Castro vs. Court of Appeals GR No.

L-50974-75, May 31, 1989

FACTS:
Petitioners Juan and Feliciana Castro are siblings of Eustaquio Castro,
while the respondent, Benita is the only child of Eustaquio Castro.
Plaintiffs filed an action for partition of properties against the
defendant Benita Castro alleging, among other things that they are the
forced heirs of Pedro Castro who died in Mayantoc, Tarlac on May 27,
1923. Marcelina Bautista also filed an action for partition of properties
against defendant Benita Castro Naval alleging, among other things,
that they are also compulsory heirs of Eustaquio Castro who died in
Mayantoc, Tarlac on August 24, 1961 and that they are entitled to the
partition of the properties of said deceased. Benita filed a petition for
appointment as receiver and for preliminary injunction. The first
petition was denied but the preliminary injunction against Marcelina
was granted. Considering that evidence in these incidents of appointing
a receiver and preliminary injunction as well as the motion for
contempt were related to the merits of the case, the parties stipulated
that evidence therein be considered as evidence in the trial on the
merits.
During the pre-trial the parties agreed that the main issue to be
resolved in this case is whether or not defendant Benita Castro Naval
is the acknowledged natural child of Eustaquio Castro. In view of this
stipulation, defendant Benita Naval was allowed to introduce evidence
to show that she was indeed the acknowledged natural child of
Eustaquio Castro.
On May 23, 1913, Pricola Maregmen wed Felix against her will. Later
that night, she cohabited with Eustaquio Castro, a widower and lived
as husband and wife until her death in 1924. They produce a child,
which is Benita. The recognition of Benita Castro as a natural child of
Eustaquio Castro appears in the records of birth. She stayed with her
father Eustaquio until she got married with Cipriano. Eustaquio Castro
died in 1961.
ISSUE:
Whether Benita is right in claiming that she is entitled to participate in
the partition of properties being an illegitimate child of Eustaquio.
RULING:
Yes. Benita was right in claiming that she was entitled to participate in
the partition of properties of Pedro Castro. According to Article 131 of
Family Code, “ The acknowledgement of a natural child must be made
in the record of birth, in a will or in some public document”.
In this case, there is no question that Benita was natural child of
Eustaquio to Pricola, being a widower when they cohabited. Eustaquio
voluntarily acknowledge Benita, as seen on her birth certificate that it
was signed, reported and registered by him. Also, it was Eustaquio who
gave away Benita during her wedding to Cipriano. The couple continued
to live with him until his death. Therefore, Benita has the right to
participate in the partition of properties of his late Grandfather Pedro
Castro.
Gonzales v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 117740, October 30, 1998
FACTS:
On 18 April 1972, petitioners Carolina Abad Gonzales, Dolores de Mesa
Abad and Cesar de Mesa Tioseco sought the settlement of the intestate
estate of their brother, Ricardo de Mesa Abad. In their petition,
petitioners claimed that they were the only heirs of their brother as he
had allegedly died a bachelor, leaving no descendants or ascendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. Petitioners amended their petition
by alleging that the real properties listed as belonging to the decedent
were actually only administered by him and that the true owner was
their late mother, Lucila de Mesa.
The trial court appointed Cesar de Mesa Tioseco as administrator of the
intestate estate of Ricardo de Mesa Abad. Petitioners executed an
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of their late mother Lucila de
Mesa in their favor.
On 07 July 1972, private respondents Honoria Empaynado, Cecilia Abad
Empaynado, and Marian Abad Empaynado filed a motion to set aside
proceedings. In their motion, they alleged that Honoria Empaynado
had been the common-law wife of Ricardo Abad for twenty-seven (27)
years before his death, or from 1943 to 1971, and that during this
period, their union had produced two (2) children, Cecilia Abad
Empaynado and Marian Abad Empaynado. They also disclosed the
existence of Rosemarie Abad, a child allegedly fathered by Ricardo
Abad with another woman, Dolores Saracho. As the law awards the
entire estate to the surviving children to the exclusion of collateral
relatives, they charged petitioners with deliberately concealing the
existence of said children in order to deprive the latter of their rights to
the estate of Ricardo Abad.
ISSUE:
Whether the three children were entitled to inherit.
