:

(1) Whether or not there exists an estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman
Pereira for purposes of administration
The resolution of this issue is better left to the probate court before which the
administration proceedings are pending. The trial court is in the best position to
receive evidence on the discordant contentions of the parties as to the assets of
the decedent's estate, the valuations thereof and the rights of the transferees of
some of the assets, if any. The function of resolving whether or not a certain
property should be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered by the administrator is one clearly within the competence of the
probate court. However, the court's determination is only provisional in
character, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action
which may be instituted by the parties.

(2) Whether or not a judicial administration proceeding is necessary where

there are no debts left by the decedent

The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be
judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in Section 6, Rule 78, in case the deceased
left no will, or in case he had left one, should he fail to name an executor therein.
An exception to this rule is established in Section 1 of Rule 74. Under this
exception, when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from
the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting
the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator.

Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however, does not preclude the
heirs from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts
or obligations, if they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary
action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to divide the estate among
themselves as they may see fit, or to resort to an ordinary action for partition, the
said provision does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to take a
different course of action. It should be noted that recourse to an administration
proceeding even if the estate has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have
good reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where partition is
possible, either in or out of court, the estate should not be burdened with an
administration proceeding without good and compelling reasons.

When a person dies without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs,
whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property to a judicial
administration, which is always long and costly, or to apply for the appointment
of an administrator by the Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the
judicial administration and the appointment of an administrator are superfluous
and unnecessary proceedings. Now, what constitutes "good reason" to warrant a
judicial administration of the estate of a deceased when the heirs are all of legal
age and there are no creditors will depend on the circumstances of each case.

In the case at bar, there are only two surviving heirs, a wife of ten months and a
sister, both of age. The parties admit that there are no debts of the deceased to
be paid. What is at once apparent is that these two heirs are not in good terms.
The only conceivable reason why private respondent seeks appointment as
administratrix is for her to obtain possession of the alleged properties of the
deceased for her own purposes, since these properties are presently in the hands
of petitioner who supposedly disposed of them fraudulently. We are of the
opinion that this is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial
administration of the estate of the deceased. To subject the estate of Andres de
Guzman Pereira, which does not appear to be substantial especially since the only
real property left has been extrajudicially settled, to an administration proceeding
for no useful purpose would only unnecessarily expose it to the risk of being
wasted or squandered. In most instances of a similar nature, the claims of both
parties as to the properties left by the deceased may be properly ventilated in
simple partition proceedings where the creditors, should there be any, are
protected in any event.

The lower court was not justified in issuing letters of administration, there being
no good reason for burdening the estate of the deceased Andres de Guzman
Pereira with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. Hence, it is
unnecessary to delve into the issue of who, as between the surviving spouse and
the sister, should be preferred to be appointed as administratrix.

VERONA PADA-KILARIO and RICARDO KILARIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

SILVERIO PADA (January 19, 2000)

FACTS: Jacinto Pada had six (6) children, namely, Marciano, Ananias, Amador,
Higino, Valentina and Ruperta. He died intestate. His estate included a parcel of
land of residential and coconut land located in, Leyte. It is the northern portion of
Cadastral Lot No. 5581 which is the subject of the instant controversy.
During the lifetime of Jacinto Pada, his half-brother, Feliciano Pada, obtained
permission from him to build a house on the northern portion of Cadastral Lot No.
5581. When Feliciano died, his son, Pastor, continued living in the house together
with his eight children. Petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, one of Pastor's children,
has been living in that house since 1960.

The heirs of Jacinto Pada entered into an extra-judicial partition of his estate. For
this purpose, they executed a private document which they, however, never
registered in the Office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.It was to both Ananias
and Marciano, represented by his daughter, Maria, that Cadastral Lot No. 5581
was allocated during the said partition. When Ananias died, his daughter, Juanita,
succeeded to his right as co-owner of said property.

Juanita Pada sold to Engr. Ernesto Paderes, the right of his father, Ananias, as co-
owner of Cadastral Lot No. 5881.Maria Pada, then, sold the co-ownership right of
her father Marciano to her first cousin, the private respondent.

Thereafter, private respondent demanded that petitioner spouses vacate the

northern portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 so his family can utilize the said area
and he filed in the MTC a complaint for ejectment with prayer for damages
against petitioner spouses.

Later on, the heirs of Amador Pada executed a Deed of Donation transferring to
petitioner Verona Pada-Kilario, their respective shares as co-owners of Cadastral
Lot No. 5581. Petitioner spouses filed their Answer averring that the northern
portion of Cadastral Lot No. 5581 had already been donated to them by the heirs
of Amador Pada. They contended that the extra-judicial partition of the estate of
Jacinto Pada executed in 1951 was invalid and ineffectual since no special power
of attorney was executed by either Marciano, Amador or Higino in favor of their
respective children who represented them in the extra-judicial partition.
Moreover, it was effectuated only through a private document that was never
registered in the office of the Registrar of Deeds of Leyte.

The Municipal Circuit Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner

spouses. The RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. The C.A. dismissed he
petition.

ISSUE/RULINGS:
1. WON the extrajudicial partition is valid?

YES. The extrajudicial partition of the estate of Jacinto Pada among his heirs made
in 1951 is valid, albeit executed in an unregistered private document. No law
requires partition among heirs to be in writing and be registered in order to be
valid. The requirement in Sec. 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court that a
partition be put in a public document and registered, has for its purpose the
protection of creditors and the heirs themselves against tardy claims. The object
of registration is to serve as constructive notice to others. It follows then that the
intrinsic validity of partition not executed with the prescribed formalities is not
undermined when no creditors are involved. Without creditors to take into
consideration, it is competent for the heirs of an estate to enter into an
agreement for distribution thereof in a manner and upon a plan different from
those provided by the rules from which, in the first place, nothing can be inferred
that a writing or other formality is essential for the partition to be valid. The
partition of inherited property need not be embodied in a public document so as
to be effective as regards the heirs that participated therein.] The requirement of
Article 1358 of the Civil Code that acts which have for their object the creation,
transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable
property, must appear in a public instrument, is only for convenience, non-
compliance with which does not affect the validity or enforceability of the acts of
the parties as among themselves. And neither does the Statute of Frauds under
Article 1403 of the New Civil Code apply because partition among heirs is not
legally deemed a conveyance of real property, considering that it involves not a
transfer of property from one to the other but rather, a confirmation or
ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of
another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. The 1951 extrajudicial
partition of Jacinto Pada's estate being legal and effective as among his heirs,
Juanita and Maria Pada validly transferred their ownership rights over Cadastral
Lot No. 5581 to Engr. Paderes and private respondent, respectively.

2. WON the donation of the heirs of Amador Pada produced legal effect?

NO. In the said partition, what was allocated to Amador Pada was not the subject
property which was a parcel of residential land in Sto. Nino, Matalom, Leyte, but
rather, one-half of a parcel of coconut land in the interior of Sto. Nino St., Sabang,
Matalom, Leyte and one-half of a parcel of rice land in Itum, Sta. Fe, Matalom,
Leyte. The donation made by his heirs to petitioners of the subject property, thus,
is void for they were not the owners thereof. At any rate it is too late in the day
for the heirs of Amador Pada to repudiate the legal effects of the 1951
extrajudicial partition as prescription and laches have equally set in.

3. WON petitioners are estopped from impugning the extrajudicial partition?

YES.Petitioners are estopped from impugning the extrajudicial partition executed

by the heirs of Jacinto Pada after explicitly admitting in their Answer that they had
been occupying the subject property since 1960 without ever paying any rental as
they only relied on the liberality and tolerance of the Pada family. Considering
that petitioners were in possession of the subject property by sheer tolerance of
its owners, they knew that their occupation of the premises may be terminated
any time. Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an
implied promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a
summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.[26] Thus, they
cannot be considered possessors nor builders in good faith.

REMEDIES AGAINST EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT

Contribution from Distribution, Execution against Bond or Sale of Realty of
Decedent

JOSE McMICKING, administrator of the estate of Margarita Jose vs. BENITO SY

CONBIENG, administrator of the estate of Pio de la Gurdia Barretto Sy Pioco
(January 15, 1912)

FACTS: Margarita Jose, a Filipino, died in Amoy, China. Engracio Palanca was
appointed as administrator of the estate left by Jose. Mariano Ocampo Lao
Sempco and Dy Cunyao executed bonds as sureties of Palanca who thereafter
took possession of all the properties of Jose. Upon the death of Mariano Ocampo,
Palanca was required to furnish a new bond, which new bond was subsequently
filed through new sureties.
Mariano Ocampo (Palanca’s former surety) left an estate and Doroteo Velasco
was appointed as its administrator with Mariano Velasco and Pio de la Guardia
Barretto as sureties. Doroteo, Mariano Ocampo’s estate administrator filed a
complete report and inventory of the latter’s properties, together with a
statement of all his debts and liabilities. As a part of said report, Doroteo filed an
instrument signed by all of the persons interested in the estate of Mariano
Ocampo agreeing to the partitition of the estate among themselves without
proceedings in court, at the same time assuming the payment of all obligations
against the estate. Such partition agreed to was affirmed and approved by an
order of the court and Doroteo, in pursuance of such order and after having
settled all liabilities of the estate delivered all of the properties to the respective
devisees and legatees leaving no property of the estate in his hands.
Engracio Palanca was then removed from office as the administrator of Margarita
Jose’s estate by reason of the fact that Palanca failed and refused to render an
account of the property and funds of the said estate and even failed and refused
to deliver such property and funds to his successor Jose McMicking who was
appointed as administrator of Margarita Jose’s estate in Palanca’s stead. Palanca
retained possession of said property and funds, absconded with the same, and
never returned to the Philippines. Due to these circumstances McMicking
instituted a claim against the estate of Mariano Ocampo who was a surety of
Palanca. The court approved such claim and directed that Doroteo Velasco, the
administrator of Mariano Ocampo’s estate, pay it if he had sufficient funds. No
payment was made to Margarita Jose’s estate.
McMicking then instituted a claim against the estate of Pio de la Guardia Barretto
who died in 1905. Pio was one of the sureties of Doroteo Velasco when he was
appointed as administrator of Mariano Ocampo’s estate. Pio left an estate to
which the defendant Benito Sy Conbieng was appointed as administrator. The
committee appointed by the court to appraise and hear claims against Pio’s
estate disallowed McMicking’s claim and such finding of the committee was
affirmed by said lower court.
ISSUE: WON Benito Sy Conbieng, as administrator of Pio de la Guardia Barretto’s
estate, is liable for the claim made by Jose McMicking in favor of Margarita Jose’s
estate?
HELD: NO. Doroteo Velasco, for whom the deceased Pio was surety, would not
have been liable himself had this action been commenced against him. If the
principal is not liable upon the obligation, the surety cannot be. The basis of the
liability of a surety on administrator's bond is the fault or failure of the principal. If
the latter incurs no liability, the former incurs none. The administrator who
complies with the law incurs no liability to any person.
The estate of Mariano Ocampo against which McMicking’s original claim was
made and to which Doroteo Velasco was appointed as administrator was already
partitioned at the time the claim was made. A partition of the property of a
deceased person may be made under the provisions of sections 596 and 597 of
the Code of Civil Procedure, notwithstanding that an administrator with the will
annexed has been appointed and the administration of the estate under said
appointment is in progress. Such provisions are applicable no matter what stage
the administration has reached.
"SEC. 596. Settlement of intestate estates, without legalproceedings, in
certain cases.—Whenever all the heirs of a deceased person are of
lawful age and legal capacity, and there are no debts due from the
intestate estate, or all the debts have been paid by the heirs, the heirs
may, by a family council as known under Spanish law, or by agreement
between themselves, duly executed in writing, apportion and divide the
estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in
court."
"SEC. 597. In such case distributees liable for debts.—But if it shall
appear, at any time within two years after such settlement and
distribution of the estate, that there are debts outstanding against the
estate which have not been paid, any creditor may compel the
settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter
provided, unless his debt shall be paid, with interest; and the
administrator appointed by the court may recover the assets of the
estate from those who have received them, for the purpose of paying
the debts; and the real estate belonging to the deceased shall remain
charged with the liability to creditors for the full period of two years
after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers thereof that may
have been made."
These sections provide for the voluntary division of the whole property of the
decedent without proceedings in court.
Where, after the appointment of an administrator with the will annexed of a
deceased person and the due making of the inventory of the property and the
taking possession thereof by such administrator, an agreement is made between
the owners thereof under the will already probated partitioning the same
between them under said sections of the Code of Civil Procedure, the delivery of
the property to such partitioning owners by such administrator, under proper
proceedings and order of court and after compliance with the provisions of such
sections, is, in effect, a discharge of such administrator as to all future obligations
and responsibilities in relation to said property. In other words, if he turns such
property over to the owners thereof after a partition among them was made in
complete accordance with said sections, and he performs his full duty as such
administrator, neither he nor his bondsmen are liable to any person for such act.
An administrator cannot be held to accountability for property over which he has
no power or control or jurisdiction and in which he has no legal interest. The thing
on which he was appointed to operate having been withdrawn wholly beyond his
ken by the very power (the law, secs. 596 and 597) which appointed him, there is
a complete revocation of the original appointment dating from the day of the
removal from his hands of the property which he was appointed to administer.
The administrator has no power or control or jurisdiction and no legal interest in
the property anymore because by such partition, the estate passes out of
existence. The whole property is taken from the administrator and passed on to
the owners. They become the absolute owners thereof, subject only to the
liability of divestiture on the happening of certain events; but even such
divestiture may be avoided by paying the debt, which is the moving cause thereof.
While at any time within two years after such partition the property, or a portion
thereof, then in possession of the partitioning parties, may be placed again in
administration in the event of the discovery of unpaid debts "within two years
after such settlement and distribution of the estate," it would not be the same
estate represented by the prior administrator, and he would not be the
administrator of the new estate by virtue of his appointment in the old. It would
be necessary to appoint, upon proper application and notice, another
administrator for the purposes set forth in said sections. Before this, it is
necessary that the requisite conditions are present; the unpaid debt must be
discovered and the creditor must make his application. In the case at bar, neither
of the above conditions being present, there could be no administration after
partition. No new administrator was or could be appointed. There was no
administration. The appointment of commissioners to hear plaintiff's claim was
without authority. It was an appointment in respect to an estate that did not
legally exist and in relation to an administration that had never been inaugurated.
The acts of such commissioners were without legal effect.
In effect, Section 597 creates a statute of limitations, which deprives all debtsnot
discovered within the prescribed time, of the power of requiring an
administration of the estate remaining. Such administration, after partition,
depends upon the discovery of the debt "at any time within two years after the
settlement and distribution of the estate." These sections do not operate unless
that discovery is made within the time prescribed.
The partition provided for in these sections is binding and valid even though not
all of the debts actually outstanding were paid before the partition was made. The
discovery of an unpaid obligation after partition does not destroy the partition. It
simply furnishes ground for the application of the creditor for the appointment of
an administrator. The discovery of a debt after partition does not permit the
whole property in possession of the partitioning parties to be thrown into
administration. Only so much of the property is subject to such administration as
is sufficient to pay the claim discovered, leaving the partitioning persons in
undisturbed possession of the remainder. Even after the discovery of a debt
subsequent to partition, the partitioning persons may prevent any administration
whatever by paying the debt discovered, thereby preserving the partition intact in
all its parts.