RULING:
Yes. Evidence presented by private respondents overwhelmingly
proved that they are the acknowledged natural children of Ricardo
Abad. They were able to prove that he stated in his individual income
tax returns as his legitimate dependent children, Cecilia, Marian and
Rosemarie Abad. He insured his daughters on a 20 year endowment
plan. He opened a trust fund account for his daughters.
Finding that private respondents are the illegitimate children of Ricardo
Abad, petitioners should have been precluded from inheriting the
estate of their brother on the basis of the following Civil Code
provisions:
“Art. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the
illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.”
“Art. 1003. If there are no illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse,
the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the
deceased in accordance with the following articles.”
Petitioners contested the filiation of the children by submitting that the
husband of Honoria Empaynado, Jose Libunao, was still alive when
Cecilia and Marian Abad were born. It was undisputed that prior to her
relationship with Ricardo Abad, Honoria Empaynado was married to
Jose Libunao. But while private respondents claim that Jose Libunao
died in 1943, petitioners claim that the latter died sometime in 1971.
The evidence presented by petitioners to prove that Jose Libunao died
in 1971 was inconclusive. The evidence presented was an enrolment
form wherein there was failure to indicate that Jose was “deceased”.
Such proof did not necessarily prove that said parent was still living
during the time the form was being accomplished. The records of
Loyola Memorial Park also showed that a certain Jose Bautista Libunao
was indeed buried there in 1971. Such person was different from the
husband whose full name was Jose Santos Libunao.
G.R. No. L-22469 October 23, 1978
TOMAS CORPUS, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ADMINISTRATOR and/or EXECUTOR of the Estate of Teodoro R.
Yangco, RAFAEL CORPUS, AMALIA CORPUS, JOSE A. V. CORPUS,
RAMON L. CORPUS, ENRIQUE J. CORPUS, S. W. STAGG, SOLEDAD
ASPRER and CIPRIANO NAVARRO, defendants-appellees.
FACTS:
Teodoro R. Yangco died in Manila on April 20, 1939 at the age of
seventy-seven years.
Yangco had no forced heirs. At the time of his death, his nearest
relatives were (1) his half brother, Luis R. Yangco, (2) his half sister, Paz
Yangco, the wife of Miguel Ossorio (3) Amalia Corpus, Jose A. V. Corpus,
and Ramon L. Corpus, the children of his half brother, Pablo Corpus,
and (4) Juana (Juanita) Corpus, the daughter of his half brother Jose
Corpus. Juanita died in October, 1944 at Palauig, Zambales.
Teodoro R. Yangco was the son of Luis Rafael Yangco and Ramona
Arguelles, the widow of Tomas Corpus. Before her union with Luis
Rafael Yangco, Ramona had begotten five children with Tomas Corpus,
two of whom were the aforenamed Pablo Corpus and Jose Corpus.
Pursuant to the order of the probate court, a project of partition dated
November 26, 1945 was submitted by the administrator and the
legatees named in the will.
The Probate court in its order of December 26, 1946 approved the
project of partition.
From that order, Pedro Martinez, Juliana de Castro , Juanita Corpus
(deceased) and the estate of Luis R. Yangco appealed to this Court.
Those appeals were dismissed after the legatees and the appellants
entered into compromise agreements. The legatees agreed to pay
P35,000 to Pedro Martinez, the heirs of Pio V. Corpus, the heirs of
Isabel Corpus and the heir of Juanita Corpus. Herein appellant Tomas
Corpus signed that compromise settlement as the sole heir of Juanita
Corpus.
On September 20, 1949, the legatees executed an agreement for the
settlement and physical partition of the Yangco estate.
On October 5, 1951, Tomas Corpus, as the sole heir of Juanita corpus,
filed an action to recover her supposed share in Yangco intestate
estate.
ISSUE:
WON Tomas Corpus has a cause of action to recover his mother's
supposed intestate share in Yangco's estate? NONE.
RULING:
The basis of the trial court's conclusion that Teodoro R. Yangco was an
acknowledged natural child and not a legitimate child was the
statement in the will of his father, Luis Rafael Yangco, dated June 14,
1907, that Teodoro and his three other children were his acknowledged
natural children.
On the other hand, the children of Ramona Arguelles and Tomas
Corpus are presumed to be legitimate. A marriage is presumed to have
taken place between Ramona and Tomas.
Since Teodoro R. Yangco was an acknowledged natural child or was
illegitimate and since Juanita Corpus was the legitimate child of Jose
Corpus, himself a legitimate child, we hold that appellant Tomas Corpus
has no cause of action for the recovery of the supposed hereditary
share of his mother, Juanita Corpus, as a legal heir, in Yangco's estate.
Juanita Corpus was not a legal heir of Yangco because there is no
reciprocal succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.
Article 943 "prohibits all successory reciprocity mortis causa between
legitimate and illegitimate relatives."
The rule in article 943 is now found in article 992 of the Civil Code
which provides that "an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner
from the illegitimate child".
That rule is based on the theory that the illegitimate child is
disgracefully looked upon by the legitimate family while the legitimate
family is, in turn, hated by the illegitimate child.
G.R. No. 77867 February 6, 1990
ISABEL DE LA PUERTA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CARMELITA DE LA PUERTA,
respondents.
FACTS:
Dominga Revuelta died on July 3, 1966, at the age of 92, with a will
leaving her properties to her three surviving children, namely, Alfredo,
Vicente and Isabel, all surnamed de la Puerta.
On August 1, 1974, Vicente de la Puerta filed with the Court of First
Instance of Quezon a petition to adopt Carmelita de la Puerta. After
hearing, the petition was granted. However, the decision was appealed
by Isabel to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the appeal,
Vicente died, prompting her to move for the dismissal of the case.
On November 20, 1981, Carmelita, having been allowed to intervene in
the probate proceedings, filed a motion for the payment to her of a
monthly allowance as the acknowledged natural child of Vicente de la
Puerta.
On November 12,1982, the probate court granted the motion,
declaring that it was satisfied from the evidence at hand that Carmelita
was a natural child of Vicente de la Puerta and was entitled to the
amounts claimed for her support.
On appeal, the order of the lower court was affirmed by the
respondent court.
Notes:
 Vicente de la Puerta was married to, but was separated from, his
legal wife Genoveva de la Puerta.
 Carmelita's father was Vicente de la Puerta and her mother is
Gloria Jordan who were living as common law husband and wife
until his death on June 14, 1978.
ISSUE:
May Carmelita de la Puerta claim support and successional rights to the
estate of Dominga Revuelta? NO.
RULING:
According to Article 970 of the Civil Code:
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of
which the representative is raised to the place and the degree of the
person represented, and acquires the rights which the latter would
have if he were living or if he could have inherited.
The answer to the question posed must be in the negative. The first
reason is that Vicente de la Puerta did not predecease his mother; and
the second is that Carmelita is a spurious child.
As a spurious child of Vicente, Carmelita is barred from inheriting from
Dominga because of Article 992 of the Civil Code, which lays down the
barrier between the legitimate and illegitimate families. This article
provides quite clearly:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from
the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall
such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the
illegitimate child.
Indeed, even as an adopted child, Carmelita would still be barred from
inheriting from Dominga Revuelta for there would be no natural
kindred ties between them and consequently, no legal ties to bind
them either.
The result is that Carmelita, as the spurious daughter of Vicente de la
Puerta, has successional rights to the intestate estate of her father but
not to the estate of Dominga Revuelta.
CORAZON DEZOLLER TISON and RENE R. DEZOLLER, petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TEODORA DOMINGO, respondents.
[G.R. No. 121027. July 31, 1997]
FACTS:
The petitioners Corazon Tison and Rene Dezoller are niece and nephew
of the deceased Tedora Dezoller Guerrero, who is the sister of their
father Hermogenes Dezoller. Teodora Dezoller Guerrero died on March
5, 1983 without any ascendant or descendant, and was survived only
by her husband, Martin Guerrero, and herein petitioners. Petitioners'
father, Hermogenes, died on October 3, 1973, hence they seek to
inherit from Teodora Dezoller Guerrero by right of representation.
Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, her surviving spouse
executed an Affidavit of Extrajudicial Settlement adjudicating unto
himself, allegedly as sole heir, the land in dispute. Martin sold the lot
to herein private respondent Teodora Domingo and thereafter, a TCT
was issued in the latter’s name.
Martin Guerrero died. Subsequently, herein petitioners filed an action
for reconveyance claiming that they are entitled to inherit one-half of
the property in question by right of representation. Tedoro Domingo
however, attacks the legitimacy of Hermogenes.