Lajom v Viola

FACTS: Donato Lajom, filed a complaint praying that he be declared a natural

child of the late Dr. Viola and therefore a co-heir of the defendand-appellees, the
legitimate children of said Dr. Viola; and that a new partition be ordered. He
alleged that he was a natural child of the late Viola and that since the early
childhood, he had been enjoying the status of a son publicly. He claimed that the
special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of their father was already
closed and he did not intervene in the said case upon the expectation that his
existence as a son of the late Viola will be disclosed by his brothers to the court
and also upon their agreement that he will be given his lawful share. However his
brothers deliberately and fraudulently concealed the truth from the court with
the intention to deprive him of his lawful participation in the estate and only
partitioned the estate among themselves.

The CFI Nueva Ecija sustained the defendants' demurrer and dismissed the case
holding that the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of
action because its allegation called for the exercise of the probate jurisdiction of
the court and consequently did not constitute a cause of action in an ordinary civil
case like the present. It was further held that the court had no jurisdiction
because there was no allegation that the late Dr. Maximo Viola was, at the time of
his death, a resident of Nueva Ecija; on the contrary, the complaint showed that
the will of the deceased had already been probated in CFI Bulacan and that court
having first taken cognizance of the settlement of the estate, the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija could no longer assume jurisdiction over the same case.

1st ISSUE: WON the co-heir may bring an action for reivindication within the
prescriptive period?

HELD: Yes. Section 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure regarding acquisitive

prescription provides that even after a decree of distribution, an action for
recovery may be brought by the excluded heir within ten years. Article 405 of
the Civil Code also provides that the division of a thing owned in common shall
not prejudice any third person, who shall preserve the rights of mortgage,
easement or other real rights which might belong to him before the partition.

Partition is of the nature of a conveyance of ownership and certainly none of the

co-owners may convey to the others more than his own true right. Moreover, a
judicial partition in probate proceedings is not final and conclusive, as shown by
articles 1073, 1074, 1080 and 1081 of the Civil Code.

The said legal provisions are material in this aspect of the present case, not
because the court believes that the partition in the probate proceedings in
Bulacan should be annulled or rescinded but because said partition not being of
such definitive character as to stop all means of redress for a coheir who has been
deprived of his lawful share, such coheir may still, within the prescriptive period,
bring an action for reivindication in the province where any of the real property of
the deceased may be situated. In this case, 16 of the lots belonging to the estate
of the deceased Dr. Viola are located in the Province of Nueva Ecija where the
present action was brought.

Broad perspectives of which policy, which the lawmaker must have contemplated,
would seem to reveal the wisdom of allowing a coheir the benefits of the law of
prescription even after a partition, judicial or extrajudicial, has been had. Not
infrequently, the heirs are living in different provinces, far from one another and
far from the residence of the decedent. Some of them may not hear of the
probate proceedings, or if they do, they may not have at the time either the
means or the inclination to participate therein. Sometimes, one of the heirs, by
cajolery, bluster or truculence succeeds in preventing a number of the coheirs
from laying their just claims before the probate court. There are also instances
where an heir, cut of a sense of self-reliance, does not care to show keen and
active interest in the partition. In some cases, as it might have happened in the
present one, a cohier, from delicacy or fitting pride does not want, at the time of
the settlement of the estate, to appear in court as a natural child, and thus make
himself the object of public pity or disdain and inconsiderately lift the veil which
time has benignantly placed over the father's past social deviation.

2nd ISSUE (if asked): WON the complaint state facts sufficient to constitute a
cause of action?

Held: Yes. The complaint does not allege that the parents were free to marry
"each other" and "without dispensation." But pleadings should be liberally
construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties. Upon this
principle the complaint is sufficient because the allegation that the parents "were
free and could have contracted marriage" signifies that neither was married and
that there was no impediment on account of relationship which would have
required dispensation.