During the hearing, petitioner Corazon Dezoller Tison was presented as
the lone witness, with documentary evidences offered to prove
petitioners’ filiation to their father and their aunt. Petitioners
thereafter rested their case and submitted a written offer of the
exhibits. Subsequently, private respondent filed a Demurrer to
Plaintiff’s Evidence on the ground that petitioners failed to prove their
legitimate filiation with the deceased Teodora Guerrero.
RTC dismissed the complaint for reconveyance. C.A. upheld the
dismissal, declaring that the documentary evidence presented by
herein petitioners, such as the baptismal certificates, family picture,
and joint affidavits are all inadmissible and insufficient to prove and
establish filiation.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners are entitled to inherit one-half of the property
in question by right of representation?
2. WON a third person (private respondent), not the father nor an heir,
may attack the legitimacy of the petitioners?
3. WON the plaintiffs (herein petitioners) are the nephew and niece of
the late Teodora Dezoller?
RULING:
1. The following provisions of the Civil Code provide for the manner by
which the estate of the decedent shall be divided in this case, to wit:
“Art. 975. When children of one or more brothers or sisters of the
deceased survive, they shall inherit from the latter by representation, if
they survive with their uncles or aunts. But if they alone survive, they
shall inherit in equal portions.”
“Art. 995. In the absence of legitimate descendants and ascendants,
and illegitimate children and their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, the surviving spouse shall inherit the entire estate, without
prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces,
should there be any, under Article 1001.”
“Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with
the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
half.”
Upon the death of Teodora Dezoller Guerrero, one-half of the subject
property was automatically reserved to the surviving spouse, Martin
Guerrero, as his share in the conjugal partnership. Applying the
aforequoted statutory provisions, the remaining half shall be equally
divided between the widower and herein petitioners who are entitled
to jointly inherit in their own right. Hence, Martin Guerrero could only
validly alienate his total undivided three-fourths (3/4) share in the
entire property to herein private respondent. Resultantly, petitioners
and private respondent are deemed co-owners of the property in the
proportion of an undivided one-fourth (1/4) and three-fourths (3/4)
share thereof, respectively.
2. NO. There is no presumption of the law more firmly established and
founded on sounder morality and more convincing reason than the
presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate. And well
settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked
collaterally.
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his wife.
He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule which
the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide whether to
conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral and economic
interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs are
allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none —
even his heirs — can impugn legitimacy; that would amount to an insult
to his memory.
The issue, therefore, as to whether petitioners are the legitimate
children of Hermogenes Dezoller cannot be properly controverted in
the present action for reconveyance. This is aside, of course, from the
further consideration that private respondent is not the proper party to
impugn the legitimacy of herein petitioners. The presumption
consequently continues to operate in favor of petitioners unless and
until it is rebutted.
3. Petitioners are claiming a right to part of the estate of the declarant
herself. Conformably, the declaration made by Teodora Dezoller
Guerrero that petitioner Corazon is her niece, is admissible and
constitutes sufficient proof of such relationship, notwithstanding the
fact that there was no other preliminary evidence thereof, the reason
being that such declaration is rendered competent by virtue of the
necessity of receiving such evidence to avoid a failure of justice. More
importantly, there is in the present case an absolute failure by all and
sundry to refute that declaration made by the decedent.
From the foregoing disquisitions, it may thus be safely concluded, on
the sole basis of the decedents declaration and without need for
further proof thereof, that petitioners are the niece and nephew of
Teodora Dezoller Guerrero.
Celedonia Solivio v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 83484, February 12, 1990
FACTS:
On October 11, 1959, Esteban Javellana, Jr.’s mother Salustia died
leaving all her property, including a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City,
to him. Esteban Jr, ”died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants,
brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces." His only surviving relatives are:
(1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-
sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private respondent,
Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban
Javellana, Sr.
Pursuant to an agreement between Concordia and Celedonia, the
latter would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of
the foundation. Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her
counsel, filed for a Special Proceeding for her appointment as special
administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr., praying that letters
of administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the
deceased; and that after payment of all claims and rendition of
inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her.
Concordia filed a civil case in the RTC of Iloilo for partition, recovery of
possession, ownership and damages. Celedonia averred that the estate
of Esteban Jr. was subject to reserva troncal and thus it should redound
to her as a relative within the 3rd degree on his mother side.
ISSUES:
1. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from intervening in Spl.
Proc. No. 2540 through extrinsic fraud; NO
2. whether or not Concordia may recover her share of the estate after
she had agreed to place the same in the Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana Foundation, and notwithstanding the fact that conformably
with said agreement, the Foundation has been formed and properties
of the estate have already been transferred to it. NO
RULING:
1. It is noteworthy that extrinsic fraud was not alleged in Concordia's
original complaint. It was only in her amended complaint of March 6,
1980, that extrinsic fraud was alleged for the first time.
Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any act or
conduct of the prevailing party which prevented a fair submission of
the controversy (Francisco v. David, 38 O.G. 714). A fraud 'which
prevents a party from having a trial or presenting all of his case to the
court, or one which operates upon matters pertaining, not to the
judgment itself, but to the manner by which such judgment was
procured so much so that there was no fair submission of the
controversy. For instance, if through fraudulent machination by one
[his adversary], a litigant was induced to withdraw his defense or was
prevented from presenting an available defense or cause of action in
the case wherein the judgment was obtained, such that the aggrieved
party was deprived of his day in court through no fault of his own, the
equitable relief against such judgment may be availed of. A judgment
may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral fraud, as
distinguished from intrinsic fraud, which connotes any fraudulent
scheme executed by a prevailing litigant 'outside the trial of a case
against the defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses,
whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully and
fairly his side of the case. ... The overriding consideration is that the
fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from
having his day in court or from presenting his case. The fraud, therefore,
is one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.
The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted.
Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the
proceedings. She stayed away by choice. Besides, she knew that the
estate came exclusively from Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio, and she
had agreed with Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the deceased
had planned to do.
Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of
Esteban within the third degree on his mother's side was not false.
Moreover, it was made in good faith and in the honest belief that
because the properties of Esteban had come from his mother, not his
father, she, as Esteban's nearest surviving relative on his mother's side,
is the rightful heir to them. It would have been self-defeating and
inconsistent with her claim of sole heirship if she stated in her petition
that Concordia was her co-heir. Her omission to so state did not
constitute extrinsic fraud.
It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a
decedent's estate may be filed by any "interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule
79, Rules of Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition did not preclude
Concordia from filing her own.
2. Inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the
deceased to the foundation in honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio Vda.
de Javellana (from whom the estate came), an agreement which she
ratified and confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider
Order dated April 3, 1978:”
That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia
Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the
estate of the decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known
each other due to their filiation to the decedent and they have been
visiting each other's house which are not far away for (sic) each other.
She is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she
did not waive her inheritance in favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to
place all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana
Foundation" which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to
honor his mother and to finance the education of indigent but
deserving students as well.
The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who,
significantly, did not even testify in the case, although she could have
done so by deposition if she were supposedly indisposed to attend the
trial. Only her husband, Narciso, and son-in-law, Juanito Domin, actively
participated in the trial. Her husband confirmed the agreement
between his wife and Celedonia, but he endeavored to dilute it by
alleging that his wife did not intend to give all, but only one-half, of her
share to the foundation. The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda.
de Javellana Foundation" was established and duly registered in the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the
Foundation, Concordia is obligated to honor her commitment as
Celedonia has honored hers.
MANUEL SARITA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ANDRES CANDIA, defendant-appellee.
FACTS:
Sps Apolinario Cedeño and Roberta Montesa acquired during their
marriage a piece of land. Apolinario died in 1895, while Roberta in 1909.
Apolinario Cedeno had three brothers and one sister. Petitioner is the
son of Sofia, daughter of Domingo (son of Apolinario). In other words,
petitioner is Apolinario’s grandnephew. Andres Candia, on the other
hand, is a nephew of Roberta
The petitioners sue for the ownership of the land against Andres Candia
in CFI Cebu alleging that:
1. As the successor-in-interest of Andres, they have right over the
property through intestate succession
2. during the lifetime of the spouses Andres was holding and cultivating
the land merely under a lease, but refused to pay rent for the
cultivation of the land and;
3. he appropriated the land and claimed ownership thereto. However,
the CFI decided in favor of defendant. Hence, the appeal.