3rd ISSUE (If asked): WON CFI Nueva Ecija has jurisdiction over the case?
Held: Yes, because the complaint contains allegations which, if shown at the trial,
would be sufficient to support and warrant an action for reivindiction of his right
as a co-owner of the sixteen parcels of land situated in the Province of Nueva
Ecija. From the moment of the death of the late Dr. Maximo Viola on September 3,
1933, succession was opened. The possession of his whole estate was transmitted
to all his heirs (including the plaintiff) without interruption and from the moment
of his death. The plaintiff's dominion over his share of the estate was therefore
automically and by operation of law vested in him upon the death of his natural
father, subject of course to the lien of the creditors of the decedent. This being
true it is difficult to ignore the right of the plaintiff to recover his charge in the
lands in Nueva Ecija, (the debts of the estate having been adjusted before the
partition approved by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan) by an action of
reivindication because of the defendant's refusal to deliver said share to him.ch
4th ISSUE (If asked) : WON the partition between the legitimate children the
deceased Viola as gained finality?
HELD: No. The defendants partitioned the estate among themselves in the
administration proceedings before the CFI Bulacan. Even granting that the
partition was binding against the whole world (though it will be shown later that
it was not), nevertheless it could not have a more puissant finality than a decree
of title under the Torrens system. The legal title obtained by the defendants to
the plaintiff's share in the estate, in the partition approved by the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan, must yield to the superior and inviolate rights equity of the
plaintiff, who abstained from taking part in that partition because of the promise
made to him by the defendants that they would deliver to him lawful share as an
acknowledged natural child.
5th ISSUE (if asked): WON the agreement the agreement between the children
may be considered as a compromise?
HELD: No. Srticle 1814, Civil Code provides that there can be no compromise over
the civil status of persons, or over matrimonial questions, or over future support.
However, it does not appear from the complaint that the defendants ever
impugned or denied the plaintiff's status as an acknowledged natural child; on the
contrary, according to the complaint, the defendants admitted such status by
promising to give the plaintiff his lawful share in the estate of the father. There
having been, in accordance with the allegations in the complaint, no controversy
over the condition of the plaintiff as acknowledged natural child, the agreement
between the plaintiff and defendants alleged in the complaint, if shown at the
trial, is not a compromise at all, and is not frowned upon by the legislator in
article 1814 of the Civil Code.
Jerez v. Nietes
30 SCRA 904 ; December 27, 1969
Facts: Oct. 3, 1960: Nicolas Jalandoni died. Oct. 27, 1960: A special proceeding for
the settlement of his estate was filed before Judge Nietes, where petitioner
Lucrecia Jerez, his widow, was appointed as administratrix.
 -June 14, 1966:
project of partition and final accounting was submitted June 15, 1966: Judge
Nietes gave an order approving the partition. June 29, 1966: respondent Lucilo
Jalandoni, alleging that he is an acknowledged natural child of the deceased, and
respondent Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta, alleging that she is an illegitimate
daughter, sought to be allowed to intervene on the ground that they were
preterited in the project of partition which they would have respondent Judge
reject for being contrary to law. - July 8, 1966: Judge gave an order allowing
intervention and reopening the proceedings to permit the movants "to present
whatever evidence they may have to show their right to participate in the estate
of the deceased." Sept. 21, 1966: CA sustained CFI order.
Issue: Whether CA erred in sustaining CFI order
Held: - It is within the power of respondent Judge to reopen the proceedings and
allow intervention. The question remains, however, whether he did so in the
appropriate manner. It is not the existence of the power but the mode of its
exercise that is open to question.
- CA judges were split. The majority held “that the determination of a prima facie
interest in anestate to justify reopening proceedings for the settlement thereof is
primarily addressed to the sound discretion and judgment of the probate court;
that, while no supporting documents are appended to the motion to reopen
tending to show the personality to intervene, said motion is nevertheless verified
upon oaths of the claimants of interest and the probate court has authority to
require the submission of at least a prima facie showing of said interest; that the
motion to reopen was filed before the order closing the proceedings had achieved
finality and during the reglementary period within which the court still had
jurisdiction over the case and retained full power to amend and control its
process and orders; that, because the closure order had not yet become final, the
requirements of Rule 38 respecting relief from judgment do not apply and, hence,
the failure of the motion to reopen to allege any of the grounds therein stated is
not fatal; that the better practice in case of the appearance of alleged preterited
heirs is to secure relief by reopening the proceedings by a proper motion within
the reglementary period, it being desirable that all aspects of a controversy be
ventilated in the same proceeding and thus avoid multiplicity of suits.”
- The CA minority held “that the better policy is to require the intervenors first to
produce prima facie evidence of the claimed civil status before opening the door
and letting them in. Under Rule 12.2, 'a person may, before or during a trial, be
permitted by the court, in its discretion, to intervene in an action, if he has legal
interest in the matter in litigation.' The possibility of interlopers getting in for a
share in the estate cannot be totally discounted specially considering that the
present intestate proceedings had been pending for the last 6 years without a
motion to intervene having been filed by the present claimants in spite of the
notice of publication and the in rem character of the intestate proceedings.”
On the power to reopen proceedings and allow intervention Ramos v. Ortuzar:
The only instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a probate
proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason
of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence. Even then, the better practice to secure relief is
reopening of the same case by proper motion
within the reglementary period, instead of an independent action the effect of
which, if successful, would be, as in the instant case, for another court or judge to
throw out a decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle properties
long ago distributed and disposed of.
- Rather than require any party who can allege a grievance that his interest was
not recognized in a testate or intestate proceeding to file a separate and
independent action, he may within the reglementary period secure the relief that
is his due by a reopening of the case even after a project of partition and final
accounting had been approved.
On the exercise of the power. The verified motion on the part of private
respondents did not suffice to call into play the power of respondent Judge to
allow intervention. There must be proof beyond allegations in such motion to
show the interest of the private movants. In the absence thereof, the action taken
by respondent Judge could be considered premature.Dispositive CA resolution
MODIFIED in the sense that Judge Nietes, or whoever may be acting in his place,
is directed to require Lucilo Jalandoni and Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta to
present evidence to justify their right to intervene in SP No. 1562 re Intestate
Estate of Nicolas H. Jalandoni. In the event that they could so justify such a right,
the lower court on the basis of such evidence is to proceed conformably to law.
Ignacio Gerona, et al vs Carmen de Guzman, et al
G.R. No. L-19060. May 20, 1964
Facts: Petitioners, Ignacio, Maria Concepcion, Francisco and Delfin, all surnamed
Gerona, allege in their complaint for reconveyance that they are the legitimate
children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman; that the latter was a
legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz;
that after the death of his first wife, Marcelo married Camila Ramos, who begot
him several children, namely, respondents Carmen, Jose, Clemente, Francisco,
Rustica, Pacita and Victoria, all surnamed De Guzman; that subsequently after the
death of Marcelo, respondents executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of
the estate of the deceased, fraudulently misrepresenting therein that they were
the only surviving heirs, although they well knew that petitioners were, also, his
forced heirs; that respondents had thereby succeeded fraudulently in causing the
transfer certificates of title to seven (7) parcels of land in their own name; that
such fraud was discovered by the petitioners only the year before the institution
of this case; that petitioners forthwith demanded from respondents share in said
properties but the respondents refused to heed said demand, thereby causing
damages to the petitioners. In their answer, respondents maintained that
petitioners’ mother, the deceased Placida de Guzman, was not entitled to share in
the estate of Marcelo de Guzman, she being merely a spurious child of the latter,
and that petitioners’ action is barred by the statute of limitations.
Issue: WON the petitioners’ action is barred by the statute of frauds.
Held: Yes. The SC held that an action for reconveyance of real property based
upon a constructive or implied trust, resulting from fraud, may be barred by the
statute of limitations. Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among
co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold
the property in question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations
operates, as in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the
possessor of the property. When respondents executed the deed of extrajudicial
settlement stating therein that they are the sole heirs of the deceased, and
secured new transfer certificates of title in their own name, they thereby
excluded the petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and, consequently, set
up a title adverse to them.
Hence, the action for reconveyance should have been filed within four (4) years
from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place, in
the case at bar, in 1948, when said instrument was filed with the Register of
Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents
exclusively, for the registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement
constitutes constructive notice to whole world.
In the light of the foregoing it must, therefore, be held that plaintiffs learned at
least constructively, of the alleged fraud committed against them by defendants
on 25 June 1948 when the deed of extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the
deceased Marcelo de Guzman was registered in the registry of deeds of Bulacan,
Plaintiffs' complaint in this case was not filed until 4 November 1958, or more
than 10 years thereafter. Plaintiff Ignacio Gerona became of age on 3 March 1948.
He is deemed to have discovered defendants' fraud on 25 June 1948 and had,
therefore, only 4 years from the said date within which to file this action. Plaintiff
Maria Concepcion Gerona became of age on 8 December 1949 or after the
registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement. She also had only the
remainder of the period of 4 years from December 1949 within which to
commence her action. Plaintiff Francisco Gerona became of age only on 9 January
1952 so that he was still a minor when he gained knowledge (even if only
constructive) of the deed of extra-judicial settlement on 25 June 1948. Likewise,
plaintiff Delfin Gerona became of legal age on 5 August 1954, so that he was also
still a minor at the time he gained knowledge (although constructive) of the deed
of extra-judicial settlement on 25 June 1948. Francisco Gerona and Delfin Gerona
had, therefore, two years after the removal of their disability within which to
commence their action (Section 45, paragraph 3, in relation to Section 43, Act
190), that is, January 29, 1952, with respect to Francisco, and 5 August 1954, with
respect to Delfin.
PEDROSA v. CA
353 SCRA 620, March 5, 2001
Facts:Ma. Elena Rodiguez Pedrosa is the adopted child of spouses Rosalina and
Miguel Rodriguez. The spouses had no other children. When Miguel died, his
collateral relatives filed an action in the CFI to annul the adoption of Ma. Elena.
(the adoptive mother was one of the petitioners there.) The CFI upheld the
validity of the adoption. The collaterals and the widow appealed to the CA; but
while the proceedings were ongoing, they entered into an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of Miguel, without the participation of Ma.Elena, who
was already of majority age at that time. Eventually, the CA upheld the validity of
the adoption. But by this time, the collaterals and the widow had partitioned the
estate. They published in a newspaper the fact of partition AFTER they
settled the partition. (For perspective, the property in question is some 226k
sqm.)
 -Ma. Elena asked the collaterals and the widow for her share. They refused
to give her because she’s not a blood relative. So she filed an action in the CFI to
annul the partition. CFI dismissed for being filed out of time. The action was filed
3 years 10 months after the extrajudicial settlement. CA affirmed CFI’s dismissal.
Issue Whether the period in Rule 74.4 (2 years) applies in this case.
Held: NO.The 2-year period in Rule 74.4 applies only for validly executed
extrajudicial settlements wherein the one assailing the same participated. A valid
extrajudicial settlement, per Rule 74.1, means that all the persons or heirs of the
decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by
themselves or through guardians. - The contention that Ma.Elena was
represented by the adoptive mom doesn’t hold because she wasn’t a minor
anymore. The fact that the extrajudicial settlement was published after the
partition is also of no value because the notice is supposed to be given BEFORE
the extrajudicial settlement, to call all the heirs to participate. The exclusion of
heirs in the extrajudicial settlement is fraudulent. Clearly, the 2-yr period doesn’t
apply to Ma. Elena. The action to annul a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon
the ground of fraud may be filed within 4 years from the discovery of the fraud.
Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed
with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of
respondents exclusively. Since Ma. Elena is the adopted child, she along with the
widow are the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez, to the exclusion of the latter’s collateral
relatives. The collaterals, who got around 90% of the estate in the extrajudicial
settlement, have no right to the same. However, the properties that were already
transferred to 3rd persons must be recovered in a separate case because there
can be no collateral attack on Torrens Titles. Ma. Elena wasn’t able to prove
damages due her so the court awarded nominal damages of P100k.
Estate of Francisco vs. Carreon
Facts: Rosa Aldana Francisco petitioned the CFI of Rizal summarily to settle the
estate of her husband Jose M. Francisco who had died in 1944. Alleging under
oath that they had three minor children who were his legal heirs, and that the
deceased left a parcel of land with a house thereon, and no creditors, she asked
for declaration that the persons entitled to share in his estate are the said three
children, with herself as usufructuary. After the requisite publication, the petition
was heard and later approved by an order declaring Rosa and the three children
as the only heirs of the deceased, and adjudicating unto the heirs the property in
the proportion of ½ undivided share to the widow, and the other half in equal
parts to the children. Rosa mortgaged her share of the property to sisters Fausta
and Catalina Carreon for the sum of P13,000, and afterwards, she conveyed by
absolute deed of sale her interest and participation in the land.
However, on motion, Tiburcia Magsalin Vda. De Francisco, mother of the
deceased Jose Francisco, allegedly in representation of the minor Jose Francisco y
Palumpon, 17, averred that the minor was a recognized natural son of the
deceased, with legal right to participate in his estate, and that the previous
proceedings were void because Rosa had concealed such fact, and because she
had interests in conflict with those of her three sons, the truth being that the land
was private property of Jose of which she could not have been awarded a portion
in fee simple. Oppositions to the motion were presented by Rosa and sisters
Carreon.
Issue: 1.Whether the court should continue hearing the motion for reopening
even after the natural child had withdrawn from the litigation
2. Whether a probate court can take cognizance of the annulment of the
mortgage and sale
Held: 1. Yes. In the motion of Tiburcia, she asked for appointment as guardian
ad litem for the natural child and for the three legitimate children. Hence, the
motion may be regarded in a spirit of liberality, as interposed on behalf of the said
four children – not only a motion of the natural child. Precisely, because the
complaint also prayed for relief beneficial to the three legitimate children –