ISSUE:
WON petitioners, being grandnephew of him, can inherit by
representation in the collateral line. NO
RULING:
The Court decided with respect to the exercise of the hereditary right
derived from the intestate succession of Apolinario Cedeño:
First. That Manuel Sarita, the principal plaintiff, in whose house there
was drawn up at his request the engagement of all the plaintiffs to
confide the suit to the attorney who has conducted it, has absolutely no
such right, because he cannot represent his grandfather Domingo, since,
as aforesaid, in the collateral line the right of representation can only
take place in favor of the children of brothers or sisters, but not in
favor of the grandson of a brother, such as is the said Manuel Sarita,
the son of Sofia Cedeño who, in turn, was the daughter of Domingo
Cedeño.
Second. That, on the hypothesis that such hereditary right derived from
the intestate succession of Apolinario Cedeño, does exist, it could only
be exercised by Cristeta Cedeño, the children of Macario Cedeño, and
those of Domingo Cedeño, but not by Manuel Sarita, because in
inheritances the nearer relative excludes the more remote, excepting
the right of representation in proper cases (Civil Code, art 921); from
which it is inferred that, in pushing forward Cristeta Cedeño, the
children of Macario Cedeño and those of Domingo Cedeño, to exercise
such a hereditary right, it should have been noticed that the personality
of these parties as the nearest relatives excluded that of Manuel Sarita,
the son of Sofia Cedeño, of a more remote degree.
Third. That, on the same hypothesis, in the eyes of the law no meaning
whatever could be given to the document of the plaintiffs, wherein it is
made to appear that the widow of Apolinario Cedeño, Roberta
Montesa implored of the heirs of her deceased husband that she be
allowed to continue in her possession of the land and the house of the
family; inasmuch as, as coowner of such property, she was entitled to
one-half of it and, besides, had a right of usufruct to one-half of the
other half of the same, pursuant to the provisions of articles 837 and
953 of the Civil Code, and until she was satisfied for her part of usufruct,
this half of the other half remained liable for the payment of such part
of usufruct. (Civil Code, art. 838.)
Fourth. The hypothesis disappears from the moment that it is proved
that at the death of such alleged predecessor in interest in the
inheritance, the land in question was not owned by him, it having been
transferred in 1881, according to a conclusion established by the trial
judge. Therefore, the action for the recovery of possession, derived
from such alleged inheritance, cannot exist.
This transfer of the land affected by Isidario or Apolinario Cedeño was
originally the title alleged by the defendant — a title which must not be
presumed in the present case, but proved. It is true that the possessor,
in the capacity of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he
holds under the lawful title and cannot be compelled to exhibit it (Civil
Code, art. 446); but it is also true that when the defendant agrees with
the plaintiffs that the thing demanded belonged to a determinate
person during his lifetime from whom these latter claim to derive their
right, the existence is thereby admitted of a right of ownership opposed
to that of the present possessor, and hence logically the necessity for
the latter to prove his title and exhibit it, in order to destroy the
contrary presumption in favor of that prior ownership.
The defendant, according to the finding of the trial judge, has proved
that he has such a title: one, of the sale by Isidario or Apolinario Cedeño
to Juan Basa Villarosa another, of the sale with pacto de retro by the
latter's son, Sinforoso Villarosa, to the defendant ; and the other, of a
final sale by the other son, Vicente Villarosa, to the same party, Andres
Candia.
GSIS vs Custodio
FACTS:
In June 1958, GSIS filed a complaint interpleader with CFI for the
determination of who among the several defendants are entitled to the
retirement benefits that fell due to a deceased who was a member of
the system, Simeon Custodio.
Deceased Simeon C. had 1 sister, Susana Custodio, appellee herein, and
3 brothers, Vicente, Crispin and Jacinto who had predeceased him.
The appellants are the children of these brothers, that two among
these children are both named Macario (Macario A and Macarion C);
that the children Macario C, Luisa and David did not sign the deed of
extrajudicial settlement and that Macario C is the only child of Crispin,
while Luisa and David are 2 of the 6 children of Jacinto.
Appellee Susana, from her opposition to the motion for reconsideration
made clear her non-opposition to the division of the estate where
Macario C, Luisa and David would share per stirpes.