contrary to the interests of the natural child – the court declined to permit
Tiburcia to represent the four children, but allowed her to act for three only. At
any rate, parties may be dropped or added by the court on motion of any party or
of its own initiative at any state of the action and on such terms as are just.
Appellants may not justly complain that they thought such petition for
readjustment or reopening could only take place within 2 years as prescribed by
Section 4, Rule 74 and as annotated in the certificate of title because they are
conclusively presumed to know the existence and provisions of Section 5, Rule 74.
We take judicial notice of the fact that in the adjudication of summary
settlements more often than not, the order merely states that the sale shall be
subject to the provisions of Section 4, Rule 74. This is the case because the Court
cannot foresee whether the movant will be affected; but section 5 being an
imposition of the law, and being a mere sequence to the provisions of section 4,
we hold that where the title on its face shows that it was subject to the provisions
of Section 4, Rule 74, a third person who accepts it must take notice that he is
running the risk of interfering with the rights of minors as provided in Section 5,
Rule 74.
2. If during the summary proceedings some of the heirs claim, by title adverse
to that of the decedent, some parcels of land, the probate court has no
jurisdiction to pass upon the issue which must be decided in a separate suit. But
in this case there is no question that the realty belonged to the decedent; and a
separate suit was unnecessary, specially remembering that in these summary
settlements the judge is expected to “proceed summarily” and “without delay” to
determine who are the persons legally entitled to participate in the estate, and to
apportion and divide it among them.
Sampilo vs. CA
Facts: Teodoro Tolete died intestate. He left four parcels of land. He left as heirs
his widow, Leoncia de Leon, and several nephews and nieces, children of
deceased brothers and sisters. Without any judicial proceedings, Leoncia
executed an affidavit stating that Teodoro left no children or respondent neither
ascendants or acknowledged natural children, nor brother, sisters, nephews or
nieces, but the widow Leoncia de Leon, the legitimate wife of the deceased. The
affidavit was registered in the Office of the RD of Pangasinan, and on the same
day, she executed a deed of sale of all 4 parcels of land in favor of Benny Sampilo
for the sum of P10,000. Sampilo in turn sold the said parcels of land to Honorato
Salacup for P50,000. Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration
of the estate of Teodoro, and having secured her appointment as administratrix,
brought the present action. Notice of lis pendens was filed in the RD and said
notice was recorded on certificates of title covering the properties. This notice,
however, was subsequent to the registration of the deed of sale in favor of
Salacup.
Issue: Whether Sinopera’s right of action to recover her and her co-heirs’
participation to the lands in question had not prescribed at the time the action to
recover was filed.
Whether Sampilo and Salacup are are innocent purchasers for value.
Ruling: 1) No mention is made expressly of the effect of the extrajudicial
settlement on persons who did not take part therein or had no notice or
knowledge thereof. There cannot be any doubt that those who took part or had
knowledge thereof are bound thereby. As to them the law is clear that if they
claim to have been in any manner deprived of their lawful right in the estate by
the extrajudicial settlement, they may demand their rights or interests within the
period of two years. But as to those who did not take part in the settlement or
had no notice of the death of the death of the decedent or of settlement, there is
no direct or express provision. It is unreasonable and unjust that they also be
required to assert their claims within a period of two years.
The provisions of Section 4, Rule 74, barring distributes or heirs from objecting to
an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years is applicable only (1) to
persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial
partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1, Rule 74 have been
strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have
taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by themselves or
through guardians. The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements
because not all the heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial
settlement, the CA having found out that the decedent left aside from his widow,
nephews and nieces living at the time of his death.
2) NO. As regards defendant Benny Sampilo, it is an admitted fact that he is a
nephew of Leoncia de Leon and he had been living with the latter. Both Benny
Sampilo and the heirs of the deceased who are claiming the property are
residents of San Manuel, Pangasinan. It is hard, therefore, to believe that Benny
Sampilo did not know the existence of said heirs, and that he was not aware that
they were nephews and nieces, children of the deceased brothers, of the
deceased Teodoro Tolete. The fact furthermore that Benny Sampilo accompanied
his aunt Leoncia de Leon to Sison, Pangasinan, when the later saw Notary Public
Ladislao Villamil, who was the former's uncle, to have him prepare the affidavit of
adjudication Exhibit "A", and the deed of conveyance Exhibit "B" by which on the
same date she conveyed to Sampilo all the property which she had adjudicated to
herself, both of which she acknowledged before said notary public, coupled with
the fact that there is no sufficient showing that the consideration for the
conveyance of P10,000 had in fact been paid, strengthens our belief that said
Benny Sampilo knew that the deceased Teodoro Tolete had other heirs who may
claim the property, and that the immediate conveyance thereof to him was a
strategem concocted to defeat the former's rights. And as regards Honorato
Salacup, while the claim that no notice of lis pendens appeared annotated in the
certificates of title issued to Benny Sampilo when he acquired the property might
be true, for he purchased the property on June 17, 1950, and the notice of lis
pendens was noted on said certificates of title on June 26, 1950, nevertheless, he
cannot claim that he was a purchaser in good faith for value of the property. It is
well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that a purchaser of registered lands who has
knowledge of facts which should put him upon inquiry and investigate as to the
possible defects of the title of the vendor and fails to make such inquiry and
investigation cannot claim that he as a purchaser in good faith for value and he
had acquired a valid title thereto.
US vs. Chiu Guimco
Facts: Joaquin Cruz had for many years resided in Misamis, where he lived as a
Chinese merchant and amassed a considerable estate. Cruz visited China and was
there married to a Chinese woman, Uy Cuan, and by her had one child. After his
return from China, he was married in Gingoog to a Filipina woman named Maria
Villafranca. Cruz again visited China, leaving his brother, Chiu Guimco, in charge of
his property and business in Gingoog as agent. While on the visit to China, Cruz
died. Before his departure he had executed a will before Anastacio Servillon, in
which Chiu Guimco and Co-Iden were named as executors. Chiu Guimco and Co-
Iden appeared before Servillon and at their request the latter drew up a petition
for the probate of the will. The will itself was not produced before the notary
public upon this occasion, and he was not informed by them as to who then had
possession of the will. Nothing further was done in the probate of the will and Co-
Iden subsequently died.
Chiu Guimco entered into an arrangement with Villafranca, whereby, in
consideration of the conveyance of certain property to her, she relinquished in
favor of the other persons interested in the estate of the deceased all her claims
in respect to the same property. When Uy Cuan went to the Philippines to settle
the estate of her husband, Chiu claimed that he and his brother had been
business partners, along with another brother, Chiu Tamco. They then agreed that
Uy Cuan and her child were to receive 40% of the estate of the deceased, Chiu
Guimco was to receive another 40%, and Chiu Tamco 20%. Later on, Uy Cuan
entered into a contract with Chiu Guimco whereby he agreed to pay the sum of
P350 per quarter by way of rental on their interest in the real estate of the
decedent. No payments have been made by him in compliance with the contract.
Ramon Contreras, a Chinese merchant acting on behalf of Uy Cuan and her child,
began to make inquiries into the affairs of the estate, and wrote Chiu Guimco
urging him to produce the will of the decedent for the institution of the lawful
proceedings in accordance therewith. The letter called his attention to the
penalty denounced by Sections 628 and 629 of the Code of Civil Procedure for
withholding a will, but assured him that if he would then produce the will no
penalty would be incurred. Still, Chiu Guimco asserted that the will had never
been in his possession and that he had never seen it.
A complaint was filed charging him with the failure to produce the will within the
time required by law. The CFI found Chiu Guimco guilty and imposed upon him a
fine of P1,800. During the hearing, the trial judge formed the opinion that Chiu
Guimco still had the will, and so ordered the latter to produce the will or make a
reasonable explanation as to why he cannot do so. However, Chiu Guimco still
failed to produce the will, and the judge was not satisfied with his explanation as
to why he cannot produce the will, thus the judgment also included an order to
place him in jail until he should produce the will.
Issue: WON the judge had the authority to make the order in question
Ruling: No. Article 629 can only be applied when a court is acting in the exercise
of its jurisdiction over the administration of the estates of deceased persons; and
where administration proceedings are not already pending, the court, before
taking action under this section, should require that there be before it some
petition, information, or affidavit of such character as to make action by the court
under this section appropriate. The proceeding in this case, under section 628, is
an ordinary criminal prosecution. The act penalized in that section is a special
statutory offense and is properly prosecuted upon complaint or information as
other criminal offenses created by law. The remedy provided in section 629 is a
totally different remedy, having no relation with that provided in section 628; and
it is not permissible in a prosecution under Section 628 to superimpose upon the
penalty of fine therein prescribed the additional penalty of imprisonment
prescribed in section 629.
G.R. No. L-48840 December 29, 1943
ERNESTO M. GUEVARA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ROSARIO GUEVARA and her husband PEDRO BUISON, respondent-appellees.
FACTS:
Ernesto M. Guevarra and Rosario Guevara, legitimate son and natural daughter,
respectively, of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara, are litigating here over their
inheritance from the latter.
On August 26, 1931, Victorino L. Guevara executed a will (exhibit A), apparently
with all the formalities of the law.
On July 12, 1933, a deed of sale was executed by and between Victorino L.
Guevara and Ernesto M. Guevara before a notary public which may be divided
into two parts: (a) insofar as it disposes of and conveys to Ernesto M. Guevara the
southern half of Victorino L. Guevara's hacienda of 259-odd hectares in
consideration of P1 and other valuable considerations among which were the
payment of all his debts and obligations amounting to not less than P16,500, his
maintenance up to his death, and the expenses of his last illness and funeral
expenses and (b) insofar as it declares that Ernesto M. Guevara became the
owner of the northern half of the same hacienda by repurchasing it with his own
money from Rafael T. Puzon.
On September 27, 1933, Victorino L. Guevarra died. His last will and testament,
however, was never presented to the court for probate, nor has any
administration proceeding ever been instituted for the settlement of his estate.
Whether the various legatees mentioned in the will have received their respective
legacies or have even been given due notice of the execution of said will and of
the dispositions therein made in their favor, does not affirmatively appear from
the record of this case. Ever since the death of Victorino L. Guevara, his only
legitimate son Ernesto M. Guevara appears to have possessed the land
adjudicated to him in the registration proceeding and to have disposed of various
portions thereof for the purpose of paying the debts left by his father.
In the meantime Rosario Guevara, who appears to have had her father's last will
and testament in her custody, did nothing judicially to invoke the testamentary
dispositions made therein in her favor, whereby the testator acknowledged her
as his natural daughter and, aside from certain legacies and bequests, devised
to her a portion of 21.6171 hectares of the large parcel of land described in the
will. But a little over four years after the testor's demise, she (assisted by her
husband) commenced the present action against Ernesto M. Guevara alone for
the purpose hereinbefore indicated; and it was only during the trial of this case
that she presented the will to the court, not for the purpose of having it probated
but only to prove that the deceased Victirino L. Guevara had acknowledged her as
his natural daughter. Upon that proof of acknowledgment she claimed her share
of the inheritance from him, but on the theory or assumption that he died
intestate, because the will had not been probated, for which reason, she
asserted, the betterment therein made by the testator in favor of his legitimate
son Ernesto M. Guevara should be disregarded.
ISSUE:
Two principal questions are before us for determination: (1) the legality of the
procedure adopted by the plaintiff (respondent herein) Rosario Guevara; and (2)
the efficacy of the deed of sale exhibit 2 and the effect of the certificate of title
issued to the defendant (petitioner herein) Ernesto M. Guevara.
RULING:
1. We cannot sanction the procedure adopted by the respondent Rosario Guevara,
it being in our opinion in violation of procedural law and an attempt to
circumvent and disregard the last will and testament of the decedent.
Presentation of a will to the court for probate is mandatory and its allowance by
the court is essential and indispensable to its efficacy. To assure and compel the
probate of will, the law punishes a person who neglects his duty to present it to
the court with a fine not exceeding P2,000, and if he should persist in not
presenting it, he may be committed to prison and kept there until he delivers the
will.
We hold that under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left
a will and no debts and the heirs and legatees desire to make an extrajudicial
partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for probate
and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the
provisions of the will unless those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may
they so away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate, because
such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy. The law enjoins
the probate of the will and public policy requires it, because unless the will is
probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right of a person to
dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory, as is attempted to be
done in the instant case. Absent legatees and devisees, or such of them as may
have no knowledge of the will, could be cheated of their inheritance thru the
collusion of some of the heirs who might agree to the partition of the estate
among themselves to the exclusion of others.
In the instant case there is no showing that the various legatees other than the
present litigants had received their respective legacies or that they had
knowledge of the existence and of the provisions of the will. Their right under the
will cannot be disregarded, nor may those rights be obliterated on account of the
failure or refusal of the custodian of the will to present it to the court for probate.
The parties herein are hereby ordered to present the document exhibit A to the
proper court for probate in accordance with law.
2. It is apparent that the defendant Ernesto M. Guevara, who was named
executor in said will, did not take any step to have it presented to the court for
probate and did not signify his acceptance of the trust or refusal to accept it as
required by section 3 of Rule 76 (formerly section 627 of the Code of Civil
Procedure), because his contention is that said will, insofar as the large parcel of
land in litigation is concerned, has been superseded by the deed of sale exhibit 2
and by the subsequent issuance of the Torrens certificate of title in his favor.
As to the conveyance of the southern half of the hacienda to Ernesto M. Guevara
in consideration of the latter's assumption of the obligation to pay all the debts of
the deceased, the Court of Appeals found it to be valid and efficacious because:
"(a) it has not been proven that the charges imposed as a condition is [are] less
than the value of the property; and (b) neither has it been proven that the
defendant did not comply with the conditions imposed upon him in the deed of
transfer." As a matter of fact the Court of Appeals found" "It appears that the
defendant has been paying the debts left by his father. To accomplish this, he had
to alienate considerable portions of the above-mentioned land.
We affirm the finding of the Court of Appeals that the northern half of the land
described in the will exhibit A and in original certificate of title No. 51691 still
belongs to the estate of the deceased Victorino L. Guevara. The Court of Appeals
found that the money with which the petitioner repurchased the northern half of
the land in question from Rafael Puzon was not his own but his father's, it being
the proceeds of the sale of a parcel of land made by the latter to Silvestre P.
Coquia. Said court also found that the respondent withdrew her opposition to the
registration of the land in the name of the petitioner upon the latter's promise
that after paying all the debts of their father he would deliver to her and to the
widow their corresponding shares. From these facts, it results that the interested
parties consented to the registration of the land in question in the name of
Ernesto M. Guevara alone subject to the implied trust on account of which he is
under obligation to deliver and convey to them their corresponding shares after
all the debts of the original owner of said land had been paid.
G.R. No. L-12207 December 24, 1959
JUAN PALACIOS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
MARIA CATIMBANG PALACIOS, oppositor-appellee.
FACTS:
Juan Palacios executed his last will and testament on June 25, 1946 and availing
himself of the provisions of the new Civil Code, he filed on May 23, 1956 before
the Court of First Instance of Batangas a petition for its approval. In said will, he
instituted as his sole heirs his natural children Antonio C. Palacios and Andrea C.
Palacios.
On June 21, 1956, Maria Catimbang filed a opposition to the probate of the will
alleging that she is the acknowledged natural daughter of petitioner but that she
was completely ignored in said will thus impairing her legitime.
After the presentation of petitioner's evidence relative to the essential requisites
and formalities provided by law for the validity of a will, the court on July 6, 1956
issued an order admitting the will to probate. The court, however, set a date for
the hearing of the opposition relative to the intrinsic validity of the will and, after
proper hearing concerning this incident, the court issued another order declaring
oppositor to be the natural child of petitioner and annulling the will insofar as it
impairs her legitime, with costs against petitioner.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in entertaining the opposition and in
annulling the portion of the will which allegedly impairs the legitime of the
oppositor. YES.
RULING:
We hold that such opposition cannot be entertained in this proceeding because
its only purpose is merely to determine if the will has been executed in
accordance with the requirements of the law, much less if the purpose of the
opposition is to show that the oppositor is an acknowledged natural child who
allegedly has been ignored in the will for issue cannot be raised here but in a
separate action. This is especially so when the testator, as in the present case, is
still alive and has merely filed a petition for the allowance of his will leaving the
effects thereof after his death.
The authentication of the will decides no other questions than such as touch upon
the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will. It does not
determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency of the
provisions; that may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its
authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected,
and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated."
G.R. No. L-23638 October 12, 1967
DIONISIO FERNANDEZ, EUSEBIO REYES and LUISA REYES, petitioners,
vs.
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, respondent.
FACTS:
It appears from the record that on January 19, 1955, Ismaela Dimagiba, now
respondent, submitted to the Court of First Instance a petition for the probate of
the purported will of the late Benedicta de los Reyes, executed on October 22,
1930, and annexed to the petition. The will instituted the petitioner as the sole
heir of the estate of the deceased. The petition was set for hearing, and in due
time, Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes and Luisa Reyes and one month later,
Mariano, Cesar, Leonor and Paciencia, all surnamed Reyes, all claiming to be heirs
intestate of the decedent, filed oppositions to the probate asked. Grounds
advanced for the opposition were forgery, vices of consent of the testatrix,
estoppel by laches of the proponent and revocation of the will by two deeds of
conveyance of the major portion of the estate made by the testatrix in favor of
the proponent in 1943 and 1944, but which conveyances were finally set aside
by this Supreme Court in a decision promulgated on August 3, 1954, in cases G.R.
Nos. L-5618 and L-5620 (unpublished).
After trial on the formulated issues, the Court of First Instance, by decision of
June 20, 1958, found that the will was genuine and properly executed; but
deferred resolution on the questions of estoppel and revocation "until such time
when we shall pass upon the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will or when
the question of adjudication of the properties is opportunely presented."
The appellate Court held that the decree of June 20, 1958, admitting the will to
probate, had become final for lack of opportune appeal; that the same was
appealable independently of the issue of implied revocation; that contrary to the
claim of oppositors-appellants, there had been no legal revocation by the
execution of the 1943 and 1944 deeds of sale, because the latter had been made
in favor of the legatee herself, and affirmed the decision of the Court of First
Instance.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the decree of the Court of First Instance allowing the will to
probate had become final for lack of appeal. YES.
2. Whether or not the order of the Court of origin dated July 27, 1959, overruling
the estoppel invoked by oppositors-appellants had likewise become final.
3. Whether or not the 1930 will of Benedicta de los Reyes had been impliedly
revoked by her execution of deeds of conveyance in favor of the proponent on
March 26, 1943 and April 3, 1944. NO.
RULING:
1. It is elementary that a probate decree finally and definitively settles all
questions concerning capacity of the testator and the proper execution and
witnessing of his last will and testament, irrespective of whether its provisions
are valid and enforceable or otherwise. As such, the probate order is final and
appealable; and it is so recognized by express provisions of Section 1 of Rule 109,
that specifically prescribes that "any interested person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order or judgment . . . where such order or judgment: (a)
allows or disallows a will."
2. As to the issue of estoppel, we have already ruled in Guevara vs. Guevara, 98
Phil. 249, that the presentation and probate of a will are requirements of public
policy, being primarily designed to protect the testator's, expressed wishes, which
are entitled to respect as a consequence of the decedent's ownership and right of
disposition within legal limits. It would be a non sequitur to allow public policy
to be evaded on the pretext of estoppel. Whether or not the order overruling the
allegation of estoppel is still appealable or not, the defense is patently
unmeritorious and the Court of Appeals correctly so ruled.
3. As observed by the Court of Appeals, the existence of any such change or
departure from the original intent of the testatrix, expressed in her 1930
testament, is rendered doubtful by the circumstance that the subsequent
alienations in 1943 and 1944 were executed in favor of the legatee herself,
appellee Dimagiba. In fact, as found by the Court of Appeals in its decision
annulling these conveyances, "no consideration whatever was paid by
respondent Dimagiba" on account of the transfers, thereby rendering it even
more doubtful whether in conveying the property to her legatee, the testatrix
merely intended to comply in advance with what she had ordained in her
testament, rather than an alteration or departure therefrom.
G.R. No. 120575. December 16, 1998
DR. OLIVIA S. PASCUAL, in her capacity as special administratrix of the estate of
the late DON ANDRES PASCUAL and as executrix of the testate estate of the late
DOA ADELA S. PASCUAL, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; JUDGE MANUEL S.
PADOLINA, Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 162; DEPUTY SHERIFF CARLOS G.
MAOG; and ATTY. JESUS I. SANTOS, respondents.
FACTS:
Don Andres Pascual died intestate on October 12, 1973. On December 11, 1973,
Doa Adela (the surviving spouse) filed a petition for letters of administration over
the estate of her husband. After due notice and hearing, the CFI appointed her
special administratrix.To assist her with said proceedings, Doa Adela hired, on
February 24, 1974, Atty. Jesus I. Santos, herein private respondent, as her
counsel for a fee equivalent to fifteen (15) percent of the gross estate of the
decedent.
When Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 took effect, the petition was reassigned to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig, Branch 162, presided by Judge Manuel
Padolina. On November 4, 1985, the heirs of the decedent moved for the
approval of their Compromise Agreement, stipulating that three fourths (3/4) of
the estate would go to Doa Adela and one fourth (1/4) to the other heirs. The
intestate court approved said Agreement on December 10, 1985.
On August 18, 1987, while the settlement was still pending, Doa Adela died,
leaving a will which named the petitioner as the sole universal heir.
Six years after Doa Adelas death, on January 19, 1994, to be exact, Judge Padolina
rendered a Decision. The assailed portion of such decision was the award of the
attorneys fees of Atty. Jesus Santos equivalent to 15% of the share of the estate
of Doa Adela S. Pascual. Petitioner insistently argues that the January 19, 1994
RTC Decision, insofar as it awarded attorneys fees, was void from the beginning
because the intestate court had lost jurisdiction over the person of Doa Adela
(the attorneys client) due to her death.
ISSUE:
Did the trial court have jurisdiction to make the questioned award of attorneys
fees? YES.
RULING:
Its jurisdiction subsists because the proper party in this case is the estate of Don
Andres, which is distinct and separate from that of Doa Adela who merely
served as the formers administratrix. Doa Adela was merely a representative
party, and the claim was an item of the administrative expense of Don Andres
estate. It is well-settled that a monetary claim against the person administering
an estate, in relation to his or her acts of administration, in its ordinary course,
can be filed at the court where a special proceeding for the settlement of the
estate is pending.
Hence, in spite of the death of the appointed administratrix, it was the duty of the
intestate court to determine whether the private respondents claim was
allowable as administrative expense if it was obtained in reference to the
management of the estate; the performance of legal services which the
administratrix herself could not perform; the prosecution or defense of actions or
suits on behalf of or against the estate; or the discovery, recovery or preservation
of properties of the estate. In other words, the intestate court has a mandate to
resolve whether the said claim is a necessary expense in the care, management
and settlement of the estate.
Payment of Separate Docket Fees Is Not Necessary
The Court required in Lacson the payment of a separate docket fee, since the
lawyers motion for attorneys fees was in the nature of an action commenced by a
lawyer against his client. In contrast, the private respondent filed a claim for his
attorneys fees against the estate of Don Andres. The difference in the modes of
action taken renders Lacson inapplicable to the case at bar.
Heirs of Doa Adela Were Not Deprived of Due Process
From her appointment as special administratrix until January 19, 1994 when the
RTC Decision was rendered, she had all the time to oppose the claim. This was the
proper time to raise any objection. When she received said Decision on February
8, 1994, again she had the chance to question the claim in a motion for
reconsideration or an appeal, and yet she opted not to take advantage of these
remedies.
Such facts conclusively prove that petitioner was not deprived of due process, the
essence of which is the right to be heard.
G.R. No. L-12767 November 16, 1918
In the matter of the estate of EMIL H. JOHNSON. EBBA INGEBORG JOHNSON,
applicant-appellant,
FACTS:
On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a naturalized
citizen of the United States, died in the city of Manila, leaving a will, dated
September 9, 1915, by which he disposed of an estate, the value of which, as
estimated by him, was P231,800. This document is an holographic instrument,
being written in the testator's own handwriting, and is signed by himself and two
witnesses only, instead of three witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.
On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of this will, on the ground that
Johnson was at the time of his death a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States
of America; that the will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that
State; and hence could properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of the
Code of Civil Procedure.
The hearing on said application was set for March 6, 1916, and three weeks
publication of notice was ordered in the "Manila Daily Bulletin." Due
publication was made pursuant to this order of the court. On March 6, 1916,
witnesses were examined relative to the execution of the will; and upon March
16th thereafter the document was declared to be legal and was admitted to
probate.
On June 12, 1916, or about three months after the will had been probated, the
attorneys for Ebba Ingeborg Johnson(daughter of Emil H. Johnson) entered an
appearance in her behalf and noted an exception to the order admitting the will
to probate.
As will be discerned, the purpose of the proceeding on behalf of the petitioner is
to annul the decree of probate and put the estate into intestate administration,
thus preparing the way for the establishment of the claim of the petitioner as the
sole legitimate heir of her father.
It is pointed out in the argument submitted in behalf of the petitioner, that, at the
time the court made the order of publication, it was apprised of the fact that the
petitioner lived in the United States and that as daughter and heir she was
necessarily interested in the probate of the will. It is, therefore, insisted that the
court should have appointed a date for the probate of the will sufficiently far in
the future to permit the petitioner to be present either in person or by
representation; and it is said that the failure of the court thus to postpone the
probate of the will constitutes an infringement of that provision of the Philippine
Bill which declared that property shall not be taken without due process of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the order admitting the will to probate was beyond the
jurisdiction of the court and void because made without notice to the petitioner.
NO.
RULING:
The proceedings for the probate of the will were regular and that the
publication was sufficient to give the court jurisdiction to entertain the
proceeding and to allow the will to be probated.
As was said in the case of In re Davis (136 Cal., 590, 596), "the proceeding as to
the probate of a will is essentially one in rem, and in the very nature of things the
state is allowed a wide latitude in determining the character of the constructive
notice to be given to the world in a proceeding where it has absolute possession
of the res. It would be an exceptional case where a court would declare a statute
void, as depriving a party of his property without due process of law, the
proceeding being strictly in rem, and the res within the state, upon the ground
that the constructive notice prescribed by the statute was unreasonably short."
NOTE:
Section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure reads as follows:
Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or his legal
representative from a judgment, order or other proceeding taken against him
through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; Provided, That
application therefor be made within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding
six months after such judgment, order, or proceeding was taken.
The petitioner, therefore, in this case could have applied, under the section cited,
at any time within six months for March 16, 1916, and upon showing that she had
been precluded from appearing in the probate proceedings by conditions over
which she had no control and that the order admitting the will to probate had
been erroneously entered upon insufficient proof or upon a supposed state of
facts contrary to the truth, the court would have been authorized to set the
probate aside and grant a rehearing. It is no doubt true that six months was,
under the circumstances, a very short period of time within which to expect the
petitioner to appear and be prepared to contest the probate with the proof which
she might have desired to collect from remote countries. Nevertheless, although
the time allowed for the making of such application was inconveniently short, the
remedy existed; and the possibility of its use is proved in this case by the
circumstance that on June 12, 1916, she in fact here appeared in court by her
attorneys and excepted to the order admitting the will to probate.
G.R. No. 38050 September 22, 1933