ISSUE:
WON the nephews and nieces of the deceased who did not sign the
agreement may inherit by representation pertaining to the share as
intestate heirs in the proceeds due Simeon from GSIS
RULING:
Yes. The intestate heirs, Macario C, Luisa and David who did not sign
the deed of extrajudicial settelement cannot be considered as having
recognized Susana as the only heir beneficiary of Simeon's retirement
money. There is no evidence, the case having been submitted for
decision below solely on stipulation of facts that these non-signatory
heirs had agreed or accepted other benefits under deed of partition.
Susana didnt oppose their separate motion for reconsideration and
actually even prayed that said motion be granted although the court
denied it just the same. The three heirs should inherit per stirpes in
accordance with Art. 1005 CC. As Macario C (as distinguished by
Macario A) is the only child of Crispin, said Macario C inherits by
representation the 1/4 share pertaining to his father, while Luisa and
David being two of six children of Jacinto are each entitled to a 6 of 1/4
equivalent to 1/24 of the hereditary mass
Fernandez vs Fernandez [GR. No. 143256. August 28, 2001]
FACTS:
Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa A. De Venecia died intestate. They
had been succeeded by Rodolfo Fernandez who was informally
adopted and taken care of by the spouses.
In 1982, Jose died leaving his wife and Rodolfo a parcel of land and a
two-storey residential building.
On 1989, Generosa executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial partition between
her and Rodolfo. On the same day she also executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Eddie Fernandez, Rodolfo's son, a parcel of
land and the land which includes the two-storey residential building.
After learning the transaction, Romeo, Potenciano, Francisco, Julita,
William, Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo, Rodolfo and Gregorio, all surnamed
Fernandez, being nephews and nieces of the deceased Jose K.
Fernandez, their father Genaro being a brother of Jose filed on 1994,
an action to declare the Extra-Judicial Partition of Estate and Deed of
Sale void ab initio.
Complainants alleged that Rodolfo not being the son of the spouses
Jose and Generosa nor a legally adopted by them have no right to
succeed over them and that they are the ones who should have
succeeded as nephews and nieces.
Rodolfo on the other hand refute the allegations and believed taht he is
an acknowledged son of the spouses by presenting a certificate of
baptismal and an application of Dr. Jose Fernandez for backpay
certificate naming petitioner Rodolfo as his son
The Trial Court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.
ISSUES:
W/N Rodolfo is a legitimate son of the Spouses
W/N the deed of extrajudicial partition and deed of absolute sale is
nullified.
RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that respondents (nephews and nieces) as
legitimate heirs of Dr. Jose Fernandez are entitled to the share of the
conjugal lot and building of the deceased spouses Jose and Generosa
Fernandez who died childless and intestate. The respondent court
delved into the legitimacy of defendant-appellant Rodolfo Fernandez
filiation with the deceased spouses. It found that appellants evidence
which consisted of a certificate of baptism stating that he was a child of
the spouses Fernandez and the application for recognition of rights to
back pay under RA 897 filed by Dr. Jose Fernandez, wherein the latter
referred to Rodolfo as his son, did not acquire evidentiary weight to
prove his filiation. Having not proved his filiation, the respondents
nephews and nieces of Dr. Jose are entitled to inherit the share of the
decedents estate by reason of Article 1001 of the Civil Code, which
provides:
Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and
the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half.
However only the part of Rodolfo's inheritance is invalidated
considering the foregoing findings, petitioner Rodolfo is not a child by
nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of Dr. Jose
Fernandez, thus the subject deed of extra-judicial settlement of the
estate of Dr. Jose Fernandez between Generosa vda. de Fernandez and
Rodolfo is null and void insofar as Rodolfo is concerned pursuant to
Art.1105 of the New Civil Code which states:
A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is
not, shall be void only with respect to such person.
In the case of the nullification of the Deed of Sale Generosa executed to
Eddie Fernandez. Generosa, during her lifetime, had the right to enjoy
and dispose of her property without other limitations than those
established by law, which right she exercised by executing a deed of
sale in favor of petitioner Eddie Fernandez.
We note however, that Generosa sold the entire 2 storey building to
petitioner Eddie Fernandez, i.e. she did not only sell her undivided
share in the building but also the share of the respondents. We rule,
that such a sale of the entire building without the consent of the
respondents is not null and void as only the rights of the co-owner
seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer, petitioner Eddie , a
co-owner of the share of the building together with the respondents
who owned the share therein.