In the matter of the will of Donata Manahan. TIBURCIA MANAHAN,

petitioner-appellee, vs.
ENGRACIA MANAHAN, opponent-appellant.

FACTS: Tiburcia Manahan instituted special proceedings for the probate of the
will of the deceased Donata Manahan. The petitioner herein, niece of the testatrix,
was named the executrix in said will. The court set the date for the hearing and the
necessary notice required by law was accordingly published. On the day of the
hearing of the petition, no opposition thereto was filed and, after the evidence was
presented, the court entered the decree admitting the will to probate as prayed for.
The will was probated. The trial court appointed the herein petitioner executrix.

One year and seven months later, the appellant herein filed a motion for
reconsideration and a new trial, praying that the order admitting the will to probate
be vacated and the authenticated will declared null and void ab initio.

Trial Court: denied the motion of the appellant.

Engracia Manahan, under the pretext of appealing from this last order, likewise
appealed from the judgment admitting the will to probate.

ISSUES: (1) WON the appellant was an interested party in the testamentary
proceedings and, as such, was entitled to and should have been notified of the
probate of the will. NO

(2) WON the court did not really probate the will but limited itself to decreeing its
authentication. NO

HELD: (1) The appellant's first contention is obviously unfounded and untenable.
She was not entitled to notification of the probate of the will and neither had she
the right to expect it, inasmuch as she was not an interested party, not having filed
an opposition to the petition for the probate thereof. Her allegation that she had the
status of an heir, being the deceased's sister, did not confer on her the right to be
notified on the ground that the testatrix died leaving a will in which the appellant
has not been instituted heir. Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did not
acquire any successional right.

But there is another reason which prevents the appellant herein from successfully
maintaining the present action and it is that inasmuch as the proceedings followed
in a testamentary case are in rem, the trial court's decree admitting the will to
probate was effective and conclusive against her, in accordance with the provisions
of section 306 of the said Code of Civil Procedure which reads as follows:

SEC. 306. EFFECT OF JUDGMENT. — . . . .

1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the

probate of a will, or the administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in
respect to the personal, political, or legal condition or relation of a particular
person the judgment or order is conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will or
administration, or the condition or relation of the person: Provided, That the
probate of a will or granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie
evidence of the death of the testator or intestate; . . . .

(2) The second contention is puerile. The court really decreed the authentication
and probate of the will in question, which is the only pronouncement required of
the trial court by the law in order that the will may be considered valid and duly
executed in accordance with the law. In the phraseology of the procedural law,
there is no essential difference between the authentication of a will and the probate
thereof. The words authentication and probate are synonymous in this case. All the
law requires is that the competent court declared that in the execution of the will
the essential external formalities have been complied with and that, in view thereof,
the document, as a will, is valid and effective in the eyes of the law.
G.R. No. 156021

Alaban v. Court of Appeals

FACTS: Respondent Francisco Provido (respondent) filed a petition, for the

probate of the Last Will and Testament of the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado
(decedent). Respondent alleged that he was the heir of the decedent and the
executor of her will. The Regional Trial Court (RTC) rendered its Decision,
allowing the probate of the will of the decedent and directing the issuance of letters
testamentary to respondent.

More than four (4) months later, herein petitioners filed a motion for the reopening
of the probate proceedings. Likewise, they filed an opposition to the allowance of
the will of the decedent, as well as the issuance of letters testamentary to
respondent, claiming that they are the intestate heirs of the decedent. Petitioners
claimed that the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition due to non-
payment of the correct docket fees, defective publication, and lack of notice to the
other heirs.

RTC: denied petitioner's motion.

Resolving the issue of jurisdiction, the RTC held that petitioners were deemed
notified of the hearing by publication and that the deficiency in the payment of
docket fees is not a ground for the outright dismissal of the petition.

Petitioners thereafter filed a petition with an application for preliminary injunction

with the CA seeking the annulment of the RTCs Decision.
CA: dismissed the petition. It found that there was no showing that petitioners
failed to avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies through no fault of their own.

Petitioners maintain that they were not made parties to the case in which the
decision sought to be annulled was rendered and, thus, they could not have availed
of the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment and
other appropriate remedies, contrary to the ruling of the CA. They aver that
respondents offer of a false compromise and his failure to notify them of the
probate of the will constitute extrinsic fraud that necessitates the annulment of the
RTCs judgment.

ISSUE: WON the allowance of the will to probate should be annulled for failure to
mention the petitioners as parties. NO

HELD: Petitioners in this case are mistaken in asserting that they are not or have
not become parties to the probate proceedings.

A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem, such that with the
corresponding publication of the petition the court's jurisdiction extends to all
persons interested in said will or in the settlement of the estate of the decedent.

Thus, even though petitioners were not mentioned in the petition for probate, they
eventually became parties thereto as a consequence of the publication of the notice
of hearing.

As parties to the probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the
remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for relief from
judgment. In fact, petitioners filed a motion to reopen, which is essentially a
motion for new trial, however, the motion was denied for having been filed out of
time.

Conceding that petitioners became aware of the Decision after it had become final,
they could have still filed a petition for relief from judgment after the denial of
their motion to reopen. Petitioners claim that they learned of the Decision almost
four (4) months from the time the Decision had attained finality. But they failed to
avail of the remedy.

For failure to make use without sufficient justification of the said remedies
available to them, petitioners could no longer resort to a petition for annulment of
judgment.

Even casting aside the procedural requisite, the petition for annulment of judgment
must still fail for failure to comply with the substantive requisites, as the appellate
court ruled.

The non-inclusion of petitioners names in the petition and the alleged failure to
personally notify them of the proceedings do not constitute extrinsic fraud.

Just in case:

Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved party to file a motion for new
trial on the ground of fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence. The same
Rule permits the filing of a motion for reconsideration on the grounds of excessive
award of damages, insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision or final order,
or that the decision or final order is contrary to law. Both motions should be filed
within the period for taking an appeal, or fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order.

Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under Section 3 of Rule 38 is

resorted to when a judgment or final order is entered, or any other proceeding is
thereafter taken, against a party in any court through fraud, accident, mistake, or
excusable negligence. Said party may file a petition in the same court and in the
same case to set aside the judgment, order or proceeding. It must be filed within
sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the judgment and within six (6) months
after entry thereof.

A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment
are remedies available only to parties in the proceedings where the assailed
judgment is rendered.

An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case

where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The purpose of such
action is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a
renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner, and is based on only two
grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A person
need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled.
An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is
extrinsic or collateral in character. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents
a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where
it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in
which it is procured.

To sustain their allegation of extrinsic fraud, petitioners assert that as a result of

respondents deliberate omission or concealment of their names, ages and
residences as the other heirs of the decedent in his petition for allowance of the will,
they were not notified of the proceedings, and thus they were denied their day in
court.

According to the Rules, notice is required to be personally given to known heirs,

legatees, and devisees of the testator. A perusal of the will shows that respondent
was instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and nieces
of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs who are entitled to be
notified of the probate proceedings under the Rules. Respondent had no legal
obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify
them of the same.

Besides, assuming arguendo that petitioners are entitled to be so notified, the

purported infirmity is cured by the publication of the notice. After all, personal
notice upon the heirs is a matter of procedural convenience and not a jurisdictional
requisite.

G.R. No. L-45463 March 18, 1937

EMERITA SANTOS, in her behalf and as guardian of the persons and

property of the minors Bienvenido, Apolonio Manuel, Juana and Norberta,
surnamed Azores y Santos,petitioners,
vs.
MODESTO CASTILLO, Judge of First Instance of Laguna, and, JOSE,
SINFOROSA, and ANTONIO AZORES, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Emerita Santos, in her behalf and as guardian of the minor
acknowledge natural children of the deceased, filed a petition for probate of the
will of Nicolas Azores. She also filed a motion for the appointment of a special
administrator. At the hearing, respondents Jose, Sinfrosa and Antonio Azores,
legitimate children of the deceased filed their opposition, on the ground that the
court had not acquired jurisdiction on the case.

Petitioner's allegations being insufficient to confer jurisdiction because she did not
allege that she had the custody of the will, and therefore, was not entitled to present
it for probate and furtherance because the will that should be probated is the
original and not a copy thereof, as the one presented by the petitioner. Petitioner
filed an amended petition praying that respondents be required to present the
copies of the will and the codicil in their possession.

Court issued an order denying the petition for the appointment of a special
administrator by petitioner and ordered Jose Azores, who has custody of the last
will and testament and all other documents in relation thereto, to deliver said
papers to the court within the date from notice.

Consequently, petitioner filed a motion praying that her amended petition be

admitted. However, before this motion was decided, respondents, after their
father's death, presented the original of the will and codicil, and petitioned that they
be admitted for probate. The court issued an order dismissing the petition filed by
the petitioner.

ISSUE: Who is entitled to apply for probate? WON the court acquired jurisdiction
over the case

RULING: Section 625 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that no will shall
pass either real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed. For this purpose,
section 626 provides that the person who has the custody of he will shall, within 4
days after he knows of the death of the testator, deliver the will to the court which
has jurisdiction, or to the executor named in the will. Sections 628 and 629
proscribed coercive means to compel a person having the custody of a will to
deliver it to the court which has jurisdiction.

Petitioner alleged that the deceased designated nobody as custodian of his will but
that he directed his nephew Manuel Azores to deliver a copy thereof to her, to keep
one in his possession, and to turn over the other two copies to his son Jose Azores,
with instructions to the effect that if petitioner or his son failed to present said will
for probate, Manuel should take charge of presenting it to the court. Taking
everything into account therefore, it is of the court's view that Jose Azores, the son
of the deceased, had the custody of the will because the original thereof was turned
over to him.

For the sake of argument, however, admitting that the testator had designated
nobody as custodian of the will, it cannot be denied that his act of subsequent
making a codicil and entrusting the custody thereof to his legitimate children,
clearly modified his last will. In this sense, the custody of both is entrusted to his
legitimate children and not to Manuel Azores or to petitioner. Hence, as the
legitimate children of the deceased had custody of the originals of the will and of
the codicil, they alone could, had the right and where bound by law to apply for the
probate of their father' last will. In order that the court may acquire jurisdiction
over the case for the probate of a will and for the administration of the properties
left by a deceased person, the application must allege, in addition to the residence
of the deceased and other indispensable facts or circumstances, that the applicant is
the executor in the will or is the person who had custody of the will to be probated.
The original of said document must be presented or sufficient reasons given to
justify the nonrepresentation of said original and the acceptance of the copy or
duplicate thereof. Inasmuch as these requisites had not been complied with in the
application filed by the petitioner, the respondent judge did not exceed in
jurisdiction in dismissing the application in question.

G.R. No. L-12359 July 15, 1959

In the Matter of the Petition for the Summary Settlement of the Estate left by
the deceased Carida Perez. BERNARDINO PEREZ, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
CONRADA PEREZ, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.

FACTS: This appeal does not belong here. Involving, as it does the summary
settlement of a testate estate worth P6,000.00 according to petitioner, or P10,000
according to oppositors, it should not have been brought directly to this Court from
the Iloilo Court of First Instance, inasmuch as several questions of fact are raised in
relation with testimonial evidence: for example, the soundness of the mind of the
testatrix and her freedom from constraint in signing the will.

The printed brief makes no assignment expressly challenging the court's

jurisdiction; but in discussing their second error, oppositors-appellants insist the
lower court did not "acquire jurisdiction to receive the evidence for the allowance
of the alleged will" because two heirs (Melanio Perez, Jr. and Milagros Perez) had
not been notified in advance of such will.
In reply to this, the petitioner-appellee says the persons mentioned were not
entitled to notice, since they were not forced heirs — grandnephew and niece —
and had not been mentioned as legatees or devisees in the will of the deceased.
And as to Milagros Perez, petitioner asserts that notice had been addressed to her
last known residence in this country.

ISSUE: WON the absence of notice to individual heirs affect the jurisdiction of the
court. NO

HELD: At any rate the omission, if any, did not affect the jurisdiction of the court:
it constituted a mere procedural error that may or may not be the basis of reversal
(Jocson vs. Nable, 48 Off. Gaz., 90). Indeed, this Tribunal has ruled that the court
acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested in the estate through the
publication of the petition in the newspapers (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil., 159;
Joson vs. Nable, supra) — which in this case admittedly took place.

Service of notice on individual heirs or legatees or devisees is a matter of

procedural convenience, not jurisdictional requisite. (Joson vs. Nable, supra) So
much so that even if the names of some legatees or heirs had been omitted from the
petition for allowance of the will and therefore were not adviced — the decree
allowing the will does not ipso facto become void for want of jurisdiction.

G.R. No. 77047 May 28, 1988

JOAQUINA R-INFANTE DE ARANZ, ANTONIO R-INFANTE, CARLOS R.

INFANTE, MERCEDES R-INFANTE DE LEDNICKY, ALFREDO R-
INFANTE, TERESITA R-INFANTE, RAMON R-INFANTE, FLORENCIA
R-INFANTE DE DIAS, MARTIN R-INFANTE, JOSE R-INFANTE LINK
and JOAQUIN R-INFANTE CAMPBELL, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. NICOLAS GALING, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION, BRANCH NO. 166,
PASIG, METRO MANILA AND JOAQUIN R-INFANTE, respondents.

FACTS: Private respondent filed with the RTC a petition for the probate and
allowance of the last will and testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola
The petition specified the names and ad- dresses of herein petitioners as legatees
and devisees.
The probate court issued an order selling the petition for hearing. Said order was
published in the "Nueva Era" A newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila
once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks.

During the proceedings, private respondent was appointed executor.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order alleging that, as named
legatees, no notices were sent to them as required by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules
of Court

The probate court issued an order denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari of the petitioners.

It is the view of petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that personal
notice of probate proceedings to the known legatees and devisees is not a
jurisdictional requirement in the probate of a will. Contrary to the holding of the
Court of Appeals that the requirement of notice on individual heirs, legatees and
devisees is merely a matter of procedural convenience to better satisfy in some
instances the requirements of due process.

ISSUE: WON personal notice of probate proceedings to the known legatees and
devisees is not a jurisdictional requirement. NO

HELD: Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court reads:

SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or

personally. — The court shag also cause copies of the notice of the time and place
fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of
residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least
twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy
of the notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he
be not, the petitioner; also, to any person named as co-executor not petitioning, if
their places of residence be known. Personal service of copies of the notice at least
ten (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.

It is clear from the aforecited rule that notice of the time and place of the hearing
for the allowance of a will shall be forwarded to the designated or other known
heirs, legatees, and devisees residing in the Philippines at their places of residence,
if such places of residence be known. There is no question that the residences of
herein petitioners legatees and devisees were known to the probate court. The
petition for the allowance of the wig itself indicated the names and addresses of the
legatees and devisees of the testator. But despite such knowledge, the probate court
did not cause copies of the notice to be sent to petitioners. The requirement of the
law for the allowance of the will was not satisfied by mere publication of the notice
of hearing for three (3) weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

BASA vs MERCADO
Facts: Honorable Hermogenes Reyes, Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, allowed and probated the last will and testament of Ines Basa,
deceased. On January 30, 1932, the same judge approved the account of the
administrator of the estate, declared him the only heir of the deceased under the
will and closed the administration proceedings. On April 11, 1934, the herein
petitioners-appellants filed a motion in which they prayed that said proceedings
be reopened and alleged that the court lacked jurisdiction to act in the matter
because there was a failure to comply with requirements as to the publication of
the notice of hearing prescribed in the following section of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Appellants claim that the provisions of section 630 of the Code of Civil
Procedure have not been complied with in view of the fact that although the trial
judge, on May 29, 1931, ordered the publication of the required notice for "three
weeks successively" previous to the time appointed for the hearing on the will,
the first publication was on June 6, 1931, the third on June 20, 1931, and the
hearing took place on the 27th of that month, only twenty-one days after the
date of the first publication instead of three full weeks before the day set for the
hearing. The appellants also contend that the trial court erred in ruling that the
weekly newspaper, Ing Katipunan, in which the notice of hearing was published,
was a newspaper of general circulation in the Province of Pampanga.
Issues: Whether the 21 days requirement for publication be followed pursuant to
the sec. 630 of Code of Civil Procedure?
Whether the said Ing Katipunan newspaper considered a newspaper of
general circulation
Held: In view of the foregoing, it is held that the language used in section 630 of
the Code of Civil Procedure does not mean that the notice, referred to therein,
should be published for three full weeks before the date set for the hearing on
the will. In other words the first publication of the notice need not be made
twenty-one days before the day appointed for the hearing. The record shows that
Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation in view of the fact that it is
published for the dissemination of local news and general information; that it has
a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular
intervals and that the trial court ordered the publication to be made in Ing
Katipunan precisely because it was a "newspaper of general circulation in the
Province of Pampanga." The law does not require that publication of the notice,
referred to in the Code of Civil Procedure, should be made in the newspaper with
the largest numbers is necessary to constitute a newspaper of general circulation.
**Note: SEC. 630. Court to appoint hearing on will. — When a will is delivered to
a court having jurisdiction of the same, the court shall appoint a time and place
when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance of the will, and shall
cause public notice thereof to be given by publication in such newspaper or
newspapers as the court directs of general circulation in the province, three
weeks successively, previous to the time appointed, and no will shall be allowed
until such notice has been given. At the hearing all testimony shall be taken under
oath, reduced to writing and signed by the witnesses.
G.R. No. L-57848 June 19, 1982
RAFAEL E. MANINANG and SOLEDAD L. MANINANG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal and BERNARDO S. ASENETA, respondents.
Clemencia Aseneta, single, died at the Manila Sanitarium Hospital at age 81. She
left a holographic will, the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:
xxx xxx xxx
It is my will that all my real properties located in Manila, Makati, Quezon City,
Albay and Legaspi City and all my personal properties shagllbe inherited upon my
death by Dra. Soledad L. Maninang with whose family I have lived continuously
for around the last 30 years now. Dra. Maninang and her husband Pamping have
been kind to me. ... I have found peace and happiness with them even during the
time when my sisters were still alive and especially now when I am now being
troubled by my nephew Bernardo and niece Salvacion. I am not incompetent as
Nonoy would like me to appear. I know what is right and wrong. I can decide for
myself. I do not consider Nonoy as my adopted son. He has made me do things
against my will.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner Soledad Maninang filed a Petition for probate of the Will of the
decedent with the Court of First Instance-Branch IV, Quezon City.
respondent Bernardo Aseneta, who, as the adopted son, claims to be the sole heir
of decedent Clemencia Aseneta, instituted intestate proceedings with the Court
of First Instance-Branch XI, Pasig, Rizal
The Testate and Intestate Cases were ordered consolidated before Branch XI,
presided by respondent Judge.
Respondent Bernardo then filed a Motion to Dismiss the Testate Case on the
ground that the holographic will was null and void because he, as the only
compulsory heir, was preterited and, therefore, intestacy should ensue.
In her Opposition to said Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Soledad averred that it is
still the rule that in a case for probate of a Will, the Court's area of inquiry is
limited to an examination of and resolution on the extrinsic validity of the will;
and that respondent Bernardo was effectively disinherited by the decedent.
The lower Court ordered the dismissal of the Testate Case.
Petitioners Maninang resorted to a certiorari Petition before respondent Court of
Appeals alleging that the lower Court exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the
Orders of dismissal of the Testate Case.
Respondent Court denied certiorari
Issue: W/N the court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it dismisses the case
by reason of it intrinsic validity.
Ruling: Yes. We find that the Court a quo a quo acted in excess of its jurisdiction
when it dismissed the Testate Case.
Generally, the probate of a Will is mandatory.
The law enjoins the probate of the Will and public policy requires it, because
unless the Will is probated and notice thereof given to the whole world, the right
of a person to dispose of his property by Will may be rendered nugatory.
Normally, the probate of a Will does not look into its intrinsic validity.
The authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon
the capacity of the testator and the compliance with those requisites or
solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of wills. It does not
determine nor even by implication prejudge the validity or efficiency (sic) of the
provisions, these may be impugned as being vicious or null, notwithstanding its
authentication. The questions relating to these points remain entirely unaffected,
and may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.
Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of the provisions of the will cannot
be entertained in Probate proceeding because its only purpose is merely to
determine if the will has been executed in accordance with the requirements of
the law.
The Nuguid and the Balanay cases provide the exception rather than the rule. The
intrinsic validity of the Wills in those cases was passed upon even before probate
because "practical considerations" so demanded. Moreover, for the parties in the
Nuguid case, the "meat of the controversy" was the intrinsic validity of the Will; in
fact, the parties in that case "shunted aside the question of whether or not the
Will should be allowed probate." Not so in the case before us now where the
probate of the Will is insisted on by petitioners and a resolution on the extrinsic
validity of the Will demanded.
Moreover, in the Nuguid case, this Court ruled that the Will was intrinsically
invalid as it completely preterited the parents of the testator. In the instant case,
a crucial issue that calls for resolution is whether under the terms of the
decedent's Will, private respondent had been preterited or disinherited, and if
the latter, whether it was a valid disinheritance. Preterition and disinheritance are
two diverse concepts.
Preterition "consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited."
(Neri vs. Akutin, 72 Phil. 325). Disinheritance, in turn, "is a testamentary
disposition depriving any compulsory heirs of his share in the legitimate for a
cause authorized by law." Disinheritance is always "voluntary", preterition upon
the other hand, is presumed to be "involuntary". The effects flowing from
preterition are totally different from those of disinheritance. Pretention under
Article 854 of the New Civil Code shall annul the institution of heir. This
annulment is in toto, unless in the wail there are, in addition, testamentary
dispositions in the form of devises or legacies. In ineffective disinheritance under
Article 918 of the same Code, such disinheritance shall also "annul the institution
of heirs", but only "insofar as it may prejudice the person disinherited", which last
phrase was omitted in the case of preterition.
Better stated yet, in disinheritance the nullity is limited to that portion of the
estate of which the disinherited heirs have been illegally deprived.
By virtue of the dismissal of the Testate Case, the determination of that
controversial issue has not been thoroughly considered. We gather from the
assailed Order of the trial Court that its conclusion was that respondent Bernardo
has been preterited We are of opinion, however, that from the face of the Will,
that conclusion is not indubitable.
Nuguid case: In a proceeding for the probate of a will, the Court's area of inquiry
is limited to an examination of, and resolution on, the extrinsic validity of the will,
the due execution thereof, the testatrix's testamentary capacity and the
compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic
validity of the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will
has been duly authenticated. However, where practical considerations demand
that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated,
the Court should meet that issue.
The parents of the testator are completely preterited.
Balanay vs. Hon. Martinez
The trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even
before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might
become an Idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed
upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.
G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987
CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Third Special Cases Division), VIRGINIA
A. FERNANDEZ and ROSA DIONGSON, respondents
Facts:
On May 1984, Constantino Acain (petitioner hereinafter Acain) filed on the RTC of
Cebu City, a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for
the issuance to Acain of letters testamentary. When Nemesio died, he left a will in
which Acain and his siblings were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed
by Nemesio was submitted by petitioner without objection raised by private
respondents. Segundo, the brother of Nemesio, was initially instituted as the heir,
in case Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio, Segundo’s children would then succeed.
After the petition was set for hearing, the respondents (Virginia Fernandez, legally
adopted daughter of Nemesio, and the latter's widow, Rosa Acain) filed a motion
to dismiss on the following grounds: for the petitioner has no legal capacity to
institute these proceedings; he is merely a universal heir and the Rosa and
Fernandez have been pretirited. Motion was denied. After the denial,
respondents filed with the SC a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the IAC. The IAC
granted the private respondents' petition and ordered the TC to dismiss the
petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio. His MR having been denied, Acain
filed this present petition for the review of IAC’s decision.
Issues:
1. Whether private respondents have been preterited. No for the widow, yes for
Fernandez.
2. Whether Acain has legal standing to intervene in the probate proceedings. No.
**3. Whether the probate court went beyond its authority. No.
Ratio/Held:
1. Preterition consists in the omission in the testator's will of the forced heirs or
anyone of them either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though
mentioned, they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited.
Insofar as the widow is concerned, there is no preterition, for she is not in the
direct line. However, the same cannot be said for Fernandez. It cannot be denied
that she was totally omitted and preterited in the will of the testator. Neither can
it be denied that she was not expressly disinherited. Hence, this is a clear case of
preterition of the Fernandez. The universal institution of Acain and his siblings to
the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will.
2. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he
must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected
by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested party is
one who would be benefited by the estate. Acain, at the outset, appears to have
an interest in the will as an heir, however, intestacy having resulted from the
preterition of Fernandez and the universal institution of heirs, Acain is in effect
not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of
the will left by the deceased and must then be dismissed.
**3. The general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the
extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's
testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities
prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the
Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. The rule, however,
is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court
is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain
provisions of the will. Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions be passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of the
will is resolved, the probate court should meet the issue. The remedies of
certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private respondents. The
petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
In the instant case private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the petition in Sp.
Proceedings No. 591 ACEB of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu on the following
grounds: (1) petitioner has no legal capacity to institute the proceedings; (2) he is
merely a universal heir; and (3) the widow and the adopted daughter have been
preterited. It was denied by the trial court in an order dated January 21, 1985 for
the reason that "the grounds for the motion to dismiss are matters properly to be
resolved after a hearing on the issues in the course of the trial on the merits of
the case. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court
on February 15, 1985.
For private respondents to have tolerated the probate of the will and allowed the
case to progress when on its face the will appears to be intrinsically void as
petitioner and his brothers and sisters were instituted as universal heirs coupled
with the obvious fact that one of the private respondents had been preterited
would have been an exercise in futility. It would have meant a waste of time,
effort, expense, plus added futility. The trial court could have denied its probate
outright or could have passed upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary
provisions before the extrinsic validity of the will was resolved.
G.R. No. L-12190 August 30, 1958
TESTATE ESTATE OF FELICIDAD ESGUERRA ALTO-YAP deceased. FAUSTO E. GAN,
petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ILDEFONSO YAP, oppositor-appellee.
Facts: Felicidad Esguerra Alto Yap died of heart failure leaving properties in Pulilan,
Bulacan, and in the City of Manila.
Fausto E. Gan initiated them proceedings in the Manila court of first instance with
a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the
deceased, substantially in these words:
Nobyembre 5, 1951.
Ako, si Felicidad E. Alto-Yap, may asawa, at ganap na pag-iisip, ay nagsasalaysay
na ang aking kayamanan sa bayan ng Pulilan, Bulacan ay aking ipinamamana sa
aking mga kamag-anakang sumusunod:
Vicente Esguerra, Sr. .............................................5 Bahagi
Fausto E. Gan .........................................................2 Bahagi
Rosario E. Gan .........................................................2 Bahagi
Filomena Alto ..........................................................1 Bahagi
Beatriz Alto ..............................................................1 Bahagi
At ang aking lahat ng ibang kayamanan sa Maynila at iba panglugar ay aking
ipinamamana sa aking asawang si Idelfonso D. Yap sa kondisyong siya'y
magpapagawa ng isang Health Center na nagkakahalaga ng di kukulangin sa
halagang P60,000.00 sa bayan ng Pulilan, Bulacan, na nakaukit ang aking
pangalang Felicidad Esguerra-Alto. At kung ito ay may kakulangan man ay bahala
na ang aking asawa ang magpuno upang matupad ang aking kagustuhan.
(Lagda) Felicidad E. Alto-Yap.
Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the
deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime.
Trial Court after hearing the parties and considering their evidence, refused to
probate the alleged will.
The trial judge refused to credit the petitioner's evidence for several reasons, the
most important of which were these: (a) if according to his evidence, the
decedent wanted to keep her will a secret, so that her husband would not know it,
it is strange she executed it in the presence of Felina Esguerra, knowing as she did
that witnesses were unnecessary; (b) in the absence of a showing that Felina was
a confidant of the decedent it is hard to believe that the latter would have
allowed the former to see and read the will several times; (c) it is improbable that
the decedent would have permitted Primitivo Reyes, Rosario Gan Jimenez and
Socorro Olarte to read her will, when she precisely wanted its contents to remain
a secret during her lifetime; (d) it is also improbable that her purpose being to
conceal the will from her husband she would carry it around, even to the hospital,
in her purse which could for one reason or another be opened by her husband; (e)
if it is true that the husband demanded the purse from Felina in the U.S.T.
Hospital and that the will was there, it is hard to believe that he returned it
without destroying the will, the theory of the petitioner being precisely that the
will was executed behind his back for fear he will destroy it.
In the face of these improbabilities, the trial judge had to accept the oppositor's
evidence that Felicidad did not and could not have executed such holographic will.
Issue: W/N a holographic will may be probated upon the testimony of witnesses
who have been allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of
the testator.

Ruling: No. The New Civil Code effective in 1950 revived holographic wills in its
arts. 810-814. "A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no
other form and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be
witnessed."
Authenticity and due execution is the dominant requirements to be fulfilled when
such will is submitted to the courts for allowance. For that purpose the testimony
of one of the subscribing witnesses would be sufficient if there is no opposition
(Sec. 5, Rule 77). If there is, the three must testify, if available.From the testimony
of such witnesses (and of other additional witnesses) the court may form its
opinion as to the genuineness and authenticity of the testament, and the
circumstances its due execution.
Obviously, when the will itself is not submitted, these means of opposition, and of
assessing the evidence are not available. And then the only guaranty of
authenticity — the testator's handwriting — has disappeared.
The Rules of Court, (Rule 77) approved in 1940 allow proof (and probate) of a lost
or destroyed will by secondary — evidence the testimony of witnesses, in lieu of
the original document. Yet such Rules could not have contemplated holographic
wills which could not then be validly made here.
Could Rule 77 be extended, by analogy, to holographic wills?
Spanish commentators agree that one of the greatest objections to the
holographic will is that it may be lost or stolen4 — an implied admission that such
loss or theft renders it useless.
Civil Code requires it to be protocoled and presented to the judge, (Art. 689) who
shall subscribe it and require its identity to be established by the three witnesses
who depose that they have no reasonable doubt that the will was written by the
testator (Art. 691). And if the judge considers that the identity of the will has been
proven he shall order that it be filed (Art. 693). All these, imply presentation of
the will itself. Art. 692 bears the same implication, to a greater degree. It requires
that the surviving spouse and the legitimate ascendants and descendants be
summoned so that they may make "any statement they may desire to submit
with respect to the authenticity of the will." As it is universally admitted that the
holographic will is usually done by the testator and by himself alone, to prevent
others from knowing either its execution or its contents, the above article 692
could not have the idea of simply permitting such relatives to state whether they
know of the will, but whether in the face of the document itself they think the
testator wrote it. Obviously, this they can't do unless the will itself is presented to
the Court and to them.
Undoubtedly, the intention of the law is to give the near relatives the choice of
either complying with the will if they think it authentic, or to oppose it, if they
think it spurious. Such purpose is frustrated when the document is not presented
for their examination. If it be argued that such choice is not essential, because
anyway the relatives may oppose, the answer is that their opposition will be at a
distinct disadvantage, and they have the right and privilege to comply with the
will, if genuine, a right which they should not be denied by withholding inspection
thereof from them.
The courts will not distribute the property of the deceased in accordance with his
holographic will, unless they are shown his handwriting and signature. Taking all
the above circumstances together, we reach the conclusion that the execution
and the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the
bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will.
Turning now to the evidence presented by the petitioner, we find ourselves
sharing the trial judge's disbelief. In addition to the dubious circumstances
described in the appealed decision, we find it hard to believe that the deceased
should show her will precisely to relatives who had received nothing from it:
Socorro Olarte and Primitivo Reyes. These could pester her into amending her will
to give them a share, or threaten to reveal its execution to her husband Ildefonso
Yap. And this leads to another point: if she wanted so much to conceal the will
from her husband, why did she not entrust it to her beneficiaries? Opportunity to
do so was not lacking: for instance, her husband's trip to Davao, a few days after
the alleged execution of the will.
In fine, even if oral testimony were admissible to establish and probate a lost
holographic will, we think the evidence submitted by herein petitioner is so
tainted with improbabilities and inconsistencies that it fails to measure up to that
"clear and distinct" proof required by Rule 77, sec. 6.
**note: in the case of gan what was required as proof by the was clear and
distinct. As such it is the holographic will itself that could clearly and distinctively
proved the existence of a will, which in this case they failed to present. In the next
case however, there is a photocopy of the testators holographic will which can be
examined and compared thus can proved whether there exist a valid holographic
will or not.
G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION TO APPROVE THE WILL OF RICARDO B.
BONILLA deceased, MARCELA RODELAS, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
AMPARO ARANZA, ET AL., oppositors-appellees, ATTY. LORENZO SUMULONG,
intervenor.
Facts: The appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of
Ricardo Bonilla in 1977. The petition was opposed by the appellees on the ground
that the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise.
The lower court dismissed the petition for probate and held that since the original
will was lost, a photostatic copy cannot stand in the place of the original.
Issue: Whether or not a holographic will can be proved by means of a photocopy
RULING: Yes. Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic
wills is the allowance of the will by the court after its due execution has been
proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If uncontested, at least one
Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may be
resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required.
However, if the holographic will has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is
available, the will can not be probated because the best and only evidence is the
handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison
between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will.
But, a photostatic copy or xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed
because comparison can be made with the standard writings of the testator. In
the case of Gam vs. Yap, 104 PHIL. 509, the Court ruled that "the execution and
the contents of a lost or destroyed holographic will may not be proved by the
bare testimony of witnesses who have seen and/or read such will. The will itself
must be presented; otherwise, it shall produce no effect. The law regards the
document itself as material proof of authenticity." But, in Footnote 8 of said
decision, it says that "Perhaps it may be proved by a photographic or photostatic
copy. Even a mimeographed or carbon copy; or by other similar means, if any,
whereby the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased may be exhibited
and tested before the probate court," Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of
the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted because then the
authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the
probate court.